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Mississippi Crime and Corrections: The Effects of House Bill 585 on Crime and Incarceration Rates

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Mississippi Crime and Corrections: The Effects of House Bill 585 on Crime and
Incarceration Rates

by

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ABSTRACT

The state of Mississippi's historically high incarceration rate peaked in the year 2013, when it was the second highest nationwide. To combat this problem, House Bill 585 was passed into law in 2014. The law consisted of multiple reforms, which were part of an effort to toughen sentencing for violent offenders and reduce severity of punishment for non-violent criminals, with the aim of reducing incarceration and refocusing prison space for violent crimes. I employed difference in differences and synthetic control methododologies to examine the effects of House Bill 585 on crime and imprisonment rates. My results revealed that House Bill 585 caused an initial sharp decline in imprisonment rate, but the effect wore off as time progressed. The impact of House Bill 585 on violent crime was insignificant at all levels, and the law led to an increase in property crime rate, which also became less significant over time.

Keywords: Mississippi, crime, incarceration , House Bill 585

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my fellow teammates on the Southern Miss women's soccer team for being a constant source of support and love in my life. Also, to my parents, thank you for calming me down any time I was stressed; I love you guys.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DiD   Difference in Differences

H.B. 585   House Bill 585

MS   Mississippi

SCM   Synthetic Control Method

US   United States

INTRODUCTION

In the year 2013, the state of Mississippi had the second-highest incarceration rate in the nation, with the prison population having grown by approximately 17% in the preceding decade (Cate, 2021). These startling statistics prompted the government of Mississippi to take a step back and re-examine the correctional system and criminal laws that were currently in place. A Corrections and Criminal Justice Task Force was created with the goal of identifying areas of needed reform in Mississippi's prison systems, in hopes of saving taxpayers a significant amount of money in the years to come (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014). House Bill 585 was thus created as a result and enacted into law in 2014, with the aim of reducing incarceration. Among the reforms created by H.B. 585 was the tiering of drug offenses, the increasing of the felony theft threshold from $500 to $1000, and the establishment of a true minimum of time served for those convicted of violent and nonviolent crimes before becoming eligible for parole or early release (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014).

This paper will address the portion of House Bill 585 that requires nonviolent offenders to serve a minimum of 25% of their sentences and violent offenders to serve a minimum of 50% before being eligible for early release and will examine how these minimums affect crime and incarceration rates. The existing literature related to House Bill 585 generally supports the notion that the law was effective only in the short-run and has had no significant long-term impacts. Previous findings have suggested that minimum time served laws generally lead to higher imprisonment rates (which H.B. 585 is attempting to prevent), but this may not be the case in Mississippi, where the time served minimum of H.B. 585 decreases the required length of sentence serving for non-

violent criminals (Latino, 2020). This portion of the bill is referred to in Cate (2021) as a "split policy verdict" law, because the implementation of these minimums leads to tougher sentences for violent criminals and reduced sentences for non-violent criminals. Similarly to Barati (2018) and Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003), I will be utilizing the synthetic control method, along with the difference-in-differences method, to discover how time-served minimums impact prison population growth and crime. Theoretically, if there was previously no true minimum in place, requiring that violent criminal offenders remain in jail for a specified amount of time, rather than being eligible for extremely early release, etc., should lead to greater prison populations but decreased crime rates in regards to violent crimes/criminals, as incapacitation leads to crime reduction by rendering criminals incapable of reoffending or harming the community outside of the prison (Piquero & Blumstein, 2007). On the other hand, instituting a 25% minimum for non-violent criminals, when the previous minimum was a year, should lead to greater non-violent crime rates but lower incarceration rates for non-violent criminals. Because the majority of prison space in Mississippi was occupied primarily by non-violent criminals prior to 2014 (Cate, 2021), House Bill 585 should lead to a decline in the total prison population. Additionally, implementation of minimum time served laws and increasing of crime severity can reduce recidivism (Johnson, 2019).

