Fugitives as Fish: Bounty Hunting and Exploitation of the Commons
Political Science, International Development, and International Affairs
This note examines the property rights aspects of bounty hunting, and suggests that fugitives within the criminal justice system represent a common property resource. Economic theory might predict that this resource would be over exploited, perhaps resulting in industry profits being driven to zero. It is argued, however, that, in addition to regulation, recently developed concepts regarding uncertainty and heterogeneity of exploitation skills likely work to limit exploitation effort in bounty hunting. The anecdotal evidence and inference provided in this note make for a compelling pedagogical device for principles and intermediate economics students. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Social Science Journal
Mixon, F. G.,
Treviño, L. J.
(2003). Fugitives as Fish: Bounty Hunting and Exploitation of the Commons. Social Science Journal, 40(4), 657-664.
Available at: http://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/4514