Terrorism And Organized Crime: An Analytical Study From An International Law Perspective

Leila Mejdoubi
University of Southern Mississippi

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ABSTRACT

With the spread of terrorism and its growing risks since the start of the 21st century, a wide range of reports and studies have emerged. This funding comes from a special relationship between terrorist organizations, organized crime syndicates, and their cooperation with each other, which has enabled terrorist organizations in particular to carry out recruitment efforts and operations alike. It has also fueled an international black market for smuggling and trade in drugs and arms. Under what conditions do violent terrorist groups driven by extreme Islamist ideology collaborate with organized criminal enterprises to generate the requisite resources to pursue their strategic objectives? Given that question, this thesis assessed the extent of the validity of the following hypothesis/central argument: As Islamist extremist terrorist groups’ financial needs increase, they are more likely to use collaboration with organized criminal enterprises, relative to other sources, as their principal means of funding. It has also assessed the extent of the argument through the presentation of comparative case studies on Western Europe and the Sahel of North/West Africa. The findings indicate that the lines of demarcation between terrorist groups and criminal organizations operating in both Western Europe and the Sahel are becoming increasingly blurred. It could, reasonably, be argued that terrorism in Western Europe and the Sahel of North/West Africa is a variant of serious organized crime in view of the modus operandi of Islamist extremist movements and their mode of financing.
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I would like, especially, to thank Dr. Tom Lansford and Dr. Joseph St. Marie for accepting to be the committee members of this thesis. My thanks also go to Ms. Annette Copeland for her help and advices during this process.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my mother, Dr. Robert Pauly, Dr. Deanne Stephens, and Dr. Kate Greene. Thank you all for the help and encouragement during my graduate study.
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CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of terrorism is manifested in violence, which pervades the international system and domestic societies of the states interacting therein. In spite of the growing danger of terrorism, there is no universally accepted definition of that term, nor is there any domestic consensus on such a definition among governmental institutions in the United States. The lack of either American domestic or broader international consensus on that issue is hardly surprising, given the range of ideological, theological and doctrinal backgrounds involved, with respect to academics, policy makers and practitioners and, for that matter, countries and their populations. That lack of consensus, in turn, hampers the development of domestic and international legal frameworks and conventions to manage the range of threats that terrorist organizations pose.

Those domestic and international security threats of terrorism have increased dramatically over the last three decades generally and especially since the start of the 21st century. In fact, September 11, 2001 marks a milestone in the history of transnational terrorism with Al Qaeda’s attacks against the United States that day representing a significant escalation in the dangers posed by organizations inspired by extreme interpretation of Islam in particular. Furthermore, since the events of 9/11, there has been a marked increase in the number of terrorist attacks carried out by members and supporters of Islamist extremist groups against targets across the Greater Middle East, as well as, increasingly, in the West. Such attacks are carried out in very precise and sophisticated ways, taking advantage of modern technology, and causing great losses, almost equivalent to the losses of regular wars, whether in lives, property or installations.
For example, there was an increase in fatalities committed by Sinai Province of the Islamic State in Egypt from two in 2016 to five in 2017.

This thesis addresses the following research question: Under what conditions do violent terrorist groups driven by extreme Islamist ideology collaborate with organized criminal enterprises to generate the requisite resources to pursue their strategic objectives? Given that question, it assesses the extent of the validity of the following hypothesis/central argument: As Islamist extremist terrorist groups’ financial needs increase, they are more likely to use collaboration with organized criminal enterprises, relative to other sources, as their principal means of funding. The dependent variable is the choice of funding sources and the independent variable is the increased demand for funds. The thesis assesses the extent of the validity of the hypothesis through a comparative analysis of the Western European cases to include France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Spain and the African Sahel region cases of Nigeria, Mali Niger, and Algeria.

Synopsis of Relevant Literature

With respect to the central issues under consideration in order to assess the extent of the validity of the hypothesis, this thesis builds on Tamara Makarenko’s The Crime–Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay Between Transnational Organised Crime And Terrorism, Louise I. Shelly and John T. Picarelli’s Methods And Motives: Exploring Links Between Transnational Organized Crime And International Terrorism, John Rollins, Liana Sun Wiler and Seth Rosen’s International Terrorism and Transnational

With respect to the history of terrorism in general, Cindy Combs (1997) finds, in her book, *Terrorism in The Twenty-First Century*, that the terrorist phenomenon is more complex to conceptualize than it first appears. The ideological interpretations, coupled with the will to introduce a demonizing connotation when the term is used by states, blurs the tracks.¹ Further, Kegley (2003) states that it may be a fault to begin by recalling that the use of terror serves to terrorize historically, which, was the role of the organized force, at least when one considers a despotic regime. This is still the case in non-democratic countries. In others, in wartime, terror can be legitimate, including terrorist attacks against civilians.²

Furthermore, Wright (2006) finds that religiously motivated terrorism is conceived as a transcendental act. Justified by religious authorities, it gives any license to those authors who carry out acts of terrorism.³ The number of victims and their identities do not matter. There is no judge above the cause for which the terrorists sacrifice themselves. The perpetrators of the first attack against the World Trade Center in

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February 1993, which was only partially successful, had beforehand, obtained a fatwa from Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who died in a U.S Federal prison.\(^4\)

Gilbert Geis (1996) states that organized crime has always been a phenomenon of power, politics and economy. Higher-level criminal organizations and mafia in general, generate order, norms, values, identities, subcultures, and belief systems. They modify their environment and shape it to their hand in order to constitute the most favorable biotope.\(^5\) It is also about systems of power that are sometimes hidden and invisible. Ruth (1967) explains that organized crime governs rather unseen, but actually governs, both side by side and in addition to legal institutions.\(^6\) This implies that the criminal power is not only economic but political and social. A rooted and territorialized criminal entity becomes a political unit. This political unit of criminal nature assumes political functions in the controlled territories: settlement of conflicts (justice), deduction of tax (taxation), public order (police), assistance to the most disadvantaged citizens (social transfers). For example, the Italian mafias must be analyzed as criminal realities intimately related to the bourgeoisie. Thus, the Sicilian mafia was born in the form of a crime of power, at the top,

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while the Ndrangheta followed the reverse course. The latter grew out of a popular crime and was then applied to developing the power of crime.\(^7\)

According to Mullins and Wither (2016), the notions of terrorism and organized crime have always been ambiguous. In fact, each can designate a form of organization or a type of activity, an entity or mode of operation and do so concurrently. Thus, organized crime designates both groups both geographically (motorcycle gangs, maras, Cosa nostra Siciliana, Los Angeles Bloods and Crips) and as forms of criminal activity (cigarette smuggling, public market rigging, extortion of funds, and assassinations). The same goes for terrorism, which can be used to label (negatively) political entities, but also, in a less subjective way, to describe operational tactics, such as serial assassinations and car bombings; the same word can be used to designate an enemy by essentializing and demonizing it or to describe tactics of struggle, a method.\(^8\)

Hoffman (2017) finds that the archetypal terrorist network with international ramifications is the al-Qaeda network, to include the core that originated in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s and range of Islamist extremist affiliates that have emerged since 9/11. Therefore, it is mainly against this network and its numerous branches that the global fight against terrorism is organized.\(^9\)

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This thesis focuses on religious extremism. In fact, the rise of religiosity among younger generations of Muslims in the developing world as well as the West seems to be a phenomenon of great magnitude. The fundamental role of Salafist ideology in the process of radicalization is real, especially among the younger generations of Muslims across the Greater Middle East and the West. These young people say they have been raised religiously and do not report conflicts with their parents about religion. Therefore, it is a religious radicalization in an environment that is itself religious. As Jocelyn Cesari (2003) notes: “While the social status of their fathers or grandfathers was defined by their economic roles, this second generation, born and educated in Europe, forced Western governments and societies to confront the cultural and political consequences of migration.”

Terrorism is a real threat to human existence, civilization and achievements throughout the world. It is practiced in the North as practiced in the South, as well as the West. Moreover, the danger of terrorism is also increasing, given significant growth in the number of terrorist organizations that carry out terrorism that involves unlimited violence and it is not restricted by law or morals.

Organized Crime typically involves a very serious criminal organization, in which the perpetrator is transformed into a permanent member of a criminal cell, a specialized criminal function and a criminal act occupying a function within the criminal organization’s structure.\textsuperscript{13} Such gangs are organized by a criminal organization based on a hierarchical cluster structure that includes cluster cells of groups of criminals spread throughout the country.\textsuperscript{14} As the phenomenon of money laundering is part of organized crime, it can also be linked to international drug cartels and some businessmen to launder their dirty money through the financing of terrorist organizations.\textsuperscript{15}

This thesis will build upon the concept of hybridization which accounts for criminological misbehavior. Two mirroring processes work here: a politicization of crime and a criminalization of politics. By way of illustration, the question on narcoterrorism will be specifically examined.

Methodology

The methodology employed in this thesis is a comparative qualitative case study analysis, with emphases on the linkages between Islamist extremist terrorist organizations


and organized criminal enterprises in Europe (France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Spain) and North and West Africa (Nigeria, Mali, Niger, and Algeria), respectively. This use of the case study is descriptive, exploratory and explanatory, allowing for a chronological description of events along with historical analysis. This study encompasses the definition of terrorism and organized crime, explores the relationship between terrorism and organized crime, and distinguishes the extent to which terrorism and organized crime are similar or different from each other. It also explores the relationship between terrorist groups and organized criminal groups and tactics, particularly money laundering.

Organizational Structure of Thesis

The balance of the thesis includes seven chapters, which unfold in the following manner. Chapter II reviews the relevant literature on terrorism, organized crime and the relationship between the two. Chapter III presents a thorough explanation of the qualitative comparative case study approach employed. Chapter IV presents the case studies of Western Europe and North Africa/West Africa. Chapter V presents the comparative analyses of the case studies drawn from Western Europe and North Africa/West Africa. Chapter VI concludes the thesis by assessing the extent of the validity of the hypothesis/central argument on the basis of the evidence presented in the main chapters and offering policy recommendations on how best to combat terrorism and organized crime.
CHAPTER II- LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Investigations into the links between terrorist groups and organized criminal organizations have long been hampered by the idea that these two types of organizations pursue different, ultimately irreconcilable objectives, with criminals seeking profits, and terrorists driven by ideological goals.\(^{16}\) This dichotomy led some scholars to suggest that terrorist groups were unlikely to engage in criminal activity, as it would be contrary to their ideological goals.

But in reality, and for several decades, there have been intersections and common interests between criminal organizations and terrorist organizations. By the 1980s, when Pablo Escobar and the Colombian drug cartels in Medellin and Cali were in full swing, experts defined “narcoterrorism” and considered whether it was a concrete example of permeability between the criminal world and the terrorist world. Similarly, it is widely acknowledged that the aims pursued by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, a group that has been smuggling cigarettes and counterfeit goods since its creation, are sometimes criminal, sometimes ideological.\(^{17}\)

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This chapter explains that with the fall of the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, there has been a marked reduction in state-sponsored financing of terrorism: “The end of the Cold War also altered the calculations of the few nations identified by the United States as sponsors of terrorism. It reduced support from and protection by the Soviet Union—as in Syria, a patron of the Palestinians.”

As a result, terrorist organizations found themselves in a critical situation, lacking resources: they used serious crime as a substitute means of financing. Today, there are certainly myriad examples of organized crime outside terrorism, but there is no longer a global terrorist organization without contact with criminal networks. There is even an incorporation of transnational crime networks into the terrorist organization. The chapter reviews the existing literature on terrorism, organized crime, and the nexus between terrorism and organized crime.

The organizational structure of the chapter follows this order respectively: Terrorism, Organized crime, the Nexus between Terrorism and Organized Crime, Terrorism and Organized Crime—Similarities and Differences, and Contribution to Existing Literature.

Terrorism

With the exception of inter- and intra-state wars, there is no worse form of political violence than terrorism. Terrorist violence, like war, reached its peak in the

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twentieth century, so much so that no country was totally spared from it. Organizations that carried out terrorist attacks in the United States often engaged in other types of legal and illegal behavior. Seventy-nine of these groups participated in non-violent political activities, and 55 carried out conventional crimes in addition to terrorist violence. It is a heinous act that has accompanied humanity for millennia. If the term “terrorism” is new, the phenomenon itself is old; the word has been used so widely that it now often refers to very different realities, sometimes far removed from what it originally covered.

Paul Pillar (2001) finds that like all political phenomena, terrorism is defined by the duality between a set of proclaimed ideals and their implementation. And like all political phenomena, terrorism exists only in a cultural and historical context. For three decades, the effects of Marxist ideology on terrorist movements has married the fortunes of the latter; today, terrorist groups with Marxist motivations are a clear minority, whereas they were predominant in the 1970s and 1980s.

Furthermore, in his article “Definition of Terrorism – Social and Political Effects,” Gregor Bruce explains that the definition of terrorism is still controversial. However, it is on the political plane that the differences are apparent, because what one state perceives and characterizes as terrorism, another does not. Each state explains the


phenomenon, according to its national interests. At the doctrinal level, the phenomenon is defined more or less identically, except that some authors remove its political characteristic.22

Richard Jackson (2008) notes that terrorism is a criminal phenomenon that threatens the whole of mankind as long as it aims not only for the destruction of property, but also serious and dangerous harm to civilians and members of the military alike, regardless of their sex, age, religion or race. It does not only concern underdeveloped or developing states, but also highly developed states in the American and European continents.23

Hoffman (1999) emphasizes the importance of cultural factors in motivating religiously inspired terrorist movements, more than those driven by strictly ideological or nationalist movements. Groups such as Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and their many affiliates mix political or pseudo-political aspirations (the destruction of Israel or the United States) with extreme and often perverted interpretations of Islam that prove useful for recruiting purposes and is, therefore, similar to the ideological element of other movements.24

There are few similarities between terrorist organizations and the governments of the states in the international system. The nature of this opposition often defines the character of a given terrorist movement. Where states are mainly rational actors, terrorist movements often have a strongly emotional character. J. Corllett (1997) explains that where the modern state apparatus operates on the principles of a “realist” policy and on the basis of maintaining stability in the international system through the balance of power, terrorist movements emphasize a strong moral current (whose code varies according to the employed ideology) and a weak-to-strong strategy that focuses on the psychological effects inflicted on the adversary.25 Raymond Aron (1966) expressed this phenomenon incisively in the following terms: “A violent action is denominated terrorist when its psychological effects are out of proportion with its purely physical results.”26

Michael Moran (2006) finds that Western tradition considers legitimate only the violence practiced by the state. This restrictive conception of the use of terror does not focus on those who do not have other means to try to reverse a situation deemed oppressive because the legitimacy of a terrorist action manifests itself through the objectives of these agents.27 Studies drawing on interviews of former terrorists suggest


that the idea of “the end justifies the means” is at the base of most terrorist actions. It is the cause of the terrorist movement rather than its mode of action that is likely to be considered moral.28

Organized Crime

Organized crime is a paradoxical object. To the extent that the perpetration of a crime is an event, it is theoretically possible to observe its progress. Therefore, the membership of an offense under the organized crime category is the product of knowledge and not an observation, and, hence, the importance of identifying the sources of that knowledge. Knowledge about organized crime is characterized by both its abundance and its scarcity.29 As on the terrorism, there is a growing plethora of alarming works which rely on sources of the last hand, of which the validity is not controlled. On the other hand, the works with a scientific character which rely on rigorous data are few in number.