By studying House Bill 585, this paper will specifically highlight the case of Mississippi, a state in which there is sparse existing literature related to the prison system, as Mississippi consistently lacks on crime reform in comparison to other states nation-wide (Latino, 2020). Cate (2021) negatively states that H.B. 585 has continued mass incarceration at cheaper rates, but this may not necessarily be a bad thing if violent crime

is reduced at a greater rate, therefore reducing social costs and taxpayer expenses. Additionally, it should be noted that it will be difficult to distinguish between the effects of incapacitation and deterrence when examining crime reduction via minimum time served laws. Implementing a true time-served minimum for violent criminals when the previous minimum was not enforced should lead to decreased violent crime rates and a refocusing of prison space on violent offenders. However, Cate (2021) points to the fact that even if House Bill 585 was initially able to accomplish this refocusing of prison space on violent criminals, Mississippi is still continuing to fall behind in crime reform and argues that House Bill 585 does not/will not have a significant effect on incarceration or crime rates over a long period of time.

POLICY BACKGROUND

As a result of the alarming crime rates in the state of Mississippi, a Corrections and Criminal Justice Task Force consisting of law enforcement officers, Mississippi legislators, attorneys, and more was assembled to propose reforms and attempt to discern the causes of the ever-increasing prison population (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014). The Task Force produced three main findings: nonviolent offenders accounted for a significant portion of the incarcerated, minimal prison alternatives were available for courts, and sentence lengths had been heightened in recent years. The Task Force then provided 19 policy recommendations aimed at placing an emphasis on incarceration of career and violent criminals, rather than first-time nonviolent offenders as well as decreasing recidivism rates, and providing better incarceration alternatives (Mississippi Corrections and Criminal Justice Task Force, 2013).

Thus, House Bill 585 was proposed and enacted into law in March of 2014 after a 105-13 vote in the Mississippi House of Representatives and a unanimous vote in the Senate (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014). House Bill 585 was first and foremost a way to produce budget cuts in Mississippi's criminal justice system by reducing the sheer number of people incarcerated, but Cate (2021) argues that it rather enables "mass incarceration on the cheap." With inmates tending to cost American taxpayers between approximately $30,000 and $60,000 per year per person (Henrichsen & Delaney, 2012), House Bill 585 promised to save taxpayers as much as $266 million dollars over the course of the seceding decade. Among the changes to the criminal justice system enacted by H.B. 585 included the aforementioned true time served minimums, as an attempt to

reserve prison space for violent and career criminals, and more (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014).

Prior to 2014, Mississippi's laws regarding minimum time served requirements for violent and non-violent offenders varied distinctly from the 25%-50% requirements instituted as a result of House Bill 585. Before House Bill 585, violent criminals did not have a true time served minimum and were eligible for early supervised release, intensive supervised release, and unadjudicated probation, barring certain extenuating circumstances or crimes (Coxwell Law, 2014) Additionally, non-violent criminals were required to serve a minimum of one year before becoming eligible for parole, so an individual sentenced for a non-violent crime to a year in prison would have had to serve the entirety of his sentence (Coxwell Law, 2014). After House Bill 585, the 50% minimum was put into place for violent offenses, and violent criminals were ineligible for intensive supervised release and unadjudicated probation. The true time served minimum was reduced from one year for non-violent criminals to 25%, once again, in an attempt to "toughen up" on violent crime specifically. However, one of the most widely acknowledged drawbacks and flaws of House Bill 585 is that it does not apply to criminals convicted prior to 2014, leading to the possibility of individuals convicted of identical crimes in different years to differ greatly in terms of parole/release eligibility, spurring inevitable questions of fairness and equity.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In the existing literature regarding the economics of crime and the efficiency of

incarceration rates and lengths, Becker (1968) provides a sufficient foundation for the

examination of tradeoffs related to crime. He believed that crime could be reduced by

increasing the costs of committing crimes or decreasing the potential benefits of crime.

