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Jimmy Carter's Post-Presidential Rhetoric: Faith-Based Rhetoric and Human Rights Foreign Policy

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A Dissertation
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ABSTRACT

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Former President James Earl Carter is well known for his rhetorical efforts to promote human rights. Carter's human rights advocacy is motivated and sustained by his belief that God duty-bounds him to assist those less fortunate than himself. Scholars generally concede, however, that as president, Jimmy Carter's human rights accomplishments were minimal and that he failed to develop or institute consistent policies. This dissertation compares and contrasts Carter's presidency and post-presidency with respect to human rights accomplishments, arguing that he was better able to serve an advocacy role when out of office. Carter, free of *separation of church and state* restraints, successfully pursued human rights advocacy world-wide.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Carter and Religious Faith

President James (Jimmy) Earl Carter is a professed *born again* Christian. While running for president in 1976 Carter stated, "I can be a better President because of my faith" (Hahn, 1980, p. 61). Years after his presidency, in the book *Living Faith* (1996) (where he catalogues several of his faith-based actions and philosophies), he notes that, "… the religious beliefs I inherited have been transformed into a living faith" (p. 3). As a born again Christian, Carter's faith is the belief that Jesus Christ is his lord and savior. Carter used his life to create a living faith that promoted the teachings of Christ.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine Carter's use of faith-based rhetoric to support human rights goals following his departure from public office. I contend that presidential politics and the presidency placed limits on Carter's ability to discuss his faith as a basis for his human rights advocacy. I will explain as well how Carter used his faith to advocate human rights goals after he left office. I begin with a literature review of Carter's post-presidential rhetoric and human rights rhetoric, and in so doing justify a need for the study of Carter's post-presidential faith-based rhetoric.

Post-Presidential Rhetoric

Former presidents do more than hock their memoirs. The political functions of former presidents change as their lives extend. Due to his active interest in geopolitical affairs and philanthropic endeavors, Jimmy Carter has significantly impacted the way the activities of former presidents are viewed. Carter is unique among former presidents. His decision to pursue political interests provides considerable data suited to rhetorical

analysis. Specifically, Carter's post-presidential foreign policy efforts presented significant data suited to faith-based rhetorical criticism.

Carter clearly establishes a model of both national and international public service for ex-presidents. Carter (in Walsh, Reese, Sawicki, Graham, & Omestad, 2005) contends that "when I left office in, I was in a quandary, I was 56 years old, and I knew I had a life expectancy of 25 years or more. I began to wonder what Rosalynn [his wife] and I could do in the international world" (p. 61). Walsh et al. (2005) contended that Bill Clinton is following a similar path. Only five years after his presidency, an unidentified confidant of Clinton's noted that (in Walsh et al, 2005) "He doesn't think in terms of 'I'm going to pioneer a new way to have a post-presidency…' He wants to make a difference (p. 60)." Even the self-proclaimed *out of politics* George H. W. Bush quietly worked for charitable causes with Clinton (Walsh et al., 2005).

In the United States, the presidency holds unique significance. Numerous accounts attempt to explain the power that the president holds over American culture. Stuckey (2004) offers an extended study of how United States Presidents incorporate cultural values into their rhetoric and define cultural values. That power allows the president to use and wield a wide variety of rhetorical strategies. The office of the president also conveys with it considerable ethos. The press, for example, pays attention to what former presidents say. Ex-presidents have the power to garner press attention as shown by a Fox News Corporations interview with Bill Clinton (the text of the interview can be found in Wallace, 2006). Clinton made arguments supporting previous policy decisions and explained his philanthropic organization's mission (Wallace, 2006). Former presidents frequently make themselves available to the media.

Unfortunately, very little is found in the communication literature regarding post-presidential rhetoric. One published scholarly study specifically examined post-presidential rhetoric and its implications. It analyzes Herbert Hoover's speaking campaign against the New Deal in 1934-1936 (Short, 1991). Short notes that after losing his re-election bid in 1932, Hoover did very little until 1934, when he inaugurated an ideological campaign against the New Deal. Hoover used radio and live speaking engagements to effectively change his image from a bumbling ex-president to a presidential peer of Franklin Roosevelt.

Beyond recreating his own image, Hoover was able to clearly develop several argumentative positions against the New Deal. The first theme developed by Hoover was the protection of "American Values" (Short, 1991, p. 338). Hoover argued that the totalitarian trends in Europe developed out of big government policies like the *New Deal*. Freedom and liberty in the United States were inexorably linked to Christian faith, which was being threatened by the *New Deal*. The second theme was that of fiscal responsibility. Hoover focused on both the *New Deal's* impact on government spending and the individual's lack of fiscal responsibility. Hoover claimed that the "New Deal" destroyed self-reliance and Christianity because fiscal responsibility is a key Christian principle. Next, Hoover proclaimed that rejection of the *New Deal* would save America's morality. This was similar to Hoover's first theme; he claimed that big government policies would result in moral destruction. Hoover effected some political change with his thematic arguments shifting the debate about the *New Deal* in the press from a debate about results to a debate about ideology.

Short (1991) contends that Hoover was the only person in the country that could address United States policy as a presidential peer. A second political advantage is that an ex-president, even though his popularity may have waned, has proven constituency. This gave him a unique ethos and opportunity to address important topics.

Lee (1995b) examines two of Carters' autobiographical works, *Keeping Faith* and *Turning Point.* He argues that Carter used these works to change his political legacy. Lee contends that "time does not assure the Truth (sic) of public memory; it merely records results" (p. 121). Carter used time to change the perception of his record. Through his post-presidential writing, Carter depicted himself as simply a humble public servant.

Carter's humility fit with his idea of *Christian virtue* (Lee, 1995b). Repentant Christians, for example, ask forgiveness for their sins by humbling themselves before God. Humility is needed to access the goodness of God. Therefore, "humility is a qualification for acquiring (the) other virtues" (Lee, 1995b, p. 123). Lee (1995b) claims that by humbling himself before "the people" Carter developed a similar relationship (p. 123). To show his virtuousness he cast himself as working for the nation's citizenry. Similarly, in order to demonstrate to commentators that the country was virtuous he crafted a humble foreign policy. Carter's foreign policy was humble because he placed faith-based values before popular will. Lee (1995b) notes that "for Carter, serving the 'public good' is calibrated in political courage and not political support" (p. 126). Carter's post-presidential writing, I argue here, helped reshape his image from a lack-luster president to a faith-driven servant. Lee (1995b) concludes that Carter's work in international affairs also demonstrated a public servant ethos.

Despite the fact that there are few studies of Carter's post-presidential rhetoric, three books chronicle Carter's actions following his presidency (Brinkley, 1998; Skidmore, 2004; Updergrove, 2006). Skidmore (2004) contends that Carter reinvented himself and has contributed more to his country after his presidency than all but two or three other ex-presidents. Brinkley (1998) chronicles Carter's post-presidential acts in detail from the years 1981 through 1997.

Carter wrote several bestselling books, monitored elections worldwide, built Habitat for Humanity houses, and gave numerous speeches. Despite all of those activities, no major study of Jimmy Carter's post-presidential rhetoric has been conducted. Writers that have chronicled the works of Carter's post-presidency concur that Carter's reputation has improved (Brinkley, 1998; Skidmore, 2004; Updergrove, 2006). Smith (2000) asserts that "Jimmy Carter used his years after the White House to refurbish his historical reputation through good works at home and abroad" (p. 189). While Carter has his critics, the response to his work has been favorable, including a Nobel Peace Prize and several other awards.

Carter's post-presidential rhetoric should be studied to develop a genre of faith-based post-presidential rhetoric. One potential result may include Carter's use of religious interpretations of the Bible to support his post-presidential goals and initiatives. Knowledge of both would help rhetorical critics to better analyze post-presidential rhetoric. A major theme of both Carter's presidency and post-presidency was human rights. Examining his human rights rhetoric, I contend, reveals a unique shift in Carter's post-presidential rhetoric. The following section explores Carter's human rights rhetoric.

Human Rights Foreign Policy

Human-rights-centered foreign policy marked Carter's presidency (for detailed accounts see Carter, 1982; Forsythe, 2002; Kramer, 2005, Schmitz & Walker, 2004; Shestack, 1989; Stohl, Carleton, & Johnson, 1984; Stuckey, 2008). Carter used speech making to promote human rights (Forsythe & Beatham, 1995). Carter emphasized his credibility and faith-based beliefs. A focus on human rights was an extension of his personality-based politics (Stuckey, 2008). To explain why human rights foreign policy rhetoric is important to the study of Carter's post presidency, this section examines Carter's foreign policy philosophies, their impact on human rights, and his failure to implement them.

Forsythe (2002) argues that American foreign policy followed four traditions: American exceptionalism, neo-isolationism, liberalism, and realism. These four traditions have independent definitions but are interrelated. American exceptionalism is defined as the idea that "Americans constitute an exceptionally good and great people, who represent above all a commitment to personal freedom or liberty…" (Forsythe, 2002, p. 502). Idealistic Americans view their nation as a "city on a hill" (Forsythe & Beatham, 1995, p. 112). Neo-isolationism is "a unilateral choice not to engage deeply on many international issues." (Forsythe, 2002, p. 503). Liberalism follows the principles of "law and individual morality…, international cooperation, human rights, and other basic liberal notions" (Forsythe, 2002, p. 505). Realist foreign policy "emphasizes the exercise of coercive power by states-unconstrained if need be by conventional notions of law and individual morality" (Forsythe, 2002, p. 507). Forsythe (2002) contends that a president could use more than one of these philosophies. For example, while Jimmy Carter

embraced a liberal foreign policy, he also embraced the idea of American exceptionalism while constructing a "government as good as its people" (Forsythe, 1992; Forsythe, 2002, p. 517; Forsythe & Beatham, 1995; Kramer, 2005). Carter felt that human rights are a "natural extension" of everything American, a position connecting human rights to both the liberal and American exceptionalism traditions (Stuckey, 2008, p. 42).

Forsythe (2002) explains how the four foreign policy traditions impact human rights policy. In the United States, despite being a weaker head of state than a prime minister or a dictator, the president is the main driving force behind foreign policy decisions (Forsythe, 2002). Congress and other groups, such as the media, are disjointed and lack knowledge. They are not effective policy makers and actually interfere with presidential policy making (see Forsythe, 2002). Because of the mixed philosophical tradition in the United States and the weakness of the president, there is a "great ambivalent – some would say confusion and inconsistency…" in applying human rights approach to foreign policy (Forsythe, 2002, p. 516). The very structure of the American system did not allow consistent support of human rights (Forsythe, 2002; Stohl et al., 1984). Carter used a foreign policy strategy that allowed him maximum flexibility for negotiation and diplomacy. It allowed him to focus on human rights when it was diplomatically advantageous (Stuckey, 2008, p. 107). For example, after looking at a country's human rights record to make a decision regarding arms distribution, its human rights record is usually not examined again. To further support this idea, Stohl et al. (1984) tracked the distribution of foreign aid to nations and found that the distribution of foreign aid did not consistently support a human rights foreign policy.

It is unlikely for a United States president to craft a consistent human rights foreign policy even when he sets out to do so. However, Shestack (1989) contends that the United States will continue to pursue a human rights based foreign policy because (1) it makes the nation uniquely relevant; (2) it serves security interests; (3) it creates a just world order; and (4) it values liberal democracies. Washington will continue to support democracies because doing so endorses human rights and civil rights values that fit with the American exceptionalism myth (Forsythe & Rieffer, 2000). After cataloging foreign policy decisions, Forsythe (2002) found that the Democratic Party was more likely to focus on human rights.

Jimmy Carter specifically tried to make human rights a focus of foreign policy during his presidency (Forsythe, 2002; Forsythe & Beatham, 1995; Kramer, 2005; Schmitz & Walker, 2004; Shestack, 1989; Stohl et al., 1984; Stuckey, 2008). Congress took the lead during the Ford administration paving the way for Carter to use a human rights foreign policy as both a campaign issue and a major issue of his presidency (Bell, 1984; Forsythe & Beatham, 1995; Schmitz & Walker 2004). Jimmy Carter (1982) covered some of these attempts in his memoirs.

Carter and Human Rights During His Presidency

Despite his best efforts and rhetoric Carter failed to implement a consistent human rights policy during his presidency (Forsythe & Rieffer, 2000; Shestack, 1989). Carter's rhetoric on human rights often came across as *preachy* (Bell, 1984; Shestack, 1989). Carter had to expend a great deal of resources attempting to get congress to support his foreign policy decisions (cf. Carter, 1982 for detailed accounts of congressional fights over Panama and China). Ultimately, Carter developed a policy that worked with regimes

like China and Panama to encourage human rights reforms (Bell, 1984; Kramer, 2005; Shestack, 1989).

Carter was never able to gain mass public support for his human rights efforts (Stohl et al., 1984). While Carter (cf. Carter, 1982, for an extended account of his Human Rights efforts) integrated human rights into his foreign policy, ultimately he acknowledged it to be unsuccessful. Stohl et al. (1984), in their study of human rights and foreign aid, indicated that "…Jimmy Carter did not actually usher in a new era of United States foreign policy with respect to the distribution of United States foreign assistance" (p. 223). Even supporters of a revaluation of Carter's foreign policy, such as Schmitz and Walker (2004), acknowledged that inconsistencies damaged support from congressional leaders who were human rights advocates.

Carter examined each foreign policy decision as a separate action resulting in what many claim were purposeful inconsistencies (Schmitz & Walker, 2004). Carter's failures were well documented. Bell (1984) contended that his focus on human rights and moralism was so inconsistent that it could have led to war. For example, Carter stuck to a noninterventionist philosophy in Nicaragua. Communists subsequently took control of the government. Carter's commitment to not engaging in military intervention came into conflict with his position that democracy was essential to human rights. As a consequence, Reagan, while on his way to a huge victory, did not hide his contempt for the Carter administration's foreign policy (Jacoby, 1986).

Forsythe (2002) notes that non-governmental agencies usually have little effect on United States foreign policy. They lack the resources to compete with other interests. Carter (1993) felt that it was the obligation of the United States as a nation to ensure

human rights for everyone. He dealt with an oppositional congress that prevented the implementation of some of his policies (Stuckey, 2008). Despite the opposition Carter was able to use human rights as a justification for the passage of the Panama Canal Treaty and the overthrow of the white supremacist government in Zimbabwe (Kramer, 2005). Carter was able to successfully cement human rights into the executive branch. He instated a human rights desk in the Department of State (Stuckey, 2008).

Human Rights Ideograph

Carter's conceptualization of human rights was an expansive liberal definition that includes peace, freedom to vote, food, shelter, and medical care (for a detailed account see Carter, 1993). In the context of the 1976 political climate, human rights served as an ideograph upon which Carter built his national ethos (Stuckey, 2008).

An ideograph is "an overarching ideology" such as "'liberty,' and 'equality'" (Lucaites, 1998, pp. 18-19). The ideograph functions within the American political system as an idealistic and abstract philosophical construct that is difficult to argue against. Ideographs are powerful, positive terms that politicians seek identification with.

Carter was the first president to develop a strategy that used human rights as a key value and policy goal (Stuckey, 2008). He argued that morals dictate his focus on human rights, "Human rights has always meant the protection of human freedom as understood through a capitalist view of democracy associates with the myth of American exceptionalism" (Stuckey, 2008, p. 82). Carter rhetorically used the term "human rights" as an ideograph (Stuckey, 2008, p. 41). Using the human rights ideograph was an effective rhetorical strategy. However, it did not serve as a useful tool to implement policy or to become reelected. Future presidents built on Carter's use of human rights as

an ideograph using the strategy to promote trade, humanitarian aid, and war. George W. Bush used human rights to justify his military actions in 2002 and 2003 (Stuckey & Ritter, 2007)

Phronesis

Carter's human rights advocacy developed out of Carter's commitment to American exceptionalism (Stuckey, 2008). Stuckey (2008) notes that "for Carter, human rights was a natural extension of everything that unified Americans—history, ideology, and political practice" (p. 42). Carter's commitment to human rights over personal political gain was similar to the ancients' rhetorical ideal of phronesis (Kramer, 2005).

The Greeks had two terms, phronesis and deinesis, to describe how politicians worked within the political system (Corbin, 1998). Deinos was the ability to work the political system for one's own gain with very little care given to morals, history and/or philosophy (Corbin, 1998). Phronesis, on the other hand, implies the use of morals and knowledge to evaluate all policy options available to work for the advantage of the state as opposed to the advantage of specific individuals (Corbin, 1998; Self 1979). Isocrates, for example, advocated rhetoric based on the idea of a unified Greece (Corbin, 1998). Isocrates used the Persian Greek war to argue for the Greek city states to form a greater Greek state (Corbin, 1998). He believed this was the next logical step in the development of Greek society. Cicero and others defined such a rhetor as a "good man speaking well" (Kennedy, 1972). Phronesis allowed the individual to attain an ethics based practical wisdom. In Carter's case, his faith-based views of human rights served as the basis for his role as a rhetorical *phronikon*.

Corbin (1998) describes Michael Calvin McGee's idea of contemporary politicians practicing phronesis. Politicians, for example, must have knowledge of ethical history. They must use such knowledge to construct stories that illustrate positive moral philosophies. In addition politicians must endorse policies that are based on moral philosophies. A *phronimos* or *phronikon*, then, is a person imbued with practical wisdom who uses that wisdom to make changes for the good of society. If politicians are able to initiate policies that benefit society as a whole only then will they benefit as well.

I contend that Carter's post-residential human rights rhetoric modeled a form of faith-based phronesis. Stuckey (2008) argues and provides examples that show Carter believes that human rights legislation is necessary because it is based on moral principles. Stuckey contends that (Stuckey, 2008, p. 71) "Carter tied human rights to his personal ethos, grounded in his religious and regional identity; connected it to the overarching goals and ethos of his administration and to his political party." Kramer (2005, p. 16) believes that Carter's "moral rhetoric" can be distinguished from other presidents because he used it at as a criteria for decision making that benefitted the United States and its people. Unfortunately, Carter was unable to gain congressional support for his policies, specifically international treaties. There is little doubt that such failure contributed to his reelection loss to Reagan (Bell, 1984; Stuckey 2008).

Restraints on Presidential Phronesis

Despite Carter's success representing human rights as an American ideograph, Carter failed to establish consistent human rights based foreign policy (Forsythe & Rieffer, 2000; Shestack, 1989). Even though he advanced human rights legislation and

policies, he was unable to implement them. Implemented policies were done so for political advantages rather than the absolute support for human rights (Stuckey, 2008).

Stuckey (2008) argues, however, that the Carter presidency created the right climate in which to develop a faith-based, human rights foreign policy. Nevertheless following Vietnam and the Nixon scandals both history and philosophy showed that no one person should control all important foreign policy decisions (Schlesinger, 2004). Indeed, the Carter administration argued that politicians could be corrupted by power.

Carter left office with an extremely hostile congress that restrained him from completing very basic human rights foreign policy goals. Congress refused to ratify any of the human rights treaties he signed (Stuckey, 2008). Surprisingly Ted Kennedy, who ran against Carter in 1980, openly opposed many of Carter's domestic and foreign policy initiatives. Congress prevented Carter from functioning as a *phronikon* functionally because the institution did not value his faith-based humanitarian policies.

As President, Carter was tied to governmental rules, laws, and ideologies. Phronesis limited Carter's ability to excessively criticize U.S. foreign policies. A *phronikon* president would, instead, promote American Exceptionalism. Carter could fight for human rights but not condemn the nation's failure to pursue human rights policies. He was left to argue that pursuing human rights goals would benefit America. Carter (1996) explained his feeling regarding political limitations:

> Any government, even the most benevolent has inherent limitations. The best it can do is strive to establish a society that enhances freedom, equality, and justice. There are deeper religious values, such as atonement, forgiveness, and love that transcend what government can achieve. When governments reach their limits,

> the teachings of Jesus Christ and of the prophets of other faiths must prevail. (pp. 110-111)

Comments such as this imply that Carter placed his pursuit of faith-based ideals ahead of governmental protocols. In addition to showing his frustration for the limits of government, Carter explicitly stated that the laws of God transcend the limits of government. I establish here that Carter's post presidential rhetoric relied more on faith-based moral truths rather than truths ideologically rooted in "American Exceptionalism."

Research Questions and Methodology

This project investigates two research questions.

RQ 1: What forms of argument differentiate Carter's presidential and post-presidential human rights rhetoric?

RQ 2: How did Carter's evangelical Christian faith affect his rhetorical posture as a human rights *phronikon*?

To answer these questions, this study is divided into two parts. Chapter II reviews scholarship that discusses Carter's rhetoric from the 1976 campaign to the end of his presidency. In Chapter III, 25 of Carter's speeches delivered between 2000 and 2009 are critiqued rhetorically.

Numerous artifacts can be studied from Carter's post-presidency. A time line of Carter post-presidential human rights foreign policy activities is provided in Appendix A. The Carter Center Website (www.cartercenter.org) chronicled the Center's and Carter's efforts to promote human rights globally. Twenty-five transcripts of speeches given by Carter were obtained from the website. The speeches covered a variety of human rights foreign policy topics. A list of these speeches is provided in Appendix B.

The time period (2000-2009) was chosen for a number of reasons. First, by 2000 Carter established himself and the Carter Center as human rights foreign policy advocates. Second, in 2002 Carter was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Third, Carter's foreign policy activity and a Nobel Peace Prize provided him with several invitations to speak to international audiences. Fourth, Carter as an individual and de facto head of the Carter Center discussed numerous human rights issues in the speeches. Lastly, groups of speeches for this time period are not accessible (*Historical Materials in the Jimmy Carter Library*, 2010). The Jimmy Carter Library has not catalogued any post-presidential speeches and refers researchers to the Carter Center for access to post-presidential materials. Speeches catalogued by the Carter Center are used for the project.

I contend that the 10-year period studied represent a unique group of speeches. As noted, Brinkley (1998) chronicled the first 16 years after the Carter presidency. There are several editorials available from the first 20 years of Carter's post-presidency. They, however, are rhetorically different documents from the speeches in that they address broad audiences on a variety of topics. Carter rarely mentions his faith. However, Carter frequently discusses his faith in his speeches.

Carter appeared to increase his public use of his faith-based rhetoric after he published *Living Faith* in 1996. Carter noted the limits of public office on his faith. Carter's shifted from what Hart (1977) described as an "official civil religionist" as president to an "unofficial civil religionist" in his post-presidency. An "official civil religionist" is the president or another high level elected official that "endorse the religious character of American society" (p. 19). "Unofficial civil religionists" represent

"political or religious (or quasi-religious) groups who promote interplay between civil and religious principles" (Hart, 1977, p. 21).

Ultimately, this study will add new information to the body of literature in communication studies. First, to date, no comprehensive study of Carter's post-presidential speech making has been completed. Second, I describe Carter's use of faith to support human rights. Finally, I discuss the implications of using faith-based rhetoric.