One of the oldest notions of the criminal law is that of premeditation which turns into a consultation when two people unite to commit a crime. From a lone criminal act to organized criminal enterprise, there is only one step. It is vain to attempt to lengthen this step by substituting the word “crime” for that of crime to produce a clear distinction between organized crime and an event crime. The overlaps between the content of

notions such as premeditation, concertation, and organization actually show that they are imprecise. It is not judicious to add to this inaccuracy by classifying under one and the same kind all forms of crime that are likely to have a collective author.\(^{30}\)

Even if the rapprochement between these delinquencies can be proved in some light, it is necessary to renounce embracing at the same time terrorism, delinquency, professions (for example, medical delinquency), criminality of businesses and organized crime later to unite these concepts after having adequately distinguished them. Not only there is no definition of organized crime at the moment, but many doubt that it is possible to produce one.\(^{31}\) Most of the definitions are very prolix, such as the one proposed by the United Nations, which is based on a paragraph including excerpts of no less than five international conventions.\(^{32}\)

A current strategy adopted as much by researchers and jurists as by practitioners is to formulate a set of traits specific to a criminal organization: organized crime is then conceived as the product of such an organization, characterized by its possession of a part or all of the listed traits. The list most frequently quoted is that of the Council of the


European Union, updated to 1999.\textsuperscript{33} Organized would be the fact of organizations possessing the following traits:

1/ A collaboration between more than two people
2/ (involving) specific tasks assigned to each of them
3/ over a relatively long or indefinite period
4/ with a form of discipline or control
5/ suspected of committing serious criminal offenses
6/ acting at international level
7/ resorting to violence or other means of intimidation
8/ using commercial structures
9/ engaging in money laundering
10/ influencing political circles, the media, the administration, the public, the judiciary or the economy
11/ acting for power or profit

All of these traits show how misleading the passive expression of “organized” crime can be. In fact, the majority of these traits are stated in the present participle, which indicates that this type of crime is less organized than it is organized.\textsuperscript{34} This list contains several flaws in many ways. Some of the traits it contains are overdetermined. In this


respect, feature 10 uses the polyvalent notion of influence, which can be interpreted as corruption according to whether it is exercised on the apparatus of the State or as subversion (or infiltration) when it is exerted on the legal economy.

The concomitance of these two practices can produce effects of economic and social destabilization that are more or less sensitive according to their magnitude. Traits 2 and 4—the specialization of tasks and discipline—remain unclear as to the hierarchical nature of the criminal organization (the presence of this character is the issue of sustained debate). Predictably, the list is incomplete: several researchers insist on the willingness of these organizations to exercise a monopoly on one or more traffickings in a given territory. This willingness is manifested by the endemic conflicts between these organisms.

The decisive test for this list is its contemporaneity. It is agreed that organized criminality is a specifically modern phenomenon, the first manifestations of which were identified, in the early 1930s in the United States, as gangsterism. Piracy is one of the oldest forms of crime. All the above-mentioned features, except 4, apply to it. Therefore, it is among those that do not apply as such to piracy: the use of commercial-type structures, money laundering, corruption, and the infiltration of the legal economy, that can be found to be one of the keys to the specificity of organized crime, namely its

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transactional nature.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, piracy is a form of predation, while organized crime is a delinquency of supply, which in this respect takes an original place alongside the two main traditional types of delinquency: the delinquency against property and against people. Even if theft plays a significant role in organized crime (for example, large networks of theft and concealment of motor vehicles or works of art), the bulk of these operations involve the resale of huge profits from products that were first bought from those who produce them (drugs, weapons), who obtain them (poaching of threatened species) or who have custody of them (nuclear materials).\textsuperscript{37}

Similarly, even if organized crime is characterized by its violence, it only uses it in an instrumental and relatively parsimonious way, since it harms business. Therefore, one could conclude that much of the organized crime consists of unlawful activities of supplying goods or services that are partially or wholly prohibited and in the illicit recycling of profits from such traffic. The main markets exchanging people (prostitution and slavery), organs, animals living or hunting for a part of their body (skin, ivory, horn), and various raw products or manufactures (drugs, alcohol, cigarettes, weapons and various substances whose circulation is prohibited or impeded).\textsuperscript{38} The most frequent services historically were protection and mediation; they now reside in the illegal passage

\begin{itemize}
of immigrants and the manufacture of false papers. In this perspective, organized crime would appear as the continuation of economic trade by other means.

During the 1990s, the concept of organized crime met with considerable success and circulated in many professional circles. An impressive list of scholarly books, peer reviewed articles, specialized magazines, websites, study centers and research centers were devoted to it. In fact, Berry (2003) contends that organized crime, which is an old phenomenon, finds a favorable ground for expansion with the globalization of the economy and the development of intercultural communication. Consequently, organized crime in its various forms, namely drug trafficking, trafficking in human organs, trafficking in nuclear substances and weapons, including firearms, smuggling of migrants, the opening and management of places of prostitution, corruption, laundering of proceeds of crime and terrorism, worries the international community.39

In addition, Beare and Naylor (1999) find that the purpose of these crimes is not only economic and financial, procuring colossal sums to their authors, but also political. The progression of organized crimes poses economic, political and security threats to international society.40 Therefore, in order to combat organized crime as a global scourge, many states, favor close cooperation in response. The adoption of certain international instruments in this field is precisely the result of this international cooperation.


Phil Williams (2009) explains that organized crime can be viewed from a political point of view, as some criminal organizations use violence to bend states to their demands. Terrorism is the best-known example. They may also have their own assets seized, as for criminal organizations that seek significant profits through organized international criminal enterprises.\footnote{Phil, Williams, “Criminals, Militias, And Insurgents: Organized Crime In IRAQ,”} Therefore, they can control the economy of the states by investing in different sectors and at the same time committing other crimes. Drug trafficking, for example, endangers public health and hygiene, but also includes other offenses associated with the activities of a given organization. The international community, having become aware of the harmful consequences of this crime, mobilized itself from the beginning of the 20th century by adopting in 1912 the International Convention against Opium.\footnote{The 1912 Hague International Opium Convention,”}

According to Europol, more than 5,000 “organized criminal groups”, most of them transnational, were being investigated within European Union (EU) member states in 2017. “You have the famous Italian, Russian or Chinese mafias” explains Fabrice Rizzoli, doctor of political science and author of the book The Mafia From A to Z. “But you also have bikers in the Scandinavian countries, who are biker criminalized groups as the Hells Angels or the big traffickers. Spanish drug gangs, the gangs that distribute it in the UK, or the big German launderers, are just as dangerous,” he explains. “The mafia


would not exist without the accomplices bankers, lawyers, judges, entrepreneurs, politicians ..." In fact, criminal revenues from illicit trafficking in drugs and tobacco, counterfeiting, VAT fraud and cargo theft, are worth 110 billion euros a year in Europe, according to Transcrime. This Italian research center, of several universities, published, in 2015, a Portfolio of organized crime in Europe, devoted to its infiltration of the legal economy via money laundering.

The Nexus between Terrorism and Organized Crime

During the Cold War, terrorism was a game with clearly established and quite rational rules. Its actors were clearly identified by their understandable motivations and methods. States used terrorist tactics to circumvent the “Nuclear Maginot line”. At that historical juncture, terrorism was an instrument of “coerced diplomacy” reporting more on the dialogue than pure war. As for terrorist organizations, often linked to states, they evolve in theoretical and operational controlled frameworks. The emblematic figures of this type of terrorism included the late Libyan leader Moammar Khadafi and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.


With the end of the bipolar confrontation, all these certainties disappeared. Yet, some “political” actors have committed brutal criminal acts. Examples include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Front Libération of Corsica, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Workers’ Party of Kurdistan. And some, criminal actors have been “politicized” to the point of growing more reliant on terrorist tactics (Cosa Nostra, drug cartels in Latin America, and Chinese Triads, for instance.).\(^4^5\)

Therefore, terrorism has become commonplace, democratized, destructured and largely de-ideologized, to the point of contaminating entities hitherto remote from such practices especially sectarians, ecologists, and trade unions. These new politico-criminal actors are now more unpredictable, and their violence has taken on a partly irrational dimension. In short, terrorism was a purely political tool that has also become an ordinary criminal instrument.\(^4^6\)

In fact, the line of demarcation between the bandit and the terrorist/guerrilla has not stopped fading. Distinctions multiply perpetually. The first breach appeared in the 1980s with the notion of narcoterrorism: A new expression was needed to describe an unprecedented phenomenon, which manifestly fell badly into one or the other frozen categories of terrorism and organized crime. Since then, the literature has acknowledged that lines of demarcation between political and criminal organization are scrambled. As


pointed out by Tamara Makarenko (2004), a continuum has supplanted the categories and walls of the past: at one end of the spectrum, there are pure political entities; to the other, pure criminal entities exist; between the two, there is a “gray area,” including a kaleidoscope of hybrid actors, with situations where organized crime and terrorism are indistinguishable. From a certain stage, it is a question of “common cause convergence”.47

These interactions between organized crime and ideological groups can be manifested through cooperation and alliances, the involvement of ideological groups in criminal activities or, conversely, the involvement of ideological groups in political activities. Makarenko, for example, bases her argument on a “black hole syndrome” or thriving political crime and commercial terrorism.48

The concept of continuum suggests that a change in the motivations of political groups will occur over the long term because of their increasing immersion in criminal activities. As this immersion takes place, the political entity changes little in nature: The means becomes ends. Building on Tamara Makarenko’s work, Louise I. Shelly and John T. Picarelli’s the terror-crime interaction spectrum in 2005; They consider five dynamics of interactions.49

Terrorist groups and criminal groups can adopt each others’ methods, imitatively, without working together (activity appropriation). Thus, terrorist group engages in criminal activities such as trafficking of illegal narcotics, cigarettes, and human beings, while criminal organizations commits acts of terrorism. These groups do not cooperate but borrow the typical activity of the other. 50

The next step is that of contact or nexus in the form of the exchange of goods, expertise or services between terrorist and criminal groups including false documents and transportation. A third step is taken when the groups deepen their cooperation by creating procedures or structures for business relations leading to a symbiosis (symbiotic relationship). Thus, the relations are maintained, for example, by the UCK with the Albanian mafia or FARC with drug cartels. 51 Another example is the increasing relations between Islamist extremist terrorist organizations, especially ISIS, with criminal organizations that facilitate terrorist activities in exchange for large sums of money. These ties had grown stronger because criminal organizations became a broker for terrorists in setting up black markets to sell petroleum wealth that ISIS has looted and has smuggled from Syria and Iraq through Turkey. 52

The fourth stage emerges when the criminal group begins to share the ideological objectives of the terrorists: a hybrid or dark network. This organization pursues both

50. Ibid, 53.
51. Ibid, 62.
political and criminal goals. Finally, the last step is that of transformation, when a terrorist group is so involved in predatory economic activities that it becomes a criminal activity.\textsuperscript{53} The organization, then, focuses as much on traditional criminal activities as on terrorism. For example, Salafist ideology is not so much a goal as a mean: it is a mask of predatory motivations (violence, money, power). Consequently, dangerous entities can no longer fall into single categories, either political or criminal. A phenomenon of mixing and crossing occurred between the bandit and the political (weapon). This is the definition of hybridization.\textsuperscript{54}

Starting from the analyzes of Shelley and Picarelli considered above, this thesis develops and applies a model built around four figures of hybridization. The first three are dynamic and historical and will thus be distinguished through processes of cooperation, convergence and mutation. The fourth figure is topographic: territorial coexistence.

The first stage of hybridization is embryonic. It is a question of the existence of long-term means of cooperation (links, contacts, exchanges, alliances) that criminal and political groups, still separate and distinct, develop according to opportunistic and utilitarian logics. In this still narrow perspective, it is important to note the work of John Rollins, Liana Sun Wiler and Seth Rosen (2010), who identify and explain the incentives that allow for the development and maintenance of such relationships. Violent actors are also rational actors. They know how to adopt strategies, both individually and

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, 62.

collectively, perform cost/benefit calculations, maximize their gains (materials, symbolic, policies) and minimize their losses.\textsuperscript{55} For example, Medellin cartel asked the guerrillas of the Eln to make carriages traps when failing to dispose of this knowledge.\textsuperscript{56} In the 1980s, Camorra collaborated with Red Brigades in kidnapping and assassination operations.\textsuperscript{57}

The second level of hybridization is that of convergence. The political and criminal entities tend to resemble each other. Their structure and methods are mirrored by imitation. Terrorism borrows the methods of criminals and vice versa. Louise Shelly, et al. (2005) note that as a matter of practice, specialists consider that only structures and methods converge, not objectives: “Methods, not Motives”, to summarize.\textsuperscript{58}

The third level is that of a convergence pushed at the end of its logic and leading to the fusion of political and criminal entities, in other words to a mutation (transformation) pure and simple. Groups become indistinctly both political (terrorist guerrilla) and criminal. Terrorist entities and criminal entities share the same methods but also the same purpose or motives.\textsuperscript{59} Then, the violent scene involves criminal groups with

\begin{itemize}
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political aims and terrorist groups with criminal aims. In fact, they are multi-faceted and multi-purpose groups, kinds of conglomerates of causes.