The two ways to increase costs, which are often considered more feasible than reducing

benefits, are increasing the certainty/probability of crime apprehension or increasing the

severity of punishment for criminal activity. There is significant disagreement amongst

those in the world of criminal justice and economics in terms of the varying importance

of certainty vs. severity. Antunes & Hunt (1973) and Mathur (1978) posit that certainty is

much more successful in preventing crime than severity. Nagin (2013) and Loughran

(2011) also support the notion that certainty has a significant effect on crime reduction.

Killias (2009) finds it to be a nonlinear deterrent of crime, meaning that the probability of

an offender being incarcerated for a crime does not proportionally affect crime rate.

Opponents of this view argue that severity plays just as much, if not more, of a significant

role in reducing crime as certainty (Friesen, 2012; Lee & McCrary, 2009; Landerso,

2015).

Becker (1968) states that certainty and severity of punishments could either have

an incapacitation effect or a deterrent effect, where the former prevents criminals from

committing additional crimes by being physically incapable due to incarceration and the

latter discourages individuals from engaging in criminal activity to avoid the

repercussions and societal sanctions of these actions. The deterrent effect aims to "deter"

individuals from committing offenses by setting penalties that are proportional to the

magnitude of the crime (Johnson, 2019). The economic framework upon which this notion is based are the theories of utility maximization and cost-benefit analysis, assuming that an individual will be willing to commit a crime if the benefits and/or utility received from this action outweigh the costs (Bushway & Reuter, 2008). Decker & Kohfield (1990) emphasizes the importance of both certainty and severity as components of the deterrent effect. Gibbs (1968) reports a significant, inverse relationship between sentence length and crime, thus offering support for the deterrent effect. Also, in support of this effect are Tittle & Rowe (1974) and Abrams (2012), which examines the effects of add-on gun laws on gun violence and finds that these laws deter gun violence by approximately 5%. May (2014) focuses on habitual crime and the three-strike rule in California, which is currently implemented in Mississippi as well, and finds that the law has a deterrent effect for criminals with two previous felonies but does not have an overall deterrent effect on the general population. Another means through which incarceration can prevent crime is the incapacitation effect, which occurs by physically separating criminals from society, thus rendering them incapable of committing further crimes (Greenberg, 1975; Bhati, 2007; Levitt, 1996; Barbarino & Mastrobuoni, 2014). Piquero & Blumstein (2007) finds that the incapacitation effect may reduce crime in a greater magnitude than the deterrent effect.

Despite plentiful evidence in support of increasing severity and certainty of punishments in order to reduce crime, longer incarceration may not actually be socially optimal or economically efficient. Donohue III (2007) discusses the possibility of optimal levels of incarceration but determines that further research is needed regarding the extent of the social costs of incarceration. Ganong (2012) argues that the costs of incarceration

outweigh the overall benefits of incapacitation, and Barati (2018) finds that milder

punishments for lower-level crimes may be more economically efficient than

punishments of greater severity. Furthermore, greater severity is often associated with

greater recidivism and increased prison populations, along with increased demand for

prison space (Drago, 2016; Cloninger, 1996). Due to the costs of incarceration often

extending to social and implicit costs and surpassing state and local budgets, severity of

punishment should be proportional to the costs of incarceration in order to maintain fiscal

responsibility (Ross & Katzenelson, 1999; Henrichsen & Delaney, 2012).

Chen & Shapiro (2015) examines the effects of poor prison conditions and

increased sentence lengths on crime and finds a significant association with increased

recidivism. Poor prison conditions are often the result of budget cuts and attempts by

state and local governments to save money, which often coincide with attempts to reduce

the prison population. In 2019, the United States' incarceration rate dropped to its lowest

point since 1995, following many years of increasing imprisonment levels (Gramlich,

2021). However, in 2020, the US still maintained the highest incarceration rate in

comparison with all other countries worldwide, with an average of 665 individuals

incarcerated per 100,000 people (Simpson, 2020). While some theories state that

increasing the prison population decreases crime by taking criminals off the streets, this

has not necessarily been the case for the United States. In recent years, states across the