CHAPTER II

CARTER'S FAITH-BASED ETHOS

A review of literature in the communication discipline revealed how Carter used faith-based rhetorical appeals to establish his credibility (ethos), beginning with the 1976 presidential campaign through the 1980 presidential campaign (Erickson, 1980; Gustainis & Hahn, 1988; Kawshima, 1977; Martin, 1983; Rarick, Duncan, Lee, & Porter, 1977). Carter's success in the 1976 presidential race in large measure may be attributed to his ability to establish credibility as a non-corrupt, moral political figure (Lee, 1995a; Martin, 1983; Patton, 1977). Ironically, many of Carter's rhetorical failures during his presidency and the 1980 campaign can be linked to his failure to maintain credibility as a "wheeler-dealer" policy maker (Brummett, 1981; Erickson & Schmidt, 1982; Martin, 1983; Rostron, 1997). Regardless, Carter consistently used credibility as a major part of his rhetorical strategy to influence voters and pursue foreign policy initiatives.

During the 1976 presidential campaign, Carter made rhetorical decisions that focused on his personality rather than political issues (Lee, 1995a; Patton, 1977; Rarick, Duncan, Lee & Porter, 1977; Self, 2007). Kawashima (1977) studied Carter's 1976 campaign speeches, observing that he used inductive arguments to argue against the status quo. Carter made consistent use of personal examples to establish a cause and effect relationship that linked his personal morality to prudent policy decisions. This strategy distinguished Carter from Ford.

Carter contrasted himself against the negativity enveloping American presidential politics following the Watergate scandal. Martin (1983) asserts that credibility was important in the campaign because Carter could contrast his squeaky-clean image against

the crime-riddled Nixon administration. The Carter campaign took great measures to place Carter in situations that emphasized character and downplayed the importance of policy making. They felt that Carter would always have the advantage if the candidate's credibility was the main issue. Carter, for example, spoke first in the presidential debates so that he could focus the debate on personality and moral issues (Self, 2007).

The campaign also chose to rhetorically display Carter's religious beliefs prominently throughout the campaign (Erickson, 1980). While only Erickson (1980) links Carter's religious appeals to building ethos, others noted that the Carter campaign made a choice to strongly emphasize religion as a rhetorical tactic during the campaign (Boase, 1989; Hahn, 1980; Perry, 1997).

Carter's personal experiences were key to crafting his presidential campaign image. Carter used his experiences to transcend traditional political myths (Lee, 1995b; Patton, 1977). Lee (1995b) argues that Carter was able to transcend the myth of the small town hard-working American and the myth of the egalitarian progressive urban American by telling his personal story. Carter used his life story of living in a house with an outhouse, working as a farmer, joining the navy, working in the scientific field, and returning to his small town lifestyle. Lee (1995b) believes that the link between small town virtue and big city competence created a mythos that transcended traditional conceptions of political competence. Rostron (1997) believes that Carter became a Frank Capra-esque common hero, a small town common man with uncommon skill and determination, much like Jimmy Stewart's character in *Mr. Smith goes to Washington*. Carter used rhetoric to show he was an outsider intent on transcending Washington politics.

Carter's transcendence of traditional Washington politics applied to his campaign arguments as well. Patton (1977) argues that the campaign was designed to challenge current political practices and introduce new values to the political scene. Carter contended, in his campaign rhetoric that people were intrinsically good. The argument was that intrinsically good people find good within themselves and vote for good people to represent them. Labeling all people as good allowed Carter to appeal to a universal audience. The rhetoric was transcendent because it allowed people to move past their notions of a government in crisis. It allowed the audience to rediscover good government. Carter defined himself as the best man for the job by emphasizing his strong morals, intelligence, and competence (Martin, 1983; Patton, 1977). Emphasizing personal characteristics allowed Carter to shape the political race by focusing on issues of personal credibility rather than specific policies.

A focus on personal credibility for the 1976 campaign proved to be an effective strategy, but it was not effective during his presidency or the 1980 campaign. Lee (1995b) notes that the transcendent rhetorical combination of small town morality and big city progress failed to garner support for his policies. The administration repackaged Carter as a competent policy maker by pushing his experience outside of Plains, Georgia. Martin (1983) believes that the best man definition was hurt by Carter's shift to political issues rather than morals. The best man definition of a moral, intelligent, and competent leader harmed Carter when his policies failed. Carter met all of the characteristics of a *phronikon* except good policy making. Carter could not maintain the definition of perfection he crafted for himself (Martin, 1983). As a result "Carter suffered from a lack of charisma and star quality" (Smith, 2000, p. 185).

Carter's limited policy success undercut his ethos. Johnson (1997) notes that, despite having a lackluster presidency, Carter managed to execute two noteworthy policies. The *Carter Doctrine* made oil a strategic military interest and that decision impacted foreign policy long after Carter left office. Carter's most noted accomplishment was the *Camp David Accords*. He firmly established Camp David as a useful location for foreign policy negotiations (Smith, 2000). Other than these two examples, Carter's administration floundered. It forced him to defend a mediocre presidency (Rostron, 1997). Rostron (1997) notes, for example, that Carter's *malaise* speech shifted blame to the citizenry for the administration's failed policies, which destroyed his mythical hero ethos (p. 9). By not taking responsibility for the administration's failed policies, he had failed to represent the ideal of a *phronikon*, a status he claimed would be achieved during his presidency.

Hahn (1985) illustrate the rhetorical failings of Carter's ethos-based rhetoric (they analyzed Carter's 1980 State of the Union Address). In his first response to the Iranian hostage crisis, Carter set himself up as a moral figurehead. Carter offered few actual policy solutions, but instead combined absolutist rhetoric with vacillating conciliatory language. Carter listed moral goals and stated challenges but offered no policy based solutions. The only solutions that Carter offered were character based moral stances, like humanitarianism. Hahn (1985) believes that Carter's failure to implement policies that supported his moral stance harmed his popularity. In turn, this failure to implement faith-based policies helped establish his reputation as a failed *phronikon*.

Similarly, during the 1980 campaign, Carter failed to link his faith-based ethos to a coherent presidential image. Brinkley (1998) believes that Carter's image problems

developed because his presidential policies do not square with his moral posture. For example, at the end of his presidency Carter stopped advocating faith-based policies. Carter used the strategy of silence, once during the end of his presidency, and once during the early part of the 1980 campaign (Brummett, 1980; Erickson & Schmidt, 1982). Brummett (1980) examines Carter's two-week summer silence in response to the oil crisis. Silence made Carter appear indecisive, created an artificial drama, and resulted in a passive rhetorical response to the crisis (Brummett, 1980). Silence did not allow Carter to clearly promote his faith-based ideals.

Erickson and Schmidt (1982) examine Carter's use of silence (also known as the Rose Garden strategy) during the Iranian hostage crisis. Carter remained in Washington for 182 days during the primary election season. Although Carter avoided direct confrontation with political opponents, he nonetheless linked his rhetorical success to the resolution of the hostage crisis. Much of the Erickson and Schmidt (1982) work focused on positives and negatives of silence as a rhetorical tool. Some of the consequences listed include isolation from his campaign, lack of grassroots campaign activity, and an unclear campaign platform.

Despite rhetorical failures leading up to the 1980 campaign, Carter tried to maintain his image as a positive moral leader (Porter, 1990). Carter's use of silence did not result in the development of a presidential figure that could be trusted to bring positive policy changes (Brummett, 1980; Erickson & Schmidt, 1982). During the 1980 campaign Carter also attempted to vilify/mortify Americans for their over consumption and materialism. His rhetoric failed because audiences did not accept accusatory rhetoric intent on producing feelings of pain and guilt (Brummett, 1981). Mortification failed as a

strategy. Carter, ironically, became associated with the pain and guilt he wanted to accuse others of (Brummett, 1981).

Carter failed to implement faith-based policies. This led to rhetorical failures when Carter attempted to use idealized presidential myths (Martin, 1983). Myths like the "best man" myth that rallied the public in 1976 failed in 1980 because Carter was unable to project the image of *phronikon*. In turn, Carter's attacks on Reagan's character failed to find mass appeal (Martin, 1983). Carter's character rhetoric failed to persuade the public in the 1980 election. Regardless, he continued to depict himself as a moral character long after the election (Brinkley, 1998; Martin, 1983).

Carter's Use of Religious Rhetoric

A second major theme of Jimmy Carter's ethos was the claim that he was a "born again" Christian. Carter made a conscience choice to emphasize his religion during the 1976 presidential campaign (Boase, 1989; Hahn, 1980; Perry, 1997). Carter emphasized religion for a number of reasons. He wished to reach out to an evangelical base that constituted 20% of the voting base (Erickson, 1980; Hahn, 1980). Throughout the campaign, Carter's religious rhetoric modeled the rhetoric of the evangelical Christian movement (Balmer, 1989; Gould, 2003; Smith, 2000). He was open and candid about his faith (Berggren & Rae, 2006). Carter was well aware of the advantages and disadvantages of emphasizing religion (Hahn, 1980). Carter, for example, was interviewed by *Playboy* near the end of the campaign. The contrast of the magazine with the religious campaign theme shocked and/or offended many voters (Solomon, 1978). Carter's willingness to be interviewed by *Playboy* revealed that Carter rhetorically used his religious faith as a campaign strategy (Hahn, 1980; Smith, 2000).

The political choice to stress religion helped Carter develop support for his campaign in 1976. Johnstone (1978) contends that Carter was able to make restoration of faith a major issue in the campaign. Carter stated, "I can be a better President because of my faith" (Hahn, 1980, p. 61). Other candidates and the press followed Carter's lead (Erickson, 1980). Religious restoration rhetoric was a direct response to the political scandals of the 1970s. Carter suggested that problem issues could be resolved by placing faith in good people, their decision making, and government. At the Democratic National Convention in 1976, Carter told the people that faith in government could be restored through faith in him (Johnstone, 1978). The link between faith and policy solutions fit with the concept of a presidential *phronikon*. Carter held the position that he would be a competent president insofar as his faith would lead to sound policies.

Rarick et al. (1977) observe that Carter used his religious rhetoric to develop religious fantasies that linked his leadership to a "restoration of faith" (p. 262). Lee (1995a) tied these fantasies to his small town roots to establish that he was a traditional American man of faith. One way Carter sustained the fantasy was by attending church and teaching Sunday School. The religious persona fit with a small town persona (Lee, 1995a). The establishment of a religious-based ethos allowed Carter to establish trust with the audience.

Carter's religious rhetoric crafted a unique political identity. Erickson (1980) labeled this identity "civic piety." Carter's religious rhetoric was generic enough that he could appeal to a mass audience. Carter effectively communicated his message to people holding a variety of faiths. Carter reaffirmed the notions of civic piety and faith-based rhetoric "to reestablish faith in America and draw together the electorate" (Erickson,

1980, p. 235). He successfully brought together people of faith. Evangelical support at the voting booth contributed to Carter's victory in 1976.

Johnstone (1978) believes that Carter's restoration of faith theme was not effective during his presidency because policies did not match religious restoration themes. Boase (1989) notes that Carter was very open about his belief in God during his inaugural address. However, Carter believed in the separation of church and state. Issues like prayer in school and abortion effectively distanced Carter from the religious evangelical right (Boase, 1989). The incompatibility of his policies with evangelical beliefs contributed to his failure as a *phronikon*.

Scholarly literature examining Carter's use of rhetoric during the 1980 campaign focuses on Carter's inability to use religious rhetoric effectively (Boase, 1989; Brummett, 1981; Miller & Wattenberg, 1984; Porter, 1990). Carter's policy and rhetorical choices during his presidency directly contributed to the loss of his evangelical base during the 1980 campaign (Boase, 1989; Carter, 2000). Even worse, by 1980 evangelicals were so turned off by the policy choices they did not engage or contribute to Carter's reelection campaign (Miller & Wattenberg, 1984).

Carter attempted to use religious rhetoric during the 1980 campaign. Carter argued that America still had an unfulfilled mission that could be fulfilled by hard-working individuals and divine intervention (Porter, 1990). Carter, of course, depicted himself the political agent through which change could be enacted (Porter, 1990). Carter's moral and religious convictions, however, were called into question (Brinkley, 1998). Carter painted his detractors as demonic and sinful (Brummett, 1981). However,

Carter's use of religious themes failed to garner any significant support in large measure due to his political ineptness as a policy maker.

In summary, Carter used moral and religious appeals to attempt to establish his credibility. His use of religious and moral appeals was a natural extension of his Southern Baptist up-bringing (Stuckey, 2008). He used morality to get audiences to think about foreign policy issues with more "empathy and responsibility" (Kramer, 2005, p. 26). This allowed him to differentiate himself from the Vietnam and Nixon era politicians. However, as president, the religious *good man speaking well* rhetoric failed because a coherent policy agenda never materialized. Carter's religious philosophy lacked a clear policy agenda resulting in the image of a failed *phronikon*. Chapter III will explore Carter's use of his faith-based rhetoric during his post-presidency, a period during which he was unencumbered by the restrictions of the mythical and constitutional presidency.

CHAPTER III

POST-PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC

Establishing Faith-Based Rhetoric

After leaving office Carter spent years doing humanitarian work to establish himself as an advocate of human rights. Carter participated in hundreds of human rights based activities after leaving office (Brinkley, 1998). Those activities are chronicled by Brinkley (1998), and in Appendix A. After 2000, Carter relied heavily on speech making to advocate his causes. A large number of these speeches are shared on the Carter Center website. The speeches represent a large database used here to study Carter's position as an unofficial civil religionist. I will argue that Carter was free to employ faith-based rhetoric during his post-presidency. This chapter discusses the failure of other post-presidential studies to address this issue, introduces the idea of faith-based apostolic rhetoric, and critically analyzes Carter's use of apostolic rhetoric.

In one of the few studies of post-presidential rhetoric, Short (1991) analyzes Hoover's campaign against the New Deal after losing for the second time against F.D.R. in 1932. Short argues that Hoover used Jeremiadic rhetorical appeals. He was like a prophet of the Old Testament warning the people about a disastrous future that would befall them if they followed the leadership of Roosevelt. Short contends that this form of sermonic rhetoric could be used by unpopular presidents to re-establish their credibility after they leave office. I contend, in contrast, that Carter does not use Jeremiadic rhetoric. Rather, I assert that Carter argued for human rights ideals based on their inherent values. He did so without the Old Testament warnings of impending doom.

Lee's (1995b) study of Carter's post-presidential rhetoric argues that Carter presents himself as a humble servant of the people. Lee believes that this is an important strategy for unpopular presidents who intend to rebuild their public image and credibility. The servant leadership model was used in Carter's early post-presidency. Carter used a servant leadership ideal to establish his post-presidential authority.

Unlike Hoover, Carter had ample time to rebuild his public image. Carter did not deal with a single issue such as the *New Deal*. Carter focused on a number of issues including human rights, democracy, and peace. Carter's position as a human rights advocate and worker allowed him to avoid Jeremiadic rhetoric. He called on people to better themselves. During his post-presidency he could be a servant leader by distancing himself from specific political policies. Instead, he served others by embracing and asking them to embrace human rights values.

Hahn (1985) cites, as a significant rhetorical strategy, Carter's 1976 proclamation of, "I can be a better President because of my faith" (p. 61). During his presidency, Carter used faith and a Christ-centered moral framework as a base for advocating human rights foreign policy. Carter (2005a), in the introduction to his book *Our Endangered Values*, says, "I must acknowledge that my own religious beliefs have been inextricably entwined with the political principles I have adopted" (p. 6). Carter continued to promote those values with his post-presidential work.

Lee's (1995b) argument that Carter is a servant leader of the people does not go far enough, I suggest, to explain Carter's attempts to re-establish his credibility as a humanitarian leader. I contend that Carter views himself as a servant of God who makes known God's moral philosophies to uninformed others. His servant posture contradicted

a Jeremiadic strategy. Carter did not make himself into an Old Testament prophet claiming that the world was moving against God's divine plan. Rather, I contend that Carter acts more like a New Testament Apostle than a prophet of doom. Therefore, Carter's servant posture starts with service to God, followed next by service to the people. Ultimately Carter criticizes others if they act against God's human rights principles.

Carter and Christian Discipleship

One way to understand how Carter conceptualized credibility is to examine Christian doctrine. Since he identifies himself so closely with his Christian faith, it is likely that Carter's notions of credibility, in the main, developed from his study of the Bible. Carter (1996) argues that "for a Christian, the life and teachings of Jesus offer a sound moral foundation that includes all the most basic elements that should guide us" (p. 14). He believes that "…our faith can provide enough courage to apply these Biblical lessons to our daily lives" (p. 14). Carter (2005a), when explaining his religious belief, notes:

> As evangelicals, we were committed to a strong global mission to share our Christian faith with all other people... although individual Christians were free to take part in public affairs, we abhorred the concept of church congregations becoming involved in the partisan political world. We also believed in religious freedom, compassion for unbelievers, and respect for all persons as inherently equal before God. (p. 18)

From Carter's perspective a credible Christian brings the ideals of Christ to others while respecting their beliefs. To Carter, an evangelical Christian, Jesus Christ is a prototypical

servant leader. The instructions to the apostles provide a model for all Christian servant leaders to follow. As an evangelical Christian, Carter believes bringing Christ's message to the world is essential to his life and faith (Carter, 1996).

Carter's concept of Christian servant leadership is closely aligned with Christ's commission to the apostles to spread his teachings. Carter, as a Southern Baptist, believes he needs to promote human rights world-wide (Stuckey, 2008). He believes that promoting human rights is commanded by God (Stuckey, 2008). Jesus Christ provides clear instructions to his apostles (servant leaders) about how to promote his teaching to the world in the *Book of Matthew* Chapter 10 verses 5 through 15 (Holy Bible, New Living Translation, 2007):

> (5) Jesus sent out the twelve apostles with these instructions: "Don't go to the Gentiles or the Samaritans, (6) but only to the people of Israel—God's lost sheep. (7) Go and announce to them that the Kingdom of Heaven is near. (8) Heal the sick, raise the dead, cure those with leprosy, and cast out demons. Give as freely as you have received! (9) "Don't take any money in your money belts—no gold, silver, or even copper coins. (10) Don't carry a traveler's bag with a change of clothes and sandals or even a walking stick. Don't hesitate to accept hospitality, because those who work deserve to be fed. (11) "Whenever you enter a city or village, search for a worthy person and stay in his home until you leave town. (12) When you enter the home, give it your blessing. (13) If it turns out to be a worthy home, let your blessing stand; if it is not, take back the blessing. (14) If any household or town refuses to welcome you or listen to your message, shake its

> dust from your feet as you leave. (15) I tell you the truth, the wicked cities of Sodom and Gomorrah will be better off than such a town on the judgment day."

Based on Biblical instructions, apostolic rhetorical appeals can be broken down into three categories. Appeals to authority are directly linked to Christ's instruction to go out and tell the people of Israel about the Kingdom of Heaven. In addition to the gospel commission of the apostles, in *the Book of Acts* apostles are instructed to speak to the world because Israel rejected the *good news* of Christ. *Acts*, Chapter 13, verses 46-48 explicate that command (Holy Bible, New Living Translation, 2007):

> (46) Then Paul and Barnabas answered them boldly: "We had to speak the word of God to you first. Since you reject it and do not consider yourselves worthy of eternal life, we now turn to the Gentiles. (47) For this is what the Lord has commanded us: "I have made you a light for the Gentiles, that you may bring salvation to the ends of the earth." (48) When the Gentiles heard this, they were glad and honored the word of the Lord; and all who were appointed for eternal life believed.

Evangelical Christians are taught to follow the instructions of the apostles, so they too can share Christ's *good news* with others.

For the purposes of this dissertation, and based on the aforementioned commission, an appeal to authority is one that directly reflects teachings of the Bible, Christ, and/or the Church. In addition, references to Biblical principles such as justice and righteousness will also be classified as appeals to authority. Prayers in the speeches will be classified as an appeal to authority. In summary, any statement or argument

referencing God is classified as an appeal to authority since Carter views God as the ultimate authority figure.

Christ requests that apostles do good works. Appeals to honor are developed by the speaker when they discuss good works. The relationship between faith and good works is explained in *James* Chapter 2, verses 14 to 18, which discusses the emptiness of faith without works:

> (14) What good is it, dear brothers and sisters, if you say you have faith but don't show it by your actions? Can that kind of faith save anyone? (15) Suppose you see a brother or sister who has no food or clothing, (16) and you say, "Good-bye and have a good day; stay warm and eat well"—but then you don't give that person any food or clothing. What good does that do? (17) So you see, faith by itself isn't enough. Unless it produces good deeds, it is dead and useless. (18) Now someone may argue, "Some people have faith; others have good deeds." But I say, "How can you show me your faith if you don't have good deeds? I will show you my faith by my good deeds.

For an evangelical Christian doing good works is an outward display of faith in Christ's teachings. Carter enumerated these good works to show that he honored and followed Christ's instructions.

Appeals to morality come from Christ's directive that the apostle has the right to declare the place (Carter is invited to several locales to speak on human rights between 2000 and 2009) they were invited to holy or unholy. In this case Carter used morality appeals to establish his credibility as an arbiter of right and wrong. Appeals to morality

deal with pronouncements about the ethics of particular thoughts and actions. His faith, then, would lead him to believe that pronouncing an act right or wrong would lend him credible support in the eyes of man and God.

Thus, a theory of apostolic rhetoric consists of appeals to authority, honor, and morality based on Christ's instruction to the apostles. I further contend that these appeals serve to establish credibility within Carter's faith-based humanitarian speeches delivered during his post-presidency, specifically the period 2000-2009.

Appeals to Authority

Carter promotes human rights because he saw it as his responsibility to promote God's will (Stuckey, 2008). The appeals to authority are broken down into two categories. Direct appeals to authority reference direct instructions from God or the Bible. For the purpose of this study, direct appeals cross into traditional Jewish teaching given the use of Old Testament and New Testament teachings by the Christian Church.

Indirect appeals to authority referenced divine instruction. One philosophy of divine instruction is Aquinas's theory of natural law. During his presidency Carter crafted a unifying religious rhetoric identified as "civic piety" (Erickson, 1980). This generic religious rhetoric was not effective during his presidency. However, he uses evangelical beliefs to bridge his beliefs to those of other faiths. Both types of appeals to authority were used by Carter in 15 of the 25 speeches studied.

One way Carter uses direct appeals to authority was to cite Biblical scriptures. For example, in three of the speeches Carter used the *Old Testament* ideals of justice and righteousness to argue for peace and human rights for Palestinians. Carter (2007d) noted

the importance of the ideals by stating the number of times the terms were used in the *Old Testament*:

> I did all I could, and left office believing that Israel would soon realize the dream of peace with its other neighbors – a small nation that then exemplified the finest ideals that I have taught on Sundays since I was 18 years old – based on the Hebrew scriptures where "Justice" is mentioned 28 times and "righteousness" 196 times. (para. 13)

He built credibility for arguments regarding Middle East peace by both complementing Israel and referencing authority based teaching. Carter uses terms that both Jews and Christians see as divine terms, those, for example, that encourage both religious groups to treat others as they would treat themselves. This argument was made in three speeches (Carter 2007b; Carter, 2007d; Carter, 2009d).

