Cornerstone of Union Victory: Officer Partnerships in Joint Operations in the West

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Cornerstone of Union Victory: Officer Partnerships in Joint Operations in the West

by

Aderian Partain

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate School,
the College of Arts and Letters
and the Department of History
at The University of Southern Mississippi
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ABSTRACT

The American Civil War included one of the pivotal naval contests of the nineteenth century. A topic of considerable importance is the joint operations on the western waters that brought about a string of crucial victories in the conflict for the Union. The effective cooperation of the naval river fleet and the western armies was a major cornerstone of Union victory. Scholars have written biographies of the more noted admirals and narratives of the flotilla have been detailed. What has not been accomplished is an exploration of the Union officers’ professional partnerships between the Mississippi Squadron commanders and their corresponding army counterparts. The Naval-Army joint missions in the riverine operations impacted the overall operational effectiveness of the Union forces and are significant to understanding the outcome of the war. This study is grounded in the *Official Records of the War of the Rebellion* and the *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*, as well as key combatants’ memoirs and postwar writings. These reveal the successes and failures in Army-Navy cooperation and their significance to the larger war effort. The complexities of these professional relationships underscore the challenges of combined operations and offer insight for modern military leaders and scholars examining the significance of the Western Theater of operations on the Union’s ultimate victory in the American Civil War.
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Scholarship Foundation, Phi Theta Kappa Scholarship Association, and Mississippi State University’s Compass, Eagle Scout, and Meridian General Scholarship Foundation all for their generous support in completing my undergraduate degree debt free with some funds left over to attend graduate school. Without the generous support of these scholarships, graduate school and this thesis would not have been possible.

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I would be remiss in not thanking the military veterans in my family for their service and instilling in me a deep respect and interest in military history: my uncle, Colonel Bert Gilmore, a thirty-three year veteran of the Mississippi National Guard and a veteran of the war in Afghanistan; my father, Robbie Partain, a twelve year veteran of the Mississippi National Guard and a veteran of Desert Storm; my uncle, Steve Partain, a six year veteran of the Mississippi National Guard; my grandfather, Bill Murray, a Korean
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Geographical Overview of the American Civil War

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

United States Navy and Army joint operations in the western theater brought about a series of crucial victories that were pivotal federal successes in the American Civil War. A major cornerstone of that victory was the effective collaboration of the officers of the fresh water navy and western armies. Numerous narratives of the flotilla and biographies of admirals have been penned by academics yet an investigation of the professional partnerships between the brown water navy officers and their army counterparts has not been accomplished. These joint missions shaped the overall operational effectiveness of the Union forces in riverine operations and are significant to understanding the outcome of the war. This study examines examples of Naval-Army collaborations, arguing the significance of effective cooperation among officers involved in these actions, and seeks to explore how the complexities of these professional partnerships influenced the success and failure of combined operations in the Western Theater and are essential to understanding Union victory in the west.

The professional naval history of the American Civil War began shortly after the conflict ended with the emergence of Naval scholars. Three of these were James Russell Soley, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Daniel Ammen. They collectively contributed to American naval history in the form of various projects. These three were all heavily involved in the United States Navy as officers, instructors, or as archivists. The first notable project that should be mentioned was a three-volume history of the Navy in the Civil War with each volume written by one of them. Mahan wrote the third volume, which detailed the naval operations of the inland waters and the Gulf of Mexico in 1874 and was the first normal history that covered the Mississippi Squadron. This was
Mahan’s first literary breakthrough and a start to an illustrious career as a naval historian and theorist. This study suffers from having a seaman try to describe riverine actions in oceanic terminology and Mahan rarely elaborates on the complexity of the operations under discussion. His naval focus also means that the army side of amphibious missions gets less focus in the overall narrative.²

Prior to the turn of the century, more general histories came out, while biographical works became more prominent. A collection of individual biographies on the Admirals of the Union Navy was created. Mahan and Russell wrote biographies of David Farragut and David Dixon Porter, respectively. These biographies were largely heroic portrayals of their subject matter and meant to serve as inspirational reading for American citizens. Yale university professor, Charles Boynton wrote a two-volume work on the naval history of the Civil War and this scholarly work still holds up despite the passage of time and is still listed in Civil War naval bibliographies. Civil War navies were largely subsumed in the context of general Civil War histories, campaign studies, or became singular focus chapters in larger histories of naval warfare with some select battles such as Hampton Crossroads achieving greater historical notoriety. These generalized analytics of the Civil War navies would continue until the rise of new historical movements into war and society topics.³


In 1949, H. Allen Gosnell was the first modern academic historian to write a focused study on the riverine operations of the American Civil War’s western theater. His book is largely an anecdotal narrative that provides the reader with a partially complete account of the war on the western waters to highlight its place in the wider war and specifically to shift focus from the eastern theater. It is a well-conceived book that, like many similar volumes on the subject, appeals to the wider public as opposed to academics. As a former Naval officer, he successfully elaborates on the technical realities of riverine warfare, but primarily conveys history in a novelistic form. The place of army-navy cooperation is once again noted, but the focus of the book is on the actions of federal gunboats in battle.\footnote{Harpur Allen Gosnell, \textit{Guns on the Western Waters: The Story of River Gunboats in the Civil War} (Louisiana State University Press, 1949).}

Gosnell’s successor in narrating the war on the western waters was Fletcher Pratt. Pratt’s substantial work is the most inclusive and thoughtful of the riverine narratives. His approach to the topic is a dual study of both the Union and Confederate brown water naval development and operations. His conclusions that the Union operated under a driving strategic directive and enjoyed a proper degree of army-naval cooperation is sound. He points out that the Confederacy failed to determine a set strategic goal, suffered from divided commands, and did not employ a proper resource allocation system. Pratt makes the case that both sides started with relatively clean slates on the western waters and that one side reaped the rewards for acting swiftly, while the other did not. Pratt, like Gosnell, fully summarizes the full extent of Union naval operations on the western rivers and gives credence to the forgotten notion that naval supremacy is a
temporary state. The Union river flotillas were engaged in a continual campaign for river dominance from the beginning of the war until its end. Unlike many later historians, Pratt is not of the opinion that Vicksburg’s fall constituted total Union control of the Mississippi. In Pratt’s estimation, the inland rivers had to be constantly contested and this means the war for the rivers was more akin to the larger Union naval blockade of the Confederacy in terms of its nature as an ongoing event. However, the lack of citations heavily hinders this work compared to its modern successors. A more modern take on Pratt’s conclusions about the crucial importance of the army-navy cooperation on the western waters and a deeper exploration of what this meant for the Union effort would be quite useful to Civil War history.  

The rising importance of the western theater in Civil War historiography led to a fixation on the importance of Vicksburg in the scope of the wider war. Historians such as Milligan, Merrill, Patterson, and Tomblin all fall into the same category that confine their analysis of the Union river squadrons to the movements that led to Vicksburg’s capitulation. The main thrust of many of them is an attempt to convey the narrative of both the Union and Confederacy on the western waters from the start of the war to the siege of Vicksburg within the same volume. The narrative is characterized as a mad dash of opposing administrations to outfit river forces, Union forces taking strongpoints, defeating the opposing naval formation in battle, and ultimately triumphing after many failed attempts to take Vicksburg. Tomblin is only different in the respect that she confines her analysis to the Union forces and offers a deeper exploration of the pressures of commanding and crewing the gunboats. These works collectively consider post

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Vicksburg operations to be simple mop up operations after the central goal of opening the Mississippi had been attained and ignores nearly two years of ongoing campaigns. The Vicksburg focused works all emphasize the importance of army-naval cooperation, but this leaves gaps in the literature that need to be filled. 6

Rowena Reed’s study of combined operations during the Civil War argues that the Union simply failed to make proper use of army-naval cooperation at a sustained strategic level past 1862. Reed’s view is that George McClellan was the instrumental figure in the Union’s successful adoption of combined operations as a policy during his tenure as General of the Armies. Reed is interested primarily in the pursuit and preparation of large strategic maneuvers. The tactical employment of army and naval forces in joint tactics constituted ad-hoc solutions as opposed to well-planned military efforts. In her estimation, Union success had little to do with their proper deployment of forces as opposed to the Confederacy’s many deficiencies. In her mind, the fact that Union operations succeeded should not be allowed to mask their failures and errors. Reed argues that the Union failed to make use of its superior resources in combined operations to end the war more swiftly and that the war illustrates the development gap between the amphibious operations of the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. Her analysis of the war on the western waters is that it was merely an outgrowth of Union policy that benefitted

from better army-naval cooperation and greater creativity on the part of the officers involved. Brown water operations are a mere branch of a larger Union policy, but they were by far the most integrated of the army-navy co-operatives and the most successful in terms of their continual impact on the conflict. Two essays on Grant’s naval partners in an edited collection also forms an important milestone in the study of combined operations and of command relationships. Reed’s study was for decades the only dedicated volume on Union combined operations. In 2010, Craig Symonds served as editor to a new collection of essays on the subject and he stated that the joint operations conducted on the Mississippi River network have been specifically excluded due to their particular circumstances, but the volume effectively details combined missions conducted on the coast and the eastern rivers. In 2015, Daniel Canfield published the most recent article on Union combined operations and yet the brown water operations only received sparse mention as an example of how the Union high command was united in the early days of the conflict and that the successes on the inland waters were simply part of the overall trend of Federal navy triumphs over the first half of 1862. 7

Over the course of the last two decades, more has been achieved and the naval side of the war has received more focus. A new biography on Andrew Foote and a new study of the Mississippi Brigade were written by experienced naval historians Spencer C. Tucker and Chester G. Hearn. Several useful one volume histories have come to the

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forefront in the study of the Western Waters by Barbara Tomblin and Gary D. Joiner.

Joiner wrote an effective introductory history of the Mississippi Squadron and a study of its role in the Red River Campaign. Tomblin’s volume on the Union riverine operations looks more closely at the hardships of the federal crewmen and her study of Union contraband policy shows the importance of African Americans to Union naval operations. More detailed campaign studies of individual points in the larger narrative such as McCaul’s new study of the Battle of Memphis offer a more effective analytical approach.

Myron J. Smith Jr.’s antiquarian volumes fill in many narrative gaps by describing at length every possible detail about the war on the western waters, but this leaves them as valuable references without their own arguments. Smith’s many passionate books on the subject are among the most important on the topic in recent years. They bring to light many events that have been forgotten about since the days of Pratt.8

Unfortunately, the view of the war on the western waters within the historiography of the American Civil War has been confined to its relationship to the Vicksburg Campaign and principally in a narrative form for the purpose of entertainment. Scholars regularly bemoan the lack of systematic analysis of the naval war in the West.

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Historians have spent the last four decades repeating the same narrative of the importance of the Union gunboats in the capitulation of Vicksburg or complete narrative histories of the Mississippi Squadron. This thesis argues that the professional officer partnerships of the Western Flotilla with their army counterparts was important in securing Union victory in the West. Union victory was not possible without the army-navy cooperation on the western waters. This research contributes to existing scholarship by examining and underscoring the importance of the professional partnerships developed in joint operations that were instrumental in the defeat of the Confederacy.

The key primary sources used in this thesis are the *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion*, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* and the memoirs of key officers. After the war, popular magazines and publishing companies played a key role in getting war veterans to write about their experiences for the benefit of the larger public and to gain a tidy profit in the process. The articles reflect a more generally romantic view of the conflict and were produced for public consumption. The problem with these early histories are the intensely personal nature of them. Most of these were written a decade after the war when feelings were still strong and the authors put their personal perceptions ahead of objective reality. Men of many ranks on both sides published books related to the war or memoirs of their service. For example, the infamous Confederate commerce raider, Raphael Semmes, wrote of his war service alongside lesser figures such as Confederate naval academy attendee Thomas Scarf, who compiled one of the most complete records of the actions of the Confederate Navy in
existence. Scarf compiled a complete account of every Confederate riverboat and the collective opposition that opposed the Union on the western waters.  

The two most prolific writers of the exploits of the Mississippi Squadron are also two of its most vital officers. Henry Walke contributed to the history of the war in two ways. He collaborated with a popular magazine in creating articles for an ongoing series that became known as the *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, collectively. Walke wrote two articles that chronicled his role in two operations of the Western Flotilla and his memoir. David Dixon Porter served the longest tenure as commander of the Western Flotilla. Porter casts a large shadow over the entirety of Civil War naval operations and its history serving a key role in the campaigns for Fort Pickens, New Orleans, Vicksburg, Red River, and Fort Fisher. Porter wrote extensively in both the genres of fiction and non-fiction. He, like Walke, contributed articles to *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* series. He also wrote a personal memoir and penned an operational history of the naval side of the Civil War in one lengthy volume. In this work, he provides wonderful depth of operational understanding and a unique perspective regarding the ships and officers involved in the various engagements and how they worked together. Porter’s boastful personality is present throughout his analysis and while this holds some entertainment value, it creates problems for reconstructing events. The book’s key merit is that it allows

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Porter to demonstrate his understanding of the wider war and demonstrates the place of the actions he directed within it.  

On the army side of affairs, this thesis uses the multi-volume memoirs of Generals Grant and Sherman. These lengthy military recollections are important to the study of the riverine operations in the West. Grant, Sherman, and their subordinates were the key army officers involved in cooperation with their navy counterparts. Grant and Sherman both provide immense detail on their operations during the war and they both give some focus to the difficulties of coordination as a joint task force. Grant affirms much of the argument of this thesis that the success behind much of the western theater was due to the Federal gunboat flotillas support of army operations. Grant and Sherman point to their battle forged partnership with Porter in the triumph of the Vicksburg campaign.