The idea that a human organism can fulfill at the same time two objectives, one political (terrorist) the other economic (criminal predator), shocks a number of analysts. However, complex organisms, including states, are already pursuing multiplied and often contradictory goals. In such situations, seemingly political or criminal groups recruit the same individuals who have the potential to be “terrorist in the day, criminals at night”.

Thus, Justine A Rosenthal (2008) describes the emergence of a terrorism sui generis. She notes that terrorism-for-profit by kidnapping individuals and holding them for ransom or producing and distributing illegal narcotics is a classic criminal activity, one that is legitimized by a varnish or an ideological facade. These new terrorists have a “malleable” ideology that allows them to work with anyone. Afghanistan, Iraq or Africa since the 1990s, are the privileged theaters of evolution for these new hybrid politically and economically motivated armed entrepreneurs.

In the end, Tamara Makarenko contends: “most criminal and terrorist groups operational in the 1990s and into the twenty-first century have developed the capacity to engage in both criminal and terrorist activities.” Furthermore, Shelley and Picarelli consider that this phenomenon of ultimate symbiosis between terrorism and organized crime is observed particularly in “regions of the world where combinations of poor

60. Tamara, Makarenko, 130.
62. Tamara, Makarenko, 133.
governance, ethnic separatism and/or a tradition of criminal activity that are most likely to support crime-terror interactions—such as failed states, war regions, penal institutions and some neighborhoods of urban centers”.

According to Boaz Ganor (2012), who bases his point of view primarily on the long-term observation of Lebanese Hezbollah, a hybrid terrorist organization acts simultaneously on two levels. The first concerns are pseudo-legitimate and voluntary activities: benefits related to charity, social protection, education and religion but also political activities at the municipal and national levels. The second concerns are illegitimate and illegal activities related to political violence and terrorism involving the demand for and the conduct of attacks. For example, in Egypt, if the Muslim Brotherhood is never directly involved in targeted terrorist acts and assassinations, such as the one that killed President Sadat in 1981, they still pull the strings, favoring oriented action towards indoctrination and phagocytizing of the society that they take as a hostage, leaving armed action to their radicalized followers who obviously lose control, as was in the case in Algeria with the Islamic Salvation Front and the armed groups born of its ideological matrix.

The United States has made the phenomenon of the hybridization of criminal species an important element of their reflection, as evidenced by the document setting the

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63. Louise, Shelley & John, Picarelli, 53.
national security strategy published in July 2011 during the first term of President Barack H. Obama, US strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, which is pointedly subtitled Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. This study notes that the processes of hybridization are facilitated by the existence of half-world intermediaries and facilitators (bankers, law firms, communicators, and real estate agents), which, at the same time, help the political and criminal entities to whiten their activities (money and image), and consequently, contribute to bring them closer together.66

According to Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur (2011), the growth of organized crime does not simply represent globalization in a classical way. It is, in fact, one of the most active drivers. High crime has come out of its reserve and its traditional, geographical, and psychological limits: it has discovered many horizons of profit, corruption and alliance.67

On the other hand, political entities are criminalizing. In 2012, the United States Department of State described more than 20 foreign terrorist organizations as having benefited from criminal financing,68 including, most notably, Somalian Al Shebab, Colombia National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), Hezbollah, Haqqani Network,


and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), even if such lists do not escape the subjectivity, because of the qualifier of “terrorist” and the diplomatic contingencies.

During the Northern Ireland conflict (1968-1998), loyalist and Catholic Protestant paramilitary groups had access to funding from common law crime, with racketeering, armed robbery, drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and user loans the principal methods employed. In the Philippines, the armed struggle experienced an identical criminal drift. In 1990, the meeting between a young Islamist militant Abdurajack Janjalani and Mohammed Al-Khalifa, Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden’s brother-in-law, gave birth to Islamist extremist terrorist the group called Abu Sayyaf on the southern island of Mindano. That group then began to, carry out attacks against the Christian churches and targeted assassinations. The group practiced kidnapping for ransom. After Janjalani’s death of his leader in 1998, “Abu Sayyaf” turned to recruiting members from criminalized armed gangs, rather than retaining radical Islam as a useful façade.

Michael E. Carter explains: “Abu Sayyaf is also expanding operations to include global jihad, aligning themselves with bin Laden’s zeal in attacking infidels throughout the world.”

The investment of a political entity in large-scale criminal activities never exists without tactical and strategic consequences. Having increased income radically changes the equation of relations with the state and society. As Chris Dishman (2001) points out, terrorist groups or guerrillas, believing that their causes had become “futile,” decided to turn themselves into criminal organizers while retaining a convenient “political banner.”

From 1989 on, the criminologist Rachel Ehrenfeld describes in her report Narco-Terrorism: The Kremlin Connection as the growing links between terrorists and drug traffickers who thus cooperate or unite. In Central Asia, for example, Afghanistan deserves careful consideration. Even though the country has always had heroin production, it did not really take off until after the Soviet defeat in 1989 and the end of funding by the foreign states of the Islamist mujahedeen rebels. Afghanistan has quickly become a narcoeconomy and the world’s largest producer of opium whose commerce provides three quarters of the GDP of the country. Opium is no longer just a source of funding for armed groups, but the main issue of contention in the 1990s intra-state conflict between Afghan warlords such as Rachid Dostom and Gullbuddin Hekmatayar.

Since then, all armed groups and some Afghan government officials are in one way or another influenced by the revenues of opium production and distribution. The Taliban behave like other narco traffickers and since the decade of 2000 are not just

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taxing producers and traffickers: they protect or even own laboratories. Starting from a study of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan between 1994 and 2008, James A Piazza (2012) showed that there was a causal link between the level of opium production and the likelihood of terrorist attacks. In other words, opium is not a single mode of operation but a goal of war in itself, explaining the place and frequency of attacks. James A. Piazza points out that while drug trafficking has proliferated in Afghanistan due to the instability occasioned by the Soviet invasion of 1979, the same traffic is also a sustaining force for terrorism. Terrorism has not led to the emergence of opium trafficking. Opium trafficking, on the other hand, explains the development of terrorism. Opium is a cause not an effect of terrorism.

**Terrorism And Organized Crime-Similarities And Differences**

In many respects, terrorism is just like organized crime. For example, many ways to protect oneself from terrorism also serves as effective safeguards against organized crime. And yet, in many cases, this is tantamount to confusing a tennis ball and an automobile on the pretext that you can stop both with a brick wall. This is a first source of confusion, based on police means. One second, based on the damage, could be stated as follows: it is obvious that those who die at the hands of terrorists or organized criminals are no more or less dead, their relatives are not more or less saddened by identity or the motives of their attacker.

75. Ibid, 230.
These forms of confusion, omnipresent in the media, are also very often found in scholarly literature. Recently, the mode of network analysis has also shown the existence of similarities in the organization of criminal groups and terrorist groups.76 The difficulties of defining terrorism are well known, but the concept of organized crime is not much better.77 If we want to avoid the tautologies and pitfalls that arise when we want to make a solid distinction between the level of “organization” of a group of young grafters and that of Cosa Nostra, we must use a more sociological definition, as used by Kostiukovsky (2003): “a coherent set of social interactions created by a desire for illicit profit”78. As for terrorism, the definitions are legion (Schmid and Jongman, 1988, have made a magisterial census)79, but for the purposes of this research, terrorism is simplified by describing it as the application of coercive violence to achieve one or more political objective(s). Therefore, the difference seems to be the motives: on the one hand profit and on the other hand a range of infinite political rationalities.

Two details still need to be brought. The first is that in both cases, it is the actual activities that underlie the identification and not the identity of the individuals or groups


The major difference between these groups and those more clearly focused on terrorism is the control of a territory, which makes the typical guerrilla group a quasi-state organization, applying some generalized social control, no doubt collecting “revolutionary taxes”, carrying out large-scale financial operations, often equipped with a more or less developed bureaucracy, and engaged in an open military conflict with the official authorities. Mancur Olson (1993) notes: “a stationary bandit has an encompassing
interest in the territory he controls and accordingly provides domestic order and other
public goods.” The second clarification deals with terrorist support activities: helping
people by hiding them, by crossing borders, and so on; recruiting new members; training,
educating these members, financing the activities of the group, and acquiring the
necessary equipment (whose possession is often illegal or controlled).

The first aspect of similarities between terrorist groups and criminal groups is the
tactics both employ. Violence is an intrinsic part of both spheres of activity and its tools
tend to converge towards firearms and explosive products. A part from violence, note that
several tools are used by all.

A second type of similarity is centered around the question of financing, as all
organizations must raise some money to be able to function. It should be noted, however,
that the needs of terrorism are very low. For example, the worst case of terrorist attack in
Canada, the bombing of Air India Flight 182 and the device that exploded prematurely at
Narita Airport in Tokyo, was done with a few hundred dollars, including the price airline
tickets; Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005 were even cheaper.

84. Mancur, Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, And Development,” The American

MOUNTED POLICE 2017, accessed December 10, 2018, http://www.rcmp-

86. Brian, Phillips, “Terrorist Tactics By Criminal Organizations: The Mexican
Case In Context,” PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM 12, no.1 (2018):49, accessed
December 10, 2018,
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-
terrorism/2018/03-terrorist-tactics-by-criminal-organizations---the-mexican-case-in-
In fact, the Air India Flight 182, which was to connect Montreal to New Delhi on June 23, 1985, remains the deadliest air attack after September 11, 2001 in New York. An hour earlier, a bomb intended to be embarked on another plane of the Indian company had exploded at Tokyo’s Narita airport, killing two handlers. The majority of the 1985 victims were Canadian nationals. Investigators believe the two operations were planned in British Columbia, home to half of Canada’s 200,000-plus Sikhs, in an attempt to avenge a murderous raid on the Amritsar Golden Temple by the Indian Army, the cradle of Sikh faith, in 1984.  

While in Madrid in 2004, thirteen bombs were placed in suburban trains, ten of which exploded in four on the morning of Thursday of March 11th, seven minutes apart; 191 people died in the attacks, where nearly two thousand people were killed. A year later in London, on July 7, 2005, the city’s transportations were hit by four suicide attacks, killing fifty-six people (including four perpetrators) and injuring hundreds of others.  

Nevertheless, the authorities of most countries in the world, especially under pressure from the United States, seem to have decided to fight against terrorism by going

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through the track of financial transactions. For example, the Anti-Terrorism Act (C-36) of December 2001 amended the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act, now called the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, which deals with two types of organization without distinction. Yet, notwithstanding all the ink that has flowed about Usama Ben Laden’s grossly over-valued fortune, terrorism is an activity that does not require any major financial transaction.

A third similarity lies in the transnational character of criminal and terrorist activities. This is mainly due to pleonasm, since it is of course expected that international terrorism involves several states; In fact, “transnationality” is no more a fundamental characteristic of terrorism than of organized crime. That said, many typical activities of both criminal groups and terrorist groups cross national borders for three types of reasons. The first is simply that some products, weapons or other materials are not available or more difficult to obtain in some countries. The second is that the change (or even better, several successive changes) of state jurisdiction can help to conceal the activities, people, funds and transactions. In this respect, it should be noted that there is a significant difference in the reasons for concealing funds and financial transactions; for

organized crime, money laundering is the removal of the criminal source of funds so that it can be used on the legal market.  

For the terrorist group, the source of funds does not matter; it is often legal (charities, collections, donations), but even if it is not the case as the transfer is already illegal because of its destination, laundering is useless. Thus, it is a “blackening” of the money that must be spoken of, which consists in eliminating not its origin, but its possible use; this, while keeping in mind that the sums needed for terrorism are derisory. A final reason for internationalization is that occasionally members of local groups emigrate, for multiple reasons, and reproduce in their host country the conflict that existed in the one they left. For example, in view of the profiles of the terrorists that have struck France in recent years, it appears that a recurring criterion would be an origin in North Africa, and more specifically in former colonies or French protectorate. In England, where Muslim immigration is mainly from India and Pakistan, they are people from these countries who take action. People who build these networks or manipulate them act in an opportunistic way. They know very well that these young people, in social  

and material difficulty and who are easily manipulated, are available for them. They make human bombs or others.95

The fourth and final point of comparison between terrorism and organized crime is their perceived seriousness and their media treatment, two elements that are, of course, closely linked. In both cases, the media dwell on the spectacular sides of events and offer a simplistic and sensationalist treatment. This kind of approach is necessarily linked to the visibility. The destruction of places, buildings, or human bodies must be visible to take its place.96 The bombing of Flight 182, which occurred over the Atlantic, left few obvious traces and thus scarcely marked the Canadian collective imagination, unlike 9/11, which enjoyed unprecedented visibility.

The most important contrast, many of which follow, is the intention of the actors. Simply put, with some exceptions, the ultimate goal of the terrorist is political whereas that of the member of a criminal organization is economic.97 This difference is not just a matter of content; Let us first note that if the political ends can be satisfied in principle, and therefore that their realization would mark an end point, the end which constitutes to enrich oneself can never be definitively realized and continues to impose oneself


96. Philip, Jenkins, Images of Terror: What We Can and Can’t Know About Terrorism (Hawthorne (NY): Aldine de Gruyter, 2003), 112.

infinitely. In fact, the purpose of such an organization is to continue to exist, while the terrorist group aims to become useless as quickly as possible.

Needless to say, in many cases, the political goal of various terrorist groups is politically unfeasible, even unrealistic, or absurd to us as observers. It is also likely that even the terrorists themselves have little hope of triumphing and continue routinely, because they can no longer imagine any other career or because they feel that despite of their low chances of success, continuing to try is a religious or moral imperative.98 Nevertheless, overall most terrorist speeches refer to a finality in time, and as close as possible. This has a number of unparalleled consequences for organized crime. Firstly, the perception by the members of a lack of progress or insufficiency of the effects of the actions undertaken can lead to an escalation or intensification of tactics. In a criminal group, criminal activities are evaluated according to their own ability to produce a satisfactory income, and not to an idealized standard future.99 If a racket ceases to be profitable enough. For example, if the taxes levied on a product for which a black market has been developed are suddenly reduced, or if a defended good is suddenly legalized, it will be replaced by another.

