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Driving Demands of a Successful Protest: A Comparative Analysis of Drivers That Leads To a Successful Outcome of Protest

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DRIVING DEMANDS OF A SUCCESSFUL PROTEST: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DRIVERS THAT LEADS TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF PROTEST

by

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ABSTRACT

The 2020 Global Peace Index found that there has been a drastic increase of civil unrest incidents worldwide since 2011. According to the Index, there were 282% more riot cases and 821% more general strikes across the world, with Europe having the most riots, protests, and strikes. Extant literature suggests that protest is a web of interconnected demands that sends a weak signal to policymakers or the intended target. I examine some of the drivers of protest that are likely to impact the chances of protesters demands being met either in part or in full. I further analyze how each of those variables produce the same or similar outcomes in Africa and across the world in general. Using the Global Protest Tracker dataset, I hand code nine variables of 435 individual protest incidents from 132 countries. Using the probit regression model to analyze the data, I find that the duration of protest is significant in determining the success or failure of protesters demands being met both in Africa and the world at large. Other variables, such as violent government response or corruption motivated, protest is significant in determining the outcome of protests in Africa and the world at large. A rather unexpected finding of my study is that the number of participants during a protest insignificantly affects the outcome of the protest.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to Dr. Kofi Takyi Asante who is my mentor, friend and boss. Kofi has held me up since I conceived the idea to pursue further studies and has consciously and rigorously trained me for this feat. Your support is invaluable!

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPT	Global Protest Tracker
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

The 2020 Global Peace Index reports that since 2011, there has been a tremendous increase in civil unrest events worldwide. The Index found that the riots case count increased by 282% while general strikes saw an increase of 821% with Europe recording the highest riots, protests, and strikes. The report also revealed that over 96 countries in 2019 experienced at least one violent demonstration. Sub-Saharan Africa also saw a significant rise of over 800% in riots and protests as of 2018 (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020). However, the characteristics of individual protest and its associated outcomes have mainly been studied across developed countries (Butcher & Pinckney, 2022). As a result, there is the need to study the various dynamics of protest in developing countries both democratic and autocratic. Therefore, I centralize my study comparing the outcomes of protest in the global context and in Africa (developing countries).

This paper specifically examines some variables that are likely to impact the chances of protesters demands being met or not. These variables are democracy (freedom rating), number of protesters, economic motivation, political motivation, corruption motivation, violent government response, coronavirus related protests, duration, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It further analyzes how each of these variables produce the same or similar outcomes across Africa and that of the world. Using data generated from the Global Protest Tracker (GPT), I address these questions. This dataset is good for measuring the signal strength of protests and to ascertain which of the selected variables significantly affects the outcomes of protest.

Using the probit regression model to analyze my data, the results show some of the main driving factors of successful outcomes of protest which broadly includes the duration of protest, corruption motivated protest, violent government response towards protesters, and economic motivated protest.

The results show that the duration of protest in the context of world protest and Africa are significant in determining the outcome of protests. However, protests that lasted more than 29 days in Africa had government conceding to their demands either in full or in part while those that lasted less than 30 days across the world in general had government concessions.

While corruption motivated protest usually yields a successful outcome in the world context, its rather the opposite in Africa - corruption motivated protest usually fail in meeting the demands of the protesters. However, in Africa, violent government response towards protesters has a negative impact on protesters demands being met.

The dataset could not measure the medium to long term impact on the success or failure of protest, however, in the short term, economically motivated protests seem to be less successful.

What is civil unrest?

In an *Empirical Assessment of Social Unrest Dynamics and State Response in Eurasian Countries*, Cadenas-Santiago and colleagues (2015) found that the dynamics of social unrest have not largely been studied. In the same vein, Butcher & Pinckney (2022) found that studies linking individual characteristics of protest to the outcomes of such protest have largely been studied in Western democracies, especially in the US. Because

of the individual dynamics of each country, it would be inaccurate to assume that the nature of protest in the US will translate into other democratic or authoritarian systems.

Badiora (2017) suggests that while civil unrest is usually characterized by a form of protest against substantial economic or socio-political problems in a country, it could also be ethnicity related problems. The author defines 'civil unrest' as a disorder caused by an individual or a group of persons, as suggested by law enforcement units. This disorder usually disrupts activities or societies for a while, especially the ones that turn out violent. Coburn et al. (2013) defines 'social unrest' as some group of the populace who dissent from established authorities. From this definition, we could see that there is a thin line between civil unrest and social unrest. Both phrases express dissatisfaction against authority and the mobilization of individuals or groups to express their discontent; I use them interchangeably in this paper.

Protests, sit-ins, parades, strikes, demonstrations, riots, and many other ways used to express dissatisfaction are forms of civil unrest and they are mainly driven by poor economic conditions, government policies, unfairness or inequalities, infringement of rights, etc. (Coburn et al., n.d.). Seattle (2014) asserts that social unrest could be either peaceful or violent, highly planned or spontaneous, legal or illegal, and principled or criminal. The focus of the paper is on civil unrest activities, mainly protests that have the potential to significantly affect national-level decision-making. Most of these protests are characterized by a large number of participants and usually last beyond a day or two. Tarrow (1991) defined protests as a "disruptive collective action that is aimed at institutions, elites, authorities, or other groups on behalf of the collective goals of the actors or of those they claim to represent" (p. 11). Protest or dissent could be violent or

non-violent in nature and could escalate into armed insurrection. Civil unrest can evolve into a civil war depending on the rate of escalation and likely lead to a spillover into the neighboring countries which has the potential of causing regional instability (Coburn et al., n.d.).

Unrests are not always violent but those that occurred in African countries often have an element of violence (Annan, 2014). The Arab Spring uprising in the Northern Africa is a clear example. According to Annan (2014), countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Liberia were plagued with civil strife and conflicts which were characterized by violence and mass murder. Such events have been on a decline, however, in recent years, coups d'état in Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso as well as insurgencies in Nigeria, Mauritania, Niger, and other African countries indicates a potential increase of internal and regional unrest in the continent.

In this paper, I compare protests that occurred across the world with those that occurred within Africa from 2017 through January 10, 2023. I specifically examine the leading variables that impact the outcome of protests.

CHAPTER II - LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I review existing literature on protest. First, I examine the impact of protest within democratic and authoritarian regimes. I study the nature of demands that usually lead to protests. Finally, I examine the number of participants during protests and its impact.

Forms of Governance: Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes

Civil unrest has escalated in many different circumstances in recent times regardless of whether the country is democratic or non-democratic. Beaujouan et al. (2020) assert that long-established democratic countries like the United States, France, Spain, Chile, and the Netherlands have experienced social unrest in recent years. Likewise, autocratic states or states that are struggling with democracy have also experienced various forms of social unrest, for example, in Mali, Lebanon, Hong Kong, Iraq, and Iran. Carothers & Youngs (2015) show that the highest number of unrest incidents occur in countries with higher income. For the Middle East and North Africa, the number of unrests fluctuated with the highest spike in 2011, coinciding with the Arab Spring.