John Mason Hoppin and the son of Charles Henry Davis produced biographies of Rear Admirals Foote and Davis, respectively. These biographies make use of a great deal of primary materials that generally cannot be found anywhere else. Charles Davis made use of his father’s naval service diaries and his war diaries as his principal materials for the compilation of this volume. It shows certain insights into Davis that simply are not available anywhere else in terms of his wartime concerns and his belief in accomplishing strategic objectives. Hoppin’s biography of Foote was compiled with the assistance of many of Foote’s friends and associates. They provided the author with numerous letters

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from Foote, which he quoted verbatim. The closing pages of this volume consist of dozens of eulogies to the late admiral. Both of these biographies make use of block quotations so frequently that they are practically primary document collection with additional commentary. These volumes are used in this thesis as evidence to demonstrate the views of Foote and Davis.\textsuperscript{12}

The most singularly important person in the historiography of the Civil War navies is James Russell Soley. He was a Naval Academy graduate and Assistant Secretary of the Navy. It was in the latter capacity, while using his skills as an archivist, that he orchestrated the genesis of the most complete war record of the Civil War navies. This achievement is the \textit{Official Record of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion} and has been the key source in practically every Civil War Naval history that followed. This official record holds the most extensive coverage of the Mississippi Squadron and has the correspondence of its commanders, its battle reports, and its ship registries. This is the central primary source that underlies every aspect of this thesis.\textsuperscript{13}

During the early days compiling the navy records, Soley was approached by Warren D. Crandall. Crandall had been an important subordinate officer for the U.S. Army Ram Fleet and the Mississippi Marine Brigade. Crandall was concerned at how his strange outfit would fit into the history of the American Civil War as they were a hybrid army-navy unit and had done much during the war. Soley decided to place the unit’s


reports in the navy record in the volumes concerning the operations on the western rivers. Crandall was pleased, but also decided that he should publish his own narrative. Crandall and his partner, Isaac Newell, compiled a complete wartime record and narrative of the Ellet brothers and the men under their command. This volume is partly a memoir, a memorial, a narrative history, and a collection of primary documents featuring such details as the outfitting of the unit’s steamboats. Crandall’s volume details the operations his brigade was a part of and a number of those missions are used as case studies in this thesis.\footnote{Warren D. Crandall and Isaac D. Newell, \textit{History of the Ram Fleet and the Mississippi Marine Brigade on the Mississippi and its Tributaries} (St. Louis: Buschart Brothers Press, 1907).}

The second chapter of this thesis looks at the anatomy of the Union gunboat flotilla, its place as the support pillar of the Union efforts in the West, and establishes the analytical framework for the rest of the study. The objectives of this chapter are to explore the squadron’s formation, the administrative and logistical difficulties of operating the Mississippi Squadron and the people who made it possible. This chapter also looks at the auxiliary role of the flotilla in the conduct of Union operations and the central place it held as an escort service. Union army transports on the inland waters needed protection while in transit and the same held true for Union supply boats that were equally threatened by Confederate guerillas. The Union gunboat escort service made rapid river travel for troop transports and supply ships a reality and gave the western armies unmatched strategic mobility.

The third chapter of this thesis looks at case studies of large scale joint operations between the Union gunboat flotilla and the western armies designed to accomplish
strategic objectives. The success or failure of these operations depended in large part on the commanding army and navy officers’ willingness to cooperate and support each other’s ideas. The choice to communicate and not compete with one another was a key element in conducting successful joint-service operations. There are a number of combined operations of this scale that occurred in the West and this chapter makes use of examples that illustrate the importance of partnership in victory or defeat, and case studies that provide a variety of outcomes. Andrew Foote and Ulysses S. Grant demonstrated how the course of the war could be altered through a successful Army-Navy partnership by undermining the Confederacy’s western line of defensive. This relationship has been thoroughly developed in the historiography and will not be covered in depth. However, the partnership between Foote and John Pope in the capture of Island No. 10 has received little scholarly attention. Charles Henry Davis and Charles Ellet were a pair of uncooperative intellectuals whose mutual discord created a stunning victory that ended in the capture of a Confederate stronghold and the dismantling of the South’s River Defense Fleet. David Porter is used twice as he is the most celebrated Mississippi Squadron commander and it was important to showcase one of his many victories and one of his few failures. Porter’s Vicksburg related exploits have been covered extensively and thus were not considered for examination. Porter’s first victory that occurred outside of Farragut’s shadow was the capture of Fort Hindman, and it was also a positive upturn in his relationship with Sherman after they failed at Chickasaw Bayou. The Red River expedition was the singular grand failure of Porter’s career, the only permanent campaign failure of the Mississippi Squadron, and a standout disaster of the Union war effort in 1864. This chapter examines the partnerships of Foote and Pope at Island No. 10, Porter,
Sherman, and McClernand at Fort Hindman, and Porter and Banks on the Red River. Each of these partnerships was built on a degree of conflict and rivalry that served to complement or undermine these operations.

The fourth chapter analyzes joint operations of a smaller scale. These joint missions or raids were generally conducted by officers of lesser rank and were usually a flanking maneuver of a larger effort. These small-scale cooperatives early on were about proving the soundness of a joint operational doctrine, as well as probing the weak points of the enemy. The characteristics of these missions were to have army troops support a few boats to probe or take an enemy position. These small maneuvers compounded damage to the enemy or secured the rearguard of the Union position. This chapter argues the importance of micro-cooperatives during wider campaigns, how they served to cover or reinforce the Union advance and how they allowed for the spirit of combined operations to be reinforced by officers in the lower echelons. Grant and the timberclad captains provided the blueprint for combined operations during the early days of the western theater at Belmont and Shiloh. The White River expedition highlights how the Union succeeded in the face of adversity, exercised influence over an unoccupied rebel state, and the varied strategic consequences of a minor expedition. The raid on Yazoo City was a milestone in the development of brown water tactics, and showcased the skill of the Mississippi Marine Brigade. Nashville was the last major operation that the Mississippi Squadron took part in during the war. This chapter examines the partnerships of Grant and the timberclad captains at Belmont and Shiloh, Kilty and Graham Fitch in the White River Expedition, Phelps and Ellet in the Yazoo Raid, and Leroy Fitch and George Thomas at Nashville.
This study examines and emphasizes the anatomy of the Union Gunboat Flotilla, its place as the support system for the Western armies, and its service to the collective joint operations that characterized the war in the West. This thesis analyzes the professional partnerships of Union army and navy officers using case studies of joint operations and argues that these inter-service partnerships laid the cornerstone for Union victory over the Confederacy.
CHAPTER II - SUPPORT PILLAR OF THE WESTERN THEATER

The Union riverine forces constituted an essential support system for the Federal military in the western theater. The Union strategy of dividing the Confederacy through river control turned most of this theater into a stage for a continuous Army and Navy campaign to control the Mississippi River network that lasted the entire war. The creation, administration, and expansion of the gunboat flotilla was integral to the Union’s affirmation of dominance over the Mississippi River and its tributaries. To understand the significance of combined operations, a full analysis of the strategic mission of the flotilla should be understood and seen in the context of the evolving role of the force. In addition, the very concept of combined operations needs to be explained and detailed in the context of contemporary military thought. The combination of this criteria and the examination of the evolution of the flotilla through the tenures of four different commanders provides the framework for the rest of this thesis. The complexities of these professional relationships underscore the challenges of joint operations and provide insight for modern academics and military leaders examining the significance of the Western Theater to overall Union victory.

After the fall of Fort Sumter, the United States began raising troops to suppress the rebellion. The General-in-Chief of the United States Army, Winfield Scott, did not believe the war could be won quickly and proposed a strategy of strangulation. The rebellious states, he argued, would have their coasts blockaded, the Mississippi River would be taken to divide the South in two, and large Union armies would crush the Confederacy once the attrition strategy achieved results. This prescription for suppressing the southern revolution was derided in the media as the anaconda plan. The northern
public wanted the war won in a single large engagement. Scott’s views impressed Secretary of State William Seward, however, and he pushed the design on Secretary of War Simon Cameron. The Mississippi River network would prove vital to waging war in the west.

One of the more specific points of Scott’s designs called for the creation of a gunboat flotilla to take control of the Mississippi River. The Navy department set up an advisory commission called the Blockade Board tasked with devising a plan for conducting the naval side of the war effectively and efficiently. This board produced several extensive surveys that advised how the navy should be used to implement the blockade and pursue a policy of cooperation with the Army. In effect, these men developed the blueprint for Union success in the war’s early years and allowed for an adaptive policy. Members of the Blockade Board concurred with Scott’s vision and agreed that river gunboats were needed. Cameron asked for the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, to send a naval advisor to assist the Army in this endeavor. Welles was occupied chiefly with expanding the Navy into a blockade force but answered the Army’s call by sending John Rodgers. This, in effect, would have the unintentional side effect of giving the War Department a force of river gunboats commanded by naval officers. The mission of this force was to localize control of the Mississippi River network, split the Confederacy in half, and mutually assist the Army in their efforts.15

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The strategic thinking pursued by Scott and the members of the Blockade Board centered on a difficult type of military endeavor referred to at the time as combined operations. This was essentially a military mission in which naval and army resources were used in concert to achieve a common end. Military manuals regarded combined operations as among the hardest type of warfare to successfully accomplish. The only military in the world that excelled at such campaigns were the British. The American military had no formal doctrine in place and no directives on how to go about such an affair. There was also the fact that the military was divided between two forces that held dominion in their own realm. The Navy held jurisdiction over the oceans, but the Army, in addition to its obvious authority over land, also had control of all inland waters. In theory, a combined operation conducted in one jurisdiction over the other would give primacy to the controlling service, but in fact matters were not very clear. The lead service officers of any given operation are in conflict, as one does not hold authority over the other so success depends on their joint direction. This requires recognizing each other as equals in a common endeavor, effective communication of ideas, and ideally sharing credit in a joint victory.16

The Union benefitted heavily from the staunch loyalty of several midwestern river ports, especially St. Louis, Missouri. They gave the Federals a foundation on which a proper naval infrastructure could be erected. Within these loyal urban bases existed men

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such as the unionist inventor James Eads who was the salvage king of the Mississippi and the foremost expert on the river in the country. He learned about Scott’s need for river gunboats and forwarded his offer to construct this force. The government accepted his offer over many others as he promised to do the job quickly. Samuel Pook completed alterations of the submitted ironclad gunboat plans and Eads proceeded to use his local connections to speed up the process. Rodgers and George McClellan agreed that the army needed gunboats immediately, so they decided to convert some riverboats. Rodgers, with McClellan’s endorsement, purchased several vessels and lined them up for conversion at ports on the upper Mississippi. These timberclads were among the most valuable tools available to the western department and they gave the Union an early lead in war boats over the Confederacy. Eads offered to convert his largest salvage boat into a formidable ironclad and Rodgers turned him down. McClellan was recalled to Washington and his place was taken by John Fremont. Fremont accepted the deal and Eads provided the Union with one of its most powerful riverine assets at a rather patriotic discount. Fremont had the boat renamed to Benton after his anti-slavery father-in-law Philip Hart Benton. William Porter secured the purchase of a steamer, oversaw its conversion to a timberclad gunboat, and later modified it into a lightly armored ironclad. Rodgers had maintained a solid partnership with McClellan, but Fremont frustrated him to no end.\(^{17}\)

This inability to work together and the need for Rodgers on the ocean led Welles to relieve him. This early development period covering Rodgers’ short tenure featured a remarkable degree of cooperation from those involved. The concurrence of the high command, the actions of Eads, and the early work of Rodgers gave the Union a notable lead in the contest for the Mississippi. Welles decided to send one of his most trustworthy commanders to take up the burden of completing the work Rodgers began.\(^{18}\)

The Navy, at the start of the war, had to deal with a crisis of loyalty. They lost twenty-five percent of their officers to the South and this included much of the recently graduated naval academy cadets. This also created a deep suspicion against the remaining southerners and led to Welles choosing northerners as his initial squadron commanders. The war essentially caused the temporary relocation of the naval academy to Newport, Maryland for the duration of the conflict. Captain Andrew Foote began 1861 with the hope of becoming the next superintendent of the naval academy due to his desire to pass on his many years of naval experience to the navy’s next generation. The war curtailed these plans and instead he spent part of 1861 advising naval operations and the latter half preparing to head west to direct riverine operations.\(^{19}\)

Captain Foote had served in the Navy for decades having been a part of the naval generation that came after the Barbary Wars and the War of 1812. He spent most of his

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naval career serving the interests of his country abroad in South America, Asia, and Africa. Foote’s true passion in his naval service was as a senior captain of the U.S. Africa squadron. In this capacity, he waged war against illegal slave trading. He wrote a book that railed against the slave trade, and how the country could profit from better relations with Africa. Foote’s puritanical beliefs led him to lead a reform movement in the Navy that banned alcohol as a ration. Foote was an ardent abolitionist and saw the war as a righteous crusade against slavery. His part in the anaconda plan was to seize the Mississippi River and bisect the slave-based cotton kingdom.\footnote{20 Paul Calore, \textit{Naval Campaigns}, 30-36; James M. McPherson, \textit{War on the Waters}, 2-6, 34-8; Spencer C. Tucker, \textit{Andrew Foote}, 102-108.}

Welles and Foote had been childhood friends and schoolmates, and they corresponded and collaborated frequently in the 1850s. Welles considered Foote to be a valued officer of the Navy and one with the right combination of abilities necessary to take charge of the force being assembled on the Western Waters. Welles needed a man who could effectively administrate, command, negotiate, and be a full partner to the army. Foote’s most important attribute was his experience working with other forces and his negotiation skills. He had served United States diplomatic efforts abroad and worked with the British in China and Africa. The experience in China gave him a preview of what he would do in the Civil War, which was attack forts from the water. The western command had to operate in concert with the army since all western naval assets belonged to them as opposed to the navy owning all their assets on the coast and in the eastern theater. Welles informed Foote, “place yourself in communication with Major-General
John C. Fremont, you will cooperate fully and freely with him as to your movements.”

As a result, Foote had to be able to coordinate efforts with others effectively to form an army-navy partnership. He was concerned that the Western Flotilla was to be subordinate to the army, but this aspect served to settle the question of local authority, which alleviated tensions. Welles sent Foote to the Western Theater where he would play a vital role in the wars early months and set the stage for a collaborative relationship with the army that would successfully split the Confederacy.

