Fascism Revisited or Millennial Eurosceptic Populism? Analysis and Rationale for a New Political Movement in the 21st Century

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ABSTRACT

FASCISM REVISITED OR MILLENNIAL EUROSCPTIC POPULISM?
ANALYSIS AND RATIONALE FOR A NEW POLITICAL
MOVEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

by Prebble Quinn Ramswell

May 2016

Euroscepticism has steadily increased since the late 1990s, culminating in the emergence and success of numerous Eurosceptic and anti-establishment parties at the national and international level. Though often considered fascist and extremist, these groups have successfully achieved recognition and mainstream support as their once non-traditional ideas have become the norm. It is argued that these groups are a new class of social movement organization, a modern-day manifestation of fascism called Millennial Eurosceptic Populism. What conditions have allowed for these groups to emerge and attain such levels of success? Analysis utilizing fsQCA will test variables from McAdam’s Political Process Model (1982) and the proposed Organizational/ Opportunity Theory in order to determine their efficacy as well as the causal conditions leading to Millennial Fascist Group success.
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Deb Simkin: Thank you for the reference letter that started it all and believing in me every step of the way.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my mom, Al-Rue McLaughlin, who always told me I could do anything I wanted to do; and my dad, Joe McLaughlin, who gave me his gift (and curse) of not being able to read or write a single sentence without correcting it. One of my greatest sadnesses is that you are no longer here to share these moments with me. I love you and miss you terribly, though your guidance and support remain with me always.

Briar: Thank you for understanding mommy was doing lots and lots of homework. You heard too many “in a little while” responses as I tried to squeeze in every spare minute possible to write and research. The good news is- you’ve got me back!

Tony: I know you often lost me for days at a time when I sequestered myself from life in order to have chunks of time to write. Your support through this entire process has not only made everything possible but has also served as a reminder of how much I love you.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Marcellus famously remarked to Horatio in Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*, “Something is rotten in the state of Denmark.” Such sentiment captures the thoughts echoing in the minds of many Europeans as they witness the rise of euroscepticism\(^1\) within member states across the European Union (EU) and the greatly altered European political landscape emerging as a result.

In 1998, scholar Robert Paxton noted fascism’s ‘politics in a new key’ through much of Europe at the turn of the 19\(^{th}\) century, reflected in a changing political environment that emerged as ‘an assembly of all nationalists who hated the Left and found the Right inadequate.’ His observations led to this thought-provoking idea:

We must be able to examine this phenomenon as a system. It is not enough to treat each national case individually, as if each one constitutes a category in itself. If we cannot examine fascism synthetically, we risk being unable to understand this century, or the next. We must have a word, and for lack of a better one, we must employ the word that Mussolini borrowed from the vocabulary of the Italian Left in 1919, before his movement had assumed its mature form. Obliged to use the word fascism, we ought to use it well. (Paxton 1998, 9)

Paxton was clearly on to something. Even to an untrained eye, the sense of great change throughout Europe in the new millennium is palpable and no longer able to be ignored. There is a certain “something” occurring in Europe, a certain something that has allowed for the reemergence of right-wing “fascist” parties in large numbers, with manifestations evident at both the national and international levels.

\(^1\) It should be noted that “euroscepticism” and its various derivatives can alternatively be spelled using a ‘k’ instead of a ‘c’ as in “euroskepticism.” Factors such as location and language contribute to the variance.
Speculation abounds. Scholars, historians, theorists, and politicians alike all have widely varying ideas as to the cause and explanation of the emergence and subsequent success of previously dismissed fascist groups. One common thread can be clearly identified and established: the pervasive presence of nationalism within eurosceptic groups. Kedourie (1960) observed that nationalism was often associated with the radical right and criticized as “an irrational doctrine with a fanatical vision and a propensity towards violence.” Nairn (1975) also highlighted the historical link between nationalism and right-wing extremism, including traditional Italian fascism, National Socialism (Nazism), and Japanese militarism.

The negative connotation associated with far-right political parties remains rampant, despite repeated denials from many groups accused of relationships with perpetrators of violence and hate crimes. In 2006, a young member of a family of known Flemish Block\(^2\) militants who shot a child and two women from ethnic minority backgrounds was alleged to have been motivated by racist beliefs; however, Flemish Interest denied any direct or indirect connection to the shootings (Ramalingam 2012).

In the United Kingdom, the vast majority of radical right political parties profess to be non-violent. However, Ramalingam (2012) has shown that some of the most prominent cases of convicted far-right extremist perpetrators have been linked to far-right parties in a variety of ways-- this includes former British National Party (BNP) member

---

\(^2\) The Flemish Block is known in Belgium as the Vlaams Blok or VB. They were a Belgian far-right and secessionist political party with an anti-immigration platform. The group was strongly nationalist and sought the independence of northern Belgium, known as Flanders. In November 2004, the group instituted several changes to address charges of racism and changed its name to Vlaams Belang, or Flemish Interest.
David Copeland, known as the ‘British nail-bomber,’ and former BNP candidate Robert Cottage, arrested in 2006 for stockpiling weapons (Ramalingam 2012, 2-3).

Yet, many of these nationalist, right-wing fascist groups have been successful in extricating themselves from the pejorative press and public, so much so that they are no longer considered to be ‘extremist.’ Historically, fascism has been viewed in many different lights from radical to patriotic, though the perjorative connotation has proven most enduring. As will be discussed in Chapter II, the term is considered by many scholars to have been overused to the point of losing its sting. Indeed, George Orwell wrote in 1944 of how trite the term had become: "the word 'Fascism' is almost entirely meaningless ... almost any English person would accept 'bully' as a synonym for 'Fascist.'"

The turn-of-the-century wave of euroscepticism, anti-European Union (EU) attitude, and surging presence of nationalist sentiment has strongly resounded with the masses, changing the face of right-wing extremism and rendering it palatable to those who previously deemed it radical and even perverse. Indeed, eurosceptic groups have become widely accepted legitimate groups and political parties now making an indelible mark on the political landscape throughout Europe.

What led Europe to this historical shift, moving the populace from a region embracing unity and a European (rather than national) identity to a public growing evermore wary and disillusioned with the reality of membership in the European Union? Instead of a battle of ideas, Leonard et al. (2013) opined that “the EU has been marred by a vicious circle between anti-EU populism and technocratic agreements between member states whom are afraid of their citizens.” Regardless of reason, a deeply divisive strand
of discontent has led to increasing criticism of the EU and opposition to the process of political European integration, extending throughout the political spectrum. Those citizens and politicians who identify themselves as ‘skeptical’ and critical of the EU have become known as “Eurosceptics” and contend that the EU usurps power from national governments and poses a threat to national sovereignty (EurActiv.com, 2013).

This eurosceptic sentiment has steadily increased since the late 1990s, culminating in the emergence and success of numerous eurosceptic and anti-establishment parties at both the national and international level. Though often considered fascist and extremist, these groups have managed to achieve national recognition and mainstream support and success as their once untraditional ideas have become the norm.

If traditional perceptions and trajectories of fascism remained, the emergence of these right-wing nationalist parties would be short-lived, fail to represent popular belief, and incapable of reaching and resonating with the masses. However, what is observable is a new reality, a world in which these groups have endurance, mainstream popularity, and growing positions of power in Europe. Indeed, many of these groups have become successful political parties winning seats in their national elections and in European Parliament.

Such success has been increasingly underscored, perhaps most notably following the European Parliamentary elections in May 2014. In a massive political shake-up, eurosceptic and anti-establishment parties captured nearly one-third of the vote in the 2014 European Parliamentary election. The most remarkable victories occurred in France, with the far-right Front National (FN) taking 25 percent of the votes, as well as in
Britain, where the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) garnered 26.8 percent (Wagner and Nagy, 2015). The momentum has been so strong that an August 2014 poll indicated that FN leader Marine Le Pen would have won the French Presidential election had it been held at that time (Hallett, 2014).

The success is not limited to England and France. The anti-immigrant Danish People’s Party won in Denmark; the far-right Jobbik came in second in Hungary; and Germany saw its first neo-Nazi member elected to Parliament (Economist May 2014). Al Jazeera noted that “Golden Dawn, a former neo-Nazi organisation whose leader and members are to face trial for criminal acts including murder, arson and extortion, will send three representatives to the European parliament….Austria’s far-right Freedom Party advanced to take 20 percent of the vote with an anti-immigrant campaign that called for halving Vienna’s EU contributions and demanded a referendum on the EU’s crucial bailout fund” (al Jazeera May 26, 2014).

The startling developments in European Parliament, clearly demonstrating Europe’s swing to the right, led to an affirmation by socialist French Prime Minister Manuel Valls that the situation was equivalent to “a political earthquake.” In an interview with the British newspaper The Guardian, UKIP leader Nigel Farage said the result justified the description of an earthquake because "never before in the history of British politics has a party, seen to be an insurgent party, ever topped the polls in a national election" and voters had "delivered about the most extraordinary result that has been seen in British politics for 100 years" (Wintour and Watt 2014).

Now, for the first time, fundamentally skeptical formations on the right margins are seeing simultaneous growth in several states of Western and Northern Europe (Kietz
and von Ondarza 2014, 1). Understood as a strong signal of loss of trust in the EU and its institutions in significant parts of the European electorate, the impact of the rise of the Eurosceptics on political processes in the Parliament and the EU becomes a decisive question for the future of the Union (Kietz and von Ondarza 2014, 1).

Indeed, in 2008, Eurosceptic momentum led the EU assembly’s political establishment to pursue changes that would have altered the rules allowing Members of European Parliament (MEP) to form political groupings (Waterfield 2008). The attempt was foiled only months later when voters solidly rejected the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, the international agreement forming the constitutional basis of the EU. Further, in November 2014, it was reported that as many as 200 Conservative Members of Parliament (MP)3 would be prepared to call for Britain to leave the European Union in an escalation of pressure on David Cameron over Europe and immigration (Merrick 2015).

Thus, in the new millennium, the EU, once held as a harbinger of hope and source of a European unity and identity, has now become a despised enemy- the source of stolen nationalism, culture and tradition. Peripheral groups of the far right have now emerged as the voices of moderation, attempting to forge a path to a Europe reflective of the union they had envisioned, a Europe that at once embraces national and European identity without a loss of economic and political sovereignty. These groups are proving resilient, competent, rational, and, above all, successful. It is fascism in a new light, fascism for the new millennium, fascism through the lens of euroscepticism; it is *Millennial Eurosceptic*

---

3 By definition, MEPs are Members of European Parliament and MPs are members of the British Parliament.
Populism: the reinterpretation and new iteration of the ideology that propelled Mussolini and Hitler to infamy.

What best explains the emergence and success of these groups? Sorenson (2008, 6) noted that “no coherent theory exists that details what euroscepticism is, or why, when and how it occurs and develops.” This observation serves to introduce the purpose of this dissertation.

The focus of this dissertation is twofold: 1) establishing the concept of millennial eurosceptic populism and determining which groups fall within its parameters, and 2) theoretical testing to explain the emergence and success of these groups. Before determining the why and the how, an evaluation of the ‘who’ is necessary. An important piece of this dissertation is making a case for a new class of fascism, a class better suiting the millennial crop of political parties and groups achieving record levels of success.

To establish a foundation and need for this new category, it is necessary to first define fascism and its subcategories. Ascertaining a single definition for fascism, neo-fascism and neo-Nazism is difficult; however, there are many aspects of the terms which overlap amongst the various definitions put forth by scholars in the field. By default, these commonalities allow for the construction of a consensus-based definition. Therefore, it is prudent to examine various definitions put forth by experts in the field to arrive at standard definitions which will serve as a starting point for categorizing the varieties of fascism. Once these standard definitions have been established, a definition of millennial eurosceptic populism will be provided based on characteristics from current groups and traits from traditional fascism, neo-fascism and neo-Nazism. The
characteristics of millennial eurosceptic populism will be explored in depth as qualifiers and disqualifiers are established to determine members of the category.

Once the components of millennial eurosceptic populism have been established, the dissertation will revisit the research question of “why now,” methodologically. Modern social movement theory appears to provide some degree of explanatory power. In particular, the concepts within the political opportunity framework, resource mobilization theory, protest cycles, and the political process model contain plausible rationales. This dissertation argues that McAdam’s 1982 conception of the political process model (PP) appears to provide considerable explanatory power of these theories and merits further exploration and testing as a theoretical explanation for millennial eurosceptic populism which shall be considered to begin circa 1990. However, though McAdam’s model does appear to offer potential explanatory power, this dissertation argues that it cannot fully account for the unprecedented number of emerging groups and subsequent paradigm shift, and that its open-ended framework is too easily applicable. Therefore, an alternate theory is proposed: Organizational/Opportunity Theory, or OO. OO focuses on the occurrence and impact of a trigger event which acts as an impetus for social change. Coupled with structural capacity, marketing presence, and public involvement, this relationship is theorized to explain the success of far-right political parties and other non-traditional groups.

This dissertation focuses on the research question: what conditions allowed for the emergence and success of millennial Eurosceptic populist groups? It is asserted that the elements of the PP model (political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength, and cognitive liberation) can lead to the success of MEPGs in Europe but not their
emergence or long-term success. It is hypothesized that the more specific causal conditions of the proposed OO model best explain the emergence and success of MEPGs in Europe.

In Chapter III, a case study approach will be utilized during the establishment of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism and subsequent determination of groups which will be classified as a Millennial Eurosceptic Populist Group (MEPG). Parties determined to meet the criteria of a MEPG will serve as the subject cases in Chapter IV for testing of the efficacy of the PP and OO models. The analytical method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), designed by Ragin (1987; 2000; 2008) and popularized by Rihoux and Ragin (2009), will be utilized. Rihoux (2008, 3) posited that “the various techniques of QCA precisely identify and narrow down ‘conditions of occurrence’” and “were important tools for reducing the enormous complexity that is routinely confronted in the social sciences.”

Identifying the factors that have led to the rise and emergence of MEPGs is important for many reasons. Of primary importance is understanding and explaining the profound impact these groups are having on European politics and society. They have served to create a new European political landscape. Further, many of these groups have established connections with increasingly complex Russia. Discovering the factors and conditions that have allowed for millennial eurosceptic populism to emerge is, thus, vitally important in terms of international relations and political stability.

Chapter II of this dissertation will review relevant literature in the areas of fascism, euroscepticism, and theory. As noted above, Chapter III will present the case for “Millennial Eurosceptic Populism,” with in-depth examination into the reasons why this
new term is necessary as well as the qualifiers and disqualifiers for a group’s inclusion. An examination of various existing groups/parties will be performed to determine whether a party meets all requirements for recognition as a MEPG. The groups which meet all requirements will then serve as the case studies for causal condition testing in Chapter IV. Chapter IV will detail the research design and methodology, with research being performed in two phases: Phase One will focus on the required elements of PP model and the selection of applicable variables, and Phase Two will follow suit for the OO model. Testing will seek to answer the research question of what conditions are in place that allowed for the increase and emergence of MEPGs. Data testing using fsQCA, as well as accompanying analysis, will be performed in Chapter V, with a discussion of the results provided in Chapter VI. The final chapter will provide implications and closing remarks.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Because this dissertation focuses on relationships among amongst several subject areas, the literature review was best presented in a delineated manner. As such, this chapter is divided into three sections: fascism, euroscepticism and theory. Each section will discuss the pertinent material in that respective subject area. The subsequent chapter, Chapter III, will introduce and discuss the concept of millennial eurosceptic populism as well as present its working definition and characteristics in comparison to fascism, neo-fascism, neo-Nazism.

Fascism

In 1944, Orwell posed a compelling and enduring question: “Of all the unanswered questions of our time, perhaps the most important is: ‘What is Fascism?’” It is a question that continues to perplex scholars and historians alike as deeper analysis generates more questions than answers. Observed prominent fascism scholar Roger Griffin (2003): “Every attempt made by a non-Marxist scholar since the 1920s to offer a way out of the conceptual labyrinth posed by fascism seemed only to have enlarged and complicated it further, with the result that historians attempting to study aspects of the generic phenomenon ‘ideographically’ were generally at a loss as to which ‘expert’ to turn for a working definition.”

Fascism has consistently been viewed by scholars through a traditional lens. This view neatly packages fascist groups within one of three categories: fascism, neo-fascism, and neo-Nazism. However, the nature and composition of fascism have changed, necessitating, it is argued, a new conceptual perspective.
Fascism has long been studied but the literature tends to focus on classifying groups within its existing categories. In an effort to sidestep the problem of answering the question “what is fascism,” scholars have attempted to develop a consensus definition. The concept of ‘generic fascism’ developed from a need to identify and concisely define the shared essential elements of fascism. Attempting brevity, Nolte (1968) proposed the concept of a “fascist minimum”- a succinct, concise definition of fascism. This led to Griffin’s infamous three-word definition, “palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism.” In their efforts to establish a definition, scholars in the field have tended to take one of two paths: one focusing on cause and viewed through a political and institutional lens (Sternhell, Gentile, Paxton); or one referred to as the ‘new consensus” which often takes a more culturalist and ideological approach (Griffin, Iordachi, Payne, Kallis, Eatwell). Other scholars, such as Renton (1999, 1), tweak the two perspectives such that there is a distinction between those who view fascism primarily in terms of its ideas, such as Griffin, Payne and Sternhell, as opposed to those who define fascism through the actual practice of Mussolini’s Italy or Hitler’s Germany. Still, others utilize a dividing line based on Marxist versus non-Marxist perspectives.

Paxton (1998, 9) noted that Pierre Milza (1987) presented a four-stage model of fascism; Philippe Burrin (1986) traced the itineraries by which Jacques Doriot, Marcel De´at, and Gaston Bergery, steering between blockages and opportunities, shifted from the Left to fascism. Indeed, Paxton (1998, 9) observes that most recent authors seek some “fascist essence.” Rejecting any mono-causal or reductionist theory, Payne (1995, 489) presented the “elements of a retrodictive theory of fascism” that applied to
movements and regimes; Laqueuer (1997, 6) found fascism similar to pornography in that “it is difficult—perhaps impossible—to define in an operational, legally valid way,” yet still presented “the essence of fascism.”

All of these studies have systematically laid the foundation for fascism of varying types and degrees, allowing for expansion (and perhaps in hopes of expansion) when the time and conditions were appropriate. Robert Paxton (1998, 21) maintains that “fascism is the most original political novelty of the twentieth century, no less. It successfully gathered, against all expectations, in certain modern nations, such as Germany and Italy, which had seemed firmly planted on a path to gradually expanding democracy, a popular following around hard, violent, anti-liberal and antisocialist nationalist dictatorships.” Further, it then “spread its ‘politics in a new key’ through much of Europe, assembling all nationalists who hated the Left and found the Right inadequate” (Paxton 1998, 9). His thoughts, though originally directed at turn of the 19th century issues were eerily prescient of circumstances at the end of the 20th century.

The seminal works in the field of fascism have stemmed from three primary scholars: Stanley G. Payne, Griffin and Paxton. As the foundational theorists in the field of fascism, these authors are a necessary component of any work done in the field. Of course, there are many other authors who have contributed engaging and provocative work and whom will also be explored. A central tenet of this dissertation is that fascism has evolved. To determine its evolution, it is necessary to explore all aspects of it as a solid basis is built for the necessity of a new form of fascism.

In 1995, Payne created a lengthy itemized list of characteristics to identify fascism. This typology is regularly cited as the standard descriptor of fascism and built
upon ideas he presented *Fascism: Comparison and Definition* (1980). Payne presented these elements as “a wide-spectrum description” comprised of three main components that embody the idea of fascism (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1

**Payne’s Typology of Fascism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Fascist Goals (Ideology and Goals):</th>
<th>o Espousal of an idealist, vitalist and voluntaristic philosophy, normally involving the attempt to realize a new modern, self-determined, and secular culture; o Creation of a new nationalist authoritarian state not based on traditional principles or models; o Organization of a new highly regulated, multiclass, integrated national economic structure, whether called national corporatist, national socialist, or national syndicalist; o Positive evaluation and use of, or willingness to use violence and war; and o The goal of empire, expansion, or a radical change in the nation’s relationship with other powers</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>The Fascist Negations:</td>
<td>o Anti-liberalism; o Anticommunism; and o Anticonservatism (though with the understanding that fascist groups were willing to undertake temporary alliances with other sectors, more commonly with the right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fascist Style (Style and Organization):</td>
<td>o Specific tendency toward an authoritarian, charismatic, personal style of command, whether or not the command is to some degree initially elective o Attempted mass mobilization with militarization of political relationships and style and with the goal of a mass single party militia; o Emphasis on aesthetic structure of meetings, symbols, and political liturgy, stressing emotional and mystical aspects; o Extreme stress on the masculine principle and male dominance, while espousing a strongly organic view of society; o Exaltation of youth above other phases of life, emphasizing the conflict of the generations, at least in effecting the initial political transformation; and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Payne posited that the fascist ‘style’ included such traits as its emphasis on violence, its exaltation of men above women and its positive evaluation of the young against the old (Renton 1999, 20). He also espoused the intellectual caliber of fascist
thought with focus on the psychological and sociological aspects, as did historian Zeev Sternhell (1980, 1995). Sternhell (1995) argued that fascism first emerged in France during the 1880s and 1890s as a concept borne of intellectuals and artists such as Drumont, Peguy, Barrès, and Maurras. This first incarnation of fascism began as a rejection of the idea that reason could be used to understand society and resulted in the formation of a ‘new generation of intellectuals [which] rose violently against the rationalist individualism of liberal society’ (Sternhell, 1995).

Building on Payne’s typology, Dimitri Kitsikis (1988) offered a typology of fascism comprised of 13 categories in which fascist ideologies, movements and establishments could be analyzed and contrasted with others. Kitsikis (1988) echoed Payne’s observations but created a shorter list of values he felt were most relevant:

- The idea of class and the importance of agrarianism;
- Private ownership, the circulation of money, the regulation of the economy by the state, the idea of ethnic bourgeois class, economic self-sufficiency;
- The nation and the difference between nation and state;
- The attitude towards democracy and political parties;
- The importance of political heroes, i.e. the charismatic leader;
- The attitude towards tradition;
- The attitude towards the individual and society;
- The attitude towards equality and hierarchy;
- The attitude towards women;
- The attitude towards religion;
- The attitude towards rationalism;
- The attitude towards intellectualism and elitism; and
- The attitude towards the Third World. (Kitsikis 1988)

Arguably the most seminal work in the field of fascism comes from Griffin (1991), whom posited that fascism was best understood as a series of propositions or ‘myths.’ In 1991, Griffin began what he called an ‘odyssey’ to unveil what he termed the ‘fascist minimum.’ He conceded to “the realization that there is no mysterious essence
waiting to be discovered which will constitute the ‘fascist minimum;’” and contended that “the ‘fascist minimum’ had to be invented ‘not discovered’ through a process of ‘idealizing abstraction,’” (Griffin 2003, 9).

Griffin is perhaps best known for his theory of ‘palingenetic ultranationalism’ which holds that fascism is defined by its core myth, namely that of national rebirth, or palingenesis. He believed fascism was anti-liberal, anti-conservative, charismatic, anti-rational, socialist, totalitarian, racist, and eclectic. He suggested that fascism emerged when a nation perceived itself to be in crisis; he also maintained – like Payne – that it had no common class basis of support. Dave Renton (1999) observed that Griffin, however, moved beyond Payne, arguing that there was one single thread which linked this common ‘mythic core:’ nationalism.

Paxton (1998) contended that there were five major difficulties undermining any effort to define fascism: a problem of timing; the problematic role of mimicry in defining fascism; the problem with defining fascism posed by the dauntingly wide disparity among individual cases in space and in time; the ambiguous relationship between doctrine and action in fascism; and the overuse/misuse of the word. Indeed, Paxton believed that the word “fascist” had become the most banal of epithets (1998, 8).

Paxton is perhaps most widely recognized for isolating five stages of fascism, each utilizing very different sociopolitical processes: (1) the initial creation of fascist movements, (2) their rooting as parties in a political system, (3) the acquisition of power, (4) the exercise of power, and (5) radicalization or entropy (Paxton 1998). Quite logically, he asserted that since different kinds of historical processes are involved in each stage, different scholarly strategies must be utilized in the analysis of each (Paxton
Such perspective has far-reaching significance, particularly in conjunction with euroscepticism.

In his 1995 essay "Ur Fascism," philosopher Umberto Eco used the term "Ur-fascism" or “eternal fascism” as a generic description of different historical forms of fascism. Eco also enumerated 14 general properties of fascist ideology, arguing that the impossibility of organizing these elements into a coherent system (1995, 5). However, he also contended that it was ‘enough that one of them be present to allow fascism to coagulate around it’ (Eco 1995, 5). Observed Eco:

Fascism became an all-purpose term because one can eliminate from a fascist regime one or more features, and it will still be recognizable as fascist. Take away imperialism from fascism and you still have Franco and Salazar. Take away colonialism and you still have the Balkan fascism of the Ustashes. Add to the Italian fascism a radical anti-capitalism (which never much fascinated Mussolini) and you have Ezra Pound. Add a cult of Celtic mythology and the Grail mysticism (completely alien to official fascism) and you have one of the most respected fascist gurus, Julius Evola. (Eco 1995, 5)

In 1963, German historian and scholar Ernst Nolte published what many scholars consider to be the magnum opus of fascism. Released in English in 1965 as The Three Faces of Fascism, Nolte argued that fascism arose as a form of resistance to and a reaction against modernity. Further, he asserted that fascism functioned at three levels: in the world of politics as a form of opposition to Marxism, at the sociological level in opposition to bourgeois values, and in the "metapolitical" world as "resistance to transcendence" (Nolte 1965, 537). Scholars, such as Griffin (1998), acknowledged Nolte’s work as “a seminal contribution to the creation of a theory of generic fascism based on a history of ideas, as opposed to the previous class-based analyses that had characterized both Marxist and liberal interpretations of fascism.”
Renton (1999, 22) posited that the interpretations offered by scholars in the field of fascism clearly diverged. Indeed, Griffin (1995) argued that fascism and Nazism are different from one another, though at the same time linked, through a common mythic core. However, Sternhell (1995) maintained that National Socialist German Chancellor Adolf Hitler “was not fascist” and that, despite such differences, there were far more significant areas in which the historians agreed. For example, Roger Eatwell, Griffin, Sternhell, and Payne all adhere to the concept of an ‘ideal type,’ derived from Max Weber. Renton (1999) observed that they generated an ‘ideal’ fascist by presenting a list of carefully selected ideas of fascism out of which they then constructed a ‘fascist minimum,’ and if a group or individual adhered to the greater number of these fascist ideas, then the adherent himself was fascist (Renton 1999, 22).

Much literature rightly focuses on the negative connotation of the word ‘fascism.’ Sakai (2002) observed that some people still believe fascism is just extreme white racism. A recurrent theme was the idea that in order to be racist one had to be white. Indeed, Sakai noted the insanity of the concept that fascism was a unique idea that could only lodge in the brain of members of one race. Others scholars echoed the 1920s European belief that fascism was "a tool of the ruling class… violent thugs in comic opera uniforms doing repression for their capitalist masters” (Sakai 2002). More often than not, both views overlap and are held simultaneously. As a result, Sakai opined, that we "know" fascism, but really we don't know it yet. Indeed, “Once reclothed, not spouting old fascist European political philosophy, fascism walks right by us and we don't recognize it at first,” (Sakai 2002). Such views serve to highlight the reasons why fascism needs to be viewed in a “new light.”
Scholars have focused on various aspects within the existing paradoxical confines and breadth of fascism, often with significant overlap or no logical placement whatsoever-- a significant reason in itself to propose and refine parameters for a new form of fascism. Groups and parties of the 21st century have a very different world in which to operate with multiple tools in their proverbial toolboxes to facilitate their operation.

In 1993, Emilio Gentile published a highly-regarded book on fascism underscoring his conviction that “Italian fascism was more than just the use of force, that it achieved a form of consensus.” Gentile combined the idea of myth and consensus as a single concept with “the fascist stress on externalities, both on a lower (in the realm of ‘culturalist’ studies) and on a higher (the masses as the aesthetic, active element in the creation of consensus) level, with an analysis of the cultic character of Italian fascist mass society….. he sees fascism as action, as theater” (Nelis 2006, 141-151). In 2000, Gentile discussed the fall of fascism and how the world was witness to a ‘de-totalitarization’ of fascism that was “reduced, in totalitarian theories, to a kind of authoritarian regime or even to a personal dictatorship, a ‘mussolinism.’ ” Gentile observed that during the 1990s, a new side of the problem of fascist totalitarianism had risen via an “expanding range of research on fascism to areas long remained unexplored by historians, such as ideology, the party, the regime, the system of rites and symbols of fascism intended as a political religion” (Gentile 2000, 6).

In 1999, Kaymak argued for an alternative classification for the rising number of rightwing populist parties. He observed that some neo-populist parties had been
successful at exploiting resentment among a growing number of unaligned voters. What differentiated neo-populist parties from their supposed forerunners, Kaymak argued, was their distinct ability to mobilize their resentment (Kaymak 1999, vii). Unlike neo-fascist parties, he argued, successful neo-populist parties appealed to heterogeneous groups; a populist style, including scape-goating common enemies, real or imaginary, helped keep the disparate coalitions together (Kaymak 1999, vii). The organizational attributes of successful neo-populist parties, centralized authority and charismatic leadership, not only distinguished neo-populist parties as a unique party type, but also accounted for their success and appeal (Kaymak 1999, vii). Kaymak’s findings implied that growing disenchantment with institutions of authority actually served to increase the support of neo-populist parties. Such findings are relevant to this examination of fascism in that they indicate the significance of discontent and institutions (structural integrity), particularly in France, Germany, Italy, and Norway. Like Paxton, Kaymak noted an atmosphere of impending change. Indeed, the growth and success of neo-populist parties and right-wing nationalist groups such as England’s UKIP, France’s Front National, and Hungary’s Jobbik, has increased exponentially.

In 1998, Paxton observed fascism’s “politics in a new key” throughout Europe in the late 19th century (Paxton 1998, 1-23). Paxton (2004) theorized that this ‘new form of politics’ was the creation of the “first popular movements dedicated to reasserting the priority of the nation against all forms of internationalism or cosmopolitanism.” He observed that the 1880s—with its simultaneous economic depression and broadened democratic practice—was a crucial threshold (Paxton 1998, 1-23). Undeniably, the world was about to enter into a significant time of change, an era that would see World
War and fascism at an unprecedented level. Paxton’s identification of a new form of politics riding on the heels of depression and expanded liberalism is not only highly perceptive, it is wholly applicable to the current changes in Europe’s political landscape due to the rise of euroscepticism.

Euroscepticism

The source of euroscepticism is firmly embedded within the EU during the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, determining whether this skepticism originated within and/or as a direct result of the European Parliament, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the establishment of the Schengen area, or from any other of a myriad of possibilities, is a source of ongoing debate often resulting in the answer “it depends.”

It is no secret that as the European Union grew increasingly authoritative, it also became more contentious (Albert, 1992; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Rhodes and Van Apeldoorn, 1997). Eichenberg and Dalton (2007, 507-534) noted that the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 evoked concerns regarding the proper parameters of integration (Hooghe and Marks 2007, 122). Indeed, scholars have noted that “social movements, along with political parties and the public began to pay serious attention. A new political front of contestation was opened between those seeking to protect their communities from the disruptive forces of globalization and European

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4 The Treaty on European Union (TEU) was signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union, which consists of three pillars: the European Communities, common foreign and security policy and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The Maastricht Treaty brought the three Communities (Euratom, ECSC, EEC) under one umbrella-- The European Union-- and institutionalized cooperation in the fields of foreign policy, defense, police and justice. The EEC was renamed, becoming the EC (Europa.eu).
integration and those supporting integration” (Hooghe and Marks 2007; 119). Asserted Walsh (2014), founded in the wake of World War II, the EU was a self-conscious rejection of nationalism.

Though the modern iteration of the EU was borne from the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union traces its roots to the aftermath of WWII. Observed Sliwinski (2015):

With the continent in ruins, several representatives from leading nations attempted to finally find some way to unify the region and put an end to the seemingly endless fighting that had just led to the most destructive war the world has ever known. The process started with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, with six founding members whom agreed to merge their coal and steel production: West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The foundation was further solidified with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which created the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1967, the European Parliament was created and had its first direct elections in 1979; in 1993, the European Union was codified through the Treaty of Maastrich. (Sliwinski 2015)

European Parliament (EP) has a unique composition. A Member of European Parliament (MEP) is elected via national vote. Once elected, MEPs either join one of the existing cross-national political groups (eight as of March 2016) or choose to be unattached and identify as a “Non-Inscrit” (NI). These groups differ from national parties in that they consist of members from several different parties from different member states. MEPs are able to (and often do) switch groups during their term. EP was founded on June 23, 1953, as the Christian-Democratic Group in the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (CVCE 2015). The ECSC established several supranational institutions, including the High Authority, the Council of Ministers, the Assembly and the Court of Justice. The six founding countries (the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) formally decided to sit together in the Assembly according to political affiliation, rather
than in national delegations (Fontaine, 2010). This tradition carried as the Assembly evolved into its modern iteration as European Parliament comprised of 27 European countries with 500 million inhabitants.

Since 1979, members have been directly elected by the citizens of the Member States. This first election resulted in seven groups and several non-attached members. Following the second enlargement of the EU and national developments leading to the realignment of political groups within EP, the number of groups peaked at 10 in 1989. Subsequent elections saw this number start to fall, returning to its 1979 level in 2004 (European Parliament 2015, 60). According to European Communities (2009), since 2004, several enlargements of the EU and increasing fragmentation of national partisan systems during European elections – particularly in France, the UK, and Italy – have caused a threefold increase in the number of national parties with elected representatives. In 2008, 185 parties were represented in the European Parliament, however, despite one or two fluctuations, the number of groups has remained constant (European Communities 2009, 60-61). Consequently, the ratio of groups to parties has steadily risen over the years to stand at 26.4:1 in 2008, compared with 7.7:1 in 1979 (European Communities 2009, 61). The 8th EP, elected in 2014, resulted in the highest number of Eurosceptic MEPs in history.

Though Paxton’s observation of a ‘new form of politics’ was made in connection to the political atmosphere at the turn of the 19th century, it is equally applicable a century later in conjunction with the burgeoning euroscepticism that has changed the political environment in Europe. The European Parliamentary elections in May 2014 resulted in an influx of far-right and far-left eurosceptic and euroreject parties, which now form
approximately 27 percent of the assembly. Observed Siddi (2014) in *EU-Watch*,

“Overall, populist, right-wing and far-right parties are much more strongly represented in the new European Parliament: the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFD) group has 48 seats (17 more than in 2009), while the number of non-attached members – who are almost exclusively representatives of the xenophobic far right – rose from 33 to 52.” Following the 2014 EP elections, the *Economist* reported: “anti-establishment parties [now] control nearly one-third of the parliament. Beyond the victories of the Eurosceptics in France and Britain, the anti-immigrant Danish People’s Party won in Denmark, the far-right Jobbik came second in Hungary and Germany has its first neo-Nazi MEP” (*Economist* 5/31/2014).

However, the formation of the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) in 2015, led to significant shuffle. As of March 2016, EFD lost three members, dropping to 45; the Non-Inscrits (NI) dropped to 15; and the newly formed eurosceptic ENF grew to 38 members (European Parliament 2016).

In 2016, nationalists and eurosceptics accounted for approximately one-third of MEPs in the 751-seat European Parliament. Prior to the creation of EFD, most sat as NIs, or joined one of the existing political groupings, which provides extended funding options and allocated time allotments for speaking (Wagner-Nagy 2015). The largest cluster of eurosceptics was previously found in the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFD) group. This 48-member (45 in 2016) eurosceptic group is led by Nigel Farage of UKIP and is dominated by UKIP and the Italian Five Star Movement. The other nations in the alliance, Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden, contribute only one or two representatives each (Wagner-Nagy 2015).
The next largest grouping of eurosceptics had been found in the “far more eurocritical than eurosceptical” European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL- 52 seats) and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR- 70 seats), respectively left and right of the political spectrum (Poli and Rosselli 2014). The 21 French Front National MEPs and the handful of Hungarian Jobbik and Greek Golden Dawn MEPs are NIs.

Several anti-establishment parties won their first seats in parliament, including Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement (Italian) and Germany's Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Observed Bruneau (2014), following the elections, there were 65 newly elected members whom joined a political group, and 41 others declared as NIs; therefore, there are “more than 100 MEPs and 14% of European Parliament who can influence the direction of new policy over the next five years. It is certain to be a very vocal minority” (Bruneau 2014).

It did not take long for the “very vocal minority” to form its own group. Reported the New Observer, “The Europe of Nations and Freedom was launched on June 15, 2015, after extended negotiations between the French National Front (FN), the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), the Italian Lega Nord (LN), the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Belgium’s Vlaams Belang (VB), and the Polish Congress of the New Right (KNP)…the 36-strong group gained two additional members when former UK Independence Party member Janice Atkinson, and former Conservative Party of Romania (Partidul Conservator, PC) member Laurentiu Rebega, joined in their private capacities” (New Observer 2016). As a result, EP now consists of eight political groups: European People's Party–European Democrats (EPP–ED); Party of European Socialists (PES); Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE); Union for Europe of the Nations
(UEN); The Greens–European Free Alliance (Greens–EFA); European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE–NGL); Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM); Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF); and the Non-Inscrits (NI).

At the local level, results are even more impressive. The March 2015 French elections gave the French extreme-right party Front National the highest percentage of votes it had ever achieved in a local election (Pezard 2015). With 26 percent of the votes, the Front National staunchly confirmed that it is in the ascendant and its leader, Marine le Pen, stands well-positioned as a strong contender in France's presidential elections in 2017 (Pezard 2015).

Interestingly, England’s UKIP fell surprisingly short in the April 2015 UK local elections. Predicted to take upwards of 18 seats, the party succeeded in only earning two. Did the “loss” signify a loss in popularity and the beginning of a downward spiral? Quite the opposite. The voting results were indicative of UKIP’s widespread appeal in the UK, and highlight the important fact that their popularity is not limited to a few districts. They won 14 percent of the vote in England (and 12.6 percent across the UK); they finished second in more than 120 seats and won 20 percent in at least 45 seats; and, in total, the party accrued approximately four million votes – that’s as many votes as the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, and the Liberal Democrats combined (Black 2015).

In May 2014, The Economist emphatically declared that “the blunt reality is that Europe's political fault-line is shifting: from left versus right, to pro-Europeans against anti-Europeans. This election night belongs to the likes of Marine Le Pen, who has polished the Front National [National Front] in France and trounced both the centre-right UMP party and the Socialist Party of President François Hollande. Further, they

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acknowledge that the Euroskeptics now have political momentum” (*Economist* May 2014). Indeed, governments in Britain and France face an acute dilemma regarding how they should respond, and the likelihood is that they will harden their stance on a host of issues, particularly immigration and EU enlargement; pressure will rise for EU powers to be repatriated (*Economist* May 2014). Further muddying of the waters in the UK was the July 2014 appointment of outspoken Eurosceptic Phillip Hammond as foreign secretary in what many observers called “a major cabinet reshuffle.”

But euroscepticism was not a construct of the 2014 Parliamentary elections. The 2005 referenda defeats in France and Holland for the proposed treaty establishing a European Constitution were widely interpreted in EU studies as signaling a major dislocation between political elites and the wider population of citizens (Fossum and Trenz 2006). Wellings (2014) reported that the ‘Future of England’ surveys, published by the IPPR in 2012 and 2013, were the first to note a link between “Englishness and Euroscepticism:”

The first point they discovered was that Englishness had become politicised, mostly since 2007, and was a vehicle for a variety of political grievances. The second point was that the British were not Eurosceptic, but that the English were. In other words, among those who identified as ‘British not English’, 45% thought that UK membership of the EU was a good thing, but this figure dropped to 14% for those who identified as ‘English not British.’ (Wellings 2014)

Scholars offer a variety of causes as explanation for the surge in eurosceptic parties. Many cite economic causes and soaring unemployment (Sliwinski 2015; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Brown 2015; McLaren 2002); others point to a loss of nationalism and identity (Hooghe, Huo, and Marks 2007; Halikiopoulou et. al. 2012; Brown 2015; McLaren 2002; Lochocki 2014);
still others cite socio-economic, socio-cultural and political factors, pointing to the relationship between low education and euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Loveless and Rohrschneider 2008; Lubbers and Jaspers 2011; Lochocki 2014).

Studies have sought an explanation for the success of some far-right groups and not others, when conditions appear similar. Golder (2003, 433) observed that empirical studies investigating the variation in the success of these parties have quite often produced inconsistent results. For example, Golder noted that some studies find that immigration matters (Anderson 1996; Knigge 1998; Martin 1996), others find that it does not (Mayer and Perrineau 1989). Others have found that it only matters in some countries (Givens 2000). Further, as Golder acknowledged in 2003, the same inconsistent results can be found for unemployment and electoral institutions. Jackman and Volpert (1996) argued that electoral thresholds influenced the support for extreme right parties, whereas Swank and Betz (1996) provided evidence to the contrary. Knigge (1998) claimed that unemployment reduced support for extreme right parties, though Jackman and Volpert (1996) concluded the opposite. Lewis-Beck and Mitchell (1993) stated that the effect of unemployment depended on the level of immigration (Golder 2003, 433), yet Sliwinski (2015) argued that what has led to this rise is how economic problems are perceived as being compounded by immigration. Sliwinski noted, in particular, that in the EU the youth unemployment rate as a whole was 23 percent; in Greece it had risen as high as 60 percent. Thus, studies reveal contradictory information and mixed results.

In 2008, White (2008) cited ‘cleavage theory’, a common analytical perspective in the EU literature, as the causal factor of euroscepticism. Lochocki (2014) observed that “studies have identified two components that make right-populists’ programs
appealing to voters: they offer an agenda of neo-nationalism, combined with an opportunity to cast a protest vote expressing general dissatisfaction with the political establishment…their programs combine “neo-nationalism” with “anti-elitism:” for the nation, against the political establishment (Lochocki 2014). In doing so, he believed, they blame the established, moderate parties for any alleged social change — primarily caused by globalization — brought upon the alleged homogenous community of the nation (Lochocki 2014, 5). Indeed, Lochocki (2014, 5) posited that prime threats were generally symbolized by immigration and multiculturalism as much as the influence of the European Union on daily life (Ivarsflaten 2008; Arzheimer 2009; Ellinas 2010; Yilmaz 2012).

Analyses of citizens’ attitudes toward the EU have consistently identified a mass-elites divide or an ‘elite-mass opinion incongruence,’ one Bertoncini and Koenig (2014) believed lent itself to the idea that so-called ‘populist’ discourses usually reject European integration.

In an effort to better explain the many dimensions of euroscepticism, many scholars have chosen to focus on the differences between eurosceptic groups. The subsequent research led to a flurry of manuscripts heavily focused on typologies. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) presented the concept of hard vs. soft euroscepticism, with hard euroscepticism defined as the opposition to membership of, or the existence of, the European Union as a matter of principle (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001, 10). Szczerbiak selected the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group, typified by such parties as the United Kingdom Independence Party, as an example of hard euroscepticism. Soft euroscepticism, on the other hand, was what he described as support for the existence of,
and membership of, a form of European Union, but with opposition to specific EU policies, and opposition to a federal Europe (Szczerbiak 2008). Blurred lines and further research led the pair to redefine hard euroscepticism as “principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU” and soft euroscepticism as “not a principled objection to the European integration project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but… opposition to the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make” (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, 7-8). Thus, soft euroscepticism can best be described as “qualified” opposition, while hard euroscepticism is viewed as outright opposition. There is a debate amongst scholars concerning the tipping point when soft euroscepticism transitions into hard. Kopecky and Mudde 2002, and Vasilopoulos 2009, have noted the flaws in such a distinction. As Vasilopoulos (2009, 5) queried, “if a party opposes three or more EU policies, is its euroscepticism still soft or has it crossed the boundaries and has become hard? Would this depend on the number of policies or their substance? Or somehow on both?”

Pursuant to Szczerbiak and Taggert’s distinction of hard and soft euroscepticism, scholars began to immerse themselves in study and debate to further delineate euroscepticism. In 2007, Flood and Usherwood presented a six-point scale ranging from EU-reject to EU-maximalist, while Rovny (2004) focused on differentiating between the motivation and the magnitude of opposition to the EU. Krouwel and Abts (2007) developed a two-dimensional conceptualization by combining both the targets and the degree of popular discontent toward ‘Europe’ (Brack and Startin 2015, 83).
Using qualifiers such as pro- or anti-integration, and pro- or anti-EU, many scholars began to reclassify eurosceptic groups using terms such as Europhobe, Euroreject, Euroenthusiast, Eurorealist, and Eurosceptic (Vasilopoulou 2011; Sorenson 2008; Kopecky and Mudde 2002). Heinisch and Lansberger (2011, 6) note that, according to the typology proposed by Kopecky and Mudde (2002, 300), “so-called ‘Euroenthusiasts’ support the general idea of European integration as well as its current manifestation as embodied by the EU, ‘Eurorejects’ are opposed to both. By contrast, ‘Europragmatists’ do not support the general idea of European integration but accept the EU for pragmatic reasons. Finally, the term ‘Eurosceptic’ is left for those supporting the general idea of European integration while rejecting the current gestalt of the EU” (Heinisch and Lansberger 2011, 7).

Factors such as exit strategy and basis, national influence, vision, and ideology often serve as variables. Interestingly, some terms have been incorporated by groups in EP; on its website, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) presents itself as “eurorealist” and calls for an EU of openness, transparency, and eurorealism (ecrgroup.eu 2015).

