The Control of Politicians Within a Constitutional Framework: The Case of State-Level Recall Provisions
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-15-2000
Department
Political Science, International Development, and International Affairs
Abstract
As previously recognized, the structure of representative democracy is endogenous and the choice of constitutional provisions selected by such organizations is important. The present paper focuses on constitutional choices that work to control the behaviour of elected officials by examining the constitutional ease of recalling elected officials across the 50 states. After developing a numerical measure of the 'ease' with which registered voters can recall officials, ordinary logistic, ordered logistic and tobit models are employed to examine the factors of such an endogenous choice across states. The results are quite consistent with the theoretical models developed previously by public choice and constitutional scholars.
Publication Title
Applied Economics
Volume
32
Issue
1
First Page
81
Last Page
89
Recommended Citation
Mixon, F. G.
(2000). The Control of Politicians Within a Constitutional Framework: The Case of State-Level Recall Provisions. Applied Economics, 32(1), 81-89.
Available at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/4317