Upon assuming his duties in the west, Foote met with James Eads to discuss the progression of the construction of the new flotilla. The heart of this force was seven river gunboats undergoing construction in major cities along the upper Mississippi. Eads was given permission by the government to dub these vessels City-Class River Gunboats, which because of their appearance were referred to as Pook turtles by sailors. He and Foote named them after the cities that helped build them to recognize the communities’ contributions to the war effort. Eads was a patriotic capitalist and his service to the country was invaluable. His initial efforts largely allowed the Union to take the lead in the Mississippi River arms race and subsequent developments ensured it never lost that lead. After the war, Eads recalled Foote as very approachable and a friendly co-partner in their collective endeavors. Eads also gave special praise to his fellow industrial

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collaborators and their workers in the communities that served by building the riverboat ironclads.\textsuperscript{23}

In addition to the gunboats, the Navy had Foote secure the procurement and modification of various river craft as scouts, escort vessels, tugboats, supply ships, and auxiliaries of various kind. In the public eye, Foote seemed to enjoy his new position while privately he expressed his anxiety to his wife, Caroline, even stating that he regretted not having an oceanic command. Foote had inherited a barely existing command and he held reasonable reservations. Most of his boats were still under construction or conversion. The most pressing concern for Foote was the lack of manpower needed to crew and operate all the river crafts being commissioned. Foote wrote a letter to the Navy Department specifically requesting the aid of Henry Walke and his strong desire to make him captain of one of the new timberclad gunboats. Walke served as a midshipman aboard the same vessel with Foote years earlier. Foote had at his disposal initially four officers commanding timberclads and they were Walke on the \textit{Lexington}, William Gwin on the \textit{Tyler}, Seth Ledyard Phelps on the \textit{Conestoga}, and William D. Porter on the \textit{Essex}. Foote gave his timberclad captains a high degree of independence, which served the flotilla well.\textsuperscript{24}

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Foote had trouble securing actual sailors because they were mostly deployed to the blue water navy. The River Jacks, as river sailors were called, were gathered from northern and Midwestern cities and consisted of a combination of experienced river men, and total novices drawn from the lowest echelons of both branches of service. There were extenuating circumstances that led a dignified oceanic officer like Foote to serve as a subordinate to an army district and beg his Army counterparts for foot soldiers to crew gunboats. The reason for this was that the Navy could not afford to build new oceanic ships and the river forces. This led to the War Department footing the bill for the Western Flotilla and making it a part of the War Department with the caveat that naval officers would be subordinate to army authority. The manpower problem was one that dogged the force the whole war in many respects as it had to compete with the steamboat lines and the army’s private navy of river transports. One of the more forgotten facts of the war is that the army had authority over a vast array of waterborne craft and completely eclipsed the navy in size. The inland waters posed a peculiar problem in that the war department initially held authority over both the gunboats and the transports. River steamboats required skilled personnel to operate them in the form of pilots and engineers. These specialized crewmen had to be drawn from the pre-war steamboat market. The rivermen were in high demand by the commercial enterprises and the competing militaries. The war was not simply a North and South conflict for the federal states of the west proved their value in retaining control of the upper most portions of the Mississippi, giving important river bases for the gunboat flotilla, and sending some solidly experienced rivermen to the Union river force. These steamboat men came at a price as they generally wanted a recognition in rank and to be paid at the going rate for the craft. This forced the
flotilla commanders to create made up ranks and pay these men far more than they would receive if they were doing the same job for the oceanic squadrons. Despite incentives the flotilla outlined, many skilled rivermen stayed with the commercial sphere or served on army contracted steamboats. The competition between these entities served to deprive the gunboats of needed crew, caused the force to never be fully efficient, and in some cases a lack of key personnel led to failures. The Confederate Army and Navy also drew on the limited supply of skilled river jacks, but the early defeats of their main river force led most to leave the cause. Some went to the Union, while others tried to profit from the reopened river trade. 25

In addition to the manpower difficulties, were additional problems of furnishing the gunboats with supplies and armament. Montgomery Meigs took the place of Quartermaster General of the Army after his predecessor, Joseph Johnston, resigned to join the Confederacy. Meigs was the head of the Union logistics and instrumental in providing materials to the Western Flotilla. He made sure the gunboat flotilla was properly provisioned with foodstuffs, coal, armament, and ordinance. The force was initially supplied with surplus guns and projectiles left over from the Mexican War. These served their function somewhat effectively, but the force was upgraded over the

course of the war. One of Meigs’ key subordinates was Lewis Parsons. Parsons was a former railroad engineer and he was attached to the western department’s headquarters so that he could oversee the efficient movement of supplies. He was in charge of river and railroad transport for the West and eventually gained authority over the entire country’s military transport network. Parson’s purchase and contract system allowed the army to procure the use of vast numbers of steamboats throughout the war. The system grew more efficient over time as the Battle of Shiloh demonstrated the inefficient deployment of one-hundred-seventy-four transports, while later campaigns necessitated the roundtrips of over sixty riverboats for the effective supplying of three field armies.\(^{26}\)

A significant example of successful leadership where counterparts understood each other’s value was Foote and Grant. Foote was in the undesirable position of having his command subordinate to the whims of his army counterparts. Grant did not abuse this authority and made arrangements with Foote that allowed the naval contingents to fully support army operations. There was also the additional problem of the unequal ranking that existed between Foote and the army generals. The United States Navy used only the rank of captain, which referred only to a single vessel. In instances where the command of a larger force was required, a senior captain was temporarily put in charge of the whole command. Later these men were given the new higher rank of flag-officer. Foote

received this rank to make it clear that he had command over the naval forces assembled on the upper Mississippi River. He was no longer just another naval captain, but instead was endowed with the navy’s highest rank.27

Foote forged a powerful bond with General Ulysses Grant and was able to serve professionally with all his other Army colleagues. An example of this came early in the war in the west when the army relied heavily upon the services of three timberclad gunboats and their captains. Foote outlined the flotilla’s mission “we are here for the purpose of cooperating with, and under the directions of, the commanding general of the Western Army, and I have no doubt but that shall prove an auxiliary power, enabling the army to succeed in an enterprise which might fail without naval cooperation.”28 Grant made use of his personality to leverage favors with these naval officers to make sure they would give him their backing in military operations. The three timberclads served in various capacities and among these duties were reconnaissance, mapping out enemy positions, launching independent raids into enemy territory, escorting Union transports, and providing cover fire for Union assaults. Grant corresponded with Phelps and Walke to plan an attack on the Confederate position at Belmont. This involved one the few missteps Grant had with Commodore Foote as he failed to inform him that they were using the gunboats to escort the transport fleet in the attack on Belmont. While Foote was initially upset at not being informed, he was happy to hear about the successful performance of the gunboats in the operation and the army navy partnership that was


The early months in the West allowed Grant and Foote to develop a respectable partnership. The mutual cooperation of the Army with the Western Flotilla evolved into a war altering instrument that was used to favorable effect from the capture of Paducah, Kentucky to the opening stages of the Fort Pillow campaign.29

Following the productive period of joint success under Foote, Charles Henry Davis followed up with additional combined operational effectiveness. Davis and Foote had been midshipman together on the frigate United States during the early days of the United States Navy. While stationed in New York, Davis received Foote’s call to assist him as second in command of the Western Flotilla. Davis was an experienced blue water oceanographer and a dedicated officer of the Navy. He led a double life as an accomplished scientific scholar and as a dutiful career sailor. The Civil War served to interrupt and then foster his attempts to advance the cause of American science. At the beginning of the war he was stationed in Washington D. C. and was serving a key role in the Bureau of Detail. His past experience in the Coastal Survey Service working under Alexander Bache and his close relationship with Samuel Du Pont landed him a position on the Blockade Board. This advisory commission provided the blockading squadrons with intelligence regarding the coastal terrain, provided an outline of how to implement the blockade, agreed with Scott on the need for a brown water force, and tried to emphasize the importance of joint operations with the Army. Davis also served on the Ironclad Board, which was a commission that presided over selection of armored vessels.

warships from the private market. He initially disapproved of John Ericsson’s radical ironclad design but was swayed by Ericsson’s arguments and his promise of swift construction. The radical design became the Monitor, while Davis’ preferred submission became the most powerful warship in the Navy.\textsuperscript{30}

Davis served as chief of staff under Du Pont during the Port Royal campaign. He devised the plan that led to Union victory in that endeavor even though all the parts of it did not go according to his design. Davis was recalled to the Navy department to serve as a troubleshooter for various technical problems. The wound that Foote suffered at Fort Donelson had gradually gotten worse, but Foote was convinced he could remain in command. Davis had served as an able second for Du Pont and so Foote wanted Davis to do the same for him. When Davis arrived at the Western Flotilla the flag officer’s condition had worsened considerably and he was required to give the command over to Davis. However, Foote’s removal was meant to be temporary and so his personal ensign continued to fly over the flag steamer despite the change in command. This meant that in some records and papers Foote would get the credit for the actions of Davis.\textsuperscript{31}

Foote and the flotilla had been left behind to fruitlessly bombard Fort Pillow for weeks in the wake of John Pope’s departure with most of his command. The brown water navy had been essentially abandoned as General Halleck massed his forces for the Siege of Corinth. A small number of regiments were left under the command of General


\textsuperscript{31} James Mason Hoppin, \textit{Life of Andrew Hull Foote}, 376-384; Spencer C. Tucker, \textit{Andrew Foote}, 244-252; Gary D. Joiner, \textit{Mr. Lincoln’s Brown Water Navy}, 44-82.
Gwinby and nominal subordinate Colonel Graham Fitch. Foote was also concerned with the Confederate cottonclads sheltered at the fort and rumors of enemy ironclads.  

Davis inherited a dismal situation in which the Army-Navy relationship was at a low point and when the Confederate river force still constituted a threat. Davis saw the flotilla through this crisis period. Davis was an immensely practical officer with a keen understanding of the larger picture of the war. Considering this, he personally tried to pursue objects of strategic importance or tried to improve his command as a functioning part of a strategic system. Davis orchestrated events as he preferred to design plans and allow his able subordinates to carry them out.

The detachment of forces to retain nominal river control left Davis with a minimal force that joined with Farragut at Vicksburg. The early naval operations before Vicksburg were a low point in the Union cause and largely pointless in Davis’ view. The Navy had been left with minute Army support to force the capitulation of a veritable fortress. It was also the time of year when disease was maximized. Over the course of the operations a larger percentage of sailors in both commands fell ill or died of illness. It was in this deplorable state that the Union squadrons that toppled New Orleans and Memphis were so easily embarrassed by the efforts of a lone ironclad. Davis succumbed to illness himself before he returned to Cairo. He was deeply bitter at the inane operation and by

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October of 1862 he was ready to return to Washington. Welles considered Davis to be ill, overworked, lacking in vigor as a fighter, and decided he was unsuited to retain squadron command. Davis did have strengths as an intellectual, immense social affability, impressive skill at navigating bureaucracy, and so Davis returned to Washington to become an indispensable piece of Welles’ administration.  

Davis’ tenure accomplished several notable objectives. The foremost of these accomplishments were that the Confederate riverine forces ceased being a serious threat. The flotilla oversaw the destruction of the last significant Confederate naval resistance during the Battle of Memphis and the collective damage that the Arkansas received. The subsequent raid up the Yazoo River he devised led to disabling initial Confederate attempts to reconstitute a river force. Davis captured and modified Memphis to serve as an effective forward base for the flotilla so that they would not always have to fall back to Cairo. He forged a tenuous partnership with the Ellet brothers and the freelancers of U.S. Army Ram Fleet. He partly had a hand in designing their new role as flexible brown water marines. He created the concept of the light-draught gunboat in the aftermath of the White River expedition and oversaw the creation of the mosquito squadron. This force was personally crafted by him to serve as a counter-guerrilla unit designed to secure the

Union lines of communication and supply. Finally, he oversaw the transfer of the command from the War department to the Navy department.35

Another of the Army’s key naval partners in the west was David Dixon Porter. He commanded the Mississippi Squadron for the longest period and was instrumental to the combined operations of the Vicksburg campaign. Porter was a scion of one of the United States’ great naval families. His father, David, was the captain of the USS Essex during the War of 1812 and considered a scourge of the Royal Navy. He also took with him on that journey his adopted son, the boy entrusted to him by the Revolutionary naval hero George Farragut. He also helped bring a swift end to the threat of Caribbean piracy to United States commerce. His harshness was not considered a virtue by his government, so he took up station as the navy chief of a fellow American republic and became head of the Mexican Navy. The young David developed his naval skills under the watch of his father and his cousin in the service of another country. It was an odd beginning for a man who, along with his elder adopted brother, would become the poster boys for the American Navy during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Porter eventually joined the United States Navy and developed fruitful connections with southern naval advocates. In the Mexican-American War, Porter fought against the country that had fostered him and gained a reputation for daring exploits. Porter led his command up the inland rivers to raid towns which gave him a formidable reputation in the years after the war. He

supported Secretary of War Jefferson Davis in the importation of camels for western expansion.36

On the eve of the Civil War, the Navy was deeply concerned that Porter would side with the South because of his connections with Davis. Despite these concerns, Seward trusted Porter enough to utilize him as an agent in Seward’s scheme to save Fort Pickens in Florida and undermine the Navy plan to resupply Fort Sumter. In this early war tango, Porter proved himself a mischievous and cunning individual. His involvement in the early war controversy, his familial relations to David Farragut, and his riverine operations in the Mexican War made him an able candidate to support Farragut in the campaign to arrest control of the lower Mississippi. Porter and Lincoln collaborated closely in the outfitting of mortar scows. Porter and his mortars were used to bombard places like New Orleans and Vicksburg into submission. Throughout the campaign on the lower Mississippi, Porter wrote letters designed to undermine Farragut, promote himself, and hopefully take over squadron command. He also wrote similar letters concerning Davis and angled to get the man removed. These tactics annoyed Welles immensely, but he recognized Porter’s talents.37

Porter rose from commander to an acting Rear Admiral of the Western Flotilla, which was retitled under the Navy department as the Mississippi Squadron. As a

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squadron commander, he was given the power to pursue naval objectives in any way he saw fit and was not subordinate to the Army. Porter found that his objectives were best achieved through effective coordination with the Army. Porter and John Alexander McClellan were dispatched at the same time to support Grant’s maneuvers against Vicksburg. Porter was initially delighted at not having to work with a West Pointer, but that was before he met William Tecumseh Sherman. Sherman and Porter bonded professionally. They also bonded over a mutual dislike of McClellan. Their bond saw them through the ups and downs of the Vicksburg campaign. Sherman’s support lent Porter a lot of weight in Grant’s estimation. Grant also recognized that he could not force Vicksburg’s capitulation without firm naval support. The majority of Porter’s tenure revolved around capturing Vicksburg and achieving the Union goal of opening the Mississippi. The other goals involved supporting Farragut’s aims to do the same at Port Hudson and to combat southern attempts to interdict federal river traffic.\(^3\)

The force that Porter had inherited from the efforts of Rodgers, Foote, and Davis had been forged and finely tuned. The formation left to him by Davis was a growing force of powerful ironclads, versatile tinclads, nimble timberclads, and a miscellaneous number of support craft. This floating city was placed into the hands of a driven, action oriented, and glory seeking individual. Porter was like Grant: persistent, highly intelligent, and willing to take calculated risks that were key for success. They both approached the Vicksburg campaign with trepidation and a need to circumvent the advantages of the enemy. Porter was highly experimental and came up with a variety of

\(^3\) Harpur Allen Gosnell, *Guns on the Western Waters*, 144-152; Fletcher Pratt, *Civil War on Western Waters*, 168-173.
schemes to preserve Union strength and weaken the enemy. Even under Porter, the squadron was still suffering from a lack of skilled crewman and this served to deter overall effectiveness. Porter benefitted heavily from the influx of new black crewman and the utilization of contrabands as additional naval labor.39

After the fall of Vicksburg, Porter acted to improve on Davis’s system of river control and converted it to a divisional system. The squadron was divided up into local forces stationed at bases along the river and each force was tasked to maintain control of their section. This process was effective, though it diffused squadron strength along the inland waters and left it without a concentrated mobile force. The build-up for the Red River campaign concentrated a great many squadron assets and weakened Union naval presence in several sectors. Davis and his tinclads had gradually become the most numerous assets available to the squadron and their cheap conversion rate gave the Union the tool to maintain localized river control for the most part. The Red River concentration and the rigors of the campaign led to the loss or damage of numerous vessels, high casualties to a manpower base that could ill afford it and threatened the Union’s monopoly on Mississippi River traffic. The last vestiges of the inland river Confederate forces were hiding inside the Louisiana river network and this force would only be rooted out during the war’s last months.40

39 Spencer C. Tucker, Blue and Grey Navies, 312-315; William M. Fowler, Under Two Flags, 300-304; Harpur Allen Gosnell, Guns on the Western Waters, 296-299; Fletcher Pratt, Civil War on Western Waters, 277-280; Gary D. Joiner, Mr. Lincoln’s Brown Water Navy, 186-188; Barbara Brooks Tomblin, Bluejackets and Contrabands: African Americans and the Union Navy (University of Kentucky Press, 2009), 284-90, 318; Steven Woodworth, ed., Grant’s Lieutenants, 175-181.