Finally, the existence of the terrorist group is subject to the socio-political evolution of its environment. Political and legal changes can undermine the legitimacy or appearance of necessity or urgency of a political objective. Even if group members do not

feel or reject this change, the intensity of support they find, in the general public, can be greatly diminished or even destroyed. This implies that terrorist activity can be tackled by political change and negotiation, since one of the ways to reduce it is to make political demands, that justify it, obsolete.100 By contrast, the pursuit of profit cannot be rendered obsolete (unless we abandon capitalism, of course, note that this tends to be a demand from terrorist groups, not criminal groups).

The second contrast has to do with the use of violence as a tactic. Obviously, the terrorist occasionally uses violence to make some social control, just like criminal groups.101 What defines terrorism, however, is the systematic use of violence directly applied to political change. In this regard, the difference can be summarized as follows: terrorists use violence as much as possible, while criminal groups use it as little as possible. The terrorist uses the maximum violence that he believes he can justify to his audience; if this audience is absolutist and bellicose, the limit disappears for all practical purposes.102 On the contrary, a criminal organization that uses too much violence risks maximizing the police pitfalls that are detrimental to corporate profitability. It should also be added that the violence of criminal organizations is almost exclusively reserved for the


organization’s competitors and delinquent members, while the terrorists aim much more broadly.\textsuperscript{103}

Thirdly, the moralizing position of terrorist speech is often a sticking point with criminal groups. In almost all cases, terrorist utopia is free of all crime, and especially of organized crime.\textsuperscript{104} For a terrorist group, accepting crime is tantamount to losing some of its legitimacy to the public. The Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA) speech about the kneecap (shot in the knees) of the Belfast dealers is particularly telling. Also practiced by Ulster Defense Association (UDA), IRA’s Unionist rival, kneecapping is a means of maintaining order in the absence of effective state power.\textsuperscript{105}

The two types of organizations are also differentiated by the nature of their relationship with the state. Excluding instances of vigilance, terrorist groups fundamentally oppose two major types of targets: governments and private companies.\textsuperscript{106} This opposition should not be seen as a form of parasitic economic predation, which is characteristic of organized crime groups. The terrorist group, by its action, seeks to


destroy the capacity of the State to govern, to demonstrate its incompetence or powerlessness, to punish the State (as an active entity) or the citizens to force the administration to adopt or abandon certain policies or laws, or even to simply replace the administration in an open revolution of the Marxist or Maoist or fascist type.⁹⁷

In near contrast, the environment that maximizes the effectiveness of criminal organizations is a stable political administration, a consistent and predictable legal system, and a state that can effectively maintain basic services, especially critical infrastructure for conducting business (legal or otherwise) and generalized social peace.⁹⁸ The other case in point, of which the Sicilian mafia is the perfect illustration, is the installation of an organization in the absence of a functional state, as in Sicily in the middle of the 19th century.⁹⁹ In both cases, the criminal organization always aims to minimize its contacts with the authorities, while the latter are targets for terrorist activities.

Like any criminological categorization, the one that separates organized crime from terrorism remains porous, with several shifts evident. These shifts occasionally come from the actors themselves, but much of it comes from speeches and political and

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police activities. In the first place, it is possible that a group loses its dominant terrorist to engage more and more in more traditionally criminal activities. Several guerrilla groups follow this path more or less. There are, of course, several reasons which explain these shifts towards the more and more systematic amalgamation of different activities, which has several political uses. First, assimilating insurgent (or simply protesting) groups to criminal organizations is a powerful public delegitimation discourse, aimed at reducing the support enjoyed by seditious movements among the population. On the contrary, it may also be useful to equate criminal groups with terrorism when justifying military intervention abroad, as is the case for the South American drug cartels, against which enormous military resources are deployed, with the help of the United States.

**Contribution to Existing Literature**

This thesis will explain that the politicization of criminal entities comes from the quantitative and qualitative development of their economic and financial activities. These economic and financial entrepreneurs find themselves depositories of a political and social power indexed on their enrichment, to the now macroeconomic point of view. The thesis will also explain that as criminal and financial flows spread through the economy


and finance through laundering, these criminal entities acquire positions of power within the society. Today, high organized criminality has the ability to do, but primarily to influence the conduct of other units, that of individuals but also large companies and states.

To sum up, this thesis builds on the above-mentioned body of the literature by suggesting that there is a strong relationship between organized crime and terrorism. For example, terrorists rely on drugs as a source of financing and smugglers use them to smuggle and promote drug traffickers. The perpetrators of the illicit drug trafficking are among the most dangerous organized terrorist criminals. They do not believe in any religion and their only goal is to destroy energies and make money.

Criminal organizations working in the field of drug production and trafficking have benefited to the fullest extent the progress of the science of technology and management of science. This has become clear from the precise organization, management and covert cooperation between cocaine and heroin trafficking organizations in many countries. They share many characteristics that enable them to reach their ends.

This chapter builds upon the works of Tamara Makarenko, Louise I. Shelly and John T. Picarelli by distinguishing three stages of hybridization. First, cooperation: Terrorist and criminal organizations can build alliances to obtain funding or weapons. Then, the convergence: these organizations begin to resemble each other and to act by mimicry. Finally, the mutation: groups become indistinctly both political and criminal.
These processes of rapprochement and transformation transcend ideologies. The chapter demonstrates this by proposing a world tour of hybrid groups.

The next chapter of the methodology defines the case study as it pertains to the existing body of the literature. It explains how the case studies of Western Europe and North/West Africa be implemented to clarify the relationship between terrorists and criminal organizations. This is accomplished by exploring both of these regions and applying a comparative perspective.
CHAPTER III– METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In 2004, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Panel of High-Level Persons proposed a definition of terrorism as “any action ... intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or civilians non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act is to force a government or an international organization to take any action or to refrain from doing so.” But there is a lack of consensus on this definition. This thesis will present and assess the extent of the significance of the hypothesis that Islamist extremist terrorist strategy and tactics are not only driven by religious ideology, but also by classic gangster practices. It will demonstrate that in the 21st century, the figure of the terrorist fighter, the irregular, is no longer be a pure political actor, like during the Cold War, but a mix of a gangster and a politicized individual.

International terrorism certainly need not be sponsored by a given state. The most disturbing sociological characteristic of this brand of terrorism in the 21st century is that nine-tenths of the individuals who have committed attacks in the name of Salafist Islamist extremism, in Western European countries such as France and Belgium and also in the countries of the Sahel of North and West Africa such as Algeria and Niger, have lengthy criminal records preceding their radicalization. It is a totally new phenomenon.

Past borders have faded. This thesis will make readers rethink the fight against terrorism and organized crime, two dangers that have grown more connected over the past three decades. Today, “mixing phenomena” are taking place. Gangs, cartels and mafias have often merged, whereas during the Cold War they were separate. Thus, in terrorism or organized crime, there are “multidimensional” people.

This thesis uses a comparative case study approach to identify and explain the principal similarities and distinction between terrorism and organized crime in Western Europe and the Sahel region of North/West Africa, respectively. By analyzing the perpetrators of terrorist attacks carried out by formal members and/or supporters of Islamist extremist organizations in France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Spain and also the Sahel from 1990-2018, the thesis notes that many of these perpetrators have started in petty crime or serious crime. They were originally “classic predators,” which was not prevalent in previous waves of terrorism in those regions. These criminals went to seek a justification more or less conscious in Salafist Islam. The study will also describe the “hybridity” of violence as a “central figure” of globalization, its “black face”. Narco-terrorism appears in this thesis as the first marker of this evolution.

Qualitative Comparative Case Study Analysis

Despite the recognition of the methodological contribution of the case study in the in-depth examination of a phenomenon, the fact remains that it relies on a relatively limited number of cases, raising the question of the scientific rigor and validation of the
results produced by this type of research. However, for some, case studies are considered as a preparatory phase for real scientific research used to mark the ground and to make assumptions emerge.

The case study is already widely recognized by the political science community for its contribution to exploratory research and the understanding of hard-to-measure factors, as well as its synergistic action with other research strategies. Yet, despite the review of different sources of information and the use of several methodological processes, case studies face some criticisms. The most frequent are, among other things, the unconsciousness of the bias of the results, the erroneous choice of the case, the lack of depth in the study of the case, the lack of verification of validity and fidelity as well as a false interpretation or generalization of results. Furthermore, qualitative case studies are far more useful in explaining the effects of independent variables on dependent variables than quantitative methods that simply measure those effects.

Several schools of qualitative analytical thought assess the utility methodology of case studies. First, Yin (1994) proposes a more positivistic view of testing and

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corroborating a hypothesis.\textsuperscript{119} Stake (1995) puts more emphasis on the case study\textsuperscript{120}. In addition, both Yin (1994) and Stake (1995) note the utility of contributed to the recognition of case studies in explaining the complex links of a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context. So far, as the observation of the interactions of a large number of factors is aimed at inducing a theoretical model, the cases are of secondary interest; that is, they import less than the situations that provide them. In fact, the case study provides an observation site.\textsuperscript{121} The case study is “a method involving systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how the subject operates or functions.”\textsuperscript{122}

Further, Yin (1994) and Stake (1995) propose a deductive analytical approach in the sense that they mark the boundaries of the case and ensure the reproducibility of the results of the research. By contrast, Starman (2013) proposes an inductive approach with the emergence of theoretical propositions. According to this author, the case study helps to discover and interpret rather than validate a hypothesis. In this sense, the inductive approach of the case study succeeds in explaining certain phenomena not addressed effectively by existing theories.\textsuperscript{123} The knowledge and theories from previous research

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid, 9.
\textsuperscript{122} Bruce, Berg, \textit{Qualitative Research Methods For The Social Sciences} (Long Beach: California State University, 2007), 283.
\textsuperscript{123} Adrijana, Starman, “The Case Study As A Type Of Qualitative Research” \textit{Journal Of Contemporary Educational Studies}, 2018, 37, accessed March 11, 2019, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1cc2/7a1b28050194da8bef5b2ab807386baa286e.pdf.
help in the precision of the object of research and the selection of relevant units. The case study is, then, defined as a comprehensive and intensive description of a single case, phenomenon or social unit.\textsuperscript{124} Moreover, the case study is also understood as an integrated and delimited system, makes it possible to reveal the phenomenon.\textsuperscript{125} Therefore, the knowledge produced is concrete, contextual, subject to interpretation and in reference to the reader’s population.\textsuperscript{126}

Since human behavior is never static, the reliability and generalizability of any case study remains problematic. Merriam Sharan and Robin Grenier (2019) argue that reliability is impossible, at least in the traditional sense of the word. In addition, the information depends on who provides it, the level of skill of the researcher and the design of the case study that seems to exclude the controls. They also argue that even though the replication of a qualitative study will not yield the same results, this fact does not discredit the results of the original research. Several interpretations of the same data can be made and held, as long as they are not contradicted by new evidence.\textsuperscript{127}

In terms of internal validity, the lack of representativeness of the case, the use of too much freedom on the part of the researcher and the collection of unsystematic data may introduce bias in the results. However, according to Roy (2009), by placing the phenomenon in its real context, the case study tends to limit the risk of measurement

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\textsuperscript{124} Sharan, Merriam & Robin, Grenier, \textit{Qualitative Research In Practice: Examples For Discussion and Analysis} (San Francisco: Jossey Bass 2019), 8.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid, 5.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid, 7.
\end{flushleft}
error of the data collection tools and allows the identification of unexpected factors.\textsuperscript{128}

Merriam Sharan (1998) argues that the observation of people’s construction of reality constitutes the strength of the internal validity of qualitative research. From this perspective, the importance is placed on the understanding of the points of interest for the actors, the discovery of the complexity of the human behavior in context and the presentation of a holistic interpretation of the events.\textsuperscript{129}

Therefore, the uniqueness of the cases simply does not allow one to draw global conclusions. Sharan and Tisdell (2016) point out that individual cases are precisely chosen in order to understand in depth “the particular” and not to find what is generally true for many.\textsuperscript{130} In sum, the methodology of the case study is driven by a desire to understand the functioning of a phenomenon through a dive into its constituent elements.\textsuperscript{131} The resolution of this methodological paradox lies in the fact that the case study inhabits a space of research in which contextualization and complexity are the foundations of a unique mode of contribution to knowledge in a given field.\textsuperscript{132}


\textsuperscript{130} Sharan, Meriam & Elizabeth, Tisdell, \textit{Qualitative Research: A Guide To Design And Implementation} (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 2016), 254.


Reiteration and Explanation of Central Argument

This thesis presents and assesses the extent of the validity of the following hypothesis/central argument: As Islamist extremist terrorist groups’ financial needs increase, they are more likely to use collaboration with organized criminal enterprises, relative to other sources, as their principal means of funding. The thesis compares, the case studies of North/West Africa on one hand and Western Europe on the other by exposing cigarette trafficking in North Africa toward Europe as a means for terrorists to generate funds to pursue their activities. Some of the cigarettes sold in France are illegally sold. One third of this illegal market comes from North Africa. Cigarettes sold in contraband are transported by small packets, by mules a little everywhere in North Africa, they are thus very difficult to detect and thus to stop.\textsuperscript{133} If one focuses on North Africa, in particular, one of the biggest explanations is corruption, complicity. The problem is that transnational criminal and terrorist organizations work with government officials.

On the other hand, in Western Europe, terrorist groups finance their activities either through cash financing or by buying weapons from warlords, black markets or arms manufacturers under international cover.\textsuperscript{134} Furthermore, the thesis shows that in Western Europe, extortion, kidnapping, drug trafficking, smuggling, fraud, theft, use of


diamonds, are considered the main sources of illegal funding for terrorist organizations.\textsuperscript{135}

In the case study of Western Europe, the countries to be examined, are France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Spain. These countries were chosen, in the study, because they were the ones that were particularly targeted by ISIS.\textsuperscript{136} For the case study of North/West Africa, the countries, in question, are: Nigeria, Mali, Niger, and Algeria. These countries have been chosen in the study because jihadists movements, such as Al-Qaeda, have been more active in this region.\textsuperscript{137}

The Western Europe and North/Africa case studies will be assessed by gathering and presenting data in the following manner:

In terms of the methodological approach, each case study will be examined in the same fashion, with examination of the motivations and tactics of the criminal and terrorist organizations in each country under consideration presented structurally in the same fashion for each case. For each of those countries, the motivations, objectives and tactics employed by each of the criminal and terrorist organizations under consideration will be presented in turn. The categories of motivations objective and tactics will be divided into categories focusing on economic, ethnic, ideological, military, political and religious issue areas.