Coburn et al. (2013) suggest that civil unrest can evolve into a full-scaled insurrection that can lead to an overthrow of a regime, especially in non-democracies. For democratic states, due to some democratic structures, civil unrest can be contained by organizing plebiscites that ensure governments rule by the will of the majority. Civil unrest, however, persists if the disenfranchised perceives that their concern cannot be addressed by the existing political structure. Coburn and colleagues (2013) assert that deprivation and inequality are strong drivers of civil unrest. The 2020 Global Peace Index

found that the only type of regime that recorded a fall in social unrest within the past decade is the authoritarian regime (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020). Between 2010 and 2019, flawed democracies and hybrid regimes recorded the most incidence of unrest with flawed democracies seeing an increase in cases. They also recorded the highest spike of violence with riots encompassing about 37% of unrest within the hybrid systems. These unrests include strike actions, riots, protests, and nonviolent anti-government demonstrations. It is important to mention that demonstrations that occurred within flawed democracies increased tenfold within the stipulated timeframe. The report revealed that with hybrid regimes, unrest almost quadrupled while almost doubled in full democracies. However, with authoritarian regimes, civil unrest declined by 30% from 2011 through 2018 (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020).

Government response: Violent and non-violent

Nonviolent conflict is likely to escalate to violent unrest if the demands of the aggrieved are not met or the aggrieved parties perceive that their interests are being threatened (Dibie & Dibie, 2017). The violent unrest may take the form of violent conflict, political instability, civil war, hostility, and civil strife. Not only does violent unrest result from the escalation of nonviolent unrest, Dibie & Dibie (2017) suggests that the disagreement over significant issues between the aggrieved (citizens) and the target group (government) can result in violent unrest or conflict.

In assessing the impact of both violent and non-violent unrest, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) found that significant nonviolent unrest/campaigns achieved 53% success while violent unrest achieved 26% success. The authors posit that a nonviolent approach enhances domestic and world-wide legitimacy while promoting wide-reaching

participation in the movement. This finding heightens the pressure being unleashed on the target, here, the government. Due to the nonviolent nature of the unrest, it generates greater internal and external support for the aggrieved group which coerces governments to meet their demands. Thus, protesters are seen as vulnerable and less extreme who are then supported by external and internal actors, thereby boosting the likelihood of their government conceding to their demands through bargaining (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).

The threat of civil unrest has been escalated by the evolution of social media and technology. Cadenas-Santiago et al. (2015) reveals that the presence of social media enables unrest to be triggered suddenly and in a more coordinated way across different locations spontaneously. However, this paper does not focus on the impact of social media on civil unrest. Instead, I focus only on protests that are not mainly driven by social media.

Demands of protesters

Civil unrest is a significant determinant of economic outcomes and development in general. Studies show that weakness or state failure which results in social unrest can lead to economic and social development impediment (Deininger, 2003; Solimano, 2005). This is because, beyond formal institutions, social unrest plays a significant role in determining economic and governance outcomes. Andrés Solimano (2005) suggests that social unrest can evolve when a group of the population fight over their shares of the national income and this has an effect on the economic outcomes, hence, development. It is important to note that the allocation of economic resources is not the only factor for underdevelopment nor is it the only factor for social unrest, but dysfunctional institutions,

unstable political atmosphere, and highly segregated social structures are contributing factors (Solimano, 2005). From extant literature, Solimano (2005) notes that countries with more wealth and income inequalities are more prone to political instability and social unrest as compared to a more egalitarian society.

Causes of civil unrest

According to Gillion (2012), scholars assert that protesting is a potent political instrument for people to engage with authorities. This political tool is particularly utilized by disenfranchised groups that find it challenging to acquire support through traditional political routes. Carothers & Youngs (2015) assert that events of social unrest are usually "large-scale gatherings of citizens who are determined to challenge fundamental policies or structures of power." This does not result in a vacuum. According to Tanner (2005), there are many grievances that cause demonstrators to hit the streets, and these have been attested to by many people. The author continues to assert that most of these unrests that take the form of protests are a result of political policies, and economic and social problems that most countries are not likely to be able to resolve either presently or in the foreseeable future. Beaujouan and colleagues (2020) suggest that civil unrest occurring in different settings does not have a uniform cause or response although it appears to be a current global phenomenon. In the next sub-section, I review existing literature on the causes of civil unrest.

Economic factors

Extant literature suggests that protests are largely driven by economic issues such as Ghana's '#Fix Country Protest' in 2021, Egypt's 'Friday of Anger protests' in 2020, Kenya's 'Njaa (hunger) Revolution protests', etc. (Beaujouan et al., 2020; Carothers &

Youngs, 2015; Deininger, 2003; Tanner, 2005). In Beijing for instance, Tanner (2005) explains that police officials mentioned that inequality as an economic condition is the major cause of unrest within the province. The police officers further shared that social unrest spikes whenever there is an economic downturn. Inequality arises when there is a disproportionate influence of a class of people against other groups in a society or excluding certain social groups. The affected groups usually include low-income earners such as poor farmers, the underemployed and unemployed, middle class, etc. The worsening living conditions of the affected groups mainly drive social unrest (ACAPS, 2021).

There are instances where groups unable to purchase basic necessities including food have led to unrest (Weinberg & Bakker, 2015). Examples are a double increase in the prices of maize in Zambia in 1986 (Bratton & van de Walle, 1992), and the Yemeni Rial depreciation which resulted in an increase in commodity prices (ACAPS, 2021). In general, anything that is likely to affect the well-being of people is likely to attract unrest from the affected groups. ACAPS (2021) assessment of Yemen reveals that the lack of basic social amenities that affect the citizens' welfare and better services is central to protests in the country. Still, on the well-being of citizens, accumulated arrears in salaries of public sector workers in Cotonou in Benin caused a huge strike action in 1989 (Bratton & van de Walle, 1992a).

Government austerity measures in terms of increase in taxes and welfare cuts can also lead to civil unrest. Coburn et al (2013) assert that since 2008, high income countries have been experiencing protests in relation to austerity measures, especially within Europe. Carothers & Youngs (2015) asserts that corruption is a major driver of protests

regardless of whether the country is a democratic, authoritarian, or hybrid form of governance. It is important to note that corruption has both an element of economic and political triggers of social unrest. They further reveal that protests triggered by a corruption scandal usually start with an exposé of the corrupt activities of a politician and then escalate to the entire governing body. They also assert that public anger against corruption worldwide within the past twenty years is on the rise (Carothers & Youngs, 2015). This is a reflection of a growing trend of public anger against the abuse of incumbency.

The spike in social unrest regardless of the economic state of a country suggests that unrest is not fueled by economic conditions alone. In the next sub-section, I briefly examine the political factors that causes civil unrest.

Political Factors

Some drivers of social unrest are purely political. Carothers & Youngs (2015) lists an unconstitutional extension of a presidential term and rigged election as political fuel for social unrest. The authors emphasize that social unrest in semi-authoritarian regimes is largely caused by political factors. These protests although may not be entirely political, there are underlying economic factors that are secondary drivers of social unrest in both authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Carothers & Youngs (2015) further found that in democratic regimes, social unrests usually start with economic drivers and later evolves into political drivers which are engrained governance problems. For instance, the Brazilian protests in 2015 were triggered by corruption in the oil sector which later evolved into widespread resentment towards the political elite. In early 2012, there was

widespread unrest in Nigeria which was socioeconomically driven but later evolved into political concerns (Carothers & Youngs, 2015).