Porter’s humiliation would not have led to a promotion under normal circumstances, but the war was rife with peculiar realities. The blockade runner haven of Wilmington, North Carolina had to be shut down and Welles did not trust the North Atlantic Blockade Squadron’s longtime commander, Samuel Phillips Lee, to do the job. Welles wanted Farragut to win another campaign for him, but Farragut wanted a vacation. This led Welles to call on Porter to command the attack on Fort Fisher. To avoid insulting Lee, Welles gave him command of Porter’s Mississippi Squadron. In effect, he swapped their positions and left both men to inherit the other’s troops.

Samuel Phillips Lee oversaw the final success of combined operations in the West in his role as the last leader of the Mississippi Squadron. Lee was among the generation of Navy officers whose careers were elevated by the war. He was a representative of loyal southern army and navy officers that stayed with the Union in the face of the secession of their home states. Lee was a member of the influential Lee family and was a third cousin of Robert E. Lee. He was initially distrusted by the Welles administration until he proved his worth while serving under Farragut. Lee made a name for himself at New Orleans, led the charge up the Mississippi River, and asked for Vicksburg’s surrender. His exploits in the West gave him a great deal of credit and he was eventually assigned to a squadron command in the North Atlantic. He was a highly successful blockader and created the most efficient system for stopping blockade runners. His plans for taking Wilmington were regularly ignored by Welles and Grant did not particularly like Lee’s handling of support on the James River operations. Welles also did not appreciate Lee’s need for promotion to Rear Admiral and using his family to promote his cause in Washington. Lee was the husband of Elizabeth Blair, the son-in-law of Preston
Blair, and the brother-in-law of Montgomery Blair. The Blairs were among the most influential political families in war time Washington, but their support for Lee’s promotion greatly annoyed Welles.\(^4\)

In the interim between Porter’s departure and Lee’s arrival the superintendent of Cairo Naval Yard, Alexander Pennock, took charge of the squadron and helped it recover from the Red River disaster. Lee was given the task of reaffirming river control, keeping open the supply lines, and supporting the army in times of need. Lee was determined to maintain river control and see to it that the last vestiges of Confederate naval resistance were summarily captured or destroyed. All the hard won gains the Union had achieved on the river were affirmed again and again during Lee’s tenure. Lee led the river squadron in the same manner he had led his blockade squadron. He was an orchestrator and a director of the actions of his subordinates. Lee believed in perfecting and regulating systems to achieve a higher level of efficiency. Under Lee’s steady hand, the squadron performed its combined operational mission efficiently and with a large measure of success. The divisional system left little room for an ironclad concentration that could be used as an effective bombardment group and this hindered the force in knocking out enemy mobile batteries. Ironclad numbers were further diluted by the transfer of assets to the West Gulf Squadron for operations against Mobile, Alabama. The squadron oversaw the renewal of normal river traffic and led the way in adjusting the region to the post-war period.

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decommission process was overseen by Lee and the vaunted vessels that had done the Union so much good were sold off at auction one by one.\textsuperscript{42}

The partnership between the western armies and the Mississippi Squadron constituted a continuous effort to control the Mississippi River network that lasted the entire war. The squadron had its origin in the strategy of the Union high command. Its creation was a joint effort of the War Department, the Navy Department, James Eads and other contractors, and the industrial communities of the Midwestern river ports. Its mission profile was explicit in conducting missions that assisted and eased army operations. The gunboat escort service made rapid river travel for troop transports and supply ships a reality and gave unmatched strategic mobility to commanders willing to utilize it.

Nevertheless, the Union lacked a formal doctrine of combined operations. The effectiveness of such a task depended heavily on the partnership of the officers involved and the direction of the Union war effort. The trajectory of the partnership did not progressively evolve. Instead, it went through periods of high and low effectiveness. Foote and Porter’s tenures demonstrate high points. Lee’s tenure falls into the later period of the war when the squadron had little opportunity to support major army operations but still served as an example of highly effective collaboration in the important role of maintaining open supply lines, control of the Mississippi, and river

commerce. Davis’ tenure demonstrates the lowest point of army navy partnership
effectiveness, but still showed some brilliant successful cooperation. Throughout the war,
the Union combined operations served as a pillar of support in the Western Theater. The
complexities of these professional relationships underscore the challenges of combined
operations and provide insight into the significance of the Western Theater of operations
on the Union’s ultimate victory in the American Civil War.
CHAPTER III - LARGE SCALE JOINT OPERATIONS

At the Vicksburg National Military Park stands a two hundred and two-foot obelisk monument, the tallest in the park. At the base of the monument stand statues of Admirals Andrew Foote, Charles Henry Davis, David Farragut and David Dixon Porter. Each Admiral faces in the direction of their most important victories in the Western Theater: Forts Henry and Donelson, Memphis, New Orleans, and Vicksburg. This monument gives full credit to the significant role that Union naval operations on the Western Waters played in supporting army operations to help win the American Civil War.44

The American Civil War’s western theater featured many large scale and pivotal combined operations. Well known joint campaigns such as Forts Henry/Donelson and Vicksburg shaped the course of the war. These campaigns prominently featured General Ulysses Grant and partnerships with naval officers such as Andrew Foote and David Dixon Porter, and they hold a monopoly on the literature of combined operations in the West. This has served to obscure other joint operations and the partnerships that helped to determine their outcome. The various partnerships presented here offer a range of operational relationships to explore the navy and army partnerships of Andrew Foote and John Pope at Island No. 10, David Dixon Porter and John Alexander McClemand at

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Arkansas Post, and Porter and Nathaniel Banks during the Red River Campaign. At Island No. 10 Foote and Pope were charged with completing the capitulation of a Confederate island fortress. It features a clash of command styles as Foote tried for cautious siege, while the more energetic Pope wanted to achieve victory more rapidly through aggressive action. In both latter campaigns, Porter was paired with political generals he despised. In the first of these campaigns, Arkansas Post, the two commanders put aside their differences to energetically pursue the most efficient course to victory in a campaign with limited objectives. The latter partnership, Red River, involved a much more monumental effort in a campaign that encompassed too many purposes and the difficult partnership between the two commanders nearly led to a disastrous war altering defeat. Despite the myriad of positive and negative professional relationships, the army-navy partnership gave the Union a synergetic engine which drove the Confederacy to defeat. The adverse conditions of complex large scale combined operations forced these partnerships to function or fail, and despite that, they are key to a greater understanding of what these professional partnerships accomplished during the war.

**Foote and Pope at Island No. 10, February-April 1862**

The lesser known Island No. 10 was the final combined operation undertaken by Commodore Foote. He had a new partner that formed a truer combined operational partnership than that of Forts Henry and Donelson. Island No. 10 required a combined operation due to its terrain. Neither the army nor the navy could accomplish the mission alone. The campaign featured a new partnership that was forced to work quickly through the stages of its development.
Island Number 10 was in the Missouri bend of the Mississippi River near New Madrid, Missouri and was the home of a strategically important Confederate bastion. General Leonidas Polk was fearful that the position was not strong enough, so he launched the first invasion of Kentucky. Polk ignited the war in the West to create a more secure border for the Confederacy and in the process, violated the neutrality of the border state of Kentucky. The South had successfully built a proper line of defense as a consequence of these actions, but Union counterstrokes unraveled these gains in 1862.

The forward enemy positions at Forts Henry and Donelson had fallen in February as had their fortress at Columbus in March. These failures forced the South to fall back to their original position and prepare to counterattack the advancing Union armies. General Henry Halleck’s cautious maneuvers failed to exploit the breakdown of the Confederacy’s outer defenses by pushing deeper into enemy territory. Halleck divided his armies and dispersed them widely to accomplish different objectives. He was obsessed with gaining control of the railroad hub at Corinth, Mississippi and thus released the previously suspended General Grant to lead the Army of the Tennessee into Mississippi while the Army of the Cumberland under Don Carlos Buell followed in his wake.45

General Albert Sidney Johnston moved his smaller army to destroy Grant’s before he could be reinforced by Buell. The Army of the Mississippi Valley marched from Corinth to engage the gathering Federals at Pittsburgh Landing, Tennessee. A series of fortifications barred the Union advance downriver, but these holding forces diminished Johnston’s strength and in combination with previous disasters left him bereft of needed

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45 James M. McPherson, War on the Waters, 50-56; Spencer C. Tucker, Andrew Foote, 122-128; James Mason Hoppin, Life of Andrew Hull Foote, 187-192.
manpower. Halleck deployed another army under General John Pope in Missouri and he moved against New Madrid. The Western Flotilla under Commodore Andrew Foote regrouped following its early victories and Foote remained in command despite his debilitating injury. Halleck had Foote deploy the squadron against the Confederate garrison at Island No. 10, and the simultaneous operations occurring there and at Pittsburgh Landing forced a division of Union naval assets. Halleck told Foote, “I think the main work should be done with the mortar boats and that the gunboats should not be unnecessarily exposed to a close fire, as they will immediately be required in other operations which will not admit of delay for repairs.”46 Most of the river gunboats fit for action were deployed against Island No. 10 and were reinforced by a unit of mortar rafts. Foote lacked these during the assault on Donelson and used these floating long-range artillery pieces to bombard the enemy at a safe distance. Halleck’s focus on moving against Corinth left Foote few army troops to support him in his objectives. Halleck requested that Pope use his forces in concert with Foote to complete the capitulation of the river stronghold. The Confederate forces were surrounded on all sides, but they could hold out for an extended siege. The Union did not want to leave a Confederate force in their rear. Foote’s previous experience at Donelson and the terrain for this operation left him feeling that more aggressive techniques would cause needless losses. He was concerned that if any of the boats became disabled, they would follow the river current into the hands of the enemy. Foote wanted to avoid this outcome by any means. Additionally, he commanded this operation through the strain of a severe injury sustained

The Confederate bastion at Donelson was garrisoned by five-thousand troops manning over seventy big guns. They were first in a series of defensive positions along the Mississippi River. The Lower Mississippi was in Confederate hands despite Union incursions into the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers. The Confederate fortress line ran the length of the river from Island No. 10 to New Orleans, Louisiana, with the Union orchestrating naval assaults on both ends of this line. Foote’s mortar rafts bombarded Island No. 10, while Porter’s mortar schooners fired upon the Confederate forts defending New Orleans. The mortar project proved its worth and preserved the lives of federal sailors but failed to force the enemy to surrender. The enemy base sat in the middle of the Mississippi River while the banks on both sides of the bend were unapproachable due to the swampy terrain. Pope worked his way toward the stronghold by turning his army into canal diggers. The army engineers dug out a new channel to outflank the enemy position to link up with Foote. Pope requested gunboats to help him support his attack, but that meant transferring them to him in front of enemy guns. Foote worried about losing ironclads to the enemy and was reluctant to transfer them to Pope. Pope quickly lost patience with Foote and began pressing Halleck to transfer authority of the flotilla to him. Halleck politely requested Foote to back Pope.47

Foote, during the Island No. 10 campaign, was suffering from his wound and news regarding the death of a son. The repulse the flotilla suffered at Fort Donelson had taught him the danger of being overly aggressive. In this operation, he adopted a fighting style that was the extreme opposite of the style he had practiced most of his life. Foote

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47 ORN, Se. 1, Vol. 22 700-705: James Mason Hoppin, Life of Andrew Hull Foote, 376-384; Spencer C. Tucker, Andrew Foote, 244-252; Gary D. Joiner, Mr. Lincoln’s Brown Water Navy, 44-82; Peter Cozzens, General John Pope: A Life for the Nation (University of Illinois Press, 2000), 53-65.
carefully employed his mortars to engage the enemy at a safe distance and employed an observation balloon to help coordinate the bombardment. These methods were successful in preserving the lives of his men but were ineffective in forcing the rebels to capitulate. This over cautiousness and unwillingness to take risks grated on his subordinate gunboat captains such as Henry Walke. Walke was concerned about the changes in his commanding officer and after the war pointedly criticized him regarding his performance at Island No. 10. Pope made the suggestion to run an ironclad past the batteries of the enemy stronghold. The ironclad would then be positioned to bombard the enemy from the opposite side and provide cover fire for his landing boats. Pope had his engineers dig out a canal for this type of maneuver, but such thinking was unprecedented during the conflict at the time. Walke thought highly of the possibility and coaxed Foote into letting him try this. He was finally persuaded by the combination of overtures to act provided by Pope, Halleck, and Walke. Halleck told Foote, “Give General Pope all the assistance in your power by the use of your gunboats. I think that by a combined operation the object can be accomplished.” However, Foote was still concerned about the enemy capturing an ironclad and gave explicit orders to Walke to scuttle his vessel if the attempt to run the batteries failed. Walke prepared for the run by adding additional improvised armor in the form of scrap metal, logs, and various other junk that sailors strapped on that added to the perception of their safety. The additional weight of this improvised defense slowed the vessel considerably, but provided a fair amount of protection from rebel sharpshooters. Walke made the run under the cover of night in the middle of a storm. The ironclad

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proceeded through the canal and linked up with Pope’s army on the opposite side of the river. Pope commended Walke on his valor and implored Foote that they could improve their chances if they had two ironclads as opposed to just one.49

Foote, having seen the success of Walke’s maneuver, concurred and gave orders to Commander Thompson of the *Louisville* to make similar preparations. Foote told Pope, “I will make the attempt to send you the additional boat requested in your letter.”50 Thompson made the run and the two ironclads ensured the capitulation of the Confederate bastion. The island had originally been left, but now it was completely encompassed. The rebel leaders had initially conceived their plan as a holding action in which their small force would prevent the advance of both the Union Navy and Pope’s army. They realized their predicament and surrendered with the expectation that they were trading their few thousand men for a big win elsewhere against Grant. The concept of running the batteries originated here and soon became commonplace. A few weeks later Farragut famously ran past the forts defending New Orleans in order to capture the city. However, when Walke did it there was no precedent to follow and the action was perceived as dangerous.51

The fall of Island No 10. was a boon to the careers of Pope and Foote. Pope elevated himself in the eyes of Halleck, while Foote added a final laurel to a long naval career with thanks from Congress and an eventual elevation to Rear Admiral. Pope was at

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the start of his short-lived experience of serving his country in the fight against the
Confederate rebellion, while Foote had unknowingly waged his last complete campaign
and garnered his final glory. Pope’s memoirs demonstrate that he thought Foote was slow
to action but thought that the overall operation had been a success for both branches of
service. His memoir of the operation largely ignores his attempts to steal the flotilla from
Foote. The campaign against Island No. 10 and the partnership that fought it are largely
forgotten in favor of Foote’s successful partnership with Grant in the war’s early days at
Fort Henry or in deeper analysis of Robert E. Lee’s stunning defeat of Pope at the Battle
of Second Manassas. Foote and Pope, however, were a workable partnership that
prospered in the face of adverse circumstances.  