Another area of focus in eurosceptic research has led to what some scholars refer to as the North Carolina/Sussex debate. Mudde (2011, 7-9) highlighted the respective impacts of ideology and strategy in euroscepticism and elaborated the concept of two schools of thought in Euroscepticism studies: the Sussex School and the North Carolina School. The foundation of the North Carolina School was the 1999 work of Leonard Ray, research from Hooghe and Marks (2007), and, in particular, Hooghe’s 2007 “What Drives Euroscepticism?” (Mudde 2011, 8). The North Carolina School emphasizes
party-based Euroscepticism and argues that party positions on European integration are a reflection of a new cleavage in European politics (Mudde 2011, 9).

The Sussex School is based on the works of Szczerbiak and Taggart (1998, 2001, 2008) and was the first attempt to comparatively and systematically research party-based Euroscepticism. This approach focuses on characteristics inherent to the nation as a whole, such as party competition and objectives, electoral systems, and institutional structures.

Vasilopoulou (2013) observed that this segment of literature portrays “Euroscepticism as a new and marginal phenomenon, located at the periphery of society and the party system and to focus mostly on its nature and its sources” (Brack and Startin 2015, 242). Serricchio, et al (2013) concurred, observing how Euroscepticism has increasingly moved from the periphery of society to the mainstream and the Eurozone crisis triggered fundamental changes in the attitudes of both citizens and elites vis-à-vis the EU but also towards national institutions” (Brack and Startin 2015, 242).

It is precisely the change in attitude and perspective described by Vasilopoulou that warrants examination of euroscepticism on a macro level. Further, though the emergence and success of euroscepticism and, subsequently, Eurosceptic groups, is a relatively new phenomenon, the underlying tenets are not. The similarity to fascism should not and cannot be ignored.

Griffin (2003) believed that fascism (like euroscepticism) was influenced by both left and right, conservative and anti-conservative, national and supranational, rational and anti-rational. Additionally, nationalism, considered the foundation of fascism, is also a primary component of euroscepticism. Another compelling aspect is the fascist view of
the nation as “a single organic entity which binds people together by their ancestry and is a natural unifying force of people” (Zimmer 2003). Yet perhaps the most persuasive example of a parallel between fascism and euroscepticism is recognition that fascism seeks to solve economic, political and social problems by achieving a national rebirth (Paxton 2005; Griffin 1991; Laqueuer 1998; Passmore 2002).

To date, research in the areas of fascism and euroscepticism has focused on each field independently, failing to unite the two. Scholars routinely focus on the right-wing, populist and nationalistic aspects of each and often label many of the emergent groups as “fascist.” The similarities go far beyond labelling and name-calling. As a result, this dissertation links these two areas of study together, forging a theoretically grounded new conception of fascism in the 21st century: Millennial Eurosceptic Populism. Chapter III will discuss and dissect millennial eurosceptic populism in depth, establishing a working definition, its characteristics, parameters, and the necessary components required for a group/party to be recognized as a Millennial Eurosceptic Populist Group.

Theory

The surge of 21st century fascism has not gone unnoticed. Efforts to explain this rise, however, have presented more of a challenge. With academic opinion on its occurrence ranging from perceptions of it as a distinctly marginal phenomenon, to those maintaining it is the wave of the future, a solid theoretical explanation remains to be seen. Hooghe and Marks (2007, 120) noted that Wessels (2005), building on Eastonian systems theory, argued that a political system can weather opposition if citizens identify with the political community. Other scholars of the EU shift have focused on geographic angles (Carey 2002; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998a; Gabel 1998b; McLaren 2002;
Ray 2003; Taggart 1998) or more comparative perspectives (Herzog and Tucker 2009; Marks et al. 2006; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004).

Fortunately, scholars of social movements have an array of tools in their proverbial toolbox from whence they can choose. The broad nature of the groups’ goals, capabilities, abilities, and tactics belies a quite simplistic commonality: achieving change. The methods these groups employ to seek change vary as greatly as their goals, though there are several traditional theories of social mobilization which are typically utilized to explain a movement’s rise. What underlying theories explain the rise of millennial eurosceptic populism? This section examines classic and modern theory in search of a theoretical model that could potentially explain the conditions that have allowed for the rise and emergence of euroscepticism as hypothesized above.

Classic Theory

The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones –Karl Marx, 1848. (Marx and Engels 1969)

Marx. In classic Marxist theory, competition between workers alienated them from one another (as well as from the means of production) as they had no say in its operation. Workers were relegated to this state of oppression, a state in which happiness or even personal fulfillment was difficult to find. Thus, according to Marx, the division of labor and conflict between capitalists and workers were critical problems of modern society in which social stratification played a pivotal role, both for and against, mobilization. Nolte (1966, 421-434) viewed fascism as “a reactionary, anti-modern
movement despite its borrowing of certain techniques such as mass mobilization and propaganda from the Marxists.”


Yet, in the vein of classic Marxist theory, many scholars have deferred to a Marxist theory of fascism which stems from Leon Trotsky. Some scholars consider this theory to be Trotsky's greatest contribution to Marxism. He began the task after Mussolini's victory in Italy in 1922, and brought it to its apogee in the years preceding Hitler's triumph in Germany in 1933. Weissman (1969) notes that Trotsky began the task after Mussolini's triumph in Italy in 1922, and brought it to a high point in the years preceding Hitler's victory 11 years later. Observed Weissman, “in his attempts to awaken the German Communist Party and the Communist International to the mortal danger and to rally a united-front against Nazism, Trotsky made a point-by-point critique of the policies of the social-democratic and Stalinist parties.” According to Weissman (1969), this constituted “a compendium of almost all the mistaken, ineffective, and suicidal positions that workers' organizations can take regarding fascism, since the positions of the German parties ranged from opportunistic default and betrayal on the right (social democratic) to ultra-left abstentionism and betrayal (Stalinist).”
To the Stalinists, every capitalist party was automatically ‘fascist’ (Weissman 1969). Stalin famously noted “that, rather than being opposites, fascism and social democracy were ‘twins;’ the socialists were thereupon dubbed ‘social fascists’ and regarded as the main enemy …there could be no united front with social-fascist organizations, and those who, like Trotsky, urged such united fronts, were also labeled social fascists and treated accordingly” (Weissman 1969).

Subsequently, much has been written on Marxist theories of fascism and there have been a number of Marxist influenced analyses of fascism. Since 1945, most of these works analyzed the fascist regimes in a time-specific manner and had little immediate relevance to a theory of fascism for the present (Smith 2012). Renton (1997) noted that a Marxist theory of fascism had its roots in a number of Marxist theories which predated the rise of fascism. These include the idea, present in The Communist Manifesto, that ideologies should be seen as class ideologies.

In 1999, Renton offered a succinct explanation of Marxist fascism: “First, Marxism is wholly critical of fascism: it is individual Marxists who have provided the most thorough opposition to the several fascist parties. Second, Marxism interprets fascism: it explains the growth of fascism with relevance to a broader theory which seeks to explain the totality of social relations under capitalism” (Renton 1997, 44).

Many Marxists utilize the insights of psychology to analyze what they perceive as a ‘fascist personality’ (Renton 1997, 80). The most important of these ‘Freudian Marxists,’ according to Renton, were the members of the Frankfurt School, which included Erich Fromm and Theodor Adorno (Renton 1997, 81). Fromm contended that “fascism was a product of capitalism which, in turn, marked the most extreme distance
from the natural economy” (Renton 1997, 81). In response to alienation, humanity could choose only socialism or fascism: “Man must either unite himself with the world in the spontaneity of love and productive work, or else seek a kind of security, by such ties with the world as destroy his freedom” (Renton 1997, 81).

Smith observed that: “One of the fundamental principles of the Marxist interpretation of fascism is that fascism is not an ideology buried in the historical past, but a living phenomenon that has re-emerged in times of economic and political turmoil” (Smith, 2012). Indeed, throughout Europe and in other former colonies around the world including the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, there has been a “revival of fascist groups” at different times (Smith, 2012). Smith also asserted that in the immediate post-war period, “these groups were often remnants of the inter-war fascist parties, but the social mobilization of groups of ‘classical fascism’ were replaced by new groups who took inspiration from the groups of the 1930s and 1940s, but with new and younger personnel, often including figureheads from the inter-war period” (Smith, 2012).

Neocleous (1997, xi) concurred: “seeing fascism as a historical phenomenon that ended in 1945 or thereabouts… encourages a dangerous forgetting.” For Marxists, fascism is inherently linked to capitalism, as asserted by both Renton (1999, 16): “fascism is a recurrent feature of modern capitalism;” and Neocleous (1997, xi): “fascism is first and foremost an ideology generated by modern industrial capitalism.”

Similarly, in the 1960s, John Cammett (1967, 162) argued that while fascism is the ‘fullest expression’ of capitalism, it is “not identical at every stage… with monopoly capitalism….As a Marxist, in order to eliminate the conditions for a revival of fascism,
one would need to abolish capitalism.” As Renton (1999, 16) concluded in true Marxist fashion: “the only decisive way to stop fascism is by fighting for a society where the potential of all humanity is fully realised and all forms of oppression are swept away.”

Marxist theory as applied to all genres of fascism offers explanatory power in some cases but fails in regards to euroscepticism. Though alienation certainly plays a role in the emergence of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, the concept of class struggle does not adequately explain a movement/group that transcends social class. As Skocpol (1985, 3-5) explained it: "With respect to all that is non-state, [the state-centered] paradigm [thus] continues the reductionist tendency of Marxism and neo-Marxism by identifying class relations and interests as the key to contemporary forms of collective action.” Struggle in terms of Eurosceptic ideology is one of sovereignty and nationalism rather than, or regardless of, class.

*Durkheim.* Like Marx, Durkheim emphasized the fact that human qualities, needs and motives are, in large part, the product of social development (Durkheim [1893] 1986). Indeed, both men emphasized the structural-anatomical links between political society and the state, and that the state is the political organ of the society with the ultimate decision being made by persons society has empowered and entrusted (Durkheim [1912] 1965). Durkheim held that political society is “polycellular” in form and comprised of secondary groups whose existence made politics both necessary and possible. While Marx adopted a negative perception of the division of labor, Durkheim casted it in a more positive light, as a way of connecting members of society, for “it is through the division of labor…that the cohesion of societies would be ensured” (Durkheim [1893] 1986, 277).
Durkheim believed that the essential elements of a modern society (as well as the primary problems of it) were similar to those of Marx though they differed in some ways. Durkheim asserted that modern society was a product of the norms, values belief systems that governed it. A further differentiation stemmed from Durkheim’s interest in reforming society while Marx sought to eliminate it.

A key component of Durkheimian theory was solidarity. With modernization and industrialization, labor became increasingly specialized. Previously in pre-modern societies, all workers engaged in essentially the same work as a means of sustenance. These workers shared social cohesion based on similarities and commonalities. This ‘mechanical solidarity’ was soon replaced by ‘organic solidarity.’ With organic solidarity, social cohesion was based on each individual’s dependence on all others in the society for his survival (Durkheim 1893).

In *The Division of Labor in Society* ([1893]1986), Durkheim proposed two concepts: first, societies evolved from a simple, non-specialized form (mechanical) toward a highly complex, specialized form (organic); second, when societies become more complex, or organic, work also becomes more complex. In the former society, people behave and think alike and generally perform the same ‘work tasks’ with the same group-oriented goals; in the latter, people are no longer tied to one another and social bonds are impersonal (Durkheim [1893]1986). This loss of connection is what Durkheim believed led to ‘anomie,’ and a breakdown of social norms and control over the members of society. As a result, individuals were unable to function in society without clear rules to serve as guides and limiters (Durkheim [1893] 1986).
Durkheim ([1893] 1986) contended that man was a product of his social environment; thus, socialization began at birth and continued through language and interaction with other people. The basis of his theory rested on the notion that the “conscience collective of a society varies alongside the division of labor. In less complex and more primitive societies, people tended to do and think alike and there was little tolerance for difference” (Smith 2008; Durkheim [1893]1986). Durkheim concluded that “two consciousnesses exist within us: the one comprises only states that are personal to each one of us, characteristic of us as individuals, whilst the other comprises states that are common to the whole of society” (Durkheim [1893]1986, 84).

Durkheim ([1912]1965) coined the term ‘collective effervescence’ to indicate how communal gatherings intensify, electrify and enlarge and individual’s experience. He believed that the act of bringing people together in close physical proximity ‘generates a kind of electricity that quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree of exaltation’ (Durkheim [1912]1965, 162). He asserted that this collectively-experienced euphoria served to reaffirm social bonds: “Within a crowd moved by a common passion, we become susceptible to feelings and actions of which we are incapable on our own... and when the crowd is dissolved, when we find ourselves alone again and fall back to our usual level, we can measure how far we were raised above ourselves” (Durkheim, [1912]1965, 157). Social mobilization, therefore, occurs as both a product and factor of collective effervescence.

Durkheim claimed *anomie* is an experience comprised of much more than one simple thing. Writing of Durkheim’s concept, Bernburg (2002, 731) described it as a normlessness of goals in which the “absence of social authority causes our capacity for
feeling in itself insatiable and bottomless.” Elaborated Bernberg, “anomie may also come forth when socially prescribed goals are practically unattainable…to pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to condemn oneself to a state of perpetual unhappiness, ends are not really undefined…they are limitless” (2002, 731). Durkheim believed that anomie is characterized by unrealistic aspirations and expectations that often cause conflict between means and ends and leave individuals with feelings of meaninglessness and hopelessness and a sense of injustice. “The limits are unknown between the possible and the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate claims, and hopes and those which are immoderate” (Durkheim 1897; 1951, 231).

Ultimately, for a social order to be just, it has to be fairly stable and consistent, it has to be characterized by equal opportunity and a predictable future (Durkheim, 1897; 1951).

A Durkheimian theory of fascism would likely stem from the concepts of anomie and collective effervescence. Richman (2002, 106) argued that “collective effervescence manifests a new paradigm of human social existence wherein the individual is no longer opposed to the group.” Rather, she posited, there was a synergy found within Durkheim's composite idea of man as homo-duplex: an integral being at once social and individual, at once the whole society and one of its constituent parts (Richman, 2002, 106). By extension, normative behavior for Durkheim ([1912]1965) is at once the principle and ‘fons et origo’ [source and origin] of society itself. Collective effervescence, therefore, served as the means through which social normativity was achieved and reinforced, despite the fact that it typically occurred during fleeting moments of “taboo ritual and non-normative social behavior” (Connolly 2004).
In his study of Durkheim’s theory of social order, Thorlindsson (2004) asserted that Durkheim’s emphasis of the idea that collective life of groups and social institutions cannot be reduced to the mere psychology of individuals. He contended that: “Rather, social groups have structural properties where norms, values and ongoing social relationships place constraints on the individual…Social order is rooted in the emergent nature of social life where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (Thorlindsson, 2004, 271). Consequently, Durkheim viewed rapid social change as a cause of anomic collective action and irrational behavior.

Durkheim would likely hold that fascism is borne from the concept of collective action stemming from social change and feelings of anomie leading to solidarity. As noted by Traugott, for Durkheim "solidarity constitutes the defining characteristic of group life. It is, by extension, the sine qua non of collective action" (Traugott 1984, 325 Indeed, far from stressing emotional disintegration, "Durkheim typically characterizes the variations in solidarity associated with social movements as intensifications of ... integrative bonds" (Traugott 1984, 325).

Durkheim’s concepts of anomie and collective effervescence may serve as theoretical explanation for many groups and movements, but they cannot be applied universally, particularly in light of research identifying collective action as a logical act. Olson (1965) believed that all motivations are individualistic; only a separate and "selective" incentive would ultimately stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way. Whilst Durkheim believed that groups socialize individuals into their obligations to one another, Olson (1965) contended that members of groups did not act out of sentiment, loyalty or a sense of belonging. They joined groups purely for
the benefit they could derive as individuals. In 1960, Kedourie observed that nationalism was often associated with the radical right and criticized as “an irrational doctrine with a fanatical vision and a propensity towards violence” (Halikiopoulou 2012, 7). Olson’s work does much to counter this erroneous concept which continues to permeate society. Indeed, euroscepticism is very much a product of logic and rational thought, weighing costs against benefits.

Weber. Weber (1968) believed that classes and status groups should be associated with power and attempting to achieve one’s will, even in the face of opposition. Indeed, Weber viewed states as autonomous organizations with their own distinctive interests and goals and as sites of “independent and effective official actions,” (Skocpol 1985, 21). Weber (1965) held that differences in wages resulted in different material conditions and, therefore, different patterns of social action. Further, “antagonisms among property-less groups can often be based on rational motives rather than false consciousness” (Appelrouth and Edles 2010, 155-162).

A recurrent theme in Weber’s work is the concept of rationalization. When discussing rationalization, Appelrouth and Edles (2010) noted that Weber referred to an ongoing process in which social interaction and institutions became increasingly governed by methodical procedures and calculable rules. Thus, in steering the course of societal development, values, traditions, and emotions were being displaced in favor of formal and impersonal bureaucratic practices (Appelrouth and Edles 2010, 155-162). While such practices may breed greater efficiency in obtaining designated ends, they can also lead to the “disenchantment of the world” where “there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all
things by calculation” (Weber, [1919]1958, 139). Weber maintained that rationalization—and the scientific, calculative outlook in which it is rooted—did not generate “an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives” (Weber [1919] 1958, 139). Instead, they offered techniques that were ultimately devoid of meaning (Appelrouth and Edles 2010).

As discussed by Appelrouth and Edles (2010, 155-162), Weber “believed the ascetic ideals lying at the heart of the Protestant ethic were carried into the practical affairs of economic activity and social life more generally… this unleashed the process of rationalization, disenchanting Western society and creating an ‘iron cage’ from which the individual is left with little power to escape.” Further, the dominance of capitalism and impersonal, bureaucratic forms of organization was a ‘collective force’ that determined an individual’s opportunities (Appelrouth and Edles 2010, 166, 169). The iron cage served to imprison us in the pursuit of the “lifestyles of the rich and famous” whether or not we can afford to live like the affluent (Appelrouth and Edles 2010, 166, 169).

Weber (1968, 927) argued that status honor was a “more important source of group social action than class or relation to markets.” Gingrich (1999) delineated the ways this could be accomplished:

First, status may be a means of maintaining the position of a group that does have privilege. The status group may be closed, with privileges available only to those in the group, and denied to those outside the group. Further, a status group may lead to the development of parties to further some specific interests of the status group. Thus, status groups may become the means by which power or authority is exercised. (Gingrich 1999, 1)

Gingrich noted that “social honor may be accorded to those who behave in the manner considered desirable by the status group” (Gingrich 1999, 1). Further: “In this
way, the ends of a status group may be furthered. Social approval is a means of achieving
the ends of the group while social disapproval may be used as a means of disciplining
those who do not behave in the approved manner” (Gingrich 1999, 1). He continued:

Second, people who have limited power may form a status group in an attempt to
gain greater control of economic and social resources. Thus, if resources are
scarce, forming a group which is able to exercise some control of the distribution
of these resources may be a means of increasing the power of that group in
society (Gingrich 1999, 1).

The restrictions placed on entry may be partially economic, but they are also
partially social in nature, having to do with status honor and prestige. Professions which
are male-dominated and have excluded women are but one example and appear to
perpetuate status distinctions based on gender (Gingrich 1999; Weber 1968).

Weber (1968) described authority as a legitimate form of domination, implying
that authority was considered to be legitimate by followers and subordinates. He outlined
three major types of legitimate domination: traditional, charismatic, and legal or rational
(Weber 1968). Weber did acknowledge that these three types are not all-inclusive though
they do offer insight into the reasons why he felt it was possible for some people to
exercise power over others. Authority serves to extend and maintain power and
demonstrates how people can come to accept domination as a normal and structured
aspect of society (Weber 1968).

Weber (1968) considered charisma to be a driving and creative force in social
mobilization, noting its ability to supersede traditional authority and established rules.
He observed that “the sole basis of charismatic authority is the recognition or acceptance
of the claims of the leader by the followers; while it is irrational in that it is not
calculable or systematic, it can be revolutionary, breaking traditional rule and often challenging legal authority” (Weber 1968, 241-242).

Leaders quite often are found to possess characteristics atypical (or at least unusual) when compared to those of the general populace. Though each trait on its own may not be so unique, leaders tend to possess a package of these special characteristics. These elements typically relate to a gift for public speaking, charisma, verbal or written eloquence. Ritzer (2008) asserted that "although Weber did not deny that a charismatic leader may have outstanding characteristics, his sense of charisma was more dependent on the group of disciples and the way that they define the charismatic leader….To put Weber's position bluntly, if the disciples define a leader as charismatic, then he or she is likely to be a charismatic leader irrespective of whether he or she actually possesses any outstanding traits" (Ritzer 2008, 134). The realization of this phenomenon is often demonstrated in cults. Cult leaders such as David Koresh, Marshall Applewhite and Jim Jones arguably serve as practical examples of this self-fulfilling prophecy.

For Weber, traditional authority was a means by which inequality was created and preserved, and--where no challenge to the authority of the traditional leader or group was made-- the leader was likely to remain dominant (1968). Gingrich (1999) opined that: “Marx would have argued that there were economic reasons for such dominance, but Weber would be more likely to have claimed that commonly accepted customs or religion constituted the underlying source of such authority. Status honor was accorded to those with traditional forms of power and this status helped maintain dominance” (Gingrich 1999). Weber (1968) also held that traditional authority blocked the development of rational or legal forms of authority.
Griffin (1991) observed that, in Weberian terms, populist ultra-nationalism rejected the principles of absolutism and a pluralist representative government. Therefore, it thus repudiated “both 'traditional' and 'legal/rational' forms of politics in favor of prevalently 'charismatic’ ones in which the cohesion and dynamics of movements depend almost exclusively on the capacity of their leaders to inspire loyalty and action” (Griffin 1991, 37). Chamorro-Premuzic (2012) argued that there were “only three ways to influence others: force, reason or charm.” He wrote:

Whereas force and reason are rational (even when we are ‘forced’ to do something, we obey for a good reason) charm is not. Charm is based on emotional manipulation and, as such, it has the ability to trump any rational assessment and bias our views. Charismatic leaders influence by charm rather than reason and when they run out of charm they tend to revert to force. (Chamorro-Premuzic 2012)

When applied to euroscepticism, such perspective does ring true to a certain extent, though the employment of force lends itself more to tyranny or dictatorship. The vast majority of the mainstream eurosceptic groups have not crossed that line.

Weber's theory of charismatic leadership is particularly applicable to traditional fascism, especially Hitler and Mussolini. Arendt (1966, 23) observed that Mussolini “was probably the first party leader who consciously rejected a formal program and replaced it with inspired leadership and action alone.” In 2013, Griffin asserted that:

Fascism was a charismatic form of politics that asserted the extraordinary capabilities of the party and its leader. The main tool for the ‘Fascistization’ (conversion to Fascism) of the masses and the creation of the new Fascist man was “not propaganda, censorship, education, or terror, or even the large fascist social and military organizations; instead, the Fascists relied on the extensive use of a ritualized, theatrical style of politics designed create a sense of a new historical era that abolished the politics of the past. (Griffin 2013, 17)

From this viewpoint, social mobilization depended on a charismatic leader.
However, Weber’s theory fails when one considers the decidedly uncharismatic leadership of leaders such as Francisco Franco and the Falange and in many modern Eurosceptic groups in which the leader may or may not be strong, it is ultimately the group’s strength as a whole that gives it a much greater level of power and recognition. His concept of status groups proves more enduring as it relates to traditional fascism, particularly as it pertains to seeking control.

The classic theorists offer insight into fascism, certainly, with varying threads of relevancy to euroscepticism and populism. Weber and Marx agreed that economic factors are integral to understanding the social system, though Weber believed that Marx’s reductionist concept of a single economic cause was too simplistic. In the case of euroscepticism, Weber’s perspective is the more germane as euroscepticism is a product various strains both within and apart from the economic realm. The concept of alienation and anomie was a focal point in Marx, Weber and Durkheim’s work. The three theorists shared the notion of man’s disconnection to society and the natural state. However, Marx viewed this disconnect as a result of class struggle, Durkheim as a loss of touch to society leading to a loss of values (anomie), and Weber as the iron cage created by the bureaucracy. Though each perspective offers insight into the current political environment in Europe, Weber’s idea of an iron cage that limits individual human potential is perhaps most applicable when juxtaposed with the confines of the European system in which Eurosceptic groups have found themselves imprisoned. Quite astutely, Weber (1904/1930, 182) observed: "No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals or, if neither.”
Modern Social Movement Theory

It is important to recognize that though euroscepticism (and the proposed concept of millennial eurosceptic populism) may be cut from the same cloth as traditional fascism, its emergence and success cannot rest on classical theory in the vein of Marx, Durkheim and Weber. Though classic theory can provide some explanation for its rise, it is necessary to consider modern social movement theories that should ostensibly provide greater explanatory power for fascism in the new millennium.

At this juncture, it bears noting that elements of the classic theories do offer significant insight into many fascist, neo-fascist and neo-Nazi groups. Indeed, many groups and/or causes have emerged and been successful based almost entirely on charismatic leadership, such as Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara; labor leader and civil rights activist Cesar Chavez; former South African President, anti-apartheid revolutionary, and philanthropist Nelson Mandela; or former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Winston Churchill. Others can trace their rise to Durkheim's concept of anomie and collective conscience. Still others can attribute their rise to the Marxian concept of class struggle. Classic theory serves to offer a piecemeal explanation of the emergence and success of euroscepticism, but fails to offer an over-arching explanation applicable to the current state of political and social affairs. Noted Gentile (2000, 302): “Modernity is an important generator of myths and political beliefs aimed at the construction of the future. I believe that fascism, in its proper and essential traits as a form of totalitarian modernism, belongs to a completely surpassed historical situation.”

With euroscepticism, the opportunity exists to explain a modern form of fascism with one modern theory, at once neatly packaging its concept and explaining its need for
separation and differentiation. Its emergence and rise superficially appears to be
connected with the political, economic and social environment. A deeper examination
into which aspects within the environment will lead to a common thread between the
groups reveals a significant relationship with opportunity and timing. In researching
euroscepticism and eurosceptic groups, the modern theories of resource mobilization,
political opportunity, protest cycles, and political process possess elements that seem
most pertinent.

Resource Mobilization Theory (RM). In 1978, Tilly described social movements
as “rational, purposeful and organized actions.” He asserted that these actions are
comprised of a calculation of costs and benefits, all of which are influenced by the
presence of resources. In turn, this creates a hospitable environment conducive to
collective action. As its name implies, RM emphasizes the importance of resources in
developing a successful social movement or political party. Resources include money,
labor, knowledge, solidarity, legitimacy, and internal/external support from the ‘power
elite.’ These ‘power elite,’ as described by Mills (1956, 286), are the decision-makers, the
highest echelons of society. They are not “men who are merely doing their duty. They
are the ones who determine their duty, as well as the duties of those beneath them. They
are not merely following orders: they give the orders. They are not merely ‘bureaucrats’: they command bureaucracies” (Mills 1956, 286).

The key concept of RM is the ability of people with shared grievances to mobilize
sufficient resources to enable action. Cragun, et al. (2006) observed that this emphasis on
resources offered an explanation as to why some aggrieved individuals are able to
organize while others are not.
Resource mobilization theory was typified by Charles Tilly (1978) and, as Pirie (2007) observed, runs contrary to popular belief which maintains collective action is irrational and the result of a malfunction in the social system (see also Olson 1965). RM is considered by many scholars to have developed as a counter to social strain theory. Social strain theorists such as Smelser (1963), believed people joined a movement due to social strain and dislocation resulting from rapid social change. Indeed, the development of the resource mobilization perspective represented a major paradigm shift in traditional social movement thought, a field which previously explained mass protest as an irrational response to social turmoil (Smelser 1963).

Tilly (1978) postulated that “collective movements are simply an extension of conventional political behaviour.” Hence, as noted by Pirie (2007, iii), it is stressed that “social movements act in a more or less organized way to mobilise resources; it is also possible to identify individuals with expertise and organising or campaigning skills – what some call ‘movement entrepreneurs’ who play a key role in social movements.”

Though there are a variety of premises of the theory and its associated components, there are a few integral assumptions. Snow and Benford [1988, 1992] enumerated some of the key assumptions of the theory: first, they noted, “there will always be grounds for protest in modern, politically pluralistic societies because there is constant discontent (i.e., grievances or deprivation);” second, “actors are rational players whom weigh the costs and benefits of participation;” third, “members are recruited through networks– commitment is maintained by building a collective identity and continuing to nurture interpersonal relationships;” fourth, “movement organization is contingent upon aggregating resources;” finally, “continuity of leadership and sufficient
resources are essential elements of a social movement as each serves as the impetus to transform discontent” (in Cragun et al. 2006, 232).

Pirie (2007) discussed the utility of the resource mobilization approach, noting that it involves careful scrutiny of obstacles as well as incentives, networks, costs and benefits, and in what way established political institutions react to the challenges created by active social movements. Such analysis concurs with Olson’s concept of collective action as logical; however, this idea also leads to some of the main arguments against the theory.

McCarthy and Zald (1977) asserted that RM emphasized both societal support and constraint of social movement phenomena. It also examined the variety of resources needed for mobilization, connections to other groups, reliance on other movements for support, and tactics authorities utilize to control movements. Piven and Cloward (1992, 302) observed that resource mobilization (RM) theorists “normalize the political impact of collective protest, as if the processes of influence set in motion by collective protest are no different than those set in motion by conventional political activities.” Other critics point to the normalizing tendency of resource mobilization proponents when rational behavior dictates it is not normal to join such movements. Piven and Cloward (1992, 302) also noted that “protest is often treated by RM analysts as more organized than it is, as if conventional modes of formal organization also typify the organizational forms taken by protest.” Pirie (2007) concurred, observing that such an approach falls victim to the contrasting criticism of the collective behavior approach: “is it not the case that not all collective action is rational, or only rational - what is the part played by the emotions in collective behavior?”
A core tenet of RM posits that the availability of resources and the ability to assemble and coordinate them for use (mobilization), influences the likelihood of social movements forming and their outcomes. Two key elements of RM, state capacity and state crisis, are also critical components of political process theory and political opportunity structures. The theory is certainly relevant to euroscepticism and eurosceptic groups, especially in terms of capability and ability to form and emerge. However, can resource mobilization alone account for the emergence and relative success of millennial eurosceptic populism? Access to and an ability to employ resources fail to account for the mass appeal and growing recognition of millennial eurosceptic fascism.

**Political Opportunity Structures.** In 1973, Eisinger presented the first conceptualized use of the political opportunity framework in his research on rioting during the 1960s. Eisinger focused on the open versus closed nature of government and its reception to public input. Meyer (2004, 128) noted that the “approach implicitly assumed constant pressures across urban America and treated the most proximate institutional arrangements as the key factors influencing the way political dissent emerged.” In 1978, Tilly expanded on Eisinger’s work, offering a broader approach with a wider range of variables (Meyer 2004). Asserted Meyer (2004, 126): “the key recognition in the political opportunity perspective is that activists’ prospects for advancing particular claims, mobilizing supporters, and affecting influence are context-dependent.”

Kitschelt (1986, 59) argued that “political opportunity structures function “as ‘filters’ between the mobilization of the movement and its choice of strategies and its capacity to change the social environment… The crucial dimensions of these structures
are the ‘openness’ or ‘closedness’ of states to input from non-established actors and the strength or weakness of their capacity to deliver the effective implementation of policies once they are decided” (Kitschelt 1986, 59).

Political opportunity focuses on exogenous factors and the role played by the strategies, protest tactics, and resources of non-elite groups for the sustained expansion of social movements (Ayres 1996). Meyer (2004) observed that changes in demography, repression, migration, and political economy contribute to a climate conducive to organizing collective action, and issues would be more readily received by at least some governmental institutions (Meyer 2004, 129).

Meyer and Minkoff (2004, 1457) observed that “the political opportunity structure, applied to the world outside a social protest movement, has been the appropriate focus of much recent theory and research on political protest.” They highlight the basic premise that “exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy” (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1458). They note that longitudinal studies of single movements focusing on a movement’s trajectory have examined temporal and sectoral variations in political opportunity (Meyer and Minkoff 2004).

Tarrow posited that opportunities are associated not only with state crisis but also with state capacity. Indeed, Tarrow (1998) contended that revolution occurs when the state collapses. He believed that a state’s threshold for enduring challenges could actually serve as "a double-edged sword," depriving challengers of the opportunity to confront hostile authorities and to play upon the sympathies of the larger public audience.
In the last chapter of *Contentious Europeans*, Tarrow turned to early state building to shed light on the political opportunity structure of a composite polity:

European state building was not simply a process of insistent national pressure from above and ultimately futile resistance from local rulers and ordinary people. Out of this triangular structure of relations among nationalizing prince, local rulers, and ordinary people, a variety of alignments and conflict structures developed among actors whose strategies and success varied with the context and the strength of the pressure from their opponents. (Tarrow 2001, 246)

Hooghe (2011) noted that the concept of the political opportunity structure has become a powerful and flexible tool for understanding transnational as well as national contention. Marks and McAdam (1996, 1999) used a typology of political opportunities to assess the European constraints on labor, regional, environmental, and anti-nuclear movements, and Imig and Tarrow (2000) distinguished four types of European protest to examine how the EU opportunity structure affected their incidence.

However compelling, the approach has its share of critics. Noted Meyer (2004, 126): “the diversity of understandings of political opportunity has led friendly critics to warn, ‘the concept of political opportunity structure is ... in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment” (Meyer 2004, 126). Further, opportunity could account for the emergence of euroscepticism, but alone cannot explain its success.

*Protest Cycles*

If cycles of protest are such watersheds of social and political change, then why is it that... we have so few studies of such cycles? (Tarrow 1991, 11)

Frank and Fuentes (1992) keenly observed that Tarrow was able to answer his own question when he noted that “because they are a moving target, they interweave with
institutions,” and “there are problems with the way they have been conceived and studied” (Tarrow 1991, 11). Indeed, many scholars now incorporate the concept of protest cycles into Political Process Theory (PPT) as one of its components. Tarrow’s political process approach traced a “cycle of protest,” by considering institutional politics along with social protest and disorder (Tarrow 1989).

Tarrow (1989, 14) defined protest cycles as "a phase of heightened conflict across the social system" with "intensified interactions between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution.” He stated in 1989 that “protest becomes a protest cycle when it is diffused to several sectors of the population, is highly organized, and is widely used as the instrument to put forward demands” (Tarrow 1989, 14-15).

Scholars refer to these protest cycles alternatively as cycles of contention and protest waves (Karstedt-Henke 1980; Koopmans 2004; Tarrow 1995). Della Porta and Tarrow (1986, 607-632) contended that although "cycles of protest and their implications for change … do not coincide with economic cycles in any way, protest movements appear to cluster in identifiable periods, and to be associated with substantial policy innovation during such periods.” Brand (1987, 23-42) also discussed the cyclical nature of social movements, but concluded that "these movement waves coincide not with long-term economic cycles but with recurring waves of tendencies critical of modern civilization." Paxton (2004, 220) concurred, noting that fascism’s momentum as it advances toward power is a difficult trend to predict as “determining the appropriate responses to fascist gains is not easy, since its cycle is not likely to repeat itself blindly.”
Many scholars suggest that repertoires develop during times of societal crisis, when innovation is a product of struggle (McAdam, Tilly, and Wood 2001; Tarrow 1995; and Tilly 1995). Tarrow (1995, 286) ascribed such formation as a part of the cyclic model in which ‘new forms of collective action develop within the experimental context of cycles of protest.’ The most ‘successful, transferable tactics’ are then adopted as part of a movement’s repertoire for use during what Tarrow referred to as the ‘quieter times’ (Tarrow 1995, 286). The 1970s serve as an example of Tarrow’s “quieter” times as they encompass periods of time between war and protest, a relative lull between heightened periods of activity.

In 1986, Tilly coined the phrase ‘repertoire of contention’ as a means to describe “the whole set of means [a group] has for making claims of different kinds on different individuals or groups” (Tilly 1986, 4). Not only did he contend that a variety of strategies and tactics were an inherent part of the repertoire’s available tools, he also believed it served to limit the players, as “people generally turn to familiar routines and innovate within them, even when in principle some unfamiliar form of action would serve their interests much better” (Tilly 1986, 4).

Tarrow prophetically observed that there was a transnational opportunity structure: “a triangular structure of relations among states, non-state actors, and international institutions” (Tarrow 2005, 20). He contended that “states created international practices, regimes and institutions to solve their collective action problems and monitor one another’s behavior. But, once formed, new norms, identities and interests developed around these venues, attracting the attention of groups of states, non-state actors, and other international actors” (Tarrow 2005, 20). Further, there exists a
class of entrepreneurs with identities and social networks that equip them to build bridges between the local, national, and global. The entrepreneurs are considered ‘rooted cosmopolitans.’ Observed Della Porta and Tarrow (2005, 238): “they are cosmopolitan because they have ‘multiple belongings, flexible identities’ ...they are rooted because national communities motivate them. Italian, French, or Canadian transnational activists confront similar problems in nationally specific ways.”

Additionally, it was Meyer in 2004 whom observed that scholars who studied political protest in the 1950s, generally had a tendency to write with fascism in mind (and Nazism in particular). As such, when these scholars defined movements in their research, it was with attributes like “dysfunctional, irrational and inherently undesirable” and observations of the member who joined as “disconnected from intermediate associations that would link them with more productive and less disruptive social pursuits” (Meyer 2004, 126).

In 2014, Almeida made the observation that cycles of protest occurred “when multiple social movements or social groups engage in sustained protest, clustered in time and span, across a wide geographical boundary.” He recognized that during cycles of protest, multiple segments of society would participate and employ increasingly confrontational tactics (Almeida 2014).

These observations are particularly relevant in considering the rise and success of euroscepticism. Indeed, the concept of protest cycles as a whole superficially appears to provide exceptional explanatory power for the rise and emergence of what will, in this dissertation, be termed “Millennial Eurosceptic Populism” and the euroscepticism embodying it. The idea of waves of activity in conjunction with a strategic seizure of
opportunities goes far in explaining this turn of the century timeframe flurry of activity from so many fascist groups.

Political Process Theory (PPT). The political process framework is a school of thought that evolved to serve as an umbrella, incorporating the ideas of political opportunity and protest among other concepts such as resource mobilization. It originated in the works of Michael Lipsky (1970), who focused on the need to analyze a system of characteristics open to specific groups at different times and places, and in Peter Eisinger’s (1973) research which focused on formal institutional rules to explain the frequency of a particular behavior (Meyer 2004). Meyer (2004, 128) noted that Tilly (1978) built upon Eisinger’s (1973) work, ultimately laying the foundation for a more comprehensive theory which suggested making national comparisons, recognizing changes in opportunities over time, and arguing that opportunities would explain the more general process of choosing tactics from a spectrum of possibilities within a “repertoire of contention.”

There are, in fact, various conceptualizations and derivatives of PPT, each consisting of different elements central to its argument. Scholars differ in their views of which elements and aspects of structure are most relevant, leading to many schools of thought within one framework. Among these variations are four developmental shifts within the framework that have a solid scholarly following: Discursive Opportunities, Specific Opportunities, Perceived Opportunities, and From Conditions to Mechanisms (Giugni 2009).

Caren (2007) discussed three noteworthy precursors to PPT: first, Olson's (1965) analysis of collection behavior turned old notions about the irrationality of protestors on
its head, exploring the rational and deliberate choices that individuals made before joining a movement. Second, McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) found that the availability of resources to the movement, rather than the degree of oppression, served to explain the variation in the level of mobilization. This resource mobilization perspective counted more than just material goods as resources, including aspects such as organizational strength and the presence of elite allies. Third, Piven and Cloward (1977) observed that only during periods of crisis, such as the Depression, were movements able to extract concessions from elites.

PPT developed from the concept of political opportunity but also incorporated the idea of protest cycles, mobilizing structures, framing processes, and contentious repertoires. Scholars of social revolutions and political scientists contributed their insights to the framework including Tarrow with his concept of protest cycles (1989, 1991). It is often considered the standard explanation for social movement mobilization.

The basic premise of the theory is that exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy (Meyer 2004; and Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Meyer and Whittier (1994, 279) observed that the approach defined a social movement as “a sustained challenge to state policy that has observable origins, peaks, and declines in activity, and uses a combination of conventional and non-conventional collective action” (Meyer and Whittier 1994; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1991; Tilly 1978, 1983). PPT focuses on the interaction between the various attributes to include organizational structure, and the broader economic and political context (Caren 2007).
In 1988, Tarrow distinguished five main variables of political opportunity: “the degree of openness or closedness of the polity, stability or instability of political alignments, presence or absence of allies or support groups, divisions within the elite and its tolerance or intolerance of protest, and the policy-making capacity of the government” (Tarrow 1988, 429). Despite the importance of each variable and that each is an important aspect to the outcome of protest, Tarrow acknowledged that only the first was genuinely structural; the others are all “essentially contingent” (1988).

Kitschelt (1986, 59) argued that political opportunity structures function “as filters between the mobilization of the movement and its choice of strategies and its capacity to change the social environment.” Indeed, in 2001, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (considered the primary developers of PPT) moved toward a more dynamic approach of PPT with the study of contentious politics rather than general causal arguments. In place of opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes, they spoke of environmental, relational and cognitive mechanisms. The emphasis was now not so much on asserting that all three are causally necessary, but on identifying the specific mechanisms within each that can be found across multiple movements (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly offered as examples of such mechanisms: brokerage- the linking of previously unconnected units; category formation- the creation of identities; and certification- a target recognition of a movement, its tactics or its claims (Caren 2012).

Tarrow (1998) asserted that many of the elements of PPT occur as a result of one another or in concert with one another. As an example, contentious politics “is produced when political opportunities broaden, when they demonstrate the potential for alliances,
and when they reveal the opponents' vulnerability” (Tarrow 1998, 23). Tarrow declared that:

Contention crystallizes into a social movement when it taps embedded social networks and connective structures and produces collective action frames and supportive identities able to sustain contention with powerful opponents. By mounting familiar forms of contention, movements become the focal points that transform external opportunities into resources. Repertoires of contention, social networks, and cultural frames lower the costs of bringing people into collective action, induce confidence that they are not alone, and give broader meaning to their claims. Together, these factors trigger the dynamic processes that have made social movements historically central to political and social change. (Tarrow 1998, 23)

The concept of seizing opportunity is highly relevant in explaining millennial eurosceptic populism. As a framework, PPT seems to hold significant explanatory power though its elements and principles can be so broadly applied it appears more difficult to prove a lack of correlation.

*Political Process Model (PP)*. In 1982, McAdam presented a different version of PPT in conjunction with his study on the development of black insurgency. McAdam believed that changes in demography, repression, migration, and political economy contributed to a climate in which African Americans *could* organize collective action, and claims about racial justice *would* be more readily received by at least some governmental institutions (Meyer 2004). McAdam’s model centered on three primary factors: indigenous organizational strength, expanding political opportunities, and cognitive liberation (McAdam 1982). He concluded that it was the unison of political opportunities, a heightened sense of political efficacy, and the institutional strength of the

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5 For purposes of clarification within this paper, *PPT* shall refer to Political Process Theory. *PP* shall refer to McAdam’s Political Process model.
black churches, black colleges, and Southern chapters of the NAACP that played a central role in shaping the civil rights movement (McAdam 1982).

Duijvelaar (1996, 2.3) observed that McAdam “built upon the resource mobilization approach by integrating macro-, meso- and micro-approaches.” In contrast with RM, McAdam felt it vital to incorporate the indigenous organizational capabilities of movements (Duijvelaar 1996, 2.3; Kitschelt 1986, 327; van Noort 1988, 37).

PP asserts that social movements are established as a result of shared ideas (cognitive liberation) and develop as a result of the strength of its members and the structure they have created (indigenous organizational strength). Continued development is facilitated by a favorable political environment (expanding political opportunities) (McAdam 1982). What set McAdam’s work apart from that of other PP and PPT scholars was McAdam’s concentration on a longitudinal study focusing on the rise and decline of a social movement. This was in contrast to the work of other scholars in the field who chose to focus on movements as a snapshot in time, such as Kitschelt’s (1986) study of antinuclear movements in four democracies—France, Sweden, the United States, and West Germany; and Eisinger's (1973) study on the frequency of riots (Meyer 2004).

Though critics fault McAdam’s model as too reductionist, it is precisely its concise nature which I believe lends the model to a more specific identification of explanatory elements.


Critics of PPT argue that scholars in the field utilize exceedingly broad definitions that vary widely based on the historical context of the social movement. Another source of criticism focuses on the emphasis scholars place on the role of social movements while ignoring the cultural and social structures that allowed the movements to form.
Organizational/Opportunity Theory (OO) is introduced as an alternate theory and will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV, Phase Two.

OO offers a different theoretical explanation for the emergence and success of social movement organizations and groups/political parties. The theory contains two essential elements: opportunity borne from exogenous factors triggered by a large-scale event, and internal organizational elements. It is built on the concept of organizational aptitude and capacity existing concurrently with external opportunities, set into motion as a result of a specific event. The proposition of a new model is not intended to imply fault with PP, though this dissertation asserts that PP’s open ended framework does not serve those researches seeking specific causal conditions. Indeed, this characteristic is both a strength and a weakness of PP as it lends itself to wider application, allowing it to explain many things. Noted Whelan (2008), many scholars have presented sound critiques of the “overly structural bias and neglect of strategic analysis of much political process theory.” OO is hypothesized to offer significant explanatory power in the success of MEPGs.

The next chapter will discuss in detail the concept of millennial eurosceptic populism. It will be the first of two chapters to collect data. Chapter IV will begin theoretical testing of the efficacy of the PP and OO models.
CHAPTER III

FASCISM REVISITED OR EUROSCEPIC POPULISM?