In two of the speeches (Carter 2007b; Carter, 2007d) references to justice and righteousness are followed by instructions to support human rights. Carter (2007b) spoke at Brandeis University and applied the ideas of justice and righteousness to both his cause and the University's namesake,

> What I have covered in these few minutes is a brief summary of the contents of my recent book. They provide an avenue that can lead to what all of us want: A secure Israel living in peace with its neighbors, while exemplifying the principles of ancient sacred texts and the philosophy of Justice Louis Brandeis: justice and righteousness. He argued that Israel must embrace the values of justice and righteousness when making foreign policies to ensure the country's long-term security. Peace would result from supporting those values. (para. 27)

Carter, at the time of the speech, had angered many Israelis with his book *Palestine, Not Apartheid.* The use of an appeal to authority illustrated that for Carter peace in the Middle East is a divine, not human, instruction. The appeal to authority allowed Carter to assert that he spoke on behalf of God.

Carter argued for reasonable Biblical scriptural interpretation based on basic tenants of Christianity. This allowed Carter to transcend disagreements between denominations and present what he determined to be a reasonable scriptural justification for his arguments. Carter (2007a), while eulogizing Gerald Ford, argued:

> We took to heart the admonition of the Apostle Paul that Christians should not be divided over seemingly important, but tangential issues, including sexual preferences and the role of women in the church, things like that. We both felt that Episcopalians, Baptists and others should live together in harmony. (para. 25)

Carter argued that, despite differences in their individual faiths, he and Ford were able to work toward common ends when observing fundamental Christian values. Carter and Ford used common values to transcend denominational differences and to promote, in their estimation, divinely inspired messages.

Although Carter claimed that several of the views are supported by divine authority, they represent points of argument in the Church community. Carter (2009e, para. 20) argued that years of study provided him with the knowledge and wisdom to make intelligent judgments about Biblical messages. His seemingly arrogant position is appropriate insofar as Carter presented himself as a reasonable interpreter of scripture. One controversial topic Carter defends is his support for women in the Church. Carter consistently supports human rights throughout the selected set of speeches. This includes

arguing for women's rights in many different cultures and contexts. For Carter, women's rights are part of human rights. He believes a faith-based foreign policy must support such rights. When he argues for women's rights he dismisses competing interpretations of scripture insofar as human rights are a universal tenet of his faith. Across Christendom there are several interpretations of the rights granted to women by the Bible. Carter explained why his experience allowed him to interpret the intention of divine authority.

> I have taught Bible lessons for more than 65 years, and I know that Paul forbade women to worship with their heads covered, to braid their hair, or to wear rings, jewelry, or expensive clothes. It is obvious to most modern day Christians that Paul was not mandating permanent or generic theological policies (Carter, 2009e, para. 20).

In addition to his long term commitment to God, Carter uses both direct quotation and interpretation of divine authority to support his arguments. First, he quotes the Bible to claim that men and women are equal noting, "The Holy Bible tells us that 'There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus'" (Carter, 2009e, para. 6). Later in the speech he interpreted Timothy's scriptural intent in his letter to the Apostle Paul: "In a letter to Timothy, Paul also expresses a prohibition against women's teaching men, but we know – and he knew – that Timothy himself was instructed by his mother and grandmother" (Carter, 2009e, para. 21). Direct quotation and his ability to interpret authority as a follower of Christ are used to construct arguments for women's rights. The use of authority based arguments enhances Carter's ethos as the Bible justifies his position.

Specifically, Carter cites Paul's letter to the Romans to establish that women participated actively in the Church in the past. His interpretation is difficult because general fundamentalist protestant teaching used Paul's letters to subjugate women in the Church. Carter (2009e) argues that:

> At the same time, in Paul's letter to the Romans, he listed and thanked twenty-eight outstanding leaders of the early churches, at least ten of whom were women. 'I commend to you our sister Phoebe, a deacon of the church … greet Prisca and Aquila, who work with me in Christ Jesus … greet Mary, who has worked very hard among you… greet Andronicus and Junia, my relatives who were in prison with me; they are prominent among the apostles, and they were in Christ before I was … greet Philologus, Julia, Nereus and his sister, and Olympas, and all the saints who are with them.' It is clear that during the early Christian era women served as deacons, priests, bishops, apostles, teachers, and prophets. It wasn't until the fourth century that dominant Christian leaders, all men, twisted and distorted Holy Scriptures to perpetuate their ascendant positions within the religious hierarchy. (para. 22)

Carter uses scriptures to build credibility for a position unpopular among many evangelicals, much the same way he used the Biblical ideas of justice and righteousness to assert credibility with respect to his comments about Israel. In addition to scriptural interpretation, Carter uses appeals to authority to show people's capacity for individual choice and freewill. During Carter's (Carter 2007a) eulogy of Ford he noted that "yesterday, on the flight here from Washington, Rosalynn and I were thrilled when one of his sons came to tell us that the greatest gift he received from his father was his faith in

Jesus Christ" (para 23). This suggests that Ford's faith enabled him to assist his son in making good choices. Good choices, for Carter, are those that follow divine instruction. For an evangelical, the cornerstone of any believer's faith is the acceptance of Christ as one's savior. The implication here is that others can use their faith in God to make good choices.

Carter expresses the opinion that Christian philosophy promotes individual liberty because of its relationship to freewill. Freewill is the concept that all Christians can choose to do right or wrong. In his Nobel lecture Carter (2002d) reminds the audience that they have the freewill to choose peace, "God gives us the capacity for choice. We can choose to alleviate suffering. We can choose to work together for peace. We can make these changes - and we must" (para. 39). This appeal bolsters his credibility in two ways. First, it builds Carter's credibility as an agent of positive change. Second, Carter believes in the human capacity to make positive choices. For Carter, one positive choice is support of human rights.

The appeals to authority also taught people how to act properly. God's "chosen people" should always choose to do what is right. Carter specifically appealed to this notion when discussing Israel's position toward Palestine. Once again, Carter used authority appeals to defend a controversial position. In one speech, Carter (2007b) explained why the *chosen people* are protected:

> I have reiterated that our nation's overwhelming support for Israel comes from among Christians like me who have been taught since I was three years old to honor and protect God's chosen people from among whom came our own Christian savior, Jesus Christ. (para. 17)

In another speech, he makes an identical argument (Carter, 2007, para. 25). Despite Carter's displeasure with Israeli government actions, he needed to argue for Israel's protection in order to justify his displeasure with their policies. Therefore, Carter uses divine authority to argue that Israel needs to be protected while simultaneously arguing against the Israeli government's seemingly anti-human rights actions.

When criticizing Israel, Carter (2007d) is careful to use appeals to authority that back his position:

> I might add that there is wide use of the word "apartheid" in Israel among prominent leaders… They have used and explained the word in harsher terms than I, pointing out that this cruel treatment of Palestinians is contrary to the tenets of the Jewish faith and the basic principles of the Nation of Israel. (para. 21)

Carter (2007b, para. 15) used similar language in another speech earlier that year, justifying his harsh stance by relating it to the Judeo-Christian faith-based position against oppression.

Carter also uses the phrase *Holy Land* to describe Israel. The term the *Holy Land* is used twice in the *Old Testament*. The prophet Zechariah (in the book of *Zechariah)* in Chapter 2 verse 12 states "The land of Judah will be the Lord's special possession in the holy land, and he will once again choose Jerusalem to be his own city." This prediction that the *Holy Land* would be reserved for the Jews by God had a positive influence on the creation of the modern independent Jewish state (Zeitlin, 1947).

Carter uses the term *Holy Land* to help build credibility for his peace efforts in Israel. In three speeches he expresses his desire for work toward peace in the *Holy Land* (Carter 2007b; Carter, 2007d; Carter, 2009d). For example, he discusses his lifelong work

to support Middle-East peace, "Many of us know and revere this land as the home of the Prince of Peace. It may be difficult for the audience to remember what I inherited as a new president concerning the Holy Land" (Carter, 2009d, para. 2). He attempted to build credibility for his position on the peace process by claiming that, as a Christian, he has much respect for Israel. Thus, Israel above all others should support the will of God. Carter argues that human rights directly reflects God's will. Therefore, Israel should support Carter's human rights goals.

Other references toward the *Holy Land* were used when Carter attacked the Israeli government regarding Gaza settlements. On three occasions he explains how the Israeli government and/or American support for the Israeli government blocked peace efforts (Carter, 2003d; Carter, 2006b; Carter, 2007d). In addition, Carter (2009d) uses the Obama administration's admonishment of the Israeli government to build credibility for his position, "President Obama has made peace in the Holy Land a high priority for his administration, and special envoy George Mitchell has called for an end to Israeli settlement activity and easing of restrictions on Palestinian travel" (para. 26). The use of the term *Holy Land* in reference to Israel was essential to establish Carter's credibility with Israelis even as he admonished their government.

In addition to arguing for human rights in the Middle East, Carter uses direct authority to justify his fight for peace around the world. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance address, Carter (2002d, para. 30) equates his personal goals for peace with the teachings of Jesus. This modeled the notion of the Apostolic *great commission* to bring the teachings of Christ to everyone. The appeal attempts to build Carter's public

credibility for his Christian persona and seemingly satisfies his own evangelical need to promote Christ's teaching.

Finally, Carter uses prayer to directly communicate with divine authority. Carter offers prayer as either an appeal or a means to create peace (Carter, 2003a; Carter, 2003c; Carter, 2007d; Carter, 2009d). Twice he states, "I join all of you in praying for this achievement" (Carter, 2006a, para. 45; Carter, 2006b, para. 66) when discussing Middle East peace and human rights.

On two other occasions, Carter offers a prayer using "direct" communication with God in order to advance his support of human rights. In a speech to the Georgia State Legislature in 2003, Carter (2003a, para. 12) concluded his remarks with the following prayer:

> I stand here then as a former senator, as a former governor of a great state, and as the former president of a great nation, praying that all of us will commit our hearts and our lives to improving the lot of people around the world, and to promoting peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, environmental quality, and the alleviation of suffering.

In another 2003 speech reflecting on the Camp David Accords, Carter (2003c, para. 40) prayed for peace in the Middle East. This lent credibility to his speech insofar as he asked God to support his goals. Christians are taught that prayer should be used to ask God for guidance or for things that support the will of God. Public prayer as a rhetorical action drew attention to human rights themes by showing the audience that the idea was worthy of God's attention. Prayer implied that human rights are Christian goals not just Carter's idealism.

Indirect appeals to authority invoke a universal divine authority. Often when establishing credibility for his causes, Carter would not directly reference Christian authority. However, he did reference a higher being, religious philosophy, and/or common religious practice to lend credibility to his faith-based position.

In three of the speeches Carter appeals to different religious groups, arguing that all share a common understanding or goal. For example, during his Nobel Lecture Carter (2002d) makes an appeal to alleviate human suffering:

> Despite theological differences, all great religions share common commitments that define our ideal secular relationships. I am convinced that Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, and others can embrace each other in a common effort to alleviate human suffering and to espouse peace. (para. 30)

Carter also reinforces his ethos by speaking to diverse groups of people holding various religious beliefs. In another instance, Carter (2009e) made a similar cross religious appeal for the rights of Women internationally:

> Recently I presented my concerns to a group of fellow leaders known as The Elders, who represent practicing Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, and Hindus. We are no longer active in politics and are free to express our honest opinions. We decided to draw particular attention to the role of religious and traditional leaders in obstructing the campaign for equality and human rights, and promulgated a statement that declares: "the justification of discrimination against women and girls on grounds of religion or tradition, as if it were prescribed by a Higher Authority, is unacceptable." (para. 29)

In this instance, he establishes the case for women's rights in the Christian church. If all religions support the rights of women, then the Christian church should do so as well. This indirect appeal to authority gave a potentially unpopular argument more credibility by offering a wider base of support than just looking through a narrow evangelical Christian lens.

Carter (2009e, para. 27) uses cross-religious appeals to call for the end of persecution of women. He rebuked the practices of abuse justified by *false* teachings. Carter expanded his argument using generalized authority to avoid the arguments of religious scholars who rely on narrow Biblical passages. I contend that Carter enhanced his credibility by looking for consensus with indirect authorities that agree with his direct authority (God).

Carter (2009c) used a similar appeal to request peace in Jerusalem, "Palestine must combine the best of the East and the West. The Palestinian state, like the land, must be blessed for all people. Jerusalem must be shared with everyone who loves it – Christians, Jews, and Muslims" (para. 12). Carter attempted to appeal to the best in all religions to establish credibility for his argument that Israel violated the rights of other groups by establishing settlements in the Gaza strip. He established the relative goodness of Jerusalem's neighbors to rationalize their right to occupy Gaza.

Another cross-religious appeal dealt with the humanization of others. In his Nobel Lecture, Carter (2002d) called for people to avoid the dehumanization of others, "In order for us human beings to commit ourselves personally to the inhumanity of war, we find it necessary first to dehumanize our opponents, which is in itself a violation of the beliefs of all religions" (para. 34). In this case, he used an appeal to all religions combined with a

statement of his own faith to build credibility for his position. Goodness, for Carter, stemmed from his Christian conception of peace and human rights.

Both direct and indirect appeals to authority are employed to emphasize Carter's faith. As an evangelical Christian he uses these appeals to reinforce his arguments. These appeals illustrated what he considered to be correct philosophical beliefs and actions. Carter presented these ideas as an apostle of Christ.

Appeals to Honor

A second form of apostolic appeal addressed honor. Rhetor's use honor appeals to promote their own good works and to establish credibility as an agent of God. In the political context, Carter appeared to use good works to establish that he has the best interest of others at heart. For this study, honor appeals are organized into three categories pre-presidential, presidential, and post-presidential.

Pre-presidential appeals were used in 6 of the 25 speeches Carter delivered between 2000 and 2009. The pre-presidential appeals established a lifelong commitment to service. Service to others established that Carter practices faith-based good works.

One significant topic discussed by Carter was nuclear war prevention. In a speech on the use of nuclear weapons, Carter discussed his work as a nuclear engineer (Carter, 2007e). Carter used his credibility as an informed scientist to intellectually discuss the topic. Carter discussed his experience with atomic energy to illustrate that he understood the seriousness of a nuclear warfare.

Carter discussed his actions as Governor of Georgia in three speeches. Twice Carter discussed electoral and democratic reform (Carter, 2003a; Carter, 2005b; Carter, 2009b). In a speech to the Georgia Legislature, Carter discussed positive changes he

initiated in the state regarding civil rights and voter access (Carter, 2003a). Carter (2009b, para. 5) also referenced his inaugural speech in an address about democracy. Doing so established his life-long commitment to equality. Carter provided clear historical examples of his support for human rights goals. Carter played by the same rules he asked others to abide by. Therefore, Carter used his track record to establish his credibility on human rights issues

Carter (2005b) also used his actions as governor to establish a relationship with the Organization of American States, "I have long been interested in this organization. Thirty years ago, as governor of Georgia, I invited the OAS General Assembly to meet in Atlanta - the first meeting in the U.S. outside of Washington" (para. 2). The discussion of democracy and electoral reform equalized him to the leaders he is addressing. Carter established his long term pursuit of democracy to show audiences that he has been a faith-based *phronikon* throughout his political life. Democracy was a cornerstone of Carter's human rights foreign policy.

Much like the pre-presidential appeals, presidential appeals to honor established credibility by noting past actions that supported the value or policy promoted. Presidential honor appeals are used in 20 of the 25 speeches. Carter often used his presidential actions to establish a pattern of good works that led to effective post-presidential actions. These good works are based on his understanding of Christ's teachings (Carter, 1996). For organizational purposes, his appeals are broken down by following topic areas, democracy, apartheid, China, Russia, Israel, Middle-East peace, human rights, and cooperation with Gerald Ford.

When using presidential honor appeals, Carter promoted his efforts to establish democracy and electoral reform. However, unlike the pre-presidential appeals, Carter never showed that he was willing to promote internal reform. Instead, Carter explained how he helped other countries to become democracies during his presidency.

Carter discussed democracy in the Americas in five speeches (Carter, 2002b; Carter, 2003e; Carter, 2005b; Carter, 2009b). Carter (2003e) contended that his efforts to promote democracy during his presidency led to successful democracies later, "As president of the United States, I worked to promote democracy and human rights, and I have been gratified to see the acceptance of democracy throughout Latin America" (para. 9). When delivering a keynote speech to the Organization of American States Carter (2005b) noted, "As president, I attended and addressed every General Assembly (of the OAS) in Washington" (para. 2). Other comments were directed at specific countries instead of at groups countries like the OAS. Carter (2009b) specifically addressed the work of his presidency for democracy in Ecuador:

> It is a privilege for me at this moment in our history to be here in Ecuador. Thirty years ago this nation began a new wave of democracy in the region while I was President of the United States, and my wife Rosalynn attended the inauguration of your new president. Now, Ecuador is beginning a new cycle with a new constitution, and my own president has proposed a new era in relations between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean. (para. 1)

All three passages illustrated Carter's efforts to show that he had a long term commitment to support democracy in the Americas.

Attempts to build credibility for his position to democratize China followed the same pattern. In three of the speeches, Carter addressed his relationship with China during his presidency (Carter, 2002a; Carter, 2003b; Carter, 2009a). Comments dealt with visits, diplomatic relations, and reform.

Carter used great detail to describe his past interaction with China. Carter claimed that his relationship with Deng Xiaoping produced many benefits (Carter, 2001b; Carter, 2009a). Specifically, in a 2001 speech about village elections in China (Carter, 2001b, para. 4), Carter gave a very detailed account of their long term relationship, promotion of rural village democracy, promotion of free enterprise, and exchange visits. Carter emphasized the equality of his relationship with Deng Xiaoping in his arguments. Together, Carter and Deng brought democratic reforms to China. Carter used the relationship with Deng to illustrate that he employed human rights principles when he negotiated for human rights.

He also emphasized establishing diplomatic relations with China (Carter, 2002a; Carter, 2003b). Carter (2002a) spelled out in great detail with whom and how relations were established:

> I'm sure that all of you know about the US Constitution, which grants this prerogative to the President unilaterally. The President can declare diplomatic relations with any country on earth, and the Congress has nothing to say about it. It's a constitutional right, and in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of our country's history, our founding fathers were wise enough to recognize existing governments, or de-facto governments, without all the nuances of 'Do you please me, or do you not please me?' But in the last century we departed from that

> practice. But I simply decided that we should recognize the Chinese government. (para. 30)

Carter left no doubt that he was the primary reason the United States diplomatically recognized China. He also proclaimed that the relationship significantly benefitted China and that it was "…one of the wisest decision I made during my time in the White House" (Carter, 2003b, para. 6). In addition to working with Deng, Carter promoted his willingness to acknowledge Chinese accomplishments.

Carter (2009a) also implied that democratic reform and recognition went hand in hand:

> On the 16th day of December, 1978, Deng Xiaoping announced in Beijing that he and I had been successful in our negotiations. So reform and opening up the society of China and new diplomatic relations with the United States were indeed the starting point for wonderful changes in your country. (para. 5)

In the same speech he concluded that "this new friendship has been wonderful for your people and for the people of the United States. I believe it's also been beneficial to the entire nation, and the entire world and people all over the Earth" (Carter, 2009a, para. 6). Carter reinforced the notion that he was and is an integral part of the reform process in China. This showed a track record of engagement with a nation and a continuing commitment to human rights reforms. Once again, Carter showed how his good works support human rights goals.

On the topic of Russia, Carter discussed two main topics, nuclear arms reduction and Jewish emigration. When he dealt with the nuclear arms issue, Carter (2007e, para. 4) used the stories of avoiding nuclear mishaps and cooperation with Russia to establish his

commitment to peace and disarmament. Carter (2007e) also explained in the speech that peace and human rights were pursued despite the threat of a nuclear holocaust. He discussed his commitment to support human rights in the former Soviet Union. During his Nobel address, Carter (2002d) reminded the audience of his support for human rights and peace activist Andrei Sakharov. (para. 5)

Carter also used support for Sakharov and Jewish emigration to enhance his credibility with Israel (Carter 2007b):

> After becoming president, I began to communicate publicly with noted human rights heroes like Andrei Sakarov and to confront Soviet leaders at every possible opportunity I had with them on behalf of Natan Sharansky and others. This increased tension between me and President Brezhnev, president of the Soviet Union then, but within two years, annual Jewish emigration to America from Russia increased to more than 50,000. (para. 5)

Despite the threat of nuclear weapons, Carter stated that his commitment to human rights and Jewish emigration was so strong that he risked tension with the Brezhnev government (Carter 2007b; Carter, 2009d). Carter seemingly placed support of human rights above the threat of nuclear war.

As previously noted, controversy generated by Carter's book *Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid* placed Carter in a position where he had to rebuild his credibility with Israelis and Jews in the United States. Like support for Jewish emigration, Carter used the acts of his presidency to attempt to reestablish his public support for Israel. Honor appeals on this topic area included discussions of secondary boycotts, establishing the

holocaust museum, problems facing Middle-East peace, the Camp David Accords, and a speech before the Knesset.

The secondary boycott law was mentioned in three speeches (Carter 2007b; Carter, 2007d; Carter, 2009d). Carter (2007b) reminded the audience when discussing Israeli abuse of Palestine that he faced "…an oil embargo by Arab OPEC nations, with a secondary boycott of any American corporation doing business with Israel" (para. 4). On the three occasions he mentioned support for the secondary boycott law. This (Carter 2007b, para. 6) is summarized well in the speech at Brandeis University, "We also supported a very controversial law sponsored by Congressman Ben Rosenthal that prohibited secondary boycotts against Israel, with the severe penalties against any U.S. corporation that violated the new law" (para. 6). Once again, Carter showed his support for human rights, even if the consequences were an oil embargo (which happened).

Another point used to increase his credibility mentioned in the same three speeches was support for the construction of the Holocaust Museum (Carter 2007b; Carter, 2007d; Carter, 2009d). The passage from Carter's (Carter, 2009d) acceptance speech for the Mahatma Gandhi Award is representative of the position taken by the three speeches: "In 1978, on Israel's 30th birthday, I announced a commission to establish a memorial to victims of Hitler's atrocities, with Elie Wiesel as its chairman. The Holocaust Museum in Washington is the result of their good work" (para. 7).

One of the biggest problems Carter faced during his presidency was the war between Israel and Egypt. Carter (2003c, para. 7) explained that even before his presidency started he wanted to restructure the peace process. Therefore, it is not surprising that he discussed the Camp David Accords in five of the speeches studied.

Carter discussed the Camp David Accords, to emphasize his role in the Middle East peace process (Carter, 2003c; Carter, 2006a; Carter 2007b; Carter, 2007d; Carter, 2009d). In a 25th Anniversary speech honoring the Camp David Accords, Carter (2003c) explained how his approach to the negotiations contributed to the meeting's success:

> I personally used what was called a single document--I have been involved in a lot of negotiations since then, and I've always used a single document--getting my superb assistants, who were all on the program this morning, to ultimately prepare a proposal that was presented precisely word by word to the Israelis, primarily to Prime Minister Begin, and to Sadat and to the Egyptians on the other side. We didn't have one document for one and one for the other. (para. 14)

He also noted later that "As one of my highest priorities, I negotiated the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1978, in which, in exchange for peace, Israel agreed to grant full autonomy to the Palestinians and to withdraw Israeli military and political forces from lands of the Palestinians and Egypt" (Carter, 2007d, para. 12). Carter clearly viewed the Camp David Accords as one of his great achievements during his presidency. The Accords comprised another good work he used to bolster his commitment to human rights.