Porter and McClernand at Arkansas Post, January 1863

Arkansas Post was an effective operation in which the professional partners put
aside their personal differences. It is a consummate example of a well-planned and
orchestrated operation in which army and navy assets were used in concert throughout
the mission. This operation showed effective mutual support and ends with neither party
the decisive leader in a successful joint operation.

In October 1862, the Western Flotilla was transferred to the Navy Department,
reitled the Mississippi Squadron, and David D. Porter became its Acting Rear Admiral.
Before he left Washington, President Lincoln introduced him to the man he had selected
to lead operations against Vicksburg, General John A. McClernand. Porter was initially

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52 James M. Merrill, *Battle Flags South*, 72-75; Spencer C. Tucker, *Andrew Foote*, 168-172;
delighted at working with someone not affiliated with West Point, but McClernand left a
bad impression. Henry Halleck, Ulysses Grant, and William Sherman were opposed to
McClernand leading the expedition against Vicksburg. They mutually decided to rapidly
mobilize against the stronghold and take it before McClernand arrived. The months
between Porter’s arrival and the start of operations against Vicksburg allowed Sherman to
develop a repertoire with the admiral. This bond was reinforced through the mutual
hardship in the expedition up the Yazoo River. The expedition and the larger Federal
movement against Vicksburg ended in failure as Grant’s supply depot at Holly Springs
was destroyed and Sherman was defeated at Chickasaw Bayou. Porter tried to employ his
squadron to support Sherman, but the terrain made this difficult.53

In early January, General McClernand arrived and Sherman deferred to his
authority. McClernand came down from Memphis and met with General William
Gorman at Helena, Arkansas. General Gorman notified McClernand of the threat of the
Confederate fort at Arkansas Post. This bastion was known as Fort Hindman and its
garrison posed a danger to Union lines of supply and communication. The rebels had
already successfully captured the Union steamer Blue Wing, along with its cargo of mail
and ammunition. One of Gorman’s subordinates, Colonel Alvin Hovey, had organized a

53 Christopher C. Meyers, Union General John A. McClernand and the Politics of Command
(Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2000), 119-121; Richard L. Kiper, Major General
John Alexander McClernand: Politician in Uniform (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1999), 156-
160; Edwin C. Bearss, “The Battle of the Post of Arkansas.” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly, vol. 18,
September 13, 2017); Richard L. Kiper, “John Alexander McClernand and the Arkansas Post Campaign.”
The Arkansas Historical Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 1 (Spring, 1997): 56-58,
http://www.jstor.org/lyrx.lib.usm.edu/stable/40031001 (accessed September 12, 2017); Rowena Reed,
Combined Operations, 229-235.
previous mission to reduce the enemy position, but this effort had been too meager to succeed.54

At a conference with Porter, McClernand and Sherman arrived at similar conclusions regarding the danger of Arkansas Post. Porter was annoyed that a man he trusted was being displaced by a person he disliked and was infuriated by McClernand’s rude treatment of Sherman. Porter was also in a poor mood due to the mortal wounding of Captain William Gwin in the previous engagement and at being unable to find a Catholic priest to perform last rites for him. Sherman played mediator between the two and the plan against Fort Hindman commenced. The generals agreed that a victory was needed to offset the previous defeat. McClernand and Porter set aside their differences and crafted a meticulous plan to ensure defeat of the enemy. McClernand combined his and Sherman’s corps into one force titled the Army of the Mississippi. McClernand had overall command, while the corps were led by George W. Morgan and Sherman. Porter amassed a compact force of ironclads, tinclads, timberclads, steam rams, and auxiliaries to support the army effort in combined operations. Over thirty-thousand troops were embarked on transports and the convoy moved upriver.55

McClernand ensured Porter’s cooperation by supplying coal for the ironclads and considering Porter’s advice. Porter supplied maps and the two agreed to surprise the


enemy by taking an indirect route to the enemy position. McClernand attempted his expedition in concert with a parallel move of General Samuel Curtis against Little Rock. This plan failed to materialize, and the federals were unsuccessful in taking the rebels by surprise. Confederate General Thomas Churchill informed his superiors, but General John Pemberton feared that it was a move against Vicksburg.56

McClernand calmly and meticulously oversaw the deployment of the two corps. The plan called for a three-sided encirclement of the enemy position so that no Confederate forces could escape. The careful and proper placement of the troops took time so McClernand had Porter’s gunboats bombarded the enemy before nightfall. The well prepared federal forces completed their arrangements before making camp. Porter requested McClernand position heavy guns to counter the rebel battery that the gunboats could not aim at. This was accomplished and the next day Union forces struck the rebels with cannon fire from land and water.57

Porter arranged his force of ironclads and tinclads to dismantle the enemy bastion. The squadron positioned itself before the fort and made sure no enemy could escape. A steam ram was on standby in case of a surprise naval assault and the tinclads made runs past the fort. During the naval bombardment, McClernand called for a general barrage from both corps. The deployed field pieces combined their bombardment with that of the


gunboats. Most of the Confederate batteries fell silent and the Union infantry began a general assault. The enemy was swept aside in the assault and most of the Confederates began waving white flags. After a three-hour engagement, the garrison of Fort Hindman surrendered to the combined army navy assault of McClernand and Porter. Almost five-thousand rebels became Union prisoners and the fort was reduced to rubble. Among these were the entire crew of the CSS Pontchartrain and the recapture of the lost cargo of the Union’s Blue Wing. The surrender was the largest that occurred West of the Mississippi River during the entire war and the victory sat well beside similar mass captures such at Island No. 10 and Fort Donelson. The two commanders continued to display cooperation over the course of the aftermath as they prepared for further moves deep into Arkansas that were halted by Halleck and Grant. Grant decided to personally take charge of future operations against Vicksburg and the Army of the Mississippi was disbanded and reabsorbed into the Army of the Tennessee. McClernand lost his army and was reduced to commanding his corps under Grant.\footnote{Christopher C. Meyers, \textit{Union General John A. McClernand}; Richard L. Kiper, \textit{Major General John Alexander McClernand, 183-185}; Edwin C. Bearss, “The Battle of the Post of Arkansas, 272-79; Richard L. Kiper, “John Alexander McClernand and the Arkansas Post Campaign, 77-79; \textit{ORN}, Se. 1, vol. 24: 120-121.}

The campaign for Arkansas Post was among the most successful examples of combined operations during the war, which is remarkable considering the mutual enmity the commanders had for one another. Porter gave thanks to McClernand, “I congratulate you that we have disposed of this tough little nut, the capture of which is alike creditable to the Army and Navy.” McClernand gave thanks to Porter in a personal note by saying, “all the prisoners and materials of war captured testify to harmonious and successful

cooperation of the land and naval forces and that each nobly emulated the other in the
time of patriotic duty” and in an official statement to Grant he stated, “Rear Admiral
Porter efficiently and brilliantly cooperated in accomplishing this complete success.”59

Much of the controversy around this battle lies in its conceptional stage and in the
conflict for credit that occurred afterward. Porter thought the Navy did not get enough
credit in the official report even though McClernand gave the squadron multiple
messages commending them on their actions during the battle. McClernand was a
controversial general as he wanted to rival Grant and lead his own army. He was an
effective commander, but his personality grated on his peers and superiors. His egotism
clashed with Grant and eventually he was dismissed from command of his corps prior to
the surrender of Vicksburg. In their memoirs Grant, Sherman, and Porter criticized
McClernand. Sherman took credit for conceiving the plan to go after Arkansas Post and
Porter reinforced the belief that all credit for the command of the battle should go to
Sherman. Porter considered McClernand to be no more than an observer to a battle they
planned and directed. This controversy obscures the fact that during the actual operation
McClernand and Porter formed a magnificent partnership. They mutually supported one
another effectively and did so despite how much they abhorred one another. While it is
unsurprising that the operation succeeded as the odds were heavily in the Union’s favor,
the combined efforts of the two partners led to an efficient employment of available
resources and to the rapid capitulation of the opposing force.60


60 William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, 2 Vols. (New York: D. Appleton and
Company, 1889), 244-251; David D. Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War (New York: D.
Porter and Banks in the Red River Campaign, March-May 1864

In contrast to Arkansas Post, the Red River Campaign featured a partnership that did not effectively put aside personal differences. This partnership failed due to the partners’ inability to work together and shows the importance of effective relationships in combined operations. The remainder of the war after the fall of Vicksburg should have been rather simple for the squadron, patrolling the river network and intercepting what few Confederate rivercrafts that remained in operation. The force had a duty to provide security for the supply line from the Northern states to the Union front lines. While these missions continued for the duration of the conflict, the squadron was drawn into an unfortunate military scheme. The initial impetus for the planning of an army navy campaign down the Red River was provided by France. Emperor Napoleon III saw the American Civil War as an opportunity to intervene in the affairs of Mexico. Napoleon deployed an army into Mexico causing tremors in the Union high command. The United States had to counter the French presence in Mexico along the border, but the key territory in question lay inside Texas, a Confederate state. Union efforts to attack Texas had all resulted in failed campaigns. The French army had to be countered. Therefore, a plan was designed that would allow for mass Union movement into Texas. In addition, Texas held vast supplies of cotton held in storehouses. This cotton was highly valuable to the North. The Union wanted the cotton and a secure position in Texas to counter the French army. The problem with this was that Union troops were already in place.

elsewhere for upcoming campaigns. There was very little in the way of troops that could be supplied to the venture without diverting them from other critical areas.61

The Union authorities selected Nathaniel P. Banks to lead an army into Texas and allotted him the use of ten thousand of Sherman’s men for one month. This force was to march from New Orleans along the Red River to Shreveport, Louisiana. The troops were ordered to seize every Confederate strongpoint along the way and confiscate as much enemy material as possible, especially stockpiled cotton bales. General Banks was the military governor of New Orleans and had jurisdiction over the Union forces stationed in Louisiana. He and his Army of the Gulf constituted the Union presence in the region. In addition to the crucial supply of army reinforcements, Banks also had the Mississippi Squadron placed at his disposal. For the campaign to be successful, the riverine force was needed, and Porter had to work with Banks. The squadron was reinforced to compensate for losses in the Vicksburg Campaign and the force grew exponentially. Porter would take into the campaign one of the largest riverine forces of the entire war. Many of the Union’s critical river borne assets were committed to this operation.62

Porter had at his disposal a variety of light ships and ironclads. Most of these armored gunboats were the proven fighting boats that had triumphed over the


62 James M. McPherson, War on the Waters, 320-324; Spencer C. Tucker, Blue and Grey Navies, 312-316; Harpur Allen Gosnell, Guns on the Western Waters, 280-283; Fletcher Pratt, Civil War on Western Waters, 300-302; Spencer C. Tucker, Blue and Grey Navies, 312-315; William M. Fowler, Under Two Flags, 300-304; Harpur Allen Gosnell, Guns on the Western Waters, 296-299; Fletcher Pratt, Civil War on Western Waters, 277-280; Gary D. Joiner, Mr. Lincoln’s Brown Water Navy, 186-188; Gary D. Joiner, One Damn Blunder, 10-15, 35-45; ORN, Se. 1, Vol. 26: 23.
Confederacy. The Western Flotilla’s partnership with the army ultimately allowed the Union to conquer the Mississippi River. On this campaign, tinclads formed the bulk of the force and served as escorts for the heavier ironclads. The force had been gradually strengthened over the course of the war and the timberclads had been supplemented by tinclads. Porter selected the tinclad, *U.S.S. Cricket* as his flagship for this expedition as its smaller size was more suited to the operation than the *Black Hawk*. Porter brought with him one of the squadron’s strongest vessels in the form of Seth Ledyard Phelps’ *U.S.S. Eastport*. This massive vessel was intended to provide a spear and a shield at the squadron’s front that could hopefully counter possible Confederate ironclads and submersibles. The enormous ironclad mainly served to slow the squadron’s advance and became an obstacle once it had been disabled by a mine. The newest additions to the squadron were the river monitors *Neosho* and *Osage*. These two monitors were well armed for offensive action and well armored for defense. Their most important aspect was their low draft, which allowed them to operate on the rivers with little difficulty.⁶³

Porter and his squadron were supposed to accompany the army under Banks down the Red River to Shreveport and take enemy positions they met along the way. The force was to reestablish Union control along the Red River and seize cotton from the Louisiana plantations. The key goal was to capture Shreveport and establish a Union zone of control in East Texas. The Mississippi squadron was to support these objectives as far as the Red

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River could take them, but it was understood the squadron could not support Banks any further than Shreveport. Banks was given a sizable host of thirty-thousand that diverted resources and delayed the Federal movement against Mobile, Alabama. The campaign was to be of limited duration since Sherman needed his troops back in time for his campaign against Atlanta, Georgia.64

The force headed out of New Orleans and began the journey up river. The enemy facing them was smaller in number and commanded by the son of Zachary Taylor, Richard Taylor of the Army of the Trans-Mississippi. Taylor was in a disadvantageous position and faced a much larger Union army backed by significant naval support. Fort De Russey served as the first obstacle and fell rapidly to the gunboats of the Mississippi Squadron. The squadron seized cotton at various plantations along the river. The force continued to Alexandria and used that as their forward base against Shreveport. The squadron was mostly left trailing in the wake of the army as the conditions of the river were not cooperative. It was understood by Union intelligence that the river level would be favorable for operations at this time of the year, but instead it was much lower than anticipated. This made swift progress up the river difficult and as the squadron lagged behind the army. Confederate defenders saw an opportunity to attack the unguarded gunboats. Detached Confederate forces at various intervals during the campaign gathered in numbers trying to disable and capture the gunboats. Rebel troops tried to take out the Osage by musket fire. The river monitor, in turn, leveled the attacking force with a full

64 Spencer C. Tucker, Blue and Grey Navies, 333-336; Harpur Allen Gosnell, Guns on the Western Waters, 285-288; Fletcher Pratt, Civil War on Western Waters, 304-306; Bern Anderson, By Sea and By River, 274-276; Gary D. Joiner, One Damn Blunder, 45-55.
display of its naval batteries. Rebels lined up artillery pieces at points along the river. The
enemy treated the squadron as sport as it made its way up river. The squadron eventually
reached a portion of the river past Alexandria with a water level so low it prevented them
from advancing or turning back.65