The repression of citizens' freedoms and rights can also fuel unrest within a country. According to Coburn et al (2013), the 1960s US civil rights campaign which escalated into civil disorder is an example of repression leading to civil unrest. The authors citing Gary Fuller and Forrest R. Pitts maintain that a country's degree of political unrest is analogous to its youthful population, that is from 15-24 years. The authors claim that countries with its population constituting more than 20% of this age group have the highest risk of encountering political instability leading to social unrest. The authors arrived at this conclusion when they analyzed a series of protests that occurred in South Korea (1980, 1985, and 1990), Egypt, Syria, and Libya in 2011 (Arab spring) and many others.

There is also the angle of police brutality inciting social unrest. In the US for example, the Guardian (2020) asserts that social unrest about police brutality is met with police brutality. Coburn et al. (2013) cites other examples of police brutality leading to social unrest and these include the shooting of Mark Duggan in London which led to severe riots in 2011; the supposed police harassment in France in 2005; and the assault of Rodney King in Los Angeles in 1992. Another dimension to police brutality unrest is that, during protests and riots, police actions (brutality) can escalate civic activism or unrest. Sometimes as a strategy to quell unrest, police brutality rather ends up prolonging and escalating the unrest (Coburn et al., n.d.).

In a study of Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa, Bratton & van de Walle (1992) found that students played a vital role in social unrest in the early 1990s,

especially in Africa. In 1990 for instance, students in Gabon were faced with poor study facilities and teacher shortages, which led to massive strike action by the students. Still, in 1990, the first significant protest in Cote D'Ivoire occurred when electrical power was cut before the mid-term examination of the students. Elite corruption in Zimbabwe caused the students to protest against the government in 1989. Kenyan students also protested against the overcrowding nature of their educational facilities as well as rising unemployment rates in 1990 (Bratton & van de Walle, 1992).

Nature of Demands

Citizens often use protest as a political tactic in airing their views (Gillion, 2012). Studying protest is therefore a science which measures public sentiment pertaining to certain issues. According to Fisher and colleagues (2019), while public opinion reports show the peoples' support of an idea or a candidate, protest operates as a way of indicating the intensity or strength of views presented by the citizens on what they want or care about. The signal strength of the protest influences the policymaker's decision(s).

Ortiz and colleagues (2022) suggest that during majority of protests, there are typically more than one demand or grievance. In the same vein, Press & Carothers (2022) assert that it will be disingenuous to ascribe protests across a specific country to merely one driver. In their research, they found that in North Africa and the Middle East, protests have the tendency to be ingrained in a network of "interconnected and compounding issues that contribute to, and grow out of, sclerotic political and economic systems". Press & Carothers (2022) makes reference to two protests to buttress this point: Lebanon's protest and Iraq's protest in Basra.

In Lebanon, there were a series of demonstrations against the government for over two years. It started as a protest against a proposed tax measure in addressing the economic crunch in the country (Lebanon Protests Explained, 2020). This developed into protests against corruption, denominationalism, and the mismanagement of the economy that led to the threshold of state failure (Press & Carothers, 2022). The protest in Iraq started off as demonstrations in Basra over unemployment and abysmal public service delivery. It later metamorphosized into a nationwide protest against religious denominationalism, corruption, and unaccountability among politicians (Press & Carothers, 2022). As a result, Ortiz and colleagues (2022) concluded that, during protests, the type of needs and complaints of protesters are "not mutually exclusive". This is to say, each protest is distinguished by a "set of grievances/demands found to have contributed to it" (Ortiz et al., 2022).

The author continues to assert that most of these unrests that take the form of protests are a result of political policies, and economic and social problems that most countries are not likely to be able to resolve either presently or in the foreseeable future. To understand the dynamics of whether the demands of protesters are being resolved or not, I examine what makes protesters demands to be met or not in the next section.

Are the demands of protesters being met?

According to Rai & Reinelt (2015), protest took a new phase in 2011 worldwide. The authors suggest that the protests did not convey a consistent idea neither did it spread disorder. Most importantly, the demands were not presented in an "easily readable and recognizable" form meanwhile it lasted for long - "It came, it stayed, and it said little". The authors found that a major issue that was predominant during the Occupy movement

was what exactly are the requests of the protesters? This led Simon Jenkins a UK broadcaster classify the occupy movement as a protest against capitalism and averred that this has nowhere to go because it has "no leaders, no policies, no program beyond opposition to the status quo ... it becomes mere scenery" (Jenkins 2011).

Rai & Reinelt (2015) adds that because of the nature of the protests across the globe within the period, it was challenging to establish whether the demands of protesters were met. Clearly, because the demands of protesters are numerous and not specific, it will be difficult to measure whether the goal of the protest was successful or failed.

Gillion (2012) presents the situation as protesters presenting a mixed message to political authorities. For example, the author suggests that if the number of protesters for or against the protest are evenly matched, they present a confusing message to the leaders – which makes their request difficult to be met. This means that, the signal strength of their demands becomes weak and that lives the decision to meet their grievances in the hands of political leaders. Ortiz and colleagues (2022) acknowledged that the recent wave of protests is typically on several issues which they termed as "omnibus protests" on the state level against the fiscal and political structures.

By making these literal inductions, protesters are undermining difficult political issues which does not necessarily help in addressing the problem. The occupy movement appeared to offer a comprehensive, although vague criticism against world capitalism that has essentially given the available resources to the top 1% elite in the society (Rai & Reinelt, n.d.).

Number of participants during protest

Conventional intuition has it that the number of participants during a protest impacts the outcome of the protest, thus, government is more likely to give in to the demands of the protesters. Many academic research backs the perception that protests with large participation from citizens is an effective tool in making government concede to their demands in relation to small number of participants (Amenta et al., 2010; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2008; Madestam et al., 2013). There are several reasons for this which includes the difficulty in repressing protest with high number of participants. It will be relatively easy to disperse few protesters than dispersing thousands of protesters. Also, depending on the regime, it is rather more costly to not concede to the demands of protesters who constitute a reasonable amount of your population/ voters. It may be more costly for the state if the protest turns violent. Due to the large number of people involved, the destruction that comes with such violent protest is much costly.

On the other hand, Butcher & Pinckney (2022) finds that large crowd of protesters do not necessarily yield to government conceding to their demands, rather, there may be other endogenous factors that account for it. For example, they explain that when the regime sends weak signals implying high chances of concession by the government, a lot of people sitting on the fence perceiving the success are likely to participate in the protest and this leads to a large number (Butcher & Pinckney, 2022; Kuran, 1991; Lohmann, 1993). Thus, the large number did not necessarily trigger the success of the protest making it difficult to determine the true relationship between government concessions and the number of participants of protests.