Carter's book *Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid* generated much negative publicity. Carter uses the Camp David Accords to show that he has a track record of supporting Israel in a fair and just manner. Carter (2006a) stated "I am proud to say that not one element of the 1979 peace agreement has ever been breached" (para. 7). He also claimed that "This agreement was ratified by an 85 percent majority in the Israeli Knesset" (Carter, 2009d, para. 8). Carter used success and fairness to establish credibility.

Nevertheless he uttered many controversial statements. One such statement was delivered in a 2006 speech about the recognition of the Palestinian elections, "As I said in a 1979 speech to the Israeli Knesset, 'The people support a settlement. Political leaders are the obstacles to peace'" (Carter, 2006a, para. 42). Regardless, Carter still used his work for peace in Israel during his presidency to attempt to establish credibility for his post-presidential position regarding the Middle-East. He also showed that he placed human rights above potential consequences such as ill-will from the Israeli government.

In addition to democracy and peace, Carter also used presidential acts to lend credibility to his human rights efforts. Specifically, Carter discussed his efforts to shift to a human rights based foreign policy (Carter, 2005b; Carter, 2008a). Carter (2005b) noted, "I decided to stop embracing dictators and to make the protection of human rights a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, not only in this hemisphere, but with all nations" (para. 3). Carter (2007c, para. 1-2) claimed he shifted to a human rights foreign policy because he saw the devastating effects of segregation in the south and that the U.S. would help prevent its reoccurrence worldwide. In addition, Carter (2009b) felt the previous administrations were:

> …wrong and so we decided to protect the human rights heroes who came forward to condemn the abuses. I announced in my inaugural address that human rights would be the foundation of our foreign policy and that every ambassador that worked for me in every country in the world would be my personal human rights representative. And that every United States embassy residence in the world would be a haven for people persecuted by their own government. (para. 6)

The idea of making human rights his first priority supported the notion that human rights is a divine instruction

Finally, Carter (2007a) illustrated cooperation to support human rights during Gerald Ford's eulogy. He (2007a) expressed his pleasure regarding Ford's ability to heal the country:

> I still don't know any better way to express it than the words I used almost exactly 30 years ago. For myself and for our nation, I want to thank my predecessor for all he did to heal our land. (para. 32)

Carter expressed his desire to work with Ford on several key points during his presidency. He specifically focused on the Camp David Accords, noting, "In fact, on a helicopter in flight from Camp David back to Washington, President Anwar Sadat, Prime Minister Menachem Begin and I made one telephone call, to Gerald Ford, to tell him that we had reached peace between Israel and Egypt" (Carter 2007a, para. 16). In summary, presidential honor appeals reminded listeners of Carter's success at promoting human rights.

Post-presidential appeals to honor were used to reinforce his commitment to human rights and were used in 19 of the 25 speeches. Carter used both his personal good works and those of the Carter Center to support his arguments. Carter often places post-presidential accomplishments next to appeals to authority to illustrate that he promotes just causes. Carter (2007d, para. 16) also claims that he is an appropriate agent to support international human rights, noting, "Few people have had a greater opportunity than I have to understand the complex interrelationships from personal observations" (para. 16).

Carter's post-presidential appeals are divided into two groups, personal actions and those of the Carter Center.

Carter made personal visits to China, Japan, Nepal, North Korea, Cuba, and Israel as well as other countries during the years following his presidency. Carter discussed those visits in order to show his commitment to human rights values. He often emphasized election monitoring efforts to demonstrate his commitment to help build democratic governments.

It is no surprise, based on the other information presented from the speeches, that China would be a focus of Carter's post-presidential work. During the time period the speeches were presented, Carter focused on helping China monitor elections and helping rural economic reform. Carter (2003b) outlined some of his work in one of the speeches regarding Chinese village elections:

> On my several visits here during the past 22 years, I have enjoyed hours of discussion with Deng Xiaoping and his successors and have had an opportunity to visit many regions of your country to witness its economic progress and its dramatic moves toward a more open society. More freedom of worship, the movement of your people, the rights of free enterprise, and China's increasing involvement in the World Trade Organization and other international organizations have been very gratifying to me. (para. 7)

This parallels pre and post-presidential appeals that established Carter's long term commitment to support Chinese democratic reforms.

Carter also discussed his work in other Asian nations, including Japan, Nepal, and North Korea (Carter 2002a; Carter, 2003c; Carter, 2007e; Carter, 2007f). He noted that

he immediately visited Japan and China as soon as he left office (Carter, 2003c). The Carter Center, for example, monitored Nepal's elections. Carter (2007f) emphasized how important it was to have hands on experience in the Nepalese culture:

> Having just left the White House, I was privileged to meet the royal family and political leaders, as well as the wonderful Sherpa guides and to have leisurely visits among the monasteries in the high mountains. We then enjoyed the beauties of the Terai, on the border with India. (para. 1)

Carter established his long term commitment to help Nepal and other Asian countries.

By contrast, Carter used his humanitarian work in North Korea to reinforce his ethos during award acceptance speeches. Carter in two speeches, the Oksenberg Award and the Albert Schweitzer Humanitarian Award, discussed his negotiations with Kim Il-Sung in 1994 (Carter 2002a; Carter, 2007e). A sample of that conversation is contained in Carter's (Carter, 2007e) Schweitzer Award acceptance speech:

> Later, in 1994, I went to North Korea and convinced President Kim Il Sung to abandon his plans to reprocess spent nuclear fuel rods into plutonium, which could be made into explosives. This was a successful mission, and an official agreement was consummated by President Bill Clinton to replace the decommissioned power plant with fuel oil and the technology for two modern atomic power plants under International inspection. (para. 7).

Carter (2002a) also explained more of the aftermath of the negotiations in the Oksenberg Award acceptance speech:

> So I went to North Korea, my wife and I, and we crossed the DMZ from Seoul, and went to Pyongyang, and got complete agreement with Kim Il Sung. Then we

> came back. It was the first time in forty-three years that anyone had made that round trip. (para. 45)

Carter used his support for human rights causes to justify his worthiness to receive the awards. He used similar examples to justify his right to promote human rights goals and policy. Carter used the appeals to establish that his experience uniquely qualified him to serve as an agent of God, an assertion he believes served him well.

When discussing Middle-East peace, Carter used three issues to establish ethos, including experience through travel, dedication to the subject, and a sense that he could facilitate peace efforts. Carter (2007d) claimed that "after leaving the White House and forming the Carter Center, my wife and I visited Israel, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza at every opportunity, to encourage peaceful relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors" (para. 14). In an earlier speech on the same topic at Brandies University, Carter (2007b, para. 10) made a similar claim. Carter attempted to enhance his standing with the Israelis by showing that his interactions with people in the Middle-East gave him a better understanding of the peace process. Carter (Carter, 2007d) summarized, "…I have spent a great deal of my adult life trying to bring peace to Israel and its neighbors, based on justice and righteousness for the Palestinians. These are the underlying purposes of my new book." (para. 18). Carter used his post-presidential experience like that of other appeals to honor, to claim that good works licensed his right to speak on the issue.

Carter also used the works of the Carter Center to enhance his credibility. Carter used general comments about the Carter Center to establish a history of good works. Carter clearly explained what foreign policy issues he dedicated his post-presidential life to (Carter, 2003a), stating, "Let me say that my life and the life of Rosalynn for the last

20 years has been in The Carter Center" (para. 9). In addition, Carter (2008a) referred to the Carter Center as a place where good works will live on.

The Carter Center's work is used by Carter to show the triumph of good over evil. Carter noted, for example, that over the twenty year history of the Center he shared the benefits of human rights policies with the Chinese people (Carter, 2002a). In addition, Carter (2009b, para. 10) notes that the center helps countries build democratic institutions. Carter often explicates the benefits countries gain from working with the Carter Center.

Carter (2002d) also used the work of the Carter Center to link himself to human rights work:

> I am grateful to my wife Rosalynn, to my colleagues at The Carter Center, and to many others who continue to seek an end to violence and suffering throughout the world. The scope and character of our Center's activities are perhaps unique, but in many other ways they are typical of the work being done by many hundreds of nongovernmental organizations that strive for human rights and peace. (para. 2)

Carter contends that the center is inclusive, specifically in the area of human rights, offering their services to organizations such as the United Nations (Carter 2007c). The Center also offers conferences that address human rights. The Center enhances Carter's credibility as it represents his commitment to God and the support of human rights. Carter, like he does with most human rights issues, uses the Center's work to enhance his credibility.

A major focus of Carter's work is the promotion of democracy. Carter (2003e) explains how a democratic system is necessary to guarantee equal rights. "I have learned

that it is healthy to have competing ideas on policies and visions for the country, but there must be a clear consensus on the rules of the game used to choose among these alternatives" (para. 9). Carter (2006c) also argued that there is an inherent relationship between human rights and democracy. "For 20 years now, The Carter Center has considered the promotion of freedom and democracy to be an integral part of our thrust or commitment to human rights" (para. 2). Carter uses several specific examples of democracy building in his speeches. Carter equates a democratic government with securing human rights (Stuckey, 2008).

Carter (2006c) often refers to the Center's work with developing democracies in the Americas and Africa:

> We've had two elections in Liberia. Both of them fair, for the people expressed their choices freely. The first one was a disaster because of the choice the people made, and the most recent we hope brings prospect for a permanent peace and freedom and human rights to the people of Liberia. One of the most glorious elections in which I've been a part of was in Haiti in 1990. We had high hopes that for the first time the people of Haiti had expressed their view and that their chosen leader would be successful. It turned out to be a disastrous process and Haiti is still suffering. We're hoping that there might be some redemption coming for those people. I've been to Haiti eight times; several of them to help with election processes. (para. 6)

In the same speech Carter discusses the Center's assistance with election monitoring in Nigeria and Venezuela. For Carter, democracy is a faith-based universal positive value.

Governments can corrupt themselves but only when they move away from democracy, which in turn moves away from the teachings of God.

Carter also discussed election monitoring in Nepal. During the 2000s Nepal transitioned from a monarchy to a democracy, and dealt with a minor insurgent group. Carter (2007c) showed his willingness to participate in an effort to support human rights in Nepal despite its potential dangers, stating, "I have just returned from Nepal where, as with World War II, a commitment to human rights has been derived from intense military conflict" (para. 21). Carter combined the potential danger of the visit with the success of election monitoring to promote his and the Center's promotion of democracy.

Carter also cites the Palestinian elections as an example of the Carter Center's democracy promotion efforts. He argues that the election, because it was monitored, legitimizes the Hamas government (Carter, 2006a). Carter also claims that the elections in Palestine promote fairness, honesty, and bring out the best of people (Carter, 2006b; Carter, 2006c). In an excerpt from Carter's speech (Carter 2007b) at Brandeis University in 2007, he explains the history of the Carter Center's election monitoring efforts in Palestine:

> More recently, I have led The Carter Center in monitoring the Palestinian elections of 1996, 2005, and 2006, which required from me and my associates at The Carter Center a thorough and intimate involvement with the candidates who ran, public officials, and Palestinian citizens throughout East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza, and also working closely with Prime Ministers Shimon Peres in 1996, Ariel Sharon in 2005, and Ehud Olmert in 2006, who gave their full political support to these adventures. (para. 11)

In addition to establishing the election process as credible, Carter used the Center's work with the Palestinian elections to enhance his authority to address Middle-East peace issues. Carter again used the tactic of showing a long-term commitment to human rights goals and activities.

Carter also relied upon his faith-based credibility to promote health care and disease prevention. Carter (2008a) stated, "About three-fourths of The Carter Center's work, our money and personnel are devoted to five so-called neglected diseases" (p. 4). The Center promoted the use of medicine and other preventative measures to stop the spread of disease (Carter, 2008a). Specifically, the Carter Center focused on eliminating Guinea worm in Africa. Carter graphically described the disease to explain the need for eradication. He noted references to the Guinea worm in the Bible. He showed that the Carter Center can identify a specific problem, make a plan to promote a solution, and implement it.

In addition to improving health conditions, Carter showed a bridge between health care awareness and individual rights. For example, Carter (2007c) explained the link between the two in a speech he delivered on human rights in Dublin, Ireland in 2007:

> In many parts of Africa, mandatory circumcisions are still pervasive religious rites, and it is taboo for many women to urinate or defecate where they might be seen, even though no private places exist. In Ethiopia, we capitalized on this abuse to promote our control over trachoma, by teaching construction of simple latrines. Our target was 10,000/year, but it became a "women's liberation" project and 306,000 were built in the first three years. I have become known as the "father of latrines." (para. 19)

Despite the fact that only two of the speeches dealt extensively with health issues, Carter used these humanitarian efforts to show how he helps enhance the lives of at risk individuals.

Carter also noted his ability to enlist partners for his work with the Carter Center in order to establish the divine nature of his faith-based works. This is similar to the credibility Carter attempted to gain from his consultations with Ford. Carter made a number of comments about partnerships (Carter 2007a; Carter, 2007e). For example, at Gerald Ford's funeral in 2007, Carter (2007a) credited Ford for helping him establish the Carter Center "In the early days of the Carter Center, Jerry joined me as co-chairman in all of our important conferences and projects. And I never declined an opportunity to help him with his own post- presidential plans" (para. 20). Carter used this and other partnerships to show that others also supported the promotion of human rights.

In summary, Carter often referenced a cartoon the *New Yorker* that said, "When I grow up I want to be an ex-president" (Carter 2007a; Carter, 2009a; Carter, 2009e). Overall, Carter used his faith-based works as a main strategy to reestablish his ethos during his post-presidency. As a former president, he was free to pursue human rights without the restraints of holding office. By showing his good works he transcended politics because, in his estimation, God directed his actions.

Appeals to Morality

Appeals to morality allowed Carter to make faith-based pronouncements about an audience's ethical actions. Carter followed Christ's request to pass moral judgment on audiences. He tells audiences whether or not they live up to his religious values. Appeals to morality appear in 10 of the 25 speeches examined.

A central appeal of morality involved asking the audience to hope for a better future. Both faith and hope are core values for an evangelical Christian. A Christian has faith in Christ's teachings that a brighter future is ahead (whether that future is on earth or in heaven). Carter calls upon audiences to adopt his value system so that they, too, can anticipate a better future.

In a speech to the Organization of American States in 2005, Carter (2005b) stated that, "we need each other. Let us work together to make our hemisphere the beacon of hope, human dignity, and cooperation for the 21st century" (para. 45). Another appeal to hope involves Middle East Peace where Carter (2009c) noted, "With our new leaders in Washington, my country will move into the forefront of this birth of a new Palestine. We were all reminded of this renewed hope and commitment by President Obama's recent speech in Cairo" (para. 13). Appeals to morality referencing hope were used to both praise and condemn. Carter praised those that could see that human rights policies would result in a positive future. He condemned those that blocked human rights policy and prevented their constituents from having hope.

Carter also uses moral pronouncements when requesting groups to employ universal human rights. He even references his high school teacher (Carter, 2002d; Carter, 2009a; Carter, 2009b). In a speech in Ecuador addressing democracy Carter (2009b) explained that his high school teacher supports positive universal philosophies, noting, "… I quoted my high school teacher, Miss Julia Coleman. She said: 'We must accommodate changing times, but cling to unchanging values.' There is no way to build institutions, reinforce democracy or promote general well-being without respect for

fundamental moral values" (para. 23). Carter used his teacher as a condemnation of sorts. Every person, even a child, should know that democracy is a universal principle.

Carter addressed other issues such cooperation and peace. He told nations, governments, and individuals that they should be working toward these goals. In a speech at the Carter Center in 2006, Carter (2006c) announced:

> This conference is a small group and like I said, The Carter Center has no authority; but I think that the promulgation of what you bring to us, the ability for the human rights defenders to consult with one another, and all of us (to) share in a common commitment to correct mistakes and to publicize problems is the purpose of this conference. (para. 17)

Carter called upon other human rights advocates to condemn those who harm others.

While moral appeals are outnumbered by the other appeals they nevertheless serve an important purpose. Carter fulfilled Christ's call to the apostles to judge those who offer invitations. He publicly rewarded and rebuked those that are doing right and wrong. This increased his credibility because he can, as an independent citizen, communicate a human rights message consistent with his religious values.

Summary

In summary, I established the idea of apostolic rhetoric as a lens by which critics may examine Carter's post-presidential rhetoric. 25 speeches were examined from 2000 to 2009. Three apostolic appeals were examined: authority, honor, and morality. After critically examining the speeches it is clear that Carter's human rights rhetorical strategies are grounded in the values taught by Jesus Christ. However, Carter promotes the moral philosophies of Christ because he believes God commands him to do so.

Carter's rhetorical style is clearly similar to a style Hart (1977, p. 21) labels an "unofficial civil religionist." Carter consistently used his faith to advocate both human rights and democratic reforms. Implications for the use of this rhetorical strategy are Chapter IV.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

A critical analysis of Carter's speeches from 2000 to 2009 enables me to conclude that Carter's Christian faith significantly influenced his rhetorical style when promoting human rights. He uses his faith to promote human rights as a universal value. Observations are developed regarding Carter's use of faith-based rhetoric by answering two research questions. I conclude by offering both advantages and disadvantages of faith-based rhetorical strategy, and explain how they draw presence to arguments.

Research Questions

RQ 1: What forms of argument differentiate Carter's presidential and post-presidential human rights rhetoric?

At the end of Chapter I, I argued that Carter's post-presidential rhetoric emphasized Apostolic principles. I contend here that apostolic rhetoric provides a critical lens through which to view Carter's use of religious beliefs in his post-presidential rhetoric. In addition, I identify a distinction between phronesis and apostolic rhetoric.

First, phronesis requires that a rhetor develop political wisdom in order to promote the interest of the state (Corbin, 1998). It is in the rhetor's best interest as a citizen to promote right actions as they promote the best interests of the state. In this manner a *phronikon* becomes *a good man speaking well* (Kennedy, 1972). However, self-interests frequently impede the efforts of rhetors to act on behalf of the state. Partisan politics trump the greater good. In the case of Jimmy Carter's post-presidency he turned to his religious beliefs as a model of the *good man speaking well*. Instructed by God, Carter believed his rhetoric spoke to the greater good of humanity. From Carter's

perspective, he represents a modern-day *phronikon* who set aside partisan politics and addressed the betterment of the state and its citizenry. In contrast, an apostolic rhetorician determines what he or she believes is right or wrong based on religious principles. Arguments are developed that support the rightness of an action based on faith-based values, thereby creating positive outcomes.

Second, phronesis requires that a rhetor derive wisdom from several sources including personal experiences, study, and morals in order to develop good policies. Apostolic rhetoric draws wisdom from a religious authority figure. The rhetor's experiences and education are drawn from the God's teachings. For Carter, wisdom came from the teachings of Christ. Carter demonstrated his commitment to Christ's teachings through his actions/faith-based works. Carter also praised those that support the teachings of Christ and cautions those that do not. Practical wisdom is replaced with faith-based moral principles as opposed to policy. Carter supported human rights because he believed it to be the right thing to do, not because it is practical or politically advantageous. Practicality took a back seat to faith-based instruction of right action.

A third distinction is that Carter believes power is granted by a religious authority, not the state. A *phronimos*/*phronikon* must put into practice what the rhetor thinks is right (Corbin, 1998). In a democracy, this is accomplished by working within the political system to transform ideas into policies. However, in Carter's post-presidency, he was not restricted to enacting his policies within a political system. Carter used the power of his faith (Christian ideals) to promote human rights. Carter, a religious *phronikon* taught leaders why they should follow God's principles when governing their nations.

Fourth, as president it was difficult for Carter to employ a consistent human rights foreign policy (Forsythe & Rieffer, 2000; Shestack, 1989). Carter had to work within the system to implement practical and incremental change. Some of the changes resulted in long term support of human rights by future presidents (Stuckey, 2008). However, Carter had difficulty selling these benefits when he ran in 1980. During his post-presidency, Carter remained consistent because he was not bound by the need to implement political policy. He was also not tied to the will of the electorate. Carter pursued human rights without considering political consequences or his electability.

I contend that Carter believes God ordained him to support human rights. He likely believes as well that promoting human rights leads to positive outcomes. As an evangelical Christian, the best possible outcome of spreading Christian teachings is for an audience member to accept Christ as their Lord and Savior, to become *born again*. Spreading Christianity enabled Carter the opportunity to bring millions closer to a state of being *born again*. The second research question dealt with how these argumentative changes would affect Carter's rhetorical posture.

RQ 2: How did Carter's evangelical Christian faith affect his rhetorical posture as a human rights *phronikon*?

Examining Carter's speeches through the lens of apostolic rhetoric reveals that Carter's post-presidential rhetoric focuses on moral principles rather than the advocacy of specific policies. In Chapter I, I established that Carter failed as a political *phronikon* during his presidency insofar as he had difficulty enacting policies that were consistent with his faith-based perceptions of human rights.

In addition to addressing human rights, Carter believes that human rights transcend politics. In the Havana Cuba speech in 2002, Carter (2002c) portrays human rights and democracy as inalienable rights:

> I am not using a U.S. definition of "democracy." The term is embedded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which Cuba signed in 1948, and it was defined very precisely by all the other countries of the Americas in the Inter-American Democratic Charter last September. It is based on some simple premises: all citizens are born with the right to choose their own leaders, to define their own destiny, to speak freely, to organize political parties, trade unions and non-governmental groups, and to have fair and open trials. (para. 2)

Carter clearly believed that human rights and democracy should be pursued regardless of a rhetor's personal consequences or political ambitions.

Finally, I contend that Carter's faith-based rhetoric allows him to make enthymatic arguments. Enthymemes are not just fact based arguments but can reflect the values of a rhetor as well (Conley, 1984). Carter's faith-based enthymatic arguments signal the values he wants his audience to endorse. Carter argues that good policies result from the support of faith-based values. Carter wants audiences to visualize the benefits of supporting human rights, and to utilize the services of the Carter Center.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Apostolic Rhetoric

Carter developed a new political persona following his presidency. The shift from an official civil religionist to an unofficial civil religionist reflected a major change in his rhetorical persona. These changes resulted in several advantages for Carter. The advantages can only be utilized by a former president that fulfills the role of an unofficial

civil religionist. One advantage that Carter cites is the ability to discuss controversial issues (Carter, 2006b). As president, Carter had to temper his speech with respect to the best interests of the country and for his electability. However, as a surrogate of Christ, Carter felt that he could assert controversial positions because he believed himself to hold correct beliefs. He even joked that his secret service protection enabled him to do so (Carter, 2006b, para. 2). As such, apostolic speakers, as opposed to politicians, have the opportunity to transcend the political process in order to address value based problems.