Banks and his army marched ahead seizing control of large portions of the state.
Taylor lacked the means to prevent this. He intended to meet Banks in battle with
everything he had available and everything else was sacrificed to achieve this. Alexandria
had been abandoned by the Confederates and its cotton supply burned to prevent seizure.
Banks left behind his stranded naval component, moved toward his objective, and all but
destroyed the fruitful Army-Navy partnership that had been sustained throughout the
conflict. Before Banks could get there, he was engaged, out maneuvered, and beaten at
the Battle of Mansfield. Banks immediately retreated and met Taylor again at the Battle
of Pleasant Falls. Banks did better in this fight but decided to continue his retreat. Banks
was slow to inform Porter of these circumstances. Porter had been ignored and forgotten
as Banks continued his rapid withdrawal.66

Porter and his command were stuck at Alexandria Falls. They could not force
their way out because of the low water level and the weight of the ironclads. Several of
the tinclads escaped and made their way to the army to inform Banks of Porter’s

333-336; Harpur Allen Gosnell, *Guns on the Western Waters*, 283-284; Fletcher Pratt, *Civil War on

66 James M. McPherson, *War on the Waters*, 316-320; William M. Fowler, *Under Two Flags*, 339-
342; Harpur Allen Gosnell, *Guns on the Western Waters*, 278-281; Fletcher Pratt, *Civil War on Western
Waters*, 270-274; Bern Anderson, *By Sea and By river* 268-270; *Mr. Lincoln’s Brown Water Navy*, 194-
predicament. Banks responded by sending army engineers under Colonel Joseph Bailey and gradually allotted thirty-five-hundred men to the task of saving the squadron. Porter expressed his concerns to Banks by saying “There are some who would not care if gunboats, horses, and everything are left behind, as long as they could get away” and Banks sought to alloy his ally’s anxiety by replying “I have never entertained for a moment the thought of abandoning any portion of the fleet and we shall not leave this post until the vessels are released.” 67 Taylor and his troops believed that the squadron was caught in an inescapable trap. 68

Bailey told Porter he intended to build a dam that would gradually force the water to rise and allow the ironclads to make their escape. Porter was doubtful of this scheme, but he had no other option. The enemy was going to capture the force if they stayed there. The command had suffered losses in sailors and boats to enemy artillery. Confederates felt there was little chance of the squadron escaping and waited for failure of the Union efforts. Bailey’s task was enormous as he intended to build a dam that spanned the river and artificially cause the water to rise. The first attempt saw the escape of a tinclad, but the dam broke. Porter felt encouraged by this minor success and allowed Bailey to continue his plan. The army engineers learned from their initial failure and built a series of smaller dams. This created the desired result as the water rose and the Carondelet was chosen to test the dam. The ironclad made it over and soon the rest of the force followed.

67 ORN, Se. 1, Vol. 26:140-141.

68 James M. McPherson, War on the Waters, 324-326; Spencer C. Tucker, Blue and Grey Navies, 328-331; William M. Fowler, Under Two Flags, 343-345; Harpur Allen Gosnell, Guns on the Western Waters, 282-284; Gary D. Joiner, One Damn Blunder, 150-165; ORN, Se. 1, Vol. 26: 135-137.
Porter gave immense praise to Colonel Bailey. He saved the squadron from an embarrassing end, the Union naval force worth millions of dollars, and managed to mend an almost broken Army-Navy partnership. Porter was directed by the Navy Department to say “To convey the thanks of the Department to the enterprising and gallant officers and men who so nobly aided the gunboats to get down from above the falls at Alexandria when there was every prospect of their remaining there, owing to the low water, and probability of their being destroyed, to prevent their falling into the hands of the rebels.” 69 The squadron successfully escaped, but the campaign had seen the loss of a handful of vessels, including two ironclads. In addition, the squadron sustained two-hundred casualties for little gain. 70

Banks’ retreating force was chased by Taylor, but he was unknowingly assisted by Taylor’s commanding officer General Edmund Smith. Smith redeployed a portion of Taylor’s command to Arkansas. Despite this, Taylor pursued Banks to the Yellow Bayou and inflicted a final defeat. Banks is an example of a political general who had little ability to command troops in the field and was ineffective in forming a successful partnership with his naval counterpart. Banks was an able administrator of New Orleans, but his political talents had no bearing on the battle field. Banks failed to use his naval contingent and did not consult with Porter effectively on the conduct of the campaign. The campaign was poorly conceived from the outset, but the lack of coordination


70 William M. Fowler, Under Two Flags, 345-348; Harpur Allen Gosnell, Guns on the Western Waters, 285-287; Fletcher Pratt, Civil War on Western Waters, 275-277; ORN, Se. 1, Vol. 26: 144-146, 159-162.
between the army and naval components prevented much chance of success. The campaign only had two successes: the fall of Fort De Russey and the successful rescue of the squadron. These are the bright spots in a campaign that accomplished little except ending the military career of Banks and leaving a black mark on the record of the Mississippi Squadron. Banks was relieved of command, while Porter would recoup his reputation at Fort Fisher.⁷¹

Union naval and army cooperation in the western theater is a vital part of the narrative of the Civil War and to understanding the war’s outcome. The key component of this collaboration was the professional relations of the key officers that coordinated their efforts to achieve combined operational success. The relationships between navy officers and their army counterparts were essential in the Western Theater. Their willingness to communicate, form professional bonds, and take part in combined operations is the underlying reason for the continual healthy army naval partnership throughout most of the war. Foote and Pope were not a dynamic coupling, but they were faced with a complex puzzle. Foote’s previous failure and his wound at Donelson had made him much more cautious. The pre-Donelson Foote was just as overtly aggressive in his thinking as Pope. Pope and Foote clashed over how the gunboats should be deployed. Pope got so infuriated with Foote that he tried to have Halleck force Foote to give authority of the flotilla to Pope. Foote was perhaps too cautious during the campaign and this served to delay Union victory. The coordination of their efforts was quite clumsy at

first, but it improved over the duration. In the latter stages of the operation Foote and Pope had finally solved the geographic puzzle facing them and this led to their shared victory. Foote and Pope worked through their initial difficulties and were prepared for a more cohesive effort against Fort Pillow. They did not get the chance to improve their partnership further. Foote and Pope simply clashed in their methodologies for this operation, but it did not serve to undermine or harm the ultimate success of the combined operation. The effective partnership of Porter and McClernand during the Arkansas Post campaign demonstrates a model Army-Navy relationship. This victory was a morale boost in that it occurred at a time when Union forces were being defeated in multiple theaters and it was strategic in that it removed a threat to Union control of the river network.

On the opposite side is the abysmal reality of the Red River Campaign, an operation that shows explicitly the dangers of poor relations between commanding officers in the conduct of joint missions. Banks and Porter failed to establish an effective repertoire with one another and more generally failed in the practice of communication. While it is doubtful that the Union scheme for the Red River was likely to succeed given poor planning, the unforeseen river conditions, and the limited time frame, the lack of a partnership between the principal officers only caused further unraveling of the federal design. The combination of these factors doomed the expedition and nearly cost the Union the bulk of the Mississippi River Squadron. These joint operational partnerships display a spectrum of differing professional relationships while still demonstrating fundamental elements of collaboration that are important to underscor
of these large scale and pivotal combined operations to the Union’s victory in the western theater of the American Civil War.
CHAPTER IV – SMALL SCALE JOINT OPERATIONS

The fourth chapter of this thesis analyzes joint operations of a smaller scale. These joint missions or raids were generally conducted by officers of lesser rank and were usually flanking maneuvers tied to a larger effort. These small-scale cooperatives early on were about proving the soundness of a joint operational doctrine, as well as probing the weak points of the enemy. The characteristics of these missions were to have army troops support a few boats to probe or take enemy positions. These small maneuvers compounded damage to the enemy or secured the rearguard of the Union position. This chapter highlights the importance of micro-cooperatives during wider campaigns, how they served to cover or reinforce the Union advance and to demonstrate how the Army-Navy relationship was maintained by officers lower down the chain of command. Grant and the timberclad captains, for example, provided the blueprint for combined operations during the early days of the western theater at Belmont and Shiloh. The White River expedition, discussed below, highlights how the Union continued tenaciously in the face of adversity, supported the larger Federal war effort, and the operational lessons of a failed mission. This chapter argues that the raid on Yazoo City was a milestone in the development of brown water tactics and the Federal strategy of keeping the Confederacy off balance. Nashville was the last major operation that the Mississippi Squadron took part in during the war. This chapter examines the partnerships of Ulysses Grant, Henry Walke, and Roger Stembel at Belmont, Augustus Kilty, James Shirk and Graham Fitch during the White River Expedition and the Battle of St. Charles,
Seth Ledyard Phelps and Alfred Ellet during the 1862 Yazoo River Raid, and Samuel Lee, Leroy Fitch and George Thomas at Nashville.

**Grant, Walke and Stembel at Belmont, November 1861**

Belmont was the first combined operation in the West, it proved that the concept would work. It demonstrated how the Union could make mass troop movements by river and strike at unexpected Confederate strongholds. The gunboats and troops were utilized in concert to accomplish Union objectives and the gunboats provided fire cover for the Union withdrawal. At Belmont the army navy partnership that developed made Grant a more notable figure in the Union hierarchy and brought him to the attention of Abraham Lincoln. In the early days of the war in the Western Theater, the army relied heavily upon the services of three timberclad gunboats and their captains. Two of these captains, Seth Phelps and Henry Walke, corresponded with their commanding officer, Commodore Foote, and General Grant frequently. While much of this correspondence consisted of military directives, the resulting effect of this correspondence and their relationship was very important to the Union war effort. Grant made use of his personality to leverage favors with these naval officers to make sure they gave him their backing in military operations. The three timberclads served in various capacities and among these duties were reconnaissance, mapping out enemy positions, launching independent raids into enemy territory, escorting Union transports, and providing cover fire for Union assaults.72

In the early days of the war in the West the Confederate forces under General Leonidas Polk strengthened their defensive position by invading Kentucky. Polk’s goal was to seize Columbus and turn it into an unassailable fortress. Polk and his army carried their offensive through Kentucky, but heavily damaged the Confederacy’s efforts to recruit volunteers in the neutral state. Polk also failed to secure control of Paducah, Kentucky, which was situated at the mouth of the Tennessee River and served as a strategic axis of the state. The Confederates had gained control of vital portions in the state, but without Paducah that control was incomplete. The Federals realized the enemy error and moved to seize the city, while volunteer forces under Grant gained control of the city. Grant loaded his troops onto several transports and was accompanied by timberclad gunboats. He disembarked his forces and led a march against the city. The Confederate forces standing in opposition dispersed and the city fell into Union hands. He realized that Paducah would serve as a forward position from which the federal forces could advance downriver and make moves against their stronghold at Columbus.\textsuperscript{73}

Over several months Grant had effectively built a repertoire with his naval peers. In return, the gunboat captains provided him and the other army commanders solid service. The highly mobile timberclads were dispatched in mission after mission to map out enemy positions and make demonstrations against Confederates. The nimble gunboats swiftly made their way around the intertwined river system and answered promptly every call for action. Grant’s immediate superior, General John C. Fremont, was uninterested in pressing the attack against the enemy defense line. He was concerned

about maintaining the territory the Union already held and the danger of losing the border
states to the enemy. Polk had already pressed hard into Kentucky, while the forces of
Confederate General Sterling Price were making advances in Missouri. Grant saw an
opportunity to launch a small-scale attack at the lightly defended Confederate camp at
Belmont. 74

Grant hoped that an attack so close to the Confederate headquarters would force
them to recall Price or prevent Confederates from reinforcing the offensive in Missouri.
Grant assembled his command and planned for the move down river. He secured six
troop transports in the form of river steamboats and made sure his volunteer soldiers were
properly equipped. He knew he could not accomplish his objective without the assistance
of the gunboats, so he directly contacted two of the captains, Henry Walke and Roger
Stembel, who answered his call and prepared their boats for action. The two naval
commanders had grown accustomed to following Grant’s prompt directives and offered
no argument. Unfortunately, in his haste, Grant failed to inform the commander of the
Western flotilla that he was procuring two of the timberclads for a special raid against the
enemy. He somewhat belatedly realized this and made sure to order the sailors not to
endanger their vessels. He did not wish to risk their destruction and failed to direct them
to perform boldly. Walke and Stembel, meanwhile, were concerned about drawing too
close to the massed force of over two-hundred artillery pieces defending Columbus. 75

74 ORN, Se. 1, Vol. 22: 398-204; Paul Calore, Naval Campaigns, 44-50; James M. McPherson,
War on the Waters, 34-42; Spencer C. Tucker, Blue and Grey Navies, 36-40, 54-58; Nathaniel Cheairs

75 ORN, Se. 1, Vol. 22: 208-212; Spencer C. Tucker, Blue and Grey Navies, 41-45; William M.
Fowler, Under Two Flags, 34-40; Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes Jr., The Battle of Belmont, 45-55.
The timberclads screened the advance of the transport convoy downriver and stood guard as they disembarked the troops. Grant’s three-thousand-man force landed safely and a rear guard of five companies was selected to defend the transports. The rest of the force marched for a mile to launch a surprise attack against the campsite of Confederate General Gideon Pillow. He was forced into retreat, but Grant’s troops began looting the campsite and lost their chance to corner the enemy. Meanwhile, the gunboats had moved as near to Columbus as they dared. Walke and Stembel maneuvered outside the range of enemy guns and kept up bombardments as they maintained a circular pattern. The two naval officers failed to realize the danger of the opposing Confederate riverboats and headed back to the landing site after completing their diversion.\footnote{ORN, Se. 1, Vol. 22: 216-220; James Mason Hoppin, \textit{Life of Andrew Hull Foote}, 376-384; Spencer C. Tucker, \textit{Andrew Foote}, 244-252; Gary D. Joiner, \textit{Mr. Lincoln’s Brown Water Navy}, 44-82; Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes Jr., \textit{The Battle of Belmont}, 55-65.}

Polk scrambled to save Pillow and mobilized his men onto several transports. They offloaded Pillow’s five thousand reinforcements, who raced to confront Grant. The federals gradually fell back to their landing site and fought desperately to extricate his command from their predicament. Walke and Stembel leveled their heavy guns at the enemy and forced them to halt. Grant and most of his troops retreated on their transports, but some forces had been left behind. Grant’s chief lieutenant, John Alexander McClernand, sent Walke back to rescue the stragglers. The Confederates thought they had fought off a massive enemy counterstroke but were mortified to learn they had been dizzied by a smaller enemy force.
Grant’s attack at Belmont failed in its original objective to divert Price’s offensive in Missouri, but it demonstrated the effectiveness of the mass transit of troops by river. He realized that Confederates were unable to counter the mobility the river network gave the Union, and his aggressive actions left a favorable impression in the mind of Abraham Lincoln. The battle at Belmont had been evenly fought and both sides incurred equal losses from the encounter. It was one of the few missteps Grant had in his professional relationship with Commodore Foote when he failed to inform him about his intention to use the gunboats to escort the transport fleet in the attack on Belmont. While Foote was initially dismayed at this, he was pleased to hear about the successful actions of the gunboats in the mission. The relative success of this raid led both Grant and Foote to ponder the possibility of what a greater combined operation might achieve. The raid had demonstrated that the Union could keep the enemy off balance through a combination of disembarked troops and naval bombardment. The process would be repeated on a larger scale with strategic consequences at Forts Henry and Donelson. The raid on Belmont was the first in a long line of combined operations that served the Union well in the Western Theater.77