For the case study of Western Europe, the sources of data include Anne Barker’s *Salah Abdeslam: The Former Bar Manager Now On The Run As One of The World’s Most Wanted Terrorists*, Magnus Normark and Magnus Ranstorp’s *Understanding Terrorist Finance: Modus Operandi And National CTF Regimes*, Emilie Ofstedal’s *The Financing of Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe*, and Pieter Ostaeyen’s *Belgian Radical Networks and The Road to the Brussels Attacks*.

For the case study of North/West Africa, the sources of data include Abdelkader, Abderrahmane’s *The Sahel: A Crossroads between Criminality and Terrorism*, James, Stavridis’s *How Terrorists Can Exploit Globalization*, Zachary Laub & Jonathan Masters’s *Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb*, and Lauren Vriens’s *Armed Islamic Group (Algeria, Islamists)*.

To sum up, the thesis will focus on events that happened both in Western Europe and the Sahel region of North/West Africa to show that both of these regions share in common the most dangerous pictures of organized crime to include terrorism, smuggling of people, and also drug trafficking. The thesis will implement an explanatory method to spot a light on the growing phenomenon of religiosity among young people in the suburbs of France, for example, which has been a concern for successive French governments since the start of the 1980s.
INTRODUCTION

In terms of the methodological approach, both of the case studies of Western Europe and the Sahel of North/West Africa will be examined in the same fashion, with examinations of the motivations and tactics of the criminal and terrorist organizations in each country, to include France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Spain for Western Europe and Nigeria, Mali, Niger, and Algeria for the Sahel region, under consideration presented structurally in the same fashion for each case. For each of those countries, the motivations, objectives, and tactics employed by each of the criminal and terrorist organizations under consideration will be presented in turn. The categories of motivations, objective and tactics will be divided into categories focusing on economic, ideological, military, religious, ethnic, and political issues areas.

Case Study on Western Europe

The Islamist extremist organizations that have attacked targets in the Western world since the 1990s, France and its laic model, have been drawing most of their terrorists into the breeding ground of the criminal and delusional world of common law. In 2015 and 2016, France suffered the costliest series of terrorist attacks in its history. The toll of the victims was considerable: 238 people killed and hundreds more

wounded. Most commentaries and analyzes, whether they are journalistic, political, or academic in orientation, attempt to decipher these murders using the notion of “radicalization”. In fact, the perpetrators of the attacks in France and Belgium in 2015 and 2016 come from the world of gangsterism. The vast majority of these terrorists were originally and essentially criminals and common delinquents, who have since crossed the Rubicon of politics. They are not pure political actors using illegal means for a cause.

France:

The itinerary of the brothers Brahim and Salah Abdessalam, two young Franco-Belgians of Moroccan origin, who were among those who carried out a series of terrorist attacks against civilian targets in Paris of November 2015 is in this respect significant. Olivier Moos explains that these two jihadists seem to have drifted, in the space of a few months, from an environment made of small delinquency, night club and video games, to a commitment to the service of the Islamic State and violence terrorist. This relative suddenness and this passage between two universes of meaning supposedly in opposition

are not so surprising when they are restored in the context of an individualistic culture of mass entertainment and delinquency, the only capital of symbolic resources accessible to the majority of people. These young neo-jihadists, with a culture or flourish theatricalization and normalization of violence, were zapping on social media and pleasure of transgression.143

After the attacks against Charlie Hebdo (7 January 2015) and the fusillades in Copenhagen (14 and 15 February 2015), the French Cherif, Said Kouachi and Amedy Coulibali, and the Danish Omar Abdel Hamid El Hussein were acclaimed on the jihadist website of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.144 All four had criminal records, been incarcerated or belonged to a violent criminal gang. Further, all four were born and raised in marginalized European Muslim communities. By putting their desire of violence to the seigneur of a cause, they could transform their status of losers into that of heroes. Allegiance to the caliph transforms delusion into Mujahid, that is to say into a political actor, even if this dimension remains very superficial.

The question of the financing of terrorism is the subject of numerous reports, resolutions and international conventions. While the general aspects of the problem are widely studied, the link between the financing of crime and the financing of terrorism has not received the necessary attention. Two recent studies attempt to fill this gap. A report by Magnus Normark and Magnus Ranstorp of the Swedish Defense University looks at


how European terrorist fighters in Syria have financed their travel over the year of 2015: in addition to loans, private donations and bank and commercial fraud, minor offenses play a role consistently highlighted in the report.145 Another study by Emile Oftedal, of the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI), examines the financing of 40 terrorist plots between 1994 and 2013: almost three-quarters were financed in part from original funds. The study shows that crime, drug trafficking, fraud and illicit trafficking in particular, played an important role in almost 40% of cases.146 Therefore, one should not be surprised that the financing of Islamist attacks in the West comes largely from common thefts, various tariffs, scams, forged falsification, etc.

_Belgium:_

The curriculum vitae of certain emblematic figures of terrorism and European jihadism who have joined or supported the Islamic state, illustrates a caricature the criminal origins of those fighting for Islam extremist terrorist organizations. Originally an ordinary delinquent, the Islamist Khalid Zerkani “Abu Riad”, born in 1973 in Zinata (Morocco), settled in Belgium in Molenbeek-Saint Jean, was sentenced in 2016 to 15 years in prison for having organized from 2012 to 2015 the trips of largest chain of

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European Islamist fighters (about 60) to the Syrian-Iraqi zone and two clandestine ISIS clique cells in Verviers and Brussels.\textsuperscript{147}

Zerkani is suspected of having recruited and sent to Syria the Belgian-Moroccan Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who played a central role in organizing the attacks of 13 November 2015 in Paris and Saint Denis (130 dead).\textsuperscript{148} Zerkani used Islamic extremism to help recruit wayward youths to the Islamic State, including that of the maritime district of Saint-Molenbeek as the prosecutor said during his trial. Zerkani financed the organization of the sectors by piloting a network of Maghreb offenders from the Brussels region, from whom he took 20\% of the loot. He encouraged and authorized robbery and burglary in the name of Islam to finance the departure of the fighters, claiming that “stealing the infidels is allowed by Allah”, acting as a true gang leader neighborhood.\textsuperscript{149}

During his arrest, stolen goods found in his home (watches, cameras, jewels, etc.) were used to reward and encourage young recruits leaving for Syria to join the Islamic State, which earned him the nickname of “Papa Noel”. Zerkani had never worked in his life, living instead off the crimes committed by his disciplines authorized to steal the “disbelievers” in the name of the jihadist cause.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{147} Pieter, Ostaeyen, “Belgian Radical Networks and The Road to the Brussels Attacks,” 


One must ask how do the dynamics of Islamist extremist group recruitment and affiliation develop? The propaganda of the Islamic State knows how to seduce the gangsters by a rhetoric that can satisfy impulses and desires of unbridled enjoyment. The ideologies channel and recover psychic fragilities, a predator energy, useful contacts (such as weapons and false documents) and a criminal knowledge, while the bandits look for excuses and absolution to preserve in their deviant life.

*The United Kingdom:*

French-speaking gangster Salafism is not the only one to have been wiped out by the Islamic State. In Britain, the list of hybrids is long. Emblematic cases will be mentioned as examples:

- In May 2008, Nick Raymond Reilly alias Muhammad Rasheed, a converted and radicalized delinquent, placed a bomb that explodes a restaurant called “The Giraffe” in a shopping center in the city of Exeter (South-West of England).\(^{151}\)

- In May 2013, in London (Woolwich), two young delinquent Nigerian Muslims, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, who called themselves Mujahid Abu Hamza and Ismail Ibn Abdullah, decapitate in the street (with chopper and knife) a British military, Lee Rigby.\(^{152}\)


On March 22, 2017, Khalid Masood committed a double attempt in London claimed by the Islamic State: He collided with a motor vehicle passerby on the Westminster Bridge and then fist a policeman in front of the parliament. He was finally shot. The balance was five dead including the assailant. Khalid Masood was a recidivist evildoer known for his deliberate degrading and possession of a knife, which resulted in two convictions and two stays in prison.\footnote{Lizzie, Dearden, “Khalid Masood Told Friend ‘I Want Some F***ing Blood, I Want to Kill Someone’ Before Converting to Islam In Prison,” The INDEPENDENT 2017, accessed December 06, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/khalid-masood-adrian-elms-ajao-westminster-london-attacker-isis-prison-radicalisation-want-blood-a7650276.html.}

According to Daesh, these operations cost Western societies a great deal of money and accentuate their decline.\footnote{Ashley, Frantz, “How ISIS Makes (and Takes) Money,” CNN 2015, accessed December 07, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2015/02/19/world/how-isis-makes-money/index.html.} It is quite likely that other actions in this direction are envisaged such as cyberterrorism or repeated sabotage of industrial infrastructures. Note that for Daesh, it is also allowed ideologically (halal, lawful) to steal the goods of the disbelievers.\footnote{Robert, Spencer, “Islamic State Tells Muslims To Steal From Infidels And Send Them 20%” Islamic Watch 2017, accessed December 07, 2018, https://www.jihadwatch.org/2017/04/islamic-state-tells-muslims-to-steal-from-infidels-and-send-them-20.} Undoubtedly, the salafist-jihadist strategy is mutating. The fact of no longer claiming operations will seriously complicate the task of the investigators. It will also be necessary to adapt the security measures to new emerging threats.
Spain:  

The state of the threat to Spain does not differ fundamentally from a number of other states in Europe, as it is a Western country, which participates in international missions regarded as an occupation of sacred lands and the fight against terrorism, international terrorism. To this must be added the reference to the myth of Al Andalus and the existence of two Spanish cities (Ceuta and Melilla), considered as occupied territories on African soil.

In fact, the attacks of August 17 in Barcelona and Cambrils raised a lot of questions: who were these young terrorists? How radicalized were they prior to carrying out the attack? On the path of these young people, there are some important details about the similarities and differences with other young people involved in global jihad targeting several European countries. In the first place, their youth must be emphasized: the six people killed by the police and directly involved in these two actions were between 17 and 24 years old. They were Moroccan, born in Mrirt for the Hichamy brothers and Naour for the Abouyaaqoub brothers. Finally, Saïd Aallaa and Moussa Oukabir are Spaniards, born in Ripoll. If one compares these attacks with the Madrid attack of


March 11, 2004, it is clear that there was more participation of Moroccans than other groups and that, overall, the terrorists were younger.

What should one think of their social situations? Should one consider how that these young people were marginalized? In this regard, it is worth noting several indicators that make, on the contrary, the difference compared to other groups responsible for attacks on European soil. The first remarkable point is precisely the integration of these young people into the labor market. Younes, 22, worked and had a permanent contract in a metallurgical company, Comforsa, and since graduating from a higher education in electromechanical engineering, he was not short of work. Some of his neighbors indicated that he was getting the best salary on his team. It also seems that Mohamed Hichamy, 24, worked in this auto parts factory located in Ripoll with a salary of approximately 1,900 euros per month. Therefore, these young people were not young people excluded from the labor market as Nuria Perpinya, a social worker at Ripoll City Hall, states: “They were four pairs of brothers. Second generation. We thought that they now felt as though they belonged here, what with their Catalan, designer labels and jobs. And then all of a sudden we realize that integration is an emotional issue. A feeling.”


Another “classic” exclusion factor is spatial segregation, characteristic of these young people who live in neighborhoods in housing projects situated in the suburbs of big cities and in priority urban areas. But here too, this is not the case. Ripoll is a small municipality in which everyone knows each other, shares a football game, places to play, schools, institutes or workplaces. Contact with people born in the commune was therefore frequent. The mayor of Ripoll, Jordi Munell, speaks of immigration as an asset for his city of 10,600 inhabitants; the majority work in metallurgy or in the tourism sector. With immigrants constituting 10 percent of the local population, Ripoll knows practically no unemployment.¹⁶⁰

Consequently, these young people escape from the characteristic often put forward in the attacks of Paris or Brussels: that of young North Africans unemployed and/or having problems of professional insertion, excluded or marginalized because of their origin, living in large dormitory towns and having school courses enameled of many failures. The terrorists of Barcelona and Ripoll are qualified by their neighbors and their social educators as normal and responsible young people, especially Younes. The youngest of the terrorists spoke perfect Catalan and Spanish. These witnesses say they do not understand what happened.¹⁶¹


Another path to explore: the strong influence close to “brainwashing” from the imam of Ripoll, Es Satty, and that of several other people during a holiday in Morocco. In support of this hypothesis, friends, neighbors or parents interviewed since the attacks point out that, for a few months or even a year, these young people had started playing football less, being quieter and less frequent others, to stop talking about women, cars or video games, to erase all music on their mobile to listen to “anasheed” (prayers).162 Younes went so far as to say that all these things no longer mattered, that they had discovered “the truth” and that others had gone astray in this Western world. Despite these remarks, no one could have imagined what would happen on August 17 in Catalonia.

In fact, Abdelbaki Es Satty (45 years old), imam of the Annour mosque in Ripoll since 2015, appears as an ideologue, adept in the use of Salafism for recruitment purposes. Investigators have discovered data linking him to Daesh. His radicalization may have crystallized during his stay in prison between 2010 and 2014 (for drug trafficking), concomitant with that of several people involved in the attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004.163


The Barcelona attacks revealed shortcomings in the intelligence system, in particular the inefficiency of the deployment of early warning mechanisms, as well as those existing in the detection device of individuals in the process of radicalization. The prevention and the fight against violent radicalization are part of the Spanish strategy against international jihadist terrorism established by the Spanish government after the attacks of 11 March 2004 in Madrid. This has been defined taking into account the objectives and approaches contained in the European Union's strategy in this area in 2005.164

Case Study on the North African/Sahel Region

Introduction

Africa is the center of some 64 terrorist organizations and groups that spread mostly from the far west coast of the continent to its far east coast. The spread of Islamist extremist ideas has contributed to the historical, economic and social structure and the security vacuum in that region. The observer, of the history of terrorism in the Sahelian region, finds it first born in Algeria in 1991 and then moves to Sudan to return to southern Algeria and deep into the Sahel, which is now one of the largest jihadist strongholds in Africa.165


In the aftermath of the Arab revolutions, especially the fall of the regime of Libyan leader Col. Muammar Gaddafi, the situation worsened as the groups exploited the heavy arms trade between the various groups to provide a continuous supply of weapons that enabled them to carry out large-scale terrorist operations in Mali, Nigeria and Burkina Faso which allowed these groups to move from one country to another easily.\textsuperscript{166} This is evident in the report of the Center for Terrorism Studies in the United States, which confirmed the 25 percent rise in the number of attacks in the Sahel and North Africa from 2013 to 2014.\textsuperscript{167}

The report, entitled “Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2014”, shows that the number of terrorist attacks in the region has increased dramatically, with more than 289 terrorist attacks in 2014, an increase of 800\% compared to 2001, a year of Al Qaeda’s expansion of its terrorist operations in different parts of the world.\textsuperscript{168}

Furthermore, the past years have seen a significant development in the trends of terrorist organizations in North Africa and the Sahel. In the intellectual framework, most of these groups have adopted the idea of establishing the state of the caliphate.\textsuperscript{169} This is evident in the increasing phenomenon of allegiance to the local organizations of their

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\textsuperscript{168} Ibid, 6.