The second major advantage of an apostolic position is that rhetors lack an obligation to advance policy solutions. As noted earlier, Carter advocated value positions, such as human rights, without advancing a specific policy solution. He made suggestions but allowed audiences to decide upon solutions. However, by not offering specific policies, Carter positioned himself to argue for or against a policy action based on the whether or not it supported human rights. Carter also used the Carter Center to assist countries who requested help in implementing human rights policies.

These two advantages are useful primarily to a Christian rhetorician who does not plan to run for reelection (Carter, 1982). Carter acknowledged that his political career was over when he lost the presidency. He started using more overt religious messages in his writing and speaking during his post-presidency. Carter's belief in the separation of church and state prevented him, as president, from melding the two. During his post-presidency he no longer felt obligated to separate religious beliefs from human rights advocacy (Carter, 1996). As an official civil religionist Carter had to maintain the separation but as an unofficial civil religionist he currently promotes the mix of religion and civic activities.

Another disadvantage of transitioning from politician to apostolic rhetor is one's religious faith. In Carter's case, he advocated human rights and tied democratic elections to human rights (Stuckey, 2008). Employing apostolic rhetoric forced Carter to consistently maintain his faith-based advocacy. I contend that a shift away from faith-based advocacy would lessen his effectiveness as a human rights advocate. Abandoning faith-based advocacy would present an inconsistent message.

Finally, apostolic rhetoricians could be viewed as religious zealots if they stray too far from mainstream cultural values. Fortunately for Carter, human rights are favorable values in American culture, and his religious advocacy is close to the beliefs of mainstream society (Stuckey, 2008). Carter uses his position as an unofficial civil religionist to link human rights to civil values. Carter's positions are not viewed as extreme but rather the visions of an idealist.

Rhetorical Presence and Faith-based Human Rights Rhetoric

Originally, I believed that Carter's ability to draw people to him would be a central discussion point. However, as I critiqued his speeches it became clear that the relationship between faith and human rights was central to this study. As such, I focused on an analysis of Carter's faith and human rights. Nevertheless, it is evident that Carter attempted to make human rights issues present for his audience. The theory of rhetorical presence, conceptualized by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) in *The New Rhetoric*, is defined as the thing which the eye dwells on when multiple things are available (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). It is the rhetor's job to draw the audience to specific points when there is an infinite amount of information available for the audience

to focus upon. Obviously, astute speakers draw the audience's attention to issues that cement their arguments in an audience's mind.

During his presidency Carter filled the role of what Hart (1977) called an official civil religionist. During the 1976 campaign, "Carter's religious-political discourse reaffirmed our civic piety and faith in America, communicated trustworthiness, served as a source of identification with evangelicals and religionists, and generated media attention" (Erickson, 1980, p. 235). Carter used his private religious beliefs to draw attention to his campaign by tapping into ideas that an American audience was already primed to hear.

During his post-presidency Carter was no longer an official civil religionist but filled the role of what Hart (1977) calls an unofficial civil religionist. Representatives of groups like the John Birch Society serve as "unofficial civil religionists" when they claim that Christian religious principles should be used for governmental decisions (Hart, 1977, p. 21). Many of the groups Hart references would be considered *right wing* religious groups. Carter is unique because, unlike *right wing* groups, he uses his private evangelical beliefs to publicly support universal human rights, a traditionally liberal or *left wing* value.

A universal audience is primed to listen to faith-based rhetoric because of the ritualistic nature of official civic piety (Hart, 1977). Carter's use of faith-based rhetoric allowed him to draw presence to his human rights arguments by linking the two together. Carter has consistently maintained that democracy is a necessary political condition for the promotion of human rights (Stuckey, 2008). Carter drew "rhetorical presence" to

human rights when he portrayed them as an inherent part of both Christian faith and democracy.

Reality is created when the rhetor successfully advocates an idea to an audience (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Private thoughts are used to draw presence when they match the values of a universal audience (Karon, 1976; Oakley, 1997). Carter uses his personal ideas about faith to promote human rights. In turn, if the audience accepts Carter's arguments as truth, Carter creates a reality where Christianity and human rights are inseparable.

Gross (2005) argues that global rhetorical presence is used to examine a text as a whole instead of individual arguments. Atkinson, Kaufer and Ishizake (2008) argue that selection and presentation elements throughout the entire rhetorical situation constitute global presence. In this study, Carter is observed as using the apostolic model to argue for human rights. It is a model that most Christian audiences are familiar with. A good apostle uses the story of Christ to convert others to Christianity. When global presence is applied to Carter's approach, it is clear that Carter uses his faith-based rhetoric to convert audiences to supporters of human rights.

Conclusion

Jimmy Carter is a unique American political figure. His dedication to promoting human rights allowed him to remain a relevant figure in international politics following his loss of the 1980 presidential election. Dawidoff (2011) sums up Carter's unique political experience:

> That this intelligent, principled, dogged man who remains so steely and enigmatic at his center got himself elected president is one amazing American story. That he

> reinvented a way for a former president to live on in defeat is another. He accomplished both by relentlessly looking forward — as he still does today. In the end, his personal paradoxes and unresolved contradictions are simply left behind by the arrow of his ambition — the ongoing desire to do something more, to go anywhere to stay in the game, to make a lasting difference. (p. 13)

His human rights advocacy allows him to bridge religious values and the secular world. Carter used his religious beliefs to stay in the public eye while promoting a faith-based human rights policy. The resolve to support human rights comes from his devout religious faith and desire to promote good actions.

Critiquing faith-based arguments as rhetorical strategies adds to the body of knowledge in communication studies. First, Carter's faith-based rhetoric reflects Hart's (1977) conception of an official civil religionist as president and an unofficial civil religionist as a former president. Second, Carter uses faith-based rhetoric to draw presence to his human rights arguments. Carter's post-presidential rhetoric relies on the use of personal faith-based appeals to promote human rights. His rhetorical style is similar to that of a Christian apostle who promotes Christian teachings. Carter used this style to promote human rights and democracy as universally good values. The speeches also show how an evangelical Christian uses faith to promote values such as human rights.

Carter's faith-based post-presidential rhetoric allowed him to become the *phronimos*/*phronikon* that he wanted to be as president. Self (1979) notes:

> Obviously, the virtue of phronesis should enable its possessor to recognize and articulate the vices and virtues of others. One's own experience in deliberating

> well about matters of value and consistent selection of the mean should facilitate the ability to explain why the conduct of another either does or does not follow the "golden mean" and deserves either praise or blame. We might also expect that the man of practical wisdom, whose virtue is publically recognizable, would often be called upon to speak on ceremonial occasions. These occasions provide a forum for the display of practical wisdom and the confirmation of it by the audience. (p. 143)

Carter did exactly what Self (1979) argues a *phronimos*/*phronikon* would, he used his faith-based advocacy to advocate the virtue of human rights and took every opportunity to speak about it.

APPENDIX A

JIMMY CARTER'S POST-PRESIDENTIAL, FAITH-BASED FOREIGN POLICY ACTION

Introduction

The following is a chronological outline of Carter's international post-presidential diplomacy. The timeline was constructed using the LexisNexis Academic database to search for articles referencing Jimmy Carter in *The New York Times*. *The New York Times* was used because it has a foreign bureau. Despite a perceived bias, mainstream United States newspapers have no significant bias when covering presidential elections (D'Alessio and Allen, 2000). In addition, research from Brinkley (1998) and Carter's books are consulted.

1981

Carter spent the early days after his presidency vacationing and shoring up loose ends. The Carter family's first major decision was to formally join Marantha Baptist Church in Plains, GA ("Church formed," 1981). The church was created when the Plains Baptist Church Pastor was forced to resign after allowing African-Americans to attend services ("Church formed," 1981). During Carter's presidency, his family attended Sunday school at Plains Baptist Church and services at Marantha Baptist.

Other family activities were reported following Carter's term in office. Carter planted trees at his home in Plains, GA and planned a vacation for the family to the Virgin Islands in early February (Krebs & Thomas, 1981d; Krebs & Thomas, 1981e). Carter's presidency was romanticized during this period by *New York Times* editorial writers who praised the former president (Rosenberg, 1981).

Carter presided over other post-presidential duties. He prepared memoirs and planned to build his presidential library. Carter also hired a literary agent ("Carter hires Josephson," 1981) and sold his memoirs to Bantam Books in early March (McDowell, 1981a). Carter visited Princeton University to get writing advice and held a question and answer session with students ("Carter is troubled," 1981; Krebs & Thomas, 1981b; Safire, W, 1981). He hired a historian to assist him instead of hiring a ghost writer (McDowell, 1981b). Carter also gained approval from Georgia universities to start building a library ("Atlanta colleges back site," 1981). They asked him to select a preliminary site.

Carter refrained from criticizing his successor's policies. Initially, Carter praised President Reagan's public response to terrorists after the conclusion of the Iranian hostage crisis ("Carter Praises Reagan," 1981). Carter's comments toward the Reagan administration were usually labeled as "concerns" ("Carter is troubled," 1981, p. B10). Carter would not formally criticize Reagan until July (Raines, 1981b). Carter and President Ford endorsed a plan for Sunday presidential voting, one of several times the two would team up on issues as former presidents (Clymer, 1981).

Many of Carter's appearances were as an honored speaker or award recipient. One such appearance was at the Georgia Democratic Party's Jefferson-Jackson day in March ("Carter is an uneasy rider," 1981). Carter spoke and afterwards other speakers were given the opportunity to praise Carter and his presidency ("Carter is an uneasy rider," 1981). Carter was also nominated for the Harry S. Truman public service award in March (Krebs & Thomas, 1981f). Carter hung Truman's picture in the Oval Office during his presidency. He was given the Truman Award in May. Carter used this

speaking opportunity to blast fringe groups for using scare tactics ("Scare tactics," 1981). Guest speaking engagements provided Carter a platform from which he could make political statements.

The next issue Carter addressed during 1981 was human rights. Following a story explaining why Carter allowed the Shah of Iran into the United States, Carter gave a speech to the New York Board of Rabbis ("Why Carter admitted the Shah," 1981). He challenged the United States to continue pursuit of a human rights based foreign policy (Carter, 1981b). In late May, Carter continued to push human rights in a speech to Southern Baptist leaders ("Views of religious right," 1981). He argued that racial equality and arms control are compatible with Christian beliefs.

In early July, Carter openly criticized Reagan (Carter, 1981a). He criticized Reagan's failure to address human rights in foreign policy decisions (Carter, 1981a; Raines, 1981b; Wycliff, Wright, & Herron, 1981). Specifically, Carter felt that Reagan had not pursued SALT discussions, government spending reform, or the environment (Carter, 1981a; Raines, 1981b; Wycliff et al., 1981).

In late June, Carter announced that he would take a nine-day trip to China, followed by a five-day visit to Japan (Krebs & Thomas, 1981c). Citizen Carter would be briefed by the state department (Krebs & Thomas, 1981c). Carter would be treated like an American dignitary and friend of Communist leader Deng Xiaoping ("Carter to visit China," 1981). Upon arriving in China and throughout his visit Carter was greeted by and met with several government officials including Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang, Party Leader Hu Yaobang, and Deng ("Carter warmly greeted," 1981; Sterba, 1981a; Sterba,

1981d; Sterba, 1981c). In addition to visiting Communist leaders, Carter toured the Great Wall of China and went fishing in the Xian province (Sterba, 1981d; Sterba, 1981c).

Carter used the visit to China as a platform to make public comments about the relationship between China and the United States. Initially, Carter announced that arm sales with Taiwan did not violate unilateral treaties (Sterba, 1981e). The next day Carter stated that he learned that the Chinese were scared by normalization talks (Sterba, 1981c). Carter argued that relations with China were producing "more thunder than beneficial rain" (Sterba, 1981e, p. 4.7). At the end of the trip, Carter acknowledged that Taiwan was the main issue hindering a mutually beneficial United States-China relationship (Sterba, 1981b).

Carter discussed several issues with Chinese officials (Sterba, 1981b). One major issue was Chinese human rights policy. Specifically, Carter pushed for Christian missionary access to China and for a self-reliant Christian Church in the country. Carter also noted to the press that if he were president he would continue trading military weapons to China (Sterba, 1981b, p. A2). He offered a public assessment of China, noting that they were suffering economically and that they had undeveloped resources.

When Carter visited Japan, his message changed. In a speech to 800 businessmen in Osaka, Carter proclaimed Middle Eastern tensions could lead to an oil shock (Stokes, 1981). In a ninety minute Japanese television interview, Carter criticized the Ayatollah Khomeini (Stokes, 1981). He also criticized Reagan's restart of the B-1 bomber program.

Despite Carter's desire to "stay out of Washington," he commented on a variety of issues and spoke with world leaders (Reston, 1981, p. A31). Israeli Prime Minister Begin made a point to visit Carter in Plains, GA after meeting with Reagan in September

(Montgomery, 1981). Carter was thrust back into the limelight in October when Anwar Sadat was assassinated in Egypt (Raines, 1981a; Carter, 1982). Carter, Ford, and Nixon all attended the funeral. Ford and Carter (1981) held a press conference where they ranked Sadat among the top of all world leaders. They credited Sadat for the completion of the Camp David Accords and then called for Middle East peace.

Carter used Sadat's death to make further comments on Middle Eastern affairs. Carter noted that if Kaddafi used Sadat's death as an opportunity to interfere in Sudan then the United States should intervene (Wicker, 1981). He also encouraged Israel to return the Sinai to Egypt as soon as possible (Wicker, 1981). Nossiter (1981b) noted that the PLO publicly thanked Carter for his calls for peace. Finally, Carter called for a stronger United States role in Middle East peace ("Carter to lobby Senate," 1981). Carter's call to lobby for the approval of AWACS technology to be shared with Saudi Arabia to help secure the Middle East put him in direct opposition with Ronald Reagan ("Carter to lobby Senate," 1981; Gailey, 1981b; Mohr, 1981).

Carter had a private meeting with Reagan on October 13. After the meeting, Carter blasted Reagan, calling him an "aberration on the political scene" (Gailey, 1981b, p. A27). Carter argued that Reagan's economic policy caused mass suffering, called the B-1 bomber a gross waste, and criticized Reagan's lack of commitment to the Middle Eastern distribution of AWACS technology. Reagan responded by calling key members of Congress to lobby against the AWACS proposal (Mohr, 1981). Carter struck back at Reagan during a fund raiser on October 14. He said that under Reagan's policies he had "misgivings about the abortion of hopes and dreams of those struggling for a better life" (Rosellini, 1981, p. A6).

During late 1981, Carter was in a minor legal battle with *The Washington Post.* Carter threatened to sue *The Washington Post* for libel after the paper published a story claiming that he had bugged Nancy Reagan's temporary residence during his last days in the White House (Gailey, 1981d). *The Washington Post* responded to Carter in an editorial. They argued that he was a public figure and that readers could discern the truth for themselves (Gailey, 1981a). However, *The Post* eventually decided to retract the original story (Gailey, 1981e; Gailey, 1981b). Carter complained that *The Post* held onto the story for two weeks after they knew it was false (Carter, 1981d). Despite his criticism, Carter decided to drop his lawsuit (Carter, 1981d; Gailey, 1981c).

In December, Carter gave a speech attacking Reagan's foreign policy to the Council on Foreign Relations (Carter, 1981c; Nossiter, 1981a). Carter was critical of the one sided foreign policy against the Soviets. He criticized Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights. He argued that the sale of fighter jets to Taiwan created a two China policy. Finally, he felt that loans to Latin American countries with poor human rights records set a bad example. Carter according to Reagan damaged bipartisan relationships by implementing these poor policies.

1982

Carter seemed to scale back his speech making in 1982, possibly because Bantam books had a legal embargo on many of his stories until his book was released in October (Curtis, 1982a). Carter seemed to want to take shots at Reagan in addition to leading a private life as a citizen. Carter criticized Reagan's lack of involvement in the Middle East. He claimed Reagan was jeopardizing the Camp David Accords ("Carter is said to seek," 1982; Krebs & Thomas, 1982). Carter said he would influence policy the best he

could as a "private citizen ("Carter is said to seek," 1982, p. 1.8)." However, Carter also praised the Reagan administration's opposition to Argentinean invasion of the Falkland Islands (Krebs & Thomas, 1982).

In May, Carter said he would never run for public office (Bird & Thomas, 1982; "Carter asks Bipartisan," 1982); he was happy with his private life (Bird & Thomas, 1982). Carter was running his church's finance committee. However, he made it clear that people had made a mistake by not choosing him in the 1980 election (Bird & Thomas, 1982; "Carter asks Bipartisan," 1982). Carter asked Democrats to think positively and called for a bipartisan approach to policy making ("Carter asks Bipartisan," 1982). He believed that was Democratic Party America wanted.

Carter planned a trip to Scandinavian countries to promote his memoirs. He planned to speak in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland (Bird & Thomas, 1982; "Carter asks Bipartisan," 1982). In Stockholm, Carter disclosed that Brezhnev had rejected a nuclear freeze and a European non-aggression pact during negotiations in 1979 (Vinocur, 1982). He said that the Soviets and the United States had an equal number of nuclear weapons (Vinocur, 1982). However, he stated that the Soviets had more intermediate range nuclear weapons.

When his publisher's embargo ended, Carter spoke more openly (Curtis, 1982a). In October, Reagan blamed an economic recession on Carter (Clymer, 1982). Carter responded by noting that he never criticized other administrations for his problems. Yet, Carter spoke on other issues. In an interview in *Time,* Carter criticized Israeli Prime Minister Begin for building settlements in the Golan Heights (McFadden, 1982). Richard Nixon identified Carter as a contact for Reagan as the president prepared for a visit from

Begin in November to discuss the settlement issue (Curtis, 1982b). Toward the end of November, Carter and Ford released a joint statement in favor of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). They noted the dangers of bi-lateral agreements could destroy the world-wide economy (Carter & Ford, 1982).

1983

In January, Ford and Carter teamed up again. In the *Reader's Digest*, the former presidents accused Israel of not living up to their end of the Camp David Accords ("Carter and Ford Criticize Israelis," 1983). They noted that the Israelis had no wish to grant autonomy to the Palestinians. They claimed that King Hussein of Jordan would back a peace agreement if Israel stopped putting settlements on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip ("Carter and Ford Criticize Israelis," 1983). The Reagan administration approved of the joint statement ("Ford-Carter Criticism," 1983). Spokesperson John Hughes ("Carter and Ford Criticize Israelis," 1983) claimed that "real peace can only be achieved through negotiated exchange for occupied Arab territory" (p. A3).

Despite praise from Reagan, Carter continued to criticize the president and Israel. Carter publicly criticized Reagan's proposed non-military budget freeze for the 1984 fiscal year, calling it "unrealistic and unsubstantive" ("Freeze in '84 Budget," 1983, p. A12). In a conference on public policy at the Ford Library, Carter criticized Begin for continuing to settle the West Bank (Peterson, 1983). Carter believed Begin should remove troops from Lebanon immediately (Peterson, 1983).

Despite heavy criticism of Israel, Carter announced plans to make a trip to the Middle East (Shribman, 1983). Carter's trip would include visits to Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Carter also tried to schedule a meeting with Palestinian

Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat ("Carter in Middle East Trip Hopes," 1983). However, right before leaving Carter ruled out a face to face meeting with Arafat. He said the PLO should acknowledge Israel's right to exist before meeting with him ("Carter on a Middle East Trip, Rules," 1983). Carter chose to pay a courtesy visit to Reagan's special envoy to the Middle East, Phillip Habib, before meeting with any foreign government officials.

The trip to the Middle East was to coincide with a Carter Center trip (Carter was a representative of Emory University). The center studied Middle Eastern policy with the intent to develop a new peace proposal ("Carter in Middle East, Hopes," 1983). Carter's first stop on the trip was Egypt. While there, Carter met with PLO officials (Farrell, 1983). A week earlier Carter said he would not meet with Arafat. He disclosed that talks with the PLO focused on Palestinian autonomy and self-determination (Farrell, 1983). Carter did not negotiate with the Palestinians. He contended that, as a private citizen, his talks were not in conflict with the Reagan administration (Farrell, 1983).

When Carter traveled from Egypt to Israel, he was not met with open arms. Upon arriving on March 8, Carter spoke with Prime Minister Begin for one hour and refused to comment to the press about the meeting (Shipler, 1983b). Carter visited East Jerusalem and the West Bank escorted by Mayor Teddy Kollkek. Palestinian protests kept him out of some areas he was scheduled to tour (Shipler, 1983c). When he met with Palestinian representative Elias M. Freija, Israelis publicly protested (Shipler, 1983c). Three soldiers were hurt and one Palestinian school was tear-gassed during the protests ("3 Soldiers Hurt," 1983). However, protests did not stop Carter from making an address at Tel Aviv University on March 10th.

During the speech at Tel Aviv University Carter outlined why he was interested in the Middle East peace process ("Carter Reaffirms Support," 1983). Carter said that his deep religious beliefs led to his commitment for the existence of Israel as an independent state. He proclaimed that, "God has ordered and ordained the existence of the state of Israel as a permanent homeland of the Jews" ("Carter Reaffirms Support," 1983, p. A3). He reaffirmed his desire to see Palestinian self-determination. Carter believed that the Palestinians should negotiate without United States or Egyptian help.

During a press conference at the end of the visit, Carter once again praised the Arab world and criticized Israel (Shipler, 1983a). Carter acknowledged that there was a "great move toward moderation in the Arab world" (Shipler, 1983a, p. 1.21). Carter blasted Begin, arguing that he had a narrow view of the Camp David Accords. Carter believed that the lack of Palestinian autonomy was the fault of both Israel and the Arab world. However, he also noted that Israel could not offer autonomy to the West Bank overnight. Carter believed that the peace process would be incremental now that Sadat had passed.

After his visit to Israel, Carter announced his plans to cross the Jordan River to visit Jordan and King Hussein (Shipler, 1983a). Carter met with Hussein on March 13 resulting in an exchange of views on international questions, according to Carter ("Carter Sees Hussein," 1983). Hussein briefed Carter about Arab efforts for peace but also told Carter that the PLO rejected Reagan's idea of Palestinian rule of the West Bank in tandem with the Jordanian government. At his press conference concluding his visit to Jordan, Carter attacked Israeli policy once again, stating that West Bank settlements were

"a direct violation of international law" and that they were "an obstacle to peace ("West Bank Settlements," 1983). Carter left Jordan on March 15.

Carter made two more stops on his tour. First was Saudi Arabia, where he met with King Fahd on March 15th ("Carter Visits Syria," 1983). The last trip was to Syria where Carter met with President Hafez Al-Assad on March 17 ("Carter Visits Syria," 1983; Friedman, 1983). Carter met with Al-Assad for two hours over lunch (Friedman, 1983). Carter publicly denounced Ronald Reagan's claim that Syria was a puppet of the Soviet Union if qualifier, use "simply" because they imported missiles from the Soviets (Friedman, 1983, p. A4). During a tour of Damascus, Syrian onlookers shouted "Death to America" upon seeing Carter.