In 1995, Tarrow indicated that two scholarly specialisms—European integration and the study of social movements—needed to come together to help understand whether, and how, a European conflict structure is emerging (Tarrow 1995). This prescient comment captures the essence of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism—the idea behind Eurosceptic populism as fascism in the 21st century. As discussed in Chapter II, the intersection of fascism and euroscepticism has led to significant changes in Europe that, in turn, have led to a surge in what were once only moderately successful fringe groups.

This chapter will consist of two sections. The first section will serve to define millennial eurosceptic populism and establish the necessary criteria for a party’s inclusion and classification as a MEPG. This process will include examination of the characteristics of fascism and its two 20th century iterations: neo-fascism and neo-Nazism. Key aspects of each of these groups will be identified, as will the primary aspects of the proposed category of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism. Definitions of each group will be established based on existing literature. As will be discussed, the lack of research into European integration, fascism, and social movements as related phenomenon leaves a void in the literature, thus opening the door for study into the proposed concept of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism which bridges this gap.

Section Two will utilize these definitions of fascism, neo-fascism, neo-Nazism, and Millennial Eurosceptic Populism (as established in section one) to categorize a selection of modern-day groups. Based on the criteria developed in Section One, which
will distinguish between categories, a determination will be made as to whether a group meets the necessary criteria and qualifies as a MEPG. The following groups were chosen from active fringe groups in Europe, and will be researched and analyzed utilizing a set of variable requirements:

- Alternative for Germany-AfD (Germany)
- Ataka (Bulgaria)
- Congress of the New Right (Poland)
- Danish People’s Party –DF (Denmark)
- Dutch Freedom Party-PVV (Netherlands)
- EDL (England)
- Fascism and Freedom Movement-National Socialist Party (Italy)
- Finns Party aka Perussuomalaiset (formerly True Finns)-PS (Finland)
- Freedom Party of Austria -FPO
- Front National (France)
- Golden Dawn (Greece)
- Jobbik (Hungary)
- LAOS (Greece)
- Lega Nord (Italy)
- National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD)
- Party of the Swedes (Sweden)
- Pegida (Germany)
- Podemos (Spain)
- Republican People's Party -Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP (Turkey)
• Right Sector (Ukraine)
• Slovak National Party –SNS (Slovakia)
• Svoboda (Ukraine)
• Swedish Democrats (Sweden)
• Swiss People’s Party (Switzerland)
• SYRIZA (Greece)
• UKIP (England)
• Vlaams Belang aka Flemish Interest (Belgium)

Following the research and classification process, the groups meeting the requirements of a MEPG will then be utilized for theoretical testing in Chapter IV. To begin this process, let us first build the case for Millennial Eurosceptic Fascism.

Section One: The Case for Millennial Eurosceptic Populism

As discussed in Chapter II, fascism and euroscepticism have been, and continue to be, studied as separate ideologies. As Vasilopoulou (2011, 224) observed: “The issue of radical right EU attitudes remains under-researched in terms of content as well as underlying argumentation.” This dissertation argues that merging the two fields allows for more foundationally sound study and improved research in causal and explanatory factors. Renton asserted in 1999, that “any model of fascism must ask which factors within the societies in which fascism emerged enabled the fascist parties to grow… The success of Le Pen… and Haider… suggests that fascism is again a threat” (Renton 1999, 4). Not only does this dissertation concur with his assessment, it contends that fascism has evolved into a modern idiom, enveloping and embodying the concept of euroscepticism.
A review of voting trends and media mentions confirm the increase in popularity of far-right and Eurosceptic groups. Google Trends data visualization (Figure 3.1) shows a steady increase in interest of far-right groups over time from 2005 through 2015 (Ramswell 2015). The info graphic (Figure 3.2) from Europe by Numbers (2014) shows the significant percentage of votes for strong right-wing parties in national elections from 2008-2013. As a case example, Stockemer (2012) graphed a comparison of citizen group support for the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in the years 1995 and 2007 (Figure 3.3). The increase in support more than doubled in three of the four categories, with the fourth just slightly less than double. Further, Udland’s 2015 research (Figure 3.4) on the right-wing highlighted the “real tail risk” of the increasing right-wing political power.

Figure 3.1. Interest in Far Right Over Time. The graph shows the increase in interest in Far Right groups over time.
Figure 3.2. % of Votes in National Elections. The percentage of votes for strong right-wing parties in national elections from 2008-2013 is demonstrated. Source: Europe By Numbers 2014.

Figure 3.3. SVP’s Mobilization of its base. This graph compares citizen group support for the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in the years 1995 and 2007. Source: Stockemer 2012.
Figure 3.4. Right-wing populism: the real tail risk in Europe. This bar graph indicates the “real tail risk” of the increasing right-wing political power. Source: Udland 2015.

In 2013, Berntson noted that: “the scope of fascist studies expands as new insights emerge, as more disciplines become involved, as new methods of inquiry are developed, and as new sources of data become available, such as archives in Russia and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union.” He also acknowledged “many scholars are preoccupied by the possibility of fascism’s return in today’s extreme right in Europe” (Berntson 2013).

Such preoccupation neatly meshes with Griffin’s frequently discussed “new consensus” of fascism, which he argues emerged in the 1990s and “conceptualizes fascism as a revolutionary form of ultra-nationalism that attempts to realize the myth of the regenerated nation” (Griffin 2012, 1; 1998; 2003). Scholars in the field, including Payne and Aristotle Kallis, concurred with Griffin’s theory, and Pinto (2011) observed
that the “‘new consensus’ of the 1990s…has only been extended and/or modified in specific ways and certainly not replaced.” By 2012, Griffin himself acknowledged the growth of the new consensus of fascism, stating he “would go even further and argue that by 2010 it has actually emerged and seems to have started spreading ‘contagiously’ to Marxist academic circles” (Griffin 2012, 13).

In 1991, Griffin observed that ideological factors combined with historical conditions often make fascism seem a viable choice. He contended that these factors, coupled with ultra-nationalism and the political space for extra movements, further opened the door for fascism to emerge (Griffin 1991). The new millennium was host to these factors, making it quite hospitable to the formation of new parties. Of note, Griffin (1991) posited that a major theme of contemporary fascism was a “Europe of Nations.” Whether consciously or ironically, the European parliament political group comprised of eurosceptics, co-chaired by Front National leader Marine Le Pen and Marcel de Graaff of the Netherland’s Partij voor de Vrijheid, was christened the Europe of Nations and Freedom Group when it launched on June 15, 2015.

Can one definitively assert that the groups emerging and finding success in Europe today are the same as those whom have existed for centuries, merely sporting new names or new leadership? Definitely not. There is much evidence to support that these groups are an anomaly, a new generation of political ideology and methodology. This study focuses on the contention that the groups rising and gaining power today are at once unique and reborn from strains of traditional fascism. Millennial eurosceptic populism is the result of the turn of the 21st century’s convergence of political opportunity, populism, nationalism, and euroscepticism.
En route to establishing a definition of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, it is important to review and discuss traditional fascism and its derivatives. The reasons for this are twofold: it is necessary to note similarities and potential differences between Millennial Eurosceptic Populism and its predecessors; and it will serve as a foundation for and springboard into the rationale for creating this new category of fascism.

Deconstructing Fascism and its Various Forms

Traditional Fascism. The term “fascism” is from the Latin ‘fascis’ and Italian ‘fascio,’ meaning bundle or political group. The term has become exceptionally difficult to define as a result of the meanings ascribed to it and their evolution. Chapter II discussed the difficulty scholars have in isolating a single definition of fascism as a result of these connotations and associated historical influence. In 1996, Eatwell logically argued that fascism “must be seen primarily as a series of ideas” (Renton 1999, 19). There was, he argued, “no other way to interpret fascism.” Eatwell believed that “fascism could not be viewed as a form of regime; moreover, fascism cannot be defined as a species of political movement, because such movements ‘exhibit time and context specific features’ which draw attention away from the decisive core of fascist ideas” (Renton 1999, 19). Using the argument that fascism was primarily an ideology, Eatwell (1996, 303-319) contended that fascism was best defined in these terms: “Generic fascism, transcending place and time, is identified as ‘an ideology that strives to forge social rebirth based on a holistic-national radical Third Way, though in practice fascism has tended to stress style, especially action and the charismatic leader, more than detailed programme, and to engage in a Manichaean demonisation of its enemies.’” Eatwell’s description of an ideology that strived to forge ‘rebirth’ is particularly apropos with
respect to euroscepticism, especially when juxtaposed with Griffin’s (1991) concept of ‘palingenetic ultranationalism’ (also a rebirth but on a national level) and his observation that “fascism emerged when a nation perceived itself to be in crisis.” Indeed, Vasilopolou and Halikiopoulou (2015) discussed this concept as it related to the far-right Greek group “Golden Dawn:”

The success of Golden Dawn must be understood precisely within this context: as dependent on the extent to which it was able to propose plausible solutions to the three sets of crises – economic, political and ideological – that befell Greece and culminated in an overall crisis of democracy to which Golden Dawn offered a nationalist solution. This can be shown by drawing upon the theories of fascism developed by authors such as Michael Mann and Roger Griffin. We argue that the nature of the Greek crisis and the fact that its economic, political and ideological dimensions challenged the Greek nation-state at its core, opened up a political opportunity for Golden Dawn to present itself as the saviour of the nation and defender of the national mission. Like fascist movements of the past, Golden Dawn puts forward “a ‘palingenetic myth’ of populist ultra-nationalism, seeking a nation rising Phoenix-like from the ashes of an old decadent social order.” (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015)

Eatwell and Griffin’s explanations of fascism highlight its stark parallels to euroscepticism. Further, the formation of movements with strategies and goals (Kitsikis 1988; Payne 1980), and the idea of a new generation of intellectuals rising against liberal society (Sternhell 1995), give further pause. Noted Leonard, et al (2013):

The old explanation for euroscepticism was the alleged existence of a democratic deficit within the EU. Decisions, critics said, were taken by unaccountable institutions rather than elected national governments. But the current crisis is born not of a clash between Brussels and the member states but a clash between the democratic wills of citizens in northern and southern Europe - the so-called centre and periphery. And both sides are now using EU institutions to advance their interests. (Leonard, et al. 2013, 1)
The similarities between fascism and euroscepticism cannot be ignored: nations in social and political turmoil, a rebirth of nationalism, group formation and rise, and a new generation in a state of revolt.

With such sweeping concepts and identifiers, it is easy to see how selecting one overarching yet concise definition of fascism has proven problematic. Efforts to develop a more succinct definition, therefore, have tended to focus on commonalities. For the purposes of this study and, in part as determined by the definition of neo-fascism discussed in the next section, fascism (and, more specifically, fascist groups) will simply be defined as: any group exhibiting nationalism and unity by way of a desire to transform, cleanse, and expand its personal community, AND that was under an authoritarian leadership willing to use force and viewing itself as superior to others, AND that existed pre-World War II.

*Neo-Fascism.* During the 20th century, fascism developed subcategories that contained its central tenets, yet established identities of their own. The subgroups ‘neo-fascist’ and ‘neo-Nazi’ are the two most widely-accepted offshoots of their ideological progenitor. Unfortunately, the difficulty in isolating a universally-accepted definition of fascism has not been limited to the term ‘fascism.’ Selection of a unifying definition for neo-fascism is only slightly less problematic, thanks in part to the parameters created by selecting a date or timeframe as a dividing line.

The term neo-fascism has become quite generic, embracing many groups with many different mantras. In its simplest form, and perhaps most widely accepted, neo-fascism is defined as a fascist group existing post-World War II. *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism* (2009) noted that the term neo-fascism defines primarily “those political and
ideological groups and parties that operated after 1945, especially in Europe, and which were directly inspired by the experience of the inter-war fascist and Nazi regimes in Germany, Italy, and other European countries.” Further, many such groups “held radical and uncompromising views which emphasized the revolutionary nature of fascism rather than its more ‘reassuring’ nationalist or statist version” (Oxford Handbook of Fascism 2009).

The Encyclopedia Britannica (2009) defined neo-fascism as “a political philosophy and movement that arose in Europe in the decades following World War II, advocating extreme nationalism, opposing liberal individualism, attacking Marxist and other left-wing ideologies, indulging in racist and xenophobic scapegoating, and promoting populist right-wing economic programs.” It was noted that the National Front in France and the Liberal-Democratic Party in Russia were often cited as examples of neo-fascist groups (Encyclopedia Britannica 2009).

The difficulty in defining neo-fascism lies in the inclusion or exclusion of the hereto defined fascist groups, now whom must be further delineated based on ideology. This characteristic already serves as a point of division amongst scholars of fascism, some of whom contend fascism is not an ideology but a form of governance or a way of life. In fact, noted Italian fascist theorist Giovanni Gentile believed that fascism was best viewed as “authoritarian democracy.”

However, for purposes of this research, ideology will serve as the primary qualifier distinguishing between neo-fascism and neo-Nazism—in itself a distinction many scholars do not make (neo-Nazism will be discussed in the next section). Succinctly, Griffin (1991) referred to neo-fascism as post-war fascism and applied the
term to parties inspired by traditional fascism. Accordingly, for this research, \textit{neo-fascism shall be defined as fascism (as defined above) occurring post World War II}.

Nazism, in its purest form as characterized by Adolf Hitler, is considered part of traditional fascism. However, as a post-WWII incarnation, there is a distinction between fascism and Nazism. A group determined to meet the characteristics of neo-Nazism, as determined in the next section, shall be included in that category rather than in neo-fascism. It is in this vein that a distinction between neo-fascism and millennial eurosceptic populism will also be constructed.

\textit{Neo-Nazism.} Griffin (1998) argued that fascism and Nazism were different from one another though at the same time linked through a “common mythic core.” He asserted that since 1945, many racially-motivated fascist organizations have been inspired by Nazism and, further, that these new Nazi movements were referred to as neo-Nazis because they used Adolf Hitler’s Nazi movement as inspiration but modified original Nazi ideological doctrine (Griffin 1991). Indeed, neo-Nazism could be considered a sub-group of neo-fascism. This research distinguishes between neo-fascism and neo-Nazism. Inclusion in the neo-Nazi category of fascism for this paper will require a Nazi ideology/refrain with a stated tenet of ‘scientific racism’ and/or anti-Semitism. Further, scientific racism will serve as a specific qualifier for this category. Garrod (2006, 54) defined scientific racism as “a scientific tradition in which biology is used not only to prove the existence of race, but also, to maintain existing social hierarchies.” Explained Garrod (2006):

\begin{quote}
While science has the reputation of objectively testing theories using the scientific method, scientific racism is the exact opposite. It seeks to create definitions of race and culture based on opinion and extremely
\end{quote}
questionable evidence: ‘Supposed scientific evidence was marshalled, to establish both the existence of different racial types, and their depiction within a hierarchy of superior and inferior, where the Black was regarded as inferior.’ (Garrod 2006, 55, citing Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992)

The parameters for neo-Nazism are, therefore, fairly straightforward. Neo-Nazi groups shall henceforth be defined as groups adhering to the Nazi ideology, scientific racism/anti-Semitism, AND existing post World War II.

Defining Millennial Eurosceptic Populism

The need to view this turn-of-the-century rise in extremist nationalism through a different lens has three vocal proponents: experts who have clearly acknowledged a need for combined study; the manifestation of political parties who have altered the political atmosphere in Europe; and the undeniable similarities between euroscepticism and fascism. This dissertation asserts that the proposed concept of millennial eurosceptic populism serves as an effective response to this need.

The problems associated with creating a universally accepted definition can often be found in the elements being used as descriptors, as the elements themselves are often challenged by thinkers embracing different perspectives. Table 3.1 lists the defining elements of fascism, neo-fascism, neo-Nazism, as well as for Millennial Eurosceptic Fascism.

With any group, consideration of cultural, environmental and historical conditions is important, but so are goals, methods and long-term strategic plans. Cunningham (2012) acknowledged that the conceptualized categories and definitions of fascism prove problematic. He asserted that “dismissing the need for a shared conceptual definition of
fascism risks the overextension of the term to any national movement bearing vague similarities” (Cunningham 2012, 379).

Also of import is recognizing that Millennial Eurosceptic Populism is a modern view of fascism, fascism in the new millennium, a new perspective on a centuries-old concept. One of the challenges in retaining the term “fascism” is overcoming its pejorative reputation. BBC (10/20/09) reported that though it has been “more than six decades since the end of World War II and the fall of Nazi Germany, those events remain the prism through which the word ‘fascism’ is still viewed.” When describing the difficulty faced in overcoming this negative connotation, Griffin (2012) eloquently acknowledged that:

…many representatives of an older generation of scholars would doubtless persist in seeing fascism as essentially nihilistic, barbaric, anti-modern, and lacking an ideology apart from the cult of action, violence and destruction, or, if they were Marxists, as basically (petty) bourgeois or capitalist reaction. But I argued that within the emerging consensus it was increasingly accepted that “like conservatism, anarchism, liberalism, or ecologism, fascism is definable as an ideology with a specific ‘positive’, utopian vision of the ideal state of society, a vision which can assume a number of distinctive forms determined by local circumstances while retaining a core matrix of axioms.” (Griffin 2012, 6)

Indeed, the concept of millennial eurosceptic populism is that it is at once the same as and different from classic fascism; it retains symbolic strands of its predecessor while exhibiting a pivotal distinction: widespread acclaim. In fact, Oxford English Dictionary now offers several definitions of fascism including: “(loosely) a person of right-wing authoritarian views” and “a person who advocates a particular viewpoint or practice in a manner perceived as intolerant or authoritarian” (BBC 10/20/09).
It is important to carefully delineate the “who, what, when, where, and why” en route to establishing a complete profile and definition of Millennial Eurosceptic Fascism. Part of this process is straightforward: the “when” is identified by virtue of the term “millennial” (though a more specific date will be discussed during examination of hypotheses); similarly, “where” (Europe) evolves from the title of this dissertation and the inclusion of the term “Eurosceptic.” The “how” will be examined in detail in the methodology section. Before taking a look at the “who” and the “what,” let us turn first to the “why.”

The Why. Why is it important to study Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, and why do MEPGs warrant a separate category of fascism? Primarily because the current and potential effects are so significant. Evidence of the need to examine Millennial Eurosceptic Populism became readily apparent in the aftermath of the 2014 European elections, if not before. The election results lend themselves to an excellent starting point in discussing the significance of these groups.

As discussed in Chapter II, the 2014 European Parliamentary elections resulted in an influx of far-right and far-left eurosceptic and euroreject parties—a group which now forms an estimated 27 percent of the assembly. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) was the clear victor, marking the first time since 1906 that a party other than the Labour Party or Conservative Party won the general election. Further, according to Reuters (Osborn and Faulconbridge 2014) it was also “the first time a party other than the Labour and Conservatives won the majority of seats in a national election since the December 1910 general election.”
In France, the far-right National Front party won a historic victory with 25% of the French vote (compared to the 6% it garnered in 2009), besting more moderate pro-EU parties whom had dominated the elections five prior (CNN 2014). In Greece, the rise of the Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή) has drawn many comparisons to the rise of the Nazi regime in the 1930s (Fallon 2014). Observed Mansheim (2014): “Swept into popularity by the current lack of faith in the EU among Greeks, the aggressively neo-fascist party is now the third most popular political party in Greece, and is making inroads on its mainstream opponents.” In May 2015, “the party received seven percent of the vote, and 6.9 percent in June, granting it 21 and 18 parliamentary seats out of 300 respectively; they retained their support in the 2014 European Parliament Elections receiving 9.38 percent of the vote and hold the third greatest number of seats (17) in Greek Parliament” (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015).

Further, there are concerns about increased connections to Russia. Observed Kreko (2014):

Russia supports increasingly popular anti-EU parties on the far left and far right, hoping to have pro-Russian caucuses in the next Parliament to help articulate Russian views, and to have an impact on decision-making processes… Fifteen out of 25 major European far-right parties are vocal and open supporters of Russia and Russian interests, while seven can be classified as ‘open’ and only three as hostile towards Russia. (Kreko 2014)

Perhaps more alarming: “The Hungarian Jobbik party has supported Russia since it was elected to the European Parliament in 2009. The party’s 2010 election program described the establishment and maintenance of good relations with ‘an increasingly influential Russia’ as vitally important” (Kreko 2014).
Halikiopoulou, et al. (2012), rightfully observing that research has led scholars to stress the compatibility of many aspects of nationalism with right-wing radicalism (Breuilly 1993; Freed 1998; Hechter 2000; and Kedourie 1960). Walsh (2014) contended that “the vote for anti-EU populists and socialists, even for right-wing extremists and assorted oddballs, is a rejection of high-handed governance that pays little attention to people’s needs and desires.” In 2014, Gifford added, “populist euro sceptic mobilizations have become an established response to the underlying crises of legitimacy faced by both British mainstream parties. These have occurred when the weaknesses in the British governing position on Europe has been particularly exposed, such as the struggle for membership on acceptable terms and the failure of Conservative governments to halt or influence the drive for Economic and Monetary Union.”

Jim Wolfreys, Senior Lecturer for contemporary French politics at King’s College London, used the example of the Front National to explain how far right parties manage to be accepted by the electorate: "The founders of [the Front National] consciously attempted to mask direct affiliation of fascism behind a language and an appearance that courted respectability," (Schwab and Joyner 2015). The authors contended that “these movements benefited from the dissatisfaction with mainstream parties, but they were also helped by the fact that the right-wing parties of today are very different to those of previous decades” (Schwab and Joyner 2015).

As Renton (1999, 43) observed: “fascism remains a force in European society, and a theory of it is needed which grasps the processes and dynamism of fascism as it continues to exist.” The impact of millennial eurosceptic populism is obvious. Euroscepticism has made an ineradicable mark on society and in the European political
landscape. With agendas and ideologies echoing the sentiments of fascism, and paths that mimic the rise of the most notorious fascist groups in history, it is incumbent on academics to explore the issue in unconventional and, perhaps, even new ways.

_The Who and the What._ In 1997, Lacqueur asserted that if fascist regimes were to come into power in the future, they would not take their earlier form. Indeed, many scholars left room for future delineation of fascism with expansive typologies and consensus definitions. Millennial Eurosceptic Populism has been constructed as a modern-day form of fascism. Its distinction from other types of fascism lies within the unique elements that have allowed for its rise, acceptance and relative success among the plethora of social movements throughout Europe. Acceptance of this concept serves to eliminate Millennial Eurosceptic Populism from established categories, but, in what ways? What aspects of these groups have allowed them to stand on their own?

Euroscepticism is held to be the primary characteristic of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, though the term itself has been met with an array of definitions. Many scholars whom study euroscepticism have focused their research on categorizing the degree of euroscepticism, developing typologies based on a variety of factors. It is my opinion that, for purposes of classification and consideration as a millennial Eurosceptic populist group, no further division is necessary. It was Paxton who, in 2005, pointed to the “latent (but misleading) Darwinian convention that if we study the origins of something, we grasp its inner blueprint” (2005, 53). This observation concurs with one of the key premises of this dissertation: a need for a macro-level study into a theoretical explanation for euroscepticism. Indeed, the aspects of euroscepticism utilized to further deconstruct parties, such as exit strategy, primary source of euroscepticism and goal, do not take
away from the core tenet held by them all—dissatisfaction with the EU and a desire to change it. In fact, the degrees of euroscepticism presented by various scholars (*hard, soft, reject, phobe, enthusiast*) are found comparable to factions within existing parties. For example, in the United States, members of the Republican Party hold often very divisive views depending on their stance as a conservative, moderate or libertarian. Further, these positions are also often subdivided based on foundational leanings, leading one to identify him/herself as, for example, a fiscally conservative or socially conservative Republican. The bottom line remains—each person still identifies with and considers himself a Republican. In fact, recent analyses of the Conservative party in England have “identified a spectrum of Eurosceptic views ranging from outright withdrawal to those who accept the status quo but object to further integration” (Lynch and Whitaker 2012).

For purposes of this research, euroscepticism will be defined as Taggart (1998, 366) described it: “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.” Utilizing this definition of euroscepticism as a foundation, this dissertation argues that Eurosceptic groups are a social and political variant making an indelible mark on European society analogous to fascism.

Several other traits are intrinsic to Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, such as nationalism, populism, reformist, main-stream appeal, popular agendas, and right-wing. This brings us to a decision point. In Europe and European Parliament, there are a number of left-wing Eurosceptic parties who have gained notoriety, including Greece’s SYRIZA. In fact, EP contains Eurosceptic groups from across the political spectrum,
including the “European Conservatives and Reformists group, typified by center-right parties such as the British Conservative Party (considered to be a soft Eurosceptic group), and the European United Left–Nordic Green Left which is an alliance of left-wing parties” (Szczerbiak 2008, 418). This gives pause, as the original conception of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism was right-wing Eurosceptic groups.

In an effort to remain true to the original and successive forms of fascism, I initially believed it important to continue the tradition of fascism as a purely right-wing phenomenon. However, millennial eurosceptic populism is a new, modern interpretation of a century-old concept. Deliberation led to a review of Mussolini’s intentions and objectives as founder of the fascist party. In 1919, Mussolini famously described fascism as “a movement that would strike against the backwardness of the right and the destructiveness of the left,” yet it is these words spoken in 1922 which served as the tipping point in the debate:

Fascism, sitting on the right, could also have sat on the mountain of the center ... These words in any case do not have a fixed and unchanged meaning: they do have a variable subject to location, time and spirit. We don't give a damn about these empty terminologies and we despise those who are terrorized by these words. (Mussolini 1922)

Therefore, the decision was made to not automatically disqualify left-wing groups from a Millennial Eurosceptic Populism classification.

In an effort to better quantify Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, it is necessary to include disqualifiers— traits which, if present, will serve to eliminate a group from inclusion. Disqualifiers that serve to remove a group from the category of millennial eurosceptic populism are: stated platform of anti-Semitism or scientific racism (as
explained above), and violent acts/terrorism with the intention of forcing compliance or surrender.

Utilizing the characteristics and disqualifiers described above, we can now define millennial eurosceptic populism based on certain necessary criteria. In 2003, Griffin wrote: “I believe any new theory of fascism should meet the challenge of being summarized in a sentence if it is not to be a work of obfuscation rather than clarification… the most recent offerings from Laqueur, Renton, and Gregor all failed this test” (Griffin 2003, 8). In crafting a definition of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, I believed it important to adhere to Griffin’s conception of a concise yet accurate description. Therefore, the following definition was established:

A Millennial Eurosceptic Populist Group will be defined as a non-violent, non-anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic group, formed after the Cold War, exhibiting euroscepticism, embracing populism, and promoting a nationalist/reformist agenda.

Section Two: Qualification as a Millennial Eurosceptic Populist Group

As discussed in Section One, Millennial Eurosceptic Populism is defined as fascism occurring post-Cold War era, non-violent, non-anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic, right or left-wing, Eurosceptic, with a nationalist, reformist agenda. This section analyzes the previously identified potential parties and groups to determine whether they meet the criteria necessary for inclusion in the category of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism. Six variables have been determined based on the definition of Millennial Populist Euroscepticism. Each potential group/party will be analyzed to determine which, if any, of the six variables are applicable to that group. Groups that are identified as meeting the qualifications of all six variables shall be determined to have met the
requirements necessary for classification as a MEPG. By default, groups not meeting the
criteria for Millennial Eurosceptic Populism will then be categorized as neo-Nazi or neo-
fascist. The variables for Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, their descriptions, and how a
qualification will be determined are outlined below:

Variables

A. Occurring post-Cold War. Identified as: formation or restructured ideology
occurring 1990 or later;

   How determined: Review of group’s history, vision/ideology, official
website(s)/publications

B. Non-Violent. Identified as: strategy and ideology that does not promote
violence or terroristic acts;

   How determined: Review of group’s mission, vision, official
website(s)/publications, media reports; non-promotion of nor participation in violence by
leadership or its members

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Identified as: mission and vision do not
specifically contain anti-Semitic, racist or homophobic ideology;

   How determined: Review of group’s mission, vision, official
website(s)/publications, media/news reports

D. Right-wing/left-wing. Identified as: a group falling anywhere along the
political spectrum;

   How determined: Political identification as stated on official
website(s)/publications or in media
E. *Eurosceptic.* Identified as: contingent or qualified and outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration, austerity measures, or the EU and European project;

How determined: Review of group’s mission, vision, official website(s)/publications, media/news reports

F. *Nationalist/Reformist.* Identified as: belief that the interests of the nation-state are of primary importance; a desire to reform the policies of the EU;

How determined: Review of group’s mission, vision, official website(s)/publications, media/news reports

At this juncture, I believe it important to provide a few points of clarification. People have a tendency to misuse the word racist, particularly when discussing Islamophobia, defined by *Oxford English Dictionary* as “the dislike of or prejudice against Islam or Muslims, especially as a political force.” The media perpetuates this misuse which has, in many cases, led to a party’s erroneous labelling as “racist.” The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines race as “each of the major divisions of humankind, having distinct physical characteristics,” and racism as “prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against someone of a different race based on the belief that one’s own race is superior.”

Some of the groups researched were found to promote anti-Islam/anti-Muslim platforms. These groups were almost always referred to as “racist.” As delineated above and underscored by The Religion of Peace (2015), “Race is the arbitrary classification of individuals according to physical traits that presumably have a genetic pattern. Muslims
are not a race, as is often implied but if they were then it would make Islam the world's most dangerous race-based supremacist ideology.”

Similarly, some groups studied are accused of xenophobia, which is also used interchangeably with the term racism. According to Oxford English Dictionary, xenophobia is the “intense or irrational dislike or fear of people from other countries.” Again, xenophobia is different from racism. A person whom is xenophobic could very well dislike someone of their own race simply because they are from a different country. Xenophobia is a location-based fear, not a race-based fear.

Therefore, this dissertation will distinguish between racism, xenophobia and religious prejudice. For Variable C, religious prejudice and xenophobia (absent racism), will not disqualify a group from meeting the required conditions.

Analysis and Qualification

Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland - AfD), Germany

According to the BBC (Hill, 2015), “AfD was founded in 2013 by Bernd Lucke, Alexander Gauland and Konrad Adam to oppose German-backed bailouts for poorer Southern European countries… The party became the first anti-euro party to win seats in a German regional parliament, receiving almost 10% of the vote in the eastern German state of Saxony in 2014, and has gone on to win seats in other states” (Hill, 2015). “The party had seven MEPs elected in the 2014 European elections and is currently part of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group” (Hill, 2015).

Frauke Petry replaced Lucke as party leader following his departure in early July 2015, arguing that AfD had become increasingly xenophobic (Hill, 2015). The party has been called the “Party of Professors” (due to the high percentage of members holding
doctorates- including founder Lucke) and the German Tea Party by various media including the BBC, Deutsche Welle, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, and UK’s Guardian.

A. Occurring post-Cold War. AfD was founded in 2013. Condition: met.

B. Non-Violent. AfD carefully screens its membership for evidence of right-wing extremism or radicalism. The group is not considered violent nor a perpetrator of violence. Rather, the party has been the target of several acts of violence by others. Reported Spiegel (Heine, 2013): “AfD campaigners have received threatening phone calls, been subjected to verbal abuse and -- in some cases -- physical attacks… Though the AfD has complained of such incidents in a number of cities including Berlin, Lübeck and Nuremberg, the party points to a particularly brutal confrontation at a campaign stand in the eastern town of Göttingen [in 2013].” Party leader Lucke has warned against the opposition’s tendency toward attribution error: “A violent crime committed by two extremists should not be attributed to an entire religious community, the majority of which consists of peaceful, respectable people,” (Sagener et al, 2015). Condition: met.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. The Economist (2/23/2015) noted that AfD is a group that “calls for dissolving the euro and which often uses anti-immigrant and homophobic innuendo in its campaigns.” However, once again, anti-immigrant is a term many use in response to a nationalist platform. Innuendo is subjective and not factual. In fact, the Guardian (Oltermann, 2014) reported that AfD “MEP Beatrix von Storch, who is considered one of the leading voices of party's conservative faction, frequently asserts that she sees the AfD as founded on a ‘Christian view of humanity’…Von Storch has described support networks for young gay people at German
schools as "forced sexualisation." However, Von Storch (2011) clarified her comments, stating that “I condemn not, there are people who live differently than oneself or as you would expect. That's not what it is about. It's about the government mission statement.”

AfD has been the target of accusations of anti-Semitism. However, in 2014, AfD-state board unanimously launched party exclusion proceedings against the Uckermark district chairman and designated MEP Jan-Ulrich Weiss after he posted an anti-Semitic cartoon on his Facebook page. The caricature was considered reminiscent of the Nazi paper Der Stuermer (Dvorin, 2014). Ultimately, speculation abounds but AfD does not promote an anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic agenda. Condition met.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. “Though the party intentionally avoids labelling itself as left- or right-wing, the German media has in recent months taken to portraying it as one of several right-wing populist parties eating into the voter base of conservative Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats” (Heine, 2013). EurActiv refers to the group as “right-wing populist” (Sagener et al, 2015). Condition: met..

E. Eurosceptic. Party spokesman Alexander Gauland acknowledged that "there are differences between being euro-critical, EU-critical, and Europe-critical. We are critical of the euro and the EU, but we are pro-European," (Knight and Goebel, 2014). EurActiv (Sagener et al, 2015) classified the group as “the Eurosceptic Alternative for Germany (AfD).” Condition: met.

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6 Original German text, translation is my own: “Ich verurteile das nicht, es gibt Menschen, die leben anders als man selbst oder als man es gewohnt ist. Darum geht es nicht. Es geht um das staatliche Leitbild” from «Die Gesellschaft kann nicht das leisten, was eine Familie leistet» Interview mit Beatrix von Storch, Vorsitzende der Zivilen Koalition e. V. (Von Storch Interview 2011)
F. Nationalist/Reformist. AfD is classified as a nationalist conservative party (Bundeswahlleiter, 2015). Observed Lochocki(2015): “The AfD’s party platform largely follows the formula of classic European right-wing populists, positioning itself as for the nation and against the existing political establishment.” Condition: met.

AfD: ALL CONDITIONS MET

ATAKA (Атака), Bulgaria

ATAKA, or “attack,” is a Bulgarian party which has gained increasing notoriety since its formation in 2005. The party touted a concise platform of 20 Principles which, “in June 2005, catapulted them into the 40th parliament (2005-2009) with 8.94% of the popular vote and 21 seats” (ATAKA, 2015). The group’s mantra “Let’s regain Bulgaria for the Bulgarians!” is one that resounds with many Bulgarians. Its founder and leader, Volen Siderov, is a former journalist whose television program was also called ‘Ataka.’

Siderov was one of the first who started anti-EU campaigning because of the closure of four blocs of “Koslodui” nuclear power plant. He also “was the first who openly gave an ethnic adjective to the criminal [in Bulgaria]... In [sic] the same time he accused the Government, the EU and the Roma organisations for money laundering [sic] and redirecting of that money to private pockets, on [sic] expense of Bulgarians” (Novaković 2008, 53).

A. Occurring post-Cold War. The ATAKA party was established by Siderov in 2005 as “a patriotic formation to stand up against globalization” (Feffer 2013). Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. In 2011, a violent protest by supporters of the far-right party Ataka led party leader Siderov to state that he had “never incited ethnic or religious hatred... and that the people who clashed with Muslims at the mosque are not members of his party,” (Dzhambazova 2011). In a 2011 Human Rights Report, it was noted that “despite the widespread condemnation of Ataka for the incident and the prosecuting authorities opening of pre-trial proceedings against several assailants arrested on the scene, it merits mention that the proceedings define the ultra-nationalists’ actions as ‘hooliganism’ rather than discriminatory violence on the grounds of religion.” “Hooliganism, as defined by the Criminal Code of Bulgaria (Article 325), constitutes acts against ‘public order’” (Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 2011). Condition: met

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. In 2013, leaders of the party distributed pamphlets detailing the group’s manifesto which highlighted the fact that: “ATAKA is neither a racist nor xenophobic party and this can be seen by every objective observer who reads our pragramme [sic] and gets familiar with our activities,” noted ATAKA MP Magdalena Tasheva (www.ataka.bg).

This position seemingly contradicts actions of the group in its early years: “ATAKA, which employed racist and discriminatory rhetoric during the 2005 and 2006 electoral campaigns, published anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim material in its newspaper, on its Web site, and on its cable television mouthpiece Skat” (US Department of State, 2008). In a 2013 interview, Volen Siderov, leader of Ataka, stated, “We do not have the difference between blacks and whites here. Racism was never an issue in Bulgaria. However, when crime rates rise, and all this crime originates in these ethnic groups,
people start having negative sentiments. So there is not a single village in Bulgaria that
has not been robbed by the Gypsy groups,” (Feffer, 2013).

Further, in 2014, Siderov proposed “amendments to Bulgaria’s Penal Code …
that would have imposed jail and huge fines for “public manifestations of homosexuality”
such as taking part in gay parades” (Leviev-Sawyer, 2014). Thus, unless ATAKA is
splitting hairs and viewing a racist ideology as different from an anti-Semitic/anti-Roma
ideology, the group is clearly misrepresenting their beliefs. In this instance, an official
stance is overruled by action and circuitous statements. Condition: unmet.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. Noted Foreign Policy in Focus, “The platform of
Bulgaria’s ATAKA mixes a left-wing critique of globalization with a frankly nationalist
approach to minority policy,” (Feffer 2013). Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. Interestingly, according to Euractiv.com: “Bulgarians are broadly
pro-European, largely because they trust EU institutions more than those of their own
country. The latest Eurobarometer poll shows that Bulgaria is among the countries that is
the most positive about the future of the EU, at 61%, with 27% pessimistic… The EU
average is 53% optimist, versus 40% pessimist” (Euractiv.com, 2014). Nonetheless,
Ataka is considered “the key progenitor of the Eurosceptic undercurrent” (Dandalov,
2014). Accordingly, Number 16 of Ataka’s “20 Principles” states: “Reconsideration of
the closed chapters in the accession negotiations with the EU; renegotiation of all
unfavourable clauses, damaging Bulgaria’s interest. Cancellation of any agreements,
accords or memoranda implying or demanding the decommissioning of the Kozlodui
NPP,” (ATAKA 2015). The party affirmed their stance in 2013, stating “Yes, we are a
Eurosceptic and anti-globalist party” (ATAKA, 2015). Condition: met
F. Nationalist/Reformist. The group is often characterized in the media as ultra-nationalist (Yahoo, BBC, *The Guardian*). Party leader Siderov has stated that “the struggle of our party is to make the Bulgarian nationality a category of prestige, so that the inhabitant of a ghetto would be proud to call himself Bulgarian,” (Feffer, 2013). The party’s official website notes one goal of the party as “Every Bulgarian investor, entrepreneur, and/or manufacturer shall have precedence over any foreign one, up until Bulgaria’s living standards reach the average European level. Bulgaria’s production, commerce, banks and all other means of production should be in Bulgarian hands,” (ATAKA, 2015). In fact, the group’s #1 stated goal is: “Bulgaria is a unitary, monolithic state, not liable to secession on neither religious, ethnic, cultural, or any other basis. Differences by origin or faith shall have no priority over nationality. Whoever violates this principle, detaches oneself off from the Bulgarian nation and the Bulgarian state and shall not be eligible to lay any claims to both of them,” (ATAKA, 2015). Condition: met.

ATAKA: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET

*Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy, Nowa Prawica-KNP), Poland*

KNP was founded on 25 March 2011 by Janusz Korwin-Mikke, the 4th place finished in Poland’s the 2010 presidential election. KNP was “a result of a merger of the Freedom and Lawfulness (WiP) with several members of the Real Politics Union (UPR)” (Dutch News, 6/19/14). It was considered a radical libertarian party and sought decriminalization of the use and production of all drugs (Dutch News, 6/19/14). The Democratic Society (5/13/2014) noted that Korwin-Mikke has conservative views on women and homosexuality and has previously suggested that women should not have the vote. In the 2014 KNP Election Programme, Korwin-Mikke claimed that “KNP is the
only anti-EU party in Poland, consistently and without compromise. Our goal is to
dissolve the EU by reducing this artificial, statist, fiscal, and ideological construct to a
free trade zone – the original European Economic Community, which was the source of
the economic success and prosperity of the West after World War II.” The 2014 election
resulted in KNP garnering 7.06% of the vote, finishing 4th in the national poll and
earning four MEPs (Lesniak, 2014). KNP joined the Europe of Freedom and Direct
Democracy group in 2014. In January 2015, Korwin-Mikke was ousted from KNP and
created a splinter party called Korwin. Since that time, Korwin holds two seats and KNP
the other two (KNP, 2015).

A. Occurring post-Cold War. KNP was founded in March 2011 by Janusz

B. Non-Violent. “If someone gives money to an unemployed person he should
have his hand cut off because he is destroying the morale of the people,” Korwin-Mikke
said, adding “Europeans were very aggressive and now the boys are taught not to be
aggressive … Give them the pistol, give them a sword” (Graham-Harrison 2014). In
2014, it was widely reported that Korwin-Mikke “slapped a leftwing Polish politician in
the face” (Graham-Harrison, 2014). As noted in Bachynowski (2015), Korwin-Mikke is
even unwilling to condemn China for cruel acts of violence towards citizens, if those
actions work to the economic benefit of the country. Condition: unmet

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. In his 2014 electoral interview to the EU
parliament, Korwin Mikke expressed his belief that there is no proof that Hitler did know
anything about Jews’ extermination which is a reference to the assertion of British
historian David Irving (Open Europe, 2014).
According to the Jewish Chronicle (Tzur, 10/21/2014), “While Korwin-Mikke claimed he was “against any restrictions on minorities”, he explained this by saying: “For us there are no minorities, there are only Polish citizens. We are against special rights for minorities. The same with Jews.” Further, Tzur (2014) stated: “Korwin-Mikke said that Jews’ efforts to win back property stolen during the Second World War often amounted to a “Holocaust industry”…and that the only Jews left in Poland were “Jewish communists”, adding: “Jews are very talented people, and therefore are our worst enemies, because they are talented communists. “This is why the Poles have a specific image of Jews. They don’t know the real Jews, only the Communists ones who stayed here.” KNP also opposes gay marriage and advocates for the disfranchisement of women because they are “not as clever as men (Bachrynowski, 2015). Condition: unmet.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. KNP is right-wing conservative with a blend of libertarian and conservative views. The Huffington Post refers to the group as a right-wing political party (Lesniak 2014). Sabin (2014) refers to KNP’s EP as the “right-wing MEP.” Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. As noted above, Korwin-Mikke boasted that “KNP is the only anti-EU party in Poland” (KNP 2014). According to Open Europe (2014), Korwin-Mikke commented in 2014 that "We are going to the European Parliament to show what a nonsensical institution it is. It's not possible to achieve anything sensible there." Further, Open Europe (2014) reported that Korwin-Mikke declared that “the party would go into the parliament in order to detonate a bomb inside it, while one of his MEP candidates claimed that the European Parliament is a brothel, a role for which it is ideally suited” (Open Europe 2014).
Lesniak (2014) noted that KNP is “against adopting euro as polish official currency and strongly discourage from further integration within the European Union.” Condition: met.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. Party founder Korwin-Mikke is a well-known Polish nationalist with a long history of activism on behalf of Poland. Korwin-Mikke “advocates national self-interest and the instrumentalisation of political” (BBC 28 April 2014). Lesniak (2014) noted that KNP “embraces the standpoint of disbanding minimal wage and privileges of labour unions. The party also demands constitutional amendment imposing on future governments to balance national budget (preventing incurring debts).” Condition: met.

KNP: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET

Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti-DF), Denmark

According to the party’s website, the Danish People's Party (DF, though alternatively abbreviated DPP in English) was founded at Christiansborg on October 6, 1995, with co-founder Pia Kjærgaard unanimously elected as party chairman (DF 2015). The party is viewed as populist, nationalist and Eurosceptic, and has been led by Kristian Thulesen Dahl since 2012. In 2001, the party won 12% of the vote and 22 seats; by 2007, it had claimed 13.9% and 25 seats. In 2015, DF “jumped to 21.1% from 12.3% in 2011” (Economist 6/19/15). DF is a member of the Europe of Freedom and Democracy group in the European Parliament.

A. Occurring post-Cold War. The party was formed in 1995 when its founders separated from the Progress Party (DF 2015). Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. The DF opposes violence and favors stricter laws on crime. The party’s website notes “Preservation of law and order is of great importance in a society founded on the rule of law, and therefore there must be coherence between crime and punishment” (DF 2015). Counterpoint (2014) rated the group as a low danger for violence. Condition: met.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. In 2003, Pia Kjærsgaard “lost a 2003 libel action against a political opponent who accused the party of having ‘racist policies’” (Europhobia 2009). The courtroom loss resulted in many opponents labeling the group as an officially racist organization (Europhobia 2009). Pfisterer (2011) noted that “The DF rejects multiculturalism and…demands increasingly stronger rules for immigrants: last year DF party leader Pia Kjærsgaard even proposed banning satellite dishes in order to prevent people living in Denmark from watching ‘anti-western’ TV channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia.”

Despite accusations and speculation, research indicates DF does not propagate a platform of racism, anti-Semitism, or homophobia. Condition: met

D. Right-wing/left-wing. The Economist (6/19/15) describes the DF as “hard-right,” as do other media. The Wall Street Journal refers to the group as “the right-wing populist Danish People's Party” (Bomsdorf 2014). Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. The Economist (6/19/15) described the party as an “anti-European Union, anti-immigration party.” Further, DF “calls for the re-establishment of border controls, and opposes scrapping Denmark’s current opt-out from EU judicial co-operation” (Economist 6/19/15). “The Danish People's Party wishes friendly and dynamic cooperation with all the democratic and freedom-loving peoples of the world, but we will
not allow Denmark to surrender its sovereignty. As a consequence, the Danish People's Party opposes the European Union” (DF 2015). Condition: met.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. On the party’s official website, Dahl proclaims “The aim of the Danish People's Party is to assert Denmark's independence, to guarantee the freedom of the Danish people in their own country, and to preserve and promote representative government and the monarchy” (DF 2015). Further, “the essence of the party program is a warm and strong love of our country… Denmark belongs to the Danes and its citizens must be able to live in a secure community founded on the rule of law, which develops along the lines of Danish culture.” Following the 2014 EP elections, DF joined the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (European Parliament 2015). Condition: met.

