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The University of Southern Mississippi

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES: A BALANCE OF POWER

by

William Jeffery Stephens

Abstract of a Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Studies Office
of The University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2009

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CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES: A BALANCE OF POWER


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Approved:



May 2009

ABSTRACT

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by William Jeffery Stephens

May 2009

Throughout world history states have banded together to form coalitions, alliances, and economic agreements with each other to protect and secure their borders, develop their economic prosperity, and grow their political relationships. Alliances, economic agreements, and political relationships have come and gone, decreased or increased, and continue to be at times as fluid as water. During the Cold War the international system had a bipolar structure, with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies balancing against the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. What makes countries align themselves with other countries economically, politically and militarily? There are many questions that have yet to be answered and some that probably never will. Since the end of the Cold War China has begun to develop into the next balancing superpower to the United States, a position that was previously held by the Soviet Union. This dissertation will identify the various realist and neo-realist theories as to why governments form military alliances or coalitions, and economic and political relationships, along with the factors that alliance theories are formed on.

It will also posit the theory that China and the United States could produce the next Balance of Power in the international system.

As China has increased its military strength, political influence, and economic power, its capacity to counter or balance against the United States and its allies has also increased. China is filling the void once held by the Soviet Union by increasing its political influence, economic power, and its security relative to that of the United States since the end of the Cold War.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADR	Annual Report to the President and to Congress
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IGO	International Governmental Organizations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
U.S.	United States
US	United States
USA	United States of America
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the last two decades China has increased its military, political and economic power, expanding its global reach and its degree of influence with other states. China is developing a military that is already stronger than those of most states in the world and could eventually rival that of the United States. It is also growing economically at a pace that few states can contend with, with an annual rate of nearly 10 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since the end of the Cold War in 1989. There has been some controversy over what rate China has grown at, though Fishman (2005) finds that "Since China set about reforming its economy a generation ago, it has grown at an official rate of 9.5 percent" (p. 12). Others suggest that the growth could be a little shy of this rate, though this is still astonishing. Shenkar (2005) states, "Some observers discount the Chinese growth numbers as exaggerated, but shaving a point, as they suggest, of a GDP growth rate of seven to eight percent would still leave China with the most rapid growth rate in either the developed or developing world over a sustainable time period" (p. 2).

China is also developing its political capabilities, building relationships with states around the globe, and participating in United Nations (UN) discussions and decisions more openly than in the past, when China generally kept to itself, safeguarding its sovereignty in the belief that the Communist Party would govern the Chinese people and that

outsiders would not direct Beijing how to manage its affairs. As states develop economic, military and political relationships with China, many oppose the United States and its allies, thus creating a balance of power between the two. This balance of power is comparable to the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War.

In the last decade there has been a significant American and global focus on the Middle East and the Global War on Terror. There are also many other problems that arise daily around the globe, but China's growing influence and interactions with other states have become increasingly prominent. This dissertation will focus on the extent to which the United States has begun to lose its global influence, while China concurrently increases its global influence.

From a historical perspective, one could consider China's actions as those of a rising power, in accordance with the tenets of both realism and neo-realism. As Bush and O'Hanlon (2007) assert, "A special interaction occurs in the international system when a formally weak country quickly accumulates money and military muscle and thereby reorders the previous power hierarchy. And it is usually the strongest and most established state, the one that has the greatest stake in the existing order, that watches the upstart most carefully" (p. 13). Further, Bush and O'Hanlon (2007) stress that "some scholars claim that world politics are

actually the most unstable when a rising power confronts the leading status quo power” (p. 13).

Research Question

The research question for this dissertation is as follows: What factors have driven China to increase its power relative to that of the United States through the development of economic, political and security relationships with other states in the international system since the end of the Cold War?

Hypothesis

The hypothesis for this dissertation is as follows: As a result of its growing demand for natural resources to fuel its expanding economy and military capabilities, China has used the development of economic, political and security relationships with other states in the international system to increase its power significantly relative to that of the United States since the end of the Cold War. China's efforts to achieve these objectives are in accordance with the behavioral tendencies of rising powers in the international system under the tenets of realism and neo-realism.

Background

To develop a clear understanding of why alliances form, research was conducted on international relations theories, international systems theories, and alliance theories in order to gain knowledge as to how states become regional and global powers in the international system. According to Walt,

States form alliances primarily to balance against threats. Threats, in turn, are a function of power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions. Throughout the cold war, the Soviet Union posed a greater threat to the major powers of Eurasia than the United States did. As 'balance-of-threat' theory predicts, these states balanced by allying with the United States, creating a global coalition that was both remarkably stable and significantly than the Soviet alliance network (1987, p. vi).

For the most part, alliances are formal agreements that are formed and agreed upon through written and signed documents (treaties) such as the Washington Treaty through which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in April 1949. Coalitions are less formal, ad hoc and temporary arrangements that are reactions to specific threats such as American President George W. Bush's "coalition of the willing" formed to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 (Snyder, 1990). This dissertation will focus on security alliances and the factors that cause alliances to form, the increasing political influence of China, and the economic growth that China has exhibited since the end of the Cold War. It is important to note that this dissertation will not focus

only on military alliances and coalitions, but also examine economic and political relationships that do not involve formal alliances. The latter two types of relationships have been indispensable to China's economic growth and increases in its global political influence.

One question that needs to be addressed is: what is 'power' and how does a state become a superpower as power is the core concept for realists (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999). One definition of power is from Robert A. Scalapino, who writes,

Power is a many-faceted force in the contemporary world. Undoubtedly, military strength, including the capacity to keep abreast of the revolutionary changes in military strategy now taking place, is of critical importance in addressing a nation's role in a regional or global balance of power. However, a nation's strength is also determined by such factors as size and location and, notably, by its economy, its political stability, and its overall relations with key external nations (2004, p. 368).

Other considerations and definitions of power also need to include the further distinction of "hard power" and "soft power". Hard power is the state's ability to use force or economic means to influence another state's actions. Soft power is a state's use of diplomatic means to influence the actions and decisions of other states. What Nye finds it that a states soft power comes from three sources; its culture, its political value, and its foreign policies (2004). As China continues to gain power it has done so especially in the area of "soft power". China has made numerous state visits and has invited various state dignitaries to China in an effort to grow its relationships and enhance its global political standing.

As is true of the Middle East, Asia is a region of the world where America's presence and policies could lead to war or cooperation (Jisi, 2005). Consequently, the United States will need to remain focused on Asia as well as the Middle East. Problems continue around Taiwan and the China Sea. China and the United States have held relationships that have been both positive and negative throughout history. Currently the U.S. position over Taiwan and the region is: "To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote our broad foreign policy objectives we are implementing fully the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act by maintaining robust unofficial relations between the American people and the people of Taiwan" (Bush, 2002). Many suggest that the Taiwan and its current position, that of a separate state and not one with China, may be the catalyst that could push China and the United States to war.

Bush and O'Hanlon (2007) suggest how this war could come into play:

Taiwan could take a major political step toward strengthening its sovereignty that its leaders might believe is reasonable and moderate but that China views as a separatist declaration of independence. Alternatively, even if Taiwan remains comfortable with the status quo, China could grow impatient about Taiwan's refusal to agree to prompt unification on its terms. In a fog of miscommunication and politics, and enraged China prepares to attack the island while Taiwan's leaders assume American support. The United States, bound by decades of promises and a strong sense of moral obligation to Taiwan, warns China should not use military force and strongly suggests that the United States will defend the island (p. 10).

China would like to impose a “One China” concept that is inclusive of Taiwan. The August 2002 Annual Report to the President and to Congress (ADR) states, “Maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be both a critical and formidable task. The possibility exists that a military competitor with a substantial resource base will emerge in the region” (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 11). Moving forward on the subject of Taiwan, the United States has stated in its 2006 National Security Strategy: “China and Taiwan must also resolve their differences peacefully, without coercion and without unilateral action by either China or Taiwan ”(Bush, 2006, p. 42).

Andrew Scobell has indicated that China’s military has become a more modern force that is better educated, equipped with a more dynamic capability and mindset that focuses not on what was the “people’s war” but now on warfare that is aimed at peaceful means by better technology (Scobell, 2005). Scobell also suggests that the economic reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 have fueled an uninterrupted growth that has lasted for over 25 years sustaining economic growth and prosperity in China (2005).

Fishman indicates that China’s military from a personnel perspective is over five times the size of that of the United States with more than two and a half million people (2005). Fishman also identifies that there are more than 220 million surplus workers in China’s central and

western regions which is considerably more than the number of people working in the United States. (Fishman, 2005)

Overview of Research

This dissertation will identify the factors found in the realist and neo-realist literature on the formation of military alliances and other economic and political relationships between states and apply them to China's growth, economically, politically, and militarily, in an attempt to support the theory that China's growth to superpower status has influenced the development of such relationships involving China, the United States and other states and international organizations. It will also demonstrate that China's political influence has increased considerably, as has China's economic power. Ultimately, the dissertation will present evidence to suggest that as a result of these three developments, China is in a position to join the United States in forming the next bipolar global balance of power. This dissertation does not intend to support the same balance of power that was once in place between the United States and the Soviet Union with a contentious escalation of military hardware and state tensions during the Cold War, but that there is a new balance of power between China and its allies and the United States and its allies where the two powers have the ability to offset each other in both positive and negative ways that have been evident since the end of the Cold War and remain so in today's international system.

Justification for Research

With America's present emphasis on the Middle East, there needs to be a greater American emphasis on the Asia Pacific region, especially with respect to China. If the United States continues to focus on the current hot bed, there is the possibility that it may miss the growth of what could become the next great power that will have the ability to balance American power. Power transitions, resurgent Asian nationalism, and poor policy choices in Washington have supposedly undermined U.S. leadership in Asia. According to critics, the Bush administration has been distracted by Iraq, has failed to deal adequately with China's economic and political rise, and has alienated many Asians with its singular focus on counterterrorism (Cha, 2007). Economic, political and military growth and influence continues at a rapid pace. If China not kept in check, the influence and power of the United States will continue to diminish is. China does have a vision of returning to its past greatness.

Structure of the Research

This dissertation will include six main chapters and a concluding chapter. Chapter II reviews the literature on the structure of the international system and the behavior of the states interacting therein in order to better understand the characteristics of unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar international systems and behavior of states interacting therein under the tenets of realism and neo-realism on one hand and liberalism

and neo-liberal institutionalism on the other as these theories will formulate the thought behind balance of power theory and a bipolar balance of power. This dissertation will follow the basic realist premise that states are the most significant and influential actors in the international system and, in turn, the “search for power and security is the dominant logic in global politics, and that states as the primary actors in the arena have no choice but to accumulate the means of violence in the pursuit of self preservation: the ‘international’ is a self-help system” (Burchill, 1996). From the neo-realist perspective, this dissertation will also address the external means that influence international systems. Burchill (1996) finds that “neo-realists such as Waltz point to the anarchical condition of the international realm which imposes the accumulation of power as a systemic requirement on states” (p. 90).

Chapter III discusses the methodology for the dissertation, providing the outline and guidance for the structure of the research. The explanatory theoretical basis for the dissertation is drawn from the realist and neo-realist perspectives. The qualitative method of historical research will be used to provide the background and data needed to conclude and support the dissertation with comparative analysis of China’s growth relative to the United States.

Chapter IV will examine the growth of China’s economic and military power and political influence in Asia and at the global level over the last twenty years. China has grown at an alarming pace and is a

rising power that can challenge the United States. The growth of China both economically and militarily brings to light this sleeping giant that is quickly awakening. China has also developed a soft power presence and has begun to make deals with many states that have a disdain for the United States. China has developed military and economic partnerships or trade with Venezuela, Iran, and Syria, all of which would like nothing other than to see the relative power and influence of the United States decrease. Another consideration in China's growth is how to feed that growth. China's growth has also had an impact on its consumption of natural resources. China will need to fuel its billions of people; its consumption of oil and other natural resources will also limit what is available for other states, namely the United States. There is now and will continue to be competition for these scarce resources. China and the United States do not have a completely polarized view of each other. There are some commonalities between the two states where there is agreement on some grounds. Both states do believe in the fight against terrorism as a start.

Chapter V will identify the relationship between China and the United States and look at both sides to identify both the positives and negatives of this relationship. This effort will also gather the demographic data that can be obtained on each state, along with its military capacity and economic information. In this portion of the research, there will also

be an effort to identify military alliances and economic and political relationships that have formed either for China or the United States.

The last chapters will present the analysis of the evidence in Chapter VI and a set of conclusions in Chapter VII. Analysis of the data will be to identify if the actions of China had any influence on the formation of any alliance that may have formed or strengthened and that China has increased its power relative to that of the United States.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

This dissertation is written from the perspective of the realist theory of international relations. Realist theories have developed and evolved over the years so it is important to understand the roots of realism and its transformation to modern political science. This chapter will discuss the concepts of both realism and neo-realism. The works of many, including E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Inis Claude, supports the theory of realism. Neo-realism, too, has many advocates, including, most notably, Kenneth Waltz, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. More specifically, it will focus on the international systems and alliance theories, which are central to the arguments, put forward in the dissertation. As China continues its growth, the economic, political, and security relationships it has developed with other states will contribute to the development of a balance of power between China and the United States.

Carr (1946) begins with his initial development in his discussion on physical Science and political science outlining the differences where physical sciences are fact based. Carr (1946) comes to the conclusion that political science is different, and finds:

In the political sciences, which are concerned with human behavior, there are no such facts. The investigator is inspired by the desire to cure some ill of the body of politic. Among the causes of the

trouble, he diagnoses the fact that human beings normally react to certain conditions in a certain way. But this is not a fact comparable with the fact that human bodies react in a certain way to certain drugs. It is a fact which may be changed by the desire to change it; and this desire, already present in the mind of the investigator, may be extended, as the result of his investigation to a sufficient number of other human beings to make it effective. ...In both physical and political sciences, the point is soon reached where the initial stage of wishing must be succeeded by a stage of hard and ruthless analysis. The difference is that political sciences can never wholly emancipate themselves from utopianism, and that political scientist is apt to linger for a longer initial period than the physical scientist in the utopian stage of development (p. 9).

It is widely regarded that Carr and Morgenthau took the lead in the establishment of modern realism. Burchill (Burchill, 1996) states, "the work of E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, widely regarded as the founding fathers of modern or 'traditional' realism"(p. 7). E.H. Carr's *The Twenty Years Crisis* (1939) is not a textbook of international theory, but a critique of the prevailing wisdom of its day. Published on the eve of the Second World War, it was a devastating attack on liberal 'utopianism' which had inspired the post great war political arrangements in Europe, most particularly the idea of collective security as it was enshrined in the institution of the League of Nations (Burchill, 1996).

Carr's posit of realism in his day was in counter to utopianism and the concerns that power had been ignored in understanding political decisions. What Burchill finds is that Carr believed that realism was 'a necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism' which had ignored the central element of power in its consideration of international politics (Burchill, 1996).

Looking at the works of Morgenthau (1948), he finds that six principles of political realism. First, Morgenthau notes, "Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives" (p. 4). Second, "The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power" (p. 5). Third, "Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all"(p. 10). Fourth, "Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action" (p. 12). Fifth, "Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with moral laws that govern the universe" (p. 13). Sixth, "The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound" (p. 13).

Morgenthau, as with Carr, also brings in the need for facts in relationship to realist theory. He states: "For realism, theory consists of ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason" (1966, p. 4). Carr also finds the need for facts and states: "In the field of thought it places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their causes and consequences" (1946, p. 10).

Though this dissertation is written from the realist perspective, it is important to understand liberalism and neo-liberal institutionalism as well.

Burchill (1996) states on liberalism "It has championed limited government and scientific rationality, believing individuals should be free from arbitrary state power, persecution and superstition, also it has advocated political freedom, democracy and constitutionally guaranteed rights, and privileged the liberty of the individual and equality before the law" (p. 29). Burchill (1996) also finds that liberalism promotes 'competition in civil society' and 'market capitalism' is the most efficient manner in which scarce resources are allocated in a society. Looking at neoliberalism one would find that it pertains to economics, specifically that the control of the economy would move from the public sector to the private sector. Many of the initial aspects of the theory begin with Adam Smith and his theories found in his book *The Wealth of Nations*; though this precedes the theory of neoliberalism it does find its roots in the economic theory.