US have begun attempting to reduce their prison populations in hopes of saving money

and cutting prison budgets (Siebrase, 2022). However, the results of Chen & Shapiro

(2015) suggest that budget cuts leading to worsening prison conditions may actually be

associated with increases in the prison population, instead. Cate (2021) discusses House

Bill 585 that was passed in Mississippi in 2014 and posits that this bill has not decreased

incarceration by a significant amount. Furthermore, the fiscally responsible approach

assumed by the Mississippi government in this case is leading to declining prison

conditions, the transitioning to different types of criminal activity, and an increasing need

for investment in public goods/works.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Due to the reforms of House Bill 585 applying only to the state of Mississippi, rather than all 50 states, I deemed the difference-in-differences method to be appropriate for use in this paper. The difference-in-differences method is typically used when specific groups are treated, but others are not (Schwerdt & Woessmann, 2020). Difference-in-differences is also commonly utilized when the issue at hand is of a political nature (Angrist & Krueger, 1999). The model estimates changes over time, in which no groups are treated in the first period, and one or more groups are treated in the next period and compared to a control group. Therefore, the effects of the treatment variable should then be observable. A sample regression equation is as follows:

$$log(Crime_i) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treatment_i + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_i.$$

I chose to use a logarithmic model in order to better interpret the effects of dependent variables on crime rate and express these effects as a percentage. In this equation, *Crime* represents the outcome variables *violent crime*, *property crime*, and *imprisonment rate*. *Treatment* is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the observation is affected by House Bill 585 (alternatively expressed as observations for the state of Mississippi from 2014-2019). The variable *X* represents a number of demographic factors that could influence crime, such as population, gender, age, race, etc. I have also included state and year fixed effect variables in my regressions.

However, the difference-in-differences method is not exactly a perfect match for the issue in question because Mississippi is the only treated group out of all 50 states,

meaning there are 49 different control groups. Some of these states, such as New York, are not comparable to Mississippi due to extreme crime rate and demographic differences. To combat this problem of incomparability of crime in Mississippi versus more populous states, I have continued the difference-in-differences model with only states that are more demographically similar. I ran separate difference-in-differences regressions with the Southern states[1] as the control states. I also utilized another method, the synthetic control method (SCM), which has previously been deemed more suitable for determining the effects of a law such as House Bill 585 (Barati, 2018). This model was first conducted in Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003), and Abadie (2021) discusses its uses and applications. SCM is often employed with panel data sets and is used to examine the effects of an intervention, in this case, House Bill 585. A counterfactual synthetic control is then created using an optimization method and pre-treatment predictors to assign weights to appropriate control groups, in this case, states. By comparing the treated group to the synthetic control group, we can more clearly and accurately depict the effects of the intervention/treatment (Abadie, 2021).

The data I utilized in this paper is panel data obtained via FBI public databases and includes figures related to imprisonment rates, violent crime rates, and property crime rates. Demographic data was retrieved from the US Census Bureau. The time period accounted for ranges from 2005 to 2019, which is comprised of nine years prior to the passing of House Bill 585 and six years after. Table 1 in Appendix A displays mean

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[1] Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina, Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, Virginia West Virginia, Maryland, and Oklahoma

and standard deviation values for the variables included in the difference-in-differences

regressions.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In regards to the difference-in-differences regressions with all 50 U.S. states, the

treatment variable representing House Bill 585 led to a 10.98% decrease in imprisonment

rate, on average. This value was statistically significant at all levels. However, much of

this effect could be encompassed by the sharp decline in 2014, the year the law was

passed. The passing of H.B. 585 led to a 2.36% decrease in the violent crime rate, on

average, but this value was not statistically significant. Property crime saw an average

increase of 7.74% as a result of House Bill 585, which was statistically significant at all

levels, as well. Table 2 in Appendix A presents these regression coefficients for the

treatment variable and the other demographic variables. For the difference-in-differences

regressions with Southern states only, the effects of House Bill 585 on the three outcome

variables were similar to the regressions with all states, but with different magnitudes.