Bratton & van de Walle (1992) suggest that not only does the number of participants affect the outcome of the protest, the duration and capacity of protesters play a significant role in determining the success or otherwise of protests. They explain that in some cases, government is willing to concede when protesters continue to put pressure on them while escalating their requests. This on the other hand coerces government to make quick and confused decisions which neither parties would have primarily desired (Bratton & van de Walle, 1992)

The next chapter presents the expectations and hypotheses of this paper which is based on the literature review.

CHAPTER III - EXPECTATION AND HYPOTHESIS

This chapter draws conclusions from the literature reviewed above and test those conclusions in the Methods and Result chapter. Since the literature is broadly worldwide protests outcomes, my expectations and hypotheses are general (worldwide), I then, compare the outcome in the results section to Africa and make conclusions from it.

The literature reviewed above, suggests that the demands of protesters are numerous and interconnected during social unrest. It also asserts that social unrests around the globe are leaderless, and it is a spontaneous movement which lacks coherent objectives and are to some extent indifferent about proposing feasible remedies to problems identified (Carothers & Youngs, 2015). Therefore, it will be misleading to suggest that most protests are driven by one demand while there are other factors that affects the outcome of protests (Ortiz et al., 2022; Press & Carothers, 2022). As a result, I expect that the outcome of protest - whether successful or not - is based on numerous demands and factors rather than a single demand.

H1:

Outcome of protest = Democracy (Freedom Rating) + Num. of protesters + Economic motivation + Political motivation + Corruption motivation + violent government response + Coronavirus related protests + Duration + GDP

Here, the outcome of protest which is my dependent variable is measured as either successful or unsuccessful and this is determined by whether the demands of the protesters were met or not. My variables and why I chose them are well explained in the variable section in chapter III of this paper. I acknowledge that the literature suggests that it is difficult to measure the outcome of protest (Rai & Reinelt, 2015), I however use a

dataset that measures the short to medium term outcomes of protest (chapter 4) which helps to ascertain the failure or otherwise of the protest.

H2:

Also, as established that government responding violently to non-violent protesters is likely to attract the support of both international and internal actors which in tend coerces the government to concede by bargaining with protesters in an attempt to meet their demands (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008), I expect that violent government responds to protesters will yield a successful outcome of protest.

H3:

Conclusions drawn from extant literature suggests that protests are to a large extent steered by economic and political issues (Beaujouan et al., 2020; Carothers & Youngs, 2015; Deininger, 2003; Tanner, 2005). However, as Ortiz et al. (2022) suggests that most of these political and economic problems are difficult to resolve momentarily or in the foreseeable future, I expect that the outcomes of protest (which measures the short to relatively medium-term outcome) regarding economically and politically motivated protests will be to a large extent unsuccessful.

H4:

From existing literature, the number of participants in a protest impacts the outcome of the protest. Not only that, the duration of the protest also affects the chances of a successful protest or otherwise. Here, I expect that the longer the protest as well as the larger the participants, the more successful the protest will be. In the next section, I explain my variables and how I measure them.

Variables

In this section, I write extensively on my ten variables including how I measure them.

Outcome of protests

My dependent variable, outcome of protests comes from the GPT dataset which records the actions taken by the government or governmental institutions in an attempt to address the demands of protestors. Sanches, 2022 finds that it is overwhelming to investigate outcomes of protests, reason that the measures taken, and its results are dependent on many factors including the impending issues, economy, the number of participants, democratic or autocratic state, etc. Protests outcomes come in varying degrees and levels making it difficult to measure. Some changes are material while others are non-material. Material changes of protest outcomes includes a change in public policies, governance, regime change, etc., while the non-material changes include trust, public perceptions, and imaginations (Frye & Borisova, 2019; Sanches, 2022). These changes are either limited changes or significant changes.

Some of these changes can occur within the short term while others are medium to long term. The scope of GPT is limited to only recording the short to medium term outcomes of protests and not the medium to long term outcomes. To effectively measure the outcomes of protests within the limited timeframe, this paper will focus on the short to medium term outcomes of protests. It is however important to mention that the demands of protesters not being met does not necessarily suggest a failure of the protest. Sanches (2022) reveals that this sometimes foster collective actions among citizens, thus,

breaking the barrier of fear in engaging in public discourse. This is necessary for the continuity of public participation in political discourse.

Political Motivation

One of my independent variables is political motivation. I measure political motivation as protests that was generally political in nature including election related protest, opposition party protest, etc. The most popular driving demand for protest from GPT dataset is elections and it related outcomes, and this influences the outcome of protest significantly. Elections in general have many individual-level predictors of protest which includes the level of democracy, (dis)trust for the electoral body and other states institutions like the judiciary, electoral participation, demographics, among others (Anderson & Mendes, 2006). Using GPT dataset, I account for electoral related circumstances that affects the outcome of protest including manipulation of elections. In the context of my study, I do not account for individuals (dis)trust against the electoral body or other states institutions due to the unfeasibility of measuring individuals trust within the limited timeframe. However, the datasets provide information on the electoral process and the outcomes of protest associated with elections. The findings offer systematic proof that election as a variable in democratic countries is essential in determining the outcomes of protests.

Economic motivation

The 2007 global crisis triggered protests against state responses to economic burdens and the application of austerity measures (Sanches, 2022). I measure unemployment, introduction of taxes, worsening living conditions of citizens, etc., as economic indicators affecting the outcome of protests. The dataset already provides

information on this. The economic motivation variable is essential because the worsening of the economy drastically increases social unrest, thus protest and that impoverished citizens are no longer barred by their circumstances to participate in political activities (Kurer et al., 2019).

GDP

Out of the numerous ways to measure the impact of the economy on the success or otherwise of protest, I use the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of each country during the period to measure how the GDP that affects the outcome of protests. Korotayev et al. (2018) found that there is a negative correlation between high GDP per capita and social unrest while the relationship is positive for low GDP per capita.

Other independent variables

I look at six other variables as part of my independent variables. These are: number of protesters, duration of protest, violent government response, Democracy (Freedom Rating), Corruption motivation, and Coronavirus related protests.

The number of participants who participate in protest affect the likelihood of government responding to their demands (Butcher & Pinckney, 2022). For instance, the 2018-2019 Sudan protest that forced the President, Omar al-Bashir to resign was due to the large number of participants which reiterates that a large number of participants is likely to affect the outcome of protest. The GPT dataset gives an average number of participants per protest, and this helps to ascertain to what extent the number of participants affect the outcome of the protest. I measure the percentage of participants to the population for feasible analyses.

GPT also provides data on how long a protest lasted - the duration of protest - as reported in the news article, the level of repression from government or governmental institutions as well as whether the protest was violent.

For Democracy (Freedom Rating), the dataset provides information on how free the protest was. I adopt this measurement to ascertain which degree of freedom is likely to make protest successful or unsuccessful. For "corruption motivation" protest, GPT measures specifically whether the protest was driven by allegations or suspicion of corruption.

I introduce a new variable that is coronavirus related protests. This is a dummy variable which measures all protest that happened before the inception of coronavirus, thus, from 2017 through January 2020 and after the inception of coronavirus which also includes coronavirus related protests and non-coronavirus related protest but protest that occurred after January 2020. This is to measure whether the pandemic had an effect on the outcome of protest.