\end{quotation}
international counterparts, most notably the allegiance of the Boko Haram group to the Islamic State and the recruitment of its fighters to carry out operations for affiliates in Africa after many years of intellectual dependence on Al Qaeda. This reflects the fact that international organizations are seeking to establish a "terrorist belt" in North and West Africa.

The terrorist groups in the Sahel developed very intellectually, organizationally and dynamically, and their development culminated in the emergence of both male and female suicide bombers.\textsuperscript{170} Organizationally, these groups have moved from small groups operating under the secret system to state-like entities with political, economic, military and logistical structures. They rely on centralization to organize their movements so that they can find senior leadership, field units, the media unit, communications and sources of funding.\textsuperscript{171}

The capabilities of these countries have also known a frightening development. They have moved from operations such as kidnapping, assassination, sabotage, which require hidden weapons, bombs and limited means of communication to the ability to confront regular forces in battles with medium and heavy weapons, advanced means of communication and modern social media.\textsuperscript{172}


As a result of the security situation in the Sahel countries and the inability to secure their borders, the region has become one of the most important theaters of human trafficking, drugs and arms smuggling in the world. Terrorist groups in the Sahel depend on several sources of funding, such as self-financing, drug trafficking, human trafficking and ransom.  

The terrorist groups have exploited organized crime to provide self-financing for their operations. United Nations Office for Drugs and Crimes estimates that organized crime of these groups amounts to approximately $3.4 billion a year in ransom payments for the release of hostages and protection of drug and drug smuggling operations. The use of such vast resources to fund training, establish safe havens and set up armed operations. Sources of funding come from major sources where the first is human trafficking or illegal immigration, whose annual revenue is estimated at $1 billion. The second source is drug trafficking from Latin America to Europe, where 10 per cent of cocaine smuggled into Europe passes through this region, generating an annual average of $328 million, of which 14 per cent goes to terrorist organizations that control

smuggling routes in the region. Then, comes the kidnapping of Western hostages and the demand for ransom for their release, and estimated the proceeds of hostage-taking $50 million a year.

The smuggling of the largest drug shipment across Mauritanian territory highlights the African Sahel and Sahara region, which has become one of the most dangerous areas in the world, being a key transit point for drugs and a safe haven for terrorists. According to a report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in 2014, drug gangs in Latin America have reached agreements with local partners in West African countries to turn the region into a major transit point for drugs destined for Europe.

In the Sahel, armed groups have proliferated since the 1980s and increased their nuisance capacity, often lethal. They have diversified into terrorists, insurgents, criminals and militias, according to variables such as their vision, their mission or the means implemented. From now on, cooperation and convergence bring together these groups.

“The most obvious example of this kind of cooperation-convergence is narco-terrorism,” says James Stavridis, former commander-in-chief of the Allied Forces in Europe (2009-2013) and US Southern Command (2006-2009). The most troubling aspect of the connection seems to be the way in which the illegal drug trade undermines efforts to pursue the political reforms and development needed to stem the radicalization and rise of terrorist groups in several already fragile regions of the world.

Nigeria:

In addition to drug and arms trafficking, the significant smuggling of cigarettes across the Sahel is also very lucrative for traffickers in the region. Cigarettes from counterfeit factories, mainly from Nigeria, are distributed in the region, the Maghreb, the Middle East and Europe. This traffic is an important source of funding for terrorist groups, who, even if they are not always and necessarily directly involved in this kind of smuggling, enrich themselves by imposing a tax against a ‘close guard’ to smugglers. Furthermore, in southern Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has multiple illicit activities: oil thefts, kidnapping and ethnic rebellion, and it has recently added terrorism to its repertoire.

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But beyond the fact that all these examples of trafficking and their perpetrators are in one way or another related, it is undoubtedly and especially the reasons and the roots behind this plague that it is urgent to question in order to remedy it. Misery, poverty, drought, famine, lack of food security, social injustice and lack of a vision for the future are all factors that encourage and incite local people to fall into this trap of easy money and a hypothetical better life. Traffickers take advantage of the idleness and socio-economic vulnerability of local populations to convince them that they can improve their lives through illegal trafficking. Worse, these different terrorist groups and criminal organizations only contribute to the human suffering of local populations in the Sahel and North Africa while also endangering the already fragile states of the Sahel such as Mali or Niger.  

Mali:

In fact, the security situation has worsened as a result of escalating political instability in several West African countries. For example, this instability led to the military coup in Mali in March 2012 and the spread of armed violence in the north of the country, which has become a haven for terrorist groups. The French and Malian forces, gradually reinforced by quotas of the ECOWAS, face katibas of jihadists who belong to Algerian and West African networks not forgetting volunteers from Western Europe in general, and France in particular.

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At the forefront of these armed Islamic movements, we find AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) which has its origins in the civil war in Algeria, which during the bloody decade (1988-1998) has made 200,000 victims.\textsuperscript{184} At the time, the Islamists of the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), who denounce the coup by the authorities following the modification of the electoral rules to block their political rise, will successively give birth to the AIG (Armed Islamist Groups) then SGPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) appeared in 1998.\textsuperscript{185}

Some of these terrorist groups are suspected of having links with similar groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabab in Somalia. Although hard evidence still needs to be provided in this regard, there are probabilities that the links between terrorism/drugs/crime actually prevail in Mali. Some Islamist activists levy “taxes” on drug traffickers in exchange for safe conduct, allowing these groups to directly benefit from illicit trafficking in the region (including smuggling of cigarettes and firearms, etc.).\textsuperscript{186}

Beyond the deadly attacks perpetrated against not only the Malian and foreign forces, but also the innocent populations by terrorist groups including AQIM, Ansarine, Mourabitoune, the Macina Liberation Front, etc., all grouped together within the


“Coalition of Defenders of Islam and Muslims”, the insecurity is also generated by the great banditry, on the whole national territory. Intercommunal conflict in some localities in the north and center of the country is also a new source of concern for social peace and public security.\(^{187}\)

**Niger:**

The Sahel region, particularly Niger, is experiencing an unprecedented rise in the threat of terrorism. Admittedly, this threat in Niger is not like that of Mali, where the entire northern region has been occupied and remains under threat, but the presence of Nigerien citizens in criminal and terrorist groups is a concern to be taken seriously.\(^{188}\)

Not to mention also that Islamic religious terrorism can mutate relatively quickly in other forms under another cover. The violence of the Islamist sect Boko Haram, despite its weakening by the joint intervention of the Nigerian, Chadian and Nigerian armies in 2015, continues to spread throughout the border area with Nigeria, including the region of Diffa and Lake Chad. It is the same in the northern region for AQIM and ANSAROU Belmoktar which contribute to the violence and rooting of cross-border insecurity in Niger and its neighboring countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso.\(^{189}\)

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Algeria:

In Algeria, for example, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operates in two groups, one performing most of the operational missions in northern Algeria; the other, to the south, being active in smuggling (weapons and other material) on behalf of the northern organization, as shown by the repeated seizures of large quantities of weapons on the southern and eastern borders of Algeria. AQIM operates in the southern Sahara where it develops an “Islamist police” of traditional trade routes, demanding money against the protection of smugglers, as well as weapons and logistical equipment, thus associated with a huge flow of illicit goods in direction of northern Algeria. A growing number of fighters from sub-Saharan African states are participating in AQIM’s activities. AQIM’s need to expand its activities in the Sahel is motivated inter alia by its inability to maintain regular recruitment among Algerians. AQIM has forged increased cooperation with Mauritanian, Malian, Nigerian fighters which has allowed it to expand its support networks, including social support for recruitment, financial support, and the use of criminal networks. AQIM is not in a position to destabilize one of the states in the region, but the fact that it is able to attract additional populations poses a threat to regional security.

To sum up, there is no doubt that Western Europe has become at the heart of the battle, and an integral part of the Middle East crisis, turning it into a terrorist that is crossing borders, states and religions. Recent attacks in the Belgian capital, Brussels, reflected the worst fears of the European intelligence and police, and although they were waiting for them, they failed to prevent them, to prove the failure of the West’s strategy in the face of terrorism. Attacks are a natural result of a group of factors that have arisen in a single moment. First, the collapse of the EU borders in front of the recent waves of refugees, mined by unknown numbers of terrorists, loaded with potential reservoirs. The collapse of the border, due to the inability to protect it, is only a harvest of the policies of European and Western countries, which caused a serious imbalance in the world, exacerbated the problem of migration and contributed to the increase in the number of refugees.

Second, the repeated failure of the European Preventive Security, from the attack of Charlie Hebdo, to the recruitment of terrorists and facilitation of their training, arming, funding and then crossing into Syria, rather than the end of the recent attacks, where they planned and moved into several countries and then carried out, without any success from the part of security services to uncover and thwart their plans. In addition, the use of security solutions to address the problem of migration and migrants was doomed to fail, but rather to the dilemma because most of the migrants were classified as potential terrorists. Western Europe was plunged into political, security, social and moral crises that prompted more of its citizens to join terrorist groups. There is no doubt that Western Europe’s preoccupation with new refugees as a potential terrorist threat is a
serious distraction from the violent extremism that is growing within Western Europe itself, since the Paris attackers were mostly Belgian or French citizens. The roots of extremism are complex but partly related to the social isolation imposed on migrant communities.

On the other hand, the political systems of the North Africa/Sahel region between Libya, Chad, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are known to spread corruption, a lack of democracy, and a severe weakening of institutional governance. Most of these countries do not have effective control over their geographical borders, and even most of their national territory, making them an authority over the capital and its surroundings. This is at a time when the societies of the North African and Sahel region are experiencing very difficult economic and social conditions, which in turn have produced new phenomena linked to terrorism and organized crime.

Furthermore, terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and Al Murabitoun benefited from organized crime and the international arms trade, as well as from the collapse of the regional regime with the fall of Muammar Gaddafi and its security and military regime in Libya, as well as the disintegration of power in Mali. This new situation strengthened the network of terrorist groups in North Africa, particularly in Tunisia and Libya, as well as in the Sahel from Mali to Niger. It was further complicated by the arrival of anti-tank missiles by terrorist groups and by the helicopters used by these organizations in Mali and elsewhere. In short, it can be said that terrorism has become a reality in the North Africa and the Sahel region, a combination of domestic and international factors makes it a threat on its way to recovery, not blockade.
CHAPTER V—COMPARTIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

Introduction

The Sahel region of Africa is witnessing activities of groups, factions and brigades operating under the umbrella of Al Qaeda. Some of these battalions have advocated the Islamist State, all of which pose a threat to North/West Africa’s security and regional and international security. The countries of Western Europe remain obsessed with North/West Africa because of the waves of migration across the coast of Libya towards Italy and Spain, which are also linked to the chaos in Libya.

In this chapter, both Western Europe and North/West Africa case studies will be examined in the same fashion, with examination of the motivations and tactics of the criminal and terrorist organizations in each country under consideration presented structurally in the same fashion for each case. For each of those countries, the motivations, objectives and tactics employed by each of the criminal and terrorist organizations under consideration will be presented in turn. The categories of motivations objective and tactics will be divided into categories focusing on economic, ideological, military, religious, ethnic, and political issues areas.