Kilty, Shirk, and Fitch in the White River Expedition, June-July 1862

The White River Expedition demonstrates how the flotilla was called upon to support the larger federal war effort. The expedition was an abortive attempt to resupply the Army of the Southwest. This operation shows how the Army-Navy relationship

continued to evolve. The incorporation of army and naval assets on a prolonged excursion during this operation was among the first of its kind. The mission was mostly a failure but it features a partnership that demonstrates that even in the lower points of the war, the Army-Navy partnership was sustained and pushed forward. Charles Davis and Charles Ellet emerged the victors in the Battle of Memphis and Davis set to the task of converting the city into a forward base for the flotilla. He took control of the city naval yard and restored the facility so that it could perform repairs on ironclad gunboats. Union efforts in Arkansas were suffering a setback as the Army of the Southwest under General Samuel Curtis was running low on supplies and slowly being cut off. Halleck was worried about Curtis’ predicament and requested that Davis arrange an expedition up the White River to resupply Curtis. Davis had already been formulating a maneuver of this kind because the Confederacy was using the river to launch attacks on federal shipping and as a haven for their remaining naval vessels.78

Davis requested the aid of the Ram Fleet and made overtures for Charles Ellet to support the expedition. But Ellet had been wounded at Memphis, so his brother Alfred would command in his stead. Charles did not care for the short notice of this request as his rams were undergoing repairs. He sent a message to Davis in which he requested that his subordinate commander, Currie, act independently in support of the expedition and be equal in authority to his naval counterpart. Davis refused to condone this two-headed adventure and decided the flotilla would do it themselves. The flag officer had failed to

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secure the support of the rams and turned to a longstanding ally. Davis requested the aid of an Army Colonel by stating, “I have therefore to request that you accompany this expedition with the Indiana regiment under your command to assist in the removal of obstructions and to protect the seaman while at work in the open river from the enemy’s guerillas concealed in the thick timber.” 79 Colonel Graham Newell Fitch was a former democratic senator and had served the Union cause satisfactorily. Fitch was Pope’s subordinate at New Madrid, Island No. 10, and one of the principal individuals that Pope left behind to support the flotilla at Fort Pillow. Fitch and his Indiana regiments had helped secure control of Memphis for Davis. Graham was also the older brother of Leroy Fitch, who had served under Davis in South America and was endearing himself to Davis by his work salvaging the Confederate vessels disabled at Memphis. 80

Davis called on the services of one of his senior ironclad captains, Augustus Kilty and his vessel, the recently repaired Mound City, to head the expedition up the White River. Colonel Fitch pledged his services and gathered his command on an army transport. Kilty was further reinforced by an additional ironclad, two timberclads and several auxiliaries. The elderly Kilty had Shirk as his second in command. Davis directed the force go up river to resupply Curtis and clear out enemy resistance. The force advanced upriver and worked its way around varying natural obstructions. Kilty was concerned about the water level and the possibility of the rebels jamming the river by laying obstacles or filling the bottom with additional debris. The Confederates were

79 ORN, Se. 1, vol. 23: 164.

alerted to the federal efforts and quickly assembled a minimal force at St. Charles. General Hindman requested Confederate Navy Captain Fry of the Maurepas and his crew to take charge of the fort batteries.81

   Kitly and Fitch worked out their plan of attack and settled on an effective two-pronged assault. Fitch and his regiment would be offloaded and march against the enemy’s flank, while the naval division would bombard the enemy position. Fitch began his movement and remained undetected. The four gunboats steamed forward and unloaded on the enemy. The process was proceeding well and with relative ease when a large caliber shell pierced the Mound City’s armor. This shell immediately caused several deaths, but disaster struck when a round hit the boiler. The boiler shuddered and released scalding hot water vapor. The endangered crew abandoned the boat and jumped into the water. The enemy commander demanded the wounded vessel strike its colors and when it did not, he ordered his sharpshooters to target the sailors in the water. The other vessels moved into position to keep up the bombardment and lowered row boats to rescue their comrades. Shirk took charge of the situation and rearranged the division to keep up the fight. The disgusted and enraged Fitch ordered his men to launch their assault. The enemy batteries had been concentrated on fending off the naval assault and were totally unprepared to counter the infantry attack on their flank. The outnumbered rebels were swiftly overwhelmed and compelled to retreat. Captain Fry and most of the garrison were captured, while much of Fry’s crew made their escape. The boiler hit on the flag steamer was one of the deadliest of the entire war as almost the entire crew became casualties. A

large portion of them died immediately and more succumbed as a result of their wounds. Kilty was severely wounded and only a handful of the crew remained unscathed. Shirk requested that Fitch’s men crew the boat back to Memphis. Shirk and Fitch fully intended on ascending the river after they saw to the needs of the sailors.\textsuperscript{82}

Davis visited Kitly and the wounded on the hospital boat. He heard the pleas of Fitch and Shirk to continue the expedition and gave them permission. General Grant lent an additional regiment to Fitch for the renewed mission. Shirk and Fitch made their way back upriver and continued the process of clearing out enemy shipping. The force continued up the White River as far as the water level would allow. Fitch and his men advanced into the Arkansas interior. They had several skirmishes with the local rebel forces, but Fitch was unable to force his way to Curtis over land. Shirk informed Fitch that the water level was getting too low to operate and the timberclads could advance no further. Shirk told Fitch, “I have to say that it will be my pleasure, as well as my duty, to remain in the river as long as the presence of the \textit{Lexington} can be of any service to your command.”\textsuperscript{83} Shirk and Fitch confirmed that the Confederates had laid additional blockage on the river bottom. The expedition was called off and ended in failure. This was Fitch’s last mission of the war. An injury sustained on this expedition forced him to quit the Army. Curtis was able to extricate himself from his predicament and the rebels failed to entrap his Army of the Southwest.\textsuperscript{84}


\textsuperscript{83} ORN, Se. 1, vol. 23: 190-191.

The White River expedition demonstrates how the flotilla was utilized to support beleaguered Union armies and how they kept the enemy off balance through riverine raiding. Fitch was an able partner to the flotilla and had been its chief army support during a dark period. Fitch and other Army colonels generally deferred authority to their naval counterparts when operating on the rivers. Davis stated, “The Department has done the honor to address to Commander A. H. Kilty and myself upon the late victory at St. Charles, achieved by the former in cooperation with the military forces under Colonel Fitch.” Fitch, Kilty, and Shirk approached and conducted this joint mission with a high degree of professionalism and did not let personal quirks get in the way of their partnership. The flotilla’s ability to weather disaster was on full display as the combined forces acted promptly to complete the capitulation of the enemy. The damaged vessel, Mound City, was rapidly put back in working order through field repairs and after a stint in a naval yard was ready to resume campaigning. The most strategically important consequence of the expedition was that Davis devised the tinclad gunboat concept so that the flotilla could operate unhindered in rivers with shallow depths. The gunboats would surge up the White and Arkansas River many times over the course of the war in support of Union forces operating in the state. The Union exercised considerable strategic influence over the rebel state through its local superiority on its inland waterways.

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85 ORN, Se. 1, vol. 23: 192.
Phelps, Ellet and Woods in the Yazoo Raid, August 1862

The Yazoo Raid is pivotal to understanding the success of combined small-scale operations. Naval assets supported the army troops in a hit and run faction before there could be an enemy counter attack. This is essential to understanding the development of brown water tactics during the war. Yazoo was a model for the raids that would follow. It helped to rebound the army navy relationship after the failure of the first Vicksburg campaign and gave rise to a federal technique that the Confederacy could not effectively counter. As Davis stated, “The combined naval and military operation planned between General Curtis and myself has returned to Helena having accomplished its work with great success.”

The detachment of forces to retain nominal river control left Davis with a minimal force that joined with Farragut at Vicksburg. The early naval operations before Vicksburg were a low point in the Union cause and largely pointless in Davis’ view. The Navy had been left with a minute Army support to force the capitulation of a veritable fortress. It was also the time of year when sickness was magnified. Over the course of the operations a larger percentage of sailors in both commands fell ill or died of illness. When Davis retreated from Vicksburg he headed for Helena, Arkansas. General Curtis and his army had recently captured the city and it became another haven for the flotilla. As the naval siege of Vicksburg dissipated, the Confederates tried to reestablish river shipping and gain localized river control through guerilla warfare.

86 ORN, Se. 1, vol. 23: 294.
Davis and Curtis met to discuss how to combat this threat. Davis proposed a kind of flying squadron consisting of gunboats backed by army troops that would proactively raid the enemy and serve as a counter guerilla force. These ideas had been germinating within Davis throughout the Vicksburg campaign and led him to select Leroy Fitch as the head of the mosquito squadron. Fitch was charged with counter guerrilla operations and convoying army supply boats. Curtis proposed increasing their forces, but to make use of what they had on hand for the first effort. Davis and Curtis laid the groundwork for a naval raid. Davis proceeded to Cairo and left Seth Ledyard Phelps in command of the flotilla.  

Curtis supplied Colonel Charles Robert Woods to Phelps. Phelps agreed with Davis that the flotilla should not remain idle and coaxed Alfred Ellet to assist with the raid. Phelps essentially intended to take a round river trip to pierce the enemy zone of control, inflict as much damage as possible, and return to Helena. Phelps, by this point, was one of the most experienced commanders of the flotilla and an avowed expert in riverine raiding. Phelps had lead the round trip up and down the Tennessee River when Fort Henry fell. In that raid Phelps had inspired fear in the southern population, devastated Confederate shipping, and captured a rebel boat undergoing ironclad conversion. Phelps hoped to achieve greater results by deploying a larger force. Davis had given charge of the fleet to Phelps, while he made Benjamin Dove the forward base

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commander. Dove helped Phelps by supplying needed boats and outfitting them for the mission.\textsuperscript{89}

Phelps took charge of the most powerful boat in the flotilla the flag steamer\textit{Benton}, an additional Pook Turtle in the form of the \textit{Mound City}, four rams, two troop transports, and several auxiliaries. The force proceeded down the Mississippi and looked for places to inspect for signs of the enemy. Their early efforts were largely disappointing as the army troops landed on the riverbanks and marched inland. The troops questioned the locals and came away without any useful intelligence. The Confederates were reestablishing their cross-river connections. In the down period after the end of the First Vicksburg Campaign the rebels did not think the gunboats would be back in action for a while and the successful transport run of the \textit{Fair Play} belied that assumption. This supply boat laden with weaponry had been sent to outfit the mostly unarmed troops of General Holmes. Holmes requested the vessel make a second run with additional weaponry.\textsuperscript{90}

The Union division approached rebel territory at night and outpaced the Confederate vessels sent to warn of the federal approach. Phelps spotted the lights of the enemy steamer first and called for the dimming of all lights. He made further preparations by cutting off the engines and readying boarding parties. The black painted ironclad was undetectable in the dark of night and the current pushed it into the \textit{Fair

\textsuperscript{89} ORN, Se. 1, Vol. 23: 300-303; Edwin C. Bearrs, “The Union Raid Down the Mississippi and Up the Yazoo August 16-27,” 112-114; Jay Slagle, \textit{Ironclad Captain}, 283-285.

Play. The bluejackets swiftly boarded and captured the weapon laden steamer. Phelps directed the transports to attack the nearby rebel camp. Woods and his men overpowered the camp. The troops proceeded inland and found a deserted camp. Woods and his men advanced to the town of Tallulah. The city was vacant, and Woods proceeded to confiscate as much material as possible. Woods set fire to the supply depot, eight railroad cars, and took the town telegraph. The Union troops spent an entire day raiding inland and returned to the river with more goods than could be loaded. The loss of the steamer had cost the Confederacy almost a division’s worth of weaponry and powder.91

The divisions approached Vicksburg and were allowed to pass under a flag of truce as the city garrison had been expecting a Union boat full of Confederate soldiers as part of a prisoner exchange. Phelps was allowed through, while Vicksburg prepared itself for another naval siege. Colonel Woods loaded his men onto the rams and the more vulnerable transports were left at the mouth of the river. The force advanced seventeen miles upriver when it noticed the rebels constructing a battery on Snyder’s Bluff. The gunboats opened fire and caused the work gangs to disperse. The rams offloaded troops onto the bank and the battery was captured. The captured materials consisted of six cannons, seven thousand pounds of powder, and one thousand projectiles. The already heavily burdened boats of the division tried with difficulty to take what they could and disposed of the rest. This process involved a combination of priming the guns to explode,

or throwing the stocks into the river. The Confederacy could ill afford the loss of irreplaceable heavy artillery pieces.\(^92\)

Phelps learned that the enemy was hiding its remaining boats on Lake George and was determined to get them. He dispatched several rams up the Sunflower River, the rest of the force was stationed at Snyder’s Bluff. While the rams were away, the rebels launched a small attack that was routed quickly by the big guns of the flag steamer. The rams returned, and the force made its way back to the mouth of the Yazoo. The force was involved in several more skirmishes on its trip back to Helena. The division set fire to multiple Confederate campsites and destroyed small amounts of material each time. At each stop the army troops were offloaded in force and advanced under the covering fire of the gunboats. The army employed a force of cavalry for reconnaissance and mountain howitzers to counter the appearance of larger rebel forces. The army officers never followed the retreating enemy too far inland to avoid traps and when attacked by overwhelming rebel assaults they promptly retreated to the safety of the gunboats. In his after-action report to the Navy Department Davis stated, “I am fully sensible of the importance of a cordial, zealous and active cooperation between the Army and Navy in this field of labor” and would go on to say that, “I am under the impression that the most perfect harmony of purpose and of cooperation exists between the Army and myself.”\(^93\)

Curtis stated that, “The Navy and Army moved to any point on the Mississippi River makes a new and unexpected base, from which the troops can dash into the country and


\(^93\) ORN, Se. 1, vol. 23: 295.
carry destruction into the enemy’s line on the railroad or Yazoo or up the small streams of Arkansas, carrying death and desolation into the country.” 94 The design of Curtis and Davis had largely been achieved and the Confederacy proved that it had no viable counter for it.95

The Phelps-Ellet raid of August 1862 is a prime example of how the Union utilized small scale joint missions to keep the enemy off balance. The raid was the last offensive organized by Davis and demonstrates his thoughts on how the gunboats and army transports could utilize strategic mobility to attack enemy weak points and deal effective material damage. The gunboat flotilla and its army allies made effective use of a hit and run style of combat that synchronized effectively with the conditions they faced. The strategic oversight was well provided by Davis and Curtis for this operation. The administrative and logistical requirements were well handled by Dove. The operational and tactical combination of Phelps, Ellet, and Woods successfully blazed a trail of destruction up and down Mississippi River network. Alfred Ellet held a deep dislike of Davis, but he respected Phelps. Alfred gradually subordinated himself and his rams to naval authority, but only got along well with people he appreciated.96 The army commanders largely followed the directives of Phelps and there was no dispute over who was in charge. Army officers operating in river raiding largely deferred authority to their naval counterparts as the naval aspect held precedence in riverine warfare and the safety

94 ORN, Se. 1, vol. 23: 298.


96 Chester G. Hearn, Ellet’s Brigade: The Strangest Outfit of All, 70-80.
of the troops rested with the gunboats that escorted them. The ram fleet is the noted exception as they were hybrid troops that possessed their own vessels, acted under their own authority, operated as sailors when attacking enemy boats and as infantry when raiding inland. The struggle for the Yazoo River outlasted the contest for Vicksburg and it took several more raids before this Confederate naval bastion was finally cleared out. The threat of enemy raids kept the rebel boats trapped inside the Yazoo River and they were never able to reconstitute their inland navy. The inland rebel fleet was ground down and forced to hide in the confines of tributary rivers and largely removed from being a strategic threat as a result.