Endogeneity

There are other factors that influence the outcome of protest which are beyond my control at this time. Some of these are the strength of protesters, particular, the days of protest and other economic indicators like standard of living of protesters. Bratton & van de Walle (1992) describes the strength of protests as the ability of protesters to collate with alternative groups to push their demands. In Friday on My Mind: Re-Assessing the Impact of Protest Size on Government Concessions, Butcher & Pinckney (2022) finds that the day for protest impacts the outcome of protest. The authors find that protesting on Fridays in Islamic countries is likely to catch the attention of the government and

governmental institutions than any regular day. This usually lead to government concession either in part or fully. However, dataset does not provide information to analyze these dynamics, therefore, I classify them as endogenous variables.

CHAPTER IV – DATA

This chapter explains the sources of data for this study, how it was collected, and coded. The main source of data is the Global Protest Tracker. The secondary sources are the World Development Indicators and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem).

Global Protest Data

The source of protest data for this study is the Global Protest Tracker (GPT). The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace houses Global Protest Tracker. The database has tracked protests in over 110 countries from 2017 - January 10, 2023 (last accessed on January 10, 2023). These protests are mainly antigovernmental protests which do not include rallies in favor of a political cause, group, or individuals (Wong and Gaither, 2023). The dataset also provides information on the triggers, motivations, duration, peak size, outcomes, and some other indicators of these protests. It is noteworthy to mention that the outcomes of these protests as captured by the tracker are explicit responses or actions - mainly, policy or leadership changes - taken in the short term either during or after the protest. Due to this, the tracker does not measure the medium to long-term policy outcomes or leadership changes.

For this paper, I reviewed worldwide protest on 435 individual protest incidents in 132 countries within the timeframe of the dataset, thus, 2017 - January 10, 2023. Out of this, I sorted out protests that occurred within Africa, that is, 32 African countries with 99 individual protests for comparison.

From the data on Africa, I observed that there were many demands of protesters across many countries, however, two were predominant, i.e., protests against standard of living (economic motivated protests) and election-related protests (political motivated

protests). Additionally, most demands that lasted over a month especially the economic motivated protest had policy outcomes or leadership changes. There were 20 protests that lasted for just a day, and out of these, 3 had major policy outcomes. These countries were Central African Republic, Mali, and Zimbabwe.

Although the protests were on different issues, Mugabe's stepdown in Zimbabwe and the ethnic violence protest in Mali had a few similarities and achieved the same outcome. The first is, apart from the protest lasting a day, they recorded over 10,000 participants during the protest. Secondly, while in Mali, Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga the incumbent prime minister at the time, and his whole government left office, Zimbabwe's Mugabe resigned, and Emmerson Mnangagwa took over the reins of power. An interesting finding is that out of the 14 protests that lasted a week, only two had policy outcome or leadership change.

The dependent variable - Outcomes - in the dataset was mainly descriptive and not feasible for statistical analysis. I therefore hand-coded each of the 435 individual outcomes as '0' and '1' representing unsuccessful outcome and successful outcome of protest respectively. I measured the success of a protest by protesters meeting their demands either in full or in part (limited concession). For example, during the "Commander Sword" protests in Afghanistan, protesters demanded the release of Commander Sword who is one of the militia commanders of Hazara ethnic group. I coded this example as successful since the commander was released after two days of the protest - thus protesters demands were met in full. Belarus "Parasite tax protests" is an example of limited concession. Here, protesters demanded that $250 tax imposed on employees who work less than a year be suspended. After almost a month of protests, the

government suspended the tax - but - for a year. I coded this as a successful outcome of protest. Another example is the “Job quota protests” of 2018 in Bangladesh, protesters demanded that the government put an end to quotas on government sector jobs immediately to enable employment by merit. Although the prime minister agreed to scrap the quota system, it materialized after two years. I classified these types of cases as limited concession and coded them as successful.



Figure 1. Outcome of Protest Across the World

This shows the outcome of protest in the world. The successful ones are 1 and unsuccessful are 0 as in the legend.

Generally, government showing commitment to act on meeting the demands of protesters were coded as successful. For instance, there were a few cases were government announced to meet the demands of protesters which resulted in the halt of the protest, however, no major step had been taken in addressing the issue. An example is

Indonesia “Criminal code protests”. The Indonesian parliament delayed voting on a new criminal code due to the protest, however, the criminal code was passed into law on December 6, 2022.

For unsuccessful outcome of protest, there were no form of concessions (either policy or leadership change) made by the government or governmental agencies. In 2017, Haiti’s government introduced new taxes on transportation, passports, driver’s license, and other public goods. This led to a “Tax protests”, however, it had no leadership or policy change. I hand-coded such incidents as unsuccessful outcomes of protests.

For the independent variables such as the demands driven by Economic, Political, and Corruption motivation, I coded the individual incidents as ‘0’ and ‘1’ representing ‘No’ and ‘Yes’ respectively. For the Democracy (Freedom Rating), ‘0’ represented ‘Not Free’, ‘1’ ‘Free’ and ‘2’ as ‘Partly Free’. With the duration of protest variable, GPT recorded the individual duration in days, months, and years which made it unfeasible for statistical analysis. I therefore used a uniform measure which is ‘day’ and manually converted each of the 435 cases from month to days and years to days. Finally, on the number of protesters, GPT recorded the average peak size of each protest. To ensure an effective measure, I used the average peak size as recorded by GPT and divided it by the country’s population size as of December 2022 and multiplied it by 100% for each individual protest incident. This helped to determine the percentage of population who participated in the protest and their effect on the outcome of the protest.

To augment the measurement of democracy, I employ V-Dem’s electoral democracy index. The index measures how closely the ideal electoral democracy is being

realized on a scale of 0 to 1 (Coppedge, et. al, 2022). In the grand scheme of things, electoral democracy is an indispensable component of representative democracy.

CHAPTER V – METHODS AND RESULTS

Probit Regression Models

My dependent variable, outcome of protest has a binary response, unsuccessful and successful outcomes which is represented by the values ‘zero’ and ‘one’ at each observation. An effective model to analyze data with its dependent variable being binary is either a logit or probit regression model (Cottrell, 2015; Daykin & Moffatt, 2002; Horowitz & Savin, 2001; Vasisht, 2007). These models assume that the effect of the dependent variable on the independent variable is known (Horowitz & Savin, 2001).

Vasisht (2007) describes the logit and probit model as a multivariate method that helps to predict the chances of an event occurring or not using a set of explanatory variables to predict the dependent variable. There is no clear-cut difference between either choosing the probit regression model or the linear regression model (Hanck et al., 2020). Both models are able to better portray the nonlinearities and avoids out of range estimates than the linear model (Hanck et al., 2020; Vasisht, 2007), however, it is tougher to interpret the output. Vasisht (2007) argues that the primary difference between these models is that the probit model advances more quickly towards the axes than the logit model. Due to this, the difference lies at the extreme tails (Horowitz & Savin, 2001).