Discussion on Realism

"Realism is widely regarded as the most influential theoretical tradition in International Relations, even by its harshest critics. Its ancient philosophical heritage, its powerful critique of liberal internationalism and its influence on the practice of international diplomacy have secured it an important, if not dominant position in the discipline. No other theory has given as much form and structure to the study of international politics, especially to the sub-fields of Security Studies and International Political Economy"(Burchill, 1996, p. 70). What Burchill is discussing here is what

is considered 'classical realism,' which is found in the works of Morgenthau, Carr, Wright, and Claude. Their works have set the foundation for much of political thought for many past generations and even future generations to come.

Realism for the most part is just what it implies and that is explaining decisions in politics as they are. Burchill provides a good explanation of realism in a simple statement and that is,

As its name implies, realism seeks to describe and explain the world of international politics as it is, rather than how we might like it to be. Accordingly, the world is revealed to realists as a dangerous and insecure place, where violence is regrettable but endemic. In their account of the conflict nature of international politics, realists give high priority to the centrality of the nation-state in their considerations, acknowledging it as the supreme political authority in the world (1996, p. 70).

As one can see, Burchill brings into play a few other thoughts on realism that are central to the theory of realism and that is the centrality of the state. This is an important concept, as states will ultimately make the decisions within the political system. This concept is a basic premise of realism. Supporting this concept Lansford states, "Realism emphasizes the primacy of the state as the main actor in global affairs and the presence of anarchy in the international system" (2002, p. 22). States will ultimately make the decisions that affect the affairs of the state at all levels from local issues to global issues that could be inclusive of its allies.

There are four assumptions that realism is based on. First, states are the principal actors within the system. States represent the unit that

measurement or analysis is based on. There are non-state actors that play a role within the international system, but they are secondary. These non-state actors include international organizations and corporations or even terrorist organizations that do play a role but from the realist perspective the state is the primary actor most important in the system. Second, states are unitary actors. That is to say that the state will resolve any differences within the state and has the authority to do so. The state will make the decisions for the whole. Third, the state is a rational actor and states will maximize the utility or costs associated with the decisions that will be made on behalf of the state. Fourth, national security is the most important issue of the state (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999).

Carr also suggests that this simple explanation of realism and the ability to deduce what is real as opposed to what should be and how equilibrium will never be reached in reality, noting that,

The antithesis of utopia and reality – a balance always swinging towards and away from equilibrium and never completely attaining it – is a fundamental antithesis revealing itself in many forms of thought. The two methods of approach – the inclination to ignore what was and what is in contemplation of what should be, and the inclination to deduce what should be from what was and what is – determine opposite attitudes towards every political problem (1946, p. 11).

Along with the concept that the state is central to the realist theory is the contention that security is the first order of business for the state and that the decisions states will make will be for the security of the state.

Jackson and Sorenson state, "The normative core of realism is national

security and state survival: these are the values that drive realist doctrine and realist foreign policy" (2003, p. 69).

Supporting the concept of the centrality of the state and the decisions states make on behalf of ensuring security, Gilpin states,

the essence of social reality is the group ...in a world of scarce resources and conflict over distribution of those resources and conflict over the distribution of those resources, human beings confront one another ultimately as members of groups, and not as isolated individuals (1986, p. 305).

A central assumption found in realist theory is that human nature is pessimistic, that there is ultimately war between states, that the ultimate goal of the state is security and that it is doubtful that political systems can be effective. Jackson and Sorenson find that,

Basic realist ideas and assumptions are: (1) a pessimistic view of human nature; (2) a conviction that international relations are necessarily conflictual and that international conflicts are ultimately resolved by war; (3) a high regard for the values of national security and state survival; (4) a basic skepticism that there can be progress in international politics that is comparable to that in domestic political life (2003, p. 68).

This view of human nature is the long-standing pillar in realist theory and that is a key driver of how or why decisions are made within political systems. To further support this pessimistic view of realism, Burchill finds,

Realists are unified in their pessimism about the extent to which the international political system can be made more peaceful and just. The international realm is characterized by conflict, suspicion and competition between nation-states, a logic which thwarts the realization of alternative world orders. Realism is a pessimistic theoretical tradition. Fundamental changes to the structure of the international system are unlikely, even if they are needed. The

apparent immutability of the international system means that it will not come to resemble domestic liberal orders, however desirable the analogue may be. For realists, international politics is a world of recurrence and repetition, not reform or radical change (1996, p. 70).

What Morgenthau states on the theory of realism is that the world is imperfect from a rational point of view, that to improve the world one must work with the forces of human nature and not against them. Morgenthau also suggests that we live in a world of opposing interests, that there is conflict among those interests and that moral interests can never be fully realized and must be approximated in an effort to continually balance the world order (Morgenthau, 1948).

There are assumptions that are held to be true in realism. Three of them are that states are rational actors with goals in mind. If states are to be the central actors in the political system, there must be a strategy to achieve these goals. The second assumption is that states have autonomy and that they will make decisions for the whole and in the best interest of the whole. The third assumption is that states have the capacity to act and when they do act it is for the whole state. Grieco states these three assumptions about states are interrelated. Within this cluster, Grieco finds that states are rational actors that are goal oriented, with strategies designed to achieve these goals and secondly, that these goals are consistent within the state and that there is a preferred outcome over another. Another aspect of this component of the cluster is that

states are 'cost sensitive' and will observe any success or failures of other states in order to attain the goals set forth.

The second component of the cluster of realist assumptions is that states are autonomous and can make decisions for the whole of the state no matter the group. What is observed is that there are many groups within the whole of the state that are powerful and that decisions and strategies must be made for the whole and not just the powerful groups within the community.

The third and last component of the realist cluster of assumptions is that a state must have the ability to call for a unity of action when dealing with other states. It is important that one understand the importance here, because if powerful entities within a state go outside the decisions made on behalf of the whole, there could be concerns that run counter to the strategy set forth by the decision makers on behalf of the whole, and that there must be a centrality as to the decisions made (Grieco, 1997).

One of the main themes of realism is that of security. To ensure that a state is secure, it must maintain both hard power and soft power. States must be able to ensure their survival through their decisions and actions; therefore, states maintain authority to make the decisions they will have to make. From the very beginnings of realist thought, one finds this concept of power in all aspects of a state's pursuit of interests.

Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbs, and indeed all classical realists ... They believe that the goal of power, the means of power, and the

use of power, are a central preoccupation of political activity. International politics is thus portrayed as – above all else – ‘power politics’: an arena of rivalry, conflict, and war between states in which the same basic problems of defending the national interest and ensuring the continued survival of the state repeat themselves over and over again (Jackson & Sorensen, 2003, p. 68).

One of the thoughts around realism and adding factual findings along with an understanding of human behavior is the ability to predict political events. Burchill finds that,

the early realists recognized the need for international political reform and were not blind to alternative forms of political organization. For them, the nation-state was not necessarily the ultimate expression of political community. And though their accounts seem unscientific and lacking in intellectual precision, many early realist believed that they could uncover the patterns and laws of international politics through a more sophisticated understanding of human nature. The most important of these early realists are E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau (1996, p. 71).

Carr was concerned with the liberal thought of the day with the League of Nations and a collective security structure. Carr's concern with this thinking was that “Secret diplomacy would be abolished and replaced by public consent in the conduct of foreign policy. The balance of power principle would give way to a system of collective security, where individual acts of aggression would be met by the collective force of world opinion and military power” (Burchill, 1996, p. 71).

Carr felt that the best way to have a stable international system was through a balance of power. If there were a balance in the international system there would be peace. “Far from being a cause of international conflict as the liberals had argued, the balance of power system

resembled the laws of nature: it was the normal expression of international power and the best guarantee of peace. Collective security, the liberal alternative, was little more than a method of placing predominant power in the hands of the victorious states, thus institutionalizing the status quo” (Burchill, 1996, p. 72).

Mearsheimer discusses his theory on realism and provides his theory of offensive realism and describes neo-realism or structural realism as defensive realism.

Defensive realism, which is frequently referred to as “structural realism” came on the scene in the late 1970s with the appearance of Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics*. Unlike Morgenthau, Waltz does not assume that great powers are inherently aggressive because they are infused with a will to power; instead he starts by assuming that states merely aim to survive. Above all else, they seek security. Nevertheless, he maintains that the structure of the international system forces great powers to pay careful attention to the balance of power. In particular, anarchy forces security-seeking states to compete with each other for power, because power is the best means to survival (2001, p. 19).

Mearsheimer defines his theory of offensive realism in the following manner:

My theory of offensive realism is also a structural theory of international politics. As with defensive realism, my theory sees great powers as concerned mainly with figuring out how to survive in a world where there is no agency to protect them from each other; they quickly realize that power is the key to their survival. Offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much power states want. For defensive realists, the international structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power; instead it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the main goal of states. Offensive realists, on the other hand believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful

incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state's ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system (2001, p. 21).

Discussion on Neo- Realism

Kenneth Waltz promulgated neo-realism in the 1979 book, *Theory of International Politics*. Burchill states that neo-realism is a modern variant of realism and that "the neo-realism of Kenneth Waltz which emerged in the 1980s as arguably the dominant theory of international relations" (1996, p. 87).

What Kenneth Waltz has done for realism is that he has brought structure to the theory and made it more scientific. Waltz has suggested that international systems are like economic markets are formed by the 'coaction of self-regarding units'. Waltz suggests is that 'city states, empires, or nations' form International structures. These are the units that are used to measure within the international system (Waltz, 1979).

To further this support neo-realism as the leading theory of the last few decades George finds that,

The dominant academic theory of international politics – variously referred to as structural realism or sometimes neo-realism – deals only with basic structural features of the international system: the "anarchical" nature of the system, the relative distribution of power, and the importance of the balance of power. This theory draws on the tradition of political realism, which has ancient roots in the writing of Thucydides, and attempts to transform classical realism into a scientific-deductive theory that focuses on the structure of the international system (2005, p. 108).

Where neo-realism differs from realism is that it relies on the structure of the system; that there are forces that influence decisions within the international system. Waltz wanted to also further the theory of realism into a more scientific theory. George states: "Waltz attempted to convert it into a scientifically respectable deductive theory, one that relies on structural attribute of the international system to generate predictions and provide a basis for explaining outcomes of international politics" (2005, p. 109).

Waltz also disregards human nature and what diplomats do to influence decisions in the international system. Jackson and Sorensen find that "Unlike Morgenthau (1985), [Waltz] gives no account of human nature and he ignores the ethics of statecraft" (2003, p. 84).

What neo-realism focuses on is that there are external forces, units, and structures found in the international system and those externalities are what cause decisions to be made.

In Waltz's view the best IR theory is a neo-realist system theory that focuses centrally on the structure of the system, on its interacting units, and on the continuities and changes of the system. In classical realism, state leaders and their subjective valuations of international relations are at the center of attention. In neo-realism, by contrast, the structure of the system, in particular the relative distribution of power, is the central analytical focus. Actors are less important because structures compel them to act in certain ways. Structures more or less determine actions. (Jackson & Sorensen, 2003, p. 85)

One of the reasons that neo-realism does not focus on the centrality of the state is that basically most states are the same, that their only real difference is in their capabilities.

According to Waltz's neo-realist theory, a basic feature of international relations is the decentralized structure of anarchy between states. States are alike in all basic functional respects – i.e. in spite of all their different cultures or ideologies or constitutions or personnel they all perform the same basic tasks. All states have to collect taxes, conduct foreign policy, etc. States differ significantly only in regard to their greatly varying capabilities (Jackson & Sorensen, 2003, p. 85).

To further support the concept that states are basically the same in all aspects other than capability, Burchill finds,

Neo-realism provides a convincing account of why the foreign policies of nation-states are so familiar, despite their very diverse internal natures. It also provides a more sophisticated explanation from the persistence of the international system. However, it exaggerates the autonomy states enjoy from their domestic conditions, overstates the importance of structure and underestimates the potential for states to transform the international system. Neo-realism implies that, in its present form, the nation-state is a seemingly perennial fixture in the international system and that the aspects for alternative expressions of political community are limited (1996, p. 99).

One of the concepts that Waltz feels supports his theory is the difference in social systems and natural systems is that within social systems there is structure, that there are external forces that influence decisions within the international system. "Waltz insists that social systems are very different from natural systems and require a different methodology to understand them. He sees social systems as possessing

a structure that constrains the behavior of the constituent units” (Buzan & Little, 2000, p. 39). Buzan and Little also find that,

Waltz argues that there are only two possible ways that political systems can be structured: one structure is characterized by hierarchy and the other by anarchy. In a hierarchy, the units perform different functions, which means that they are structurally dependent upon each other. The mode of organization amongst the units reflects subordinate – superordinate relationships, with the overall distribution of power giving the resulting hierarchy a distinctive shape. In an anarchy, by contrast, the units relate to each other as independent agents, and so must be functionally autonomous in order to avoid structural dependency (2000, p. 40).

Waltz has brought to the theory of neo-realism the scientific oversight that is needed to truly test theories, especially in the social sciences. What Waltz posits of the theory is that theories are different than laws, that laws identify the probable associations and theories show why those associations exist (Waltz, 1979).

Discussion on Liberalism

What Burchill finds is there are two variations of liberalism: “between the market view of human beings as consumers maximizing their utilities and the ethical view of humans striving to release their potential” (1996, p. 29). The end of the Cold War is what Fukuyama considers the “ideal state” where the political and economic forms cannot be improved on, that there cannot be any more progress in the development of ‘underlying principals and institutions’ of the international system (Fukuyama, 1992).

From a true liberal perspective, liberal views find a positive view of human nature and that there can be “rational principals can be applied to international affairs” (Jackson & Sorensen, 2003, p. 106).

What Morgenthau writes of liberalism is,

One believes that a rational and moral political order, derived from universally valid abstract principals, can be achieved here and now. It assumes the essential goodness and infinite malleability of human nature, and blames the failure of the social order to measure up to the rational standards on lack of knowledge and understanding, obsolescent social institutions, or depravity of certain isolated individuals or groups. It trusts in education, reform, and the sporadic use of force to remedy these defects (Morgenthau, 1966, p. 3).

Running opposite the realist views as to human nature, the liberal perspective places high value on the goodness of human nature to drive individuals and the states they lead to do the right thing for the good of all mankind. The realist perspective is not as optimistic, given its advocates’ belief that at some point human nature will fail and war will be the eventual outcome.

Viotti and Kauppi (1999) discuss pluralism, which in this case is synonymous with liberalism, also with four assumptions. First, non-state actors cannot be ignored; that they play an important role in international relations. This concept runs counter to that of realism. Second, the state is not a unitary actor. The state is composed with many bureaucracies within the system and that state cannot act alone given the extent of competition within the system. Third, liberalism challenges the realist assumption that states are rational actors as there is negotiation and

compromise within the system of the state. Fourth, the agenda for international politics is extensive and security cannot be the primary issue within the system.

Burchill (1996) continues with the theories of liberalism and finds that,

The foundations of contemporary liberal internationalism were laid in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by liberals proposing preconditions for a peaceful world order. In broad summary they concluded that the prospects for the elimination of war lay with a preference for democracy over aristocracy, free trade over autarky, and collective security over the balance of power system (p. 32).

Where this differs from the realist perspective is that the struggle for power will eventually win out. As states struggle to retain resources for its growth and prosperity, states will ultimately choose to go to war in an effort to gain power over other states and their resources.

The main component of liberalism is that of economy. Liberals feel that free trade is a more peaceful manner in which to achieve wealth. Moving away from the theory of "comparative advantage" states are better off as this is the best way to expand economies especially if one were to take away artificial barriers in order to expand the markets to a global perspective (Burchill, 1996).