H.B. 585 led to a decrease in imprisonment rate by 14.6% and violent crime rate by

8.2%, on average, with the former being statistically significant at all levels and the latter

once again being statistically insignificant. The effect of H.B. 585 on property crime rate

was a 5.66% increase that was statistically significant at a 5% level. These regression

results, depicted in Table 3 of Appendix A, support our initial hypothesis that

imprisonment rate will show an initial decline, and property crime rate will increase in

Mississippi in the years after the passing of H.B. 585.

The pool for the synthetic control group consisted of every U.S. state except

Mississippi. Predictor variables and lagged outcome variables produced a synthetic

control with varying weights for appropriate states, with regards to each specific outcome

variable. Mississippi is referred to in the graphs as the *treated unit*. Figure 1 depicts the

behavior of Mississippi and the synthetic control group pre-treatment and post-treatment

for the outcome variable *Imprisonment Rate*, measured per 100,000 people.

Figure 1: SCM Graph for Imprisonment Rate per 100,000 People

As you can see, the synthetic control unit and treated unit (Mississippi) follow similar

paths until the year 2014, when House Bill 585 was passed. We see a sharp drop from

2013 to 2014 in imprisonment rate in Mississippi, likely caused by the large increase in

non-violent criminals eligible for parole as a result of the 25% true time served minimum.

However, we see much less drastic results in the following years, with Mississippi's

imprisonment rate eventually surpassing the treatment group in 2019, indicating that the

effects of House Bill 585 wore off over time.

Figure 2 displays the trends for Mississippi and the synthetic control for the

variable *Violent Crime Rate*, which is also measured per 100,000 people.

Figure 2: SCM Graph for Violent Crime Rate per 100,000 People

The effects of House Bill 585 on violent crime look to be insignificant, barring the year 2018, in which Mississippi experienced an abnormally low level of violent crime. The significant decline in 2018 appears to be unrelated to H.B. 585, and the most probable explanation for this anomaly is an error in data reported by Mississippi's police department, although this cannot be proven. Robertson (2019) cites the passing of a federal law that could have affected violent crime in Mississippi in 2018, but this would not explain the lack of such a significant decline for other states. The negative effect of House Bill 585 on violent crime rate is likely due in part to the decrease in 2018 and may have been even more insignifant in the absence of this data anomaly.

The SCM results for the final outcome variable, *property crime rate* per 100,000 people, are shown in Figure 3 on the following page.

Figure 3: SCM Graph for Property Crime Rate per 100,000 People

Prior to 2014, Mississippi and the synthetic control unit experienced very similar trends in property crime rate. Following the passing of H.B. 585, Mississippi's trend line jumps above the synthetic control group, and the treatment effect can be estimated by the difference between the two curves. As expected and supported by the DiD regressions, House Bill 585 led to an increase in property crime for the state of Mississippi in comparison to the control states.

CONCLUSION

House Bill 585 was created as a result of the recommended policy reforms of the 2014 Mississippi Corrections and Criminal Justice Task Force. It aimed to save Mississippi taxpayers as much as $266 million in the decade following the passage of the bill by reducing the state's staggeringly high incarceration rate. Among the critical reforms included in the bill was the implementation of a true time served minimum of 25% of the sentence for non-violent crimes and 50% of the sentence for violent crimes. This minimum was part of an effort to refocus Mississippi's prison space on violent criminals by toughening up on violent crime and reducing punishments for non-violent crimes. The law was passed in March 2014 and was applicable to any criminal convicted of a crime in 2014 or later.

Although H.B. 585 attempted to take a step in the right direction, Cate (2021) argues that this step was too small, as Mississippi continues to fall behind on crime reform in comparison to the rest of the nation. Cate (2021) also stated that the law would not be effective in the long run in terms of reducing incarceration in the state. From the difference in differences regressions, we saw that imprisonment rate in Mississippi sharply decreased in the year the law was passed, but this effect wore off, and imprisonment eventually began to increase once more. The impact of House Bill 585 on violent crime was insignificant when comparing Mississippi both with the rest of the U.S. and with a selected few Southern states. Because H.B. 585 increased severity of crime for violent criminals, the desired deterrent effect would be a decrease in violent crimes, but in line with Cate (2021), this effect did not occur. For property crime rate, an increase

occurred as a result of the passing of House Bill 585, and the statistical significance of this increase varied when including 49 control states versus only Southern control states.