After Carter's visit to the Middle East, Carter was silent on foreign affairs issues for several months. In June, Carter gave a speech to the environmental group Global Tomorrow Coalition (Biddle & Slade, 1983; Shabecoff, 1983). In the speech, Carter claimed that the Reagan administration deliberately abandoned environmental leadership (Shabecoff, 1983). This supposed abandonment included changing environmental laws to circumvent them (Biddle & Slade, 1983). Carter noted that Reagan has ignored many problems that were identified during his administration including world hunger, unequal distribution of natural resources, and overuse of fossil fuels. Finally, Carter attacked Reagan's escalation of the arms race. Carter felt that the arms race would destroy the American economy.

In July, Carter gave a speech in Tokyo that was simulcast on US superstation TBS. Carter criticized United States limits on Japanese trade and defense that were implemented by the Reagan administration. "These kinds of decisions ought to be made

by Japanese officials in your country not by American politicians in Washington," argued Carter during the speech ("Carter Assails Demands," 1983, p. A2). Carter believed that Reagan was endangering the greatest trade relationship in the history of the United States. Carter also noted that Russian industrial espionage indicated that the West was far ahead of the Soviets.

In August, Carter was invited to offer his views on United States interests in Central America to a Presidential Commission led by Henry Kissinger (Smith, 1983). Carter testified on September 1st with Sol Linowitz his chief advisor on Latin America (Ayres Jr., 1983). Carter said he desired to see a clear and consistent policy on Central America. Linowitz also noted that unilateral action in Latin American affairs could not solve the complex problems in the region. Despite Carter's recommendations to the commission, Reagan had United States troops invade Grenada to rescue American citizens (Gwertzman, 1983). One of Reagan's justifications was that he did not want to have another Iranian style crisis on his hands (Gwertzman, 1983).

In November, a Lebanese suicide bomber killed 210 marines stationed in Lebanon. This event coincided with the first major initiative of the Carter Center. Several officials from the Middle East and scholars of Middle Eastern affairs met (Schmidt, 1983a; Schmidt, 1983b). Ford, who was attending the conference, and Carter issued a joint statement (Schmidt, 1983a). Ford and Carter felt that United States military retaliation was an inappropriate course of action as their attackers had not been clearly identified (Schmidt, 1983a). Ford felt that the Marines should not be withdrawn from Lebanon. Carter felt that no military action should be taken except action in defense of the Marines remaining in Lebanon. Reagan accused Carter of gutting the CIA. That led to

an intelligence failure which allowed the bombing to happen ("White House Contends Carter," 1983).

The conference at the Carter Center was the first major event the Center hosted (Schmidt, 1983a; Schmidt, 1983b). The conference had officials from Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the United States (Schmidt, 1983b). Israel refused to attend because Walid Khalid, a Harvard Professor and former PLO member, attended the conference. Much of the discussion was regarding building a larger Arab state coalition in support of the Camp David Accords. However, Faraq Al-Shar, a Syrian foreign minister, publicly attacked United States Middle Eastern policy. Osama el-Baz of Egypt, contended that without Lebanese peace there would not be a greater peace. Finally, Carter publicly stated that the United States would not punish Israel for non-compliance in regards to the Camp David Accords. The conference served as Carter's last major public comment or activity in 1983 regarding foreign affairs.

1984

During 1984, a presidential election year, national coverage of Carter's activities lessened. On January 2, Carter and Gerald Ford issued a joint statement at the World Food Conference in Rome. They called on the governments of the world to work to end world hunger ("Around the world, A New Campaign," 1984). Carter also visited Australia in early February but chose to make his visit private ("Carter in Australia," 1984). In May, several Carter administration officials helped Nicholas Ardito Barlettas win the Panamanian presidential election by 1700 votes (Brinkley & Gailey, 1984).

Carter was interviewed by *The Atlanta Journal and The Atlanta Constitution* in October. Carter made several comments about the administration's policies (Riding,

1984). Carter stated that "for the first time since Eisenhower, we made no progress on nuclear arms control" (Riding, 1984, p. A11). Carter also contended that "Reagan has had no success at all in foreign policy" (Riding, 1984, p. A11).

Carter travelled to several South American countries in early October. Carter visited Peru, Brazil, and Argentina. All were countries that he had targeted with his human rights based foreign policy during his presidency (Freudenheim & Giniger, 1984; Riding, 1984; Schell, 1984). Carter met with several leaders that were helping countries transition to stable civilian rule (Freundenheim & Giniger, 1984). While visiting Peru, Carter met with President Fernando Beluande Terry (Riding, 1984). While visiting Brazil, Carter met with General Joao Batista Figueinedo. He also met with leaders of the pro-government party and the opposition party (Riding, 1984). While in Argentina, Carter visited with President Raul Alfonsin (Freudenheim & Giniger, 1984).

In addition to meeting with leaders, Carter visited human rights leaders in the countries. While in Brazil, Carter met with pro-human rights Archbishop Paulo Evaristo Cardinal Ares (Riding, 1984). He also met with Rio de Janeiro governor Leonel Brizola (Riding, 1984). After those meetings, Carter stated that a clear human rights policy had positively impacted Brazil (Riding, 1984, p. A11).

During the trip former Peruvian, Brazilian, and Argentine exiles met with and praised Carter for his actions during his presidency (Freudenheim & Giniger, 1984, p. 4.4). Carter told the press that Reagan had abandoned his human rights foreign policy. Despite that, Carter said nations were still benefiting from his decision to promote human rights (Freudenheim & Giniger, 1984; Riding, 1984). After Carter completed his tour, Schell (1984, p. A27), the head of the human rights watchdog group Americas Watch,

declared him a hero. Carter's human rights policy had a positive impact on American interests. He claimed that Reagan had taken advantage of his policies (Schell, 1984, p. A27).

After the tour of South America, Carter and Ford announced that they would host a symposium on the issue at the Carter Center in April of 1985 ("Nuclear Panel Planned," 1984). Carter, as well as other Democrats, called for the resignation of C.I.A. director William J. Casey on October 21. It was disclosed that the C.I.A. wrote a manual for Nicaraguan rebels on how to conduct guerrilla warfare against the Nicaraguan government ("Carter Bids C.I.A. Chief Quit," 1984). As election day neared, on October 24, during a speech at Princeton University, Carter attacked Reagan's ability to manage foreign policy issues. He noted that "Reagan lacks the interest" in foreign policy to serve as an effective negotiator for the United States ("Carter Says Reagan," 1984, p. A25).

Carter was silent in the press on foreign policy issues except for an attack on Reagan. The attacks followed Reagan's landslide election victory over Walter Mondale. At a Habitat-for-Humanity fundraiser on November 10, Carter attacked Reagan for his use of the military in both Lebanon and Grenada ("Carter Cites Reagan," 1984). Carter was also concerned that America voted for a man who simply kept restating a message of "well-being" ("Carter Cites Reagan," 1984, p. H25).

1985

On January 5, it was announced that Jimmy Carter would receive the World Methodist Peace Prize on March 13 1985 ("World Methodist Peace Prize," 1985). Carter was given the award because of his promotion of human rights, his work on arms control, and his contributions for Habitat For Humanity ("Carter first American," 1985). This

award was important because it was the first major award Carter received after his presidency ("Carter first American," 1985; "World Methodist Peace Prize," 1985).

While promoting a book, Carter went on the attack against Reagan during an interview in April (Mohr, 1985). Carter contended that Middle East peace would be built on common ground between Israel and the Arab world. He pointed out that Reagan had failed to advance the peace process. Carter would ask the United Nations to punish Israel if Prime Minister Begin did not help Israel live up to the Camp David Accords. In addition, Carter felt that Reagan had alienated all sides in the peace process. Carter believed that no progress could be made in the Middle East unless the Camp David Accords that he had negotiated were fully implemented.

A day later, Carter used an upcoming nuclear arms conference as a platform to comment on the state of the Democratic Party. Carter believed that the future of the Democratic Party should not rest in the hands of Senator Edward Kennedy. He felt Kennedy was too liberal to be a good party leader (Gailey, 1985). Carter felt that a moderate, like New York Governor Mario Cuomo, would be a better choice. Carter also noted that Reagan should appoint a specialist to handle the Middle East peace process.

The Carter Center conference on nuclear arms control, hosted by Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, took place in mid-April 1985. Delegates from the Soviet Union, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States attended (Biddle, 1985). Much criticism of arms policy came from the representatives. Soviet Ambassador, Dobrynin, claimed that Reagan refused to negotiate with the Soviets. The Chinese delegation criticized the nuclear build-up of both the United States and the Soviets. Henry Kissinger

postulated that the Soviets and the United States were simply out of ideas on how to negotiate an arms freeze.

Carter also made several comments about the nuclear arms race and the conference. On April 12, Carter noted that an immediate nuclear freeze would not be compatible with the Soviet arms build-up (Biddle, 1985). On April 14, Carter claimed that the conference was developing potential treaty terms. The Soviets would never sign a treaty as long as Reagan pursued his Strategic Defense Initiative (including Star Wars) (Lewis, 1985).

Carter (1985) commented about the conference findings in an editorial in *The New York Times*. He felt that while both sides wanted nuclear arms control talks, negative comments from both governments prevented effective negotiations. Complex negotiations involving terms and definitions of those terms, were difficult enough without hostility between governments. Carter set up the conference to define terms in a calm environment. Carter, once again, claimed that Reagan must drop his insistence on pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative to extend the anti-ballistic missile treaty. Carter believed that arsenal reductions to around 2,000 weapons each piece would be a good starting point for negotiations. Carter proposed that Reagan's push for Congressional and Soviet support for arms control.

Carter continued to make public comments about arms control throughout the year. In September, he again publicly stated that the pursuit of *Star Wars* would prevent arms control talks (Smith, 1985). In November, Reagan announced that he would hold a conference to meet with Nixon, Ford, and Carter about the issue (Gelb, 1985).

On June 21, Carter publicly supported Reagan while he dealt with the hijacking of Trans World Airlines (TWA) flight 847 (Smothers, 1985). He believed Americans should "give President Reagan our full support and encouragement" during the crisis (Smothers, 1985, p. 1.6). Leaders, according to Carter, were in a tough spot during a hostage crisis because they had to balance national interest with protecting lives. He conveyed that, in a hostage crisis, the president needs to have the sustained support of American people. Carter chose to speak to the press only once on the issue (Smothers, 1985).

In July, Carter visited Greece ("Carter meets Papandreou," 1985). On July 13, Carter met with Greek Prime Minister Papandreou and went sightseeing ("Carter meets Papandreou," 1985). Carter held a press conference in Greece to attack Reagan's public stance against international terrorism ("Around the world; Carter faults," 1985). He also assured the Greeks that the Athens airport would be removed from Reagan's travel advisory list. The Reagan Administration believed the airport was a security risk.

In October, Carter publicly supported Reagan's handling of the hijacking of the "Achille Lauro" (Hazarika, 1985). He felt it would be a mistake to extradite the hijackers from Italy because they would receive a fair trial there (Hazarika, 1985). Mr. and Mrs. Carter also took a 13 day trip to Nepal to visit Mount Everest at the end of October ("Carter vacationing in Nepal," 1985). No public comments were made during this trip.

1986

On January 2, Yasser Arafat said that Carter was a man of principles derived from "true Christian spirit ("Arafat terms Reagan," 1986, p. A6). Carter followed up on the comment by starting a human right's tour in February. He visited Venezuela, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Mexico ("Carter sees new avenues," 1986). On the first part

of his trip, Carter met with Costa Rican government officials and rebels ("Carter in Nicaragua," 1986). Carter also met with Sandinista government and opposition officials in Nicaragua on February 7 ("Carter in Nicaragua," 1986). As a result of Carter's visit, the Sandinista government released two political prisoners at his request on February 9 (Erlick, 1986). Carter, after 12 hours of talks with Sandinista leaders, identified some ways to help solve the conflicts in Nicaragua. They included a request by the government to end aid to CONTRA rebel forces ("Carter sees new avenues," 1990).

Carter continued publicly sparring with Reagan. Carter was upset with comments made in a March 1st speech by Reagan. Reagan attacked the military record during Carter's presidency (Mohr, 1986). Carter responded with harsh criticisms of Reagan's knowledge of history. He criticized covert United States's assistance of rebel groups in Angola, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. He chastised Reagan for his failure to continue arms talks with the Soviets (Mohr, 1986). Carter argued that funding of the CONTRAS had failed to develop an opposition military group that could compete with the Sandinista government (Mohr, 1986). Reagan contended later in the month that Carter had misunderstood his position and that he was sorry for the disagreement (Weinraub, 1986).

After his visit to Latin America, the Carter Center hosted a symposium on developing country debt (Farnsworth, 1986). Mexico was the primary focus of the discussion. Finance minister Jesus Silva Herzog, Carter, and Senator Howard Baker were at the conference among others (Farnsworth, 1986,). Mexico lost six billion dollars from falling oil prices and was already paying ten billion per year in interest on a 100 billion dollar debt (Farnsworth, 1986). Few possible solutions were offered except for Minister Herzog requesting that the IMF refinance Mexico's loans (Farnsworth, 1986).

Carter traveled to Zimbabwe in early July. Carter walked out after a speech given on July 4 by a Zimbabwean government official. The speaker criticized the United States for not taking a stance against South African Apartheid ("Around the world; Carter faults," 1986; "Carter leads walkout, 1986; Gwertzman, 1986a; "Zimbabwe: Ugly words," 1986). Carter said that the speech "was entirely inappropriate and an insult to my country and me personally" ("Carter leads walkout," 1986, p. 1.4). Carter was invited to Zimbabwe, because he helped the transition to Zimbabwean majority rule while he was president (Gwertzman, 1986a).

On July 9, Reagan suspended aid to Zimbabwe for 1986. Aid for 1987 was later cut (Clarity, 1986; Gwertzman, 1986a; Gwertzman, 1986b). Despite this, Zimbabwe refused to apologize publicly for the July 4 comments ("Around the world; Carter faults," 1986; Day, 1986; "Zimbabwe: ugly words," 1986). Carter later postulated that he would not have walked out if he had known aid would be cut ("Around the world; Carter faults," 1986). Carter's actions and their impact led President Robert Mugabe to meet with a group of non-aligned nations in September (Gwertzman, 1986b). Despite aid eventually being restored, Mugabe was able to use the United States as leverage to increase his power base ("United States ends Zimbabwe freeze," 1988). Mugabe remained in power ignoring several request for elections for the next 20 years.

The Carter Library opened on October 1st. The library held 27 million documents, served as a teaching center, and housed the Carter Center offices (Schmidt, 1986). Carter went to Brown University at the end of September to assist with the opening of an institute for international studies ("New foreign institute," 1986). Carter visited Bangladesh with hopes of starting a philanthropic center in November ("Carter in

Bangladesh," 1986). Carter also visited a refugee camp for Afghani citizens in Pakistan as co-chair of a group aiding health projects in the region ("Carter meets with Afghan," 1986).

The Carter Center hosted a conference for emerging democracies that had Carter, Gerald Ford, Argentine President Alfonsín, and Guatemalan President Cerezo in attendance (Chavez, 1986). As a result of the conference, Nicaraguan government officials announced they would release American political prisoners (Chavez, 1986). Carter proclaimed that Nicaragua must take real steps toward a genuine democracy for United States/Sandinista relationships to improve (Chavez, 1986). On December 9, Carter demanded that Reagan be truthful about the Iran-Contra affair ("The White House Crisis," 1986).

1987

Very little of Carter's international affairs comments or activities were covered in 1987. In March, Carter visited Israel and criticized the fact that former Prime Minister Begin refused to meet with him (Friedman, 1987). In October, Carter publicly criticized the military buildup in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war ("Carter recommends that Reagan," 1987). Carter called for Congress to be notified of any imminent danger to troops because of the War Powers Act. He said the act was unconstitutional during his presidency ("Carter recommends that Reagan," 1987). In November, Carter and Houston philanthropist Dominique de Menil awarded a $100,000 human rights prize to La Vicaria, a Roman Catholic aid group in Chile ("A foundation led by Carter," 1987).

1988

In 1988, a presidential election year, Carter's comments on international affairs were rarely covered. Carter and 2,000 other passengers were trapped in San Juan harbor ("Grounded ship stalls," 1988). A cruise ship on which the Carter family was vacationing was blocked by a grounded cruise ship. Carter met with an advisor to PLO leader Yasser Arafat on August 20 in Cairo and returned to the west the next day ("Carter is reported," 1988). In November, Carter sent a letter to the Ayatollah Khomeini asking for the release of American prisoners. He acknowledged that the State Department was also working on the release of Iranian prisoners (Binder & Wines, 1988).

1989

Vice-President Dan Quayle publicly criticized Jimmy Carter for meeting with rebel groups and anti-United States leaders ("Quayle chides Carter," 1989). Quayle stated that, "obviously when you have a former President meeting with heads of state we don't meet with, it has a chance of complicating matters" (p. A3). Quayle and Carter attended the inauguration of Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez together. Criticism of Carter also came in the form of a letter to the editor to *The New York Times* (Balsom, 1989). It noted that Carter should not ask people to be sensitive to moderate Muslim concerns about a book written by Salman Rushdie. Rushdie's book the *Satanic Verses* was highly critical of the Koran and Muslim culture. The Ayatollah Khomeini put a price on Rushdie's head after the book was released.

Carter was thrust back into the international spotlight in April. The Bush administration was highly critical of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega (Pear, 1989a). Carter and Gerald Ford were drafted to lead an election observation team for the May 5

election between a puppet candidate of Noriega's and an opposition candidate (Cochez, 1989; Pear, 1989b). Cochez (1989) was prophetic with the prediction that Ford and Carter were too late to help an inherently corrupt election process. Carter (1993) covered the days following the election in detail. News reports reflected Carter's observations. Carter phoned in statements that the Noriega government was taking the election by fraud. He reported that Panamanian soldiers stormed polling places and took the tally sheets (Gruson, 1989). The Carter group reported that Guillermo Endara was defeating Noriega candidate Carlos Duque by almost a 3 to 1 margin (Gruson, 1989; "Stern but steady on Panama," 1989).

Upon returning to the States, Carter continued his public comments about Panama. Carter felt strongly that the Panama Canal Treaty signed during his presidency should be upheld. If the treaty was canceled, the United States would alienate every other nation in the hemisphere (Pear, 1989b). Carter felt that the United States should only use force to keep the Panama Canal open and for no other reason (Pear, 1989). Carter and Senator John McCain both felt that using military force to remove Noriega would be against US interests (Weinraub, 1989). Carter briefed President Bush in Washington, D.C. on May 11 (Applebome, 1989). The United States attacked Panama in December and forcibly removed Noriega from power.

Carter also made several other observations following the Panama election fiasco. After his White House meeting, Carter showed appreciation for Bush. He believed the administration was developing a bi-partisan foreign policy (Applebome, 1989). Carter argued that he could meet with people and governments as a United States citizen that government representatives could not. The Carter Center was already spending $16

million per year on program including health care, agricultural, African peace, and technological development in the developing world. Election monitoring was also a major focus of the Carter Center. Liberal editorial writer Dionne Jr. (1989) believed that, "Carter was emerging as the best former President" (p. B6). Carter seemed to be granted credibility by the Bush administration.

Carter worked, through the Carter Center, in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. In June, the leader of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, John Garang, came to Atlanta to hold talks with Carter. They discussed the long term civil war between his Christian group and the Muslim government in Sudan (Perlez, 1989d, p. 1.8). Garang also met with the State Department while visiting the United States (Perlez, 1989d, p.1.8). After meeting with Carter, Garang announced his group's intention to meet with the Sudanese government to discuss peace. The main conflict was the Sudanese government's implementation of Muslim law ("Sudan peace talks," 1989; "Sudan rebel to meet," 1989).

In December, Carter mediated talks between Garang and the head of the Sudanese Government, General Omar Hassan al Bashir ("Sudanese Agree," 1989; "Sudan peace talks," 1989). Both sides agreed to allow United Nations sponsored food flights to resume in the country ("Sudanese agree," 1989). Carter told reporters Garang claimed that over 250,000 people had died in the southern Christian and tribal region of the Sudan during the civil war ("Sudan peace talks," 1989). Talks collapsed on December 5 over the issue of Islamic Law ("Sudan peace talks," 1989). Carter believed that neither side was prepared to take the steps for peace ("Sudan peace talks." 1989).

In August, Ethiopian President Mengistue Haile Marian announced that he was willing to meet with rebels at the Carter Center ("United States talks with Ethiopia," 1989). The government and the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front had been at war for three decades. Over 500,000 people had been killed ("Carter to bring," 1989). Both sides agreed that Carter was an appropriate choice to restart talks because of his concern for human rights and peace ("Carter to bring," 1989). Talks had broken down in 1978, 1982, and 1985. Both sides hoped the end of the war would stop economic strain ("Ethiopian minister says," 1989). Eritrea became part of Ethiopia in 1950 after an United Nations resolution. Eritreans believed that they should be independent ("Opponents in Ethiopia," 1989).

To complicate the peace talks, the Ethiopian government was also at war with the Tigre Peoples Liberation (TPL) army. Their main complaint against the government was their Marxist policy making ("2nd rebel group joins," 1989). The TPL announced that they were willing to observe talks between the Eritreans and the Ethiopians if Carter was the mediator ("2nd rebel group joins" 1989). Five days before the talks, the Ethiopian government released 87 political prisoners and 820 others including three grandsons of the former Ethiopian emperor (Perlez, 1989a). Carter believed that ancient hostilities would be difficult to resolve through talks (Apple, 1989). Both sides had taken steps since they had both met with Carter initially in 1988. Carter believed that the Carter Center was in a perfect state to help all three groups. Carter Center officials could speak with the rebel groups while the United States negotiated only with recognized governments (Apple, 1989).

Talks began in Ethiopia on September 7. The main topic was Eritrean independence. The Eritreans offered Red Sea access if they were given land in return ("Opponents in Ethiopian, 1989). As a result of the talks, Cuban troops left Ethiopia ("Cuban troops to," 1989). Many issues were unresolved during the eight days of negotiations. Carter felt that some procedural issues were resolved ("Ethiopia talks make progress," 1989; Schwartz, 1989). Procedurals that were not resolved would be discussed during another set of talks on November 18 ("Ethiopian peace talks," 1989). Talks were complicated because of the ongoing civil war and conflicts in neighboring Sudan and Somalia (Perlez, 1989c).

Talks resumed in Nairobi, Kenya in November ("Ethiopia-Eritrea peace treaty," 1989; "Ethiopia and rebels," 1989). Both the Ethiopian government and the Eritreans agreed to hold formal peace talks with Carter and former Tanzanian president Julius K. Nyerere as co-chairs ("Ethiopia-Eritrea peace treaty," 1989; "Ethiopia and rebels," 1989; Perlez, 1989a). There would also be a seven person international observation panel present. Carter was excited about the progress. Mengistu stopped conscripting citizens for the war. There were still problems including the war with the Tigre Peoples Liberation Front (Perlez, 1989a).