Another aspect of liberalism is that of collective security. As states come together in an effort to ensure security to the whole that international relations does not have to be a zero-sum game, as many states feel secure enough to maximize their own gains regardless of what accrues to

other states (Burchill, 1996). One of the larger perspectives of liberalism is how balance of power results from collusion of powers that can influence international interests and that international relations are "arranged" in an effort to suit those in power. Burchill continues,

Liberal critics of the balance of power claim the concept is vague and unintelligible and the method by which great powers pursue their commercial and strategic interests at the expense of small powers, often in violation of international law. Realist defenders of the concept, on the other hand, argue that liberals have missed the point of the system. The principle function of the balance of power is not to preserve peace, but to preserve the system of states (1996, pp. 45-46).

The early liberal thinkers had a focus on freedom, cooperation, and progress and included the likes of John Locke whose theories included the constitutionality of states and toleration. Other early liberal thinkers were Jeremy Bentham, who worked for International law and reciprocity between states and Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher, whose theories posit progress and perpetual peace.

Discussion on Neo-Liberalism

Neo-liberalism has come into play through the globalization of the world economies and a renaissance of liberal thinking (Burchill, 1996). Burchill finds that especially in Britain and the United States this new emergence of liberal thought was,

was achieved at the expense of Keynesianism, the first coherent philosophy of state intervention in economic life. According to the Keynesian formula, the state intervened in the economy to smooth out the business cycle, provide a degree of social equity and

security, and maintain full employment. Neo-liberals, who had always favored the free play of 'market forces' and a minimal role for the state in economic life, wanted to 'roll back' the welfare state, in the process challenging the social-democratic consensus established in most Western states during the post-war period (1996, p. 55).

Neoliberals, like neorealists, view the structure of the interstate system as anarchic, yet they believe that this constant feature of the system still permits a variety of patterns of interaction among states. Neoliberals are thus more optimistic that enduring cooperation among states is possible (Thies, 2004). Most significantly, neo-liberals believe that institutions can temper the extent of the anarchy within the international system and facilitate cooperation between states. Thies also finds that neoliberalism and neorealism are 'twins' or 'opposites' and that there is no 'Waltz' associated with neoliberalism, causing a number of problems that Thies finds, which is,

This has created a number of problems for establishing neoliberalism as a theory in its own right. First, neoliberalism is often defined solely in relation to neorealism, either as its *virtual twin* or as its *opposite*. Second, neoliberals themselves have called for a synthesis of their approach with neorealism. Lastly, such a synthesis calls into question the essential nature of both neoliberal and neorealist approaches to world politics that derives from a misunderstanding about the relationship between process and structure (2004, p. 162).

The basic primary concept of neoliberal thought is based around commercial trade on that of a global perspective. Neoliberal thought is that there should be little to no constraints against global trade and with no 'artificial protection and subsidies' to enhance one state over another.

There should be open borders when it comes to trade of goods and services between states and that this will generate the most efficient means to the use of 'resources, people, and capital' for all states on a global basis (Burchill, 1996).

One other concept of neoliberal thought is that Thies finds is; "neoliberalism places emphasis on absolute gains that can accrue to each state from international cooperation, while neorealists believe that states are concerned primarily with relative gains" (2004, p. 162). Here, the concept that with an emphasis on absolute gains, each state will have gained at an equal basis when compared to relative gains.

One of the concepts the Keohane (1986) suggests one of the problems with realism, at least from the liberal perspective, is that of human nature. If human nature was consistent and the behavior traits for conflict or interaction were consistent and provided a consistent outcome, why is it that the variations of warfare cannot not be predicted as to the outcome of a given conflict as the realist theory would suggest. Keohane also suggests of the concept of balance of power and Morgenthau's concept the universality of balance of power is also inconsistent. The reason for this is that there is no universally accepted concept of power.

Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane also suggest problems with the realist theory and the lack of a consistent definition for power. Nye and Keohane also argue that one of the problems with realist thought is the inability to calculate the power of others. The ability of states has become

more deceptive and difficult to estimate or analyze the power of states that may or may not be an ally in an ever-changing international system (1999).

Discussion on International Systems

There are three types of international systems, unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar. Within a unipolar system, there is one power that can influence other states, either through hard power or soft power. In a bipolar system, there are two powers that balance each other. An example of a bipolar system that one could visualize in recent history was that between the Soviet Union and the United States. At the point when the Soviet Union fell, the international system transitioned into a unipolar one. As Mastanduno states, "The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union as one pole in a bipolar system clearly represent significant changes in the international environment" (1997, p. 53). Mastanduno also finds: "many commentators and theorists have concluded that the current structure is unipolar" (1997, p. 53).

If one were to look at the end of the Cold War, one day there were two superpowers holding a balance in the international system and the next there was only one, the United States, creating a unipolar international system. "The Soviet Union's collapse transformed the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity" (Layne, 1993, p. 5).

One of the concepts of Waltz on multipolar systems is concerned with the number of powers within an international system. That if there are multiple powers and no true or formal alliance between the powers, then there is no true security in knowing that if a conflict were to arise what power would align with what other state. In a bipolar system states are fully aware of their allies. Although they could switch alliances depending on the circumstance, the system is basically more stable than a multipolar one. Waltz states,

In multipolar systems there are too many powers to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries and too few to keep the effects of defection low. With three or more powers flexibility of alliances keeps relations of friendship and enmity fluid and makes everyone's estimate of the present and future relation of forces uncertain. So long as the system is one of fairly small numbers, the actions of any of them may threaten the security of the others (1979, p168).

When there is a bipolar international system there are historically two superpowers with states aligned with each power. In the Cold war era the Soviet Union and the United States held those two positions. Because of the economic and military power of each of these states, the bulk of the support came from internal sources. As Waltz explains,

In a bipolar world, military interdependence declines even more sharply than economic interdependence. Russia and America depend militarily mainly on themselves. They balance each other by "internal" instead of "external" means, relying on their own capabilities of allies. Internal balancing is more reliable and precise than external balancing. States are less likely to misjudge their relative strengths than they are to misjudge the strength and reliability of opposing coalitions (1979, p. 168).

Waltz goes on to discuss states reliability on other states and finds, "Militarily, interdependence is low in a bipolar world and high in a multipolar one. Great powers in a multipolar world depend on one another for political and military support in crisis and war. To assure oneself of steadfast support is vital. This cannot be the case in a bipolar world, for third parties are not able to tilt the balance of power by withdrawing from one alliance and joining the other" (Waltz, 1979, p. 169).

Within the international system there are alliances between states. These alliances are found in all types of international systems and each of the states contributes to the alliance. Granted, the greater power will contribute the most to the alliance as it also has the most to give in all aspects of the alliance. Decisions on strategy of the leaders though are not made by the whole. Waltz finds that "In bipolar as in multipolar worlds, alliance leaders may try to elicit maximum contributions from their associates. The contributions are useful even in a bipolar world, but they are not indispensable. Because they are not, the policies and strategies of alliance leaders are ultimately made according to their own calculations and interests (Waltz, 1979).

One of the concerns with multipolar systems that Waltz finds is that states will have to look for common interests that will satisfy all parties in the alliance. Because of the need to satisfy all and that ultimately the decision may not be the best one for a state that may have made a different decision if other states were not involved. Waltz finds,

In a multipolar world, states often pool their resources in order to serve their interests. Roughly equal parties engaged in cooperative endeavors must look for a common denominator of their policies. They risk finding the lowest one and easily end up in the worst of all possible worlds. In a bipolar world, alliance leaders make their strategies mainly according to their own calculations of interests. Strategies can be designed more to cope with the main adversary and less to satisfy one's allies (1979, p. 171).

Waltz also discusses the competition between powers in a bipolar system. Many can remember the race to the moon between the Soviet Union and the United States. Though the Soviets put a man in space first, the United States put a man on the moon first. Other competitions between the two superpowers were security based. The arms race and the buildup of nuclear armaments grew at an alarming pace while each party was concerned with the possibility of being attacked by the other.

Bipolarity extends the geographic scope of both powers' concern. It also broadens the range of factors included in the competition between them. Because allies add relatively little to superpowers' capabilities, they concentrate their attention on their own dispositions. In a multipolar world, who is a danger to whom is often unclear; the incentive to regard all disequilibrating changes with concern and respond to them with whatever effort may be required is consequently weakened. In a bipolar world changes may affect each of the two powers differently, and this means all the more that few changes in the world at large or within each other's national realm are likely to be thought irrelevant (1979, p. 171).

Within the international system there will be a balance of power. The balance of power depicts not the polarity of the states but how they are aligned. A good example of this in a bipolar system would be that of the Cold War era and the Warsaw Pact of the Soviet Union with its allies

and that of North Atlantic Treaty Organization of the United States with its allies. On the configuration of the balance of power and the international system Claude states,

The versatility of three words, balance of power, is further exhibited in their capacity to denote *systems* of international politics. Perhaps the most common use of the phrase makes balance of power mean not a certain type of power configuration, or certain precept of policy, but a certain kind of arrangement for the operation of international relations in a world of many states (1962, p. 20).

In a bipolar international system each power is certain of its enemy. When there was a bipolar system with the United States and the Soviet, each state knew who its enemy was. "In great power politics of bipolar worlds, who is in danger is never in doubt. This is the first big difference between politics of power in the two systems"(Waltz, 1979, p. 170).

After the fall of the Soviet Union the United States held the position as the only global superpower with the capability to reach any region of the world from many perspectives. The United States has the most powerful military in the world, one that far exceeds the capabilities at the disposal of any other power. There is also great economic power and political influence that run counter to that of some rising powers. China is growing its economic, military and political power and will challenge the United States as it continues its journey toward greatness. China continues to influence and align with states that are in direct contention with the United States. States like Venezuela, Iran, Russia, and Syria

have continued to make oil deals, military deals, and political deals with China that will affect the security of the United States and its allies.

Overview of Alliance Theories

This literature review will examine the various theories as to why alliances form and will identify the factors that influence alliances. Throughout history alliances have formed mostly for protection against a state that threatens the sovereignty of another nation, its welfare, and its resources. One can look back through history and identify States such as Germany led by Adolph Hitler attacking in an effort to expand its territory. In more recent years, one can identify then President Saddam Hussein and Iraq trying to expand into Kuwait. In both these examples the threatened state had to align with other states, either through formal military alliance or by coalition in order to defend itself. Stephen Walt discusses in his book *The Origins of Alliances* (1987) the many reasons or factors that cause alliances to form. Basically, Walt suggests that states align to balance against a threat and that threats are basically a function of power. When Kuwait was attacked by Iraq in August 1990, Kuwait could not protect itself and therefore the United States had to come to its defense. What Walt is suggesting is that function of power whereby Iraq was trying to increase its power through expanding its territory and its resources by gaining control of Kuwait's oil. To balance against this

power increase or threat, Kuwait had to turn to the United States to maintain its control and ultimately its sovereignty as an independent state.

Balance of Power/Against Threat

By far, balance of power is the most prominent theory as to why alliances form. Classical realists like Hans J. Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, Edward Gulick, and Inis Claude or Neorealists like Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer and Glenn Snyder all suggest this theory as to why alliances form. In all of the articles and books referenced on alliance theories, balance of power is used as a point of departure. The most helpful books found in this research are Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* (1993), Claude's *Power and International Relations* (1962), Walt's *The Origins of Alliances* (1987), Gulick's *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (1955), Carr's *The Twenty Years Crisis* (1939), Walt's *Theory of International Politics* (1979) and Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001). These books alone provide a wealth of information on balance of power and balance of threat theories, with balance of threat being Walt's theory, which he considers to include balance of power theory. Balance of Power theory purports to explain the result of such methods that produce. "If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance of power theory is it" (Waltz, 1979, p. 117). There are many scholars who have professed the balance of power theory but the most referenced include Waltz, Morgenthau, Martin

Wight, and Ernst Haas. Haas and Wight have articulated eight and nine meanings of the term balance of power, respectively (Waltz, 1979). All of these references or meanings were found through their own research back through history.

Balance of power is thought by some to run with the laws of nature and by others as an outrage (Waltz, 1979). This varying of interpretations is due to the many views of balance of power within international relations. Theories such as realism, neo-realism, liberalism, and neo-liberal institutionalism are the most followed in balance of power theory, which are explained through differing aspects as to why balance of power comes to play in the international system and why states act in the manner they do. Chiu (2003) finds that traditional alliance literature such as Waltz (1979) and Morgenthau (1985) indicates that alliances are formed to balance power in international systems. Schweller (2006) finds that the idea of balance of power in international politics stemmed from other fields of the day, at least from the classical realist perspective, such as ethics, science, law, economics, and philosophy and that balancing happened as a law of nature. Waltz states that “most of the confusion with balance of power theory, if properly stated begins with assumptions about states: They are unitary actors who, at minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (1979, p. 118). With balance of power theory, there need to be at least three actors where the two weaker states would align to balance the power of the third, or

stronger, of the three. If less than three, there is no one to come to the help of the less superior party; therefore, there must be at least three.

Walt advances the balance of power theory and moves to suggest that it is a balance of threat theory. He suggests that states balance or ally to oppose a threat rather than against power. Walt does suggest that balance or distribution of power is important but that the alliance against threat is more likely and that geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions are more important. Walt basically studies three types of behavior: balancing, which is the alignment against a threat; bandwagoning, which is alignment with the dominant power; and détente, which is the voluntary development of a peaceful relations to reduce the tension (Gangale, 2003). Détente is a form of soft power as opposed to the hard power tactics mentioned above. A more substantial discussion of the distinctions between hard power and soft power follows later in this chapter.

In *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (Gulick, 1955), Gulick suggests a set of assumptions that one must understand in order to explain balance of power. Gulick, states that,

When writers have viewed the balance of power, they have unconsciously and habitually made (and often ignored) numerous assumptions. They have assumed, for example, the initial existence of the state, a unit of power, based upon land and people, which was capable of exerting influence beyond its own borders; they have assumed also that power existed; that it could be measured by men; that men, having measured it, could balance it; that their balancing policies could affect the lives of states and the movement of history; and that the state system could be; and

would be perpetuated through human analysis, direction, and action (1955, p. 3).

From this Gulick finds it important to focus on four distinct and important assumptions. One, that there is a state system. "Balance of power theorists assumed, first of all, the existence of a *state system*" (1955, p. 4). Gulick identifies a state system from the work of Friedrich von Gentz in *Fragments on the Balance of Power, 1806* where Gentz suggests that a group of independent states are a group of neighboring states that are interconnected in some fashion and that they are of relative equal power (1955). The suggestion that there is a state system and that they have a common cultural cohesiveness from past history had bound them together. Gulick goes on to write, "This assumption of a state system is basic to any theory of political and military equilibrium among states. Just as one person does not make a crowd, one state cannot make a state system; and without a state system, one can have no balance of power among states" (1955, pp. 4-5).

The second assumption Gulick identifies is that there must be a framework "that is, a generally recognized size of the system and therefore a limited number of entities to be balanced" (1955, pp. 8-9).

What Gulick is stating is that there must be a defined territory with stated bounds that do not fluctuate. What Gulick goes on to state about balance of power and the number of states is:

Logically, one may say there is a precise minimum-that is, two states with relatively equal power could theoretically comprise a

balance-of-power system. The fact that neither possessed an overwhelming preponderance of power would act as a check on their actions. But while it might seem possible for the state system to consist of no more than two powers in order to permit the existence of a balance of power, this number should properly be regarded as improbable, unusual, and even dangerous for the continuance of the equilibrium (1955, p. 9).

The third assumption Gulick finds is that of relative homogeneity. That is "Europe was an in-group of states which excluded non-European countries and which displayed a high degree of homogeneity within itself, as shown. Relative homogeneity was a demonstrable fact; it existed and it bestowed certain benefits upon the European balance of power" (1955, p. 20). What Gulick is suggesting that there was a group conscious effort between the states that kept the balance in check to ensure the preservation of the balance of power. Gulick continues stating that "In addition, homogeneity meant a kind of advantageous group-consciousness for the members of the state system; it meant a uniformity of assumptions which in turn facilitated the perpetuation of a balance of power" (1955, p. 23).

