Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-1-2013
Department
Finance, Real Estate, and Business Law
Abstract
We examine the determinants and value effects of corporate lobbying, controlling for corporate political action committee (PAC) campaign contributions. We find evidence that firms with greater potential payoffs from favorable policy and regulations lobby most actively, and that managers often utilize both lobbying and campaign contribution channels to influence the political climate affecting the firm. We also find that shareholders value the lobbying activities pursued by management on their behalf, particularly if the firm does not have a PAC that contributed to an election campaign. The results are robust to a number of tests designed to mitigate potential omitted-variable and self-selection bias.
Publication Title
Financial Management
Volume
42
Issue
4
First Page
931
Last Page
957
Recommended Citation
Hill, M. D.,
Kelly, G. W.,
Lockhart, G. B.,
Van Ness, R. A.
(2013). Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying. Financial Management, 42(4), 931-957.
Available at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/7999