In addition to his peace negotiation activities, Carter agreed to monitor elections in Nicaragua in February 1990 ("Carter to monitor," 1989; "Role likely for Carter," 1989). A similar group to the one that monitored the Panamanian elections sponsored by the Carter Center would be sent to Nicaragua ("Carter to monitor," 1989). In September, Carter was concerned about Mikito Indian leaders and others who emigrated from Nicaragua during Sandinista rule. He felt emigrants would potentially be blocked at the

border when they returned to vote (Schwartz, 1989). In October, Spanish President Felipe Gonzalez noted that he believed Carter could successfully monitor the Nicaraguan election (Riding, 1989). The election would serve as a step to solving problems between Nicaragua and the United States. In November, Carter communicated with the Sandinista government and the press. The Sandinistas needed to stop smearing opposition candidates in the Nicaraguan press by linking them with CONTRA military violence ("Carter says Sandinistas," 1989).

Carter made a few other statements regarding international affairs toward the end of the year. There was a reunion of 2,000 Carter administration officials in Washington. Carter criticized the international affairs policy of the Reagan administration (Tolchin, 1989). He noted that Bush and the Carter Center had an almost perfect relationship. The second annual Carter-Menil Human Rights Award was given to a Jewish group and a Palestinian group that both monitored human rights violations in the West Bank ("Carter-Menil Rights Award," 1989). King (1989) chronicled Carter's accomplishments following his presidency. He concluded that the Carter Center was the perfect organization for conflict resolution. Carter's work to settle a dispute between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Turkish government came to fruition. Orthodox Mass was held in a 16th century church that the Turks allowed the Greek Orthodox Church to restore ("Mass is said," 1989).

1990

Carter continued his work with Middle East peace in 1990. In January, Carter accused Israel of selling cluster bombs to the Marxist Ethiopian government (Sciolino,

1990b). Carter was quick to point the finger at Israel acknowledging that Ethiopia had the bombs.

Carter spent much of the earlier part of the year preparing to monitor elections in Nicaragua. While visiting Nicaragua on January 26, Carter told the Sandinista government to release United States backed funds to the opposition party ("Release opposition's funds," 1990). Funds approved by Congress to support the opposition party were being held up by United States red tape and Nicaraguan bank rules (Uhlig, 1990a). Nicaraguan law allowed foreign contributions as long a 50% tax was given to the government (Pear, 1990b). As of February 3, the government had access to 1.3 million of their 4.5 million. The opposition party only had access to 278,000 dollars of their 9 million in funds supplied by the United States government (Pear, 1990b). The election would take place on February 27 (Uhlig, 1990c). The Sandinistas agreed to release funds after Carter's visit (Pear, 1990b).

Another problem between the United States and Nicaragua involved a United States Congressional election observation team ("Nicaragua will let Congress," 1990; "United States delegation on Managua," 1990). On January 27, the Sandinistas announced that they had reversed their policy and were going to allow United States Congressional observers ("Nicaragua will let Congress," 1990). However, on February 7, the Sandinistas reversed their policy again and denied many members of the Congressional delegation visas (Pear, 1990a; "United States delegation on Managua," 1990). The Sandinista government announced that they did not want an official United States delegation because of funding for the Contras during the Reagan administration (Pear, 1990b). Carter brought members of Congress with him who received visas with his

delegation. He publicly stated that this would be the most observed election in the history of the world ("United States delegation on Managua," 1990). The election would be monitored by the Carter Center group, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States (Pear, 1990a; Uhlig, 1990b).

Pre-election polling showed that the Sandinistas had huge leads (Uhlig, 1990b). However, on Election Day the Sandinistas were routed by a coalition of opposition parties (Uhlig, 1990c). Preliminary numbers were likely misleading because many opposition voters were returning (Uhlig, 1990b). Carter noted that the Sandinistas did nothing to stop the election. Ortega needed no convincing to resign. Carter praised the Sandinistas for their peaceful overtures (Uhlig, 1990c).

Carter attended a conference with Reagan and Nixon on United States-Japanese relations. Following the conference, Carter began another trip to the Middle East in March (Weisman, 1990). Carter started his trip with a visit to Syria. He met with Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa ("Carter in Syria," 1990). During the March 14 meeting, Syria announced that they were committed to freeing American hostages in Lebanon ("Carter in Syria," 1990). Carter also visited Egypt on March 15 before heading to Israel ("Carter in Syria," 1990).

Before he arrived in Jerusalem, Carter announced to the press that the United States plan for a separate Israel and Palestine killed Israel's Likud party coalition government ("Carter in Syria," 1990). Carter also announced that Syria was willing to hold peace talks with Israel (Brinkley, 1990; "Carter criticizes Israelis," 1990). The change in Syria's stance after four previous wars with Israel was necessitated by a Soviet

unwillingness to back the Syrians in another war (Brinkley, 1990). The Israelis ignored Carter's announcement (Brinkely, 1990).

Carter continued his attacks on Israel during the visit ("Carter criticizes Israelis," 1990). During a three day sojourn Carter accused the Israeli military of shooting peaceful protesters, of holding over 9,000 Palestinian prisoners, and killing over 650 Palestinians due to excessive force ("Carter criticizes Israelis," 1990). Carter visited the Golan Heights to observe how the Syrians were being treated ("Carter criticizes Israelis," 1990). In addition to publicly attacking Israel, Carter announced on April 4 that he had met with PLO leader Yasser Arafat ("Carter meets Arafat," 1990). Stearn (1990) noted that Carter's critiques of Israel were the equivalent to treating them like a despotic nation.

In May, the Carter Center led another group monitoring the presidential election in the Dominican Republic (French, 1990b; French 1990d). Despite accusations by both President Balaguer and longtime rival former president Mr. Bosch, Carter said the election was carried out adequately and honestly (French, 1990b). Regardless, the day after the election on May 18, Carter visited the homes of both candidates. He met to discuss the next step in the election as it had been it was a tight race. Both candidates should have expected this as they had already run against each other five times previously (French, 1990d). On May 20, Carter urged that votes stop being counted so the observation team could make a plan to deal with fraud ("Election tally is suspended," 1990). Three weeks later in June, the election still was not resolved (French, 1990a). The Carter team failed to help the Dominicans choose a president.

Carter continued to deal with issues in Central America and the Caribbean throughout the rest of the year. Carter wrote a letter to Guatemalan President Vincicio

Cerezo. He demanded an investigation of the kidnapping of human rights workers from a group to which he had planned to award the Carter-Menil Human Rights Award ("Carter asks Guatemala," 1990). Carter also agreed to monitor elections in Guyana. Guyana's elections had been marred by fraud since their independence in 1966 ("Carter asks Guatemala," 1990). Carter also monitored the Haitian elections in December. He announced that they were free of violence but that polling places were not all ready for voters at the start of the election (French, 1990c).

The Persian Gulf crisis erupted in September 1990. Initially, Carter noted that he believed military action against Iraq might be inevitable after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait ("Confrontation in the Gulf," 1990). Carter was interviewed in *Time* in October and pushed for peace talks with Saddam Hussein ("America's best weapon," 1990). In November, Carter praised Bush's handling of the Persian Gulf crisis, urging Bush to wait it out and not go to war ("Mideast tensions; Carter charges," 1990). Bush used military action to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait and invade Iraq in January 1991.

1991

Early in 1991, Carter did little, but others were quick to recommend Carter for international affairs positions. Najm (1991) recommended that Carter serve as the impetus for change in the Middle East as a peace envoy. Stone (1991), in a letter to the editor to *The New York Times*, recommended Carter for the vacant U. N. Secretary General position. Not all publicity was positive. For example Rosenthal (1991) was highly critical of Carter's visits to and stance on China. He felt that Carter believed that socialist governments were better equipped to serve their people than democracies.

Carter made news for his work in international affairs later in the year. In September, Li Lin, a Chinese political prisoner was released at Carter's request (Kristof, 1991). Carter monitored elections in Zambia. Frederick Chiluba was elected to replace popular statesman-dictator Kenneth Kamuda (Perlez, 1989a; Perlez, 1989b). Carter noted that after this election on the African continent, "It will be much more difficult for the oppressors to keep their people oppressed…" (Perlez, 1991b, p. A14).

1992

Much like other election years, very little regarding Carter's international work was mentioned in the press. In October, Bill Clinton noted that he would make Carter his Middle East Envoy if elected (Friedman, 1992). Syria also rejected an Israeli peace proposal made during talks that Carter helped to establish between the two nations (Friedman, 1992).

1993

Carter started out 1993 criticizing Clinton for placing Chelsea in a private school in Washington, D.C. An on again, off again feud would continue throughout Clinton's presidency (Stanley, 1993). Carter believed that Clinton was inheriting as many international problems as any president had since Truman (Stanley, 1993).

Carter started a vaccination program for the poor in Atlanta, comparing vaccination and health care in the United States to a third world country ("Carter announces vaccination plan," 1993). Carter also spoke at Rice University's commencement. Carter commented that despite the attention the world was giving Bosnia, it was not the only place in the world where ethnic cleansing was taking place ("Commencement; Carter, at Rice," 1993).

Carter monitored the first free presidential election in Paraguay since 1811 (when the country became independent) in May (Brooke, 1993a; Brooke, 1993b; "Dirty democracy in Paraguay," 1993). The Carter monitoring team walked into a situation that had already been wrought with fraud. This included the way in which the presidential candidate from the ruling Colorado party was chosen (Brooke, 1993a). The Colorado Party, which had been in control since 1948, blocked opposition television signals, cut telephone lines, closed the border, and delayed the vote count for seven hours on election day (Brooke, 1993c). Despite problems, Carter felt the Colorado 7% victory over the opposition party candidate was accurate. He noted that "if the race had come within one or two percentage points, the fraud would have been a significant factor" (Brooke, 1993b, p. A3). Critics of the election process noted that Carter had stopped an election marred by fraud from producing inaccurate results ("Dirty democracy in Paraguay," 1993).

During the rest of the year, Carter made public appearances with the president, brokered deals, and prepared for future action. Carter was shouted down in June during a speech to several human rights groups by anti-United States protesters ("Hecklers stop Carter," 1993). Carter went to the Sudan in August to moderate talks between southern opposition and government forces ("Jimmy Carter goes to Sudan," 1993). Carter met with the Kenyan president as well to discuss ongoing civil wars in Somalia and the Sudan. In October, Carter met with the split southern rebel faction leaders at the Carter Center ("Carter will mediate," 1993). Carter also brokered a deal between General Aidid of Somalia and the United Nations. The United Nations investigated allegations that the Somali general had ambushed United Nations troops (Holmes, 1993; Lewis, 1993). The

United States sought an informal truce in Somalia and an investigation of the United Nations troop attack (Jehl, 1993). Carter accomplished half of those goals.

In September, Carter was invited by Clinton to attend the Israeli-Palestinian peace accord signing at the White House ("At White House", 1993; Friedman, 1993; Holmes, 1993). Yasser Arafat met with several American VIPs including Carter at the Westin Hotel in D.C. upon arriving on September 12 (Bradsher, 1993). While in Washington, Carter pitched NAFTA with President Clinton as well as other famous politicians, once in September and again in November ("Ex-Presidents invited," 1993; Ifill, 1993; "Presidents unified in support," 1993). A *New York Times* editorial praised Carter's statements against NAFTA opponent Ross Perot ("Well spoken, Mr. Carter," 1993).

In October, the Carter Center made initial contact with Haiti. They planned to work with Prime Minister Malval and Dictator General Raul Cedras to settle differences that could possibly lead to future elections (French, 1993). They also discussed the restoration of exiled leader Jean-Bernard Aristide. These initial talks set-up future negotiations. Carter sent a letter to Saddam Hussein in November. It was sent with letters from other politicians requesting that Hussein free an Oklahoma oil man, which he did ("Iraqis Free United States Oilman," 1993). The man had accidentally entered Iraq from Kuwait illegally.

1994

In May, Carter attended the two year anniversary of the Oslo accords. He gave the Carter-Menil award to the Norway Institute of Applied Social Science for hosting fourteen secret meetings between Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres in 1992 (Schmidt, 1994). Carter noted to the press that he was embarrassed by the lack of praise Clinton

gave Norway during the treaty signing in 1993 (Schmidt, 1994). In June, the Emperor of Japan toured the United States, starting with a visit to Plains, GA to see Jimmy Carter (Manegold, 1994).

In June, Carter took the boldest step of his post presidency when he met with Kim Il Sung in North Korea. After the initial meeting between Kim and Carter on June 17, Carter called on the United States to stop sanctions against North Korea. Discussions to stop a potential nuclear program took place (Sanger, 1994a). After the meeting, Kim announced that he would allow UN inspectors to check for nuclear weapon development (Gordon, 1994a; Sanger, 1994a). Carter felt that a potential standoff between the United States and North Korea was "the reason I came over here…" (Sanger, 1994a, p. A10).

South Korea was uncomfortable with Carter's visit to North Korea (Sanger, 1994a). The Clinton Administration seemed to support Carter. They announced that they would negotiate with North Korea if they immediately froze their nuclear weapons program (Gordon, 1994b).

However, a day later the Clinton Administration distanced themselves from Carter after he publicly hugged Kim and called the trip a good omen on national TV (Sanger, 1994b). Carter and Clinton publicly contradicted each other in the press (Sanger, 1994b):

- Carter told Kim the United States would quit pushing for sanctions in the United Nations
- Clinton Administration officials said they had no plans to stop pushing for sanctions.
- Carter said United States officials would engage the Koreans in direct talks.

- Clinton Administration policy would not change unless the North Koreans froze their nuclear program.

Carter stood against sanctions (Sanger, 1994d). His stance made it harder for the United States to push for United Nations sanctions. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who also worked in the State Department during the Carter Administration, was surprised by Carter's comments. Carter was not asked by the White House to comment publicly (Sanger, 1994b). One major accomplishment from the meetings was an agreement by Kim Il Sung to meet with the South Korean government (Sanger, 1994b). Carter met with South Korean president Kim Young Sam on June 19. Kim Young Sam then agreed to set up a meeting with Kim Il Sung (Sanger, 1994e; "The Carter Opening," 1994).

After Carter left North Korea, he criticized the United States' stance in favor of sanctions. Kim Il Sung continued to insist that North Korea was not building nuclear weapons (Sanger, 1994d). Kim Il Sung attempted to enhance his international reputation (Sanger, 1994d, p. 4.5). His ultimate goal was a face-to-face meeting with Clinton. Carter's trip allowed Kim to create the terms for future negotiations (Sanger, 1994e, p. 4.5).

Upon leaving the Korean Peninsula, Carter declared that the North Korean crisis was finished (Gordon, 1994a; Gordon, 1994b; Jehl, 1994b). Carter openly criticized the Clinton Administration. Carter noted that if he had believed sanctions could work, he never would have gone to North Korea (Jehl, 1994b). Carter proclaimed that a disaster would have happened without his visit (Jehl, 1994b, p. A3). Clinton and Administration officials thoroughly distanced themselves from Carter. If talks had failed, the perception would have been that the Carter mission failed (Gordon, 1994a; Jehl, 1994b). The Bush

Administration twice denied Carter a visa for the trip in 1991 (Jehl, 1994b). Carter was first invited by Kim in 1991 (Sciolino, 1994b).

In an interview on NBC, Clinton noted that hopeful signs came from the Carter trip. He backed away from all conditions for talks except a nuclear freeze (Jehl, 1994d). Clinton was committed to restarting talks. The Clinton Administration sent North Korea a formal letter offering to convene talks (Gordon, 1994c; Sciolino, 1994b). Clinton acknowledged that Carter's role had been important (Jehl, 1994e). Clinton noted that Carter's visit "is the beginning of a new stage in our efforts to pursue a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula" ("Finally Talks," 1994, p. 1.22).

Safire (1994, June 27) pointed out that Kim turned down other emissaries, including Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar, to speak with Carter. A *New York Times* editorial ("Finally talks," 1994) countered that Kim's choice of Carter allowed the Clinton Administration to gain a foothold for negotiations with North Korea. Levine, (1994) in a letter to the editor, argued that Clinton should be proud of Carter's trip. Kim Il Sung died in July before negotiations with Clinton could start (Sanger, 1994c). Kim Jong Il later sent a letter to ask Carter to moderate further talks. Carter never responded to the letter (Sterngold, 1994).

In September, Carter was involved in another United States foreign policy crisis when Clinton threatened to invade Haiti. Clinton sent ships and troops toward the Island in an attempt to force the military junta government led by General Raul Cedras to abdicate (Rohter, 1994b). Before invading, Clinton decided a team comprised of Carter, General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn should be sent to negotiate with Cedras (Jehl, 1994h). Critics believed using Carter to negotiate made Clinton look indecisive,

especially considering that Clinton had rejected Carter's request to be a mediator merely one week earlier (Apple, 1994; Jehl, 1994j). Clinton later claimed that he had always intended to send negotiators before war broke out (Jehl, 1994g). *The New York Times* ("Jimmy Carter's Contribution," 1994) was quick to praise Carter noting that he was a useful diplomat and that he deserved to be honored. Administration officials publicly stated that Carter's negotiations were the best remaining chance for peace (Jehl, 1994j).

On September 17, Carter, Powell, and Nunn met with Cedras (Rohter, 1994a). Initially, Carter's group was not welcomed. Aristide supporters were anxious about the United States military presence (Rohter, 1994a). Carter was vital to any negotiations because he had already made contact with Haitian officials (Jehl, 1994g). The Cedras junta government was interested in negotiating only with Carter. Cedras agreed to step down and turn over power to the Aristide Government on October 15. Haitian government officials also decided to allow the American military to occupy the country during the transition period (Jehl, 1994i).

Upon returning home, the Carter group met with Clinton and declared the Haiti mission a success ("Mission to Haiti," 1994; Wines, 1994). Both Carter and Clinton praised each other ("Mission to Haiti," 1994). Despite the glad handling, Carter and Clinton had another public media dispute. They disagreed on whether or not Junta leaders should be exiled (Wines, 1994). Carter noted, in a CNN interview, that, "a serious violation of inherent human rights for a citizen to be forced into exile" (Wines, 1994, p. A1). Carter called Mrs. Cedras a hero (Bragg, 1994; Orenstein, 1994). He even invited General Cedras to teach Sunday school at his church (Orenstein, 1994). Clinton's approval ratings rose during occupation (Kagay, 1994).

Dowd (1994) interviewed Carter and disclosed that he was unhappy with Clinton Administration policies. He felt mistreated by the administration. Carter was unhappy with Secretary of State Warren Christopher. He felt that their dysfunctional relationship caused tensions with the Administration. Carter was concerned by the perception that he was too soft on dictators. He felt that dictators were often vilified by the press and their positions were misunderstood. Carter still thought that the Saddam Hussein Government could be negotiated with. Carter also told a story of visiting the Cedras home and bouncing the general's son on his knee. Later in the week, Carter criticized the State Department for opposing the Haitian negotiations. Carter enraged Administration officials when he said he was ashamed of the economic embargo on Haiti (Sciolino, 1994c).

After Carter's public rant, Christopher and Carter had a friendly personal meeting in Plains, GA. Christopher praised Carter for his accomplishments ("Christopher, Carter," 1994). The meeting seemed to ease tensions for the short term. However, in mid-October, Norman Schwarzkopf postulated that Saddam Hussein was stirring up problems in the Gulf in order to get Carter as a mediator. With Carter, he could negotiate on his own terms like Kim Il Sung had ("Threats in Gulf," 1994). Carter left the Haiti situation both praised and criticized for his efforts.

The next crisis into which Carter inserted himself was the Bosnian civil war. Carter publicly said that he would visit Bosnian Serbs. However, Bosnians had not met initial agreements to allow United Nations convoys and peace keepers into the country (Jehl, 1994c; Sudetic, 1994). Carter serving as a mediator made everyone nervous including United Nations officials, NATO officials, the Clinton Administration, and other

European countries impacted by the conflict (Sciolino, 1994a). Boutros Boutros Ghali felt that sending Carter to the region sent a mixed message (Sciolino, 1994a).

On December 16, Bosnian Serbs opened the Sarajevo airport and allowed the United Nations to enter the country (Cohen, 1994f). Once the Bosnian Serbs had met his terms, Carter agreed to meet with them (Cohen, 1994d, Jehl, 1994a). Carter also met with the Croatians and Serbian governments (Jehl, 1994a). Bosnian Serbs had taken 70% of Bosnia. Carter had no mandate to negotiate any terms besides the 51% Muslim, 49% Serbian split proposed by the United Nations (Cohen, 1994c). The Bosnian Serbs hoped that Carter could change United States policy. He assured them publicly that he had no authority to do so (Cohen, 1994f).

Carter, after meeting with Bosnian Serb President Dr. Karadzic, announced to the media that a cease fire had been brokered (Cohen, 1994g; Jehl, 1994k; Kagan, 1994). It was believed the cease fire was of little value because fighting had been largely stalled by the harsh December winter in the Balkans (Cohen, 1994; Kagan, 1994; Kinzer, 1994). Carter also infuriated Muslim Bosnians with his visit. He commented that, "the American public has heard primarily one side of the story" (Cohen, 1994g, p. A1). The Clinton Administration noted that "positive vibrations" came from the visit. White House press secretary DeDe Myers told the press that if Carter opened doors the trip would be worthwhile (Jehl, 1994l, p. A11).

The treaty was signed by the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims ("A little help," 1994; Cohen, 1994b; Jehl, 1994l). An unnamed official from the Clinton Administration said, "I don't think Carter has pulled anything out of his hat" (Jehl, 1994l, p. A14). The cease fire agreement was the latest of 30 short cease fires (Cohen, 1994b). The United

Nations was concerned that Carter glossed over the human rights concerns they had with the Bosnian Serbs (Cohen, 1994e). Finally, even though fighting had stopped for the short term, Dr. Karadzic was already taking advantage of his international press exposure. He reinterpreted the terms of the Carter agreement ("A Little Help," 1994). In early 1995, Carter would offer to return to Bosnia. After the winter had ended there was no interest in bringing Carter back to negotiate another cease fire ("Carter Willing to Return," 1995)

1995

In February, Carter returned to Haiti to receive an honorary degree (Rohter, 1995b). No government officials met with Carter at the airport. Anti-Carter graffiti was on city walls and buildings. Carter had a brief meeting with President Aristide after finding his own way to his office (Rohter, 1995b). Carter made it clear that he was willing to serve as a mediator to work out election rules (Rohter, 1995a). Haitian government officials were concerned about Carter serving as a mediator. They felt that, after his support for Cedras, he was interested in uniting opposition parties against the Aristide government (Rohter, 1995a).

Concern about Carter's influence increased when Aristide announced that he would not campaign for his own party ("World News Briefs, Ex-Military Leader," 1995). The message was so confusing to Haitians that Pastor (1995), a Carter Center representative, noted that Aristide's decision was his own. It had not been solicited by Carter during their meeting. The Carter Center sent an election monitoring team led by Pastor. He criticized the government for widespread fraud. The Carter Center team felt that the Clinton Administration should not sponsor any further elections conducted by the

Aristide government (Greenhouse, 1995). A member of a Haitian peace-keeping group, in a letter to the editor to *The New York Times,* accused Carter and the Carter Center of undercutting the Aristide government (Driver, 1995). Carter and the Carter Center were unable to help promote election reform and long term peace in Haiti.