DF: ALL CONDITIONS MET

Dutch Freedom Party- (Partij voor de Vrijheid- PVV), Netherlands

In 2004, Geert Wilders left the right-wing party “Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD), angered in part by the party’s support for Turkish membership in the European Union” (de Jong 2015). Two years later, Wilders formed the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV). Wilders and, by extension, the PVV, believe “Muslims should be subjected to other, more oppressive laws and regulations than people in the ‘in-group’; their holy book should be banned, there should be a special tax for wearing head-scarves, unlike other religious groups they should not be allowed to organize their own schools, and recently the party called for closing all mosques in the Netherlands… The PVV doesn’t have members, branches or other publications than a website” (de Jong 2015). Terry (2014) noted that: “Under Dutch law, a political party must have at least two
members. Hence, “the PVV has exactly two members: Geert Wilders, and the Geert Wilders Foundation… PVV policy is set by Wilders. All the party’s candidates for office are only accepted onto its lists after heavy vetting by Wilders personally” (Terry 2014).

The BBC (2009) observed that the PVV went “from winning nine seats in the 2006 election to 24 in 2010, taking a bigger share of the vote than the Christian Democrats - the main party in the outgoing government.” According to the Netherlands House of Representatives, in the 2012 election, the party only won 15 seats. The number of seats they held in European Parliament remained at four following the 2014 elections.

A. Occurring post-Cold War. As noted above, Wilders formed PVV in 2006. Condition: met.

B. Non-Violent. In an interview with BBC (October 2009), Wilders proclaimed “It's not my intention to have anything at all to do with violence…On the contrary, I despise violence - I just want a debate.” Counterpoint (2014) ranks the group as a low danger for violence. Condition: met.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. In the October 2009 BBC interview, Wilders, whose wife is Hungarian, was adamant that he is not a racist. He told the BBC his intention had only ever been "to have a debate about freedom of speech and the threat of Islamisation of our Western societies" (BBC 2009).

"Our culture is based on Christianity, Judaism and humanism and (the Israelis) are fighting our fight," Wilders told Reuters… "If Jerusalem falls, Amsterdam and New York will be next" (Heneghan 2010). Noted the BBC (2009), “unlike other figures on the fringes of European politics, he has never been accused of anti-Semitism.” Further,
Wilders “styles himself as a promoter of gay rights, which he sees as in line with traditional Dutch values” (Polyakova 2014).

Bahceli (9/16/15) reported that “In a September 2015 debate, Wilders called the wave of refugees passing through Hungary and other countries ‘an Islamic invasion of Europe, of the Netherlands….Masses of young men in their twenties with beards singing Allahu Akbar across Europe. It's an invasion that threatens our prosperity, our security, our culture and identity.’” Such rhetoric has been called racist, though, as noted above for FPO, Islam is a religion not a race. Wilders words are certainly inflammatory, particularly his reference to appearance, but are not directed at a particular race.

Similarly, in June 2014, Wilders asked his supporters: “Do you want more or fewer Moroccans in this city and in the Netherlands?” The response came loud and clear: “Fewer! Fewer! Fewer!” “We'll take care of that,” their leader replied. (McDonald-Gibson 2014). Once, again, is this rhetoric directed at a race? Though his words were certainly disparaging to Moroccans, Wilders obvious point was immigration. Condition: met.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. Wilders is not only right wing, he and his party are widely considered to be far-right wing. Lesniak (2014) refers to the group as a “far-right” party, as does Oudenampsen (2013) and multiple other sources. Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. Wilders has suggested that “the Netherlands take back its national border and immigration control from the Schengen system of 26 European countries that has enabled free transit for European recruits to join the Islamic State… He has also suggested that any returning Dutch veterans of the ISIS be barred from entry and deprived of Dutch citizenship” (New English Review 2015). Terry (2014) noted that
“since 2011 Wilders has also increasingly positioned himself as an opponent of EU austerity, but even his opposition to austerity is coached in nationalist terms. Since 2012 he was become an uncompromising advocate of total withdrawal from the EU.” The Huffington Post (Robins-Early, 2015) reported “Wilder's PVV party is anti-European Union, anti-euro, anti-Islam and anti-multiculturalist. The party wants the Netherlands to leave the European Union so The Hague can independently decide on its immigration and fiscal policies.” Condition: met.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. “The party has a populist economic program, but is socially conservative -- advocating the protection of Dutch tradition” (Robins-Early, 2015). Oudenampsen (2013) referred to the group as nationalist and populist. Condition: met.

PVV: ALL CONDITIONS MET

English Defence League (EDL), England

According to the EDL official website, the English Defence League is a “human rights organisation that was founded in the wake of the shocking actions of a small group of Muslim extremists who, at a homecoming parade in Luton, openly mocked the sacrifices of our service personnel without any fear of censure” (EDL 2015). Thus, as Goodwin (2013) identified, the group is “a prime example of what Eatwell (2006) described as ‘cumulative extremism,’ whereby the activities of one extremist group trigger the formation of another manifestation, and possibly thereafter a spiral of counter-mobilization or even conflict.”

The group was formed in Luton in 2009 by cousins Kevin Carroll and Tommy Robinson. Tommy Robinson is also known as Stephen Yaxley-Lennon and is a former
British National Party (BNP) member. The EDL is vigorously anti-Islam and part of what Goodwin (2013) terms the “counter-Jihad” wave of movements. The EDL believes that “British Muslims should be able to safely demand reform of their religion, in order to make it more relevant to the needs of the modern world” (EDL 2015).

Though the group was originally written-off as a band of violent hooligans and street thugs, EDL has observed Goodwin (2013): “between 2009 and 2012 the EDL organized over 50 street-based demonstrations that often mobilized between 1,000 and 3,000 activists…in only a short period, the EDL established a national media profile and more than 80 local divisions, and attracted over 80,000 Facebook followers.”


B. Non-Violent. On the official EDL website, the group proclaims “We are an inclusive movement dedicated to peacefully [emphasis my own] protesting against Islamic extremism.” However, media such as the Independent has reported multiple violent incidents involving EDL leadership and members, including: then-leader Tommy Robinson head-butting a fellow member at an EDL march in Blackburn and 172 EDL members arrested at one march on Whitehall in London (Rawlinson 2011).

The BBC reported in 2015 that 50 convictions had resulted from a 2013 “gathering of 2,000 EDL supporters in Centenary Square where missiles and bottles were had been thrown at police,” and the Guardian has highlighted the EDL’s regular staging of violent protests (Taylor 2010).

Channel 4 News (2013) reported that “EDL supporters are more likely to believe that violence is justifiable - and inevitable: 72 per cent say that violence between
different groups is ‘largely inevitable’, compared with an average of 46 per cent.”

Observed Goodwin (2013): “while most supporters say they would never personally engage in violence (only five per cent would), the picture changes when violence is framed as a response to other forms of extremism: 38 percent agree that ‘violence against extremists is justified’, a figure significantly higher than the wider average of 21 per cent.” Further, "The vision that they offer to supporters is one in which different ethnic, racial and religious groups are embroiled in communal violence, and where violence may be called for (and justified) in order to protect the native group" (Goodwin 2013). Condition: unmet.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. The court of public opinion holds the EDL as racist and fascist. However, according to Goodwin (2013), the EDL has “specifically sought to rally support among Jewish, Sikh and Pakistani Christian communities, as well as lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual ones.” The EDL acknowledged it is “keen to draw its support from people of all races, all faiths, all political persuasions, and all lifestyle choices. Under its umbrella, all people in England, whatever their background, or origin, can stand united in a desire to stop the imposition of the rules of Islam on non-believers” (EDL 2015). They note, ironically, “The time for tolerating intolerance has come to an end: it is time for the whole world to unite against a truly Global Jihad” and “The EDL will continue to work to protect the inalienable rights of all people to protest against radical Islam’s encroachment into the lives of non-Muslims” (EDL 2015).

The EDL notes that “There is a little understanding of what it is to be an ‘Islamic extremist’, and critics are all-too-often unfairly labelled as ‘racists’ or
‘Islamophobes’, again without any real understanding of what the terms mean” (EDL 2015). Reported Goodwin (2013): “Only a minority of those who agree with the platform of the EDL endorse classical or ‘biological’ racism. Few endorse open expressions of racial supremacism: 58 per cent agreed that non-white citizens who were born in the country are just as ‘British’ as white citizens, while 56 per cent said there is no difference in intelligence between black and white citizens.”

Then-party leader Robinson told Channel 4 News (28 May 2013) that the EDL “is not a fascist organisation.” “We oppose a fascist ideology. I hate Nazis as much as I hate Islamists, but Nazism isn't a problem in this country." He also insisted that the EDL is not racist: "The truth cannot be racist," adding "You can be any colour, but you can be a terrorist Muslim" (Channel 4 News, 2013).

Thus, once again, we have a group with an anti-Islam/Muslim agenda, (specifically, an anti-Islamic extremist agenda) and we face the question of racism vs religious prejudice. As in the prior cases, it is determined that the two are not synonymous. Condition: met.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. The group is widely recognized as radical right-wing. In fact, the Jewish Chronicle has characterized the group as extreme right-wing (2010), though the Guardian reported that “Metropolitan police say English Defence League is 'not extreme' (Dodd and Taylor 2011). Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. The EDL is considered to be Eurosceptic because of their anti-immigration stance. In 2013, EDL leader Robinson endorsed UKIP, stating “They are saying exactly what we say, just in a different way” (Stanley 2013). UKIP, as examined above, has “one key policy - to leave the European Union” (BBC 21 Nov 2014).
However, as EDL has no seats in EP and has no official EU position, they cannot be determined to meet the required conditions to be considered Eurosceptic. Condition: unmet.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. Goodwin (2013) noted that the EDL has garnered support by “framing the religion as a fundamental threat to the national way of life and to Europe generally.” Channel 4 News (28 May 2013) noted that the EDL “sees itself as a defender of British values, which includes the army.” EDL is widely recognized as a nationalist and even ultra-nationalist group. Condition: met.

EDL: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET

Fascism and Freedom Movement-National Socialist Party (Movimento Fascismo e Libertà – Partito Socialista Nazionale, MFL–PSN), Italy

The Fascism and Freedom Movement-National Socialist Party was formed on 25 July 1991 by Senator Giorgio Pisanò with the motto “L’unico movimento del e per il popolo italiano!” or “the only movement of and for the people of Italy” (Freebase 2015). The group’s leader has been Carlo Gariglio since December of 2001. The group embraces fascism and Benito Mussolini’s political thought, and is the only group in Italy to incorporate the fascist symbol in its logo (Milesi et al. 2006). The party is most often referred to as, simply, the Fascism and Freedom Movement. Note: Information on this group was exceptionally difficult to find. As a result, most references are from the party’s official website (in Italian and translated to English for this research).

A. Occurring post-Cold War. The party was formed in 1989 as a political movement within the Italian Social Movement, becoming its own party in 1991 (Freebase
2015). In 2009, it added the “National Socialist Party” (NSP) to its name (Cyclopaedia 2015). Condition: met.

B. Non-Violent. No explicit references to the group either condemning or condoning violence could be located. There are various reports of members in attendance during protests or public addresses which turned violent, but no definitive links. As such, it is concluded that the group will meet the condition. Condition: met.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. The party adheres to an ideology of anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism, and it outspokenly, unapologetically fascist. It is widely in the media as neo-Nazi and neo-fascist (Cyclopaedia 2015). Acknowledges the party, “The MFL-PSN favors adherence to the ideals of fascism over skin color, nationality and religious belief: for us a Fascist of color and who is Islamic is worth a thousand times more than a non-fascist who is white and Catholic.”

Interestingly, the party states on its website that “Il MFL-PSN, infatti, chiarisce subito di non essere razzista,” which translates to “the MFL-PSN, in fact, makes it clear that it is not racist” (Fascismo e Liberta 2015).

The party does not specifically reference homosexuality though, by it strict adherence to fascist principles, it follows that MFL-PSN would echo classic Italian fascist beliefs. Wrote Quine (1995): “Fascist Italy considered homosexuality a social disease…it condemned pornography, most forms of birth control and contraceptive

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7 Original Italian text: “Il MFL-PSN privilegia l’adesione agli ideali del Fascismo al colore della pelle, alla nazionalità ed al credo religioso: per noi un Fascista di colore ed islamico vale mille volte più di un antifascista bianco e cattolico”
devices (with the exception of the condom), homosexuality, and prostitution as deviant sexual behaviour.”

Further, because of its status as a fascist party, it would be disqualified from consideration as a MEPG, and categorized as a neo-fascist party. Condition: unmet.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. According to the group’s website (Fascismo e Liberta, 2015) as well as Google Freebase, the party “refuses agreements and/or alliances, stressing categorically not to be classified as a right-wing party.” The party website states that it is not a right-wing movement, rather it is “avowedly fascist” and, therefore, has nothing to do with the right and can be moderate, extreme, socialist or whatever.\(^8\) Freebase (2009) noted the group’s “stressing categorically not to be classified as a right-wing party.” Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. The party’s official website asserts that the MFL-PSN knows that the enemy is not the refugee, stowaway or immigrant (call it what you will) but the SYSTEM that allows a foreigner to enter Italy undisturbed… In fact, the system that favors unrestricted immigration (as well as the introduction of gay marriage, the gender theory and the Jobs Act) is a capitalist system (translated by the author from Italian).\(^9\) Condition: met.

\(^8\) The original Italian text is as follows: “Il MFL-PSN non è un movimento di destra, ma dichiaratamente Fascista; pertanto, non ha nulla a che fare con la destra, sia essa moderata, estrema, sociale e quant’altro.” (http://fascismoeliberta.info/chi-siamo/)

\(^9\) The original Italian text is as follows: Tuttavia MFL-PSN sa bene che il nemico non è il profugo o il clandestino o l’immigrato (chiamiamolo come vogliamo) bensì il SISTEMA che permette allo straniero di entrare in Italia indisturbato… In realtà il sistema che favorisce l’immigrazione selvaggia (così come l’introduzione del matrimonio gay, la teoria del gender e il Jobs Act) è un sistema capitalista (http://fascismoeliberta.info/page/2/).
F. Nationalist/Reformist. The party “makes explicit reference to the ideals of the Italian Social Republic as corporatism, the socialization of the economy, taxation and monetary nationalism (Freebase 2015). Their website notes that “We believe that fascism is, in its essential and fundamental purpose (defense identity, exaltation of the concept of national sovereignty, nationalization of enterprises, defense of the community with a great attention to social issues and weaker sectors of the population) the solution to problems facing an Italy which, thanks to this class of politicians has become only poorer, more insecure, weaker economically, socially and in relations with other states”\(^{10}\) (Fascismo e Liberta 2015). Condition: met

MFL-PSN: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET

**Finns Party formerly True Finns (Perussuomalaiset-PS), Finland**

The Finns Party claims that it is “both the youngest – established in 1995 – and one of the oldest – with roots going back to the 19\(^{th}\) century” party in Finland (PS 2015). The party has experienced multiple iterations and name changes. Observed the BBC (Sundberg, 2015), “The party's origins lie in a split in the Centre Party (then known as the Agrarian League) in 1959, when charismatic former cabinet minister Veikko Vennamo resigned in protest at what he saw as Finland's too-friendly relations with the Soviet Union.”

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\(^{10}\) The original Italian text is as follows: Riteniamo che il Fascismo sia, nei suoi propositi essenziali e fondamentali (difesa dell'identità, esaltazione del concetto di sovranità nazionale, socializzazione delle imprese, difesa della collettività con una grande attenzione al sociale e ai ceti più deboli della popolazione) la soluzione ai problemi che affliggono un'Italia la quale, grazie a questa classe di politici è diventata solo più povera, più insicura, più debole economicamente, socialmente e nei rapporti con gli altri Stati (http://fascismoeliberta.info/page/2/).
After a period of instability and several name changes, he established the Rural Party in 1966, which also splintered years later.” The party dwindled away and “by 1995, the party was in ruins, and the True Finns Party was established from its ashes”… with Timo Soini taking over as chairman in 1997 (Sundberg 2015).

As noted on the party website, the Finns Party “according to a Finnish Broadcasting poll in September, 2013, is the second most popular party in Finland. It is, from the general election of 2011, the third largest party in the national parliament (Eduskunta) – and the largest party in opposition... The party has one MEP in the European Parliament as well as representatives in significant international organisations such as the Council of Europe, OSCE, Arctic Council, Inter-Parliamentary Union, and Nordic Council” (PS 2015).

A. **Occurring post-Cold War.** Though it has origins as far back as 1959, the party in its current form and revised agenda was established in 1995 (PS 2015). Condition: met.

   B. **Non-Violent.** In an August 2015 speech, Party Chairman Soini emphasized: “No violence or hate speech against anyone, not even against the Finns Party,” he stated, demanding that the actions of both the far-right and far-left be condemned (*Helsinki Times* 10 August 2015). Soini further declared that “Such ideas and actions have no place in the Finns Party” (*Helsinki Times* 10 August 2015). The party’s 2015 manifesto asserts that “enforcement and punishment related to laws should be applied equally to all – with no consideration given to different economic and political standing of those violating laws” (PS 2015). Counterpoint (2015) ranks the group as a low danger for violence. Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. As discussed previously, most oppositionist groups are quick to be labelled racist, homophobic and xenophobic, particular when they embrace restrictions on immigration. Such labels proliferate when comments are taken out of context, are lost in translation, or are the comments of one member or associate and are wrongly attributed to the organization as a whole. As the Finnish Department of Ministry (Finland.fi 2015) acknowledges, “To be sure, individual extremist voices are often heard from the party’s rank-and-file.”

As an example, on July 25, 2015, “a True Finn’s Member of Parliament, Olli Immonen, released a Facebook update where he openly declared to be against a multicultural Finland. The text was posted in English and it is included below in its original form: I’m dreaming of a strong, brave nation that will defeat this nightmare called multiculturalism” (Joukahainen 2015). As expected, adversaries pointed to the comment as evidence of the party’s racism.

However, the party’s manifesto clearly stipulates: ‘‘Justice for all’ is a concern that permeates the Party’s whole platform and policy… the basic foundation of the Party is a recognition of the Progressive traditions of equality of opportunity for all,” and their 2011 manifesto declared that “Hate crime is not to be tolerated and legislation is needed” (PS 2015). Condition: met.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. The party does not label itself as left or right wing, noting: “The Party has support from all sectors of the political spectrum so it defies being put into any traditional left-right pigeon hole. One unifying aspect is the attempt of the Party to approach matters with rational solutions with emphasis on activism and creativity while maintaining respect for both social and individual responsibility” (PS
Eurosceptic. The BBC characterizes the Finns Party as a populist and Eurosceptic party (Sundberg 2015). Indeed, the Finns Party makes no secret of their disdain for the EU: “The Finns Party is a leading EU-skeptic party in Finland. The Party argues that the European Union is working far below its capability and much could be done for improvement. Its opinion is that the EU meddles too much into citizens’ every day affairs and is creating excessive central governance in Brussels” (PS 2015).

Further, the party presented a list of five main concerns ahead of the Finnish Parliamentary elections in 2015. Among these concerns was a desire to stop bullying, particularly as it related to “Termination of detrimental EU-bureaucracy” (PS 2015). Condition: met.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. The party presented an elaborate manifesto of reforms ahead of the 2015 elections. As part of their economic platform (PS, 2015), the Finns Party “believes the most important function of government is assuring the security and welfare of the ordinary Finnish citizen – thus budget cuts must come from decreasing migration – support and foreign development aid as well as other ‘make a better world’ -type spending.” This priority is revisited during the presentation of ‘Five Main Concerns.

Further, the party website proclaims that “The Finns Party does not accept outsiders setting up standards for how people judge themselves” (PS 2015). Sundberg (2015 observed that: “Beneath the strong Euroscepticism lies a brand of Finnish nationalism that targets refugees, immigrants and the Swedish population in Finland.”
The party has also established a language policy: “The Finns Party believes that the Finnish language supports, nurtures and unifies Finnish citizens and their society. Promotion of proficiency in the Finnish language and its protection and development should be incorporated into national legislation. Such policy includes requirements such as “Satisfaction competency in Finnish must be shown for extension of residency permission” (PS 2015). Condition: met.

FINNS PARTY: ALL CONDITIONS MET

*Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich- FPÖ), Austria*

The US Library of Congress reported that “the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs--FPÖ) was founded in 1956 by Anton Reinthaller, who had served in the Seyss-Inquart national socialist government formed in collaboration with Hitler after the Anschluss in 1938” (Solsten 1994). During an FPÖ convention in spring of 1986, Jörg Haider, leader of the Carinthian branch of the party, launched a successful coup against leader Norbert Steger and became the new chairman (Solsten 1994). The Encyclopedia Britannica (2015) stated that:

In 1999–2000 a series of electoral successes...created a storm of controversy and produced widespread protests in Austria and abroad, largely because of perceptions that the leadership of the party, including Haider himself, was sympathetic to Nazism. Haider, whose father had been a leading member of the Austrian Nazi Party before and during World War II, became notorious for his praise of Hitler’s employment policies and his remark, made to a group of Austrian veterans of World War II, that the Waffen-SS deserved ‘honour and respect.’ Arguing for stricter controls on immigration, he warned against the ‘over-foreignization’ of Austrian society, pointedly borrowing a term—*Überfremdung*—used by Joseph Goebbels, Hitler’s minister of propaganda. (Encyclopedia Britannica 2015)

Today, the Freedom Party is a self-proclaimed Eurosceptic group whom has campaigned under an anti-immigrant platform and slogans such as "Too much EU is
dumb” (Bell, 2014). The party is part of EP’s newly formed Europe of Nations and Freedom party, a bloc of right-wing, Eurosceptic nationalist parties.

A. Occurring post-Cold War. The Freedom Party was originally founded in 1958. Because this pre-dates the end of the cold war, the FPÖ is disqualified from consideration as a MEPG unless the party underwent an ideology change when Haider’s assumed leadership. Morris, et al. (2014) noted that Haider succeeded in “transforming the FPÖ into a radical right-wing protest party that positioned itself against the mainstream.” Indeed, 1993 served as a transformational year for the FPÖ.

According to Meret (2010), “In 1993, the FPÖ launched a popular initiative on the topic of immigration called ‘Austria First!’ The aim was to collect signatures in favour of a popular referendum on … restrictions and control in relation to immigration. The initiative was considered very controversial and provoked the exit of five party MPs, among them Heide Schmidt, who later launched the new party Liberal Forum (LiF). In the same year, relations between FPÖ and the Liberal International group – of which the party was a member since 1979 – became more difficult. In 1993, the Liberal International executive recommended the expulsion of the FPÖ from its ranks, but the measure was preceded by the decision of the FPÖ to withdraw its membership.”

Thus, as a result of the pivotal changes in platform, rhetoric and ideology during the early 1990s, FPÖ will be determined to meet the condition of restructured ideology. Condition: met.

B. Non-Violent. An article in Reuters acknowledged that the FPÖ “continues to attract a neo-Nazi fringe which has no other party to join and warns continually of an ‘Islamicisation’ of Catholic Austria… There is, however, no evidence of any association
with anti-foreigner violence, which remains rare in Austria” (Prodhan, 2013). Similarly, reports of violence by members are spotty and circumstantial. Condition: met.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Freedom House (2013) reported that “the far-right FPÖ has been accused of anti-Semitic rhetoric in recent years… Additionally, the FPÖ has been criticized for fueling anti-Muslim feelings in Austria through controversial ad campaigns.” FPÖ believes “that the influence of the outsiders must be reduced or eliminated” (Morris, et al. 2014). The Anti-Defamation League reported in 2004 that “Haider has fended off accusations of anti-Semitism since the 1980's, but his insensitivity to Nazi brutality and a refusal to appreciate the suffering endured by those who lived under Nazi rule is well documented.”

Current party leader Heinz Christian Strache has taken strides to dispel party links with anti-Semitism. During a visit to Israel with Rene Stadtkewitz) leader of the German Freedom Party), Kent Ekeroth (Sweden Democrat MP), and Filip Dewinter (head of Belgium's Vlaams Belang), “denied they were stoking Islamophobia with their statement of support for Jerusalem,” noting that Israel faced "an Islamic terror threat that aims right for the heart of our society," (Heneghan 2010).

However, in a 2008 interview with Britain’s Telegraph, Strache stated "It is not about keeping Austria white, just about protecting its traditional community... We see Europe as Christian, and we believe it's at risk of Islamization"(McHugh 2015).

Obviously, Islam is a religion and not a race/ethnicity.

Many analysts point to the FPO’s definition of family as a sign of the party’s homophobic leanings since the party defines family as “a partnership between a man and woman with common children.” They offer as further evidence the party’s opposition to
crosswalk signals depicting same-sex couples. However, in “November 1996, when the reform of three anti-homosexual provisions in the Austrian penal code was on the agenda of the Parliament, the FPÖ voted in favour of repealing the ban on gay and lesbian organisations (Article 221)…and also proposed to lower the age of consent for gay men to 16” (Hosi Wien 2015).

As with Front National, the FPÖ asserts that any accusations of racism and anti-Semitism stem from a misinterpretation of their tough immigration stance or isolated statements made by party members rather than official rhetoric. Coupled with the philosophically different leadership of Strache, a leader without close ties to the Nazi party, and the waters are muddied even further.

However, in the absence of a stated platform of homophobia, racism or anti-Semitism and attributed statements extrapolatory, it is determined that FPÖ will be deemed to have met this condition. Condition: met.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. The FPÖ is unapologetically right wing. In June 2015, FPÖ MEPs joined with France’s FN, the Dutch PVV, Belgium’s Vlaams Belang, and Italy’s Lega Nord, among other right and far-right parties to form the European Parliamentary bloc Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) (European Parliament, 2015). Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. FPÖ’s platform holds that international institutions like the EU have no right to intrude excessively in Austria’s affairs (Morris, et al. 2014). The FPÖ has adopted a critical position of the European Union and the enlargement in particular. In campaign materials, the party utilized the slogan “EU critics vote blue. The FPÖ stands for an Austria without ifs and buts” (Meret 2010). Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. FPÖ embraces several key core institutions held to be extremely valuable: the family, the nation (or “fatherland”), and the welfare state (Morris et al. 2014). Further, FPÖ is “committed to protecting our homeland of Austria, our national identity and autonomy as well as our natural livelihood” (Morris, et al. 2014). Freedom House (2015) categorizes the party as “the country’s far-right, nationalist, and anti-immigration” party. Condition: met

FPÖ: ALL CONDITIONS MET

Front National- FN, France

Front National (FN) has been one of the “success” stories of euroscepticism. Originally founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen, FN is considered to be the Europe’s oldest political far-right party (Ivaldi 2012). Le Pen earned the nickname “Devil of the Republic” as a result of his extreme right-wing views; his daughter, Marine Le Pen, has subsequently been referred to as “the devil’s daughter.” Craw (2015) wrote that under Jean-Marie Le Pen, FN “vehemently opposed to immigration, the European Union and same-sex marriage and in favour of the death penalty and promoting anti-globalisation in traditional values — views which saw him targeted by a car bomb outside their home when Marine was eight years old.” Marine Le Pen assumed leadership of the party in 2011, having already made significant strides in reframing and redefining the party’s tenets and vision. Her efforts to “normalize” the party are the result of a softer line that have increased political acceptance (Ivaldi 2012).

In his 2013 study on the ideological changes within Front National, Almeida observed that “Academic analyses of the French radical right tend to converge in their assessment that, since Marine Le Pen took over the campaign management of the 2007
presidential election and succeeded her father as party president, the Front National has undergone a path of image change and ideological deradicalization or, at least, that most radical and polemic stances have been toned down.” Ivaldi (2012) concurred, writing that “criticism of Islam has been tactically reframed into a pseudo-liberal agenda of tolerance or gender equality, borrowed in part from France’s tradition of laïcité (secularity)” though the “concept of ‘national priority’ remains cornerstone to the party’s ideology.” Indeed, many of the ideas of FN resonate throughout Europe. In January 2015, Le Pen formed the new anti-EU bloc Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) after recruiting enough MEPs to meet a requirement that political groups have members from at least seven different EU countries (de la Baume 2015).

A. *Occurring post-Cold War.* FN was founded in 1972 which would disqualify it from meeting the conditions of this variable. However, FN has had a significant change in ideology and political stance, underscored by a change in leadership in 2011. This philosophical overhaul and subsequent softer, more appealing approach is widely documented and recognized by mainstream media world-wide such as the BBC, the Economist, and the Guardian. Marine Le Pen’s incarnation of FN serves as a reinvention of the party, thus allowing for the post-Cold War condition to be met. Condition: met.

B. *Non-Violent.* Since Marine Le Pen assumed leadership of FN, none of the group’s official press/website has promoted or encouraged violence. In a 2011 statement, Le Pen noted her party’s determination to fight mercilessly against all forms of violence and barbarity (Front National 2015). Counterpoint (2014) rates FN in the category of lowest risk of violence.
Although there is a fine line between not discouraging and encouraging, because the group does not condone acts of violence this condition is determined to have been met. Condition: met.

C. Non-anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Under Jean-Marie Le Pen, anti-Semitism was rife. Jean-Marie has been described as “a political provocateur convicted multiple times for hate speech and Holocaust denial” (Liphshiz 2014). However, the new FN under Marine Le Pen repeatedly has “condemned anti-Semitism and punished a party official who made anti-Semitic statements. In 2011, Le Pen dispatched her life partner and National Front Vice President Louis Alliot on a bridge-building mission to Israel” (Liphshiz 2014).

Though some people contend that the non-racist rhetoric is part of a rebranding strategy, Marine Le Pen has continually stated that FN is not racist (BBC News 2014). Since Marine Le Pen assumed leadership of FN, none of the group’s official press/website has promoted racism or anti-Semitism, focusing instead on immigration. Counterpoint (2014) rates FN as lowest possibility for anti-Semitism, and moderate risk for homophobia and racism. Condition: met.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. Freedom House (2015b) categorizes FN as “far-right, anti-immigration, and anti–European Union.” Yet despite widespread labeling of FN as right wing (and quite often extreme right wing), in 2013, Party leader Marine Le Pen claimed it was “unfair for the party founded by her father Jean-Marie Le Pen to be lumped together with the likes of Norwegian mass killer Anders Behring Breivik and Greece's New Dawn party” (The Local 2013). "We are absolutely not a party of the right,
those who think that are making a total analytical error,” stated Marine Le Pen (The Local 2013).

Regardless of how Le Pen chooses to self-identify, millennial eurosceptic populism does not require a group to be either right or left-wing. Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. FN is unapologetically Eurosceptic. In a 2014 interview, Le Pen stated: “I want to destroy the EU, not Europe! I believe in a Europe of nation-states. I believe in Airbus and Ariane, in a Europe based on cooperation. But I don't want this European Soviet Union… The EU is deeply harmful, it is an anti-democratic monster. I want to prevent it from becoming fatter, from continuing to breathe, from grabbing everything with its paws and from extending its tentacles into all areas of our legislation.” (Spiegel 2014).

Further, Le Pen has readily acknowledged her party’s anti-immigration stance, adding that it is not because of a hatred of foreigners, rather it is because of an inability of the government to assist those already in France. “We have millions of unemployed and cannot afford any more immigration…we support putting a stop to immigration” (Speigel 2014).

Lesniak (2014) noted of FN that “since the 1990s, its stance on the European Union has grown increasingly Eurosceptic. The party's opposition to immigration is focused on non-European immigration, and includes support for deporting illegal, criminal, and unemployed immigrants.” Condition: met.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. Marine Le Pen asserted in 2014: “We want to represent all the French people with ideas that are neither left nor right: patriotism, defense of the identity and sovereignty of the people. If a person like me is described as
being extreme-left and extreme-right at the same time, then that isn't far off the mark.” (Spiegel, 2014). Lesniak (2014) observed that “the party's ideology has been broadly described by scholars such as Shields as authoritarian, nationalist, and populist.”

Condition: met.

FRONT NATIONAL: ALL CONDITIONS MET

Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή), Greece

In 2015, the London School of Economics reported that “Golden Dawn is an extreme, ultra-nationalist and racist party. Among current far-right parties in Europe, it is the one that most resembles fascism, and in particular Nazism, in its outright espousal of National Socialism: the endorsement of what it terms the ‘third biggest ideology in history’, i.e. nationalism, combined with support for an all-powerful state premised on ‘popular sovereignty,’” (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015).

The UK’s Telegraph has noted that the group’s founder and leader, mathematician Nikos Michaloliakos, is “a former nationalist youth leader, who was close to the army dictators who ruled the country from 1967 to 1974…. In 2010, he caused controversy by giving fascist salutes in the city council in a taunt to a Left-wing councilor who had called him a fascist.”

Further, it was noted that, in 2012, “the party exploited widespread anger over immigration and austerity reforms imposed by the EU and IMF and won 18 seats in parliament” (Squires 2015). In 2015, scores of Golden Dawn supporters went to trial on charges ranging from murder to participation in a criminal organization (Squires 2015).

A. Occurring post-Cold War. Golden Dawn was borne from ideas generated
from Nikolaos Michaloliakos in the 1980s, though it wouldn’t be until 1993 that the group would formalize and register as a political party. Condition: met.

B. Non-Violent. In 2013, the BBC profile on Golden Dawn reported that in 2012, “most of the 154 recorded racist attacks in Greece were attributed to Golden Dawn members, as were most of the 104” attacks reported through mid-2013. The BBC (2013) reported that in 2012, “party spokesman Ilias Kasidiaris, caused outrage last year when he attacked two female left-wing politicians during a live TV debate, slapping one and throwing water over another.”

Unfortunately, such incidents pale in comparison to charges against members that include murder. In 2015, 69 alleged members of Golden dawn are on trial for charges that include a variety of serious charges, including murder. “Golden Dawn has already taken the line that even if some of its members are indeed guilty of the crimes of which they are accused, this has nothing to do with the party itself. The wrongdoers, the claim goes, are bad eggs, members gone rogue, or caught up in the wrong moment. If this claim is successful then the party itself is politically exonerated and ducks a blow that might irreversibly undermine its continued existence” (Melissaris 2015).

In the face of such diametric positions, the argument becomes one of whether those involved in these heinous acts are merely supporters and “wanna-bes” or active members; further, if they are found to be members are they acting on their volition or at the behest and encouragement of the Golden Dawn leadership. The BBC (2015) reported that: “Police say they found evidence linking the killer of Pavlos Fyssas to the Golden Dawn leadership. In the homes of MPs arrested, they said they uncovered photos of Adolf Hitler and swastika flags. Witness testimony told of a ‘Fuehrer-like’ party
structure, commanding hit squads that drove through Athens attacking migrants” (Lowen 2013).

Ultimately, there is too much evidence pointing to, at the least, an attitude of turning the other cheek if not outright acceptance of violence as a permissible method to achieve the group’s goals. Condition: unmet.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Golden Dawn does not openly tout a racist platform. However, they are widely regarded as racist, homophobic, and anti-Semitic. Lesniak (2014) noted that “according to academic sources, the group is racist and xenophobic.” Reported the BBC in October 2013, “Golden Dawn may officially deny being a neo-Nazi movement but its badge resembles a swastika and some of its senior members have praised Adolf Hitler… Mr. Michaloliakos himself has denied the existence of gas chambers and crematoria at the site of the Auschwitz death camp.”

Further, In 2014, Golden Dawn MP Ilias Panagiotaros extolled “the virtues of a "one-race nation, and lashed out at the minorities the party considers deviant in the 60 Minutes interview, describing Muslim immigrants as jihadists and gays as ‘faggots’” (Smith 2014). He further stated that "until 1997, [the] international association of doctors, and I don't know what, considered homosexuality a sickness, illness, which it is" (Smith 2014). Condition: unmet.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. Another aspect of the group that is perhaps undisputed is its status as right-wing. The only potential argument would be the group’s degree of “far-rightedness,” as the party is described as ultra-right (Euractiv.com), far-right (BBC, the Guardian, Reuters), and extreme right (AP). Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. The party was, and remains, adamantly opposed to the EU. At the exit polls in 2014, party spokesman Ilias Kasidiaris delivered a message from Michaloliakos stating: “I congratulate you for managing to resist the government’s terrorism and for not believing their lies…We are the only political power that actually stands up against our state being run by foreign powers” (Govan 2014). Condition: met.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. The Golden Dawn website (Golden Dawn 2015) states “GOLDEN DAWN is a Popular and Nationalist Movement, with structures, principles and positions…nationalism is the only absolute and true revolution because it seeks the birth of new ethical, spiritual, social and mental values. The right and left solutions supposedly fighting each other, are just a fake theater of two partners who perpetuate the dominance of cosmopolitan internationalists, anti-national and anti-social forces.” Lesniak (2014) affirmed that “the party's leader has openly identified it as nationalist and racist.”

The group’s nationalist platform is one aspect of the party in which nearly everyone can agree. Condition: met.

GOLDEN DAWN: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET

Jobbik- Hungary

According to its website, the Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary formed as a party in October 2003, from a movement of the same name (Jobbik 2015). Its founders were primarily Christian university students. Jobbik is a “principled, conservative and radically patriotic Christian party. Its fundamental purpose is protecting Hungarian values and interests” (jobbik.com).
The group has seen its popularity continue to rise. Notes its website: “At the 2009 European parliamentary elections, Jobbik won 3 seats with 15% of the votes and in doing so came close to beating the ruling Hungarian Socialists into third place. Hungary's 2010 parliamentary elections saw Jobbik cement its position as the nation's 3rd largest party, doubling the vote it had received in the previous year and getting just 3 seats short of the previous ruling party. Jobbik reached nearly 18% of the votes and delegated 47 deputies into the Hungarian Parliament” (Jobbik 2015).

A. Occurring post-Cold War. The group was formed in October 2003 (Jobbik 2015). Condition: met.

B. Non-Violent. In a letter sent by Jobbik leadership to Reuters in 2014, the group pronounced “Jobbik condemns violence, and its members cannot be linked to such acts either,” (Business Insider 2014). Counterpoint (2014) rated Jobbik as a medium danger for violence, contending “that the party is connected with violent groups and/or party leaders have made comments encouraging violence, although there is little evidence that members of the party leadership are themselves violent.” They noted that Jobbik was “connected to the banned paramilitary group Magyar Garda, but party leaders have denounced violence” (Counterpoint 2014). Condition: met.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Jobbik (2015) states “what everyone knows but is silenced by: “political correctness”— that “phenomenon of “gypsy crime” is real.” It is a unique form of delinquency, different from the crimes of the majority in nature and force” (Jobbik 2015). In an official statement on its website, the party states “Jobbik has never denied the holocaust, and persistently refutes as absurd the idea that it is anti-Semitic….we maintain that the charge is a completely invalid one, because the
religious adherence or not of any of the parties involved, has absolutely no bearing or relevance whatsoever to these matters, only the facts, and people's actions do.”

However, perhaps Germany’s Spiegel stated it best, noting that deputy parliamentary floor leader Márton Gyöngyösi regularly devolves “into tiring marathons of relativization… He's not an anti-Semite, he insists, but the Jews… he's not against the Roma, but the Gypsies …” (Speigel 2012).

Counterpoint (2014) rated Jobbik as a high danger of homophobia, anti-Semitism and racism. They noted that “there is clear evidence – either from the party manifesto or comments by the party leadership – that the party discriminates against people on the basis of race or ethnic group, stokes fears of Jews, and discriminates against gay people” (Counterpoint 2014). Condition: unmet.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. In discussing its reputation for far-right extremism, the Jobbik website states “as for Right-Wing political extremism, all the fundamental constitutional changes that Jobbik proposes are marked out by the desire to give less power to a centralised political elite, by giving more power to the people. Almost every major measure we propose, has an established contemporary precedent in one or more other European countries” (Jobbik 2015). News outlets worldwide including the BBC (3 October 2014) categorize Jobbik as far-right. Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. Jobbik (2015) states that “Jobbik rejects the Lisbon treaty accepted by each party in the Hungarian Parliament and renounces the cynical tactics of the political elite to force the EU Constitution upon the peoples of Europe, despite it failing to ratify in France and the Netherlands… we endorse the Europe of Nations concept instead of the United States of Europe agenda.” Jobbik is openly eurosceptic and

F. Nationalist/Reformist. Jobbik’s fundamental purpose, as asserted on its website, is “protecting Hungarian values and interests…the party considers the protection, replenishment and expansion of the national resources crucial. These include the physical and mental condition of the nation, patriotic togetherness and solidarity” (Jobbik 2015). Freedom House (2015c) referred to the group as “the radical-nationalist and Euroskeptic” Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik). Condition: met.

**JOBBIK: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET**

*LAOS Popular Orthodox Rally (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός – LAOS), Greece*

“LAOS is the Greek name for the Popular Orthodox Rally (also translated as the Popular Orthodox Alarm), an extreme right-wing party in Greece” (JTA 2014). Founded on 14 September 2000 by Georgios Karatzaferis, the party began as a split from New Democracy (Project Gutenberg 2015). In 2007, “LAOS won 10 of the 300 seats in Greek Parliament, making it the first extreme-right party in Greek Parliament since 1974” (JTA 2014). Since 2009, the party has been a member of the EP group “Europe of Freedom and Democracy.”

A. Occurring post-Cold War. LAOS was founded in September 2000 (Project Gutenberg 2015). Condition: met.

B. Non-Violent. LAOS is not regarded as a violent group. Violence amongst Greek groups has been relegated other groups in Greece, most notably Golden Dawn. Observed Roushas (2013): “Golden Dawn –in contrast to LAOS– has been explicitly
violent throughout its political career.” In fact, LAOS offices were attacked in 2009 and 2001 (Michaletos, 2015). Condition: met.

C. *Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic.* Multiple sources including the Anti-Defamation League and the Huffington Post, cite a history of anti-Semitic statements made by leader, Karatzaferis (Tzilivakis 2013; Mionis 2012). *The Jewish Chronicle* (Elgot 2011) reported that: “The party has been condemned by the American Jewish Committee… one party member Adonis Georgiadis, has publicly endorsed a book called *Jews: The Whole Truth* on a television show, on a TV channel owned by the party.” The book “has been described by the Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece as a ‘defamatory, anti-Semitic book in which Jews are called ‘subhuman’ and are directly threatened with annihilation’” (Elgot 2011).

The United States Department of State also reported in *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* for 2011 that “LAOS Party leader Georgios Karatzaferis had made numerous anti-Semitic statements in the past, insinuating that Jews planned the September 11 attacks and denying the existence of the Holocaust” (US State Department 2011). Condition: unmet

D. *Right-wing/left-wing.* According to the Popular Orthodox Rally website (LAOS 2015, and Project Gutenberg 2015), party leader Karatzaferis proclaims the Popular Orthodox Rally as "a profoundly democratic party… consisting of everything from a ‘pre-dictatorship Right’ to a merger of Left and Right to a ‘Popular Liberalism’ in official party literature.” The U.S. State Department (2011) categorizes LAOS as “extreme right-wing.” Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. Vasilopoulou (2010) contended that the LAOS perspective is ‘soft Eurosceptic:’ “LAOS sustains that the future of Greece is linked to a great extent to the European Union. The party supports the incorporation of all the European states into a viable Union, that is it is in favour enlarging the EU. However, it argues that ‘this can only occur within the context of a Confederation where there would be recognition and protection of the historic, cultural and ethnic roots as well as the ethnic characteristics of the European peoples.’” (LAOS website as documented in Vasilopoulou 2010). Such identification qualifies LAOS as contingent or qualified Eurosceptic. Condition: met.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. Al Jazeera (Bollier 2012) reported that LAOS “describes itself as ‘hellenocentric’ - opposes illegal immigration, and suggests deporting all undocumented immigrants.” Commented party leader Giorgis Karatzaferis: “I don’t want them to become a majority” (Bollier 2012). The U.S. State Department (2011) described LAOS as a “small, extreme right-wing party (that) supports virulent nationalism.” Condition: met.

LAOS: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET

Lega Nord (Northern League-LN), Italy

Lega Nord per l’Indipendenza della Padania is a Italian political party better known as Lega Nord, Lega or Carroccio. The party was founded as a regional party in 1991 by Umberto Bossi. In 1996, Lega Nord declared its full name as the

11 Original document no longer online. Original Greek text per Vasilopoulou: ‘θεωρούμε όμως ότι κάτι τέτοιο είναι δυνατόν να επιτευχθεί μόνο στα πλαίσια μιας Συνομοσπονδίας όπου θα αναγνωρίζονται και θα προστατεύονται οι ιστορικές τόσο οι πολιτισμικές και οι εθνικές ρίζες όσο και τα ιδιαίτερα εθνικά χαρακτηριστικά των Ευρωπαϊκών λαών.’
“Independent Republic of Padania” (Brambilla 2012). The party “advocates federalism and transfer of control of resources to regional governments” and is a fierce opponent of immigration (European Election and Referendum Database 2015). LN has an ultimate of realizing the secession of Padania (the northern region of Italy) and creating a new pan-European state that would include Northern Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Bavaria and Savoy (Brambilla 2012).

Paxton (2004) observed that: “In the parliamentary elections of 1992, the Lega Nord won almost 19 percent of the northern vote (8.6 percent nationally) by playing on northern small businessmen’s resentment of the social burden of the Italian south, expressed in terms approaching racism.” Lega Nord currently holds 60 seats in parliament (European Election and Referendum Database 2015).

A. Occurring post-Cold War. Lega Nord was created in 1989 as a result of a merger of seven regional leagues, including Alleanza Nord, Lega Lombarda and Liga Veneta (Caramani and Mény 2005). It was officially established in February 1991 with Umberto Bossi serving as chairman. Condition: met.