To ascertain the similarities between the two models, I run both models on my dataset. I find that results generated from both models produced a close result such that all variables that were statistically significant in the probit model (figure 2 and 3) were also statistically significant in the logic model with a similar coefficient estimate (figure A1 and A2).

Worldwide Protest from 2017 - 23

Dependent Variable: Outcome of Protest

Variables	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
	-0.6012	0.2528	-2.38	0.0174*
Democracy (Freedom Rating)	0.0276	0.0815	0.34	0.7349
GDP	-0.0000	0.0000	-1.51	0.1319
Num. of protesters	0.0516	0.0380	1.36	0.1749
Economic motivation	0.0882	0.1415	0.62	0.5329
Political motivation	-0.1066	0.2104	-0.51	0.6124
Corruption motivation	0.3104	0.1671	1.86	0.0632 ·
Violent government response	0.0436	0.1533	0.28	0.7763
Coronavirus related protests	0.0408	0.2077	0.20	0.8443
Duration	0.0013	0.0005	2.89	0.0038**

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\cdot}\ p < 0.1$

Figure 2. Worldwide Protest from 2017 - 23

Due to existing research on relatively insignificant difference between both models and my findings as well, I decided to use the probit regression model. Regardless, I used the logit regression model to perform the same analysis and put the results in the appendixes (1 and 2).

Performing a manual probit analysis with 435 individual protests for each of the 9 variables will be tedious and inefficient. Therefore, I performed the regression using R statistical software. I installed the Political Science Computational Laboratory package (pscl) by Simon Jackman and used the ‘glm’ function to perform both the probit and logit regression. I then used the ‘summary’ function to generate the inferential statistics of the model.

Protest from 2017 - 23 in Africa

Dependent Variable: Outcome of Protest

Variables	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
	0.0347	0.5631	0.06	0.9508
Democracy (Freedom Rating)	-0.0721	0.1582	-0.46	0.6484
GDP	-0.0000	0.0001	-0.02	0.9812
Num. of protesters	-0.2588	0.2323	-1.11	0.2654
Economic motivation	-0.7091	0.3673	-1.93	0.0535 ·
Political motivation	-0.3090	0.4836	-0.64	0.5228
Corruption motivation	0.5109	0.3990	1.28	0.2003
Violent government response	-0.7811	0.3207	-2.44	0.0149 *
Coronavirus related protests	-0.3115	0.6668	-0.47	0.6404
Duration	0.0053	0.0016	3.26	0.0011**

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\cdot}\ p < 0.1$

Figure 3. Protest from 2017 - 23 in Africa

Explaining the results

Results from the worldwide protest and Africa protest clearly show that there are many factors accounting for the success or failure of protest achieving its aim. Broadly, the model suggests that the duration of protest, corruption motivated protest, violent government response towards protesters, and economic motivated protest were statistically significant. This means that, 5 out of the 9 i.e., 56% of the independent variables I used, affected the dependent variable - Outcome of protest - to a large extent. It is important to note that the GDP variable was close to significance level with a p value of 0.131. The p value represents a 13% probability of discovering a difference that is same or larger than the one in my study. It however had a negative 0.0 coefficient estimate implying a very weak or no correlation between the outcome of protest and the GDP of a country. This is an indication that protest that are embarked on the backdrop of

GDP, is somewhat going to fail than succeed since it has a negative zero as the coefficient estimate.

The 'duration' of protest variable stood out to be statistically significant in both protest that occurred in Africa and the one that occurred in the world (figure 2 and 3). They all had a positive correlation signifying that as the duration of protest increases, the likelihood of government conceding to the demands of protesters either in full or limited concession. However, the correlation is a weak one; that is, 0.001 and 0.005 for the world protest and Africa protest respectively. Simply put, although the duration of protest impacts government decision in meeting the demands of citizens, it is rather on the low side.

World Protest that lasted less than 30 days

Dependent Variable: Outcome of Protest

Variables	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
	-0.6316	0.4350	-1.45	0.1466
Democracy (Freedom Rating)	-0.1883	0.1371	-1.37	0.1695
GDP	-0.0000	0.0000	-0.63	0.5317
Num. of protesters	-0.0009	0.1063	-0.01	0.9934
Economic motivation	-0.1493	0.2371	-0.63	0.5288
Political motivation	-0.2740	0.3395	-0.81	0.4196
Corruption motivation	0.1938	0.2628	0.74	0.4607
Violent government response	-0.1163	0.2541	-0.46	0.6473
Coronavirus related protests	0.2145	0.4059	0.53	0.5973
Duration	0.0600	0.0173	3.46	0.0005***

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\cdot}\ p < 0.1$

Figure 4. World Protest that less than 30 days

Protest that lasted less than 30 days in the world (figure 4) were likely to yield a successful outcome of protest while in Africa, protest that lasted more than 29 days were likely to receive government concession (figure 5).

This finding to a large extent affirms my first hypothesis. That is to say, the independent variables I used affect the outcome of protest, that is, the dependent variable. The coefficient estimates make it clear that while these independent variables affect the outcome of the protest, the weak correlation with some of the variables indicate that there are other factors that account for the success or failure of the protest which have not been captured. As a result, endogeneity covers those factors. For example, as explained in the variables section (section 3.1), Butcher & Pinckney (2022) finds that protesting on Fridays in Islamic countries have a high tendency of attracting more protesters as well as government conceding to their demands either in full or in part.

Protest that lasted more than 29 days in Africa

Dependent Variable: Outcome of Protest

Variables	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
	0.1111	0.7606	0.15	0.8838
Democracy (Freedom Rating)	0.0164	0.2162	0.08	0.9396
GDP	0.0001	0.0001	1.08	0.2810
Num. of protesters	-0.3321	0.3022	-1.10	0.2718
Economic motivation	-1.1142	0.5350	-2.08	0.0373*
Political motivation	-0.2538	0.6379	-0.40	0.6908
Corruption motivation	0.9077	0.6023	1.51	0.1318
Violent government response	-0.8633	0.4132	-2.09	0.0367*
Coronavirus related protests	-0.2270	0.7580	-0.30	0.7646
Duration	0.0045	0.0020	2.27	0.0229*

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\cdot}\ p < 0.1$

Figure 5. Protest that lasted more than 29 days in Africa

With the worldwide protest, the corruption motivated protest variable was slightly significant with a p value of 0.06. The coefficient estimates of this variable showed a relatively weak correlation between the outcome of protest and the protest that are

motivated by allegations or conviction of corrupt of officials. Since it has a positive correlation, it means that, the more a protest is held on the back of corruption in general, the higher chances of success protesters will have in government conceding to the demands. This phenomenon can be explained by the conventional knowledge of the relative ease to remove corrupt officials from office when there is public anger against the official.

In Africa, results (figure 3) show that violent government response variable has a negative coefficient estimate of (-) 0.78 signifying a very strong correlation between the dependent and independent variable. It is statistically significant as well with a probability value of 0.01. The model suggests that the more government responds violently to protesters, the less chances of success for the protesters demands to be met. This finding is contrary to the findings of Dibie & Dibie (2017) which suggests that when government responds violently to a peaceful protest, protesters are seen as vulnerable and then gain support from both international and local actors. They then coerce government either directly or indirectly to heed unto the demands of the protesters.