The fourth assumption Gulick discusses is a rational system of estimating power. What Gulick finds from Theodore H. Von Laue's *History of Balance of Power, 1494-1914* is: "The power of individual states was conceived to be susceptible of measurement by certain well-defined factors: Their populations, their territories, their finances, - i.e. 'the balance of trade'-and by the state of their armies and navies" (1955, p. 25). One can also find this concept in Walt's work suggesting that a threat is

measured by geographic proximity, and offensive capabilities along with perceived intentions of the threat. This concept would hold true as if the threat was perceived to be greater than the capability of the threatened state than they would surly need to align with another state for its protection. Though Gulick provides many examples of this assumption in this book, one can find more modern examples. In Asia, and especially where China and the United States are concerned one would only have to look at Taiwan and the problems and concerns in that region. Where Taiwan would like to remain a sovereign state, China would like to pull it back into the fold.

Discussion on Balancing, Bandwagoning, Free Riders and Buck-Passing

There are basically two methods to balancing (or bandwagoning) and they are defined: "Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat or power and bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger" (Walt, 1987, p. 17). Whether alliances are formed by means of bandwagoning or balancing will determine the balance of power and the number of superpowers will determine bipolarity (two powers) or multi-polarity (more than two powers offsetting each other). As an example, if one looks back at the Cold War there were basically two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, creating a bipolar balance of power.

Free riding is where states within an alliance consume more than their share of what they add to the alliance or coalition. One can look at institutions such as the United Nations or and could make more than one case on this concept of free riding. One could also look at the example of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, where the United States provides most of the resources, both militarily and economically from a security perspective, along with the United Kingdom, where many of the newer states do not have the ability to contribute.

A good example of this principle would be during operation Enduring Freedom and the number of allies that contributed to the effort, though all gained through security and stability in the region, only a few actually participated in the war.

Buck-passing is one state's actions to pass the cost and support to another state in its defense or security. A good example outlined by Mearsheimer (2001) is: "British policy makers tried to minimize the amount of fighting their troops did on the western front and instead get their alliance partners, France and Russia, to assume the costly burden of wearing down the German army" (2001, p. 159).

Walt finds that,

Excessive confidence in allied support will encourage weak states to free-ride, relying on the efforts of others to provide security. Free-riding is the optimal policy for a weak state, because its efforts will contribute little in any case. Among the great powers, the belief that allies are readily available encourages buck-passing; states that are threatened strive to pass to others the burdens of standing up to the aggressor. Neither response is a form of bandwagoning, but both suggest that the effective balancing behavior is more likely

to occur when members of an alliance are not convinced that partners are unconditionally loyal (1987, p. 31).

One of Walt's hypotheses is that "The greater the probability of allied support, the greater the tendency to balance. When adequate allied support is certain, however, the tendency for free-riding or buck passing increases"(1987, p. 33).

Another theory of buck-passing is that of under-reaction by a state to threats when trying to free ride on other states. Schweller suggests that,

Another strand of realist literature focuses on buck-passing, a form of underreaction to threats by which states attempt to ride free on the balancing efforts of others. The strategy of buck-passing exhibits several distinctive characteristics. Threatened status quo states: (1) form very loose alliances with vague commitments or avoid alliances altogether, (2) convene few, if any, joint meetings of their General Staffs to coordinate war plans and the establish a coherent Allied grand strategy, (3) spend a disproportionately low percentage of their gross national product on defense in relation to that of the aggressor state(s), (4) adopt purely defensive strategies with little or no capability to project military power (2006, p. 7).

When it comes to who pays for the ride the general measure is that of GNP of a state. "According to the free-riding model, the larger country in an alliance (as measured by size of GNP) has a larger defense burden than the smaller country does" (Lee & Heo, 2001, p. 822). We see this in institutions or alliances like NATO and the United Nations both of which follow this model.

Discussion on Hard and Soft Power

When discussing power one must understand that there are different types of power. In state politics there are basically two types of power that are observed and those are hard power and soft power. From one of Joseph Nye's definitions of power, one sees that "At the most general level, power means that ability to get the outcomes one wants" (2004, p. 1). Nye also finds that "power means having the capabilities to affect the behavior of others to make those things happen. So, more specifically, power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants. You can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want" (2004, pp. 1-2). So basically what Nye is saying is that one can use hard power or 'coerce with threats or induce them with payments' or one could use soft power and 'co-opt them to want what you want' which is where China has made the greatest strides in its buildup of power. We can see this with the many agreements that China has made with other States and in its more commanding assertions at the United Nations and its voting power. This newly found power is discussed later in Chapter V of this dissertation, *China's Rise to Superpower Status*.

As China has become a global presence, it has taken steps to wield its soft influence responsibly, joining multilateral institutions, supporting peacekeeping, powering economic growth in Latin America and Africa, fighting drug and human trafficking. China even has begun to mediate other nation's conflicts and apply pressure on dangerous countries, a step from the recent past, when China avoided any involvement in other states' domestic politics (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. xi).

China has used its newly found soft power as it has advanced its growth globally. China has made inroads with many states, especially with those having vast natural resources. China has courted many leaders in Latin America and Africa that have views that run counter to those of the United States. China has also invested large sums of money into these states through foreign direct investment or through funding exploration efforts for oil and other natural resources. By doing so, China has won or bought the support of these states, as it has become the new provider and supporter especially in areas of human rights and state sovereignty. China's influence in Asia has also increased as relationships have formed with many states throughout the region. For example, 70 percent of Thailand's population now considers China its closest friend (Kurlantzick, 2007).

The larger view of China's use of soft power is in the United Nations Security Council. On US important votes in the since 2000, there have been eighty-five votes cast. Of those eighty-five votes China has voted with the United States only five times ("China: Voting coincidence percentages. (2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000)." 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000 #223).

Hard power is the ability to influence through military means or economic means or as Nye states above through threats or payments. Campbell and O'Hanlon suggest concerns that the United States has is that over China's increase in its military and economic power.

The UNITED STATES will confront two overriding national-security challenges for at least the next generation. First, Americans must effectively wage a long twilight struggle against violent Islamic fundamentalists. Second, we must simultaneously cope with China's almost certain rise to great-power status (2006, p. 185).

Campbell and O'Hanlon go on to state,

China's economic successes over the past two decades have helped stimulate global commerce and improved the lives of millions of Chinese citizens. Unfortunately, they also have caused disturbing implications for the global balance of political and military power. As China's economy expands, so do the resources available to its leaders for pursuing diplomatic and military policies that will frequently conflict with American preferences (2006, p. 190)

Economic Theory

Economic theories not only suggest that an ally within an alliance does such for purely economic gains but are more focused on what each state can provide in an alliance and how production decisions will be made depending on what an ally can provide to the alliance and what it might consume.

There is an 'equilibrium' reached when there is a balance of power and that alliances are built economically and that there will be a 'marginal utility' of joining an alliance and basing decisions on rewards versus costs (Chiu, 2003).

Sandler (1975) discusses two models of an economic theory of alliances. One constant to the two models is that defense goods are public good and private goods. The further explanation of a public good

within the two models is either from a pure public good or an impure public good. The author's note,

a good that exhibits properties of nonappropriability of benefits and the indivisibility with respect to consumption opportunities is a public good. At one extreme is a pure public good which is completely indivisible among consumers in the sense that once the good is provided one man's consumption does not detract from another's. Hence, all individuals must consume the same quantity of the pure public good once it is produced. A second characteristic of the pure public good concerns the complete inability on the behalf of the provider to appropriate the benefits derived from the good. Therefore, excluding others from the good's benefit cannot be exercised by the provider of the pure public good even though a user refuses to reveal a preference for the good in the form of user fees. The nonappropriability characteristic of the pure public good is especially problematic inasmuch as most people fail to pay for the good in anticipation of a 'free ride. ... On the opposite end of the spectrum is the private good. A private good's benefits are completely divisible and appropriable. One individual's consumption of a piece of cake fully detracts from all others' consumption of that piece. In addition, the owner of the private good can fully exclude others from its benefits (Sandler, 1975, pp. 331-332).

In the development of an alliance the economic ability of each state will come into play in how each state will make its production decisions for that alliance. What Sandler state's is "the formation of an alliance permits benefits from defense expenditures to cross political boundaries, each country's production decision with respect to both the defense and nondefense good can be shown to be influenced by the production decision of the ally" (Sandler, 1975, p. 338).

From the perspective of absolute economic gain, Powell states, "Neoliberal Institutionalism assumes that states focus primarily on their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains of others.

Whether cooperation results in a relative gain or loss is not very important to a state in neoliberal institutionalism so long as it brings an absolute gain" (Powell, 1993, p. 209). Though, because of this desire for absolute economic gain states are willing to give up some sovereignty, not only because of the need for absolute gain but also the component of globalization in neoliberal thinking.

Cultural Theory

Huntington (1993) suggests that alliances are formed on the basis of cultural identity. Culture or civilization, which in this case is inclusive of religion, will be the bond that will keep people in alliances and other economic, political and security relationships, as articulated in "The Clash of Civilizations?" (1993). Huntington describes seven or eight cultures or civilizations that will be the dividing lines between alliances (Huntington, 1993). From the Huntington's article (1993) came Huntington's book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* in 1996.

Huntington expands on his article in more detail in respect to his original hypothesis and that is:

the concept of civilizations; the questions of a universal civilization; the relation between power and culture; the shifting balance of power among civilizations; cultural indigenization in non-Western societies; the political structure of civilizations; conflicts generated by Western universalism, Muslim militancy, and Chinese assertion; balancing and bandwagoning responses to the rise of Chinese power; the causes of dynamics of fault line wars; and the future of the West and of a world of civilizations (1996, p. 13).

As Huntington describes the various civilizations, he identifies the Sinic civilization, which pertains specifically to China and a few other regional states such as Vietnam and Korea. Huntington states, “

Labeled this civilization Confucian. It is more accurate, however, to use the term Sinic. While Confucianism is a major component of Chinese civilization, Chinese civilization is more than Confucianism and also transcends China as a political entity. The term “Sinic,” which has been used by many scholars, appropriately describes the common culture of China and the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and elsewhere outside of China as well as the related cultures of Vietnam and Korea (1996, p. 45)

Ideology Theory

The general thought on ideology theories is that the more similar a state's ideology the more likely a state is to align with a state that follows that same ideology (Walt, 1987). Walt (1987) also finds that the more collective a states ideology the more fragile it will be. If a state perceives that it is secure there is a greater likelihood that a state will align from an ideological perspective.

Gangale (2003) finds that in Schweller's view both Walt and Waltz assume that states act to preserve what they already possess, that all states have a compulsion to maximize their power. If all states were satisfied with what they had, what would be the motivation for aggression and war? Waltz claims that the primary cause of war is uncertainty and miscalculation, but in Schweller's view, it is clear that some states are revisionist (1994, p. 5).

Kevin Sweeny and Paul Fritz suggest an interest based bandwagoning theory as opposed to balancing and that actors chose to bandwagon more often than balance (Sweeney, 2004). Again, these authors cite the works of Waltz (1979) and Morgenthau (1967) and two others, Gulick (1955) and Claude (1962) as the classic writers of balance of power and that great powers join the weaker side to keep the balance the power of international relations (Sweeney, 2004).

Coalitions

Coalitions are informal agreements between actors and are usually short lived and for a single purpose. As illustrated by the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq in the spring of 2003, the United States and others countries have formed coalitions in an effort to deter and stop terrorism. The difference between a coalition and that of an alliance is that of a formal treaty that is entered into by two or more states outlining the goals and considerations of such an alliance. These separate operations both are good examples of how coalitions are formed and how they operate. In general, coalitions are formed for a short-lived, though not always so short, but specific need. Pauly and Lansford find that "The US has used formal and informal multilateral configurations in order to pursue its specific national interests " (2005, p. 83).

Alliance Theory Review

In reviewing the various alliance theories, balance of power is without a doubt the most prominent of the theories. Again, balance of power posits that alliances are formed in the event that international systems have gone out of a balance of power as one state has developed into a state that could overtake another state. From a realist perspective this “out of balance” scenario is where weaker states join to form an alliance to counter the power and bring the international system back to a balance of power. Carr, Morgenthau, and Gulick would suggest this theory. Another perspective would come from the neo-realists Walt, Waltz, Schweller, and Keohane. What the neo-realists would add is how external powers in the international system effects the decisions states make as to why alliances form.

The second theory discussed above is that of a balance against threat proposed by Walt, which he suggests is really why alliances form. Walt has suggested that states as described in the scenario above really balance against a threat and that the two weaker states join to form an alliance to balance against the threat of the stronger state.

The final three theories discussed above (economic, ideological and cultural) also describe various reasons that alliances will form. For the purposes of this dissertation, balance of power theory and Walt’s balance against threat theory will be the driving theory used in discerning

alliance formation and the balance of power with the remaining three theories supporting a balance of power.

Within this literature review discussions of international relations theories and international systems have been presented. At the onset of this chapter, the theory of realism is the perspective that is taken in the writing of this dissertation. This dissertation intends to outline the growth of China in the areas of politics, security, and economics, providing the perspective that China has made the decisions it has made from the realist notion that security, in all forms, are at the mainstay of those decisions. China has provided for its people and has provided the resources needed to sustain that growth and that ability to secure those needed resources are within the theory of realism.

What this dissertation should add to the existing literature is the additional support to the theory of realism and neo-realism by providing additional evidence that the actions of China support the fundamental notion that the realist precept of security. As will be depicted throughout this dissertation the predominate concept of security in all facets is what China has followed, and that the growth of China supports the realist theories providing China's sustained growth to a superpower.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Discussion on Historical Research

The primary methodological approach this dissertation will utilize is historical research, which it will employ in analyzing the data submitted. A case study approach will be utilized to compliment the historical research approach. The historical research used will identify the increase in China's power relative to that of the United States since the end of the Cold War in 1989 through 2007. This research will support the hypothesis that China has made gains in the areas of its economic growth, military power and political influence in comparison with America's capacities in each of those areas.

The use of qualitative methods is not new, especially in the social sciences. "For several decades, political scientists have debated the merits of case studies versus statistical studies, area studies versus comparative studies, and 'scientific' studies of politics using quantitative methods versus 'historical' investigations relying on rich textual and contextual understanding." (King et al., 1994, p. 12) A qualitative approach will be useful in providing a comparative analysis on the growth of China's economic, military and political power and influence relative to that of the United States since the end of the Cold War through historical research of primary data and secondary sources.

Historiography originated with the ancient Greek writers and dominated historical writing. The earliest of these writers is Herodotus who wrote an account of the Persian Wars in the 5th Century BC. The next would be that of Thucydides who wrote about the accounts of the Peloponnesian Wars between Athens and Sparta. Both of these accounts concentrated on war, history and politics of the day. After the Greek writing was Roman historiography, which followed the Greek language until Cato the Elder finally wrote his account on Roman history in Latin. This work provided psychological insights on ethics, political analysis and human motivation. Following Cato the Elder was that of Cicero, who wrote of moral standards as they applied to public life.

The next line of historical writing was the early Christians. Prior to this time all writers were Pagan except for Josephus. When Constantine the Great was converted to Christianity the Roman Empire was introduced to new thoughts on history. Eusebius and Caesarea wrote an ecclesiastical history following the growth of the Christian church, which described people of no political importance or thought on the hierarchy but instead they focused on the thought of human existence.

The Middle Ages followed the early Christians. During this time most of the writing was left to clergy, most of who were in monasteries, where vast libraries of historical writing were maintained. During this time there was a rise in intellectual thought, which is found in the works by mostly Monks during this period.

Following the Middle Ages was the Renaissance, which brought back a study of Greek and Roman literature that instilled a more realistic view of political history and current life. Bruni wrote about Florence while reflecting on how it mirrored Rome and the 16th Century Machiavelli began to write about political history with respect to human laws and ambitions in his works *The Prince*.

The period of historical writing that followed the Middle Ages may be one of the most important changes in basic historical research. The period that is called the Antiquarian and Enlightenment period is from the 16th century onward. This period brought forth a more systematic approach to collecting the sources on historical writing. Where the classical writings maintained a literary skill, this period began an examination of historical religious publication and writing. This period produced such writers and researchers that created and defined the 'major fields of critical research'. In the 18th century, Voltaire added a rationalism that ignored the classical writings on the many aspects of civilization that included great detail as to historical research and writing. The most notable work that came from this period is that of Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776-88).