B. Non-Violent. LN condemns violence, instead advocating for civil disobedience. As Zaslove (2011) notes, “Lega has not been directly involved in any acts of violence other than small skirmishes and some acts of civil disobedience.” Counterpoint (2014) concurred, rating the group as a “low danger” of violence. Condition: met.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Research from Counterpoint (2014) indicated “little or no evidence – either from the party manifesto or comments by the party leadership – that the party stokes fears of Jews” or that “the party discriminates
against people on the basis of race or ethnic group.” However, Counterpoint (2014) found “there is mixed evidence – either from the party manifesto or comments by the party leadership – that the party discriminates against gay people.” The Democratic Society (4/22/2014) reported that “some of the party’s local councils have banned kebab shops ‘to preserve real local foods’… The party is widely considered to be Italy’s most strongly anti-immigrant party. The party has often been labelled as Islamophobic, and has sometimes been accused of racist rhetoric.”

In 2014, Lega Nord’s Gianluca Buonanno “dirtied his face with makeup to illustrate the point that Italians ‘needed to be a little bit darker’ if they were going to get welfare benefits. During a discussion in Italy's parliament last year on gay issues, he produced a bulb of fennel — whose name in Italian is a homosexual slur — to taunt two openly gay lawmakers. That particularly nicety came on the heels of a radio interview in which he said that, if confronted by a homosexual, he would ‘kick him in the balls’” (Faiola 2014).

Davies (2012) recounted a 2013 incident in which “Roberto Calderoli, a former minister under Silvio Berlusconi and senate vice-president of the Northern League, told a rally in the northern town of Treviglio that Kyenge would be better off working as a minister ‘in her country.’” Calderoli also suggested “the country's first black government minister had the features of an orangutan” stating: “I love animals, but when I see her, I can't help but think of an orangutan” (Davies 2013). Calderoli himself claimed that what he had said was a "little joke" and that it was "not racist" (Foot 2013). Foot (2013) opined that:
The Lega has always been a racist party, fanning the flames of ethnic and religious conflict whenever it has been able to. You could compile an encyclopedia of the League’s racist comments and activities. There was, for example, the mayor of a major Italian city who argued that immigrants should be dressed as animals and hunted down, or the League politician who recently claimed to be happy on hearing of the death of immigrants trying to arrive by sea… (Foot 2013)

One of the problems is that there is disagreement over what racism actually is. Calderoli thinks that comparing a black woman to an orangutan is a ‘little joke,’ or even a ‘funny joke.’ When [Italian footballer] Mario Balotelli was depicted as King Kong in a cartoon, many people didn't see any problem at all. (Foot 2013)

Smythe (2013) provided provocative insight: “when you have Italians in the South not considered Italians because of their skin colour or the lack of industry, oblivious to the fact that Italians worldwide have been considered people of colour until only recently. Italy does not need an awareness campaign of the Other. Italy needs first to recognise who the Other is, and it should start with a mirror.”

Are these examples of ignorance, insensitivity or racism? It is best to revisit the original qualifiers/disqualifiers set forth at the beginning of this chapter: mission and vision do not specifically contain anti-Semitic, racist or homophobic ideology with information gathered from a review of group’s mission, vision, official website(s)/publications, and/or media/news reports. In the case of LN, the party was founded with the guiding principle of separatism and creating a distinction between northern Italy and southern Italy. Can one be racist against his/her own race? Could such sentiment be better described as elitism?
In 1993, Putnam acknowledged the long-standing dichotomy between southern and northern Italy, and pointed to the level of civic engagement as an explanation. Putnam (1993) contends that this concept of social capital was largely absent in southern Italy but present in northern Italy and led to the north’s prosperity. This disparity is the foundation of LN’s argument and the foundation of their separatist ideology.

The final word comes in the form of an opinion rendered by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). In 2002, the ECRI denounced the party, asserting that "members of Lega Nord made a particularly intense use of racist and xenophobic propaganda". Yet the racist hate speech continued despite the party’s 2013 creation of a new “anti-racist committee” to defend Italians from Roma. The 2015 report found that “from January 2013 to March 2015 the ERRC has documented the following in relation to hate speech: 35 cases of hate speech by public figures, including two demonstrations. Most of the hate speech (15 cases) came from the Lega Nord (Northern League), a political party” (ERRC 2015). Condition: unmet.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. Paxton (2004) characterized LN as a far-right separatist group. The Democratic Society (4/22/2014) noted that: “While the party was initially a rather catch-all party for Northern regionalism, it has become a right-wing populist beast with tough stances on crime and immigration.” News media such as the BBC utilize headlines touting the group as right-wing” (Squires 2013). Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. LN argues that “the European institutions are not close to the European citizens and that integration should mean the respect of the traditions and cultures of the European peoples, which is not currently the case. However, it argues that ‘we must construct a Europe that is founded on the respect of national and
territorial realities, giving the European Union only a limited degree of sovereignty, delimiting its competences and the fields of its intervention avoiding ambiguities” (LN website as documented in Vasilopoulou 2010).12

Further, “as a consequence of Italy's integration in the EMU in 1998, the Lega Nord shifted from a pro-European to a Eurosceptic position. The Lega's Eurosceptic vision combines a strong identification with Europe with a hostile attitude towards the institutions of the EU” (Huysseune 2010). LN’s new party secretary, Matteo Salvini, has recently “described the European Union as a ‘monster’ that needs to be ‘slaughtered’ and has called the Euro a ‘crime against humanity’ (Squires 2013). Condition: met.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. LN advocates for the creation of a new, independent state that would better serve the people of northern Italy. The Democratic Society (4/22/2014) observed that: “The party has wavered between separatism for the North and a federal Italy. At its most separatist the Lega claims that the North of Italy is a forgotten nation called ‘Padania’. In the late 1990s the Lega went as far as to arrange elections to a ‘Padanian parliament’, a Padanian football team and even a ‘Miss Padania’ beauty contest in order to lay claim to a ‘Padanian’ nationhood.”

The Democratic Society (April 2014) reported that the group touts a “Padanian nationalist stance and stronger anti-immigrant stances.” Condition: met.

LEGA NORD: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET

12 Original document no longer online. Original Italian text per Vasilopoulou (2010): “si deve cercare di costruire un’Europa fondata sul rispetto delle realtà nazionali e territoriali, cedendo all’Unione Europea solo una limitata parte di sovranità, delimitando chiaramente le proprie competenze; vanno delimitati con precisione gli ambiti di intervento dell’Unione Europea, evitando norme ambigue ed indefinite.”
National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands-NPD)

An official NPD website states that NPD: “is Germany's oldest nationalist party since 1945 and one of the few patriotic organizations not yet banned by the government. It was formed on November 28, 1964, by leading members of the disbanded Deutsche Reichspartei and several smaller patriotic groups” (NPD 2015). The party has been the target of much scrutiny due to alleged ties with neo-Nazism, racism, anti-Semitism, and homophobia. The party website notes that “in 2004 the NPD attained 9.2% of the electorate and won factional strength in state parliament in the southeastern State of Saxony and only two years later 7.3% in the northeastern State of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern where a second faction in a state parliament was established with Udo Pastörs as leader. This was a real shock for the system-parties in Germany. Besides these victories, the NPD also made good progress in municipal and local elections with over 21% of the votes in some districts” (NPD 2015). The party is viewed as extreme-right wing with racist tendencies and there are ongoing attempts to ban the group.

A. Occurring post-Cold War. According to the NPD website, beginning at the end of the 1970s then-chairman, Martin Mussgnug, “began a restructuring which combined the dropping of much of the early conservative political rhetoric with an emphasis on the ideological education of members. Thereafter the party began concentrating upon building a strong organizational infrastructure, rather than upon short-term electioneering. Consequently, after the partial reunification of Germany in 1990, the NPD was able to gain considerable strength in the eastern part of the country: the former German Democratic Republic” (NPD 2015).
Thus, despite some waxing and waning, because the party was founded in the 1960’s and has held to a similar agenda throughout, the party will not meet the condition of occurring post-Cold War. Condition: unmet.

B. Non-Violent. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (Lee 2015):
“The German government asked the country's highest court to ban the NPD, claiming it has ties to neo-Nazi Skinhead gangs involved in a surge of violent attacks against foreigners and other minorities.”

Further, “Describing the NPD as the ideological seedbed for neo-Nazi aggression, German officials accuse the party of fomenting racist violence throughout the country… [In 1998] NPD candidate Manfred Roeder called for the violent overthrow of the German government” (Lee 2015). Borrud (2015) has noted that many people “have witnessed first-hand the violence that groups like the NPD are able to bring about.” Condition: unmet.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Ralf Jäger, Interior minister of North Rhine Westphalia, contended that "the NPD provides the basis for neo-Nazi violence and spreads hatred against foreigners" (Borrud 2015). In the past few years, there have been numerous attempts to have the party banned. Deutsche Welle has reported that the primary problem in having the party (or any party) prohibited (Borrud 2015) is mounting sufficient evidence: “Explicit proof that the party not only condones - but also takes an active part in - unconstitutional actions such as the propagation of racism and xenophobia must be successfully demonstrated before the country's leading justices. The case is to be made by the leaders of Germany's 16 federal states, who comprise the Bundesrat, or the upper house of federal parliament.” Indeed, following an unsuccessful attempt in 2003 to
ban the party, it was determined that NPD executives had provided much of the evidence (Borrud 2015). Additionally, the NPD Party Programme states that ‘homosexual couples are not family and may not be promoted. Children need a mother and father for a healthy development.’  

As reported by Reuters (Chambers 2012): “Germany's domestic intelligence service has described the NPD as ‘racist, anti-Semitic and revisionist’ and says it aims to abolish democracy.” Further, noted Chambers (2012): “The party calls the German constitution a ‘diktat’ imposed by victorious Western powers after 1945.” Condition: unmet.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. The party is unapologetically right-wing and even described as extreme and radical right-wing by multiple news agencies. Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. The NPD Party Programme (NPD 2015) explicitly declares that “We reject all ‘multicultural’ societal models as inhuman, because they alienate both German and non-German community order.” The EU Observer reported that “NPD is in favour of a breakup of the eurozone and a return to national currencies, and demands a ‘rapid dismantling of the European Stability Mechanism’ – the eurozone bailout fund” (Pop 2014). Condition: met.

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13 Original German text, translation my own: “Homosexuelle Lebenspartnerschaften bilden keine Familie und dürfen nicht gefördert werden. Kinder brauchen Mutter und Vater für eine gesunde Entwicklung.”

14 Original German text, translation my own: “Wir lehnen alle ‘multikulturellen’ Gesellschaftsmodelle als unmenschlich ab, weil sie Deutsche und Nichtdeutsche gleichermaßen der nationalen Gemeinschaftsordnung entfremden”
F. Nationalist/Reformist. As proclaimed in the Party Programme, NPD is the home of the social party of Germans, is committed to human rights and is therefore working consistently for national identity, national sovereignty and national solidarity as a means of livelihood of our people.\(^\text{15}\) Condition: met.

**NPD: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET**

*Party of the Swedes (Svenskarnas parti –SVP), Sweden*

The party disbanded in May 2015 following highly disappointing national election results in 2014.

**PARTY OF THE SWEDES: N/A**

*Pegida - Germany*

Pegida is far-right radical group which has taken Germany by storm during its short existence. The Economist (2/23/2015) reported that “the movement was founded last autumn [2014] in Dresden… Its first organiser was Lutz Bachmann, an owner of an ad agency who had repeatedly fallen afoul of the law and who once fled to South Africa to avoid going to prison.” Germany’s Spiegel expanded, noting that, “on Oct. 10, 2014, Lutz Bachmann posted a video on YouTube showing a Dresden rally in support of Kurdish fighters battling Islamic State. One day later, he founded a Facebook group called ‘Peaceful Europeans against the Islamization of the West,’ which ultimately turned into Pegida” (Popp and Wassermann 1/12/2015). Explained the Economist (2/23/15):

\(^\text{15}\) Original German text, translation is my own: “Die Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands ist die soziale Heimatpartei der Deutschen, bekennt sich zu einem lebensrichtigen Menschenbild und setzt sich deshalb konsequent für nationale Identität, nationale Souveränität und nationale Solidarität als Lebensgrundlagen unseres Volkes ein.”
“Pegida is a German acronym for ‘Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamicisation of the Occident.’” The Economist (2/23/2015) also observed that “the sudden and spontaneous rise of Pegida has caused much soul-searching in German society and has shaken its political system.” The group holds well-attended demonstrations every Monday known as ‘Monday marches.’ Time Magazine (Shuster 2015) noted that a survey taken in December 2014 “found that 30% of respondents had ‘full and total’ sympathy for Pegida’s cause, the same level of support that Merkel’s political party got in the German elections to the European Parliament last year.”

A. Occurring post-Cold War. Pegida was founded in the fall of 2014 by Lutz Bachmann. Condition: met.

B. Non-Violent. Shuster (2015) reported in Time Magazine that Bachmann publicly renounces extremist violence of any kind. In July 2015, a town hall in Freital, Germany, to discuss housing of refugees turned into chaos as opposing sides argued and fights ensued. When Deutsche Welle asked Bachmann for comment on the violent nature of the meeting, he replied: "In principle we support any protests that are directed against economic migrants. We're behind those. But we do not support protests directly against homes where there are definite war refugees" (Knight 2015).

Such a comment is thinly veiled support of violence. Condition: unmet.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. The Economist (2/23/15) calls Pegida “a German movement with an explicitly anti-Islamist and implicitly xenophobic message” and perceive Muslims as a threat to German culture. Indeed, Pegida member Siegfried Däbritz has stated, "We want to gather to oppose the advancing Islamization of our country. We don't want terrorist, Islamist powers to fight their religious war on our
streets. We are against IS, PKK, al-Qaida and all the others," (Popp and Wassermann 1/12/2015). Further, Bachmann added: "It is clear that people will accuse us of being Nazis. But why should we make it easy for them rather than being clear about where we stand from the beginning: PATRIOTIC and not Nazi!"

In January 2015, Bachmann “abruptly stepped down after pictures of him posing as Hitler on his Facebook page became public. A march on January 19th was cancelled by police after they obtained information concerning a possible plan to assassinate Mr Bachmann…” (Economist 2/23/2015). Bachmann, however, reassumed his leadership of Pegida by February 2015.

In a January 2015 interview with YNet News, Christian Mayerhoff, a spokesperson for PEGIDA, asserted "We are no Nazis. Personally I was active in left-wing human rights movements in my youth during the early 1990s. After 9/11 I started learning about Islam and Islamism and this changed my opinion about multiculturalism and political correctness. In PEGIDA there are leftists, centrists and conservatives. In the city of Kassel our committee includes a Croatian, a Jew and a secularized Muslim…”

As with PVV and others, there is a definite prejudice against Islam but prejudice is, arguably, not racism and Islam is a religion not a race. Condition: met.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. BBC News (January 2015) has reported that Pegida is an “umbrella group” for the German right-wing. The group embraces their right-wing status, but desires the public to view right-wing parties in a different light: “We want to emphasize that this here is not to become a collection of right-wing crazies, neo-Nazis or the like but is the first step for a Germany and a Europe where people can once again say
what they want, where patriotism is no longer a crime," (Popp and Wassermann 2015).
Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. The Economist (2/23/2015) wrote that “supporters seem troubled by the perceived threat to German culture posed by immigrants and asylum-seekers.” In January 2015, the group presented a 19-point manifesto with a “six-point plan demanding clear immigration rules, an end to “absurd” EU controls and direct democracy in Germany through referenda” (Scally 2015). Condition: met.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. Pegida presented their six-point highly nationalistic and reformative political platform in January 2015: “First: qualitative rather than quantitative immigration; second: compulsory integration for foreigners; third: no entry visas for jihadis; fourth: referendums; fifth: a good relationship with Russia; sixth: more money for the police” (Schulze 2015).

Thran and Boehnke (2015) analyzed Pegida’s nationalist views, noting “the xenophobic logic of Pegida's value-based nationalism.” Condition: met.

PEGIDA: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET

Podemos (We Can), Spain

Frayer (2015) reported that Podemos was founded by Pablo Iglesias (also known as El Coleta “the ponytailed one”) and Miguel Urbán of the radical left party “Izquierda Anticapitalista” in January 2014, with pretensions of breaking the two-party hegemony in Spanish politics. Iglesias (2015) noted that” after the May 2014 elections, Podemos had five MEPs, although it still lacked a formal political leadership and an organized territorial and sectoral structure across regions, as well as formal mechanisms for decision-making.” McHugh (2015) observed that: “By May 2015, Podemos had swept
many local elections, winning important mayoral seats in major cities like Barcelona and
destabilizing parties that had held positions since the 1980s.”

Noted Duarte and Tadeo (2015): “At the center of the Podemos’s platform is a
plan to force a restructuring of Spain’s 1 trillion euros ($1.1 trillion) of government debt
in what would be the biggest sovereign reorganization in history. The proposal has helped
Podemos top 10 opinion polls in Spain since November.” McHugh (2015) observed that
Podemos “built its platform in opposition to the austerity policies adopted by most debt-
stricken European nations, which included budget cuts and higher taxes in exchange for
debt-relief loans from European lenders.” Many people in the political arena voice
concern regarding Iglesias’ close relationship with Greek Syriza leader Tsipras,
wondering how it might impact or even steer Podemos.

A. Occurring post-Cold War. Iglesias officially announced the creation of
Podemos on January 17, 2014, at a small theatre in Lavapiés, a district in Madrid
(Tremlett 2015). Condition: met.

B. Non-Violent. Podemos has virtually no connections with violence though, as
noted by Kassam (2014), “Others have taken aim at his words – he has been accused of
justifying terrorism at the hands of Eta after he said that the group's violence ‘had
political explanations’ that needed to be understood in order to find democratic
solutions.”

Observers note the party’s rise based on peaceful demonstrations: Podemos
“was forged on the back of the largely peaceful protests held across Spain by the M-15
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. As outlined in the 2015 Podemos electoral platform, ‘El Programa del Cambio’ (Podemos, 2015), Podemos advocated for gay rights, abortion rights, gender equality and civic liberties (Igualidad), and favored an open and inclusive immigration policy (Migraciones). Zabala (2015) observed that: “Contrary to Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement, which ruined its reputation in Italy by joining Nigel Farage's racist Europe of Freedom and Democracy group, Podemos opted for the European United Left/Nordic Green Left group, where Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories as well as the CIA's torture programme are often condemned.”

Further, the Podemos platform specifically addressed racism noting that “we will implement a plan to combat racism, xenophobia and other forms of discrimination affecting both people of Spanish origin residing abroad as well as people of foreign origin residing in Spain.”  

D. Right-wing/left-wing. Podemos is widely considered a left-wing political party, though “party leaders have often resisted the designation of ‘radical left,’ saying the group exists too far outside of the mainstream to be right or left” (McHugh 2015). Al Jazeera classifies the group as far-left (Zabala 2015). Noted Zabala (2015): “Even though their manifesto and programme was clearly rooted in European radical left, they defined it ‘a participatory method open to all citizens,’ that is, independent of ideological preferences.” Condition: met.

Original Spanish text (translation my own): “Pondremos en marcha un plan de lucha contra el racismo, la xenofobia y cualquier otra forma de discriminación que afecte tanto a las personas de origen español que residen en el exterior como a las personas de origen extranjero residentes en España” (Podemos, 2015).
E. *Eurosceptic.* Frayer (2015) noted that “Iglesias argues that Spain’s recovery has come at the expense of the Spanish working-class, which continues to suffer from slumping wages and persistently high unemployment — still 23%. He blames ruling conservatives, Germany and the troika of the European Union, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund — and vows, if elected prime minister, to roll back the austerity measures they support.” Iglesias contends one enemy of Spain is “Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel and the unelected officials who oversaw the euro from the European Central Bank in Frankfurt. Iglesias did not want Spain to leave the European Union, but he was not satisfied with it either” (Tremlett 2015). Such views are in line with soft euro-scepticism.

Stokes (2015) also pointed out that Podemos “has called for a renegotiation of EU-demanded fiscal austerity measures and a curbing of EU powers.” Condition: met.

F. *Nationalist/Reformist.* Above all, Iglesias has stated that “he wanted Spaniards to recover ‘sovereignty’” (Tremlett 2015). As noted above in Duarte and Tadeo (2015): Podemos sought “a plan to force a restructuring of Spain’s 1 trillion euros ($1.1 trillion) of government debt in what would be the biggest sovereign reorganization in history.” The 2015 Podemos platform (Podemos 2015) explicitly states “El nuestro es un programa ciudadano. De la ciudadanía y para la ciudadanía” (Ours is a national program. Of the citizens and for the citizens). Condition: met.

PODEMOS: ALL CONDITIONS MET

*Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP), Turkey*
The Republican People’s Party (CHP) was established in 1923 “and mostly ran a single-party regime for the first quarter century of existence. It transformed Turkey from a mostly pious Sultanate to a westward-looking country: political Islam was banned, women were enfranchised, and a Latin alphabet replaced the old Arabic lexicon” (JamesinTurkey.com 2015).

However, as part of a military coup on 12 September 1980, The National Security Council (MGK), dissolved Parliament and the Government, and created adopted a military-inspired constitution that banned political parties (Reuters 3 May 2010). The Turkey Analyst (May 2008) noted that “when the ban on pre-1980 political parties was lifted in 1992, Baykal immediately re-established the old CHP.”

In February 1995, CHP merged with SHP, then the main left-wing party, with Baykal serving as leader until May 2010 (All About Turkey 2015). Reported All About Turkey (2015):

Following the general elections of April 1999, CHP - which obtained only 8.7% of the votes - disappeared from the Parliament for the first time in its history. During the elections of 2002, ex-leader Mr. Baykal re-gained his seat and they were able to get 19.39% of the votes, thus became the second and the main opposition party in the parliament.

In 2007 they joined their forces with DSP and got 20.88% of the votes. After the elections, members from DSP have left the party and returned to their original party. In 2011 they got 25.92% of the votes and thus hold 135 seats. In 2015 they got 25.13% of the votes and hold 132 seats. (All About Turkey 2015)

In 2014, Today's Zaman reported that “The main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) is undergoing a transformation and has, under the leadership of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, nominated certain names in local and presidential elections who are affiliated with the political center-right and who embrace a conservative ideology in
consecutive elections in an effort to break the party's reputation of only appealing to a limited part of society. The party has also signaled change in its policy direction on the Kurdish problem, which has occupied the agenda of the country for decades” (Üstüntağ 9/6/2014).

A. Occurring post-Cold War. Though CHP was formed in 1923, it survived the 1980s ban on political parties to reemerge in a new Turkey in 1992. Through leadership changes and party mergers, the party took various forms though it presented a new ideology in 2014. Caliskan (2014) argued that CHP has experienced three transformations- the first during the 1930s when CHP was the state; the second beginning around 1971 under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit; and the third in the 2000s under Kılıçdaroğlu.

Kılıçdaroğlu promised a fundamental change of course in the party’s political practice with an initial goal of bridging the gap between CHP’s two ideological wings, the Nationalists and Social Democrats (Caliskan 2014). Following an electoral loss in 2011, Kılıçdaroğlu called for a party congress to change the dated party constitution. He pushed for democracy and introduced positive discrimination for women and a 10% youth quota (Caliskan 2014). In 2015, the success of the new party ideology was apparent as CHP garnered 25% of the vote. Condition: met.

B. Non-Violent. CHP condemns violence. In 2014, Kılıçdaroğlu stated that "We all need to know that terrorism is a humanity crime" (Daily Sabah 10/10/2014). Turkish Weekly (2015) reported that Kılıçdaroğlu has spoken against violence: “Turning our demonstrations into violent acts would only serve the terrorist organization. Let’s denounce terrorism, let’s march against it with our flags in our hands.” Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Kulaoğlu (2015) reported that: “Faruk Loğoğlu, deputy chairman of CHP, told Turkey’s Zaman that the CHP categorically rejects any manifestation of anti-Semitic behavior and discourse, whether in Turkey or elsewhere.” Loğoğlu stated that: “We strongly blame Erdoğan and his cohorts for hurting the feelings of our citizens of Jewish origin and for endangering their well-being and safety…no one should forget that that the family of nations views anti-Semitism as a crime against humanity. The CHP stands in solidarity with our citizens of Jewish origin,” (Arslan, 3/16/2014). Further, CHP has proposed homosexual candidates for elections and has signed on to protect the rights of homosexuals (Kulaoğlu, 2015). Condition: met.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. As noted above, the party is historically left-wing, though under the leadership of Kiliçdaroglu it has seen movement toward the right (All About Turkey 2015). TRTWorld (2015) classifies the group as left wing. Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. Uzun and Kaleagasi (2015) noted that “CHP has consistently been against censoring of media, for freedom of speech, and for further integration into the European Union.” In 2015, “CHP announced plans to build a new mega city called ‘Central Turkey’ (Merkez Türkiye) to serve as a trade hub between Europe, Asia and other continents” (CHP EU 2015). Condition: unmet.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. According to All About Turkey (2015), “CHP’s main ideological source has always been Kemalism, which is the modernization paradigm of Turkish Republic… [Kemalism] was meant to preserve the independence of the Republic of Turkey and also to help the Republic’s political development. It was a nationalism which respected the right to independence of all other nations.”
CHP is reported to be embracing ‘soft-nationalism.’ Mahçupyan (2012) opined that as embraced by CHP, “nationalism represents a true alternative and is a postmodern form of Kemalism.” Condition: met.

**CHP: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET**

*Right Sector (Pravy Sektor/Правий сектор), Ukraine*

The Right Sector is a Ukrainian movement led by Dmitry Yarosh. According to the group’s official website (http://pravyysektor.info), the movement originated during the early events of Euromaidan in Kiev Square (Maidan) on November 28, 2013, as a union of right-wing organizations and individual activists. Right Sector is considered a far-right, ultranationalist, militant group.

A. *Occurring post-Cold War.* The group was formed in 2013, in Kiev. Condition: met.

B. *Non-Violent.* According to the BBC (28 April 2014), “activists claiming to be Right Sector members were involved in Kiev's Maidan protests from late November, but the group did not attract much attention until violent clashes with police in central Kiev on 19 January, in which it played a leading role. By early February Mr Yarosh was saying the Right Sector had 500 fighters on Independence Square and could mobilise up to 5,000 nationwide.” Additionally, the BBC (28 April 2014) reported that Russia has accused the Right Sector of “involvement in multiple acts of violence” including “against pro-Moscow separatists in eastern Ukraine… The Right Sector denies this, but maintains a barrage of anti-Russian rhetoric” (BBC 28 April 2014). Indeed, after a “Right Sector activist wounded a number of people in central Kiev in 2014, the group was forced to vacate its city headquarters, leaving all weapons behind” (BBC 28 April 2014).
Peters (2015) reported that the Right Sector has threatened violence throughout Ukraine, and on July 11, 2015, “the neo-fascist organization engaged in a gun battle in the town of Mukacheve.” Condition: unmet.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Party leader Yarosh has rejected all accusations of racism, asserting that “he regards anyone who fights for Ukraine as a comrade. Right Sector leaders have recently assured the Israeli ambassador that they reject anti-Semitism along with other forms of chauvinism and xenophobia” (BBC 28 April 2014). In April 2014, a representative of Right Sector “travelled to Odessa after vandals defaced a Holocaust monument with Nazi symbols to show solidarity with the local Jewish community” (International Business Times 2014). Condition: met.


E. Eurosceptic. BBC (28 April 2014) reported that Right Sector leading figure, Andriy Tarasenko, has stated that the group aimed “not for closer ties with Europe but rather to build a nationalist Ukrainian state and stage a nationalist revolution.” Not only is the group adamantly anti-Russia, they are also anti-Europe. The group “regards the EU as an ‘oppressor’ of European nations” (BBC January 2014). Condition: met.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. Right Sector’s official website states that it is an organized movement that aims for Ukrainian national liberation from foreign and domestic occupation and nation-building (Pravy Sektor 2015) The website further states that the mission of the movement is gaining and development of an Independent
Ukrainian State through a national revolution. The BBC (28 April 2014) refers to the group as “ultra-nationalist.” Condition: met.

RIGHT SECTOR: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET

_Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana-SNS), Slovakia_

The Institute for European Policy (2013) noted that the Slovak National Party claimed to be “the oldest Slovak political party, tracing its roots to the 19th century Slovak National Party. However this historical SNS was rather an honorary party representing all political groups nationally self-defined as Slovak… there is no traceable continuity among these two subjects from 1938 to 1990.” The party in its current form an iteration was founded in March 1990. The party has seen multiple leadership changes and mergers/splits. A 1999 splinter of the party led to the creation of Real Slovak National Party though both parties shared a principal ideology and policies (Institute for European Policy 2013). Ultimately, the parties merged in 2003 naming Ján Slota as chairman. By 2006, they had “gained 11% of the votes and became the third biggest parliamentary faction and, after eight years, also part of the ruling coalition” (Institute for European Policy 2013). In July 2011, “SNS signed a memorandum of understanding with the Austrian Freedom Party to oppose Turkeys bid for EU membership” (Lansford 2015). The SNS is a member of the EP group “Europe of Freedom and Democracy.”

A. _Occurring post-Cold War._ The current iteration of SNS was established in March 1990. Condition: met.

B. _Non-Violent._ No associations with violence were identified in conjunction with SNS. Any accusations lobbied against SNS in regards to violence related to their
agenda inciting violent behavior in others. Counterpoint (2014) concurs, discovering “no evidence of violence within the party leadership.” Condition: met.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. The group is perceived as racist and xenophobic, but is perception reality? In its manifesto for the general elections of 2010, SNS “defined the nation in terms of values and culture” (Institute for European Policy 2013). It included ethnic minorities into the definition of national culture…” rather than speaking about helping this community [Roma minority], the manifesto calls for control of this ethnic group” (Institute for European Policy 2013). In the 2006 general election SNS manifesto, the party acknowledged that “the nation was understood as the primary value of reference. However the nation is not defined by race or blood but rather by culture, shared history and most importantly by language and values” (Institute for European Policy 2013).

However, Slota, the party’s former leader (Slota was removed as leader in 2013), “made many controversial statements, including threatening to role tanks into Budapest, referred to medieval Hungarians as ‘Mongoloid types with crooked legs and even more disgusting horses’ suggesting that they were ‘civilised’ by Slovaks. He has referred to Hungarians as a ‘tumour in the body of the Slovakian nation.’ He stated that 70% of Roma were criminals and suggested the best policy for dealing with them was a ‘long whip in a small yard’” (Democratic Society 2014).

A 2009 report on Slovakia prepared by the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and published in May 2009 by the Council of Europe (Ivo.sk 2015), pointed out the “worrying increase ... in racist political discourse mainly against the Hungarian minority as well as against, inter alia, Roma and Jewish people”
since the coalition government comprising the Slovak National Party took power in 2006 (ECRI 2009). However, blaming an entire coalition’s behavior on one member seems quite a stretch. Indeed as discussed by Mesežnikov (2009), “The SNS may be described as the most relevant factor of radical though not anti-system) nationalism in Slovakia. The party currently enjoys a strong position within the power system thanks to its ability to capitalize on xenophobic and anti-minority (i.e. anti-Hungarian) sentiments of certain population segments and due to coalition strategies applied by other populist parties.”

Ultimately, UK’s Counterpoint (2014) summarized it most succinctly: “there is mixed evidence from the party’s history that the party promoted (or promotes) values directly opposed to democracy and human rights… the roots of the Slovak National Party (SNS) are in the campaign for Slovakian independence in the 1990s. It has had a chequered past, with a number of splits and changes in approach. But the SNS has claimed continuity with the historical Slovak National Party, which in turn had members connected to the Nazi regime in Slovakia, and the party shown support for fascist leader Jozef Tiso.”

Counterpoint (2014) rated the SNS as a high danger for racism and homophobia, arguing that there is “clear evidence – either from the party manifesto or comments by the party leadership – that the party discriminates against people on the basis of race or ethnic group” and that the party discriminates against gay people. Condition: unmet.

E. Eurosceptic. According to the SNS manifesto, the party “advocated for a Europe of sovereign nation states and criticized the bureaucracy of the European institution” (Institute for European Policy 2013). The “Party explicitly refuses the liberal immigrant policy produced by the EU…The EU is defined as an institution importing liberal policy such as multiculturalism; but in fact, the EU misuses Slovakia while ignoring national sovereignty and serving TNCs and global capitalism” (Institute for European Policy 2013). Condition: met.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. The primary objective of SNS, as stated repeatedly in their 2010 manifesto, was “to establish a government composed only of Slovak political parties, meaning without any party representing ethnic minority interests… The creation of this so called ‘Slovak government’ was necessary, according to SNS, because Slovak national interests were in grave danger” (Institute for European Policy 2013).

Further, “SNS strongly condemns the secession of Kosovo from Serbia and rejects any possibility to recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state. The nation is more than simply a summary of the citizens – it is an entity with its own, distinctive identity.” Condition: met.

SNS: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET

Svoboda (Всеукраїнське об’єднання «Свобода), Ukraine

As detailed on the Svoboda website (Svoboda 2015), “the Svoboda Party-formerly the Social National Party of Ukraine (SNPU)- was formed as a merger of several groups including: the Varta Rukhu (Rukh's Guards), the Studentske Bratstvo (Students' Brotherhood), the Spadshchyna (Heritage) and the Ukrainian Veterans of Afghanistan.” They note that “on 29 September 1991, a coordinating group session was
held in Lviv, followed by a founding Convention on 13 October 1991 which announced the creation of the SNPU” (Svoboda 2015). “At the 9th SNPU Convention on 14 February 2004, a new name was adopted for the party - the ‘All-Ukrainian Svoboda Union,’ and elected Oleh Tiahnybok as Svoboda’s leader” (Svoboda.org 2015).

The BBC (4/28/2014) reported that “the nationalist Svoboda party - also a significant player in the Maidan protests - now has three powerful posts in the interim government: acting chief prosecutor, deputy prime minister and chairman of the National Security Council.” In the 2012 parliamentary election, 10.44% voted for Svoboda, leading the party to claim 37 parliamentary seats. However, 2014 would be a resounding disappointment. Svoboda failed to earn a seat in Parliament “falling only 0.3% short of the required minimum of 5%” (Ishchenko 2014). However, The Guardian also noted that “infamous extreme right politician from the Svoboda party Yuriy Mykhalchyshyn, who once promoted Joseph Goebbels’ A Little ABC of National Socialism and the 25-point NSDAP Program, will head up propaganda and analysis in the Security Service of Ukraine” (Ishchenko 2014).

A. Occurring post-Cold War. SNPU was formed in 1991 and the name change to Svoboda occurred in 2004. Condition: met.

B. Non-Violent. Yahoo News (8/31/2015) reported that “The Ukrainian ultranationalist party Svoboda, blamed for clashes that killed one person and injured dozens more outside parliament on Monday, has a long-established reputation for violent confrontation.” The August 2015 incident outside Parliament involved an admitted member of Svoboda and the Sich battalion who tossed a grenade at police officers and
journalists -- its shrapnel killing a 24-year-old member of the National Guard (Yahoo News 8/31/2015).

Additionally, “Svoboda lawmakers have been known to engage in physical confrontations with pro-Russian parliamentarians” (Yahoo News 8/31/2015). On its website, Svoboda has noted that 19 of its members have died in fighting with pro-Russian separatists since April 2014 (Yahoo News 8/31/2015). Condition: unmet.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. Olszański (2011) noted that “the party advocated the social nationalist ideology by combining radical nationalism with equally radical social rhetoric. Among the canons of its ideology there was: a vision of the nation as a natural community, the primacy of the nation’s rights over human rights, the urge to build an ‘ethnic economy’, but also an openly racist rhetoric concerning white supremacy.”

Andrew Srulevitch, director of European Affairs for the Anti-Defamation League, said: "Svoboda has been disciplined in its messaging regarding Jews since the Maidan demonstrations started in November, but they have a history of anti-Semitic statements to overcome, and a clear political program of ethnic nationalism that makes Jews nervous" (Zawadzki, Hosenball and Grey 2014).

However, in 2004, concurring with the party name change to Svoboda, “the radical neo-Nazi and racist groups were pushed out from the party” (Olszański 2011). Ivan Katchanovski, an expert in comparative politics, contended that "Svoboda is currently best described as a radical nationalist party, and not as fascist or neo-Nazi…It is now not overtly anti-Semitic" (Zawadzki, Hosenball and Grey 2014). Additionally, Zawadzki, Hosenball and Grey (2014) reported that a senior U.S. official observed that:
"Since entering the Ukrainian Parliament in October 2012, the Svoboda leadership has been working to take their party in a more moderate direction and to become a modern, European mainstream political party…The leadership has been much more vigilant about expelling or otherwise punishing individual members who engage in xenophobic behavior or rhetoric." (Zawadzki, Hosenball and Grey 2014). Yahoo News (8/31/2015) noted that “Svoboda has continued to adopt hugely controversial positions, staunchly opposing gay pride parades and annual pilgrimages to the country by Hassidic Jews.”

This variable is difficult to call. However, news reports indicate strong past (and potentially ongoing) connections with anti-Semitism and note “efforts” to change. “Efforts” in this case are not strong enough on their own merit to overcome strong anti-Semitic connections, particularly when they are unaccompanied by party leadership’s promotion of Jews. Condition: unmet.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. Svoboda is widely considered the “major Ukrainian far-right party” (Ishchenko 2014). The party refers to itself as a “rightist political party” (Svoboda 2015). Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. In the 2008 Svoboda party manifesto, the party sought to “terminate agreement with the EU on readmission. Conclude with other states, from territories where illegal immigrants come to Ukraine, readmission agreements (return of illegal immigrants) on favorable conditions for Ukraine” (Svoboda 2015).

Noted Olszański (2011), “The strategic direction of the state is to be ‘European Ukraine-centrism’ which should guarantee Ukraine’s status as ‘not only geographical, but also a geopolitical centre of Europe’. Ukraine is to leave the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and other post-Soviet structures, demand an explicit guarantee
of accession to NATO within a set period of time, and to once again become a possessor of tactical nuclear weapons. The European Union is not even mentioned in the programme.” Indeed, the BBC reported in 2014 that Svoboda “supports EU integration - an exception among Europe's far right” (BBC 7 March 2014). Condition: unmet.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. Katchanovski has said that "Svoboda is currently best described as a radical nationalist party” (Zawadzki, Hosenball and Grey 2014). In fact, Svoboda’s party manifesto contained an entire section devoted to its nationalist posture. On their website, Svoboda (2015) described in the ‘Program for the Protection of Ukrainians’ their desire to: Adopt a new Citizenship Act, under which citizenship will be given only to those persons who were born in Ukraine or are ethnically Ukrainian, who returned from abroad for permanent living and working in Ukraine. Allow people born in Ukraine from foreigners or stateless persons to acquire Ukrainian citizenship upon reaching age of majority only under the conditions of Ukrainian language fluency, knowledge of Ukrainian history and content of the Constitution of Ukraine (Svoboda 2015). Condition: met.

SVOBODA: ALL CONDITIONS NOT MET

Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna-SD), Sweden

The Swedish Democrats were founded in 1988 “to preserve Swedish values and to reducing immigration to Sweden. Initially, the party was led by a number of people linked to Nazi and right-wing extremist groups” (Radio Sweden 2014). Foreign Policy (September 16, 2014), reported that the national elections resulted in “the Sweden Democrats, which has turned xenophobia and anti-immigrant posturing into a political growth industry, captured 12.9 percent of the vote. The election marks the end of the
eight-year rule of the Moderate Party, which saw a huge number of its voters jump ship and vote for a group that has been roundly denounced by Sweden’s political class as a racist movement that has no place in the country’s politics.” Party MEPs joined the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group.

A. *Occurring post-Cold War.* The party was founded in 1988. Noted Bengtsson (2014), “the party lived in the political shadows and scored a few tenths of a percentage point in the general elections. But in 2010 the party, after polishing its act for a considerable time, entered parliament with six percent of the vote. Condition: met.

B. *Non-Violent.* The SD is widely reported and considered to condemn violence. Reuters (Johnson 2014) reported that SD “rejects violence.” Indeed, the group is often the target of violence. “A 2012 police study found that nearly half of the party’s politicians reported threats or assaults in 2011. Some had been beaten with iron bars, some had bombs detonated in their cars, and some had cans of tear gas emptied into their mouths in front of their children” (Teitelbaum 2014). Condition: met.

C. *Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic.* The BBC (2014) reported that one local “party candidate stood down after a picture emerged of her wearing a swastika armband” while another “was highlighted for posting racist and anti-immigrant comments online.” Party leader Akesson has stated that "Islamism is the Nazism and communism of our time. It has to be met with disgust and much stronger resistance than has so far been the case."

*The Independent* (Sims 2015) reported that “While the party has sought to distance itself from associations with Nazis, some of its founders were linked with Nazi
groups and its secretary said in 2014 that Jews were not Swedish unless they abandoned their ethnic identity.”

Al Jazeera (Bengtsson 2014), commented that although other parties have related manifestos, “the Sweden Democrats' extremist roots, as well as its single-track obsession with migration policy, makes it different…The main reason why the Sweden Democrats stand out in this context is probably due to the strong consensus behind the country's policy on immigration by the other Swedish political parties and the fact that Sweden has a long tradition of viewing immigration favourably.”

Interestingly, the SD organized a gay-pride parade in July 2015, though their motivations were called into question because the parade route passed through a Muslim neighborhood. One commenter on PoliticsForum.org (2015) responded that “Since Islam holds that gays should be executed, something like this is obviously an attack on Muslims.”

The SD manifesto is certainly anti-immigrant but there are no racist, anti-Semitic or homophobic declarations nor are there directives or statements from leadership indicating such leanings. Condition: met.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. The SD are resoundingly right-wing, though the Washington Times (Pipes 2015) offered that “Sweden Democrats offer a populist — and not, as usually described, a ‘far right’ — brew of policies.” Teitelbaum (2014) regards the group as “far-right” and “nationalist, anti-immigrant.” Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. Radio Sweden (2014) reported that “immigration and asylum policy are the core issues for the Sweden Democrats. This election [2014], the party is pushing for a ninety percent reduction in immigration.” Tommy Nilsson, southern
Sweden’s party manager, told the *Telegraph* in 2015 that “there’s too much immigration and too many beggars from eastern Europe” (Orange 2015). Condition: met

F. **Nationalist/Reformist.** Akesson has “identified himself as a nationalist but called for his party to show they were ‘broad and inclusive’” (BBC, 2014). Radio Sweden (2014) noted that “the Sweden Democrats are a socially conservative party with a nationalist foundation, who want to preserve Swedish traditions, increase punishments for criminals and to invest more in care for the elderly.” Condition: met.

**SD: ALL CONDITIONS MET**

*Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP), Switzerland*

The Swiss People’s party was “originally founded in 1971 by the merger of the Farmers, Artisans, and Citizens’ Party—generally known as the Agrarian Party—with the Democratic Party” (Encyclopedia Britannica 2015). The party adopted “a more populist agenda in the 1990s, particularly on immigration and social welfare,” and made “substantial gains.” “In the 1999 elections it won the largest vote share and the second greatest number of seats in the lower house of the parliament” (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2015). One writer for the London School of economics has contended that “the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) has established itself as the most powerful radical right-wing party in Western Europe” (Stockemer 2012).

A. **Occurring post-Cold War.** Stockemer (2012) reports: “Coinciding with the rise of the party’s charismatic leader Christoph Blocher in the 1990s, the SVP began to embrace initiatives to halt immigration, engaged in historical revisionism and spread anxiety about globalization and Switzerland’s possible entry into the European Union.” The party also “expanded enormously in the 1990s, increasing the number of cantonal
sections from fourteen to twenty-six… The 1992 vote was also the starting point for the electoral and political success of the SVP, which, with Christoph Blocher as a wealthy and sedulous populist leader, had been the driving force in the campaign against EEA membership” (Skenderovic 2013).

Rejection of membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) is one example of the reformed ideology embraced by the new SVP, as is “the SVP’s new ‘winning formula’ which consists of linking nationalist and exclusionist demands in immigration and foreign policy with neo-liberal and anti-state positions in economic and taxation policy” (Skenderovic 2013).

The party does, however, consciously draw on its agrarian beginnings. Observed Skenderovic (2013): “the party continues to refer in its narratives and political iconography to peasantry and agrarian life. At party meetings, in public speeches and political campaigns, the party likes to evoke the rural world and farmers as steadfast representations of national authenticity and as a highly symbolic, historically tested bulkhead in the fight against any kinds of foreign influence.”

Ultimately, though the party was originally founded in the 1970s, its well-documented and publicized philosophical facelift, which addresses and focuses on post-cold war issues, will be determined to have met the threshold for an ideological change so great as to render it a “new’ group. Condition: met.

B. Non-Violent. Political violence in Switzerland is considered “exceptionally rare” according to the Switzerland Business Law Handbook (2012). Indeed, violent acts involving SVP appear to be not only rare, but incidental and in one case SVP members were on the receiving end. This was the case in a 2009 incident concerning the ban of
minarets when the “black bloc” damaged property at locations used by the SVP (Switzerland Business Law Handbook 2012). Condition: met.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. SVP is often labelled “racist” due to its tough stance on immigration. In an October 2003 speech, SVP was accused of “xenophobic appeals, including running a newspaper advertisement blaming ‘black Africans’ for crime” (Piano 2005). SVP countered by noting that it “had nothing against legal immigrants and was merely opposed to illegal immigration and abuse of the asylum policy” (Piano 2005). Further, following a 2010 interview with Lesbenorganisation Schweiz – LOS, the Council of Europe reported that a Swiss parliamentarian group for LGB persons was been established within the SVP.