With this finding, I filtered the protests that government responded violently from the non-violent response to determine which other variables are also influencing the outcome of protest. With the non-violent response (figure 6) the results affirm the initial findings that the duration of protest and economic motivation are significant in determining the outcome of protest in Africa. The economic motivation had a coefficient estimate of - 0.95 signifying a strong correlation between the economic motivation variable and that of the outcome of protesters whenever government responds non-violently to protesters.

Non-violent government response to protest in Africa

Dependent Variable: Outcome of Protest

Variables	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
	0.5359	0.6812	0.79	0.4315
Democracy (Freedom Rating)	-0.1948	0.2062	-0.94	0.3449
GDP	0.0000	0.0001	0.08	0.9338
Num. of protesters	-0.3162	0.3156	-1.00	0.3164
Economic motivation	-0.9528	0.4714	-2.02	0.0432*
Political motivation	-0.9299	0.5971	-1.56	0.1194
Corruption motivation	1.0212	0.5051	2.02	0.0432*
Coronavirus related protests	-0.3450	0.8134	-0.42	0.6714
Duration	0.0079	0.0027	2.91	0.0036 **

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\cdot}\ p < 0.1$

Figure 6. Non-violent government response to protest in Africa

In addition to this, corruption motivated protest became statistically significant when government did not respond violently to protesters. It had a positive coefficient estimate of approximately 1.0 (figure 6) which implies that whenever government does not respond with violence when protesters are protesting, protesters demand will be met (either in full or in part) when the protest is driven by corruption. On the contrary, with protests that government responded violently, none of my independent variables was statistically significant (figure A3). Notwithstanding, the duration of protest variable was close to being significant with a p value of 0.12.

In Africa, economic motivation is statistically significant; however, it has a negative coefficient estimate of -0.709 (figure 3). This implies that, the more a protest is driven by economic motivation, the less chances it has to succeed. The chances are very slim. This is not to say that economically motivated protest does not achieve a successful outcome, however, economic measures in addressing unemployment for instance are

mostly felt within the medium to long term rather than the short term. As a result, although the government may concede to the demands of citizens, the impact may not be felt within the short term in Africa.

I filter economically motivated protest from that which are motivated economically. I find that with protest that are not economically motivated (figure 7), the duration of protest and violent government response in Africa remains statistically significant with a strong negative coefficient estimate for violent government response variable of - 0.76.

Non-economically motivated protest in Africa

Dependent Variable: Outcome of Protest

Variables	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
	-0.7924	0.4202	-1.89	0.0593 ·
Democracy (Freedom Rating)	0.0455	0.2185	0.21	0.8352
GDP	0.0000	0.0001	0.35	0.7300
Num. of protesters	-0.4966	0.7593	-0.65	0.5131
Corruption motivation	1.0785	0.8963	1.20	0.2289
Violent government response	-0.7606	0.4204	-1.81	0.0704 ·
Coronavirus related protests	-1.0030	1.4185	-0.71	0.4795
Duration	0.0112	0.0039	2.86	0.0042**

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\cdot}\ p < 0.1$

Figure 7. Non-economically motivated protest in Africa

On the hand, the results (figure A4) from the filtered economically motivated protest in Africa shows that violent government response and democracy (freedom rating) are somewhat statistically significant with a p-value of 0.05 and 0.07 respectively.

Corruption motivated protests (figure 2) in the world are statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.31 in the worldwide protest. This can be primarily attributed to the

relatively ease to sack an official who has been proven to be corrupt than overthrow a whole regime or solve other demands of protesters including economic and political demands as in conventional knowledge.

CHAPTER VI – ROBUSTNESS TEST

In empirical research, a regular practice is a robustness check. The researcher employs measures to ascertain how robust the coefficient estimates of the results are as an indication of 'structural validity' (Cleveland, 1979; Lu & White, 2014). Specifically, the researcher assesses some main regression coefficients behavior when a regressor is added or removed (Lu & White, 2014). When the estimate of the coefficients does not change much after modifying the regressor(s), it is an indication that the coefficients are robust and can be adequately explained as the "true causal effects of the associated regressors" (Lu & White, 2014, p. 1). It is expedient to note that, under suitable conditions the estimated coefficients of the core variables should be significantly indifferent when a variable is added or dropped during a robustness checks. If the estimated coefficients are sensitive during the checks, then it indicates a specification error.

In my robustness checks, I drop the variable 'democracy (freedom rating)' and replace it with another variable that measures electoral democracy from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). V-Dem's electoral democracy index measures the extent to which the ideal electoral democracy is attained (Coppedge, et. al, 2022). Furthermore, the index measures how free and independent the media is and able to present different perspectives on substantial political issues. This exercise will help to confirm the real or possible drivers of the 'outcome of protest' other than the 'Democracy (Freedom Rating)' variable.

After dropping the variable 'democracy (freedom rating)' and adding the 'electoral democracy index' in both the world and Africa data, I find that the estimates of

the coefficients are significantly insensitive - does not change much - and this is a sign that the coefficients estimates are robust, reliable, and adequately explains the actual causal effect of the other regressors. Also, all the variables that were statistically significant before dropping the democracy (freedom rating) variable remained statistically significant after the robustness test was performed.

Specifically, the results from the world data (figure 2) shows the same coefficient estimate for the duration variable in (figure 8). For all the other variables, the coefficient estimates are the same when rounded to 2 decimal places except for the modifier variable. Also, they all have the same relationship either positive or negative relation. This is a strong signal that the model is robust and appropriate for this study.

Robustness Test: World Protest

Dependent Variable: Outcome of Protest

Variables	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
	-0.5954	0.2729	-2.18	0.0291*
Electoral democracy index	0.0552	0.3314	0.17	0.8678
GDP	-0.0000	0.0000	-1.34	0.1787
Num. of protesters	0.0533	0.0377	1.42	0.1567
Economic motivation	0.0876	0.1420	0.62	0.5371
Political motivation	-0.1031	0.2101	-0.49	0.6236
Corruption motivation	0.3072	0.1668	1.84	0.0655 ·
Violent government response	0.0392	0.1524	0.26	0.7972
Coronavirus related protests	0.0417	0.2076	0.20	0.8410
Duration	0.0013	0.0005	2.89	0.0039**

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $\cdot\ p < 0.1$

Figure 8. Robustness Test: World Protest

Similarly, the results generated from the African data in (figure 3 and 9) has similar coefficient estimates which indicate that the model is robust. For instance, apart from the modifier regressor, there are 6 independent variables that have negative

coefficient estimates in (figure 9) and these same variables produced a negative coefficient estimate in (figure 3). Also, the coefficient estimates of the results are very similar to the results generated as a robustness check.