The synthetic control graphs told a story very similar to that of the DiD regressions. The significant decrease in imprisonment rate was largely attributed to the first year in which H.B. 585 was passed. The decrease in violent crime, albeit insignificant, was influenced by the abnormal and unexplained large drop in Mississippi violent crime in the year 2018. Property crime increased initially in Mississippi in the year the law was passed and continued to trend above the synthetic control group for the next five years. In conclusion, House Bill 585 was impactful only in the short-term in initially decreasing incarceration. However, this decline did not persist for the following years, and violent crime did not significantly decrease in the manner which the Corrections and Criminal Justice Task Force anticipated. These results support the assertions made in Cate (2021) that House Bill 585 was not effective in the long run, and Mississippi must continue to make further reforms to improve its incarceration and crime rates.

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APPENDIX A

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation
Yearly Crime/Imprisonment Rates Defined per 100,000 People:			
Imprisonment	750	388.45	138.45
Violent Crime	750	374.35	152.60
Murder	750	4.51	2.30
Robbery	750	88.69	50.04
Rape	750	37.54	15.73
Aggravated Assault	750	243.61	113.41
Property Crime	750	2743.37	729.05
Theft	750	1925.23	447.53
Burglary	750	577.90	238.20
Vehicle Theft	750	240.24	132.13
Population Characteristics:			
State Population	750	6251954	6929862
Population per Square Mile	750	196.81	260.17
Male Population	750	3075934	3421201
Female Population	750	3176020	3509238
Race, Age, and Sex Data (As a Percentage of the Population):			
White	750	80.23	12.26
Black	750	10.78	9.54
Hispanic	750	10.93	10.01
Other Race	750	8.99	10.28
Female	750	50.62	0.76
Male	750	49.38	0.76
Younger than 15	750	19.39	1.79
Age 15-24	750	13.89	0.90
Age 25-34	750	13.24	1.00
Age 35-44	750	12.91	1.00
Age 45-54	750	13.87	1.27
Age 55-64	750	12.38	1.29
Older than 65	750	14.31	2.24
Unemployment Rate:	750	2.83	1.06

Table 2: DiD Regression with All States

Variable	Imprisonment	Violent Crime	Property Crime
House Bill 585	-0.1098***	-0.0236	0.0774***
	(0.0347)	(0.0430)	(0.0283)
Population Density	-0.0026**	-0.0057***	-0.0030***
	(0.0011)	(0.0015)	(0.0010)
Male Median Age	3.9702**	4.4764	3.2993
	(1.6527)	(3.8747)	(2.3712)
Female Median Age	-3.1510*	-2.2964	-3.8890
	(1.7904)	(2.5545)	(2.4882)
Younger than 15	0.5107	-0.5893	-1.3681
	(1.0532)	(1.2794)	(1.3379)
Age 15-24	-0.1266	0.7477	-0.9184
	(0.7104)	(0.9737)	(0.8036)
Age 25-34	-0.6830	0.4328	-0.7945
	(0.7258)	(1.1665)	(0.9199)
Age 35-44	-0.7300*	0.2324	0.0994
	(0.4066)	(0.4482)	(0.4409)
Age 45-54	-0.7309*	-0.3305	0.3992
	(0.3854)	(0.4451)	(0.4073)
Age 55-64	-1.1630**	-0.4057	-0.6792
	(0.4347)	(0.6554)	(0.4744)
White	0.6644	0.2908	-1.9628
	(1.1200)	(1.5333)	(1.1775)
Black	0.0842	0.2933*	-0.1019
	(0.0930)	(0.1580)	(0.1005)
Hispanic	-0.0150	0.3244	0.4971**
	(0.1906)	(0.2431)	(0.2272)
Other Race	0.1827	-0.6505*	-0.6113***
	(0.2145)	(0.3869)	(0.2284)
Female Officer	0.0676	0.1646*	0.0740
	(0.0700)	(0.0982)	(0.0701)
Male Officer	0.7366*	-0.1430	0.0547
	(0.3741)	(0.7302)	(0.4198)
Female Population	71.1792	-157.6368	-224.3316**
	(73.0528)	(108.5549)	(89.2784)
Male Population	78.0221	-144.9624	-210.3244**
	(73.1077)	(108.1435)	(85.7775)
Unemployment	0.0387	-0.0505	0.0008
	(0.0475)	(0.0667)	(0.0490)
Female Civilian	0.1302	0.0786	0.2174
	(0.1528)	(0.2014)	(0.1566)