Carter continued long term efforts for peace in Africa. In March, General Olysegun Obasanjo was freed by Nigerian officials at Carter's request ("World News Briefs, Ex-Military Leader," 1995). The General was accused of plotting to overthrow Nigerian dictator Obacha. Carter also agreed to convene a conference to discuss refugee problems in Rwanda and Burundi. An ongoing conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups had led to the crisis (Lorch, 1995; "The U.N. at 50; Carter," 1995). There were over 800,000 Hutus in Zaire that fled Rwanda when Tutsis took over the government. Zaire planned to forcibly remove refugees December 31st (Lorch, 1995). Carter met with representatives from Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania, and Uganda and set up an agreement to allow United Nations peace keepers to stay in the area. They created a time table that allowed approximately 1.8 million refugees to return to their own country (Jehl, 1995).

In November, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated. Carter attended his funeral along with George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and other United States dignitaries (Cowell, 1995; Mitchell, 1995).

1996

Carter attended meetings with the countries of east central Africa to attempt to work out a solution to the continuing Hutu-Tutsi war and refugee crisis (Vance & Hamburg, 1996). Carter and Carter Center officials monitored the Dominican Republic

elections in July. Leonel Fernandez Regna, a 42-year-old lawyer from a new centrist party, won ("A New Dominican President," 1996).

Though Carter continued his Carter Center work, Carter and President Clinton's relationship was broken. Brinkley (1996) noted that Carter and Clinton did not get along despite Carter's many accomplishments. Carter was even excluded from the 1996 Democratic National Convention (Brinkley, 1996).

1997

In March, Carter met with Yasser Arafat in Georgia (MacFarquhar, 1997). Carter and the Clinton Administration also took steps to improve their relationship. In May, Madeline Albright met with Clinton (Bennet, 1997). Carter was invited to brief Clinton before a Latin American trip. It was believed that Albright replacing Christopher helped to thaw out the cold relationship between Clinton and Carter (Bennet, 1997).

Carter monitored two elections during the year. The first was in Liberia in July (McNeil Jr., 1997a; McNeil Jr., 1997b). Despite the fact that he had been a dictator since 1989, Charles Taylor won with 64% of the vote. Voter turnout was over 85% (McNeil, Jr., 1997a). Carter also monitored elections in Jamaica in December with General Colin Powell, and Evander Holyfield ("Jamaica Governing Party," 1997; Rohter, 1997).

In August, Carter (1997) wrote an editorial on Chinese progress for *The New York Times* that prompted praise and criticism. Carter made two controversial claims (1) that the Christian Church made great strides in China and (2) that Chinese leaders had been promoting significant democratic reforms (Carter, 1997, p. 4.15). Rosenthal (1997) and Bauer and Shea (1997) believed that China was much tougher on Christians than Carter

led the public to believe. Chen (1997) felt that China's consistent crackdowns on pro-democracy groups proved Carter's statement wrong.

1998

Carter (1998), in a letter to the editor in *The New York Times*, argued that a United Nations war crimes court is something that United States citizens and soldiers should not fear. Carter wanted the United States to embrace the court and acknowledge its jurisdiction. Carter urged an inquiry into Clinton's bombing of a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant. It was originally purported to be a factory for developing chemical weapons linked to Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda ("Carter Urges Inquiry," 1998). In October, Carter visited a Chinese gymnast who was paralyzed in a fall during the Goodwill Games (Litsky, 1998). Carter was awarded a United Nations human rights award in December. He received the award for his work around the world but did not attend the ceremony. He was occupied monitoring the election in Venezuela (Crossette, 1998).

1999

On March 30, Carter was notified by the Clinton Administration of impending air strikes in Bosnia (Seelye, 1999). Carter (1999) wrote a scathing editorial criticizing United States unilateral action. He argued that the problems could only be solved through cooperation with groups like the United Nations. Carter opposed using a United Nations War Crimes Tribunal to try Serbian leaders (Ferencz, 1999). Despite his continued criticism of United States action, Clinton awarded Carter and his wife the Presidential Medal of Freedom in August (Henneberger, 1999).

In December, Carter was chosen to hand over the Panama Canal (Clymer, 1999b; Clymer, 1999a; Gonzalez, 1999a; Gonzalez, 1999b). Carter was asked after Clinton, Gore, and Albright all declined attend (Clymer, 1999b). The Panamanian foreign minister believed that sending Carter showed a lack of respect for the region. Panamanian president Mirega Moscoso tried to save face by noting that she was pleased to welcome Carter (Gonzalez, 1999a). Carter served as the United States representative signing a document that stated the United States intended to honor the treaty to hand over the canal (Clymer, 1999a; Gonzales, 1999a). Maushard (1999) believed that Carter's presence in Panama was a reminder of the major accomplishment Carter had achieved during his presidency. The Canal was officially turned over on January 1, 2000. The Panamanians shouted "the Canal is ours!" ("To Cheers, Panama," 2000, A17).

2000

In February, the Carter Center criticized Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori for not taking proper steps to ensure fair and fraud-free elections ("Carter Center Criticizes Peru's," 2000). At the end of the Elian Gonzalez debacle in April, Carter and Ford both publicly stated that decency demanded that the young Cuban should have been returned to his father sooner ("A Cuban Father," 2000). In May, Carter, Ford, Gore and Clinton joined forces to lobby for the passage of a bill which would normalize relations with China (Schmitt, 2000; Seelye, 2000). Carter felt that "there is no doubt in my mind that a negative vote on this issue in the congress will be a serious setback and impediment to the further democratization, freedom, and human rights in China" (Schmitt, 2000, p. A14).

During the second half of the year, Carter observed what he called the most fraud-free election in the world in Mexico (Fuentes-Berain, 2000). Carter's absence from Israeli-Palestinian peace talks was noticed in letters to the editor (Berger, 2000; Escobales Jr., 2000). Carter was invited back to the Democratic National Convention. Observers noted that his relationship with Gore was much better than his relationship with Clinton (Weinraub & Bumiller, 2000). Carter demanded, in September, that Australian Prime Minister John Howard should acknowledge a United Nations human rights monitoring report (Carter, 2000). Prime Minister Howard believed that the United Nations had no right to interfere in Australian domestic affairs. Finally, in October, Carter attended the funeral for Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (Onishi, 2000).

2001

Clinton, upon leaving office, expressed a desire to emulate Carter's post-presidential model (Dowd, 2001). In March, Carter (2001a) criticized the Canadian government for unfairly subsidizing the timber industry. Canadian officials responded quickly. Ambassador to the United States Kergin (2001) argued that Carter's facts were inaccurate. The Canadian government did not subsidize the timber industry. Canadian Minister of Natural Resources Snoebelen (2001) argued that any trade off for public land ownership was compensated for in the cost that went to enforcing far tougher Canadian environmental standards.

In July, Carter told the press that he was disappointed with everything that George W. Bush was doing. Specifically, Bush was not demanding the removal of Israeli settlements from the West Bank (Sack, 2001). Later in the month, Carter and Ford recommended that the United States election system be completely overhauled (Seelye,

2001). Carter visited Bangladesh on August 3rd to help them prepare for elections (Bearak, 2001). After 9/11, Carter and Ford both pledged their support to George W. Bush (Berke, 2001). In November, Carter monitored an election in Nicaragua. Enrique Balkans defeated Daniel Ortega (Gonzalez, 2001).

2002

Carter was back in the headlines again in March. The Bush Administration considered a request to allow Carter to visit Cuba (Marquis, 2002a). Carter was invited by Castro to visit Cuba at Pierre Trudeau's funeral in 2001 (Marquis, 2002a; Marquis, 2002c). Bush approved the Carter trip in early April. Carter was allowed to bring a small delegation (Marquis, 2002c). A group called Project Varela led a successful campaign to get some electoral reform on the ballot in Cuba. They hoped that a Carter visit would bolster their efforts (Gonzalez, 2002h; Gonzalez, 2002d; Gonzalez, 2002g).

Castro appeared to be making an end run around the Bush Administration by inviting Carter. He criticized the Cuban embargo (Marquis, 2002c). At the bare minimum, Castro's image would be enhanced by appearing with Carter (Gonzales, 2002a). Bush wanted Carter to push for democratic reform. He had the State Department brief Carter before his visit (Gonzalez, 2002h; Marquis, 2002a). Carter, however, maintained that he was visiting as a private citizen pushing no one's agenda (Gonzales, 2002a).

Carter arrived in Cuba on May 12 and immediately found himself in a sticky situation (Gonzalez, 2002e). Future United Nations Ambassador John Bolton had previously accused Castro of developing biological weapons (Gonzalez, 2002b). Carter let it be known that he wanted to inspect the weapons facility (Gonzalez, 2002e). After

inspecting the facility, Carter made it clear that he believed that Cubans were not producing biological weapons (Gonzalez, 2002b). Carter stated that the Administration had never mentioned that Cuba had manufactured biological weapons (Gonzalez, 2002b).

Castro was quick to praise Carter for his human rights efforts around the world (Gonzalez, 2002e). Carter spoke at Havana University. The address was broadcast on Cuban television and printed in the state paper without any edits (Gonzalez, 2002a; Gonzalez, 2002j). In the speech, Carter called for an end to the United States embargo. He chastised Castro for maintaining a one party government. He also noted that the United States had problems as well, such as the lack of health care for the poor (Gonzalez, 2002a).

Even though Carter openly chastised the Castro government, Castro allowed Carter to speak with members of the anti-government group Project Varela (Gonzalez, 2002f; Gonzales, 2002j). Carter spoke out against United States support for opposition parties (Gonzales, 2002c). At the same time, Carter was visiting Cuba, Bush spoke to a group in Miami at a fundraiser. Bush was against ending the embargo (Marquis, 2002b). On May 21, Carter went to the White House to discuss the trip with Bush ("President and Carter," 2002).

In November, the Nobel Committee announced that Carter would receive the Nobel Peace Prize (Gettleman, 2002; "Nobel Achievements," 2002; Riding, 2002; "The Nobel Award," 2002). The Committee gave him the Award because "Carter has stood by the principles that conflicts must as far as possible be resolved through mediation and international cooperation based on international law, respect for human rights and economic development" ("The Nobel Award," 2002). The selection of Carter was

controversial. When he accepted the Award, he took jabs at Bush's Iraq policy (Bruni, 2002b). Berge, the chair of the prize Committee, told the press that the choice of Carter was a public statement against the Bush Iraq policy (Bruni, 2002a).

Carter (2002c), after gaining publicity from the Nobel announcement, wrote an editorial that criticized the Bush Administration policy toward North Korea. Carter (2002c) felt that Bush's lack of engagement was hurting the relationship with the country and encouraging them to develop weapons. Carter (2002c) also believed that the framework for engagement had been set-up in 1994. Grandsen, (2002) in a letter to the editor, argued that Carter ignored options like deterrence. Kim Jong Il was quick to take advantage of Carter's public statement. He let the world know that his nuclear program was open to inspection and negotiation (Shenon, 2002).

2003

In January, Carter revisited the North Korean issue (Shenon, 2003). Carter believed that the North Koreans had a sincere desire to normalize relations with the United States (Shenon, 2003). Carter offered his services as a negotiator (Shenon, 2003). In September, Carter spoke in Tokyo labeling the North Korean nuclear standoff the world's greatest threat (Brooke, 2003). Carter made it clear that he had no intention of making a repeat trip to North Korea (Brooke, 2003). Chae (2003) believed that Kim Jong Il wanted no negotiations and needed an outside threat to cement his power base.

Later in the month, Carter turned his efforts to Venezuela. He attempted to settle a dispute between the Hugo Chavez government and striking opposition party workers ("Shooting Kills One," 2003; Thompson, 2003). Carter offered two proposed solutions to end the strike. One was a constitutional amendment to shorten the presidential term so a

new presidential election could be held. The second was a recall vote that allowed the people of Venezuela to decide on whether or not they wanted Chavez to stay in office (Thompson, 2003). Both a *New York Times* editorial ("Preserving Democracy in Venezuela," 2003) and Colin Powell (Dao & Forero, 2003) believed that the Venezuelan's best chance for peace was choosing one of Carter's proposals. The recall proposal was chosen by the Venezuelans (Forero, 2003, January 30). Voting was not to take place until August 2004.

2004

In August, the Carter Center and the Organization of American States monitored the recall election in Venezuela in August (Forero, 2004a). Carter certified the election results. The Bush Administration accepted the fact that Chavez had won (Forero, 2004a). After demanding an audit of the vote, the opposition said that corruption was so bad that the audit would not solve problems (Forero, 2004b). Carter and the OAS planned to continue with the audit. They argued that any major irregularities would be found; none were (Forero, 2004b).

During the year, Carter observed two other elections. In July, Carter monitored elections in Indonesia. He was satisfied that they had been fair ("Carter, in Jakarta," 2004). In December, Carter observed elections in Mozambique. He said that the surprising win by the governing party had happened in a fair and transparent election (Wines, 2004). Lastly, in an editorial, the day after Yasser Arafat's death, Carter (2004) postulated that the Israelis would impose their will on the Palestinian people. He believed the Palestinians would not have a strong leader.

2005

In 2005, not much was covered about Carter's international work. Carter monitored the Palestinian elections in January (Myre, 2005). Israel communicated through Carter and the Carter Center. They agreed not to interfere with the elections as long as there was peace (Myre, 2005). Abbas was elected the Palestinian leader.

2006

Carter spent a lot of time on his book *Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid* (2006). The book was controversial. In the book, Carter claimed that the Israeli Government stifled debate about the Israel-Palestine issue in the United States media, committed human rights violations, and only released pro-Israeli news (Bosman, 2006a). Carter met with a group of Rabbis while visiting Arizona. The rabbis proclaimed that the meeting was not conciliatory (Bosman, 2006a; Kleinberg, 2006).

Not everyone was critical of Carter, Glazer (2006) and Roy (2006) both felt that Carter's criticisms were fair. Carter was not acting in an anti-Semitic way. Despite some individual's praise of the book as being fair, controversy continued to surround the book.

Carter felt the need to defend the book in a 1000-word letter addressed to the Jewish community (Bosman, 2006b). Kenneth Stein, a Carter Center adviser, resigned saying that the book was full of factual errors and copied material (Bosman, 2006a). Fourteen members of the Carter Center advisory board resigned in January 2007 (Belluck, 2007; Carter, 2007b; Goodman, 2007). Book reviews criticized the book (Bronner, 2007). The Anti-Defamation League ran advertisements criticizing Carter and the book (Goodman, 2007). The purpose of the ads was to criticize Carter for adding to conspiracy theories and myths that paint Jews in a bad light (Foxman, 2007).

2007

In addition to dealing with the book, Carter also had the unhappy occasion of attending the funeral of Gerald Ford. Ford had teamed up with Carter publicly on several occasions after his presidency (Kornblut & Broder, 2007). In February, Carter visited Africa on a four country tour. He coordinated efforts for his Guinea worm eradication project (Kristof, 2007b; Kristof, 2007a). Carter also took a shot at Bush, noting that he was winning his wars (Kristof, 2007a).

In May, Carter took more shots at Bush, calling him "the worst President in history ("Carter Criticizes Bush," 2007). Carter also postulated that Bush had reversed American values. He said Bush was making pre-emptive war a United States foreign policy norm. He accused Tony Blair of being subservient to Bush ("Carter Criticized Bush," 2007).

Carter's outbursts prompted comments in the press on Carter's presidency about the way he alienated everyone (Moyar, 2007). Carter took back his comments about the administration on *The Today Show* (Leibovich, 2007). He said that they were "careless and misinterpreted" (Leibovich, 2007, p. A15). Carter also toured the United States in October. He promoted a new book that discussed his peace and anti-disease efforts (Cohen, 2007).

2008

Carter resumed international activities in April of 2008. He was responding to a crisis in the Gaza Strip where over 20 Palestinians and Israelis were killed when fighting erupted (Kershner & El-Kodary, 2008). Carter agreed to meet with members of Hamas in the Gaza Strip to attempt to negotiate an end to the violence (Kershner, 2008a). Carter

met with Hamas despite protest from Israeli government officials and the Bush administration (Worth, 2008). During two meetings, one in Cairo and one in Damascus on April 18th and 19th, Carter requested that Hamas and the Palestinians halt rocket attacks on Israel (Kershner, 2008b; Worth 2008).

Carter also attempted to use the meetings to open a dialogue for long term peace. Carter felt that he made progress in the meetings getting Hamas to acknowledge a two state solution (Bronner, 2008a). Despite opposition from Israel and the United States, Carter stated that "the problem is not that I met with Hamas in Syria. The problem is that Israel and the United States refuse to meet these people" (Bronner, 2008a, p. A12). The Bush Administration continued to criticize Carter over the next week, prompting Carter to tell the media that the Bush Administration had never counseled him not to meet with Hamas.

Carter (2008b) authored a scathing editorial entitled "Pariah Diplomacy" that was published in *The New York Times*. Carter (2008, p. A23) stated that, "A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE (sic.) Washington policy in recent years has been to boycott and punish political factions or governments that refuse to accept United States mandates. This policy makes difficult the possibility that such leaders moderate their policies" (p. A23). Carter cited Washington's inability to negotiate with Maoists in Nepal and Hamas as examples of bad policy that did not promote peace. Despite the criticism of the administration, Bush was not willing to criticize Carter. However, Bush did continue to criticize Hamas, complaining that they were an obstacle to Middle East peace (Myers, 2008).

In May, Carter issued a strange comment that did not fit with his normal promotion of human rights policies. Carter was asked at a news conference on May 26th in Wales, "how a future president should deal with the Iranian nuclear threat" ("Israel: Carter offers details", 2008, p. A8). Carter, while listing the nuclear capabilities of several nations, said that Israel had around 150 nuclear weapons. This was a departure from a long standing policy of both Israel and the United States not to publicly admit the existence of an Israeli nuclear arsenal.

In June, Carter was successful in a long term project. A letter was released by Hamas leader, Khaled Mashal, from Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit to his family (Kershner, 2008c). Carter was also recognized for the significant role he played in changing the image of Hamas from a terrorist organization to a legitimate party in Palestine (Bronner, 2008c).

In November, Carter attempted to make a trip to Zimbabwe with Kofi Annan and other dignitaries to assess the living conditions of the populace and the viability of the power-sharing government. Despite being told by an envoy in Washington, D.C. that he would not be granted a visa, he and the group went to Zimbabwe anyway, expecting a visa to be issued at the airport in Johannesburg, South Africa (Dugger, 2008a). However, Carter and the group were denied entry into Zimbabwe by President Robert Mugabe. A *New York Times* editorial noted that Mugabe had a long term contempt for international opinion and that had led to his decision to deny Carter entry ("Has South Africa", 2008). Carter was critical of Mugabe's decision to reject help arguing that, "…the situation in Zimbabwe 'may implode or collapse altogether.'" (Dugger, 2008b, p. A8).

2009

Carter returned to the Gaza Strip to meet with the Hamas government in June. Carter held a joint press conference on June 16, 2009 (El-Khodary & Kershner, 2009). Carter once again continued to emphasize the idea that he was in Gaza as a private citizen, but following a presidential change in the United States, he would write reports to the Obama administration about his experience. Carter also expressed displeasure with the bombing and economic strife in the Gaza Strip. Carter continued to express his desire for the Hamas government to be recognized by Israel so the process for peace could be restarted.

Carter attended two funerals in August and September. The first was for Ted Kennedy at the end of August (Barry, 2009). While Kennedy and Carter were not close, Carter attended the funeral with Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. In mid-September, one of Carter's closest friends and former press secretary Jody Powell died (Stout, 2009). Carter released a statement saying, "Jody was beside me in every decision I made as a candidate, governor and president, and I could always depend on his advice and counsel being candid and direct, I will miss him dearly" (Stout, 2009, p. B17). While Kennedy was a noted critic of Carter, Powell was one of his greatest supporters.

In December, Carter apologized for any comments that might have upset Jews within his 2006 book *Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid* ("Carter apologizes to Jews", 2009). Carter offered a prayer on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement. In a letter sent to the Jewish wire service, JTA, Carter stated, "We must not permit criticisms for improvements to stigmatize Israel" ("Carter apologizes to Jews, 2009, p. A13). Carter ended the decade continuing to fight for one of major life goals, Middle East peace.

APPENDIX B

LIST OF HUMAN RIGHTS SPEECHES BETWEEN 2000-2009

Speech	Title	Date	Location
1	President Carter's Speech at the International Symposium on Villager Self-Government and the Development of Rural Society in China	9/3/2001	Beijing, China
2	The United States and China A President's Perspective	5/6/2002	Stanford University
3	Remarks by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter at the University of Havana, Cuba	5/14/2002	Havana, Cuba
4	2002 Nobel Peace Lecture: The Complete Text	12/10/2002	Oslo, Norway
5	President Carter's Remarks to Georgia State Legislature	4/8/2003	Atlanta, GA
6	President Carter Delivers Speech to Beijing (Peking) University	9/9/2003	Beijing, China
7	Camp David Accords: Jimmy Carter Reflects 25 Years Later	9/17/2003	Washington, DC
8	Geneva Initiative Public Commitment Event: Remarks by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter	9/1/2003	Atlanta, GA
9	Speech to the Joint Session of Congress of Bolivia by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter	12/18/2003	La Paz, Bolivia
10	President Carter Delivers Keynote Speech to OAS Lecture Series of the Americas	1/25/2005	Washington, DC
11	Remarks on Middle East Peace By Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter	1/23/2006	Israel
12	Jimmy Carter on Middle East Peace: Council on Foreign Relations Speech Calls for Renewed Commitment to Justice for Palestinians, Israelis	3/2/2006	New York, NY

13	Opening Remarks by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to the 2006 Human Rights Defenders Policy Forum	5/23/2006	Atlanta, GA
14	Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter's Remarks at the Funeral Service for President Gerald R. Ford	1/3/2007	Grand Rapids, MI
15	Remarks by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter at Brandeis University	1/23/2007	Waltham, MA
16	Human Rights Speech	6/19/2007	Dublin, Ireland
17	Peace With Justice in the Middle East	6/21/2007	Oxford, United Kingdom
18	Jimmy Carter Receives First Albert Schweitzer Humanitarian Award	9/26/2007	Hamden, CT
19	Former U.S. President and Carter Center Co-Founder Jimmy Carter's Address to Nepal's Parliament	11/23/2007	Katmandu, Nepal
20	Remarks by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter: 2008 Skoll World Forum Awards Ceremony	3/27/2008	Oxford, United Kingdom
21	Remarks by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter at the LixXiannian Library in Hong'an, China	1/14/2009	Hong'an, China
22	New Beginnings: Living Together in the 21st Century Remarks by Jimmy Carter at FLACSO University, Quito Ecuador	4/29/2009	Quito, Exuador
23	Speech to the United Nations Relief Works Agency's Human Rights Graduation in Gaza	6/16/2009	Gaza Strip, Palestine
24	Address by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter: Mahatma Gandhi Global Nonviolence Award	9/21/2009	Harrisonburg, VA
25	Speech by Jimmy Carter to the Parliament of the World's Religions	12/3/2009	Melbourne, Australia / from Atlanta, GA

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