In the 19th century the academic discipline of history had its own critical method and approach that required academically rigorous preparation in the research of history. Leopold von Ranke had influenced

and advanced 'the criticism of sources' that has allowed historiography to come into its own as a meaningful academic discipline. There had to be a neutral approach to the research of history with a break in the literary arts of the past and align it with scientific research (Partner, 2002).

The history of historical research has a long and varied past. There are many opinions and thoughts as to how history happens. The important point of historical research though, is to understand through history how 'things' happened. With this understanding of how things have happened it is possible to posit a theory as to 'why', from the 'why' things (history) has happened, then it is possible to develop an understanding as to current events happening in the world. The varying thoughts as to 'why' things have happened in the past follow various theories.

The qualitative method of historical research does have its critics. The most notable one is that it lacks scientific rigor, as science would be the highest form of knowing. From an historical perspective though, it is important to note that history is history and if historical research is based on historical fact then there should be bias free reporting. The other critique against qualitative research is that there is a possibility of the research being influenced by the researcher's political values. In respect to that concern, the output of qualitative research allows the researcher to study phenomena that is not available in any other method. What historical research allows for is the ability to measure a period in time with

the ability to make comparative analysis as to the correlations between independent and dependent variables.

Another concern with historical research is that with reliability because qualitative research is based on descriptive narratives rather than statistical tables and when events are categorized there could be bias in that activity. Validity is another concern with qualitative research as there are concerns over attempts to explain or deal with contrary cases.

In developing this dissertation, information will be gathered as it relates to three issue areas: China's economic growth, the growth in its political influence and the increase in its military power since the end of the Cold War. The information will be gathered through research of journals, Internet searches, database searches, and books. It will draw on primary sources for data on China's and the United States' GDP numbers for the years 1989 through 2007, including the US State Department, International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the National Bureau of Statistics of China. Primary sources for political data will be the United Nations' databases. Primary data on military spending as a percentage of GDP will include United Nations databases, the US Department of State database, the International Monetary Fund, and the National Bureau of Statistics of China. Data gathered on China's voting record within the United Nations was gathered from: China: Voting coincidence percentages for the years 2000 through 2006 were retrieved 01/28/2008, 2008, from <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/82644.pdf> and

the subsequent years related to this data point. Data gathered on the GDP and the military budget of the United States was gathered from:

Historical Tables: Budget of the United States Government (2005).

Retrieved Jan 12, 2008, from

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/hist.pdf>. Data

gathered on China's GDP and military budgets were gathered from

China's National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2006) Retrieved Jan 12,

2008, from: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/>.

Secondary sources will include journal articles and books on the above topics.

The use of the historical research and comparative analysis will be a study of China since the end of the Cold War to the present to understand China's rapid growth relative to that of the United States to support the research question and hypothesis that China has made advances in the void that was left by the Soviet Union. That research will focus on case studies of the growth of China's economy, expansion of its military capabilities and increases in its political influence.

Historical research with comparative analysis is a method that fits the research for this dissertation as it relates to the subject of China as a whole and the study of the growth China has made relative to that of the United States. Qualitative research will help to uncover the many aspects of the international relations theories and China's growth of China. As a component of this dissertation, knowledge of international relations

theories to include realism, neorealism, liberalism and neoliberalism are important as it is the driving factor as to how and why decisions will be made in order for a State to advance its ideology, maintain its sovereignty, or expand globalism by relaxing laws and allowing access to cross borders, greater free trade, and economic expansion, possibly giving up some of a states sovereignty. From the perspective of the relationships between states in the international system, it is critical to understanding how bipolar, multipolar, and even unipolar systems are formed and governed. For the purposes of this dissertation, the central theory is that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the world entered into a unipolar international system with the United States leading the way. Since the end of the Cold War, China has begun to fill that void and has grown in terms of its economic and military power and political influence relative to that of the United States and now balances the power of the United States as the international system moves toward bipolarity. Lastly, alliance theories are important to this dissertation as they provide the rationale for states to align with or against China, as China continues its growth as a superpower.

In searching the various repositories of data, one can find new questions as discovery of new insights are found. Social scientists have the ability to look for new approaches to hidden information and discoveries that could be missed in other methods of research.

Social science research at its best is a creative process of insight and discovery taking place within a well-established structure of

scientific inquiry. The first-rate social scientist does not regard a research design as a blueprint for a mechanical process of data-gathering and evaluation. To the contrary, the scholar must have the flexibility of mind to overturn old ways of looking at the world, to ask new questions, to revise research designs appropriately, and then to collect more data of a different type than originally intended (King et al., 1994, p. 12).

The use of historical research and analysis will provide the identification and analysis of the primary and secondary historical data on China's growth from 1989-2007. "A history is an account of some past event or combination of events. Historical analysis is, therefore, a method of discovering, from records and accounts, what happened in the past" (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 123). Historical research is really about the relationships and issues and not just the facts found in the period being researched and that the present is influenced by what has happened in the past (Glass, 1989). The historical data identified for this dissertation will help support the hypothesis, as it will identify the baseline of where China was in 1987 and where China is now in 2007. Berg (2004) states, "Historical research, then, involves a process that examines events or combinations of events in order to uncover accounts of what happened in the past"(p. 234). The data gathered through historical research will be primary data on China's growth, most of which will be numerical. With this numerical data graphs can be produced that will indicate China's growth when compared to that of the United States.

There are five parts to historical research (Pavlic, 2005).

1. Find a problem

2. Form a hypothesis
3. Conduct research
 - a. External research (is it genuine)
 - b. Internal research (Is it reliable)
4. Make your argument
5. Share your knowledge

The problem outlined in this dissertation is outlined in the research question, which states: What factors have driven China to increase its power relative to that of the United States through the development of economic, political and security relationships with other states in the international system since the end of the Cold War?

The hypothesis posited in this dissertation states: As a result of its growing demand for natural resources to fuel its expanding economy and military capabilities, China has used the development of economic, political and security relationships with other states in the international system to increase its power significantly relative to that of the United States since the end of the Cold War. China's efforts to achieve these objectives are in accordance with the behavioral tendencies of rising powers in the international system under the tenets of realism and neo-realism.

Part three identified by Pavlic (2005) is conducting the research. Chapters IV and V will provide the data found in the research found to be genuine and reliable through the use of primary data found within state

published data of the governments of China and the United States and databases of the United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund. Consistency will be maintained through the use of data that is current and from the same databases throughout this dissertation.

Part four will be produced in Chapter VI and VII of this dissertation providing and analysis and a conclusion to the data presented.

Part five will be shared through the publication of dissertation.

The dissertation will leverage the use of the historical research method will be conducted through four phases utilized in the development and writing of this dissertation. Those four phases are:

- 1) Chapter II will be a literature review of international relations theories, international systems theories, and alliance theories mainly from the realist and neo-realist perspective as this dissertation emphasizes those perspectives in explaining the balance of power and the phenomena of why states align economically, politically, and militarily.
 - 2) Chapter IV will be an examination of the growth of China's economy, its military power and its political influence since the end of the Cold War, identifying evidence of the gains that China has made in these three.
- Chapter V will compare China's growth relative to the United States in those three areas during the same period, indicating an increase in China's ability to balance American power in the international system.

3) Chapter VI will analyze the data presented in Chapters IV and V on the gains China has made relative to the United States since the end of the Cold War.

4) Chapter VII will provide the conclusions of this dissertation and the analysis presented with consideration for future studies on this subject.

Phase 1

The literature review of this dissertation will provide the basis of this dissertation as it is written and researched from the Realist theories of International Relations and the move from a unipolar system, which developed after the fall of the Soviet Union, to that of a bipolar balance of power between China and the United States as China has filled that void as it has grown into the next superpower. The literature review will also include a review of alliance theories, as it is important to understand why states align which in turn support the balance of power between China and the United States as states will align with or against China and the United States. As China continues its growth China will need to align itself, economically, militarily and politically, to ensure that it can supply the resources needed to support the economic expansion and infrastructure growth, secure its borders and maintain its sovereignty.

The literature review will be conducted through books, journal articles, bibliographies, and database and Internet searches.

Phase 2

Chapters IV and V will focus on the advances that China has made relative to the United States since the end of the Cold War. This dissertation will look at GDP numbers, military expenditures, and political decisions and observations of China and the United States since the end of the Cold War found within the research. Specifically, Chapter IV will focus on China's rise to becoming a superpower. This dissertation will present observations of China's growth since the end of the Cold War from the perspective of economic, political, and military views. The research will be conducted through reviews of books, journals, databases, and Internet searches. Chapter V will focus on the relationships between China and the United States on one hand and between those two powers and other states on the other, presenting evidence supporting the hypothesis that China has made significant gains against the United States in the areas of economic growth, political relationships, and military growth since the end of the Cold War. Specific data on China's GDP and military spending as a percentage of GDP will support the hypothesis along with observations of China's new 'soft power' in the world of politics. The strength of this dissertation lies with the primary data gathered to analyze China's growth relative to the United States. The primary data is actual GDP numbers for China and the United States. Therefore the analysis of this data is straightforward. One of the weaknesses in analyzing the primary data used for this dissertation will be in converting

Chinese Yen to its equivalent purchasing power parity. The number used is the 2006 International Monetary Funds equivalent factor of seven with all dollar calculations using 2007 values.

Phase 3

Chapter VI will provide the analysis of the data presented in Chapter IV and Chapter V by examining the gains that China has made relative to the United States since the end of the Cold War. By comparing the economic gains of China against that of the United States, the political ties that China has made supporting its ideology and culture, and China's military build up and expenditure as a percentage of GDP, the evidence will support the hypothesis that China has made significant gains relative to that of the United States since the end of the Cold War.

Phase 4

Chapter VII will provide the conclusions of the dissertation expanding on the research question and hypothesis presenting additional ideas on future studies, assumptions and possible alliances that could form as China continues to grow as a superpower balancing the power of the United States.

Data Collection

For development of the hypothesis, data will be gathered during the literature review, identifying factors that influence states to align, international relations theories, and international systems with an examination of China's growth, economically militarily and politically since the end of the Cold War. Research for this dissertation will be conducted through searches on the Internet, academic databases, journals, books, and bibliographies. In reviewing the literature, specifically balance of power theory, factors that suggest that alliances will form economically, politically, and militarily can be identified and used to support the inference that the current actions of China, its economic growth, political growth and military growth support balance of power theory that alliances will form economically, politically, and militarily supporting a balance of power between the United States and China. The data collected will also support the hypothesis that China has made significant gains economically, politically, and militarily relative to the United States.

Data collection for GDP numbers that are used to determine China's economic growth will be obtained through Internet searches of databases to include the US State Department, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Secondary sources will be conducted utilizing bibliographies, journals, and books that pertain to the subject of economics and China's growth since the end of the Cold

War. There have been a number of works written as they pertain to China's growth and the perceived direction and intentions of China.

From the political perspective the primary measure of China's political growth will be that of China's inclusion of International Governmental Organizations (IGO) and coincidence of voting with or against the United States within the United Nations. Primary will be collected from the United Nations database on voting records and secondary data on China's inclusion into IGO's found in the *Yearbook of International Organizations* since the end of the Cold War.

Data collection pertaining to China's military growth will be measured by determining China's military budget as a percentage of its GDP. Data for GDP numbers will be obtained from databases to include the US State Department, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. China's military budget will be obtained from US State Department figures and the Bureau of Statistics of China. Secondary data will be found through research of journal articles and books pertaining to the specific subject of China's military growth and possible intentions from a military perspective.

CHAPTER IV

CHINA'S RISE TO SUPERPOWER STATUS

China's rise to a superpower has arrived at an alarming pace.

China has increased its economic, military, and political influence considerably between the years of 1989 and 2007, basically since the end of the Cold War. This chapter will identify China's economic growth on the basis of its GDP, which has grown at a pace that has caught the eye of many states, including the United States. China's military growth has also advanced considerably. China's military budget as a percentage of GDP has grown at a pace greater than that of the United States during the same period. China has also managed to advance its military capabilities through improvements in technology and training of its security forces. Lastly, China has increased its political influence at both the regional and global levels. China has moved from its borders and has increased its memberships presence in international organizations from a mere 10% of those of the United States to 80% of those of the United States in the 20 years since the end of the Cold War.

Examination of China's Economic Growth

In the past two decades China has begun to develop at a pace that is astonishing. Growth was at over eight percent each year between 1989 and 2007. Fishman (2005) notes that there are more than 220 million surplus workers in China's central and western regions, which is

considerably more than the number of people working in the United States in total.

China's relationships continue to evolve on the global level. In the past China has kept to itself on regional and global economic issues, which seem to be changing. In the past seventeen years China has developed a more aggressive role on the world stage as it has grown its economy at a rate that has been unmatched in recent history. China's population provides cheap labor for the along with a market for goods that have become commonplace in China's larger cities. Jain (2004) indicates that emerging trends show that "China can remain highly competitive in global and regional trade and the economic domain, and would continue to compete for status and influence in the Asian region in general, and in South Asia in particular" (p. 253).

Scobell suggests that the economic reforms launched by Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1978 have fueled an uninterrupted growth that has lasted for over 25 years, sustaining economic growth and prosperity in China (Scobell, 2005). Justin Yifu Lin, Director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University, asserts that this trend of nine percent growth could continue for the next 20 years (Zwieg & Jianhai, 2005).

Keith (2001) suggests that "The optimistic view contended that China's economic reform would lead to democracy and the rule of law whereas the pessimistic view argued that China's economic modernization

would provide the means by which to transform China's military power into a threat to regional security and peace" (p. 4).

China also has advanced its economic capabilities by advancing its technological capacity. Foreign direct investment and transfers of technology from other States in the region have also helped to stem China's economic rise. This advancement of new technologies and many of the manufactures have taken advantage, as they have understood the importance of technology in the production of manufactured goods (Ohashi, 2005). Changes in technology and new discoveries along with globalization of economies have helped to create a new industrial revolution that has advanced the growth of a knowledge based economy in China (Suttmeier, 2004). One of the areas such technological innovation is evident is in the private owned sector. As China moves to a new market economy there is growth that twenty years ago would not have happened. Suttmeier (2004) also finds that technological progress in the last twenty years has generally been emphasized in the non-state sectors especially where foreign direct investment has been the model with new firms being formed outside the normal model for Chinese firms that have been government owned previously.

As China continues its economic growth there are signs that the political situation in the Asia Pacific region is also changing. As noted by Kusuma Snitwongse (2003), "there are also signs of a changing power configuration in the Asia-Pacific region – a factor that must be taken into

consideration in addressing the question of international order” (p. 37). It is evident that China is becoming the dominant power in the region, with the capability and capacity to affect the world both economically and militarily, indicating China’s rise to superpower status or at least a regional hegemony. Snitwongse also states that “[T]he status of Taiwan in relation to China is another issue of contention, particularly between the US and China” (p. 37). The need for skilled labor is of utmost importance to China’s economic growth. Companies are knocking at China’s door and making deals that will open the door to the billion plus people who will need or provide the skills necessary to continue this growth. China is also viewed as an endless supply of labor that is becoming more skilled more educated and available to support China’s economic growth (Snitwongse, 2003). There are concerns however, on this rapid growth. Snitwongse suggests that concerns over security and stability in the area could be hindered or compromised depending on how China uses its newfound power.

Another factor that China is continuing is the foreign direct investment that is now being directed to China. In an article in the *South China Morning Post* the numbers are evident on investors directing investments to China at a rate that has changed 180 degrees. The article states that in the past Southeast Asia had received 61% investment into developing countries and China only receiving 18%. The numbers are now reversed, with 61% going to China and 17% to the rest of the

Southeast Asian countries in just ten years (Glosserman & Fritschi, 2002). Other indicators are that the ASEAN states are losing market share as a percentage of the export market. As China's share continues to grow the regional states are losing its share. ASEAN states have to compete with a labor force supporting the manufacturing and export of Chinese firms. As China has educated and grown its labor force China has filled the voids in the supply chain, providing the capital goods needed to fuel its growth (Cheng, 2004).