Commodore Davis’ service on the rivers had worn down his health and now that he had overseen the stabilization of the flotilla’s position in the aftermath of the Vicksburg campaign, he was ready to accept reassignment to Washington. Davis had leaned heavily on the experience of the younger Phelps and had uplifted Leroy Fitch during his tenure. Phelps believed that he should be the one to succeed Davis and organized a campaign to gain command of the flotilla. Welles disapproved of Phelps as squadron commander and twice passed him over in favor of David Porter and Samuel Lee. Phelps attached great hopes to his ironclad *Eastport,* but the vessel suffered continual breakdowns. This left him absent during the whole of the Vicksburg Campaign. Phelps finally got his prized ironclad operational and commanded it during the Red River campaign. However, his hopes were dashed as the cumbersome boat suffered continual trouble, was disabled by rebel torpedoes, and Phelps was forced to scuttle the vessel he had tied his professional career with. Welles did not even factor Phelps into his calculation when he sent another blue water novice in the form of Lee to command the
squadron. Phelps resigned from the Navy and left the war behind him. Fitch was made the head of Davis’ experimental mosquito squadron and charged with escorting army steamer convoys and countering Confederate guerillas. Fitch spent most of the war leading his tinclads in an odd assortment of logistical duties and clashing with the Confederacy’s cavaliers. This is best demonstrated by his role in supporting the logistics of William Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga and by his five-hundred-mile pursuit of Daniel Hunt Morgan. Fitch and his compatriot James Shirk were the commanders of the ninth and tenth divisions of the Squadron during the last joint campaign of the western theater.97

Siege and Battle of Nashville and surrounding river systems

Lee, Thomas, and Fitch at Nashville, November-December 1864

Belmont opened the curtain on combined operations in the West and Nashville was the final curtain call. Nashville is, in part, both a large scale and small scale combined operation. On the operational level, it features the highly synchronized partnership between senior army and navy commanders. On the tactical level, a naval commander was charged with dislodging an enemy position. That mission represents the symbolic evolution of combined operations during the war.

General William Sherman’s Army of the Tennessee began its march from Atlanta to Savannah and George Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland had been left in place to counter the movements of John Bell Hood’s Army of the Tennessee. Hood embarked on a campaign to take back the city of Nashville and the Federals were gathering strength for the coming battle. The strength of the Army of the Cumberland rested on the safe passage of army steamers up the Cumberland River. Thomas worried about the danger that Confederate cavalry and horse artillery presented to his supply boats. He worked closely with Lee during the entirety of the Nashville Campaign and began his request for ironclads. Tinclads made up most of the squadron and performed the more systemic task of escorting steamers to effectively traverse rivers with lower water levels. The Cumberland River rose sharply in the period leading up to the engagement and the Union took advantage of this to transfer several ironclads to the waters around Nashville. Lee originally intended for the combined divisions of Fitch and Shirk to lead the initial operations, while he would arrive later with reinforcements. Shirk came down with an
illness and left Fitch the man on point. During the campaign, Lee and Thomas conferred with one another constantly and sent their directives to Fitch.\textsuperscript{99}

Fitch and his division of tinclads had been reinforced by the pook turtle, \textit{Carondelet} and the river monitor \textit{Neosho}. They were collectively assigned the task of escorting a convoy of sixty steamers up the Cumberland River. Fitch arranged his division into formation for screening the convoy and safely delivered all the supply boats to Nashville. Thomas and his army were properly supplied. The steamers made their run before the rebels had a chance to interdict the river. One of Nathan Bedford Forrest’s lieutenants, David Kelly, followed his orders to establish a battery at a strategic location so that river traffic could be blocked and counter federal naval attempts to dislodge them. Kelly set up his battery on a rise above the river bank that allowed his gunners to make plunging attacks on enemy vessels and deployed mines in the water beneath his position. Some independent river commerce found itself fired on and captured by this battery at Bell Mills. Fitch’s concern during the campaign was countering this battery and reopening the river to traffic.\textsuperscript{100}

Fitch’s division originally went after this battery after it received news of the captured commercial vessels. Fitch’s first attack on Bell Mills was a heated engagement in which several of his tinclads suffered hits and expended much ammunition to little avail. The tinclads were lucky they suffered no critical hits and the enemy temporarily retreated from their position. Fitch did not have any army troops with him that could take


\textsuperscript{100} \textit{ORN}, Se. 1, Vol. 26: 660-664; Myron J. Smith Jr., \textit{Le Roy Fitch}, 302-305.
advantage of this and the enemy held firm control of their territory. The navy forces succeeded in freeing the captured steamers during the fight. The force headed a reconnaissance mission in between their attempts to disable the battery at Bell Mills. Fitch switched from his tinclad command boat to the river monitor for the second attempt. The monitor engaged in a fierce duel with the battery, but neither side could overpower the other. The monitor suffered one-hundred hits and kept up its diligent assault. The monitor was forced to withdraw when its pilot house crumbled down on top of its viewport. Kelly and his rebels had frustrated the tenth division’s multiple attempts to dislodge them.\textsuperscript{101}

In the wider sphere of the campaign Lee and Thomas made arrangement for a naval encirclement on the waterways surrounding the flank and rear of Nashville. Thomas was concerned about the enemy crossing the waters behind the city and cutting off lines of supply and communication. Lee and Thomas coordinated their efforts to block this possibility. Lee sent what forces he could and tried to attend in person, but the worsening winter weather and falling water levels left him stationed in nearby Clarksville. The naval blockade was not stable or mobile enough to block every enemy attempt at penetration. Confederate cavalry forded the waters behind the city and ravaged for a time before they were forced to return to their command. The blockade largely held firm in the face of most enemy attempts.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{101} ORN, Se. 1, Vol. 26: 664-668; Myron J. Smith Jr., \textit{Le Roy Fitch}, 307-310.

\textsuperscript{102} ORN, Se. 1, Vol. 26: 670-675; Myron J. Smith Jr., \textit{Le Roy Fitch}, 310-315.
Lee and Thomas were in constant communication and they synchronized their efforts at every turn. Thomas believed that his forces were properly assembled, equipped, and prepared. At the start of the campaign his army had been short on cavalry and he was fearful of this imbalance when compared to the enemy. Thomas made use of his naval assets as waterborne cavalry that served to keep track of the movements of his opponent and to counter these maneuvers. The battery at Bell Mills had to be taken care of and Thomas had the necessary components to deal with it. Thomas and Lee planned a joint mission that involved Fitch’s division working in concert with General Richard Johnson’s cavalry. The cavalry of Thomas and Lee were to strike at Bell Mills together.  

On the first day of the battle the foggy weather severely hindered visibility, but the Army of the Cumberland began its advance in all sectors. Fitch led his ironclads against the opposing battery and opened the attack not knowing when the cavalry would arrive. Fitch began a vigorous, but orderly attack as he did not wish to lob shells at his allies due to the heavy fog. Fitch was concerned as he did not know which direction the Union cavalry would approach from. During the naval bombardment Johnson’s troopers arrived to overtake the battery and the enemy retreated inland. Kelly’s Confederates repositioned their artillery pieces away from the river and continued the fight until they were routed. The dislodging of the rebel battery meant that Fitch had accomplished the reopening of the Cumberland River. Thomas told the War Department and Lincoln “I must not forget to report the operations of Brigadier General Johnson in successfully

driving the enemy, with the cooperation of the gunboats, under Lieutenant-Commander Fitch.” Thomas and his well-supplied army swept away Hood’s army in two days of battle. Thomas reorganized his command to pursue the fleeing rebels and requested Lee dispatch Fitch to Florence to destroy the pontoon bridges.

Lee concurred with Thomas and forwarded this directive to Fitch. Fitch had been actively and energetically serving the Union cause for the past two years without respite. He had just secured the free flow of traffic and wished to continue monitoring the resumption of trade. Lee consented to these wishes as he understood that Fitch was exhausted and that Lee now had the opportunity to command his forces in person. Fitch resumed his overseer role on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, while Lee assembled the greater portion of the squadron for a downriver push. Lee led his forces in person and communicated closely with Thomas in the final days of the campaign. Thomas told Lee that “Your efficient cooperation on the Tennessee River has contributed largely to the demoralization of Hood’s Army.” The Union efforts to entrap the remnants of the Army of the Tennessee failed as they escaped to Tupelo.

The Nashville campaign was largely fought by the Army of the Cumberland and saw it triumph decisively over a dilapidated enemy force. It was the last time that the rival armies faced off and these naval aspects tend to be overlooked. The Mississippi

104 ORN, Se. 1, Vol. 26: 670.


106 ORN, Se. 1, Vol. 26: 679.

Squadron was instrumental in the campaign for a combination of logistical, strategic, and tactical purposes. Lee’s men provided the logistics Thomas needed to fight the battle and served to protect his flanks. The tactical component demonstrates the physical way in which the gunboats played their role as a bombardment and scouting element. The campaign featured the firm and respectful partnership of Thomas and Lee as co-orchestrators in an effort to save the city of Nashville and dismantle the opposing army in the process. One possible factor in the success of this partnership is that both men were Virginians that sided with the Union and thus had a common ground for understanding. Lee and Thomas coordinated their forces with a persistent belief in maintaining a combined front. Thomas and Lee mutually supported one another and maintained a high degree of professional appreciation for one another throughout. Their collective efforts paid off handsomely as the enemy army was severely reduced and Nashville remained under Union control.

Fitch stepped up his role in the war during the campaign. He took over a job designed for two people and performed an escort service that helped ensure the Union position. Circumstances allowed Fitch to command the largest riverine flotilla assembled in the Cumberland River during the whole war and he personally directed its actions throughout. The fighting around Bell Mills shows an in-battle evolution in tactical approach that also serves to symbolically demonstrate the evolution in riverine warfare. In the first attempt Fitch used only naval forces to try to achieve the goal and it failed. In the second attempt Fitch put his faith in the ironclads to accomplish the mission, but this also failed. It was on the third attempt when Fitch’s ironclads were partnered with General Johnson’s cavalry that ultimate success was achieved. The fight at Bell Mills on
the first day of the battle constituted a well-designed and coordinated small-scale joint mission that occurred during a much larger engagement. The dynamic and flexible operational partnership of Lee, Thomas, and Fitch ended combined operations in the Western Theater on a triumphal high note.

The effective partnerships of Grant and the timberclad captains at Belmont and Shiloh, Kilty, Shirk and Fitch during the White River Expedition and the Battle of St. Charles, Phelps and Ellet during the Yazoo River Raid, and Lee, Fitch, and Thomas at Nashville are all examples of the importance of successful small scale combined operations. These operations demonstrate the importance of micro-cooperatives during wider campaigns and how they served to reinforce the Union war effort. Even though these joint operations were on a smaller scale, it is clear that the underlying reason for the continuous healthy Army-Navy partnership that was fostered throughout the war was due to these officers who showed their willingness to communicate, form professional bonds, and work together toward victory in the Western Theater.
CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION

The war in the West was waged through ongoing combined operations by the Federal Army and Navy. Union high command saw the theater as one in which branch cooperation was paramount and emphasized this position to local commanders. While rivalries between the service branches impacted every theater of the war, it was in the West where this division was at its weakest. The jurisdictional, administrative, logistical, and strategic realities of the war’s western theater created an environment that fostered and forced Army-Naval cooperation. Army jurisdiction over the inland waters led to the Navy being subordinate in this theater and this alleviated tensions that hindered other areas. The Western Flotilla itself was the byproduct of Army and Navy cooperation in the creation of a brown water force. The original and expanding roles of this force made it an integral component of the Union strategy in the West.

The professional cooperation of Army and Navy commanders was integral to the success of large campaigns and smaller actions. While there were outliers such as the Battle of Memphis where the nonexistent partnership of Charles Henry Davis and Charles Ellet were able to stumble to victory by circumstance, this hardly represented the norm. The success or failure of combined operations both large and small rested on the ability of the commanders to cooperate, communicate, discuss ideas, and to share credit in victory. This cooperation took on a variety of types and created different dynamics from partnership to partnership. Some partnerships had the time to develop while others only lasted the duration of the mission. The Army and Navy partners in combined operations lacked a common military education and most came from different regions. The senior
Navy commanders all hailed from the East Coast, while many of their partners were from the Midwest. The changing command of the flotilla meant that the continuity of a healthy Army-Navy relationship rested on the conduct of commanders with one another to overcome adverse circumstances. Gravely detrimental to the Federal war effort were failed partnerships in which the commanders let personal squabbles get in the way of completing the mission. The Union benefitted when its commanders put their professionalism ahead of their personal differences.

The popularity of the War in the East stole focus from the War in the West both during and after the conflict. This included academic and postwar military analysis for a long time. The story of the gunboats would be looked back to for inspiration during the Vietnam War. European military observers spent most of their time in the East, but did keep up with the war’s technological developments. Europeans noted the importance of river transport, but the overwhelming significance of railroads for European warfare overshadowed this notion. The armies of Europe overlooked the lessons of the American Civil War in favor of concurrent European conflicts. A select few such as Prussian Justus Scheibert and Garnet Wolseley concluded that the Federal Navy gave the Union unparalleled mobility, but the former warned against over reliance on a Navy. Wolseley and other British observers balked at the indecisive nature of American amphibious assaults and simply believed that any demonstrated successes merely reinforced the strengths of British doctrine.108

In the 1860s, The United States lacked a formal doctrine on combined operations which led to different results from theater to theater. In the East the efforts were largely abysmal and had rather limited effect on the Army of the Potomac’s ongoing effort to defeat the Army of Northern Virginia. It was in the West where the many conditions of the theater laid the foundation for ongoing joint missions and where Union offers largely put their professionalism ahead of personal squabbles and service rivalries. As a result, it was here that combined operations had their greatest impact on the war. It was these professional partnerships in joint operations in the West that laid the cornerstone for Union victory over the Confederacy.

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Maps


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