Analysis of the Case Study of Western Europe

Economic Issues:

One of the primary objectives of terrorism is to strike people psychologically, beyond the serious human and material damage directly caused by the attacks. From this point of view, the attacks perpetrated in Western Europe by the terrorist groups seem to have reached their ends more deeply than one might think: by modifying the economic
behavior of individuals, the harshness of the images they conveyed has indirectly weighed on European growth, says research center Rand Europe, based in Cambridge and Brussels.\textsuperscript{192} In a study commissioned by the European Parliament and conducted in the 28 member countries of the Union, between 2004 (the year of the bombing of Al Qaeda in Madrid transportations, the deadliest so far in Europe with 191 dead and more than 1,800 injured) and 2016, terrorism has cost 180 billion euros to the European Union, thus, showing the direct negative effect of these operations on GDP.\textsuperscript{193}

Ideological Issues:

Since the launch of the waves of illegal migration towards European Union (EU) member states since 2015 to date, Western European States have witnessed a state of security preparedness, warning and deployment of troops on the ground, as well as occasional warnings by the European intelligence services, to become more routine procedure than was previously the case.\textsuperscript{194} Western Europe may have succeeded in maintaining its external borders and preventing the return of foreign fighters, but that does not mean the end of security threats by Islamist extremist groups who take the fields

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{194}“Reflections Of The Migrant Crisis In The Countries of Southeastern Europe,” \textit{Parliamentary Institute} 2016, 5, accessed February 11, 2019, https://www.sobranie.mk/content/Парламентарен%20институт/Reflections%20of%20the%20Migrant%20Crisis%20in%20the%20Countries%20of%20Southeastern%20Europe%20-%20ENG.pdf.
\end{itemize}
of Europe, as staging points for spreading extremist ideology and providing logistical
support to different groups whom they are affiliated with such as the Islamic State. 195

Violent extremism remains the most difficult challenge for Western Europe from
within, which needs expertise in the fields of sociology and psychology, combating
extremism and the removal of extremist ideology. The European Police Agency
(Europol) reported on June 21, 2018 that terrorist attacks against European targets more
than doubled in 2017. The agency warned against the danger the Islamic State attacking
Europe, although it is less developed than its predecessors. 196

Military Issues:

The European Union Police Agency (EUROPOL) has always warned that the
Islamic State is seeking to intensify attacks on European targets following the marked
territorial, resource and personnel losses it has sustained in Iraq and Syria since 2017. 197
Europol reports revealed that more foreign fighters will try to return to Western Europe,
where there will be several dozens of these fighters capable of carrying out attacks,

195. Amandine, Scherrer, “The Return Of Foreign Fighter To EU Soil,”
European Parliament 2018, 5, accessed February 11, 2019,
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196. Press Release, “Terrorist Threat In The EU Remains High Despite The
Decline of IS In Iraq And Syria,” 2018, accessed February 11, 2019,

197. Robin, Simcox, “The Threat of Islamist Terrorism in Europe and How the
U.S. Should Respond,” The Heritage Foundation 2016, accessed February 12, 2019,
including their plans to launch car bombs, kidnappings and extortion, but the Europol report has reduced the likelihood of attacks on installations as vital as nuclear sites.\textsuperscript{198}

The British Interior Ministry predicted in June 2018 that the threat posed by terrorism will remain at its current high level, for at least two years, and the British Prime Minister Theresa May in September 2017 confirmed that the level of terrorist threat in the country would remain at the “Dangerous” level, which means there is a high probability of an attack, indicating that the level will remain under consideration in the light of continued investigations into terrorist operations.\textsuperscript{199} Mark Rowley, the United Kingdom’s senior counterterrorism officer, said in February 2018 that Britain faces a new and significant threat of terrorism, and Britain is a major target for local and foreign Islamist extremists.\textsuperscript{200}

\textit{Religious Issues:}

The European Centre for Countering-Terrorism and Intelligence Studies has reached the fact that French intelligence, perhaps the most European Intelligence Agency, has issued warning reports of possible terrorist attacks and concerns about the return of foreign fighters and their families to France, as well as British and Belgian


intelligence.\textsuperscript{201} The number of reports from the European Centre issued in 2017 revealed that the French intelligence service had been reporting throughout the year, reflecting the fears and concerns of French intelligence.\textsuperscript{202} Furthermore, the Belgian state Security Service warned on January 29, 2018 of the security consequences of penetrating extremist groups of the Muslim community in Belgium. It drew attention to the risk of growing “Salafist groups and initiatives” in the country and the possibility of becoming a social problem that threatens Western values and democracy in the country.\textsuperscript{203}

The actions of Western European States are almost identical in response to the phenomenon of terrorism, which has seen international concern, the fact that the European continent can be described as one of the generators of extremist and militant movements. For example, Belgium is an important part of Western Europe, and Belgium is a small country that has produced large numbers of extremists who joined the ranks of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq relative to the geographical area and population

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\textit{Ethnic Issues:}

The actions, taken by Western Europe with regard to migration issues or check-in and out of Europe, were a successful process that controlled the movement of these militant groups within Europe. For example, France and Denmark “have cited security concerns as justification for their reluctance in accepting migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, particularly in the wake of the Paris and Copenhagen terrorist shootings in early 2015”.\footnote{205}{Jeanne, Park, “Europe’s Migration Crisis,” \textit{CFR} 2015, accessed May 27, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/europes-migration-crisis.} Belgium, of course, had been more assertive on the subject, and had positively reflected on the Belgian citizen, with his sense of satisfaction, whether he was a Dutch or French speaker, and the Belgian citizen was reassured that there was a limit to the expansion of such movements.

As for the underlying causes, one of the most important of these is the identity crisis, which resulted in the European Community because of the presence of three jihadist groups, the first of Arab origin, the second children of Arab immigrants, the third entered into Islam recently. The first group is experiencing a severe identity crisis, where they had to choose between the merger Assimilation into the host society, or to remain resident in the indigenous culture to which their parents are raised, if one chooses to bias
the Western culture, it changes its appearance, and those who choose the indigenous
culture do the opposite. 206

Political Issues:

Some believe that terrorism in Europe was caused by the adoption of policies of
integration or defamation of identity by Western European countries, free expression of
culture and politics, the tendency to unite nationalism, and non-cultural pluralism, such as
the United Kingdom, which allowed for religious and cultural pluralism. 207 The impact of
historical accumulations in the field of security concepts of identity, a quasi-subjective
conviction of the majority of European public opinion, that multiculturalism is indeed a
structural problem with a pressing weight on the internal balance of Western Europe, and
the problem has been determined by the difficulty of integrating immigrant groups into
the systems of democratic societies, especially those who are challenged by dogmatism
and who congregate in organizational forms that are incompatible with the democratic
approach of Western European institutions.

In order to face the challenges posed by migration in its cultural dimension,
Western European States have adopted schemes, that will alleviate the cultural and nodal
conflicts, between the majority (indigenous population) and the minority (immigrant

206. Syed, Murshed and Sara, Pavan, “Identity and Islamic Radicalization in
207. Anna, Triandafyllidou, “Addressing Cultural, Ethnic & Religious Diversity
Challenges in Europe: A Comparative Overview of 15 European Countries,” European
University Institute 2011, 128, accessed February 12, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-
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groups). These are all policies that have made a fundamental purpose which is the control of the political and social dynamism of the migratory communities on the European soil.208

Analysis of the Case Study of the Sahel of North/West Africa

Military Issues:

The Sahel region of North/West Africa is threatened by several terrorist groups, with roots dating to Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks. Analysts focused their attention on Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its links to Al Shabab organization and the Nigerian Boko Haram group.209 It is interesting to note that the terrorist attacks in Africa do not receive due attention from international public opinion. In fact, media rallied around the globe when the terrorist attacks on the headquarters of the French newspaper Charlie Hebdo took place, as leaders of individual and group countries rushed to Paris to show sympathy and deep sorrow for the deaths.210 At the same time as the crime of Paris, the city of Baga, Nigeria, witnessed a bloody massacre by the Boko Haram gangs, in which


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about 150 civilians and soldiers. However, no one raised the slogan “all of us are Baga” in comparison to the slogan “all of us are Charlie”.

The growing concern of a terrorist threat in the Sahel is evident since 2001 and is clear from the escalation of violent attacks by extremist armed groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram group, Ansar Al Sharia, the Tawhid movement in West Africa and Al Shabab group of Somalia and the Organization of the Islamic State in Libya. The announcement of the Caliphate, in the specific sense, is that the link between these extremist groups is clear and growing in a sacred alliance with the movements that share their opinion, as well as a strange coalition based on trafficking, kidnapping and violent extremism.

Moreover, these transnational terrorist networks are expanding significantly from hot spots in the Middle East, especially Syria and Iraq to the Sahel region of North/West Africa, which poses a great threat to the people and countries of the region as a whole. The loss of terrorist groups by the army and the gradual weakening of its political and religious discourse in Algeria, thanks to the war against terrorism and increased awareness among the population, led to its re-deployment and the polarization of ex-combatants who fought in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.


According to the Global Terrorism Index in 2014, there has been a significant increase in the number of terrorist attacks in the Sahel region of North/West Africa: “Nigeria experienced the biggest year-on-year increase in deaths ever recorded with 5,662 more people being killed, an over 300 per cent increase.” Boko Haram, Mujahideen and AQIM groups are the most dangerous terrorist networks in West Africa, and their operations have killed thousands of people in the last two years. Boko Haram seems to be a real regional threat, threatening the security of Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Nigeria. Some 13,000 people have been killed and about 1 million displaced by Boko Haram violence since 2009.

Ethnic Issues:

The African Sahel region has been found to be a breeding ground for stability and unemployed young recruits. In fact, since the beginning of the millennium, the Sahel has become a strategic area for terrorist movements in an uncontrolled geographical area where most of the countries are exposed to ongoing violence and conflicts such as the Tuaregs’ oppression in Mali, Niger and internal conflicts in West Africa. In addition to the border disputes, sudden conflicts and the deteriorating situation in recent years due to

drought and poverty and the lack of political systems. In short, the region is witnessing a situation close to chaos, which is not improving and affects the ability of countries to combat security risks.

*Political Issues:*

The weakness of the countries in the world is a serious threat to them and others and applies to the countries of the African Sahel region, which is comprised of corrupt and failed states unable to effectively control their territory and ensure security. They lack effective state agencies. The fragility of the countries of the region is a potential breeding ground for terrorist groups and smugglers who have infiltrated into the region. In fact, these countries are impoverished for several reasons: Absence of investments and economic conditions lagging behind unemployment and poverty. Most countries in the region are unable to perform their duties.217

The absence of a state in this region is a boon to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, because it strengthens its presence in the region and creates chaos in order for it to be able to function with magnificence. All activities of terrorist groups grow and thrive in a turbulent security environment starting with developing its operational capabilities, training, armament, recruiting, committing terrorist acts against states, institutions, citizens, and against neighboring countries and foreign nationals.218

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218. Dario, Cristiani & Riccardo, Fabiani, “Al Qaeda In The Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Implications For Algeria’s Regional and International Relations,” *Istituto Affari*
state in the Sahel is also due to its inability to meet the basic needs of its citizens (education, health, food and economic and social opportunities) which led to a feeling of state alienation.

Economic Issues:

A group of experts was appointed, by the UN Secretary-General in 2004 to reflect on the security challenges of humanity, to lay the groundwork for a new collective security system. Infectious diseases and extreme poverty are threats themselves, “a breeding ground for other threats including civil conflicts”.

Development indicators for countries that are at the heart of the work of terrorist groups in the African Sahel are among the lowest global rates and three of these countries suffer from poverty. In Mauritania, the World Development Index is ranked 159th, Mali was ranked 183rd and Niger was ranked 189th. This allowed the terrorist movements to have permanent residence and to benefit from the chaos.

Ideological issues:

Certainly, the millions of dollars raised each year from kidnappings and drug trafficking allow for a significant number of criminal activities across national and terrorist groups and will certainly increase the extent of the threats and harm posed to

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African societies. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has increased its presence in the Sahel of North and West Africa in particular, expanding into a significant threat rather than simply a nuisance. The inevitable result of this situation is the creation of a climate of insecurity and increased extremism and violence. The countries of the Sahel region are still attractive to drug trafficking through the previously mentioned reasons (porous borders, rampant corruption, poverty and underdevelopment).

*Religious Issues:*

It is necessary to distinguish Salafist ideology imported from abroad, and especially the Gulf countries, from traditional Islam which exists in Africa since the 8th century. The introduction and growing influence of controversial Shari'a interpretations is a frequently cited factor in the “radicalization” and recruitment of individuals into violent extremist groups such as in Mali and Mauritania.\(^\text{221}\)

Furthermore, many Muslims who go to study in Arabic-speaking countries are struggling to find a job once they return to their country of origin because they do not master the official language. Discouraged and without resources, some do not hesitate to radicalize themselves and join extremist groups with whom it is easy for them to communicate.\(^\text{222}\)


To sum up, in the Sahel region of North and West Africa, the overlap between terrorism and organized crime has become so strong that some analysts have argued that Al Qaeda transformation from criminality to terrorist financing is a cover to make money. Drug trafficking has become a major source of money for terrorist groups and organizations deployed in the Sahel region of North and West Africa. On the other hand, the reality observed in France or in Western Europe is quite different where the financing of terrorist attacks is showing, rather, links between terrorism and criminal law. The next section of this chapter compares and contrasts both the case studies of Western Europe and the Sahel region of North and West Africa to explain in depth the similarities and difference between each case.

Similarities Between Western Europe and the Sahel Region

For Western Europe, one can note that the perpetrators of the attacks were young criminals found in their involvement in the ranks of an organization calling for the rise to the status of senior criminals:

- France/ Belgium: Cells that carried out Paris and Brussels attacks and the suspects who were later arrested included delinquents who were living in a state of rupture with the community and graduated as extremists from prisons. In addition, the link between terrorism and organized crime for Western Europe is seen where criminal gangs provide terrorist organizations with weapons, explosives and false identities, and terrorist groups also conduct drug trafficking, robbery and hate speech on social media sites. They do not,
also, hesitate to use the waves of refugees and immigrants to infiltrate their customers into European soil, as did the suicide bombers in France.

- The United Kingdom: On March 22, 2017, a man rushes into the crowd with his vehicle on the Westminster Bridge before stabbing a police officer deadly in front of Parliament. The attack, claimed by the IS, killed five people. Its author, Khalid Masood, a 52 years old British citizen converted to Islam, is shot dead by the police.223

- Spain: Persons detained for terrorist acts in Spain are mostly young people between the ages of 20 and 34, and men, who represent 83.1% of jihadists in Spain. Jihadist women, although minority, could become more and more numerous because of a campaign of mobilization of the Islamic States, especially directed towards them. Although the main motivation put forward by the detainees for their terrorist act is the Islamist ideology, the institute estimates that in only 11% of cases the knowledge of religious texts is relevant.224

Similarly, one can observe that for the case study of the Sahel of North and West Africa, terrorists, from Boko Haram or other groups, recruit youngs mostly from the countries of the Sahel:

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Nigeria: Forced to retreat to the north in the areas of Lake Chad and the Cameroonian border, Boko Haram was forced to redefine its strategy: the multiplication of suicide bombings including the use of girls kamikazes and expansion of its field of action. action towards neighboring countries such as Niger, Cameroon and Chad. At issue, widespread poverty and youth unemployment in northern Nigeria, providing fertile ground for the recruitment of the Islamic sect through religious preachers.  

Mali: In the Malian context, especially in the occupation of the northern regions in 2012, terrorist groups came to occupy places in which people lived. These are the groups that joined youth whose engagement is very rarely the result of a process of religious indoctrination. If the young people found themselves involved, it is mainly for reasons related to logics of protection or basic economic logic. There is a desire to protect his livestock, there is pragmatism.  