Looking at the various economic sectors within China, there has basically been sustained growth in all areas with areas in the United States losing in many of the same sectors as jobs move to China. These manufacturing losses in textiles, footwear, and computers have all moved overseas, where China has grown in these areas. What is most significant here is that as China's economy has grown the trade deficit of the United States increased to an average \$18.9 billion per month in the first quarter of 2007 (Fuller, 2008).

The expected benefit of the China – ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with over 1.7 billion customers will produce a GDP of \$2 trillion dollars with the total trade estimated to be \$1.23 trillion. The agreement will be of great benefit to all ASEAN countries, but it is an even greater benefit to China, as exports to China from ASEAN nations would equal 48% with exports from China to ASEAN nations at 55% (Wong & Chan, 2003).

Wong and Chan (2003) also note, "For the past two decades, Chinese exports have increased at a hefty annual rate of 15% (or more than twice the world's average), from \$13.7 billion in 1979 to \$325.6 billion in 2002, catapulting China to the rank of the world's fifth-largest exporting nation" (p. 512).

Chapter V will provide greater detail on China's economic numbers providing data on China's actual growth numbers as it pertains to GDP and export and import as a percentage of GDP with Chapter VI providing an analysis of China's economic growth since the end of the Cold War.

China's Growing Need for Natural Resources

Between 1987 and 2007, China's growth has influenced the aligning of states to have formal agreements for trade that have increased, especially when it is in need of resources and most specifically when it comes to oil. This is quite evident by the economic and political agreements that China has made with countries in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. China has grown its need for natural resources to capacities that are almost on par with the United States. China's growth and formation of a middle class has become a considerable movement into the world of 'globalization'. China's economy and growth has been at an alarming pace with people moving to the cities for work that pays enough to begin the development of a middle class. China's 1.3 billion plus people will need the technologies that continue this development and

if it can be sustained the economy will continue to grow at this alarming pace.

This need for natural resources of all types will continue to grow, as China will continue to increase its infrastructure to support the labor force that has moved into the industrial centers in order to fill the void that is needed to manufacture goods at the levels support China's growth.

China's ideas on foreign policy have begun to take shape as there is more need for trade to fuel its growth and development of a middle class and market economy. Keith (2004) states that, "Chinese foreign policy has espoused a new 'idealist' view on multilateralism and multipolarity while at the same time demonstrating a cautious approach to the realities of the balance of power. It sees globalization, particularly economic globalization as inevitable, yet and still pits the equality of state sovereignty, against 'hegemony', unipolarity and unilateralism" (p. 507).

Examination of China's Security and Military Buildup

By looking at history, one can understand the era of the Cold War where the United States and the Soviet Union maintained a bipolar balance of power, with alliances formed around each of these states. China does, however, accept that 'sovereign' countries are entitled to form alliances (Harris & Cooper, 2000). Scobell (2005) has indicated that China's military has become a more modern force that is better educated, equipped with a more dynamic capability and mindset that focuses not on

what was the 'people's war' but now on warfare that is aimed at peaceful means by better technology. McDevitt (2004) also suggests that China is modernizing its military. McDevitt states that "Over the course of that decade of the 1990s the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has been putting into motion a reform and modernization program that is based on a very careful analysis of the changing nature of modern warfare-the so called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)-and an equally careful assessment of the most likely future contingencies it might face" (p. 418).

Another factor that is faced by China's growth and buildup in the region and possible the global perspective is the battle over Taiwan and security in the region. The August 2002 Annual Report to the President and to Congress (ADR) states, "Maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be both a critical and formidable task. The possibility exists that a military competitor with a substantial resource base will emerge in the region"(Rumsfeld, 2002). McDevitt states that "some throughout the government worry about a potentially antagonistic China that would be economically and militarily strong in the 2020-2030 time frame, China could become a regional peer competitor" (p. 414).

China is a rich and powerful nation. It has the capability to reach global targets and upset regional, if not global, economies and markets. The Chinese are also beginning to produce technologies that mimic those of the United States sometimes on their own and sometimes from stolen plans or technologies. In his book, *China: The Gathering Threat*, Menges

writes, "The Chinese Communist Party took power on the battlefield. Mao said, 'Political power grows out of the barrel of the gun,' and the party has always been serious about issues of war and military strength. China fought against the United States in Korea and, by preventing the defeat of North Korea, believes that it won the war" (Menges, 2005, p. 311).

Menges also discusses China's missile buildup from ballistic to nuclear with global potential. He writes,

in the 1980's China developed six new types of ballistic missiles. Some of these were able to survive attack by either the Soviet Union or the United States because they would be solid – fueled and mobile, rather than being launched from fixed silos or deep – tunnel areas that might become known and therefore targeted in advance. As these missiles were moving from design to early development in the 1980s, China also used espionage and its own skilled personnel to begin developing the smaller, lighter nuclear warheads that those missiles would deliver to their targets. During the 1990s, China tested the newly manufactured nuclear warheads and moved the new ballistic missiles from development to testing and in the production phase (2005, p. 312).

By 2004, China had grown its ballistic missile stockpile to over 800 missiles with the capability of striking targets on a global basis and as a preemptive one. These missiles have nuclear, biological, and conventional configurations (Menges, 2005).

One concept that Menges has is that China could strike first. Menges states, "The combination of China's strategic objectives and its assessment of the implications of advanced technologies for warfare have resulted in a number of fundamental shifts in military approach. In broadest terms, China ended its emphasis on 'protracted, large scale land

warfare' and began to focus on 'regional conflicts along China's periphery officially called peoples war under modern conditions' but also described as 'local warfare under high technology conditions' (2005, p. 322).

Menges goes on to state that, "Another aspect of China's new military strategy is given the name 'active defense' but what it means, as the Chinese describe it, is 'gaining initiative by striking first'" (2005, p. 322).

China's growth in military capability concurrent with its economic growth over the past 20 years suggests that as China grows economically it will grow militarily to protect those interests. China does continue to state that it is a peaceful nation and will only defend itself if attacked. However, China has the capacity and ability to strike first and as it continues into modernization policies could change. If China continues to develop power the United States should be concerned with the notion that power corrupts. Once China develops its middle class, its citizens will want more. That is evident every day in the United States and around the world. American policymakers should be concerned. China has the capacity to have a need for it all. Resources could become scarce or demand for resources may drive prices up as we see in current oil prices.

Keith (2001) suggests that "The optimistic view contended that China's economic reform would lead to democracy and the rule of law whereas the pessimistic view argued that China's economic modernization would provide the means by which to transform China's military power into a threat to regional security and peace" (p. 4). Keith goes on to state, "the

new Bush administration pushed the envelope when it announced on April 24 a six billion dollar sale of arms to Taiwan, which Beijing immediately denounced as 'offensive' in its strategic implications" (p. 5).

One argument that Menges puts forward is that China could strike first. Menges states, "The combination of China's strategic objectives and its assessment of the implications of advanced technologies for warfare have resulted in a number of fundamental shifts in military approach. In broadest terms, China ended its emphasis on 'protracted, large scale land warfare' and began to focus on 'regional conflicts along China's periphery officially called peoples war under modern conditions' but also described as 'local warfare under high technology conditions'" (Menges, 2005, p. 322). Menges goes on to state that, "Another aspect of China's new military strategy is given the name 'active defense' but what it means, as the Chinese describe it, is 'gaining initiative by striking first'" (2005, p. 322).

China has argued that the form of military alliances is not what it would like to see in an international system that has moved away from the Cold War mentality. McDevitt finds that China continues to undermine U.S. security strategy in Asia by touting its 'New Concept of Security,' one that is less dependent upon bilateral alliances (McDevitt, 2004). Yahuda finds that,

Beijing's version of multi-polarity calls for coexistence between states with different systems, religions and so on, leading to a 'democratic' stable order devoid of confrontation. Interdependence should not undermine the 'economic security of sovereign states',

nor should there be discrimination in international trade, nor attempts to use 'currency and financial levers' to impose political and economic conditions which violate the legitimate national interests of any particular country (2003, p. 201).

China's new concept of security is what China calls 'cooperative security'. China has articulated this position since the early 1990s as traditional security systems such as bilateral alliances are outdated post-Cold War ideas, though the first time that then President Jiang Zemin described this cooperative security was at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in June 2001 (Yahuda, 2003). China has also influenced the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN's) agenda as it pertained to cooperative security, which, unlike traditional alliance based systems of security, is an approach that is applicable to all states (Yahuda, 2003). Yahuda goes on to explain, "cooperative security is concerned with the process of building trust and mutual confidence in the expectation that by continually extending the practice of multilateral cooperation the prospect for armed conflict will disappear in due course" (2003, p. 192). China's actions since 1987 are indicative of a cooperative strategy with states in the region or along its border. Russia and China have forged an ongoing relationship along with three other states to form the Shanghai Five. In 1992 China and Russia began to ease the strain of their relationship with a visit to Beijing from Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President. This initial visit has led to greater cooperation between Russia and China, including the

formation of the Shanghai Five, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, and Tajikistan, in 1996.

China and the United States have had and continue to have working relationships that have held up for many years and cooperation continues to be the norm. Pablo-Baviera (2003) states that "Military relations between the two sides have encompassed technology and weapons transfer projects; high level exchanges of joint chiefs-of-staff, service chiefs and between defense universities; working level exchanges of experts in logistics, management, maintenance and military medicine as well as sharing of intelligence" (p. 340). Pablo-Baviera also suggests that once the Soviet Union had imploded in 1990-91, providing an absence of a common threat to China and the U.S. differences between the two have been highlighted as well as creating a potential for competition, though China is still far behind America. Beijing has begun its rise with the development of its military and economic growth and regional influence.

Yahuda (2003) suggests that "The American alliance system has been the principal factor in preserving the status quo in Northeast Asia that has so far served Chinese interests well in the post Cold War era" (p. 200). Yahuda goes on to state that U.S. alliances with Japan "will encourage Japan to emerge as an active regional military partner of the U.S. with consequences that Japan would once again re-emerge as a military power" (2003, p. 200). Murata (2003) also supports this argument, stating "The cracks that are appearing in the alliance between the U.S.

and Korea, in the NATO alliance, and various others will serve to further increase the importance of the alliance between the U.S. and Japan" (p. 56).

China also continues to increase its military capabilities at an alarming pace. One of the most identifiable characteristics of a 'superpower' is its military might and ability to reach global targets. China currently has the world's largest Army with over 2.5 million soldiers and the world's largest Air Force with 4,000 fighters, 400 ground-attack aircraft, and 120 bombers. China is now building what is destined to become the world's largest Navy, building large fleets of ships capable of navigating the globe though its current arsenal consists of 64 major surface combat ships, 55 attack submarines, and more than 40 medium and heavy amphibious lift vessels ("Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China", 2007). Keith (2004) states,

China's military diplomacy and its 'new security concept' are based upon a new application of apparently established principles in a new world confronted by the changing requirements of globalization. When it comes to the economic relations between states, Chinese policy has stressed the opportunities for 'common prosperity' and 'common development'. The same underlying themes relating to reciprocity and mutuality between states that are equally sovereign is stressed in security terms. In particular the US quest for 'absolute security' is contrasted with the need for a security community, based upon sovereign equality (p. 516).

Keith also states, "The Chinese are attempting to blunt the potentially destabilizing aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs, particularly as the power relations between states are affected by

unevenness in the military technological capacity of states to participate in high-tech weapons development” (p. 516).

One of the most important relationships that China has formed with other states is that with Russia. China and Russia have held joint military exercises in recent years. China and Russia have also held China – Russia summits beginning in 1992 when then Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited Beijing. This China-Russia relationship also has helped China to advance its military as China has benefited as has Russia from the sale of military armament to China as Russia needed the influx of currency during this period after Russia’s fall. The continuation of this relationship that China and Russia have forged resulted in the development of the Shanghai Five. The inclusion of the Central Asian states from China’s perspective was a much needed alliance for China as these states were rich in many of the natural resources that China needs to sustain its growth and the inclusion of Russia helped to ease any suspicions by Russia as to the formation of this alliance (Menges, 2005).

Examination of Increase in the Extent of China’s Political Influence

In addition to its economic growth and increased military capabilities, China has increased its regional and global prestige and political influence. Keith writes,

The People’s Republic of China is the first developing state to become a world power. Within a relatively short time frame, China has had to carve out a new role for itself and define its responsibilities as an influential state both at the regional and

international levels. Within this time frame, however, China has also had to cope with the liabilities and opportunities of 'globalization'. In meeting this challenge, the Chinese have demonstrated a new penchant for multilateralism, even as they have adopted to the realities of the balance of power (2004, p. 507).

One of the key areas where China is gaining political strength is in its own region. Through associations created for trade and interchange such as ASEAN, China has gained support of its regional partners.

Joseph Yu-Shek Cheng (2004) states,

The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area is undoubtedly an outstanding achievement of this approach; but ASEAN has been trying to keep its options open. On the other hand, China has been concerned with the danger of deterioration in Sino-American relations and the increasing distrust between Tokyo and Beijing. Improvement of China-ASEAN relations therefore assumes increasing significance in China's regional policy; and enhancing mutual interests and interdependence is the best way to erode the ASEAN states' perception of the 'China threat'. But China must not neglect the interests of Japan and South Korea or underestimate ASEAN's resistance to exclusion of the US and its desire to maintain a balance of power in the region (p. 257).

Another indicator that China has advanced is its admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Ronald Keith indicates this was done through policy debates and the thought that China has become or is now a 'normalized' state. Keith states that,

The PRC's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was accompanied by domestic foreign policy debates on China as becoming a 'normal country' (*zhengchangole guojia*). The debate was filliped by Jiang's July 1, 2001 speech commemorating the 80th anniversary of Chinese Communist Party. The speech was widely interpreted as a key gloss on the history of the struggles of the Chinese people as it relates to the contemporary need for China to put the history of national humiliation truly in the past so that China

can properly achieve its rightful status as a new world power (2004, p. 509).

China's past reluctance to play an influential role in regional and global political matters has decreased significantly as China is now playing a more powerful role in global politics (Fishman, 2005). There is within the region a thought of China's emergence as an economic power with its size and exceptional growth of possibly being positive to the region.

Snitwongse states,

Within Southeast Asia, China is increasingly being viewed as an engine of growth, a distinction which previously belonged to Japan. China's agreement with ASEAN to set up a free trade area by 2010, accompanied by the offer of an 'early harvest,' is seen as another benevolent act – one that is intended to calm ASEAN countries' concerns about the economic challenge that China poses; the 'China factor' is increasingly being seen more as an opportunity than a cause for concern (2003, p. 39).

Concerns over resources could also create tense situations.

"Given the White House's current penchant for unilateral intervention and the loud voices in Congress calling China a military threat, Beijing might reasonably begin to fear that the United States will try to block its purchases on natural resources to destabilize it" (Zwieg & Jianhai, 2005, p. 27). Zwieg and Jianhai (2005) also indicate that there is tension between China and Japan over natural gas reserves in the East China Sea.

Other aspects of China's move to a state with thoughts on globalization and its growth is how China is taking advantage of its technical advantage by changing foreign policies. Keith states,

the PRC has adjusted the underlying rationality of its foreign policy so as to take advantage of the new global opportunities of trade, investment and technological cooperation while seeking to influence the rules of international organization and regimes so as to insure their qualification in relation to the priorities of China's own national economic development"(Keith, 2004). Keith also suggests that China is still at times reluctant to undertake responsibilities in international affairs often times abstaining rather than voting on resolutions within the United Nations (2004, p. 509).

China and the United States have had and continue to have working political relationships that have held up for many years and cooperation continues to be the norm. Pablo-Baviera states that "Military relations between the two sides have encompassed technology and weapons transfer projects; high level exchanges of joint chiefs-of-staff, service chiefs and between defense universities; working level exchanges of experts in logistics, management, maintenance and military medicine as well as sharing of intelligence" (2003, p. 340). Pablo-Baviera (2003) also suggests that once the Soviet Union had dismantled providing an absence of a common threat to China and the U.S. differences between the two have been highlighted as well, as creating a potential for competition. Although China is far behind with the U.S. as the world's only superpower at the moment, China has begun its rise with the development of its military and economic growth and regional influence. Snitwongse also identifies concerns with China's military growth. Snitwongse states,

Another dimension of the 'rising China' is its military power. As reported on October 2002, China is fast reshaping its bloated and outdated armed forces into a modern, integrated fighting force that is emerging as a regional power. The main objective for now appears to pose a credible threat towards Taiwan rather than the US, and China now denies that it views itself as a natural leading power in the Asia-Pacific region (2003, p. 39).