In 2007, the group was accused of racism after using campaign posters which depicted three white sheep booting a black sheep out of the country (Swiss Info 2007). Roman Jäggi, spokesman for the Swiss People's Party, described the poster campaign as "completely fair," and it had nothing to do with race, asserting that "It is not racist…We have a big problem with violence and in particular youth violence, and foreign criminals are a big factor," (Swiss Info 2007). Condition: met.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. The SVP touts itself as “the only consistent centre-right party in our country” (SVP 2015). The group is referred to as extreme right-wing and radical right-wing by respected media ranging from the New York Times to the UK’s Guardian. Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. The party “opposed Swiss membership in international bodies such as the United Nations (which Switzerland joined in 2002) and the European Union” (Britannica 2015). The SVP firmly supports imposing strict immigration quotas. "We

F. Nationalist/Reformist. The Swiss People's Party electoral platform for 2015 - 2019 was expressed in the motto "SVP - the party for Switzerland" (SVP 2015). Further, the group declared: “Our country must no longer be insidiously integrated into international structures such as the EU” (SVP 2015). In 2014, the party authored a referendum against mass-immigration. SVP head Toni Brunner stated: "We have created the initiative because it's really become excessive" (Bleiker 2014). Skenderovic (2013) also observed that SVP voters are primarily attracted to “its identity politics on questions of preserving Swiss traditions and national sovereignty.” Condition: met.

SVP: ALL CONDITIONS MET

SYRIZA- Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás
(The Conference of the Coalition of the Radical Left), Greece

SYRIZA is an acronym meaning the "Radical Coalition of the Left." The BBC (1/29/2015) reported that SYRIZA, “formed in 2004, is an umbrella group, with the party Synaspismos – the Coalition of the Left of Movements and Ecology- as the key component” (BBC 1/29/2015). Comprised of 16 ‘ideologically diverse’ left-wing parties, SYRIZA includes ‘social democrats, radical ecologists, radical socialists, Trotskyists, and even anarchists,’ according to SYRIZA supporter Matthaios Tsimitakis, also an editor of the Greek Left Review (Bollier 2012). The party is led by Alexis Tsipras, and boasts the motto: “Always struggling for unity among the Left, the now united SYRIZA asserts a government of the Left with a new, broad and strong social majority that will allow for the people's interests to be served” (Πρίφη 2015).
BBC reporter Paul Mason (2012) noted that, “under Tsipras' leadership, SYRIZA grew the far left's vote from 3.3% to 5.6% in the 2007 election - giving it 14 MPs… [by 2012] SYRIZA massively scooped up the votes of leftist, progressive, socially liberal young people, as well as the trade union voters, not specifically aligned with the Communist Party, to gain 52 seats.” By 2015, claimed approximately “36% of the vote, an eight-percentage-point lead over the New Democracy party of Antonis Samaras, the outgoing prime minister. SYRIZA’s support leapt by nine percentage points compared with the 2012 election result; … SYRIZA fell just short of an absolute majority, winning 149 seats in the 300-seat parliament” (The Economist 1/25/15). In 2015, Time Magazine named Tsipras one of the 100 Most Influential People (Iglesias 2015b).

A. Occurring post-Cold War. SYRIZA was founded in 2004 when Greek left-wing political forces united. Condition: met.

B. Non-Violent. Though SYRIZA has been accused of violence and is oft considered a violent party, the SYRIZA manifesto lists its adherence to “the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes” (SYRIZA 2015). In 2013, SYRIZA’s primary opponent, the New Democratic Conservatives, released a video that appeared to show “SYRIZA Member of Parliament Vangelis Diamantopoulos delivering a speech in which he is seen to suggest that Greeks taking up guns is a justifiable response to the country’s crushing economic crisis” (Dabilis 2013). However, “SYRIZA said New Democracy was guilty of ‘forgery and a disgusting provocation’ because they had used a heavily edited version that took comments out of context” (Dabilis 2013).

Spiegel (2015) noted concerns that the party, though perhaps not partaking in violence itself, did not distance or disassociate itself from groups that did advocate for
violence. Speaking of the 2008 street riots that resulted in the death of a teenager at the hands of police, Nikos Voutsis, a leading SYRIZA MP, commented that: “Nobody [in the party] was ever arrested for smashing up a shop, but there was a social upheaval and we heard the voices…we’re not in favour of violence, but we like having people in the street protesting” (Spiegel 2015).

In 2013, SYRIZA “refused to vote for a motion by the Parliament's ethics committee that condemned violence, arguing that the text should refer to ‘racist violence’ and not just ‘violence,’” (van Versendaal 2013). A few months later, in response to the bail-out agreement with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund in 2013, Tsipras asserted that: “We condemn violence but we understand the frustration of those who react violently to the violence of the memorandum,” (van Versendaal 2013).

Due to insipid and open-ended statements made by party leadership, SYRIZA has certainly not disentangled itself from violent acts for the cause committed by the hands of others. Ultimately, though the party seems to be comfortable with allowing others to do their “dirty work,” it does not officially condone violence nor has leadership been personally involved in violent acts. Condition: met.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. The symbol of the party is “the five-pointed star, a symbol of unity, along with three flags: a red one for the classic left, a Greek one for the ecological movement and a purple one that represents other social movements that SYRIZA embraces, such as feminism, migrant rights and gay rights” (Πρίφτη 2015).

As stated in SYRIZA’s 2013 political resolutions: “We combat racist and homophobic violence, all discriminations based on racial or national origin, religion,
color of the skin, disability, age, sexual orientation or gender identity, which are endemic in many aspects of social life and we guarantee the change of the legislative framework that legalizes, directly or indirectly, such discriminations. In this context, we fully support the right to self-determination in terms of sexual orientation and gender choice, homosexual civil marriage with full and equal rights, and recognition of gender identity” (SYRIZA 2015). Condition: met.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. SYRIZA’s slogan is “For the first time, the Left in government.” The SYRIZA website (SYRIZA 2015) notes: “SYRIZA has been established as a unified, democratic, multi-tendency, mass party of the contemporary Left.” Lesniak (2014) categorizes the party as “a coalition of left-wing and radical left parties.” Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. In their Political Resolution of the 1st Congress of SYRIZA (July 2013), SYRIZA (2015) claimed:

In Greece, very harsh measures that lead large parts of the population to a humanitarian crisis are implemented by the troika of the European Union, IMF, and European Central Bank, with Germany playing a dominant role in the European strategy. National resources, public goods and companies are put under privatization/sell-off. Production collapses, tens of thousands of small and medium-sized companies close down, public services dismantle, the welfare state is constantly shrinking, and large parts of the population are deprived of health, education, pension, and social security. (SYRIZA, 2015)

Bollier (2012) observed that “SYRIZA ultimately supports Greece's membership in the European Union, but rejects the austerity measures required by the memorandum.” Lesniak (2014) pointed to one of SYRIZA's main points their manifesto The Exit from the Crisis Is on the Left: “The capitulation of our foreign policy to the desires of the U.S.
and the powerful states of the European Union endangers the country's independence, peace, and security.” Condition: met.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. An article in Foreign Policy (Papadogiannis 2015) noted the nationalist rhetoric employed by Tsipras. “Radical left-wing nationalism has been both an enduring and a multifaceted phenomenon, and Syriza’s trajectory serves as the most recent reminder. Riding on a wave of opposition to bailout packages and the austerity measures that accompanied them, SYRIZA stressed the need to bring back hope and defend the dignity of the Greek people. This rendered the party as an attractive choice to more than a third of the voters this past January” (Papadogiannis 2015). Lesniak (2014) wrote that Tsipras believed the party's win in 2014 sent “a clear message against the budget-cutting austerity measures tied to Greece's 240 billion euro ($327 billion) bailout from the euro area and International Monetary Fund,” noting he immediately called for national elections (Lesniak 2014). Condition: met.

SYRIZA: ALL CONDITIONS MET

UKIP (England)

UKIP, or the UK Independence Party, was “founded on 3 September 1993 at the London School of Economics by members of the Anti-Federalist League, which was founded by Dr. Alan Sked in November 1991, with the aim of running candidates opposed to the Maastricht Treaty in the 1992 general election” (BBC 21 Nov 2014).

The party has seen a surge in popularity the past decade. The BBC reported: “the party's initial successes were all in the proportional representation elections for the European Parliament - winning its first three seats in 1999 with 7% of the vote. It built on that in 2004, winning 12 seats and pushing the Lib Dems into fourth place. The 2009 poll
saw its total grow to 13 seats, pushing Labour into third place with 16% of the vote. And in 2014’s European election the party lived up to its confident promise to top the vote, getting 27.5% of all those cast” (BBC 21 Nov 2014). The 2014 success was likely due in part to shift in rhetoric, courtesy of party leader Nigel Farage. In March of 2014, Farage stated that his “party has got rid of ‘old UKIP’ and now has a ‘huge’ opportunity to take votes from Labour in future elections” (BBC 16 March 2014). Farage added: "New UKIP is a lot more professional, a lot more smiley, a lot less angry, and it's going places" (BBC 16 March 2014).

A. *Occurring post-Cold War.* UKIP was founded in 1993 (UKIP, 2015). Condition: met.

B. *Non-Violent.* UKIP has found itself the target of accusations of violence, which the group repeatedly denies. News Channel 4 reported that, following a May 2015 incident involving a campaigner who said he was punched in the face by a man who appeared to be one of the party’s supporters, a UKIP spokesman categorically stated “we condemn any intimidation or violence towards anybody, whether involved in this election or otherwise.”

In 2012, West observed that “Not all movements that occupy the far right-wing are the same: whereas some, such as the British National Party (BNP), are associated more strongly with ideological extremism, criminality and violence, other movements, such as the more moderate UK Independence Party (UKIP), advocate similar policies in many areas but would strongly reject any association with extremism and violence.” In terms of likely engagement in violence, Counterpoint (2014) classified UKIP as low risk. Condition: met.
C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. News headlines often obscure the real story, as in the case of one headline that proclaimed “UKIP is a Racist Party.” The article explained that “Lord Heseltine, who advises the Coalition on economic growth, told the BBC: ‘Of course it’s racist, who doubts that? Farage isn’t racist but his party is very attractive to a racist agenda’” (Hope 2013). The quote tells a different story.

Party Leader Farage has made it perfectly clear that UKIP was strengthened as a result of “reforms… getting rid of ‘old UKIP.’” (BBC 16 March 2014). He further acknowledged that “aspiring UKIP candidates now have to declare that they have ‘never engaged in, advocated or condoned racist, violent, criminal or anti-democratic activity’ and that there are no ‘skeletons in my cupboard' that may cause me or UKIP embarrassment” (BBC 16 March 2014).

Counterpoint (2014) rated UKIP a moderate threat for racism and homophobia noting that “there is mixed evidence – either from the party manifesto or comments by the party leadership – that the party discriminates against people on the basis of race or ethnic group” or sexual orientation. Condition: met.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. UKIP is broadly considered to be a right-wing, populist party, so it came as quite a surprise when party migration spokesman Steven Woolfe was quoted stating UKIP was “not a "right-wing" organisation” (The Telegraph, 14 June 2015). Prompted for further explanation, he elaborated: “We’re a party uniquely positioned to win votes from both Left and Right-wing parties, but not so supinely, unoriginally centralist as to be run down in the middle of the political road.” Lesniak (2014) categorizes UKIP as ‘a Eurosceptic right-wing populist party.” Condition: met.
E. Eurosceptic. Quite simply, “the UK Independence Party has, as its name implies, one key policy - to leave the European Union” (BBC 21 Nov 2014). Further, the UKIP Manifesto states, “We can never control immigration while we continue to be members of the European Union. Until we leave, we are forced to abide by the EU’s founding, unshakable principle of the ‘free movement of people,’ meaning we cannot prevent the flow of citizens from all EU member states into Britain” (UKIP 2015). It also details exit strategies and legal options for leaving the EU.

Lesniak (2014) explained that “UKIP advocates leaving the European Union, resulting in stopping payments to the EU and withdrawal from EU treaties, while maintaining trading ties with other European countries.” Condition: met.

F. Nationalist/Reformist. UKIP’s 2015 Manifesto states “immigration has driven down wages and led to job losses for British workers…The sheer weight of numbers, combined with rising birth rates (particularly to immigrant mothers) and an ageing population, is pushing public services to breaking point. Our current immigration rules ignore the wishes of the British people. They discriminate in favour of EU citizens and against the rest of the world. The system is failing so badly that we cannot even properly identify how many people enter and leave our country” (UKIP 2015).

UKIP’s nationalist policies pervade almost every aspect of its 2015 Manifesto, with numerous references to returning Britain to its people. The Guardian noted “UKIP is a ‘civic’ nationalist party, rejects ‘blood and soil’ nationalism and claims to be ‘open and inclusive’ to anyone who wishes to identify with Britain, regardless of ethnic or religious background” (The Guardian 14 April 2014). Condition: met.

UKIP: ALL CONDITIONS MET
Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), Belgium

According to the Brussels Journal, the Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) is Belgium’s largest party with a goal of an independent Flanders (Belien 2007). Until 2004, the Vlaams Belang was called the Vlaams Blok; the name change came as a result of the party’s reformation following the government’s decision to force the party to disband following their conviction as a criminal organization (Belien 2007). Its party slogan was “Our own people first” (Belien 2007). Belien (2007) observed that it had not lost a single election in 25 years (through 2007), “growing slowly but continuously from 3% of the vote in 1987, to 10.3% in 1991, 12.3% in 1995, 15.8% in 1999, 18.2% in 2003 to 24.1% in 2004, and is “the most successful of all the so-called ‘Euro-nationalist’ parties” (Belien 2007). However, the party has seen its popularity begin to decline. In the 2014 Parliamentary elections in Belgium, the party, now chaired by Gerolf Annemans, only garnered 3.69% of the vote and 3 seats (down 9) (Fondation Robert Schuman 2014).

A. Occurring post-Cold War. Belien (2007) reported that: “Originally founded in 1977 as a radical Flemish-secessionist break-away of the Flemish-nationalist party, in the late 1980s the party transformed itself into a mainstream conservative party” (Belien 2007). Observed Coffé (2005): “While the far-right party had cut a radical profile in its first years, throughout the 1990s its appeal was populist, as it presented itself ever more as a right-conservative people’s party.” In 2004, following a government-ordered disbandment, Vlaams Blok reemerged with a “new handle” as Vlaams Belang (Coffé 2005). “With its new statement of principles and platform, the Vlaams Belang –at least on paper – has [had] cut the ties with its unsavoury past” (Coffé 2005). Condition: met.
B. Non-Violent. Counterpoint (2014) found no evidence of violence, positing that there was “no evidence of violence within the party leadership.” Media reports point, ironically, to an incident in 2007 in which Vlaams Belang several members were assaulted at a 9/11 tribute (Flemish Republic 2009). Condition: met.

C. Non anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic. In 2004, Vlaams Blok (as Vlaams Belang was then known) was declared a criminal organization by the Supreme Court in Brussels. According to Belien (2007):

In the 1990s in an effort to kill the party the Belgian Parliament changed the Constitution and voted a series of new laws, including an Anti-Racism Act and an Anti-Discrimination Act, which define ‘discrimination’ so broadly that anyone and everyone is vulnerable to hate-crime prosecutions. These new laws were used against the Vlaams Blok… The party was convicted on the basis of an anthology of as few as 16 texts published by various local Vlaams Blok chapters between 1996 and 2000. Though many of these texts simply quoted official statistics on crime rates and social welfare expenditure the court posited that they had been published with ‘an intention to contribute to a campaign of hatred.’ (Belien 2007)

As part of its current (2015) manifesto, the party asserted: “Inspired by its concern to defend and protect the cultural identity of the Flemish people, the Vlaams Belang rejects the tenets of the multicultural ideology” (Flemish Republic 2015). This verbiage supports the party’s strong anti-immigrant platform but does not necessarily correlate to racism or anti-Semitism.

The party manifesto also noted that “The traditional family is at the heart of a humane society. Its merit is acknowledged and safeguarded in the marriage between a man and a woman. Policymakers should recognize the central role of families with children in society. Their task is to protect the family instead of attempting to usurp its functions. This is the only approach which can provide solutions for the urgent problem
of the birth dearth” (Flemish Republic 2015). Because Vlaams Belang promotes family and children and does not present a pro-gay or pro-gay marriage stance, it does not necessarily follow that they are anti-gay or homophobic.

In 2005, the Vlaams Belang approved a Holocaust resolution, strongly indicating that “it will not be equated in absolutely any circumstances with Holocaust advocates and holocaust deniers of all kinds” (DeWinter 2005). Counterpoint (2014) found that “there is little or no evidence – either from the party manifesto or comments by the party leadership – that the party stokes fears of Jews, though there is mixed evidence – either from the party manifesto or comments by the party leadership – that the party discriminates against people on the basis of race or ethnic group” or sexual orientation. Condition: met.

D. Right-wing/left-wing. The Vlaams Belang describes itself as “nationalist party of the right” (Flemish Republic 2015). Erk (2005) described the group as “far-right” and discussed the party’s desire to attract a wider voting base by becoming more mainstream. Condition: met.

E. Eurosceptic. “The Vlaams Belang is also the only Eurosceptic party in Belgium and the only one that rejects the official state ideology of multiculturalism” asserted Belien (2007). “Vlaams Belang opposes Brussels and does not really differentiate between Brussels as the capital of Belgium and Brussels as the capital of Europe. It sees both Belgium and Europe – in other words Brussels and Brussels – as enemies of Flanders and of the Flemish people, whose national identity these enemies want to subvert and destroy” (Belien 2007). Condition: met.
F. Nationalist/Reformist. “The Vlaams Belang strives for the secession of Flanders from the artificial Belgian state. Our aim is to dissolve Belgium and establish an independent Flemish state” (Flemish Republic 2015). Erk (2005) noted that as part of the group’s name change, the party sought to rebrand “itself as a Flemish nationalist party on the political right.” Condition: met.

VLAAMS BELANG: ALL CONDITIONS MET

In Sum

In accordance with the established definition of MEPG (a Eurosceptic, non-violent, non-anti-Semitic/racist/homophobic group, formed after the Cold War, either right or left-wing, with a nationalist agenda designed to transform, reform and serve their community above all others), and following analysis and qualification, the below groups have met all conditions for categorization as a MEPG:

- Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland- AfD)
- Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti-DF)
- Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid- PVV)
- Front National
- True FINNS Party
- Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich- FPÖ)
- PodemosSwiss People’s Party, SVP
- Swedish Democrats
- Syriza
- UKIP
- Vlaams Belang
Figure 3.5 reviews the results. These 12 groups will now serve as the subjects for theoretical testing in Chapter IV to determine the explanatory power of PP vs. OO. The groups failing to meet the conditions for a MEPG are now classified as SMO, or neo-fascist, neo-Nazi, or independent.
### Figure 3.5: MEPG Qualification Results

Each of the groups tested is indicated along with each of the six variables serving as criteria. The final column indicates where a group qualified as a MEPG.
CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, DATA COMPILATION

In Chapter III, analysis and qualification led to a subject group of 12 MEPGs for theoretical testing: Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland- AfD); Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti-DF); True FINNS Party; Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich- FPÖ); Front National- France; Podemos- Spain; Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid- PVV); Swiss People’s Party, SVP; Swedish Democrats; Syriza- Greece; UKIP-England; and Vlaams Belang- Belgium. Testing is designed to determine the efficacy of the Political Process (PP) model and the Organization/Opportunity (OO) model in order to answer the research question: what conditions allowed for the emergence and success of Millennial Eurosceptic Populist Groups?

The unprecedented increase, emergence, and success of non-traditional parties right and left-wing parties in Europe served as the genesis of millennial eurosceptic populism. In an effort to explain this trajectory, testing was conducted to determine the efficacy of the two theories. Phase I examined the explanatory power of the political process model, while Phase II studied the explanatory power of the proposed Organizational/Opportunity Theory (OO). Each phase began with a stated hypothesis, a review and explanation of the variables, discussion of how each independent variable was measured, and concluded with the analysis.
Theoretical testing first focused on measuring and analyzing the independent variables with data compiled from various sources including Eurobarometer\(^{17}\) and the Open Government Index. Additional relevant data was gathered and analyzed such as recent end of war, cohesion and subgroups, and cultural dimensions (Hofstede 2010). The approach was mixed-method and included the case study approach outlined by George and Bennett (2005) and Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) designed by Rihoux and Ragin (2009) and detailed below.

QCA is an analytic technique pioneered by Charles Ragin which uses Boolean algebra, crisp and fuzzy sets, and multi-variates to implement principles of comparison used by scholars engaged in the qualitative study of macro social phenomena. QCA permits a researcher to assess causation that is very complex, involving different combinations of causal conditions capable of generating the same outcome. Ragin (2008) notes that QCA is grounded in the analysis of set relations rather than correlations. Because social theory is largely verbal and verbal formulations are largely theoretical in nature, QCA provides a closer link to theory than is possible using conventional quantitative methods. QCA evolved to utilize fuzzy numbers leading to a variation known as Fuzzy Set QCA, or fsQCA. This also led to the use of the term csQCA (Crisp Set QCA) in order to distinguish between methods.

Thiem and Dusa (2013) noted that QCA was considered one of “the most influential recent innovations in social science methodology.” In line with Ragin’s own

\(^{17}\) Results from Eurobarometer are taken in polling “waves.” Countries are separated into groups (or “waves”) and are surveyed on a rotating basis. The Eurobarometer data used in this study utilized the most recent wave to include that country and specific question examined.
background, QCA was “initially employed only by a small number of political sociologists (e.g. Amenta et al. 1992; Griffin et al. 1991; Wickham-Crowley 1991). It has since expanded into the fields of political science and international relations (Thiem 2011; Vis 2009, Thiem and Dusa 2013).” Hudson and Kuhner (2013) recognized that proponents of QCA techniques suggested they are better placed to “handle the diversity of policy provision found in different spatial entities than standard linear quantitative methods, while also able to allow for hypothesis testing based upon a fine grained analysis that is more systematic in approach than the techniques typically employed in standard qualitative analyses.”

Ragin and Rihoux (2009) acknowledged that “computer algorithms developed by electrical engineers in the 1950s provide techniques for simplifying this type of data. The data matrix is reformulated as a "truth table" and reduced in a way that parallels the minimization of switching circuits (Ragin 2000; Rihoux and Ragin 2009)…These minimization procedures mimic case-oriented comparative methods but accomplish the most cognitively demanding task -- making multiple comparisons of configurations -- through computer algorithms. The goal of the logical minimization is to represent -- in a shorthand manner -- the information in the truth table regarding the different combinations of conditions that produce a specific outcome” (Rihoux and Ragin 2009).

As noted on Ragin’s University of Arizona website, “qualitatively oriented scholars tend to examine only a few cases at a time, but their analyses are both intensive - - addressing many aspects of cases -- and integrative -- examining how the different parts of a case fit together, both contextually and historically” (Ragin and Rubinson 2015). Further, Ragin explained that:
By formalizing the logic of qualitative analysis, QCA makes it possible to bring the logic and empirical intensity of qualitative approaches to studies that embrace more than a handful of cases -- research situations that normally call for the use of variable-oriented, quantitative methods. Boolean methods of logical comparison represent each case as a combination of causal and outcome conditions. These combinations can be compared with each other and then logically simplified through a bottom-up process of paired comparison. (Ragin 2000)

In 2000, Ragin noted that QCA with fuzzy sets allowed cases to have varying degrees of membership in sets, with assigned membership scores ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. As an example, a country could potentially have only partial membership in the set of democratic countries depending on the perceived extent of democracy (Ragin 2000).

Membership scores greater than 0.5 indicate that a case is more in than out, scores close to 1.0 indicate that a case is mostly in, scores close to 0.0 indicate that a case is mostly out, and so on. Full membership (1.0) and full non-membership (0.0) are understood as qualitative states, not arbitrary values (e.g., the highest and lowest observed scores). Thus, the calibration of membership in a fuzzy set involves both quantitative and qualitative assessment and must be grounded in theoretical and substantive knowledge. (Ragin 2000)

Each MEPG was tested using the four applicable variables for that respective model. Each variable (or “causal condition”) was assigned a membership score based on certain qualifications. The process for each is described during the next section on methodology, distinguished by Phase I and Phase II. Research will show which conditions are necessary, which are merely sufficient, and which have no effect.

Phase I: Methodology and Data Compilation: Political Process Model

This dissertation argues that McAdam’s concept of PP provides explanatory power for the emergence of MEPGs. In this section, the three elements of PP will be evaluated to determine any relationship to the dependent variable, subsequently providing an explanation for the emergence and success of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism and MEPGs. As noted in Chapter II, McAdam’s model centered on three primary factors:
indigenous organizational strength, expanding political opportunities, and cognitive liberation (McAdam 1982). He concluded that it was the unison of political opportunities, a heightened sense of political efficacy, and the institutional strength of the black churches, black colleges, and Southern chapters of the NAACP that played a central role in shaping the civil rights movement (McAdam 1982). It is theorized that this same confluence of elements accounts for (on a macro level) the rise of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism.

**Hypothesis and Variables**

For the testing of PP, it is hypothesized that:

\[ H_1: \text{The elements of PP (political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength, cognitive liberation) led to the emergence and success of MEPGs in Europe.} \]

**Dependent Variable:** Emergence/Success of MEPG

**Independent Variables:** political opportunity, indigenous organizational strength, cognitive liberation

\[ \text{MEPG SUCCESS = Political opportunity + Indigenous Organizational Strength} \]

\[ \quad + \text{Cognitive Liberation} \]

**Political Opportunity**

The significance of opportunity in the Millennial Eurosceptic Populism realm has not gone unnoticed. According to Jens Rydgren (2004), some of the following political opportunities need to be present for radical right-wing populist parties to emerge:

1) A niche, or a gap, between the voters’ opinions and their perceived position of the parties.
2) Decreased trust in (established) political parties.
3) Politicisation of new issues, preferably immigration.
4) A high degree of convergence among the established parties.
5) An open political system, where new parties have a good chance to enter.
6) Alllying with established parties might render credibility, but being controversial might also do the same.
7) The state’s capacity and propensity for repression.
8) A potent master frame (Rydgren 2004)

Accordingly, Gifford (2014) contended that from 2010-2013, “a constellation of forces created the opportunities for a significant Eurosceptic challenge to the UK’s Coalition government’s European strategy.” Gifford (2014) believed that the failure of the Conservative party to win a clear victory in 2010 election weakened the Cameron leadership coupled with the crisis in the Eurozone and the pro-integrationist response of European leaders served to create a unique synthesis of opportunity.

Eisinger (1973) and Koopmans (1996) focused on the “openness” of government as the key factor in opportunity. This research utilized the concept of openness of government as the means of measurement of political opportunity by utilizing data from the 2015 Index of Economic Freedom. The Index measured economic freedom based on 10 quantitative and qualitative factors, grouped into four broad categories, or “pillars,” of economic freedom:

1. Rule of Law (property rights, freedom from corruption);
2. Limited Government (fiscal freedom, government spending);
3. Regulatory Efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom);
   and
4. Open Markets (trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom).
   (Index of Economic Freedom 2015)

The 2015 data covers the timeframe of the second half of 2013 through the first half of 2014 (Index of Economic Freedom 2015). Each of the ten economic freedoms within these categories was graded on a scale of 0 to 100. The “Freedom from Corruption”
percentages from the “Rule of Law” category were used as the data representing political opportunity (Figure 4.1) and will be scaled between 0-1 for fsQCA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index Year</th>
<th>Overall Score</th>
<th>Property Rights</th>
<th>Freedom from Corruption</th>
<th>Fiscal Freedom</th>
<th>Government Spending</th>
<th>Business Freedom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>90.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>80.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>91.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4.1.** Freedom From Corruption Data. This figure shows the Economic Freedom data in 12 categories for each of the 12 countries represented by our MPEGs. The data specific to this study, Freedom from Corruption is inside the box. Source: Index of Economic Freedom 2015.

Data. These are the results for each group:

Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland- AfD)- Germany 73.8

Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti-DF)- Denmark 76.3

Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich- FPÖ)- Austria 71.2

Front National-France 62.5

Podemos-Spain 67.6

Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid- PVV)-Netherlands 73.7
Swiss People’s Party, SVP-Switzerland 80.5
Swedish Democrats-Sweden 72.7
Syriza-Greece 54.0
True FINNS-Finland 73.4
UKIP-England-United Kingdom 75.8
Vlaams Belang-Belgium 68.8

*Indigenous Organizational Strength*

Indigenous organizational strength, as explained by Kropczynski (2013), refers to the resources that allow a marginalized population to exploit opportunities afforded to them by changes in the political opportunity structure. Examples of these resources include members who can be recruited as a group, respected leaders, a communications network, and individual connections (Kropczynski 2013). McAdam (1982) believed that the more organized a group was the greater the capacity of its members to act, and the more likely it was to be successful. Oberschall (1973) concurred, assigning paramount importance to the degree of organization within the group and its creation of strong networks. The topic of structural strength and its importance was also recognized by Griffin (Griffin 1991, 170). In his study of the success and failure of 53 social movement organizations in the United States between 1800 and 1945, Gamson (1990) found that a formalized structure increases a movement’s chance of success, and Cress and Snow (2000) found the same in their study of homeless movement organizations in 12 cities. In a 2012 study on party organizational strength, Tavits (2012) found that “strong organization helps parties increase their vote share significantly and steadily, and that organizational strength played a significant independent role in helping parties succeed.
For this study, indigenous organizational strength will be measured in terms of a group’s network—its resources—in the form of members. A six-value fuzzy set will be utilized: Place/Score: $1^{st}$ = 1.; $2^{nd}$-$3^{rd}$ = .9; $4^{th}$ = .6; $5^{th}$-$6^{th}$ = .4; $7^{th}$-$8^{th}$ = .1; $≥9^{th}$ = 0. Groups were ranked according to the size of their group as compared to other parties in their respective country. Results are listed below by group with their rank, source, and fsQCA corresponding score in parentheses.

**Membership Size.**

Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland- AfD): $7^{th}$ (Fischer 2015); (.1)

Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti-DF): $3^{rd}$ (Foght 2014); (.75)

Finns Party: $5^{th}$ (Politiikka 2013); (.4)

Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich- FPÖ): $3^{rd}$ (Briggs 2015); (.9)

Front National: $3^{rd}$ (Clavel 2014); (.9)

Podemos: $2^{nd}$ (Garcia 2014); (.9)

Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid- PVV): The Hague (2013) noted that the PVV “does not have any members, but consists solely of delegates who represent the party in local, provincial and national parliaments.” Because there are no membership numbers to compare, data for this variable utilized Eurbarometer 71.1 survey results asking respondents to name the party to which they felt an attachment: $7^{th}$ (Eurobarometer 71.1): (.1)

Swiss People’s Party, SVP: $3^{rd}$ (Swiss Confederation 2010); (.9)

Swedish Democrats: $4^{th}$ (Holmqvist 2014; Sverigedemokraterna 2015); (.6)
Syriza: 4th (no membership numbers located- see PVV above; Eurobarometer 71.1); (.6)

UKIP: 5th in 2014 (Nardelli 2014); (.4)

Vlaams Belang: 5th in 2014 (Paelinck 2014); (.4)

Cognitive Liberation

McAdam (1982) posited that: “mediating between opportunity and action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations.” Such meanings are the basis of cognitive liberation or, shared ideas developed from an “injustice frame.” McAdam (1982) suggested that cognitive liberation comes first from the subjective interpretation of political opportunities or macro-level events (See Phase II for expansion on the concept of macro-level study as it relates to this research).

In his study, Wessels (2007) found that “41 per cent of citizens across the EU-25 are neutral or negative with respect to European identity, of whom a third can be described as hard-core Eurosceptics.” He concluded that “Euroscepticism has the potential to become system-threatening” (Hooghe 2007). The impact of Euroscepticism has only increased since Wessels’ study.

Brown (2009) suggested that cognitive liberation is based upon grounded knowledge and social trust: as corruption and lawlessness increased in the post-transition years, people’s sense of efficacy decreased. It was also Brown (2009, 21) whom asserted that nationalism was “arguably the most important of these subterranean movements, bearing the standard of environmental activism (Dawson 1996; Pryde 1991; Weiner 1999). Many of the break-away Soviet Republics were as concerned with the Russian influence meddling in their native homeland as they were with the rivers and forests
themselves” (Brown 2009, 21). Such perspective served as a guide in determining how to best measure cognitive liberation. In this study, cognitive liberation was characterized in terms of nationalism and euroscepticism.

*Cognitive Liberation: Euroscepticism.* The data utilized for euroscepticism was compiled from Eurobarometer 83.3 (2015). For purposes of this research, Euroscepticism was measured in terms of tendency to trust the European Union. Eurobarometer results were based on the query “if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it” with regards to the specific entity European Union. Figure 4.2 indicates the results of each of the 12 subject groups’ countries with the exception of Switzerland, whose data was not included in Eurobarometer. As a result, data for Switzerland (Swiss People’s Party–SVP) was compiled from the World Values Survey (2015).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust in the European Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4.2.* Trust in the European Union. Trust in the EU is depicted for each of the 12 countries represented by the MPEGs. Source: Eurobarometer 83.3; May 2015.
Five of the 11 countries had greater than a 50% response indicating a tendency NOT to trust the EU. Greece scored the highest in this regard with 73% of respondents tending to not trust the EU. Finland had the highest response rate of those who trusted the EU (58%). This survey question also had a significant number of “don’t know” responses. In France, 17%, and in the UK, 16%, of respondents replied they didn’t know if they could trust the EU.

For Switzerland, data was compiled from the World Values Survey (2015) question: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The European Union.” Data from wave five, covering the years 2005-2009, was utilized. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 reveal that 59.6% in wave five had none to “not very much” confidence in the EU.

![Figure 4.3](image)

*Figure 4.3. Confidence in the EU-Switzerland. Date from Wave Five (2005-2009) indicates the amount of confidence in the EU as reported by Swiss respondents. Source: World Values Survey 2015.*
The percentages for “tendency not to trust” and “not very much” and “none at all” will be used for statistical analysis purposes in QCA.

**Cognitive Liberation: Nationalism.** The data for the element of nationalism followed the above utilized methodology for Euroscepticism, with data from Switzerland gathered separately from the World Values Survey. The dataset for determining nationalism was based on the query “Please tell me how attached you feel to…[OUR COUNTRY].” Table 4.4 offers a visual of the results gathered from Eurobarometer 77.3 (May 2012).

France (91.2%) and Greece (93.7%) returned the highest percentages of people “very attached” to their respective country. The Netherlands returned the lowest
percentage at 69.6%. Because data from Germany was separated into east/west, the percentages were averaged resulting in a percentage of 85.6% for Germany as a whole.

Table 4.1.

*Attachment To Country*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY/SAMPLE ID (SERIES STANDARD)</th>
<th>Very attached</th>
<th>Fairly attached</th>
<th>Not very attached</th>
<th>Not at all attached</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR - France</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE - Belgium</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL - The Netherlands</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE-W - Germany - West</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK - Denmark</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB-GBN - Great Britain</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR - Greece</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES - Spain</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE-E Germany East</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI - Finland</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE - Sweden</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT - Austria</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>86.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,929</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data Compiled using Eurobarometer 77.3 (May 2012) Europe 2020, the Financial and Economic Crisis, European citizenship and European values.

For Swiss data, results were utilized from the most recent wave including Switzerland: Wave Five 2005-2009 (Figure 4.5). The question asked was “How proud are you to be [nationality]?” Data indicated 31.1% were “very proud” of the Swiss nationality, and another 43.9% were “quite proud.”
Figure 4.5. How Proud of Nationality. Chart indicating level of pride in nationality experienced by Swiss citizens. Source: World Values Survey 2015.

For QCA analysis, the percentages for “Very attached” and “Very proud” will be used for membership degree data.

Phase ii: Methodology and Data Compilation: Organizational Opportunity Model

As discussed in Chapter II Two, Organizational/Opportunity Theory (OO) offers a theoretical explanation for the rise and success of social movement organizations and groups/political parties. As will be demonstrated in this dissertation, OO is hypothesized to offer significant explanatory power in the case of Eurosceptic groups. OO is comprised of two essential elements: opportunity borne from exogenous factors triggered by a large-scale event, and internal organizational elements. It is built on the concept of organizational aptitude and capacity existing concurrently with external opportunities, set into motion as a result of a specific event.

OO utilizes organizational elements from Modern Structural Organizational Theory. Observed Shafritz, Ott, and Jang (2011, 169): “Organizations are rational
institutions whose primary purpose is to accomplish established objectives; rational organizational behavior is achieved best through systems of defined rules and formal authority.” It also incorporates elements of opportunity from PPT; it specifically utilizes four aspects of opportunity, as identified by Tarrow (1991, 34-36): “the openness or closedness of the polity, stability or instability of political alignments, presence or absence of allies or support groups, divisions within the elite and its tolerance or intolerance of protest. Optimum opportunity exists in conditions of openness, stability, presence of allies/support groups, and tolerance of protest.”

It was Doug McAdam and William Sewell Jr. (2001) whom stressed the importance of “crucial junctures” in the timing and frequency of contentious politics. They noted the possibility of specific events or phases in EU development that triggered peaks in European protest as well as the likelihood of more incremental and linear development of European contention (McAdam and Sewell 2001). Observed Tarrow (2005, 88): “We have seen that, at least through the late 1990s, there was a long-term trend toward more Europe-directed collective action. But the more erratic inflections… suggest that both processes were at work. A critical juncture marked the mid-to-late 1990s.”

The introduction of OO was not intended to imply fault with PP. Indeed, this dissertation does not claim that PP fails to offer explanatory power. Rather, this research posits that PP is too easily applicable. A strength and a weakness of PP is its macro-level approach which lends itself to wider application, allowing it to explain many things. Whelan (2008, 6) observed that Goodwin and Jasper (1999) and Morris (2000) presented sound critiques of the “overly structural bias and neglect of strategic analysis of much
political process theory.” Gamson (2011, 463) noted that “with cognitive liberation, the basic problem is that the concept tends to conflate and blur different simultaneous but at least partially independent processes.” Nepstad (1997, 471) concurred, arguing that the concept of cognitive liberation tends to emphasize a state of consciousness rather than a process or set of processes. “It conveys what people believe but not how they change their beliefs” (Nepstad 1997, 471).

OO solves this problem by digging deeper into strategic analysis and better isolating the variables determined to be causal conditions. Its isolation of two elements, narrowed in scope, place focus on pivotal and essential components. Specifically, OO focuses on opportunity created by a trigger event and organizational aptitude. In 2004, Meyer defined political opportunity as an event in an ongoing cycle of resource mobilization. This concept is similar to the idea broached in this dissertation, though here it is conceived as the genesis rather than part of the cycle.

As previously discussed, the element of opportunity in this model is exogenous and spurred by a trigger event. This event must be large-scale and significant, meaning it must be impactful and life-changing to a large population. The event leads to a change in population dynamics and results in cultural change which, in turn, creates social-political opportunity. The other essential element is organizational aptitude. While the aspect of opportunity is based on exogenous factors, organizational aptitude is internal. An organization’s indigenous strength stems from elements within its realm of control such as efficacy and consistency in leadership, ideology, public outreach, and marketing.
This dissertation holds that PP, as proposed by McAdam (1982), does provide explanatory power. However, it is argued that the proposed Organizational/Opportunity Theory provides greater explanatory power for the emergence and success of MEPG.

Hypothesis and Variables

For the testing of OO, it is hypothesized that:

H1: MEPG emergence was a result of opportunity borne from a trigger event - the Fall of the Wall - that led to culture change in which the political and social environment became conducive to the formation of MEPGs.

H1: Dependent variable: Emergence of MEPGs
H1: Independent variables: Fall of the Wall, new cultural norm
Fall of the Wall = Cultural Change + Political/Social environment conducive to MEPG formation

H2: MEPG success is a result of internal organizational efficacy and capacity (consistent leadership and ideology, public outreach, and marketing presence).

H2: Dependent variable: MEPG Success
H2: Independent variables: Consistent Leadership and Ideology, Marketing Presence, and Public Outreach

Success = consistent leadership + consistent ideology + public outreach + marketing presence

It is argued that OO provides the most explanatory power in explaining emergence and success of MEPGs. Gifford (2014, 3) observed that: “Eurosceptic mobilisations have not always successfully exploited opportunities and periods of heightened Euroscepticism have been contained by political leaders.” He further noted
the turn of the 21st century anomaly: “what became evident during the current wave was the extent to which this was not the case. The speed and effectiveness of this mobilisation quickly impacted on the governing position, shifting it in a harder Eurosceptic direction” (Gifford 2014, 12).

H1 and H2 seek to explain this anomaly and better understand the conditions that allowed for the emergence and success of MEPGs. H1 and H2 will utilize a set of preconditions and conditions necessary to emergence and success, offering tangible variables as predictors. Research will use the case study approach and analytic tools such as the New York Times Chronicle. Compiled data will be analyzed using fsQCA.

**Opportunity: H1 Emergence**

Azmanova (2004, 18) observed that a “realignment is taking place between centre and periphery between, on one hand, the centre-left and centre-right midpoint and, on the other hand, the circumference of far-right and radical-left parties. In this new alignment, the new centre…becomes one of the poles in the political axis, embracing the ‘opportunity’ side of the dilemma, while the farright and radical-left constitute the opposite pole responding to societal fears of the hazards of the new economy of increased competition and open borders.” In this vein, H1 asserts that the elements of opportunity created an environment allowing for H2. OO posits that a trigger event, in this case the end of the cold war, symbolized by the removal of the Berlin Wall (referred to as “the Fall of the Wall”), led to a new cultural norm that created a political and social environment conducive to the formation of MEPGs in Europe. These elements are held to be necessary preconditions considered necessary for the rise and success of MEPGs (H2).
Fall of the Wall. The Fall of the Wall (FOTW) concept is built on the premise of a trigger event serving as the impetus for wide-scale change or reform. Examples of such events are the onset/end of war; a catastrophic event such as 9/11; or a socio-political event of international proportion like the fall of the Berlin Wall.

As an example, the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 marked the end of World War I, but it also signaled the beginning of Hitler’s rise to power. Within the Treaty was an article (Article 231-now referred to as the War Guilt Clause), which not only blamed Germany for World War I, but punished them for it as well. Hitler leveraged and utilized the growing frustration and anger felt by the Germans over the conditions of the Treaty, calling for its abrogation in his 1920 Nazi Programme (Yale University 2008). The signing of the Treaty of Versailles served as a trigger event for the rise of Hitler and the Nazi regime- a regime that would orchestrate one of the world’s most horrific and notorious events- the holocaust.

Additionally, the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States by Al Qaeda offer another example of a trigger event. The attacks, carried out that morning, led to the formation of a “War Cabinet” by 9:30pm and a declaration of a “War on Terror” by 11:00 pm, the same day (Chossudovsky 2011). The effects of 9/11 continue to impact the world today, culturally and politically, leading to altered way of life, a new beauroratic structure, a new international alliance known as the “Global War on Terror.” Perspectives changed to mindsets of “us vs. them” and illustrated Samuel Huntington’s titular prophecy of a “Clash of Civilizations.”

This research’s symbolic event, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and subsequent end of the Cold War in December 1991, led to significant changes throughout
Europe, specifically culture change and new-found freedom. Indeed, Mudde (2007, 159) identified the 1992 signing of the Maastricht Treaty as the ‘turning point’ for radical right parties in terms of both their position on European integration and the salience of the issue in their agenda. Although the EU existed before the Maastricht Treaty, it was formally established under its current name following the signing of the Treaty in 1993 with 12 member countries. Since that time, the EU has more than doubled in size. In 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden were admitted. In 2004, the largest enlargement of the EU occurred with the addition of ten countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Romania and Bulgaria joined in 2007, and Croatia in 2013, bringing the total number of member countries to 28 (European Commission 2015). Such rapid expansion, coupled with the launch of the euro as the single currency and austerity issues, has led to significant backlash against the status quo in the form of euroscepticism, in addition to altering life for its citizens.

Malone (2014, 7) noted that “in the years immediately following the Second World War, right wing populist parties virtually ceased to exist across Europe, as their brand had become toxic.” In fact, statistics reflect a waxing and waning of fascist groups that will coincide with the end of war. Halla, et al. (2014, 2) observed that from “the 1970s until the mid-1980s, hardly any ERW [extreme right-wing party] had gained more than five percent in a general election. Fifteen years later, ERW parties received between ten and twenty-five percent in these votes.” Figure 4.6 (from Langenbacher 2011) traces this increase in radical right-wing parties.

Langenbacher (2011, 38) opined that “present-day European right-wing radicalism is a modern phenomenon that has undergone several phases of renewal. These

Phases were either visible as the consequence of modernisation spurts in postwar Western societies, or appeared as newly constituted forms in the wake of the regime changes in Eastern Europe.” In 2004, Paxton noted that “all the eastern European successor states have contained radical Right movements since 1989, but most of these have remained gratifyingly weak” (Paxton 2004, 189). Such perspectives support the argument of the FOTW as the trigger event for Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, but also provide support for the theory that a subsequent trigger event within a short timeframe--9/11--could serve to strengthen resolve and offer additional opportunity for groups in transition or on
the verge of formation. In fact, groups such as ATAKA (2004), Jobbik (2003), and Syriza (2004) were all formed within 2-3 years of 9/11.

These examples support the claim that a single event can dramatically change and impact life. The chain of events each set into motion evidences the influence possible from one single event. In the case of Millennial Eurosceptic Populism, the FOTW as a trigger event served as the impetus for socio-cultural change: the variable examined in the next section.