Niger: On Friday November 02, 2018, the Nigerian government adopted a bill amending the Penal Code to reintegrate the repented Boko Haram. To avoid

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young people joining the ranks of the terrorist group, the authorities are trying
to create a favorable economic and social environment.²²⁷

- Algeria: After the two car bombings perpetrated on Tuesday December 11th, 2007 in Algiers that left 37 dead, the Algerian police has been gradually providing information on the profile of the two terrorists who blew themselves up. One of them is Larbi Charef who is a young man of 30 from a poor neighborhood of the Algerian capital.²²⁸

Furthermore, the activities of Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine also specialize in various trafficking (drugs, human beings ...) and organized crime worries. These movements maintain connections allowing them to support each other.²²⁹

Differences Between Western Europe And the Sahel of North/West Africa

A look at the studies of International Transparency, which maps the corruption, reveals that corruption is important in North Africa but not very important in Western Europe:


- France: After the attacks of January 2015, an extraordinary meeting is organized in Paris at the initiative of France. It gives rise to the Paris Declaration of 11 January, which takes shape in April 2015 with the adoption by the European Commission of a European Security Program.\textsuperscript{230}

- Belgium: The handover of Salah Abdeslam, in less than two months by Belgium to France, illustrated the effectiveness of the European Arrest Warrant. The vigilance against Islamist extremism remains in spite of the military defeat on the ground of the jihadist group, the Islamic State.

- The United Kingdom: The plan of security aims to better share information from MI5 (British Home Intelligence) with the police or local authorities. The other priority reform is to improve, within the police and intelligence services, the use of data to detect threatening activities.\textsuperscript{231}

- Spain: The attacks in Madrid in 2004, and then in London in 2005, led to the adoption of a “European Union strategy to fight against terrorism”.\textsuperscript{232}

On the other hand, terrorism, or rather the rise of armed groups in the Sahel, is the consequence of a serious governance crisis affecting all of North and West Africa:

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- Nigeria: It is on this ground that emerged in 2002 Boko Haram, in Maiduguri, the capital of the state of Borno, in the north-east of the country. Originally a simple sect, the movement has slipped to become a social movement denouncing poor governance, corruption of the politico-administrative elite and disparity of development between North and South.\textsuperscript{233}

- Mali/ Niger: The governance crisis is characterized by the disappearance of the state at the service of the people, because the modern state is privatized by the political elites for their benefit. These states both have in common a mined political system, monopolized by a predatory elite whose methods have not only carried the blow to what was left of the state and its administration, but also brought organized crime to the very heart of power.\textsuperscript{234}

- Algeria: This state is too repressive or ineffective in its fight against terrorism. It is a country with corrupt and authoritarian political power, denying its citizens the exercise of their fundamental rights. This increases evidence of the risks in this area. The economic decline and the rise of inequalities go in the same direction.\textsuperscript{235}

Furthermore, in a Sahelian territory wider than Europe, the process of ensuring concomitant security and development is extraordinarily complex. In terms of border security for Western Europe, thanks to the European Union (EU) that member states have


tools to better share their information in complete security and respect for the protection of personal data. The Schengen Information System, set up in 1995 between the member states that are parties to the Schengen Convention, facilitates the sharing of information on the persons or objects sought. This tool is used in external border checks to verify whether the person checked has been flagged in the system by a member state as wanted or dangerous.\textsuperscript{236}

On the other hand, the nature of conflicts in the Sahel region is interconnected and complex which often leads to the outbreak of other conflicts. These situations have reflected the strength and cohesion of the Sahelian countries, which has made the countries of the region, known for their weak border controls, to the imposition of security administration on its territory\textsuperscript{237}. This leads to the ease of organized criminal activity and the ease of communication between non-national criminal organizations. This is mainly due to the bankruptcy of the state, which contributed primarily to the tribal system that governs many countries of the region which worked and is working to create chaos and division between factions.\textsuperscript{238}

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Conclusion

To sum up, for both Western Europe and the Sahel region of North and West Africa, there is an interconnection between jihadist groups and criminal networks. In the case of the Sahel region of North Africa and West Africa, jihadist groups finance themselves in a number of ways through their relations with tribal and local communities in the region, a transit zone for legal and illegal products between the Mediterranean and West Africa. Jihadist groups operate on these roads, sometimes benefiting from financial arrangements with local criminals who provide convoy security. Kidnappings are another source of income. For Western Europe, the practices that different terrorist used to finance their operations include armed robbery (as Mohamed Merah did in particular), consumer scams (as Amedy Coulibaly and Hayat Boumedienne have done), and illegal trade (as the Kouachi brothers did).
CHAPTER VI- CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

This thesis addresses the following research question: Under what conditions do violent terrorist groups driven by extreme Islamist ideology collaborate with organized criminal enterprises to generate the requisite resources to pursue their strategic objectives? Given that question, it assesses the extent of the validity of the following hypothesis/central argument: As Islamist extremist terrorist groups’ financial needs increase, they are more likely to use collaboration with organized criminal enterprises, relative to other sources, as their principal means of funding. It, also, assesses the extent of the validity of the hypothesis through a comparative analysis of the Western European cases to include France, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Spain and the African Sahel region cases of Nigeria, Mali, Niger, and Algeria.

This chapter is organized in the following manner: Introduction, Assessment of Extent of Validity of Central Argument, Limitations of Thesis and Suggestion for Future Research, and Policy Recommendations.

The question of the financing of terrorism arose immediately after Al Qaeda’s attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.239 According to official sources, the terrorists had used the financial circuit to raise money for the purpose of perpetrating the attacks. Money central to financing any war effort, terrorists fund their

activities on a global scale. This financing of terrorism comes from different horizons but one of the most serious threats is its link with money laundering.

Theft, drug trafficking, kidnappings and a range of other crimes are examples of ways terrorist groups raise money that is then employed both for the recruitment of new members and the organizations and prosecution of attacks. Money laundering and terrorist financing are thus linked and present similar points. By their very nature, they are secret activities with both domestic and international components. Yet, the financing of terrorism differs from the usual patterns of money laundering where criminals must find a way to launder their illicit profits. Indeed, terrorist financing sources can be both legal and illegal, unlike money laundering, which is still of an illegal nature.

Assessment of Extent of Validity of Central Argument

The central argument of this thesis is as follows: As Islamist extremist terrorist groups’ financial needs increase, they are more likely to use collaboration with organized criminal enterprises, relative to other sources, as their principal means of funding. It was assessed by showing one of the most important questions about the link between crime and terrorism which is how the criminal past contributes to the process of radicalization, such as how the background, experiences, and the history of individuals, to include the networks they are exposed to lead them to turn to Islamist extremism and turn into violence. The profiles and routes recorded in the database suggest that the Islamist State’s

discourse is perfectly in tune with the needs and personal aspirations of criminals and can serve as an incentive or a deterrent to continuing engagement in criminal activities.241

For Western Europe, the Islamist State follows the same reasoning. The most famous example being that of Khalid Zerkani, a Belgian member of Daesh responsible for recruiting and mobilizing up to 72 foreign terrorist fighters. After his radicalization, Zarkani used his criminal “skills” (and his immense charisma) to recruit young men as foreign terrorist fighters, whom he encouraged to commit robberies and attacks, justified by religious motives.242

As has been indicated previously, terrorism is traditionally distinct from organized international crime. Consequently, a distinct legal approach to regulate of these two forms of crime is essential.243 However, the evolution of these two phenomena, and in particular the paths followed by the new terrorism, suggest that these two forms of crime are closer than envisaged, as suggested by recent methods and practices of the Islamic State, but also other jihadist terrorist groups (like Boko Haram or Al Shabab). These new terrorist organizations resort to traditional criminal practices such as theft and extortion, while pursuing a primary objective of political and economic control by adopting new methods similar to those used for this purpose by any criminal

organization.244 Thus, the Islamic State’s internal hierarchical military structure, in accordance with the “caliphate” proclaimed on the territory which he controls, is different from the horizontal structure, made up of autonomous cells, which are generally found in older terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda.

In fact, the participation of terrorist groups in the drug trade should not be understood as an ideological contradiction or as a move towards a total fusion of the two types of criminal groups, especially if one knows that jihadist groups accept this participation in drug trafficking if they are sold to infidels but not to Muslims. Therefore, in addition to being seen as a vital source of revenue for terrorist groups from all continents, resulting in a wedded of convenience between the two activities, drug trafficking has become a powerful tool for realizing other crucial objectives of terrorist groups. Most worrying, however, is the fact, as studies have shown, that a significant proportion of those involved in terrorist attacks in Western Europe, in the last six years at least, have previously participated in various forms of crime and in particular to small drug trafficking, without being sentenced to prison or any other penalty.

The challenge of combating terrorist financing lies in locating money that has a clean source or minimal. The transfer of funds is carried out through the banking system as well as parallel money remittance systems such as “hawala” which consists of

circulating the money in a network of stockbrokers “hawaladars”. A client gives a sum of money to one of these agents, who contacts the agent closest to the recipient and asks him to pay this amount in exchange for a promise of future repayment.

This system works without transmission of means of payment, it relies entirely on the trust existing between the agents of the network. As it does not depend on the legal application of contracts, this system operates outside of a legal framework. There is no centralized register, and past transactions have no trace, and the only information necessary for its smooth operation is the maintenance of the total amount of current debt between each agent of the network. Debts can be settled in several ways depending on the wishes of the agents.

For a more effective fight, GIABA also collaborates with other partners within the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) network. Building the capacity of African countries to fight terrorism by improving financial intelligence services, is becoming a necessity.

The prevention of abuse by non-profit organizations and the introduction of anti-money laundering measures and money-changers must be of particular concern to decision-makers.


In December 2008, Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, director of CAERT already spoke of alarming signals about the links between terrorism and organized crime. According to him, the question that arises is how to ensure the stability of political institutions, the security of States and populations of the African continent and especially how to protect economies from the perversion of organized crime. He also wondered how to prevent Africa from serving as a “backbone” or source of funding for terrorists.248

Organized crime, money laundering and the financing of terrorism undermine the integrity of the political and judicial systems, the stability and prosperity of States.249 Therefore, the continent of Africa, for example, becomes an easy target not only for money laundering but also for the financing of terrorism. The predominance of cash in the financial transactions of young African economies and the prevalence of informal channels carry risks.250 The states of the Sahel must reflect on ways to prevent the proliferation of terrorist networks such as AQMI. This Islamist group finances its


activities using methods such as kidnapping and ransom demand, hostage-taking, racketeering, the drug trade and smuggling.\textsuperscript{251}

In the context of the fight against the financing of terrorism in West Africa, a model framework law has been adopted so that all Member States can adapt it in their laws in the West African And Monetary Union (WAEMU) area.\textsuperscript{252} Some countries have incorporated it into their legislation quickly. For example, Benin has a National Cell of Financial Information Processing (NCFIP) that functioned belatedly, while that of Senegal, operational for some time, gives convincing results.\textsuperscript{253}

The role of NCFIP is to collect, analyze and process financial information specific to establishing the origin of the transactions, or the nature of the transactions subject to the declarations of suspicion of the taxable persons. They have extended the scope of their mission to the fight against the financing of terrorism, which shows that the link between the two threats is worrying. Benin, like most countries in West Africa, is a

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signatory to several conventions on money laundering and the financing of terrorism.\textsuperscript{254} Money laundering is a crime under the WAEMU uniform law.\textsuperscript{255}

West Africa remains a fragile zone because of the large number of countries that are shaken by conflicts or political crises. It is an enabling environment for organized crime because of multiple instabilities.\textsuperscript{256} There seems to be a correlation between money laundering and the financing of terrorism, which makes, this area, a heaven for terrorist movements. Strengthening cooperation between countries is becoming an emergency as well as a greater role for regional organizations (WAEMU, AU, NCFIP) in the fight against these new threats. Mali, Mauritania and Niger in particular have been affected by the issue of terrorism. This situation can be explained by their geographical position and their common borders with the Maghreb, zone of origin of the Islamic group AQIM.\textsuperscript{257}

Limitations of Thesis and Suggestions for Future Research

Regarding the organizational structure for both terrorists and organized criminal groups, the concept of the network, which is mentioned in this thesis is ineffective in

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  \item \textsuperscript{254} Ibid, 24.
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understanding the degree of violence and the shift in the use of political violence by certain individuals. In future studies, it is essential to understand the organizational form from various geographical, financial and human constraints (number of activists, experience).

Furthermore, the thesis did not treat organized crime concerns and the nature of the threat it poses to the state. In future research, it is recommended to explore how criminal organizations are more interested in exploiting the weaknesses of state control over the economy and how they use the deficiencies of the implementation of the prohibitions. Finally, this thesis used a comparative case study approach between Western Europe and the Sahel of north and West Africa without suggesting the way in which Europe can guarantee a sustainable development to ensure a just and equitable public security to the countries of the Sahel. For future research, it is recommended to study the various challenges facing the Sahel population and what the European Community is required to do for them, because the security and development of the Sahel means Europe enjoying stability and being free of terrorism.

Policy Recommendations

Certainly, terrorism is a constant threat to peace, security and stability, and there is no justified justification for the terrorist acts, and they are always condemned regardless of the circumstances and the alleged motives. Therefore, it is important to solidify the values of understanding, tolerance, dialogue, pluralism, acquaintance among people, and rapprochement between cultures, to reject the logic of the clash of civilizations, and to fight every ideology that calls for hatred, incites violence and
warrants terrorist crimes which cannot be accepted in any religion or law. It is also important to emphasize the role of the media, civil institutions and education systems in developing strategies to address the terrorists’ claims and to encourage the media to establish guidelines for media and press reports, so as to prevent terrorists from benefiting from them in communication, recruitment or otherwise.

Further, the United Nations is required to develop standards to help charities and non-profit humanitarian organizations in their role of organizing relief and humanitarian work and to prevent exploitation of individuals through illegal activities. Increased cooperation at the national and bilateral levels is needed to coordinate between the agencies that specialize in countering terrorism, money laundering, weapons testing, explosives and drug trafficking in order to exchange expertise and experience, including training to ensure effectiveness in combating terrorists and their links to organized crime. Also, strengthening international action is crucial to preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction to support the UN role in this area, including the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540.

Developing national legislation and procedures is suggested to prevent terrorists from exploiting the laws of asylum and immigration to obtain safe haven or use the territory of countries as bases for recruitment, training, planning, or incitement to carry out terrorist operations against other countries. Also, it is important to focus on the phenomenon of juvenile delinquency from being prey to favorable criminal and terrorist organizations and to take concrete and specific counter measures to protect them from being the victim of these criminals. It is paramount to take effective, firm and urgent
measures to prevent and combat criminal activities committed by deterring the promotion of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and to promote universal compliance with international instruments, covenants and treaties relating to the fight against terrorism.
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