The reality today is that China is a major threat to the United States, and a growing one. China's rulers – from its presidents to its general in charge of the all-powerful Central Military Commission – remain communists, and the fifty years of communist rule are replete with brutal repression, mass murder, and border wars with China's neighbors. But communism seeks to change not only external political conditions but also the internal nature of human beings – hence its emphasis on mass indoctrination and its hatred for anything that might offer a contrary view of man (Gertz, 2000). Gertz continues,

In a December 1998 speech, Jiang Zemin affirmed that 'without Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership, there would not be a new China; and without Comrade Deng Xiaoping's leadership, there would not be the path of building socialism 'with Chinese characteristics' means a communism that fulfills China's sense of its own superiority. China considers its culture to be the oldest in the world. It refers itself as the Middle Kingdom – the place between heaven and earth. And to restore its former grandeur through modernizing communism, it will pay any human price" (2000, p. 11).

One of the many concerns with the United States and its global partners is that China continues to state that it is a peaceful nation that will never attack or interfere with international affairs of other nations though it continues to grow the military and its economy and a considerable pace.

Bernstein and Munro discuss the notion of hegemony and the Chinese beginning the chapter with,

A slogan that has been a consistent since the heyday of Chairman Mao is 'we will never seek hegemony'. Indeed, that slogan, a statement of China's peaceable intent in its foreign relations, is one of the few that has remained in use in China as the country has passed through its various political stages, from radical Maoism to the era of Deng Xiaoping. All along, China's official position has been that it seeks to develop a world class economy, to maintain military force only for defense, and to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries (1998, p. 51).

Bernstein and Munro continue, noting, "for three decades, China has promised never to attack another country first – only to counterattack if another country attacks it. It has vowed never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It proclaims itself to be a struggling Third World country with no superpower capabilities or ambitions" (1998, p. 51). One of the concerning ideas with this statement is that China considers itself a 'struggling Third World country'. How can a state with such power make this comment? How does a country with a GDP growing at 10% yearly, trade agreements, and possibly the largest military with a blue water navy that is growing at a massive pace make such a statement? How does a country with the capability to reach global targets and upset regional economies make such a statement? It cannot. This is a sleeping giant following the strategies of Sun Tzu and ideals of deception and denial against its enemies. Bernstein and Munro give us three good reasons not to believe these comments:

One is that China is now beginning the passage into a new phase of its history, what might be called an era of restored national greatness. Two, China is so big and so naturally powerful that it will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to do so as a matter of national policy. Three, and most important, China has pursued initiatives and framed strategic goals that belie its claims of modest Third World status. In sum, China's historic sense of itself, its basic material and human conditions, and its own assessment of its national interest combine to make a Chinese move toward Asian hegemony virtually inevitable (1998, p. 53).

This greater aggressiveness should be what concerns the region and the world. If China continues its sentiments as peaceful nation with no concerns as to the affairs of others and no want to control the world China's growth could be a good thing. But we need to watch this sleeping giant. Trade with China will need to level off if the US would like to continue with its way of life. If America is not careful, jobs will disappear with China in the lead.

Since the end of the Cold War, China has begun to utilize its power and influence in the international system. It has voted with and against the United States in United Nations Security Council votes and has expressed its belief in state sovereignty, especially when it comes to human rights issues. China is filling the void that was left by the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War as it is working to achieve the level of international influence and prestige Moscow once had.

Yahuda suggests that China has faced a century of shame and humiliation and is still in the process of establishing its identity in the modern world. Further, Yahuda contends that China has made many of the changes, as a means to resume what it deems is its rightful historical

role at the apex of world power. China is beginning to search for the means to attain wealth and power that would enable China to recapture that 'rightful' role (Yahuda, 2003).

China can be very explicit in its sovereignty and expects that there should be no external push from other states to intervene in Beijing's domestic affairs. Zhou Enlai, premier of the State Administrative Council, in 1949 stated that "No country may interfere in China's internal affairs" (Keith, 2001). China wants to control its own destiny. Keith states,

The PRC's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was accompanied by domestic foreign policy debates on China as becoming a 'normal country' (*zhengchangole guojia*). The debate was flipped by then Chinese President Jiang Zemin's July 1, 2001 speech commemorating the 80th anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party. The speech was widely interpreted as a key gloss on the history of the struggles of the Chinese people as it relates to the contemporary need for China to put the history of national humiliation truly in the past so that China can properly achieve its rightful status as a new world power (2004, p. 509).

China is a rich and powerful nation. It has the capability to reach global targets and upset regional, if not global, economies and markets. China is amassing the largest military around the globe. The Chinese are also beginning to produce technologies that mimic those of the U.S., sometimes on their own and sometimes from stolen plans or technologies. In his book *China: The Gathering Threat*, Menges (2005) writes "The Chinese Communist Party took power on the battlefield. Mao said, 'Political power grows out of the barrel of the gun,' and the party has always been serious about issues of war and military strength. China

fought against the United States in Korea and, by preventing the defeat of North Korea, believes that it won the war” (p. 311). Menges also discusses China’s missile buildup from ballistic to nuclear with global potential. He writes,

in the 1980’s China developed six new types of ballistic missiles. Some of these were able to survive attack by either the Soviet Union or the United States because they would be solid – fueled and mobile, rather than being launched from fixed silos or deep – tunnel areas that might become known and therefore targeted in advance. As these missiles were moving from design to early development in the 1980’s, China also used espionage and its own skilled personnel to begin developing the smaller, lighter nuclear warheads that those missiles would deliver to their targets. During the 1990’s, China tested the newly manufactured nuclear warheads and moved the new ballistic missiles from development to testing and in the production phase” By 2004, China had grown its ballistic missile stockpile to over 800 missiles with the capability of striking targets on a global basis and as a preemptive one. These missiles have nuclear, biological, and conventional configurations (2005, p. 312).

Pablo-Baviera goes on to state, “Beijing and Washington themselves had had very close security cooperation on a wide range of activities until the June 1989 events at Tiananmen” (2003, p. 340). The events that occurred between April 15, 1989 and June 4, 1989 caused great concern as to how China treated its people. There were demonstrations held in China’s most sacred landmarks and martial law was declared on May 20th. Though martial law was in effect the protests did not let up. Beijing made a decision to clear the square and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moved in to stop the demonstrations and clear the square. In the aftermath from the time the PLA entered the

square many Chinese citizens were killed. This show of force by China against its own people raised attention to more than the U.S. that had raised apprehension as to how relations with China should proceed or if reparations should be levied against China. Ideas on how governments should "manage" its people have long been at the forefront of many a dialog between diplomats.

China's leaders continue to suggest that there should be a multipolar leadership in the international system, creating a more conducive balance between states. Pablo-Baviera (2003) states that "A multipolar order, it is argued, would be more consistent with recent global trends such as the greater salience of economic over military power, increased interdependence, the different nature of security threats and challenges since the 1990's, and the U.S.'s own inability to take action in response to such challenges to international security without relying on coalitions with other states" (pp. 342-343).

Yahuda (2003) states that "Communist ideology has eroded and continued engagement with the outside world undermines it still further" (p. 199). As China continues its march to a market economy the old ideology will continue to erode, communist ideals will go by the wayside and China will continue its economic and military growth as a superpower.

Since the end of the Cold War China has grown its political influence in various ways. One of the most obvious has been China's involvement in international organizations. At the end of the Cold War,

China's involvement in international organizations was at 20% of that of the United States. China has grown this involvement to 80% in 2006.

China is also a permanent member of the Security Council, which lends itself China's ability to counter actions by the United States. In Chapter V, data is provided identifying yearly important votes. Of those 85 total votes China has only voted with the United States five times. This platform and the platform of other international organizations provide China the ability to sound its ideology on topics that affect the United States and its ideology as to a states action. Areas around human rights and security are at the forefront of the challenges between China and the United States. China has developed relationships with states in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East that at a minimum support China's ideology and government of its people.

Conclusions

China has grown its need for natural resources from very little just 10 years ago to capacities that are almost on par with the United States. China's growth and formation of a middle class has become a considerable movement into the world of 'globalization'. China's economy and growth has been at an alarming pace with people moving to the cities for work that pays enough to begin the development of a middle class. China's 1.3 billion plus people (*Political handbook of the world 2005 - 2006*, 2006) will need the technologies that continue this development and

if it can be sustained the economy will continue to grow at this alarming pace. Just reading Fishman's book *China, inc.*, will open one's eyes to the capacity that China has to control its destiny.

The masses of people should be cause for alarm to all. The ability for a need of resources, labor, and other goods will advance China to superpower status, as they will have the ability to direct and control economies and prices. As foreign investment continues China is making the rules, granted those investors are making profit but China is managing that profit. China is a regional superpower and will soon be a global superpower. China has economic controls and we bow to them for access to the billion plus labor and buying force. Americans can see that in the U.S. trade deficit has increased considerably with the Chinese.

China also has the ability to reach global targets and strike at will. There military is becoming more advanced with new technologies and the building of a large blue water fleet of navy ships with the ability to transverse the globe. China is a superpower and continues to grow at an alarming pace through economic growth, military growth, and its diplomatic growth and it appears that China will continue this path.

The last half century in short saw China acquiring the conditions for renewed greatness. First came the elimination of foreign exploitation and invasion. The great contribution of the communist revolution to Chinese history was that it completed the tasks of national consolidation and domestic stability. Communism also restored a great deal of Chinese national pride, since, under it, China was able for the first time in more than a century to defend itself against foreign interference. But it was only when Deng Xiaoping jettisoned orthodox Marxist economies that China was able to begin realizing its potential. And that potential is vast, given

the country's basic elements. Indeed, they are the same elements of size, population, and economic resources that ensured it superpower status in the past and will ensure superpower status in the future (Bernstein & Munro, 1998, p. 57).

CHAPTER V

RISING CHINESE POWER AND SINO-AMERICAN REALTIONS

An Introduction to the Relationship between China and the United States

China and the United States have had both adversarial and cooperative relationships with each other in the past and continue to do so currently. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, China has filled the void as the principal balancing power to the United States. China's longing for recovering its greatness has finally arisen with the end of the Cold War and China has stepped up to take advantage of that opportunity.

China and the United States have had fairly good relations since the time President Richard Nixon initiated talks with China back in 1972. Since then the United States has had some reservations on China's behavior, mostly due to human rights concerns and the protection of Taiwan.

The U.S. – China relationship was frozen for more than twenty years after the Chinese Communists came to power on the mainland in 1949. The turning point came when President Richard M. Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong recognized they had a common adversary in the Soviet Union. Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972 led to a period of euphoria and goodwill, allowing the two sides to achieve even a degree of accommodation on the difficult question of Taiwan's status (Suettinger, 2003, p. ix).

China did support the United States after Al Qaeda's attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 and has worked to support the cause against terrorism to some extent, though China still sells arms to states characterized by the Department of State as sponsors

of terrorism. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States China has been at the forefront in support against the war on terror. On 9/11 Chinese President Jiang Zemin sent a message to President George W. Bush and condemned the terrorist stacks. In a later phone conversation with President Bush, the Chinese ruler promised the corporate with the United States to combat terrorism. Within the United Nations Security Council, China also voted for Resolution 1368 to combat terrorism (Kan, 2005). As this dissertation will identify, China has been developing its relationships in an effort to extend its political reach, economic growth, and security to advance its interests, regionally and globally as a result of its growing demand for natural resources and enhanced international prestige. China has had concerns over the United States and its formal military alliances, but has also taken advantage of those relationships. During the last quarter-century of the Cold War when China supported the United States in its efforts against the Soviet Union, China basically put up with the alliances that America formed to keep pace with the Soviet Union (Pablo-Baviera, 2003).

With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union China has filled the void, making its way back to its former greatness.

The absence of a common threat helped highlight differences as well as the potential for competition between the two, primarily because, just as the United States emerged as the world's sole superpower, China has itself began to rise in economic importance, military strength, and regional influence (Pablo-Baviera, 2003, p. 340).

The extent of political relationships between China and the United States dropped considerably in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, especially with China's poor record on human rights and China's continued support of terrorist states through the sale of military goods. In particular, the United States is concerned over political, economic, and security aspects of China's expansion.

Despite the more benign security environment in the 1990's, without the Soviet threat underlying strategic cooperation Sino-US relations deteriorated, especially in the last few years before 11/9. From the US perspective, China's poor record of human rights and democracy, ambitious military modernization program, increasing nationalism and assertiveness, weapons sales to countries perceived as hostile to the United States, provision of missile technology to some developing countries, and irredentist claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea led to perceptions that it was basically a dissatisfied or revisionist power and therefore a potential destabiliser (Pablo-Baviera, 2003, pp. 340-341).

China has increased its power considerably in all three areas this dissertation posits, which are economically, politically, and from the security perspective. Depending on the issue area and circumstances involved, China can be considered a threat or an ally in this world of globalization. Some would consider China's growth just that, growth as it advances to a more modern state as its economy advances at a double-digit rate. "The issue of a 'China threat' has indeed thrown up two competing American assumptions, the one that Chinese economic modernization will underwrite an aggressive foreign and defense policy and the other that Chinese economic modernization is consistent with regional and international peace and security" (Keith, 2001, p. 6).

Since the end of the Cold War there have been a few cases in which China and the United States have had a contentious relationship. Consider, for example, China's continued missile tests where China has tested long and short-range missiles, firing them over Taiwan into the South China Sea, and in 2007, Beijing's successful firing of an anti satellite missile destroying a weather satellite, which illustrate its advancement in missile technology and guidance systems. Though there have been protests from the United States, Taiwan, and other regional States, China continues to advance this technology. There have also been accidental bombings of China's embassy in Kosovo and an US EP-3 aircraft making an emergency landing after a mid air collision with a Chinese aircraft that have also led to some deterioration of the China - United States relationship.

Conflict between Washington and Beijing was aggravated during the Taiwan Straits tensions in 1996 when the United States deployed aircraft carriers from bases in Japan in response to missile tests conducted by China; again during the May 1998 bombing (accidental or otherwise) of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by US fighter planes at the height of Kosovo operations; and then again during the April 2001 US EP-3 spy plane incident over Hainan (Pablo-Baviera, 2003, p. 341).

There has also been positive communication between China and the United States in the past years as well. China and the United States have worked together in a few areas especially on combating terrorism. After Al Qaeda's September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, China provided its support of the United States in the war against

terror and on September 12, 2001 China voted for UN Security Council Resolution 1693 supporting the combat of terror. This support has continued through multiple round tables on the combating of terror between China and the United States. As of March 8, 2008 there have been six such meetings. Though there are still concerns on both sides though both states work together when necessary.

On the positive side, there was cooperation between Beijing and Washington on bilateral economic issues, managing a soft landing for North Korea, global non-proliferation and environmental regimes, the campaign against narcotics, and other areas of functional cooperation. Yet, with the US becoming more powerful now than any other country at any time in history, and China perceived as a rising and dissatisfied power, the possibility of China becoming a new target of US containment strategy, and therefore of alliance action, loomed large. In this context China started to become more critical of US alliances toward the end of the 1990's (Pablo-Baviera, 2003, p. 341).

As China continues its growth economically, militarily, and politically the United States will have to continue to advance its abilities as well. The United States will need to stay ahead of China's developments as the threats to America and its allies increase. As Keith write about the realist notion of peace;

The Western concept of 'threat' has often tended to focus on the changing capabilities of states and hence the enduring realist notion, *si vis pacem, para bellum*, (if you want peace, prepare for war). Putting aside the issue as to whether the world's only superpower enjoys an extraordinary power advantage over China as a developing state, this classical realist rational for an arms race suggests that increases in capability are *prima facie* evidence of 'threat' and require appropriate levels of a military buildup in order to re-assert a balance of power (2001, p. 7).

