Compensation Schemes and Human Capital Attainment in Congress: Is There an Adverse Selection of Legislator Attributes?

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

7-1-1999

Department

Finance, Real Estate, and Business Law

Abstract

This study examines the role that compensation plays in the self-selection process of legislator attributes in the U.S. Congress. The statistical results from the 104th Congress suggest that human capital levels of senators are significantly different from those of representatives, and this result is likely duc to adverse selection because of the disparity in compensation schemes across the two chambers of the Congress. Such a result has potentially significant consequences given the constitutional provisions that place taxation authority in the U.S. House of Representatives, and the fact that House members sponsor vastly larger amounts of spending legislation land total legislation) than senators. Although much future work is needed to be done, this study lays a foundation for public choice scholars to ponder.

Publication Title

Public Finance Review

Volume

27

Issue

4

First Page

418

Last Page

433

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