Robustness Test: Protest in Africa

Dependent Variable: Outcome of Protest				
Variables	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
	-0.1693	0.6022	-0.28	0.7786
Electoral democracy index	0.5186	0.8021	0.65	0.5179
GDP	-0.0000	0.0001	-0.29	0.7691
Num. of protesters	-0.2712	0.2285	-1.19	0.2352
Economic motivation	-0.7479	0.3719	-2.01	0.0443*
Political motivation	-0.3743	0.4899	-0.76	0.4448
Corruption motivation	0.5636	0.4016	1.40	0.1605
Violent government response	-0.7669	0.3241	-2.37	0.0180*
Coronavirus related protests	-0.3293	0.6685	-0.49	0.6223
Duration	0.0055	0.0016	3.41	0.0006***

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\cdot}\ p < 0.1$

Figure 9. Robustness Test: Protest in Africa

CHAPTER VII – CONCLUSION

There are a lot of factors that leads to the successful outcome or failure of protests achieving its aim. I looked at several of the chances of these variables affecting the outcome of protest in the context of the world and Africa: democracy (Freedom Rating), number of protesters, economic motivation, political motivation, corruption motivation, violent government response, coronavirus related protests (as a dummy variable), duration of protest, and GDP.

Using a probit regression model, the duration of protest is significant in determining the outcome of protest in both the world and Africa's context. They all have a positive coefficient which indicates that, the longer the duration of protest, the higher the chances of getting a positive result. The difference between those that occurred in the world and those that occurred in Africa is that protest that lasted more than 29 days in Africa were more likely to receive government concession than those that lasted below 30 days. On the contrary, protest that lasted less than 30 days were more likely to receive government concession than those that were more than 29 days.

For corruption motivated protests, it was statistically significant and had a positive correlation. This indicates that, protest that occurs in the world will generally have its demands being met when it is on the back of corruption allegations.

Violent government response towards protesters and economic motivated protest were statistically significant in Africa. Violent government response had a very strong negative correlation to the outcome of the protest. In essence, protesters demands are likely not to be met when government responds violently to the protest.

Economically motivated protests have a lower chance of success in the short to medium term. Basically, short to medium term measure of economic motivated protest does not accurately tell whether the demands of protesters were met or not. For example, measures to curb unemployment can be best measured by medium to long term indicators.

Since the duration of protest is significant in determining the outcome of protest, in future research, I will look into exploring whether there is a correlation between the specific days protest were organized and the outcome of protest. Is there a correlation between protest organized on national holidays and government concession? Is there a correlation between protest organized on weekends and government concessions?

CHAPTER VIII – LIMITATIONS

The limitation of this paper mainly revolves around the dataset. I hand-coded the entire dataset which I downloaded from the GPT website - it was mainly qualitative. Some of the incidents were not recorded or were left blank. For instance, one rare incident where the outcome of protest was left blank was Zimbabwe's Fuel Protest. I googled and found that the fuel prices remained the same even after the protests, so I coded it as unsuccessful (CNN, 2019).

Also, there were a few inconsistencies regarding the recorded duration of protest. For example, the dataset as January 10, 2023, reported that Kosovo's License plate protests was still active meanwhile, several news articles had reported that Serbia and Kosovo had resolved the license plate dispute on November 23, 2022 (Cruz, 2022). Likewise, Ghana's corruption protest lasted for a day (Haynes, 2022), but GPT reported that it was active even after a month it occurred. With these examples, I corrected the numbers based on the report from newspaper articles as cited above. There are a lot more I could not individually ascertain the veracity of due to the limited timeframe for this project.

The duration of protest major drawback is that not all the protest were constant throughout the duration recorded, rather, some were intermittent. So, although a protest lasted for 2 years, it was more intermittent than constant.

The outcome of protest was an explicit response towards the protest and not events that occurred later. They are mainly leadership or policy change.

The information provided by the dataset made it impossible to generate a continuous variable rather a binary variable for 7 out of the 10 variables. It would have

been interesting to see the results of a continuous variables for the variables under investigation.

APPENDIX A - OTHER RESULTS

Logit Regression Model - Worldwide Protest

Dependent Variable: Outcome of Protest				
Variables	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
	-0.9918	0.4174	-2.38	0.0175*
Democracy (Freedom Rating)	0.0486	0.1351	0.36	0.7192
GDP	-0.0000	0.0000	-1.49	0.1364
Num. of protesters	0.0804	0.0640	1.26	0.2086
Economic motivation	0.1566	0.2346	0.67	0.5043
Political motivation	-0.1611	0.3462	-0.47	0.6417
Corruption motivation	0.5050	0.2722	1.86	0.0636 ·
Violent government.response	0.0691	0.2542	0.27	0.7858
Coronavirus related.protests	0.0650	0.3431	0.19	0.8498
Duration	0.0021	0.0007	2.87	0.0042**

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $\cdot\ p < 0.1$

Figure A1. *Logit Regression Model of World Protest*

Logit Regression Model - Protest in Africa

Dependent Variable: Outcome of Protest				
Variables	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
	0.1547	0.9568	0.16	0.8716
Democracy (Freedom Rating)	-0.1065	0.2702	-0.39	0.6934
GDP	-0.0000	0.0001	-0.00	0.9984
Num. of protesters	-0.4414	0.4606	-0.96	0.3379
Economic motivation	-1.3071	0.6559	-1.99	0.0463 *
Political motivation	-0.6173	0.8305	-0.74	0.4574
Corruption motivation	0.9694	0.6880	1.41	0.1588
Violent government response	-1.3968	0.5705	-2.45	0.0143*
Coronavirus related protests	-0.6581	1.2009	-0.55	0.5837
Duration	0.0090	0.0028	3.19	0.0014**

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $\cdot\ p < 0.1$

Figure A2. *Logit Regression Model of Protest in Africa*

Protest that government responded violently to in Africa

Dependent Variable: Outcome of Protest

Variables	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
	-8.4623	916.0316	-0.01	0.9926
Democracy (Freedom Rating)	0.2837	0.3136	0.90	0.3657
GDP	0.0001	0.0002	0.78	0.4370
Num. of protesters	-2.0963	2.3512	-0.89	0.3726
Economic motivation	0.6515	0.8176	0.80	0.4256
Political motivation	6.9452	916.0311	0.01	0.9940
Corruption motivation	-6.0806	781.8212	-0.01	0.9938
Duration	0.0052	0.0033	1.56	0.1184

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\cdot}\ p < 0.1$

Figure A3. *Protest that government responded violently to in Africa*

Economically motivated protest in Africa

Dependent Variable: Outcome of Protest

Variables	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
	0.4620	0.6763	0.68	0.4945
Democracy (Freedom Rating)	-0.5439	0.3018	-1.80	0.0715 $^{\cdot}$
GDP	-0.0001	0.0001	-1.18	0.2393
Num. of protesters	1.0201	1.0840	0.94	0.3467
Political motivation	-0.3255	0.5168	-0.63	0.5288
Corruption motivation	0.1542	0.5129	0.30	0.7638
Violent government response	-1.1669	0.6195	-1.88	0.0596 $^{\cdot}$
Coronavirus related protests	-0.1492	0.8388	-0.18	0.8589
Duration	0.0017	0.0022	0.78	0.4350

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\cdot}\ p < 0.1$

Figure A4. *Economically motivated protest in Africa*

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