*Cultural Change.* It was Geertz (1973) who observed that symbols derive their meaning not from their relationships with one another, but rather from the various roles they play in people’s lives, and the Berlin Wall was one powerful symbol. With its demise, literal and figurative borders were opened providing opportunity and freedom—often where none before existed. In an interview with *Foreign Policy*, Volen Siderov, leader of the Bulgarian ATAKA party, discussed the hopes and expectations shared by those against the communist regime that were borne from the FOTW:

People…believed that with the fall of the communist regime, things would settle down in a democratic fashion along the lines of the freedoms that were missing — the freedom of expression, the freedom of speech — as well as in terms of lifestyle, because back then we were frustrated from an economic point of view … we were too naïve. (Feffer 2013)

Interestingly, Siderov even referenced Huntington when discussing the effects of the FOTW:

Ideologically, I realized that there was a clash between the model of globalization and the model of national identity. This is not the clash of civilizations offered by Samuel Huntington, the clash between Islam and Christianity. The true clash is between the globalization model and the well-developed national sovereign state that has a well-preserved identity, economy, middle class, and social system. (Feffer 2013)
In 2004, Paxton observed that “the most successful of a number of antiliberal, anti-Western, anti-Semitic parties in Russia was Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s badly misnamed Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), founded at the end of 1989, with a program of national revival and unification under strong authority combined with wild-eyed proposals for the reconquest of Russia’s lost territories.”

Indeed, theorists tend to view culture change from one of two schools of thought: one views traditional values as declining due to modernization while the other views traditional values as persisting in spite of modernization (Inglehart and Baker 2000).

Accordingly, Griffin’s concept of palingenesis— a rebirth— is acutely appropriate. Such rebirth captures traditional values bringing them to the forefront. His idea of palingenetic ultranationalism (1991) mirrors the surge in post-war nationalism seen in Japan.

Surges in post-war nationalism are more common than not lending more plausibility to the idea of social and culture change following a trigger event. Examples include the United States following the War of 1812, Germany after World War I (in which Hitler embraced symbols), and Africa following World War II. The surge in nationalism in Europe following the FOTW, however, had unintended consequences and led to a nationalism collision rather than unification and, ultimately, euroscepticism. As noted by Langenbacher (2011, 37): “More than sixty years after the end of the Second World War, with Europe largely reunited, radical-right-wing, ultra-nationalist and xenophobic movements and parties have become part of the normal political scene.”

Snow, et al. (2004) made the observation that two conceptual shifts have occurred. First, the political opportunity structure in Europe is conceived as multilevel.
Scale shift has become part of the social movement repertoire. When problems implicate several levels of government but political opportunities across these governments vary, strategic actors can be expected to exploit the opportunities that are available. Tarrow (2001, 18) opined that “the European Union . . . is at the same time cross-territorial, intergovernmental, and multilevel, which opens opportunities for coalitions of actors and states to formulate common positions and overcome their diversity and dispersion to exploit its political opportunities.”

Harmsen and Spiering (2004) acknowledged the relevance of culture and the pervasive role it plays. They noted that the term Euroscepticism “assumes a meaning which must be understood relative to the different national political traditions and experiences of European integration which frame those debates” (Harmsen and Spiering 2004, 17). This is particularly critical in times of transition when values and norms can be challenged and even targeted.

Many Europeans point to demographic changes as a primary cause of socio-cultural change in the 90s. Allievi (2005, 21) noted that “the presence of ever-increasing numbers of immigrants in the European social landscape it is not merely a quantitative fact with different consequences for many social and cultural dynamics. Changes in the quantitative levels of so many different indicators (economic, social, cultural, political, religious) not only produce quantitative change, they alter the scenario completely.” Azmanova (2004, 119) focused on political change, noting that “the nature of political centrism itself has undergone a change in the nineties, and thus given rise to new political cultures. At the root of this change are the deep socio-economic transformations in Europe.” In fact, a 2015 Pew Research Study revealed that 50% or greater of people
surveyed now view non-traditional parties positively. Langenbacher (2011, 54) offered additional support for the argument of a cultural shift: “Various studies show that from the 1980s up to the present day, the framework conditions have shifted towards a higher rather than a lower degree of tolerance.”

In 1961, Maurice Bardéche wrote that “fascism is, by its essence, nationalist, and while it originates as the reaction to a crisis, all fascist reaction is resurrection” (Griffin 1991, 172). This dissertation argues that Bardéche’s ‘resurrection’ is Griffin’s palingenetic ultranationalism; it is the manifestation of coveted traditional values embraced by MEPGs and materializing in the form of nationalism and euroscepticism as a result of the culture change in Europe triggered by the FOTW.

Organizational Aptitude: H2 Success

H2 examines organizational aptitude, defined as the internal elements of an organization that have contributed to solidifying its presence. The OO model argues that leadership and ideological consistency, marketing presence, and public outreach are essential components of a successful group.

Success in this study will be considered as a group having a member in the EP. Scores are coded using the six-value fuzzy set: \( \geq 25\% = 1; 15-24\% = .9; 9-14\% = .6; 4-8\% = .25; 1-3\% = .1; \) and \( 0 = 0 \). Table 4.2 details the scoring process. Testing of H2 consisted of data from sources including the World Values Survey and the Eurobarometer. Data was analyzed using fsQCA.
Table 4.2.

**MEPG Success as of January 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEP</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)</td>
<td>2 of 96</td>
<td>2.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finns Party-Perussuomalaiset</td>
<td>2 of 13</td>
<td>15.384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ)</td>
<td>4 of 18</td>
<td>22.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front National (FN)</td>
<td>23 of 74</td>
<td>31.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podemos- Spain</td>
<td>5 of 54</td>
<td>9.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)</td>
<td>4 of 26</td>
<td>15.384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss People’s Party (SVP)</td>
<td>2 of 7*</td>
<td>28.571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Democrats (SD)</td>
<td>2 of 20</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syriza- Greece</td>
<td>4 of 21</td>
<td>19.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP-England</td>
<td>22 of 73</td>
<td>30.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlaams Belang- Belgium</td>
<td>1 of 12</td>
<td>8.333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scores: ≥ 25%=1; 15-24%=.9; 9-14%=.6; 4-8%=.25; 1-3%=.1; 0=0. As Switzerland is not part of the EU, party success was measured as a seat on the Federal Council.

*Consistency: Leadership and Ideology.* In their article on elements of social movement organizations, Benford and Snow (2000) discussed the importance of consistency in framing collective action, noting that it “refers to the congruency between an SMO’s articulated beliefs, claims, and actions.” Further, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) specified that “clearly defined political identity serves to strengthen political parties through its contribution to consistent policies based on common values” (NDI 2008).

The link between consistency and political parties has become increasingly significant. A 2014 survey by the Pew Research Center revealed that “as ideological consistency has become more common, it has become increasingly aligned with partisanship” (Pew Research Center 2014). In their survey on American ideological partisanship, Pew found that “70% of the politically engaged now [2014] take positions...”
that are mostly or consistently in line with the ideological bent of their party. By comparison, the equivalent positions were held by 58% of Republicans and 35% of Democrats in 1994 and 40% of Republicans and 59% of Democrats in 2004” (Pew Research Center, 2014).

For this research, consistency was examined as it related to a group’s leadership, mission and ideology. Though leadership can and often does change, it was held that when a group’s central focus and ideology remained consistent, its status and level of success would not falter. MIT (April 2014) underscored the importance of leadership consistency, noting that “consistent, replicable behavior of leaders plays a crucial role to create organizational trust.” Though leadership is certainly believed to be important, change in leadership is surmountable as long as the group’s underlying mission and goals remain consistent. An examination of the DF revealed a positive result when leadership was replaced by consistent ideology was maintained: “DF’s broader appeal among the voting public has also increased significantly since the polarizing Pia Kjærsgaard stepped down in 2012 and was replaced by the younger and more rhetorically restrained Kristian Thulesen Dahl.” (Jensen 2015).

In this study, consistency was measured in terms of ideology and of leadership. Some of the information for this dataset utilized data compiled in Chapter Three: Testing for Millennial Eurosceptic Populism. Leadership and Ideology scores will again be based on a six-value fuzzy set with a scoring system as detailed in Table 4.3.

*Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland- AfD).* AfD has had two leaders in as many years. However, it has remained solidly nationalist, populist and right-wing with a firm anti-Euro/anti-EU stance. Leadership: .9  Ideology: 1
Table 4.3.

*Leadership and Ideology Scores*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (fully in)</td>
<td>same leader since founding</td>
<td>same ideology since founding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9 (mostly but not fully in)</td>
<td>two leaders total in 10+ years</td>
<td>same ideology though softer or harsher stance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6 (more or less in)</td>
<td>three leaders total in 10+ years</td>
<td>same ideology but shift in primary focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4 (more or less out)</td>
<td>three leaders in less than 10 years</td>
<td>one change in primary ideology OR two shifts in focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1 (mostly but not fully out)</td>
<td>more than four leaders in 10 years</td>
<td>more than one change in primary ideology in 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 (fully out)</td>
<td>ALL OTHERS</td>
<td>more than one change in primary ideology in 10 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Scores were based on a six-value fuzzy set as described by Ragin 2008.

Danish People’s Party (*Dansk Folkeparti-DF*). In more than 10 years of existence DF has seen one leadership change in 2012. It has remained a right-wing populist group since its inception with strong anti-immigration policies. Leadership: .9

Ideology: 1

True FINNS Party. The True Finns have had the same leader, Timo Soini, since 1997. The party was founded as and remains socially conservative, populist and nationalist. Leadership: 1 Ideology: 1

205
Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich- FPÖ). FPÖ has had two leaders as well as coalition government rule since the 90s. However, it has remained fervently right-wing, nationalist and anti-immigration since its reinvention in the 90s. Leadership: .6  Ideology: 1

Front National. Led by a Le Pen since 1972; Founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen and assumed by daughter Marine Le Pen in 2011. The party has been consistently right-wing and nationalist with increasing focus on immigration. Leadership: .9  Ideology: .9

Podemos. As a new party, Podemos has only seen one national election and one leader. Its platform continues to evolve though it is left-wing and focused on economic recovery. Leadership: 1  Ideology: 1

Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid- PVV). Party leader Wilders has remained at the helm since the party was founded in 2006. It is staunchly right-wing, populist and Eurosceptic. Leadership: 1  Ideology: 1

Swiss People’s Party, SVP. Since it was reinvented in the 90s, the SVP has had three leaders with their current leader serving since 2008. The party has refined its goals and policies several times, presenting a new manifesto in 2010. It remains firm in its rejection of EU membership and is right-wing populist. Leadership: .6  Ideology: .4

Swedish Democrats. The party has had several leadership changes, though current leader Akesson has been at the helm since 2005. The party has maintained a right-wing-populist, nationalist and anti-immigration focus since Akesson assumed leadership. Leadership: .6  Ideology: .4

Syriza. Syriza was founded and remains a left-wing, populist and nationalist party. Its leader, Tsipras, has served as chairman since 2009, sitting out a little more than
a month following a party splinter in 2015. This led to Tsipras’ loss of the majority in Parliament, so he stepped down as Prime Minister and called for a new election, which Syriza ultimately won. Leadership: 1 Ideology: 1

**UKIP.** Nigel Farage has served as party leader from 2006-2009 and again from 2010 to present (2016). Since 2006, UKIP has had Roger Knapman, The Lord Pearson of Rannoch, Jeffrey Titford and Farage at the helm. UKIP is firmly populist, right-wing, and Eurosceptic. It was founded as a Eurosceptic party. Leadership: .1 Ideology: 1

**Vlaams Belang.** Vlaams Belang has remained an anti-immigrant, right-wing nationalist party seeking an independent Flemish republic. The party has had four leaders since 2004, with Frank Vanhecke, Bruno Valkeniers, Gerolf Annemans, and Tom Van Grieken serving as chairman since 2008. Leadership: .1 Ideology: 1

**Online Marketing Presence**

As explored in Phase I, testing of PP, McAdams’s idea of cognitive liberation was a powerful and important concept. However, one must consider how these shared ideas are developed and imparted. This study holds that messaging/marketing is the method of delivering and establishing these shared ideas and beliefs.

One of Adolf Hitler’s legacies was his adept usage of propaganda. The London Jewish Cultural Centre (2011) noted that Hitler chose to appoint Josef Goebbels as Minister of Propaganda to propel his efforts: “Goebbels developed extremely successful campaigns using simple slogans and images repeated over and again in order to win public support for the party. The Nazis spent huge sums on newspapers, leaflets and poster campaigns.” Hitler had Goebbels depict Germany as a country “with traditional values and with Hitler as the beloved Führer. The promotion of Nazi racial policy was at
the very centre of Goebbels’s message. The re-writing of school books and the production of antisemitic books, films and exhibitions supported this policy” (London Jewish Cultural Centre 2011). This early manifestation of a marketing campaign was telltale of the potential impact possible through a strategic marketing effort.

A marketing campaign can take many forms and involve many different aspects. Social media and traditional media are now the two primary outlets. In 2012, Ramalingam determined that “in recent years, the far right’s use of social media has expanded. The extreme right capitalises on relationship-building mechanisms online, and the emergence of new social media and other such tools has become far more important than static websites, particularly to build a sense of comradeship as well as ownership over the movement” (Ramalingam 2012, 9). De Vreese (2007, 280) highlighted the role of the media in shaping citizen’s attitudes towards European integration, concluding that “Euroscepticism is, at least partially, a function of the diet of information that citizens consume about European affairs. News media coverage of EU-issues and events, such as Council meetings, can cause changes in the level of cynicism about European integration” (DeVreese 2007, 280).

Another important aspect of marketing is branding and messaging, i.e. how a group presents itself and the words and methods it uses to represents its ideology and goals. Word use is particular important- in this case semantics are everything. Word choice paints a clear picture of a group’s meaning and/or intention; for example, opting to use the word “demand” rather than “ask for” conveys a particular tone and meaning. In an article for the BBC, Williamson (2014) reported that: “In the past three years, Marine Le Pen has put a lot of effort into ‘detoxifying’ her party - ridding it of the racist stigma
and neo-Nazi links it attracted under her father’s leadership.” Le Pen stated that “The devil's cloak that we were forced to wear has been removed…the French are beginning to see us as we really are. Our party was never racist. None of our proposals are based on race or religion. We are patriots: we welcome and work with all who are French” (Williamson 2014). It is important to note Le Pen’s emphasis on and, perhaps, misdirection evidenced by the choice of the word “patriot.”

As a whole, the method and manner of spreading the word about one’s organization takes a new form in the 21st century. The number of people using the internet as their primary source of news has continued to climb, while the number of traditional print news readers declines. Observed Sheppard (2015): “Industry focused research reiterates the popularity of online news consumption in comparison to the fading traditional print formats. Accessing news online is favoured over print in France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, United Kingdom, Spain and Finland.”

It is therefore not surprising to recognize the utility, reach and growing need to focus marketing and publicity campaigns online. In this study, marketing will be measured in terms of online presence. Each party in our study will be analyzed to determine whether it has a website and, if so, what social media links they have included. Any icon links/feeds displayed on the party’s homepage will be noted.

Scoring was based on the number of social media links found on a party’s main/home page on its website, if applicable (Table 4.4). The party’s own website counted as one point. One additional point was given if a website offered any additional languages. An additional point was also given for a group exceeding more than 100,000 page likes on Facebook, 50,000 followers or 5,000 tweets on Twitter, and 10,000
Table 4.4.

Social Media Scoring

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of social media links plus bonus points</th>
<th>10+</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corresponding Score</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Scoring for each group was based on the number of social media links found on the party’s main/home page on its official website.

YouTube subscribers. Thus, a maximum of 15 points was possible. The tallied points corresponded to a score which was then utilized for fsQCA. For consistency, the English versions of online media were utilized for data compilation. For example, Facebook was utilized instead of the Dutch version “Hyves.” An online presence chart (Figures 4.7 and 4.8) shows the information compiled.

Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland- AfD).

- http://www.alternativefuer.de/ (1)
- Four social media links: Google +, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube (4)
- Offers English as a language (1)
- Facebook likes >100,000K (1)

TOTAL: 7 (.7)

Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti-DF).

- http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/ (1)
- One social media link to Facebook (1)
- Also has links to the FB pages of several members/leaders

TOTAL: 2 (.2)
Finns Party-Perussuomalaiset.

- https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/ (1)
- Has four social media links: Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, Blog (4)
- Offers English (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Online Presence/Group</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Google +</th>
<th>YouTube</th>
<th>Instagram</th>
<th>Pinterest</th>
<th>RSS</th>
<th>Flickr</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alternative für Deutschland AfD - Germany <a href="http://www.alternativefuer.de">www.alternativefuer.de</a></td>
<td>alternativefuer.de 27,083 People Talking About This 180,270 Total Page Likes</td>
<td>@AfD_Bund Tweets 3,908 — Following 333 Followers 14.3k Likes 98 Lists 1</td>
<td>+AlternativefuerDeutschland 1,536 followers 2,481,801 views</td>
<td>wahlalternative2013 2,398 subscribers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Online Shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti-DF Denmark <a href="http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk">www.danskfolkeparti.dk</a></td>
<td>DanskFolkeparti/520449347963427 2,011 People Talking About This 63,028 Total Page Likes</td>
<td>@DanskDF905 Tweets 286 — Following 354 Followers 4,915 Likes 82 Lists 1</td>
<td>+DanskFolkepartiOfficial 20 followers 4,170 views</td>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti UCDI10-eqjzSVwYW-Ro9g 41 Subscribers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>dffolding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perussuomalaiset True FINNS Party <a href="http://www.perussuomalaiset.fi">www.perussuomalaiset.fi</a></td>
<td>perussuomalaiset 6,858 People Talking About This 30,446 Total Page Likes</td>
<td>@VerkkomediaPS Tweets 2,809 — Following 414 Followers 2,077 Likes 74</td>
<td></td>
<td>psvverkkomedia 303 Subscribers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>perussuomalaiset blogit.perussuomalaiset.fi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreich FPÖ - Austria <a href="http://www.fpoe.at/">www.fpoe.at/</a></td>
<td>HSBrach @HSBrach Twitter 85,143 People Talking About This 303,107 Total Page Likes</td>
<td>@HSBrachFP Tweets 15.4K — Following 15 Followers 6,679</td>
<td>+170553960190633 68228 21,914 views</td>
<td>FPOETonline 12,938 Subscribers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front National - France <a href="http://www.frontnational.com/">www.frontnational.com/</a></td>
<td>FN_oficial 15,206 People Talking About This 337,574 Total Page Likes</td>
<td>@FN_oficial Tweets 18.2K — Following 500 Followers 106k Likes 104</td>
<td>+Frontnational 1,519 followers 557,431 views</td>
<td>marine_lepen/ 50 posts 5,509 followers 219 following</td>
<td>marine.lepen/ 50 posts 5,509 followers 219 following</td>
<td>marine_lepen/ 50 posts 5,509 followers 219 following</td>
<td><a href="http://www.frontnational.com/feed">www.frontnational.com/feed</a></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4.7.** MEPG Online Media Presence Part 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party / Country</th>
<th>Handle / Website</th>
<th>Social Media Metrics</th>
<th>Other Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Podemos - Spain</td>
<td>@ahorapodemos/unpaisescontigo.es</td>
<td>Tweets 521K, Followed 1,386, Followers 881K, Likes 1,002</td>
<td>64,981 Subscribers, 167 Followers, 8 Following, Reddit/podemos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partij voor de Vrijheid - PVV Netherlands</td>
<td>@geertwilderspvv/Tweets 3,807, Followed 657K</td>
<td>+1106126662168190</td>
<td>00000, No posts, <a href="http://www.pvv.nl/index.php">www.pvv.nl/index.php</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss People's Party, SVP</td>
<td>@svp.ch/Tweets 542, Followed 134,724, Likes 979</td>
<td>1728 subscribers, svp.ch</td>
<td>39 posts, 431 followers, 84 following, <a href="http://www.svp.ch/rss/home/">www.svp.ch/rss/home/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Democrats sd.se</td>
<td>@sdemokraterna/Tweets 1364, Followed 36K, Likes 381</td>
<td>Sverigedemokraterna 105, followers 130,281 views</td>
<td>Sverigedemokratenma, 8,551 Subscribers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syriza - Greece</td>
<td>@syriza_g/Tweets 3,591, Followed 88,496</td>
<td>+officialsyriza 130 followers 191,865 views</td>
<td>officialisyriza and UCIAJPCVju.JXbn MAzK64Smolw 681 subscribers, <a href="http://www.syriza.gr/rss.php">www.syriza.gr/rss.php</a>, syrizaofficial, 5 Followers, 3 Following</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP - England</td>
<td>@UKIP/Tweets 24,5K, Followed 851, Likes 1</td>
<td>UKIP MEPs UC3ZzC7sMhWJPM 35Y19J1w 12,628</td>
<td>Subscribers, 1596582/12N24 6 Members, 37 Photos, 1 Discussions, Online Donations-Paypal UKIP Store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlaams Belang - Belgium</td>
<td>@vbelaeng/Tweets 8,050, Followed 1,549, Likes 727</td>
<td>+vlaamsbelang 88 followers 46,006 views</td>
<td>VlaamsBelangInBeeld 1202 Subscribers, vlaamsbelang.org/rss/index.php, +E-magazine, +FEC, +Magazine, +Uitgeverij Egmont</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4.8. MEPG Online Media Presence Part 2.*
TOTAL: 6 (.6)

*Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich- FPÖ).*

- http://www.fpoe.at/ (1)
- Has three social media links to YouTube, Facebook and Twitter (3)
- Also has link to party leader Stroche’s website and the FPO-TV site
- Facebook >100,000 likes (1)
- YouTube subscribers >10,000 (1)
- Twitter >5,000 tweets (1)
  
  TOTAL: 7 (.7)

*Front National- France.*

- http://www.frontnational.com/ (1)
- Lists seven social media links on their website (7)
- Lists two audio/video links (iTunes and Google play)
- Live Twitter feed with >5,000 tweets and >50,000 followers (1)
- Facebook >100,000 likes (1)
- YouTube >10,000 subscribers (1)
  
  TOTAL: 11 (1)

*Podemos- Spain.*

- http://unpaiscontigo.es and podemos.info (1)
- Has social media links to Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr (4)
- Lists hashtags for use in English and Spanish #TOGETHERPODEMOS #UnPaísContigo
• Offers five language choices (1)
• Twitter >5,000 tweets and >50,000 followers (1)
• Facebook >100,000 likes (1)
• YouTube >10,000 subscribers (1)
  TOTAL: 9 (.9)

Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid- PVV).

• http://www.pvv.nl/ (1)
• Has links to RSS feed and party leader Geert Wilders’ Twitter (2)
• Twitter >50,000 followers (1)
  TOTAL: 4 (.4)

Swiss People’s Party, SVP.

• http://www.svp.ch/ (1)
• Has social media links to YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram (4)
• Offers French or German (1)
  TOTAL: 6 (.6)

Swedish Democrats.

• http://sd.se (1)
• Has social media links to Twitter and Facebook (2)
• Facebook >100,000 likes (1)
  TOTAL: 4 (.4)

Syriza- Greece.

• http://www.syriza.gr/ (1)
- Has social media links to Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, RSS feed (5)
- Offers international option for other languages (1)
- Twitter >50,000 followers (1)
- Facebook >100,000 likes (1)
  TOTAL: 9 (.9)

**UKIP-England.**
- Has links to Twitter, Facebook and YouTube (3)
- Has live Twitter and Facebook feed
- Twitter >50,000 followers (1)
- Facebook >100,000 likes (1)
- YouTube >10,000 YouTube subscribers (1)
  TOTAL: 7 (.7)

**Vlaams Belang- Belgium.**
- Has social media links to Facebook, Twitter, Google+, Pinterest, YouTube, and RSS feed (6)
- Live feed/video links Twitter, Facebook, Google+
- Twitter >5,000 tweets (1)
  TOTAL: 8 (.8)

**Public Outreach**

In 2005, the European Commission found that “access to decision-makers is more difficult for the eurosceptics than for supporters of the integration process. In other
words, we expected the strong EU opponents to rely more heavily on public-related strategies than the EU supporters.” They further observed that “eurosceptics are obliged to rely more heavily on public-related strategies, because they find it difficult to get access to decision-makers at the national or the EU-level” (European Commission, 2005).

Such insight is central to the proposed variable of grassroots activism. Public appeal and involvement is a critical component of most campaigns, but especially so with MEPGs. Evans and Butt demonstrated that “public opinion increasingly cues political parties rather than the reverse,” and that “Euroscepticism in Britain has become less driven by economic insecurity and moreso by concerns about British (or English) identity” (Hooghe and Marks, 2007).

MEPGs have sought to change the status quo; to do so they must involve and call upon the masses to gain voters and, subsequently, seats. Groups seek to inspire and mobilize the public, encouraging them to engage and demand change on behalf of their cause. From these efforts emerge voters-like-minded and patriotic citizens responding to a call-to-action.

Websites and social media are now considered agents of mobilization. They allow politicians and parties to interact and engage with constituents and members as well as serve to broadcast a call to action. Indeed, Bartlett, et al. (2013) observed that “The M5S Movement in Italy has evolved rapidly to become a significant political player by using social media to engage like-minded people in virtual and real life political action.” Indeed, traditional outreach efforts may not have disappeared from the choice of tools in the toolbox, but they have been forced to make ample space for millennial grassroots activism such as online marketing and targeting.
As a practical example, Podemos is widely considered to have created one of the best social media and marketing campaigns in Europe. Miguel Arana Catania, co-founder of Laboratorio Democratico, noted that “the use of social media has been a major success for Podemos” (Sangsari 2015). Sangsari (2015) reported that “Podemos’s social currency reaches close to one million Facebook fans and 557,000 Twitter followers. To put that in perspective, the four largest federal parties in Canada have a combined total of 270,000 Facebook likes and 370,000 Twitter followers.” Troncoso (2014) described how “Podemos’ unprecedented tactics and organizational methods can reinvigorate the New Left in Europe.” Accordingly, Ken Loach, co-founder of the UK party Left Unity, told Troncoso: “I think we can emulate [Podemos] in the organising in the grassroots, drawing people in, speaking to the 90%, using social media when necessary” (Troncoso 2014).

The Podemos website not only proudly recruits members and volunteers, it encourages public involvement and engagement. Their efforts include online do-it-yourself door hangers, bicycle tags, and campaign cards. They also involve visitors by encouraging them to take ‘selfies’ and videos and post them with a Podemos hashtag. Podemos even goes the extra mile when it comes to online fundraising, offering microcredit and crowdfunding options in addition to more traditional methods. Further, Podemos uses Reddit to enable their political candidates to debate with citizens.

In this study, a MEPG’s level of public outreach was tabulated utilizing a scale of 0-2 points for each of five categories:

1. info availability (news, manifesto, events)
2. face-to-face efforts (canvassing, leafleting, contacting voters)
3. public events (demonstrations, protests, rallies)
4. encouragement of youth involvement
5. media mentions

Figure 4.9 provides the compiled results. Info availability focused on ease of access (via the group’s website) to news, manifesto, vision, goals, and events. Face-to-face efforts reflected the extent of personal contact with voters via methods such as canvassing, leafleting, and door-knocking. Results were obtained by searching the group’s website and via open-source google searches using the MEPG name and the terms (and variations thereof) “canvassing,” “leafleting,” and “door-knocking.” Public events were opportunities for the party to address the public and for the public to gather in support of and to promote the group. These include rallies, demonstrations and protests. The same method was used as was for face-to-face, utilizing search terms/variations of “demonstrations,” “protests,” and rallies.” Encouragement of youth involvement reflected whether a group had a youth wing and how interactive, embedded

![Figure 4.9. MPEG Public Outreach Scores. The 12 MPEGs in this study are shown with their respective scores in each of five public outreach categories.](image)
and involved the MEPG was with them. The MEPG’s website was examined for links to a youth group and google was used to search for the MEPG and “youth wing.” Open-source news reports were searched using google and the same terms to determine any news items involving the group and youth. A “0” will reflect a below average result in that category, “1” will indicate an average result, and a “2” will reflect an above average result.

Media mentions revealed the number of times a group made the news. Media mentions data was compiled utilizing the *New York Times* visualization tool “Chronicle” (Figure 4.10). The Chronicle tool is described as “visualizing language usage in *New York Times* news coverage throughout its history” (NYTlabs 2015). Though the *New York Times* is a US based newspaper, it amasses and prints news from around the world. The tool is considered a method of visualizing “a historic corpus of news coverage” (NYTlabs 2015). Similarly, because none of the MEPGs are US-based, the groups are

![Figure 4.10. Media Mentions. Media mentions of each MPEG are indicated by color-coded waves. Data was compiled using the New York Times Chronicle Visualization Tool.](image)

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equally disparate and any mentions would be equally impartial and based on widespread European media coverage. Note that searches were performed using MEPG native language spelling and English language spelling (ex: Alternative für Deutschland vs Alternative for Germany). In all cases, the native language search returned fewer or no results, most likely because the New York Times is US-based and, therefore, would present the group’s name in English. Figure 4.11 provides the calibrated score for each MPEG.

![Table]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEPG</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
<th>SCORE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfD:</td>
<td>.01 (.02 in 2016)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF:</td>
<td>.01 (.03 in 2016)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finns Party</td>
<td>.0 (.02 in 2016)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPO:</td>
<td>.0 (.01 in 2000)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front National</td>
<td>.01 (.03 in 2016)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV:</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podemos:</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Democrats:</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVP:</td>
<td>.0 (.01 in 2014)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syriza</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlaams</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4.11. Media Mentions Scores. Scores for each MPEG were calibrated based on a conversion of the percentage of mentions received.*

Highest percentages were used as media mentions fluctuate with peaks typically occurring during election years (which vary per country). Based on the results using Chronicle, percentages above .10 earned a “2” representing an above average result; percentages of .02-.09 were assigned an average score of “1;” and percentages less than or equal to .01 were assigned a below average score of “0.” With five categories and a maximum score of “2” for each, the greatest total score possible was a “10” which
corresponded, for fsQCA purposes, to a “1.” A total score of “5” equaled a “.5,” and so on.

All MEPGs had fairly comprehensive websites that included their program/manifesto. Some had extensive news reports and even included news and social media feeds (Front National, SVP). A few were difficult to navigate and/or information was buried/difficult to locate (PVV, FPÖ). In some cases, a party had few events listed on their primary website but a google search led to a local branch of the group which had posted additional events in that location (ex. AfD vs http://afd-bw.de/termine-veranstaltungen/). Others had extensive schedules listed on their primary site (Finns Party, SVP). Some parties had less events noted, but extensive details such as the food to be served and how to carpool or take the bus to attend (DF). Others had full schedules during the election year but few to none other years (SD). Podemos relied heavily on social media for advertising events. This strategy is excellent for cutting costs and targeting younger, tech-savvy voters but overlooks those accustomed to and expecting traditional notification methods.

Media mentions results indicated that Syriza and Podemos had significantly greater results than any other group. UKIP, Front National, and DF had the next three highest scores, while PVV, Swedish Democrats and Vlaams Belang had negligible results.

Overall public outreach scores revealed that PVV had the lowest total score for public outreach—ostensibly because as a one-man party Wilders simply cannot do everything a traditional party with members can do. Syriza had the highest and only perfect score of 10.
Remarks

Chapter IV served to introduce the methodology and design for this study. Data collection was completed and detailed. The next chapter, Chapter V, will detail the testing procedure and present results, with Chapter VI serving as the forum for a discussion and analysis of results and conclusions.
CHAPTER V

THE EFFICACY OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND ORGANIZATIONAL OPPORTUNITY MODELS: TESTING AND RESULTS

This chapter utilizes the data collected in Chapter IV to test the efficacy of PP and OO using fsQCA. For fsQCA testing, data sets require a determination of degree of membership based on a scale of 0-1: zero (“0”) corresponded with .00% and “1” equated with 100% or 10, depending on data format. Each variable’s value was considered to be its degree of membership. A “1” indicated “full membership” in the data set and a “0” was indicative of “full non-membership.” FsQCA analysis will indicate the strength of the relationship between causal conditions and the outcome, allowing for a determination of the conditions which might be sufficient, necessary, or both.

Data consisted of four variables from each of the three elements of PP: political opportunity, cognitive liberation (two conditions) and indigenous organizational strength. The variables utilized for testing PP were: Political Opportunity (polopp), Indigenous Organizational Strength (indorgst), Cognitive Liberation-Euroscepticism (coglibeur), and Cognitive Liberation-Nationalism (coglibnat).

OO model testing also had four variables from three elements: consistency (two causal conditions), marketing presence, and public outreach. The variables utilized for testing OO were: Consistent Leadership (consldr), Consistent Ideology (considea), Marketing Presence (markpres), and Public Outreach (pubout). The outcome variable was success for both models. FsQCA utilizes the term “causal condition” rather than independent variable, and “outcome” for dependent variable. As a result, these terms will
be used in addition to standard statistical terminology. As a starting point, Figure 5.1 provides the data that was entered into fsQCA.

**Figure 5.1.** Variables by MPEG. The eight independent variables and the dependent variable are identified by group, calibrated according to fsQCA requirements.

FsQCA provides the following descriptive statistics (Figure 5.2) for the study’s causal conditions:

**Figure 5.2.** Descriptive Statistics. fsQCA printout displaying the descriptive statistics for each variable.

In fsQCA (as with its parent technique, QCA), analysis is based on relationships between and amongst sets rather than correlations. Ragin (2008) distinguished “between the analysis of ‘independent variables’, where factors are necessarily distinct, and the configurational analysis of causes and conditions.” “In the former, investigations of
combinations of conditions are hampered by collinearity (when variables have a linear relationship), whereas the fact that some conditions may be related to one another is expected in a QCA, and is part of the Boolean set logic (intersection) that underpins the analysis” (Thomas et al. 2014). Ragin and Rihoux (2004) discussed five primary goals of QCA: data representation as a truth table; consistency review of the data; testing of the hypothesis; the basic assumptions of the analysis; and the development of causal hypotheses based on observable patterns in the data.

The truth table is the starting point and is essentially a data spreadsheet which displays the causal conditions (independent variables), the outcome (dependent variable), and the degrees of membership of each. It provides consistency scores based on various relationships and allows for the researcher to input an outcome value based on data and theoretical information. Ragin (2008, 46) noted that: “The truth table will have $2^k$ rows (where $k$ represents the number of causal conditions), reflecting all possible combinations of causal conditions. The 1s and 0s represent full membership and zero membership for each condition, respectively.”

The researcher then determines a frequency threshold and a consistency threshold:

The researcher must begin by developing a rule for classifying some combinations (rows) as relevant and others as irrelevant, based on their frequency. This is accomplished by selecting a frequency threshold based on the number of cases in each row, shown in number column. When the total number of cases in an analysis is relatively small, the frequency threshold should be 1 or 2. (Ragin 2008, 46)

Once the frequency threshold is determined, all rows below the threshold are deleted. The researcher must then “distinguish configurations that are subsets of the outcome from those that are not” (Ragin 2008, 46). He notes that “values below 0.75 indicate
substantial inconsistency” while a threshold of .8 is the standard threshold (Ragin, 2009). Based on the chosen threshold, the researcher then enters a “1” in the outcome column for each configuration whose consistency level meets and/or exceeds the threshold and a “0” in the outcome column for each configuration whose consistency level does not meet the consistency threshold (Ragin 2008).

Once the above procedures are completed, analysis may begin. FsQCA analyzes causal combinations or “recipes” to determine those that are sufficient and/or necessary for the outcome. This research will utilize the fsQCA “standard analysis” which, as Ragin (2008) explained “is the recommended procedure, as this is the only way to derive the intermediate solution.” Not only is the intermediate result considered the most reliable, it also “conducts counterfactual analyses based on information about causal conditions” (Ragin, 2008).

The standard analysis method returns three different results in truth table analysis: complex, intermediate and parsimonious. The complex result omits contradictory cases (rows with no cases); the intermediate result uses only the remainders that survive contradictory analysis as determined by the researcher; and the parsimonious result utilizes any remainder that will offer simpler combinations. Summarizing, Elliott (2013, 9) noted that “the complex solution makes no assumptions, the parsimonious solution uses both easy and difficult assumptions to simplify, and the intermediate only uses easy assumptions.”

Evaluation will also include analysis of necessary conditions, coincidence, and subset/superset analysis. Necessary conditions and coincidence will be tested for each model: Phase I (PP) and Phase II (OO).
Phase I: Testing of PP Model

To determine the degree to which PP explains rise and success, the combination of causal conditions specific to this model were evaluated: *polopp, indorgst, coglbeur, and coglibnat*. Analysis began with subset/superset analysis (Figure 5.3). Truth table analysis followed, beginning with the creation of the truth table, appropriate evaluation and deletion/coding, causal condition selection, and finally, analysis. Testing for Necessary Conditions and Coincidence followed, as did any graphic representations of interest. As described in Chapter IV, success was considered as a group having a member in the EP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome: success</th>
<th>consistency</th>
<th>coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>polopp<em>indorgst</em>coglbeur*coglibnat</td>
<td>0.834108</td>
<td>0.506593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indorgst<em>coglbeur</em>coglibnat</td>
<td>0.836230</td>
<td>0.517703</td>
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<td>polopp</td>
<td>0.717780</td>
<td>0.824383</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 5.3. PP Model Subset/Superset Analysis. fsQCA data report showing consistency and coverage scores for the four variables of the PP model. Yellow indicates potential important relationships.*

Subset and superset analysis offers insight into potential relationships and causal conditions of interest. It examines all variables and provides coverage and consistency scores which are considered parameters of fit. Consistency scores below .75 indicate substantial inconsistency, while scores greater than 90% tend to indicate those variables
which are potentially necessary conditions. Ragin (2008) notes that “consistency measures the degree to which membership in each solution term is a subset of the outcome” and that “raw coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained by each term of the solution.” Following this formula, as well as the recommended coverage of 50%, subset/superset analysis (Figure 5.3) identified indorgst as the causal condition having the highest combined score as well as the highest consistency score of .81.

Truth Table Analysis

In order to interpret the results, it is essential to understand the components used in analysis. Ragin (2008) defined coverage as the measurement of how much of the outcome is explained (or covered) by each solution term and by the solution as a whole. Consistency reflects the degree to which solution terms and the solution as a whole are subsets of the outcome. Another way of explaining consistency is that it determines whether the causal path regularly produces the outcome. As Epstein, et al. (2008) observed: “Consistency is thus a measure of the extent to which membership strength in the causal configuration is consistently equal to or less than membership in the outcome.” Stated differently, coverage “determines the empirical relevance of a solution and quantifies the variation in causal pathways to an outcome” (Schneider and Wagemann 2010).

It is important to recognize that fsQCA stresses equifinality- the idea that there is more than one combination of conditions associated with the same outcome. Truth table results will report several paths to the outcome. Explained Schneider and Wagemann (2010): “The empirical significance of a path, measured by the degree of coverage of the outcome to be explained, is not equivalent to its theoretical significance. Some paths with
a high coverage can be theoretically uninteresting or even trivial. Likewise, researchers should not focus on any minimum value of consistency and hide those cases that deviate from broad patterns.” Kane, et al. (2014) succinctly noted “When coverage of a causal pathway is high, the more common the solution is, and more of the outcome is accounted for by the pathway.” Wrote Elliott (2013):

…the lower your consistency, the higher your coverage. The goal is to find a good balance, in which the solution is empirically and theoretically compelling, and your consistency and coverage are in ranges that validate your solution. If you have a super high consistency, but your coverage is super low, then your solution isn't that compelling because it doesn't describe many cases at all. On the other hand, if you have high coverage, but low consistency, it isn't compelling because your solution doesn't lead to the outcome often enough to make a strong causal argument. (Elliott 2013)

Kenworthy and Hicks (2008, 78) explain that “by definition, an intermediate solution must be a superset of the complex solution (no simplifying assumptions used)

![Figure 5.4. PP Model Truth Table Before Evaluation. fsQCA data report showing consistency scores for the four variables of the PP model.](image-url)
and a subset of the parsimonious solution (all possible simplifying assumptions used, regardless of their plausibility).” Additionally, Ragin (2008, 86) noted that “unique coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained solely by each individual solution term,” while raw coverage identifies which share of the outcome is exclusively explained by a certain alternative path (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). Necessary conditions represent a superset of the outcome while sufficient conditions are a subset (Ragin 2008).

Truth Table Results. Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 provide the truth table procedural steps which must be undertaken before analysis. In this model, data was run with causal conditions present as well as with causal conditions present or absent. Results were more reliable when run with conditions “present.” As detailed below in Figure 5.7, truth table
analysis yielded two configurations (paths) leading to success in the complex and intermediate solutions: \texttt{coglibnat*polopp} and \texttt{coglibeur*indorgst*polopp}. There was no parsimonious solution because causal conditions were evaluated based on their presence rather than absence. When a contributing cause contains no elements, there are no minimal prime implicants and no parsimonious solutions. The “ERROR(Quine-McCluskey): The 1 Matrix Contains All Configurations” message indicates that all cases met the consistency threshold and there were therefore no cases coded “0.”

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.731148</td>
<td>0.253443</td>
<td>0.839503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.508852</td>
<td>0.031148</td>
<td>0.968789</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.762295
solution consistency: 0.845045

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term polopp*coglibnat: DF (0.763,1), UKIP (0.758,1), AfD (0.738,0.1), Finns (0.734,0.9), SD (0.727,0.6), FPO (0.712,0.9), PVV (0.696,0.9), VB (0.688,0.25), Podemos (0.676,0.6), FN (0.626,1), Syriza (0.54,0.9)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term polopp*indorgst*coglibeur: SVP (0.596,1), FPO (0.59,0.9), Podemos (0.54,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9), FN (0.51,1)

*** ERROR(Quine-McCluskey): The 1 Matrix Contains All Configurations. ***

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
Figure 5.7. PP Model Truth Table Analysis. The complete fsQCA analysis providing consistency and coverage scores for the PP model variables for the complex, intermediate and parsimonious solutions.

The first path in both the complex and intermediate solutions indicates that political opportunity and cognitive liberation-nationalism cover 73% of the instances of success. Twenty-five percent of the instances of success in MEPGs are uniquely explained by political opportunity and cognitive liberation-nationalism. The consistency score of .84 indicated that 84% of this configuration is supported by the empirical evidence or, that this causal combination will lead to the outcome in approximately 84% of cases.
The second path in both the complex and intermediate solutions indicates that cognitive liberation-euroscepticism, political opportunity, and indigenous organizational strength cover 51% of the instances of MEPG success. Three percent of the instances of success in MEPGs are uniquely explained by the cognitive liberation-euroscepticism, political opportunity, and indigenous organizational. The consistency score of .97 indicated that 97% of this configuration is supported by the empirical evidence and that this combinations will almost always lead to the outcome of success.

The overall solution coverage score of 0.76 indicates the proportion of memberships in the outcome success that is explained by the complete solution, while the solution consistency score of 0.84 indicates the degree to which membership in the solution (the set of solution terms) is a subset of membership in the outcome.

According to Tomasino (2015), a necessary condition occurs when “the relevant causal condition is present in all instances of an outcome. In contrast, sufficient conditions represent causal complexity because they exist only in combinations with other conditions” (Tomasino 2015, 4). He noted that in “fsQCA sufficiency is indicated when the membership of the input is less than or equal to the membership of the outcome….High consistency values indicate the condition is sufficient for the output” (Tomasino 2015, 5). Ragin (2008) asserted that “when utilizing fsQCA, analysis conditions considered potentially sufficient for an outcome typically have consistencies greater than .8” (Tomasino 2015, 5).

This truth table analysis returns the causal condition polopp in both paths to the outcome success. In this model, polopp is considered a necessary condition for a MEPG
to achieve success, though it is not sufficient because it does not produce the outcome on its own. The two paths indicate they are sufficient combinations of conditions.

*Analysis of Necessary Conditions*

Schneider and Wagemann (2010) explained that “the necessary condition represents – in set-theoretic terms – a super-set of the outcome Y, or, inversely, the outcome Y is a sub-set of the necessary condition X.” They also observed that the logical minimization of a truth table is essentially an analysis of sufficient conditions and that QCA's sensitivity to causal complexity gives it an analytic edge over many statistical techniques of data analysis (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). Legewie (2013) detailed it in this manner:

Condition A is necessary for outcome Y if the occurrence of Y is not possible without the presence of A, but A alone is not enough to produce Y. In such cases, all cases in which outcome Y occurs share the presence of condition A. In fuzzy set terms, a necessary relation exists if outcome Y is a subset of causal condition A; that is, in each case the degree of membership in Y is less than or equal to the degree of membership in A (Y ≤ A). (Legewie 2013, 3.1.2)

Beginning with the assumption that the union of all causal conditions is a necessary condition, the variables are broken down to stand alone and into pairs in an effort to reduce and determine the fewest number of necessary terms. FSQCA returns a consistency and a coverage score for each condition/condition union tested with the outcome variable. In this analysis, consistency scores greater than 90% with coverage scores greater than 50% indicate potentially necessary and/or sufficient conditions.
Figure 5.8. PP Model Analysis of Necessary Conditions Testing. The variables of the PP model were tested for necessary conditions. Yellow indicated likelihood of necessity.

In this analysis (Figure 5.8), no single conditions appear to meet the threshold for necessary, though indorgst has the highest coverage score of .94 and coglibnat has the highest consistency score of .86. This is interesting since polopp was determined to be a necessary condition in truth table analysis. Two of the six pairs and the entire union of causal conditions meets the threshold. The combined condition of polopp+coglibnat and indorgst+coglibnat meet the threshold, as does the union of all four variables. The union of polopp and coglibnat is consistent with truth table findings and indicates potentially necessary combination to achieve success.

Coincidence

Set coincidence measured the number of cases found in the intersection of variables. In essence, it measured the degree to which the sets overlapped. Ragin (2009, 59) clarified: “Set coincidence is not the same as the correlation but rather is a special case of correlation. In a plot of two fuzzy sets, any straight line that is neither vertical nor horizontal yields a perfect correlation coefficient. However, perfect set coincidence occurs only when all the cases plot exactly on the main diagonal of the plot.” Scores should be closer to 0 than 1, as this provides for greater diversity in explaining the
outcome. Scores close to 1 indicate conditions that could be capturing the same phenomenon. Analysis of the causal conditions for PP yielded the following results:

Table 5.9. PP Model Coincidence. fsQCA analysis of the PP model variables for coincidence.