Table 2 (Continued)

Male Civilian	0.1326*	-0.0237	-0.0172
	(0.0686)	(0.1248)	(0.0724)
Constant	-580.1327	1181.982	1727.504
	(573.7966)	(848.3617)	(689.3833)

*denotes significance at p=.10   ** denotes significance at p=.05   *** denotes significance at p=.01
Standard Error values

Table 3: DiD Regressions with Southern States Only

Variable	Imprisonment	Violent Crime	Property Crime
House Bill 585	-0.1460***	-0.0821	0.05663**
	(0.0332)	(0.0906)	(0.0256)
Population Density	-0.00002	-0.0113	-0.0006
	(0.0049)	(0.0089)	(0.0024)
Male Median Age	6.4771	2.2890	-0.5661
	(4.8670)	(8.3116)	(2.6083)
Female Median Age	-3.1007	-3.8789	4.0844
	(4.9732)	(4.6845)	(3.1217)
Younger than 15	-3.3638	-3.4207	4.9547
	(3.7883)	(5.0838)	(2.8364)
Age 15-24	1.4816	-0.5631	1.9828
	(1.5238)	(2.1664)	(1.3222)
Age 25-34	1.6709	-0.3995	1.7879
	(1.3965)	(1.9039)	(1.0003)
Age 35-44	3.2379*	1.0365	1.7575*
	(1.7966)	(2.2518)	(0.9294)
Age 45-54	0.8842	-0.5146	1.1877
	(2.5481)	(2.1676)	(1.3229)
Age 55-64	-4.2256*	-0.3309	2.4703**
	(2.2450)	(2.1768)	(0.9973)
White	-5.7640	-4.1647	3.5855
	(3.7873)	(4.1878)	(2.1254)
Black	0.3218	-0.3947	-0.3830
	(1.0874)	(1.5597)	(0.6073)
Hispanic	0.3002	0.2220	-0.0906
	(0.6133)	(0.7629)	(0.3436)
Other Race	0.3173	0.7719	0.1928
	(0.8440)	(0.9159)	(0.3089)

Table 3 (Continued)

Female Officer	0.1940*	0.1436	-0.0110
	(0.0966)	(0.0905)	(0.0601)
Male Officer	1.2754	0.6610	-0.7777*
	(0.8025)	(0.9938)	(0.4076)
Female Population	-621.8004	-454.6249	-9.2251
	(923.7993)	(964.5863)	(364.0819)
Male Population	-566.2549	-423.8971	-13.2045
	(882.0833)	(931.9115)	(348.2886)
Unemployment	-0.0809	-0.0347	0.0267
	(0.0551)	(0.1273)	(0.0313)
Female Civilian	0.3537**	0.1109	-0.1437
	(0.1219)	(0.2193)	(0.1113)
Male Civilian	0.2250	0.1687	-0.0425
	(0.1360)	(0.1239)	(0.0649)
Constant	3662.055	3476.958	32.3511
	(7042.163)	(7423.95)	(2774.638)

*denotes significance at p=.10   ** denotes significance at p=.05   *** denotes significance at p=.01
Standard Error values