The results (Figure 5.9) indicated that the greatest overlap in cases existed between the variables *polopp* and *coglibnat* with a score of .78. The combination with the least overlap was *coglibeur* and *coglibnat* with .57. The overlap for all four causal conditions was .44. Political opportunity data was derived from freedom of corruption. Cognitive liberation in the form of nationalism was derived from scores of national pride. An overlap could be construed based on pride for one’s country stemming from opportunity. This seems to be quite a reach, however, as one does not require opportunity in order feel pride. An alternate analysis provides the observation that nations experiencing greater freedom from corruption would be exhibit more pride in their country, though the opposite could be true as well. Pride could increase as a demonstration of solidarity to spite existing corruption. For greater perspective, consider whether it seems logical that a country with high levels of corruption would also exhibit high levels of pride. The response is most likely a “probably not.” As a result, it is prudent to consider that an overlap between *polopp* and *coglibnat* is possible.

Extending the Analysis: Visual Representations

The XY Plot provides a visualization of the relationships between variables. Plots returning cases above the diagonal indicated the X-axis variable was a subset of Y, thus
supporting the contention that X was sufficient for Y. If cases were on or below the diagonal, a superset is indicated supporting the contention that X was necessary for Y. Ragin (2008, 31) noted that: “the lower right box shows the degree to which the data plotted are consistent with Y ≤ X (Y is a subset of X). The upper left box shows the degree to which the data plotted are consistent with X ≤ Y (X is a subset of Y). If one of these two numbers indicates high consistency, the other can be interpreted as a coverage score” (Ragin 2008, 31).

The fuzzy set XY plot examines bivariate relationships between conditions. Figure 5.10 examined the union of the four PP model causal conditions against the outcome variable success. It indicated all but one case above the diagonal, with Vlaams Belang serving as the outlier. The plot indicates that the combined four causal conditions of the PP model are a potentially sufficient condition for success from a complex causality perspective.

The union of polopp,coglibnat (Figure 5.11) yielded contradictory results. It was expected to show necessity or sufficiency but returned neither. Interestingly, indorgst (Figure 5.12) showed a strong relationship with only two outliers: VB and Podemos.
Figure 5.10. PP Model Conditions Leading to Success. Plot indicating the PP model conditions are a potentially sufficient condition for success.

Figure 5.11. Polopp/Nat Leading to Success. Plot indicating lack of necessity and sufficiency in polopp and coglibnat in leading to success.
Figure 5.12. Indorgst and Success. Plot indicating indorgst is a potentially sufficient condition for success.

Phase II: Testing of OO Model

To determine the degree to which OO explains rise and success, the combination of causal conditions specific to this model will be evaluated: consldr, considea, markpres, and pubout. As in Phase I, analysis will begin with the creation of the truth table, followed by appropriate evaluation and deletion/coding, causal condition selection, and finally, evaluation. As in testing of the PP model, success in this study will be considered as a group having a member in the EP.
Figure 5.13. OO Model Subset/Superset Analysis. fsQCA data report showing consistency and coverage scores for the four variables of the PP model. Yellow indicates potential important relationship.

In this analysis (Figure 5.13), no OO causal conditions return scores greater than the threshold of .85. The highest consistency score was for consldr*markpres*pubout which returned a score of .75.

Truth Table Analysis

Figures 5.14, 5.15, 5.16, 5.17, and 5.18 detailed the truth table procedural steps for this model. In this model, data was run with causal conditions present as well as with causal conditions present or absent. Results were more reliable when run with conditions “present or absent.”
Figure 5.14. OO Model Truth Table Before Evaluation. fsQCA data report showing consistency scores for the four variables of the OO model.

Figure 5.15. OO Model Truth Table After Evaluation. fsQCA data report showing consistency scores for the four variables of the OO model after coding.

Figure 5.16. Selections for Prime Implicants. OO model analysis necessitated selections for prime implicants.
Figure 5.17. Additional Selections for Prime Implicants.

Table 5.18. OO Model Causal Conditions Selections.

***************
TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS
***************
Model: success = f(consldr, considea, markpres, pubout)
Rows: 6
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.873134

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>consldr<em>~markpres</em>~pubout</td>
<td>0.273224</td>
<td>0.021858</td>
<td>0.925926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consldr<em>markpres</em>pubout</td>
<td>0.661202</td>
<td>0.021858</td>
<td>0.876812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consldr<em>considea</em>~markpres</td>
<td>0.338798</td>
<td>0.010929</td>
<td>0.939394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consldr<em>considea</em>pubout</td>
<td>0.726776</td>
<td>0.032787</td>
<td>0.886667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.814208
solution consistency: 0.897590

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term consldr*markpres*pubout: PVV (0.6,0.9),
SD (0.6,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term consldr*markpres*pubout: FN (0.9,1),
Podemos (0.9,0.6), Syriza (0.8,0.9), UKIP (0.7,1),
Finns (0.6,0.9), FPO (0.6,0.9), SVP (0.6,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term consldr*considea*markpres: DF (0.8,1),
PVV (0.6,0.9)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term consldr*considea*pubout: Finns (0.9,0.9),
FN (0.9,1), Podemos (0.9,0.6), Syriza (0.8,0.9),
DF (0.7,1), UKIP (0.7,1), FPO (0.6,0.9)

**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************
Rows: 6
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1-L

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.873134

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.879781</td>
<td>0.879781</td>
<td>0.838542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.879781
solution consistency: 0.838542

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term consldr: Finns (1,0.9),
Podemos (1,0.6), PVV (1,0.9), AfD (0.9,0.1),
DF (0.9,1), FN (0.9,1), UKIP (0.9,1),
Syriza (0.8,0.9), FPO (0.6,0.9), SVP (0.6,1),
SD (0.6,0.6)

**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************
Model: success = f(pubout, markpres, considea, consldr)
Rows: 16
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1
0 Matrix: 0L
Don't Care: -

--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.873134
Assumptions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5.19. OO Model Truth Table Analysis. The complete fsQCA analysis providing consistency and coverage scores for the OO model variables for the complex, intermediate and parsimonious solutions.

Results. Truth Table analysis (Figure 5.19) indicated four paths in the complex and intermediate solutions leading to success: ~pubout*~markpres*consldr, pubout*markpres*consldr, ~markpres*considea*consldr, and pubout*considea*consldr.

The parsimonious solution indicated that the condition consldr alone causes success. This finding indicates consldr is a sufficient condition to produce the outcome success.

The first path ~pubout*~markpres*consldr indicated that the absence of both public outreach and marketing combined with consistent leadership covered 27% of the instances of success. Two percent of the instances of success in MEPGs were uniquely explained by these conditions. The consistency score of .93 indicated that 93% of this
configuration was supported by the empirical evidence and that this combination will almost always lead to the outcome of success.

The second path $\text{pubout*markpres*consldr}$ indicated that the presence of public outreach, marketing presence, and consistent leadership covered 66% of the instances of success. Two percent of the instances of success in MEPGs were uniquely explained by these causal conditions. The consistency score of .88 indicated that 88% of this configuration was supported by the empirical evidence. In other words, this combination will lead to success 88% of the time.

The third path $\sim\text{markpres*considea*consldr}$ indicated that the absence of marketing, consistent leadership and consistent ideology covered 34% of the instances of success. One percent of the instances of success in MEPGs were uniquely explained by these conditions. The consistency score of .94 indicated that 94% of this configuration was supported by the empirical evidence and almost always will lead to success.

The fourth path $\text{pubout*considea*consldr}$ indicated that the presence of public outreach, consistent ideology, and consistent leadership covered 73% of the instances of success. Three percent of the instances of success in MEPGs were uniquely explained by political opportunity and cognitive liberation-nationalism. The consistency score of .89 indicated that 89% of this configuration was supported by the empirical evidence. This combination provided the strongest path to success because it resulted in the highest consistency and highest coverage scores.

The overall solution coverage score of 0.81 indicated the proportion of memberships in the outcome success that was explained by the complete solution, while
the solution consistency score of 0.90 indicated the degree to which membership in the solution was a subset of membership in the outcome.

Because *consldr* appeared in all four paths to the solution and as a single condition leading to success, it is considered necessary and sufficient. The four combined causal conditions were sufficient to cause *success*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition tested:</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>consldr</td>
<td>0.879781</td>
<td>0.838542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>considea</td>
<td>0.901639</td>
<td>0.771028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>markpres</td>
<td>0.737705</td>
<td>0.794118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pubout</td>
<td>0.770492</td>
<td>0.839286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consldr+considea</td>
<td>0.945355</td>
<td>0.779279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consldr+markpres</td>
<td>0.913497</td>
<td>0.789720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consldr+pubout</td>
<td>0.901639</td>
<td>0.800971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>considea+markpres</td>
<td>0.934426</td>
<td>0.777273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>considea+pubout</td>
<td>0.923497</td>
<td>0.775229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>markpres+pubout</td>
<td>0.825137</td>
<td>0.811828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consldr+considea+markpres+pubout</td>
<td>0.956284</td>
<td>0.781250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 5.20. OO Model Analysis of Necessary Conditions Testing.* The variables of the OO model were tested for necessary conditions.

In this analysis (Figure 5.20), consistency scores of .90 and coverage greater than .50 warrant closer scrutiny. One of the four variables (*considea*) and five of the six pair combinations, as well as the combination containing all four causal conditions returned scores meeting this threshold, indicating potential necessary conditions. It should be noted that some studies include consistency scores of .85 or greater. In this research, using that threshold leads to the inclusion of another singleton, *consldr*. When comparing these results to the truth table analysis, it becomes important to recognize that a high coverage score is most important but that it must also be accompanied by a high consistency score.
Coincidence

The four variables (consldr, considea, markpres, pubout) tested in the OO model yielded the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coincidence</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>coincidence(consldr,considea) =</td>
<td>0.828829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coincidence(consldr,markpres) =</td>
<td>0.691589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coincidence(consldr, pubout) =</td>
<td>0.747573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coincidence(considea, markpres) =</td>
<td>0.745455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coincidence(considea, pubout) =</td>
<td>0.752294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coincidence(markpres, pubout) =</td>
<td>0.817204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coincidence(consldr, considea, markpres, pubout) =</td>
<td>0.598214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.21. OO Model Coincidence. fsQCA analysis of the OO model variables for coincidence.

Results indicate that the greatest potential for overlap in cases was between considea and consldr with a score of .83. Markpres and pubout also had a high probability scoring a .82. The least overlap occurred between consldr and markpres with a score of .69. The overlap between all four causal conditions was .60. The higher the score, the more potential for overlap. High scores indicate a need for examination so as to ensure they are not capturing the same phenomena.

The two highest combinations for coincidence were consldr, considea (.83) and markpres and pubout (.82). Considea measured the vision, mission and ideology of a group, while consldr measured consistency in a group’s leadership. Pubout measured a group’s public contact and interaction, while markpres focused on a group’s online presence.

On reflection, consistency in ideology and consistency in leadership could certainly capture the same elements. Consider that a leader often remains in power embracing the same ideology for decades. However, other variances are equally true. A leader can change his/her ideology, different leaders can retain the same ideology.
Indeed, different leaders often bring different ideologies, and the same leader can try
different strategies. Ultimately, this combination is one in which analysis of coincidence
rightfully indicates a warning to beware of overlap.

The other pair, *markpres* and *pubout*, measured a group’s presence online via
social media marketing and public outreach, respectively. At first glance, this
combination also seemed likely to potentially capture the same phenomenon. In fact, it
now becomes obvious that *markpres* could be a subset of *pubout* since social media
activity was certainly a component of public outreach. In this case, the primary objective
of the variable public outreach was capturing a group’s personal contact with voters, the
“reach out and touch someone” phenomenon. However, a review of the indicators within
the data collection of *pubout* revealed that the categories “info availability” and “media
mentions” did not contain the personal contact the variable sought to capture. They were
included as ways of reaching and arming the public with information in order to engage
and involve them and gauging how well the information was spread to the public.

Removing these two indicators could result in better measurement of public
contact/personal interaction. Further, because *markpres* focused on social media activity
there is no direct overlap. However, social media in many cases is exclusively and/or
primarily used as a means of public outreach. Technology has greatly reduced the
amount of face-to-face interaction people have with one another. Though in-person
connections remain valuable they are perhaps not as necessary as they were in in years
past. Ultimately, though the two variables were designed to capture different
phenomena, in the new millennium these phenomena are no longer distinct.
Extending the Analysis: Visual Representations

Graph 5.4 shows an XY Plot of the OO model’s four causal conditions on the x-axis and the outcome success on the y-axis. The graph indicated all but three cases in the upper triangle leading to a consistency score of (.87) on sufficiency. This indicated OO causal conditions were a potentially sufficient condition for success from a complex causality perspective. AfD returned a score higher in causal condition membership (.5) than the outcome (.1), as did Podemos (.9, .6), and VB (.4, .25). These three cases can be construed as outliers because they undermine the strength of the argument for an explicit relationship between X and Y.

Figure 5.22. OO Model Conditions and Success. Plot indicating the combined causal conditions of the OO model do not appear to be a sufficient condition for success.

A detailed discussion of all results and conclusions will follow in Chapter VI.
CHAPTER VI
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSION

The testing of the efficacy of the two models and their relationship to success led to surprising insight and results. At the onset of this study, it was anticipated that data would reflect a stronger relationship between the Organizational/Opportunity model (OO) and successful MEPGs rather than McAdam’s Political Process model (PP). To reiterate, for the testing of PP, it was hypothesized that:

\[ H_1: \text{The elements of PP (political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength, cognitive liberation) led to the emergence and success of MEPGs in Europe.} \]

For the testing of the OO model, it was hypothesized that:

\[ H_1: \text{MEPG emergence was a result of opportunity borne from a trigger event- the Fall of the Wall- that led to culture change in which the political and social environment became conducive to the formation of MEPGs.} \]

\[ H_2: \text{MEPG success is a result of internal organizational efficacy and capacity (consistent leadership and ideology, public outreach, and marketing presence).} \]

Results corroborated the hypotheses, but did not necessarily reveal one model better than another.

PP Model

Testing of the causal conditions of the PP model revealed that the union of political opportunity and nationalism \((\text{polopp}^{*}\text{coglibnat})\), and the union of political opportunity, indigenous organizational strength, and euroscepticism \((\text{polopp}^{*}\text{indorgst}^{*}\text{coglibeur})\) provided the greatest causality. These unions were sufficient to lead to a MEPG’s success. The latter union accounted for a greater than .5
membership by 11 of the 12 cases (SVP was the exception). Seven cases had membership in this union of >.7. The former combination contained five of the 12 cases, though all had membership scores around .5. Because political opportunity was present in both paths to the success, it is considered a necessary condition and, therefore, the variable which bears perhaps the greatest need for further examination in its studies of MEPGs.

Data was run again using a higher consistency threshold of .966. This embraced the natural gap in the data. This analysis was nearly identical to the lower threshold analysis in Figure 5.7. The difference was the disappearance of the combination political opportunity and nationalism (polopp*coglibnat) found in Table 5.7, and the addition of nationalism, indigenous organizational strength, and political opportunity (coglibnat*indorgst*polopp). With a coverage of nearly 60% and a consistency of 96%, this combination was stronger than the other triad combination of political opportunity, indigenous organizational strength and euroscepticism (polopp*indorgst*coglibeur), also reported in Figure 5.7:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{coglibnat*indorgst*polopp} & : 0.588962, 0.111257, 0.959751 \\
\text{coglibeur*indorgst*polopp} & : 0.508852, 0.031148, 0.968789
\end{align*}
\]

Since testing revealed a potential overlap in political opportunity and nationalism, the data was run again, this time omitting the causal condition of nationalism (coglibnat). Results are presented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. These results revealed one path to success: the union of indigenous organizational strength and political opportunity (indorgst*polopp). The parsimonious result (the most minimized result) revealed indigenous organizational strength as a necessary condition.
**TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS**

File: C:/Users/Prebble/Documents/Grad School/PhD/Dissertation/Drafts/Full Dissertation/4-Methodology/MFGdataforFSQCA3.csv

Model: success = f(polopp, indorgst, coglibeur)

Rows: 4
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.968112

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>polopp*indorgst</td>
<td>0.642951</td>
<td>0.642951</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.642951
solution consistency: 0.963005

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term polopp*indorgst: SVP (0.805,1), DF (0.75,1), FPO (0.712,0.9), Podemos (0.676,0.6), FN (0.626,1), SD (0.6,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9)

**TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS**

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1-L

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.968112

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>indorgst</td>
<td>0.710383</td>
<td>0.710383</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.710383
solution consistency: 0.935252

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term indorgst: FPO (0.9,0.9), FN (0.9,1), Podemos (0.9,0.6), SVP (0.9,1), DF (0.75,1), SD (0.6,0.6), Syriza (0.6,0.9)

**TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS**

Rows: 2
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
0 Matrix: 0L
Don't Care: -

--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.968112
Assumptions:
coglibeur (present)
indorgst (present)
polopp (present)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>indorgst*polopp</td>
<td>0.642951</td>
<td>0.642951</td>
<td>0.963005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.642951
solution consistency: 0.963005

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term indorgst*polopp: SVP (0.805,1), DF (0.75,1), FPO (0.712,0.9), Podemos (0.676,0.6), FN (0.626,1), SD (0.6,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9)

--- Figure 6.1. Revised PP Model Truth Table Analysis. The analysis providing revised scores for the PP model variables based on revised consistency threshold. ---

![Figure 6.1](image)
Figure 6.2. PP Model Plot w/o Coglibnat. Plot indicating the causal conditions of PP (minus the variable “nationalism”) were sufficient to produce success. VB is the outlier.

However, when presented in combination with political opportunity, consistency increased. (Consistency, explained in Chapter V, is a measure of whether a causal path regularly produces the outcome.) This signifies that the addition of political opportunity to an existing condition of indigenous organizational strength has the rather substantial effect of increasing the consistency of the solution (Figure 6.3). Put another way, the pair are stronger together and lead to success more frequently than each variable on its own. This corroborates the underlying premise of this study that it is the union of several conditions that leads to the emergence and success of MEPGs.

Figure 6.3. PP Model Plot of Polopp and Indorgst. This plot reveals that Political Opportunity and Indigenous Organizational Strength are sufficient to produce success. The two outliers are Podemos and VB.

Data was also reevaluated without the variable political opportunity in order to gauge any changes. These results nearly mirrored those found above in which
nationalism was omitted. Two paths to success were indicated, both of which included indigenous organizational strength rendering it a necessary causal condition:

- coglibeur*indorgst 0.515410 0.031148 0.969174
- coglibnat*indorgst 0.641639 0.157377 0.940715

The parsimonious result was identical, also revealing indigenous organizational strength as necessary. These results indicate that in the absence of nationalism, indigenous organizational strength becomes stronger. Results also reveal that political opportunity and nationalism are each stronger when both are present, and weaker when one is absent. If these two variables were capturing the same phenomena, one would expect results to show each supplanting the other.

Due to the unanticipated rise of indigenous organizational strength, the original data was run once again utilizing the natural gap in raw consistency occurring between .96 and .84 (see Figure 6.4) as a threshold. As a reminder, the original data coded all five rows as “1” as they all were greater than the .80 threshold utilized.

![Revised PP Truth Table](image)

*Figure 6.4. Revised PP Truth Table. The revision shows coding with higher consistency threshold.*

During this reevaluation, the second and fifth rows (.82 and .84 raw consistency) were recoded to “0” instead of “1” indicating they would serve as logical remainders. When compared to the original results, testing revealed indigenous organizational
strength emerging as a causal condition in both the intermediate and complex paths, and its appearance as the sole condition in the parsimonious solution:

- \( \text{coglibnat*indorgst*polopp} \quad 0.588962 \quad 0.111257 \quad 0.959751 \)
- \( \text{coglibeur*indorgst*polopp} \quad 0.508852 \quad 0.031148 \quad 0.968789 \)
- \( \text{indorgst} \quad 0.710383 \quad 0.710383 \quad 0.935252 \)

Thus, when consistency was increased, political opportunity became less important and indigenous organizational strength became more important. This indicates that though the political opportunity is capable of producing success when part of a combination, it does not serve as reliable causal condition on its own. Conversely, indigenous organizational strength proved reliable on its own as its presence became more important the greater the consistency threshold. These results explain the Chapter Five Phase I findings in which Figure 5.2, the combination of political opportunity and nationalism (polopp*coglibnat) failed to show sufficiency, and the somewhat surprising strength of indigenous organizational strength (Figure 5.3).

**PP Testing Summarization.** Ragin (2009) acknowledged that the “evidentiary bases for consistency assessments are much broader.” When discussing good practices, Ragin (2009) observed that it is important to take into account the nature and quality of the evidence, and that one should “choose a threshold as close to 1.0 as feasible, given the nature of the data.” He advised to “look for gaps in the distribution of consistency scores” and to “avoid a threshold below .75” (Ragin 2009). With this advice in mind, a review of the analysis utilizing the highest consistency threshold served to corroborate

\( H_1: \) The elements of PP (political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength, cognitive liberation) led to the emergence and success of MEPGs in Europe.
combination of nationalism, indigenous organizational strength, and political opportunity with a coverage of 59% and consistency of 96%, and the combination of euroscepticism, indigenous organizational strength, and political opportunity with a coverage of 51% and consistency of 97%, collectively utilized all four of the model’s variables to reach success. As depicted in Figure 6.4, there was a nearly perfect subset relationship between the variables of the PP model and the outcome of success. With the exception of one outlier, Vlaams Belang, when present, these causal conditions were sufficient to produce success.

![Figure 6.5. PP Model and Success Plot. This plot indicates that, with consistency set to the highest threshold, the PP model variables are sufficient to produce success.](image)

OO Model

As noted above, the underlying premise of this study was that the idea no one condition could produce MEPG success, rather it was a combination of causal conditions.

Testing of the OO model yielded corroborating results.

Testing of the causal conditions associated with OO revealed that it was indeed the interplay among variables that led to success. The combination of consistent leadership, marketing presence, and public outreach \((consldr*markpres*pubout)\), and the combination of consistent leadership, consistent ideology, and public outreach \((consldr*considea*pubout)\), were most significant, revealing high degrees of both coverage and consistency. Consistent leadership was determined to be a necessary and sufficient condition, returning scores of 0.879781, 0.879781, 0.838542. However, in both combinations to the solution, consistency increased four and five percent when other conditions joined consistent leadership. This substantiated the argument that it was the combination of causal conditions that provided the strongest path(s) to the solution.

Running the data again and excluding consistent leadership led to exceptionally low coverage scores of .39 and less, underscoring the necessity of this condition. The removal of consistent ideology led to consistent leadership as a single causal condition for success in the parsimonious and intermediate analyses, and in two combinations:

- \(consldr*~markpres\) 0.360656 0.065574 0.942857
- \(consldr*pubout\) 0.748634 0.453552 0.889610
- \(consldr\) 0.879781 0.879781 0.838542

The addition of public outreach resulted in consistency increasing 5%.

Interestingly, the absence of marketing presence with the presence of consistent
leadership, caused consistency to rise to 94%, though it also made coverage reduce to 36%. The low coverage was sufficient cause to rule out this combination.

Exclusion of public outreach also yielded detrimental results as all coverage scores dropped below 36%. Removal of marketing presence as a causal condition resulted in only one path in all three analyses: consistent leadership. This finding reinforced the strength of consistent leadership and determination of it as both necessary and sufficient to cause success. However, it is important to recognize that the presence of other conditions increase its explanatory power.

Changing consistency thresholds for truth table analysis did not substantially alter the results in this model, nor did altering the conditions “Present or Absent.” Consistent leadership remained a necessary causal condition because it remained a part of all paths to the solution. What proved interesting was the impact of the absence of two variables when the consistency threshold was increase to .92:

\[
\begin{align*}
  \sim \text{markpres} & \quad 0.360656 & \quad 0.251366 & \quad 0.942857 \\
  \sim \text{considea} & \quad 0.142077 & \quad 0.032787 & \quad 1.000000 
\end{align*}
\]

This finding indicated that the absence of marketing presence led to success 94% of the time. This seemed counterintuitive, but when viewed in conjunction with the coincidence analysis it was more plausible. The absence of marketing presence would not be impactful in the presence of public outreach if both conditions captured the same phenomena.

*OO Testing Summarization.* Results of OO testing were surprising in that there were a number of causal combinations containing the absence rather than the presence of specific variables. Adjusting the consistency threshold accomplished little more than
adding more combinations containing the “absence of” particular variables. Ultimately, the most reliable threshold was .87, utilized in Table 5.15, which caused one logical remainder.

The strongest combination to the solution was consistent leadership, consistent ideology, and public outreach ($consldr*considea*pubout$) which provided for 73% coverage and 89% consistency. The other strong combination was consistent leadership, marketing presence, and public outreach ($consldr*markpres*pubout$) which had a coverage of 66% and consistency of 88%. A plot of all four variables in the OO model (Figure 6.6) provided a visual of the subset relationship between the variables of the OO model and the outcome of success.

Figure 6.6. OO Model and Success Plot. The plot indicates the four variables of the OO model are sufficient to produce success with the exception of three outliers.
With the exception of three outliers, Vlaams Belang (also an outlier in the PP model), AfD and Podemos, when present, these causal conditions were sufficient to produce success.

Combinations provided the strongest paths to the solution, which supported the hypothesis H2: MEPG success is a result of internal organizational efficacy and capacity (consistent leadership and ideology, public outreach, and marketing presence). In other words, it was the interplay among the four variables that leads to success.

**PP and OO Models Tested Jointly**

Data was analyzed one final time to include all causal condition from both models. Results were somewhat surprising (Figure 6.7):

```
***************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
***************
File: C:/Users/Prebble/Documents/Grad School/PhD/Dissertation/Drafts/Full Dissertation/4-Methodology/MFGdataforFSQCA3.csv
Model: success = f(polopp, indorgst, coglibeur, coglibnat, consldr, considea, markpres, pubout)
Rows: 8
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.896373

consistency
raw coverage unique coverage
---------  --------------  --------------
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*markpres*pubout 0.998470 0.020765
0.189071 0.052459
0.261312 0.057924
0.091366 0.031148
0.463497 0.255738
solution coverage: 0.631257
```
solution consistency: 0.942866

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*~considea*~markpres*~pubout: SD (0.59,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
polopp*~indorgst*~coglibeur*coglibnat*~consldr*~markpres*~pubout: PVV (0.58,0.9)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
polopp*indorgst*~coglibeur*coglibnat*~consldr*~markpres*pubout: DF (0.68,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*~coglibnat*consldr*~considea*~markpres*~pubout: SVP (0.596,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*~coglibnat*~consldr*~markpres*~pubout: FPO (0.59,0.9), Podemos (0.54,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9), FN (0.51,1)

*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
Rows: 8
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1-L
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.896373

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>indorgst</td>
<td>0.710383</td>
<td>0.344262</td>
<td>0.935252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~pubout</td>
<td>0.349727</td>
<td>0.010929</td>
<td>0.888889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~markpres</td>
<td>0.360656</td>
<td>0.005464</td>
<td>0.942857</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.781421
solution consistency: 0.893750

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term indorgst: FPO (0.9,0.9), FN (0.9,1), Podemos (0.9,0.6), SVP (0.9,1), DF (0.75,1), SD (0.6,0.6), Syriza (0.6,0.9)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~pubout: PVV (0.7,0.9), SD (0.6,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~markpres: DF (0.8,1), PVV (0.6,0.9), SD (0.6,0.6)

*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
Rows: 59
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
0 Matrix: 0L
Don't Care: -
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.896373
Figure 6.7. Joint Model Truth Table Analysis. This analysis provided scores on causal paths of PP and OO model variables.

Consistent leadership was no longer the standout condition. Rather, indigenous organizational strength proved to be the one causal condition, in the presence of all others, strong enough to cause success on its own. Its coverage of 71% and consistency of 94% considerably surpassed any other condition or combination. The next strongest combination was consistent leadership, nationalism, indigenous organizational strength, and political opportunity (\textit{consldr*coglibnat*indorgst*polopp}), with a coverage of 58% and consistency of 96%.
There were several options when running the data with all eight variables (Figure 6.9). The consistency level could occur at first gap (<.965), second gap (<.896), third gap (<.843), or less than .828, the latter which would code all cases as a “1.” The option for coding all cases “1” was dismissed, as even though this met recommended consistency levels of 80%, the results were very complex and contained multiple combinations of seven and eight variables which were not compelling.

![Table](image)

*Figure 6.8. Joint Model Truth Table. This analysis indicated clear gaps in consistency offering natural threshold division points.*

Running the data with various consistency thresholds resulted in several observations. Indigenous organizational strength emerged during the highest consistency threshold (the first natural gap) of .96, see Figure 6.9. It was the only causal condition leading to *success* in the parsimonious solution (see Figure 6.10).

```
**********************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
**********************
Model: success = f(polopp, indorgst, coglibeur, coglibnat, consldr, considea, markpres, pubout)
Rows: 8
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
  True: 1
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.965839
```
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*~markpres*~pubout  0.098470  0.020765  1.000000
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*~markpres*pubout  0.261312  0.063388  1.000000
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*~considea*markpres*pubout  0.091366  0.031148  1.000000
polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*markpres*pubout  0.463497  0.255738  0.965839

solution coverage: 0.578798
solution consistency: 0.972457

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*~markpres*pubout: SD (0.59,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*markpres*pubout: DF (0.68,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*~considea*markpres*pubout: SVP (0.596,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term polopp*indorgst*coglibeur*coglibnat*consldr*considea*markpres*pubout: FPO (0.59,0.9), Podemos (0.54,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9), FN (0.51,1)

***************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
***************
Model: success = f(polopp, indorgst, coglibeur, coglibnat, consldr, considea, markpres, pubout)
Rows: 8
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1-L

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.965839

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>indorgst</td>
<td>0.710383</td>
<td>0.710383</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.710383
solution consistency: 0.935252

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term indorgst: FPO (0.9,0.9), FN (0.9,1), Podemos (0.9,0.6), SVP (0.9,1), DF (0.75,1), SD (0.6,0.6), Syriza (0.6,0.9)

***************
*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS*
***************
Model: success = f(pubout, markpres, considea, consldr, coglibnat, coglibeur, indorgst, polopp)
Rows: 4
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
0 Matrix: 0L
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.965839
Assumptions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>raw coverage</th>
<th>unique coverage</th>
<th>consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>~pubout<em>~markpres</em>~considea<em>consldr</em>coglibnat<em>~coglibeur</em>indorgst*polopp</td>
<td>0.098470</td>
<td>0.020765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pubout<em>~markpres</em>considea<em>consldr</em>coglibnat<em>~coglibeur</em>indorgst*polopp</td>
<td>0.261312</td>
<td>0.063388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pubout<em>markpres</em>~considea<em>consldr</em>~coglibnat<em>coglibeur</em>indorgst*polopp</td>
<td>0.091366</td>
<td>0.031148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pubout<em>markpres</em>considea<em>consldr</em>coglibnat<em>coglibeur</em>indorgst*polopp</td>
<td>0.463497</td>
<td>0.255738</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

solution coverage: 0.578798
solution consistency: 0.972457

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
~pubout*~markpres*~considea*consldr*coglibnat*~coglibeur*indorgst*polopp: SD (0.59,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
pubout*~markpres*considea*consldr*coglibnat*~coglibeur*indorgst*polopp: DF (0.68,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
pubout*markpres*~considea*consldr*~coglibnat*coglibeur*indorgst*polopp: SVP (0.596,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term
pubout*markpres*considea*consldr*coglibnat*coglibeur*indorgst*polopp: FPO (0.59,0.9), Podemos (0.54,0.6), Syriza (0.54,0.9), FN (0.51,1)

Figure 6.9. Joint Truth Table Analysis-Highest Consistency. Analysis of joint testing of all eight variables at the highest natural threshold gap in consistency.

At this high level of consistency, the intermediate solution returned the highest scores for the combination containing all eight variables. It scored .46 for coverage and .97 for consistency.

Figure 6.7, discussed earlier in this section, utilized the second gap with the consistency threshold of .896. It also resulted in the emergence of indigenous organizational strength as a minimum formula of the parsimonious solution.
When utilizing the consistency threshold of the third gap (.843), indigenous organizational strength was replaced by consistent leadership to become the single causal condition of the minimum formula (Figure 6.10):

![Figure 6.10. Joint Testing Third Natural Gap. This image is the relevant portion of the truth table analysis indicating consldr as the single causal condition for success. As in the other consistency thresholds that included all cases, the combinations leading to success were expansive and included no less than seven variables. Overall, there were no combinations of 2-3 variables which would have indicated an opportunity to combine variables from each model to achieve success.](image)

*PP and OO Model Testing Summarization.* During the PP model retest, indigenous organizational strength returned scores of 71% coverage and 94% consistency. The model’s two strongest combinations nationalism, indigenous organizational strength, and political opportunity; and euroscepticism, indigenous organizational strength, and political opportunity; had coverages and consistencies of 59% and 96%, and 51% and 97%, respectively.

The OO model parsimonious result yielded the causal condition of consistent leadership with scores of 88% coverage and 84% consistency. The model’s two strongest combinations, consistent leadership, marketing presence, and public outreach; and
consistent leadership, consistent ideology, and public outreach; indicated scores of 66% and 88%, and 73% and 89% respectively.

Though the consistency scores in the OO model are not as high as those in the PP model (Table 6.1), its coverages are higher. In the second OO model combination (consistent leadership, marketing presence, and public outreach; and consistent leadership, consistent ideology, and public outreach), the difference in coverage is 13% when compared to the PP model’s combination with highest coverage score (nationalism, indigenous organizational strength, and political opportunity). Similarly, a comparison of the consistencies of each model revealed that the PP model had scores seven to eight percent greater than the OO model configurations.

Table 6.1.

*Comparison of PP and OO Model Causal Paths*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Causal Path</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OO Model Combination 1 consistent leadership, marketing presence, public outreach</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OO Model Combination 2 consistent leadership, consistent ideology, public outreach</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP Model Combination 1 nationalism, indigenous organizational strength, political opportunity</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP Model Combination 2 euroscepticism, indigenous organizational strength, political opportunity</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Consistency scores in the OO model are not as high as those in the PP model but its coverages are high.
Conclusion

To summarize, when consistency was set to greater than or equal to .896, indigenous organizational strength emerged as a necessary condition. For consistency thresholds less than .896, consistent leadership emerged as the necessary condition. With the consistency threshold set at .92, consistent leadership only appeared in combinations (with additional variables serving to increase its consistency), and indigenous organizational strength remained absent because of the presence of other contributing variables.

Setting consistency too high can compromise coverage and lead to the exclusion of important causal conditions. As acknowledged by Ragin (2009) and others, determining that fine line can be tricky. In following the guidance from Ragin (whom was consulted via email on this study), the results from the highest thresholds would serve as the ultimate guide in determining the efficacy of the two models. Because sufficiency in fsQCA focuses on the degree of membership rather than a full-in or full-out (as in csQCA), “assessment of each combination of conditions is ultimately based on the ‘pattern observed across all cases’ ” (Ragin 2009). This is the reason why various consistency thresholds were tested. As discussed, these additional analyses served to eliminate possibilities and obtain a better understanding of the interplay amongst the causal conditions and the significance of consistency.

Although the results of both models ultimately supported their respective hypotheses, the OO model combinations were determined to be the stronger paths to success, if only slightly. This determination was based on the much higher coverage scores in both its strongest configurations, and consistency scores which were only 7-8%
lower than the PP model. Though lower than the PP model scores, these consistency scores were far above 75%, which is considered inconsistent. At the risk of repetition, it should again be noted that researchers must strike a balance in determining the most effective levels of coverage and consistency, armed with the awareness that as consistency increases, coverage decreases. Chapter VII will discuss the implications of these results as well as provide some final thoughts.
CHAPTER VII
IMPLICATIONS AND CLOSING REMARKS

Implications

In 2014, Gifford observed that “the mobilisation of a hard right wing Euroscepticism between 2010-13 represents one of the most profound challenges to a government’s European policy that has been witnessed in the UK” (Gifford 2014, 16). Indeed, the emergence and success of MEPGs are impossible to ignore. “Far-right movements and groups are becoming more diverse, flexible, and are increasingly working beyond country borders to achieve their goals” (Ramalingam 2012, 28). Such international alliances and working relationships are in evidence across Europe in multiple forms. The rise of millennial eurosceptic populism necessitates deeper study into and understanding of how and why. Its impact has led to a dramatically altered political landscape, an altered socio-cultural perspective and norm, destabilization of EU governments, and national, regional and international political uncertainty and instability. But perhaps most concerning is the influence and enmeshment of Russia

Kreko, et al. (2015) reported that “up to 20 percent of all MEPs currently vote at times in the interests of Putin’s Russia.” A 2015 study of far-right MEPs who now comprise part of the Europe of Nations and Freedom Group (ENF) in European Parliament (EP), found evidence of support for Putin’s Russia before the new caucus had formed (Kreko, et al. 2015). Kreko, et al. (2015) also found that “in 93 percent of cases the pre-ENF members voted “no” in Russia-related decisions, which essentially suited Russian interests.”
In 2014, Front National’s Marine Le Pen acknowledged that: “I have a certain admiration for Vladimir Putin because he doesn't allow decisions to be forced upon him by other countries. I think he focuses first and foremost on what is good for Russia and the Russians” (Spiegel 2014). In fact, Kreko (2014) reported that “through what Putin calls the ‘active means’ of his ‘Eurasian Doctrine,’ Russia provides political and organizational support to ‘friendly’ organizations.” Indeed, Le Pen has confirmed that, in November 2014, a Kremlin-linked bank lent her party €9M to help her finance Front National’s campaign for the 2014 EP (Kreko, et al. 2015). Lichfield (2015) added that the loan “is expected to be the first tranche of a series of Russian payments which will fund the cash-strapped far right party up to the French presidential election in 2017.”

As Lichfield (2014) observed, “this is part of a growing pattern of connections between Vladimir Putin’s Russia and far-right and Europhobic parties in the European Union.” Here are only a few examples of eyebrow-raising associations:

- A new policy, supported by the Finns Party, is being tested in municipalities close to the Russian border, where instead of mandatory Swedish, Finnish pupils will have mandatory lessons in Russian instead (Sundberg 2015);
- Fifteen out of 25 major European far-right parties are vocal and open supporters of Russia and Russian interests (Kreko 2014);
- In its 2014 Defense Policies, the British National Party lists as an objective: “Engage constructively with Russia as a natural ally and trading partner” (BNP 2014);
- In 2014, several European far-right groups were invited to attend the Russian National Forum (hosted by the Intelligent Design Bureau) with an objective of developing a new national doctrine for Russia and Europe with the far-right parties. Among those invited: Jobbik, Austrian Freedom Party, Swiss People's Party, Golden Dawn, National Front (Laruelle 2015);
- The crisis in Ukraine has revealed the close bonding of European far-right parties with Russia. Far-right parties sent “independent observers” to the Crimean referendum and their representatives in the EP have joined forces with far-left parties to reject a resolution condemning the Crimean annexation and the “destabilization of eastern Ukraine” (Kreko 2014);
Jobbik’s MP, Márton Gyöngyösi, has stated that “Hungary should welcome Russia gaining ground against the West, as a new balance of power will probably be advantageous for Hungarian national interests” (Klapsis 2015); and

Vlaams Belang leadership has stated for the record “I think we can be a good partner for Russia in the European Parliament. And Russia sees us as a potential partner.” (Kreko 2014)

Though perhaps not surprising, collectively these items are certainly alarming, particularly in terms of international relations and political affairs. The landscape has changed, and continues to change, throughout Europe with effects felt worldwide. An article in the May 31, 2014, Economist echoes this concern:

The global repercussions may be more worrying. The new European Parliament will probably be more sceptical of free markets and less favourable to free trade, particularly the ambitious Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with America. One of Ms Le Pen’s demands is the immediate suspension of these negotiations. Moreover, anti-EU parties are often markedly pro-Russian. Internationally, the loser of these elections could be America—and the winner, Russia. (Economist May 31, 2014)

In a 2015 story on the increasing ties between European parties and Russia, CNBC reported that Russia appeared to be capitalizing on widespread disenchantment:

“As for Russia's motivation, destabilizing the European Union at one of the most vulnerable points – and when east-west relationships have soured -- is key” (CNBC 2015). Neil Barnett, the founder of risk consultancy and CEE specialist Istok Associates, told CNBC: “This is part of a broad spread of measures designed to confuse and demoralize the opposition. This part is opportunistic, taking advantage of disillusionment with the existing political order in Europe” (CNBC 2015).

Adding to the level of concern is recognition that many countries and parties believe they need Russia to succeed. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban
commented that: "Without co-operation with the Russians we cannot achieve our goals." (CNBC 2015). Figure 7.1 details established party connections with Russia.

As discussed in Chapter III, the similarities between fascism and euroscepticism cannot be ignored: nations in social and political turmoil, a rebirth of nationalism, group formation and rise, and a new generation in a state of revolt. Millennial eurosceptic populism is the manifestation of groups borne from the unique synthesis of traditional traits and end-of-the-20th century social and political change. As Klapsis (2015) keenly observed: “Russia is not a threat but rather an asset to peace and stability in Europe. For the Kremlin, the growing success of far-right parties (with the backing of Russia, where necessary) is clearly an advantage since it is thought that this will destabilise EU
governments and the EU itself.” Indeed, though countries see Russia as aiding in their struggle, the opposite is also true: by offering support to other countries (often strategically located) Russia gains influence and the potential for regional hegemony.

The relationships Russia has cultivated with successful and ascending Eurosceptic groups offer indisputable, viable, and alarming evidence of an underlying master plan in which foes become allies, acquaintances are dissociated, and compatriots serve both wittingly and unwittingly as strategic pawns. A deeper understanding of the causal conditions that have allowed MEPGs to emerge and rise could allow for preemptive networking and building of relationships. Engaging in dialogue to gain a mutual understanding of needs and motivations can have far-reaching benefit. As the saying goes, it is far better to build bridges than tear them down.

Closing Remarks

In 2011, Langenbacher observed that “the important thing is to understand how the radical right arose as a phenomenon, and particularly the current success of rightwing populist parties in Europe in terms of its social origins, before we can develop meaningful counter-strategies” (Langenbacher 2011, 310). This research contends that the elements at play leading to the emergence and success of MEPGs can now be identified, studied, and understood.

Statistics clearly indicate an increase in the number MEPGs corresponding with the FOTW. The resultant cultural shift provided an environment hospitable to their development. But not every group that formed after the FOTW was successful. This study offered insight into potential causal conditions and was able to pinpoint variables that lead to a MEPG’s success.
One of the main premises of this study was the idea that the PP model was too
general and easily applicable due to a researcher’s ability to select conditions which fit
each of its three elements. A goal of the OO model was to pinpoint specific variables
rather than provide an open-ended framework. This goal was accomplished. The
variables of consistent leadership, consistent ideology, public outreach, and marketing
presence were found to lead MEPGs to success in two separate combinations. Likewise,
nationalism, euroscepticism, number of members (indigenous organizational strength),
and freedom from corruption (political opportunity) also lead to success in various
combinations, though to a lesser degree. This research proves that it is the power of
several variables in the presence of each other that leads to success.

Results corroborated the hypotheses of this research, but did not indicate one
model as significantly stronger than the other. Though results of this study were
expected to show the OO model as having a much stronger causal relationship to success
than McAdam’s PP model, the findings are no less important. A strong contention of this
research is the need to identify specific variables that lead to a MEPG’s success to better
isolate and understand causal conditions. Thus, the goal of the OO model was to pinpoint
variables any researcher could utilize to explain and predict the emergence and success of
MEPGs and -- possibly -- other parties and social movement organizations. The
identification of opportunity created externally by a trigger event and the subsequent
culture shift, and internal organizational capacity resulting from consistency in leadership
and ideology, marketing efforts, and public involvement, provides researchers with the
ability to examine one dynamic that has allowed for MEPGs to achieve success.
The use of the phrase “one dynamic” was intentional. This study is not contending that the variables identified here as causal conditions leading to MEPG success are the only such conditions than can result in that outcome. There may be others. However, this research does claim that the variables identified in this study as causal conditions that do lead to success, bear a need for deeper study and analysis. It is believed that the components of these causal conditions can be narrowed down even further to identify variables with the strongest relationship to success. Such minimization will lead to stronger, clearer paths to success.

A goal of social science study is identifying the predictors that lead to a certain outcome. Understanding the trajectory of MEPGs is of critical importance, particularly in light of the implications noted above. The ability to identify groups that possess the identified elements leading to success provides political bodies, intelligence agencies, and scholars the opportunity to be a step ahead and proactively strategize methods and means for interception, cooperation or any level in between. This research offers political scientists, analysts and sociologists enhanced insight into the tools that can be used to analyze, predict, and perhaps even preempt, potential sources of development, strife or concern.

The insight it provides offers the potential for a better understanding of the underlying dynamics within changing cultures, as well as improvement in international, interregional, and interlocal relationships. The implications and benefits of this additional insight are many, but perhaps most importantly seek to contribute to the fortitude of the “3Ds” of U.S. national security: diplomacy, development and defense.
Maurice Bardéche wrote that “fascism is, by its essence, nationalist, and while it originates as the reaction to a crisis, all fascist reaction is resurrection” (Griffin 1991, 172). His comments, though made in 1961, remain relevant nearly a half century later in the new millennium. Not only is this statement prescient, it underscores three main points of this dissertation: the emergence and success of the non-traditional parties christened MEPGs was a reaction to a trigger event; nationalism is a fundamental element of MEPGs; and, that the emergence and ascension of MEPGs has served as a rebirth of traditional values. In a realm of could be, maybe, and possibly, one thing is certain: MEPGs have been able to achieve levels of success never before imagined and have forever changed the face of politics in Europe.
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