In the 1990s many of China's leaders were against the direction China was heading and worked to change the direction to one exerting more pressure on the United States, asking for an end to some of the current policies of China. Many of the senior officers had forged a letter to Deng Zhao Ping and Secretary General Jiang Zemin on the concerns of China's tolerance for the United States and stating other concerns over the sale of military fighter jets to Taiwan and hints of espionage by journalists and academics and stating that the United States was its enemy. After the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989 China campaigned hard to get its most favored nation status renewed during the Clinton presidency. Chinese and U.S. corporate leaders asked that there be no conditions on trading and on May 26, 1994 President Clinton decided to renew the Most Favored Nation trading status of China with no conditions (Menges, 2005).

One of the major problems between China and the United States is the Tiananmen Square events, which lasted for approximately two months in 1989 when protests in China's Tiananmen Square led to a government crackdown that hindered US-Chinese relations. President George H. W. Bush had previously expressed intentions of strengthening America's relationship with China (Suettinger, 2003). However, the human rights atrocities that China's leadership had committed left the Bush presidency searching for answers. Thousands were killed in those months during the protests and the United States determined that such human rights

violations were inexcusable and President Bush revoked the Most Favored Nation status of China. Though up until the problems occurred China and the US had been working closely on a range of topics especially security. Once the problems ensued much of the transfers had stopped. Much of the cooperation between the two sides was the exchange of high profile exchanges.

Beijing and Washington themselves had had very close security cooperation on a wide range of activities until the June 1989 events at Tiananmen. Military relationships between the two sides then encompassed technology and weapons transfer projects; high level exchanges of joint chiefs-of-staff, service chiefs and between defense universities; working level exchanges of experts in logistics, management, maintenance and military medicine as well as sharing of intelligence (Pablo-Baviera, 2003, p. 340).

One of the greatest areas where China and the US have worked together is after the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the Global War on Terrorism. After this period the United States had an opportunity to build new alliances and rekindle old ones, which did cause China some concern though they never raised issue with the growing relationships (Pablo-Baviera, 2003).

Pablo-Baviera states the advantages and disadvantages to the new war on terrorism which have been positive for both the US and China:

Indeed, there are both advantages and disadvantages for China's security. The advantages for China centre around how international terrorism has deflected the attention of the United States, its allies and the international community as a whole, away from the 'China threat'. It has led to the diversion of US military resources to other parts and problems of the world. These in turn will allow Beijing breathing space for the new 'forth generation' leadership to consolidate and direct its attention to the many

serious internal problems China faces. China also can expect less pressure from the West on its human rights record, especially since the United States itself has been under criticism for violations of rights of suspected terrorists since it opened the detention facilities in Guantanamo. Finally, China can expect more sympathy and understanding from the West for its own heavy-handed treatment of Muslim separatists in Xinjiang province (2003, p. 348).

Another area of contention is with the island of Taiwan. On April 26, 2006 President Bush made the comment that the United States would 'do whatever it takes' to support Taiwan if there was a conflict with China. China sees this as a direct conflict with its policy toward Taiwan. The United States had also just signed an arms deal with the Taiwanese, supplying them with military hardware and support just a few days earlier. What Keith discerns from this remark is that the United States is leaving no question as to what Washington will do if the event were to ever occur (Keith, 2001). According to Keith, "In Beijing, the comment prompted debate as to the substance of Sino-US 'strategic rivalry' and whether Bush was actually abandoning 'strategic ambiguity' as the basis for dealing with the Taiwan question" (2001, p. 1). This confrontation over Taiwan will continue until the leadership comes to an agreement to bring Taiwan back under the 'One China' fold.

China's Economic Relationships and Their Impact on the United States

Within the last few decades China's economy has grown considerably. One of the needs for China's growth has been the accelerated consumption of natural resources, especially oil, natural gas

and heavy metals to support this growth. China has had to import most of its energy needs by developing relationships with other states around the globe. In doing so, China has had to make many deals, forming new relationships along the way. The continued need is an important strategic component of the relationships China has formed along the way in sustaining this growth. To satisfy its continuing needs, China will have to continue to make these economic deals if it intends to sustain this growth. (Bergsten et al., 2006)

In many cases what we see is that China is focusing on developing countries. What Kurlantzick (2007) finds is:

China's strategy also includes focusing on developing nations whose bilateral relationships with other major powers are faltering. Often, these countries are either authoritarian states or nations whose leaders display some autocratic traits, and thus could be sympathetic to Chinese influence; many also have significant energy resources (p. 53).

China has truly moved into Latin America and has formed many relationships with states therein. Supporting this evidence Luft, suggests that in the Western Hemisphere China concluded oil and gas deals with Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador, though its main country of interest is Venezuela, which is the forth largest supplier of oil for he United States (Luft, 2003). Also supporting this contention, Campbell and O'Hanlon (2006) state that,

Finally China has made inroads into Latin America, long considered 'Americas backyard' because of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. In April 2001, then president Jiang Zemin spent almost two weeks in the region, visiting Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

In November 2004, Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba, signing business deals worth billions of dollars. With half of China's FDI flowing to Latin America, Chinese officials predict that their FDI in that region could amount to \$100 billion by the end of the decade (p. 198).

China's dependence on oil and other natural resources to support its basic needs will continue and one can only expect it to grow. For the ten years between 1995 and 2005 "China's energy consumption rose 80 percent, even as domestic oil production growth slowed. Consequently, China now relies on imports to meet almost half its petroleum demands" (Bergsten et al., 2006, p. 33).

One of the most significant examples of China sustaining this growth through engagement with Latin American countries came during the 2004 Asia-Pacific Cooperation Summit in Chile, where China committed to invest over \$100 billion with Latin American countries, including with deals Venezuela for oil and with Cuba for nickel (\$500 million). Bush and O'Hanlon have concerns over some of the deals that China has made citing "economic issues that create foreign policy problems," stating,

There are other economic issues that create foreign policy problems. One is China's investment in companies around the world, particularly those that produce oil and other natural resources. President Hu Jintao used his November 2004 visit to South America at the time of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Chile to sign a whopping \$100 Billion in investment commitments to Latin America (2007, p. 48).

Other evidence of China's growing development of relationships and economic alliances can be seen in the following economic agreements. China has developed relations with Bolivia, which have grown as socialist Bolivian President Evo Morales has asked China to help it develop its natural gas reserves, stating that China is Bolivia's 'ideological ally' as both countries continue to develop (Kurlantzick, 2007).

In addition to China's investment in Cuba's nickel industry, both communist nations have agreed to form closer relationships on all fronts ("China, Cuba agree to business deals ", 2004). To further the commitment both countries also agreed to expand the relationship politically (Huanxin, 2004).

China is also working with Venezuela, which has been very critical of the policies of the United States. In an article by the BBC in 2004 one can see the beginnings of the Chinese-Venezuelan relationship that is taking place. The Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez, has offered China access to much of the country's oil reserves in a trade deal between China and Venezuela which will allow China to operate oil fields in Venezuela and invest in new refineries ("Venezuela and China sign oil deal", 2004). To further the relationships in early 2005, China and Venezuela have signed nineteen agreements around oil, agriculture, and technology (Wagner, 2005). Wagner also notes China's needs, especially around oil and natural resources and notes that China has been strengthening economic relations with energy supplying countries as there is an

abundance in raw materials and resources (Wagner, 2005). During the visit where the deals were signed Chavez commented on the relationship with China stating that the conditions are better than ever and that continued relations would ensue between the two countries (Wagner, 2005).

China's new relationships are not only in Latin America but have reached into Central Asia as well, where China has also forged large deals with Kazakhstan in a pipeline agreement which is worth US\$3.5 billion (Afrasiabi, 2004).

Even with the preceding deals mentioned above, China's biggest deals are with states situated in the Middle East. China and Iran have signed a mega deal worth upwards of \$200 billion. According to Kavah Afrasiabi,

A clue to the fact that such anticipation may have totally understated the case was last week's signing of a mega-gas deal between Beijing and Tehran worth \$100 billion. Billed as the "deal of the century" by various commentators, this agreement is likely to increase by another \$50 to \$100 billion, bringing the total close to \$200 billion, when a similar oil agreement, currently being negotiated, is inked not too far from now. The gas deal entails the annual export of some 10 million tons of Iranian liquefied natural gas (LNG) for a 25-year period, as well as the participation, by China's state oil company, in such projects as exploration and drilling, petrochemical and gas industries, pipelines, services and the like. The export of LNG requires special cargo ships, however, and Iran is currently investing several billion dollars adding to its small LNG-equipped fleet (2004, p. 1).

China has also ventured into Africa. One of the deals it has made is with Somalia. This area is very unstable and provides the evidence that China is willing to undertake significant risks in order to fulfill its need for

resources as the area that China will be developing is hindered with political strife managed by warlords as battles are waged for power in the area. China's oil giant, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has won the right to look for and develop its search for natural resources (Jopson, 2007).

These economic relationships further the notion that China will be able to continue its growth as it inks new deals with states that as they gain access more natural resources that China will need to sustain its growth. China has invested in these states and continues its developments of relationships across the globe, as its need is great. If China is to provide security, economic stability, and political growth and development, it will need these deals and more.

As further evidence of China's economic growth, the tables below will provide some insight to China's growth relative to that of the United States and its growing relationships around its imports of oil. As seen in Table 1: Yearly GDP Stats on China and the United States, China's GDP growth outperforms the United States considerably. This growth is expected to continue and as such China will continue to make considerable gains. The statistics have been consolidated from three sites, which are referenced in the source information and bibliography. Each of the three sites is a government or public sector site providing data that is published by the represented governments of each state. The data utilized is such that any repetition of the methodology used would produce

consistent results in the data. The sites were used as the data could be found easily and without bias.

Table 1: *Yearly GDP Stats on China and the United States*

Yearly GDP Stats on China and the United States					
YEAR		CHINA		U.S.	Relative Increase
1989		11.47%		3.50%	7.97%
1990		8.98%		1.90%	7.08%
1991		14.30%		-2.00%	16.30%
1992		19.10%		3.30%	15.80%
1993		23.80%		2.70%	21.10%
1994		26.69%		4.00%	22.69%
1995		20.72%		2.50%	18.22%
1996		14.59%		3.70%	10.89%
1997		9.87%		4.50%	5.37%
1998		6.43%		4.20%	2.23%
1999		5.88%		4.50%	1.38%
2000		9.61%		3.70%	5.91%
2001		9.52%		0.80%	8.72%
2002		8.87%		1.60%	7.27%
2003		11.40%		2.50%	8.90%
2004		15.05%		3.60%	11.45%
2005		12.68%		3.10%	9.58%
2006		10.50%		2.90%	7.60%
2007		10.40%		4.90%	5.50%

Source: Data collected from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, The United States State Department, and The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at the following sites:

<http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/>

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/hist.pdf>

http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_china_milex_01.pdf

The 2007 numbers are estimates.

Table 2 below depicts the percentage of oil China imports from various regions around the globe. As one can see China's moves into Africa are providing much of its needed oil as imports from the Asia Pacific declines. One of the more important aspects regarding oil imports by

China over the past decade imports have increased considerable and is continuing that growth. The data collected below is from the International Energy Agency (IEA), which is an organization that works with governments in a cooperative effort with its twenty-eight member nations as an energy advisor to ensure that there is reliable energy that is clean and affordable to its people. The data provided is readily available to provide consistent information in order to ensure transparency if recreation of this data were needed in order to limit any bias that may be induced through the methodology used in this dissertation.

Table 2: *China's Oil Imports by Region (% percentage)*


Region	1990	1997	2001	2004
Asia Pacific	60.6	26.2	14	11.5
Middle East	39.4	47.5	56	45.4
Africa	0	16.7	23	28.7
Other (Europe, Americas)	0	9.6	7	14.3

Source: International Energy Agency, *China's Worldwide Quest for Energy Security*, 2000, 50. (Bergsten et al., 2006)

Table 3 below depicts the number of exports that have made their way to China. From 1990 through 2005, exports have increased with the greatest change coming from the region. This data was chosen in order to

provide insight into the trade that China is making in the region. The source is from the National Bureau of Statistics of China is a database that is readily available, easily accessible, and provides statistics of many Chinese sectors, products, and GDP. Yearly data for the past twenty years is available and would be consistent and available to perform any future research that may be produced.

Table 3: *Exports of Selected Economies to China*




Source: (Abramowitz & Bosworth, 2006) 2005 numbers estimated.

Table 4 below depicts China's source of imports from 1990 through 2005. As depicted here the greatest numbers of imports are also from the region. This data was chosen in order to provide insight into the trade that China is making in the region. The source is from the National Bureau of Statistics of China is a database that is readily available, easily accessible, and provides statistics of many Chinese sectors, products, and GDP.

Yearly data for the past twenty years is available and would be consistent and available to perform any future research that may be produced.

Table 4: *China's Source of Imports as a Percentage of Total Imports*



Source: (Abramowitz & Bosworth, 2006) 2005 numbers estimated

China's Political Relationships and Their Impact on the United States

On the political front China has made great strides. China has developed its soft power political relationships on all fronts and is considered by some to now play the role of the balancer as this dissertation suggests. Pablo-Baviera finds that, "There are also some who may envisage China as itself playing a role as a balancer, whether of Western US influence (e.g., on human rights issues, multilateral trade, and other developing country interests), or of Japanese economic power, or perhaps in the case of Myanmar-of future Indian power" (Pablo-Baviera, 2003, p. 347). This soft power that China has developed is also serving to

increase its presence in the international community, increasing its prestige on both regional and global levels as China has worked diligently to grow its power to a level that it had held in the past many centuries earlier.

From the political perspective of China, there have also been changes facilitated by new leadership in the upper echelons of government in China. From the old guard that held the strict military hold to what is the 'Fourth Generation' of new leaders that have a better understanding for China's growth in broader aspects. "Most recently, since 2002, China has witnessed a sweeping turnover of party, state, and military elites: first at the 16th CCP Congress in November 2002, and then at the 10th National Peoples Congress in March 2003. A new generation of Chinese leaders has come to the fore – the "Fourth Generation" (Scobell, 2005, p. 227). To further expand on the new generation of leaders, Miller (2003) states,

The changes in the top posts of the PRC state hierarchy made at the 10th NPC, held in Beijing March 5–18, 2003, confirmed widely held expectations. As could be inferred from party rankings, Hu Jintao replaced Jiang Zemin as PRC president, Wu Bangguo succeeded Li Peng as NPC chairman, and Wen Jiabao replaced Zhu Rongji as State Council premier. Jiang Zemin's reappointment as chairman of the party Central Military Commission in fall 2002 was replicated by his reappointment to the parallel chairmanship of the state Central Military Commission at the NPC. In the only appointment marked by real suspense, Zeng Qinghong was appointed PRC vice president, capping his spectacular ascent over the past year. Taken together with the changes made at the 16th Party Congress in November 2002, the NPC appointments complete a sweeping turnover of leaders. The CCP has a new general secretary and a new chairman of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission. The

PRC has a new president, vice president, NPC chairman, and State Council premier. Only the party and state Central Military Commissions' top leader—Jiang Zemin—retained his post. Beneath this top level of the leadership, the party congress and NPC brought about turnover of comparable sweep. As of the closing of the NPC on March 18:

- Sixteen of 25 members of the party Politburo are new to that body.
- On the Politburo Standing Committee—the party's core decision-making group—eight of nine members are new.
- Seven of eight members of the party Secretariat, which coordinates and oversees implementation of Politburo decisions, are new.
- Most of the heads of the party Central Committee are new.
- In the State Council, four of four vice premiers and five of five state councillors are new to those posts.
- Only three of eight members of the Central Military Commissions (their respective memberships are normally identical) are new as a consequence of the people's congress, but that statistic obscures the promotion of three men as successors to retiring members ahead of the congress.
- Eighteen of 28 State Council ministers are new as a result of the NPC.
- In the provinces, thanks to the rounds of provincial party and provincial people's congresses held over the past year, 11 of 31 province party secretaries and 15 of 31 governors are new to their posts" (2003, p. 1).

There has also been a change in how China is perceived in other parts of the world. Along with Venezuela, Russia, Iran, and Syria, one finds that states in Africa and Latin America have a more positive attitude towards China than of the United States. Kurlantzick has found support of this change in attitude: "Polls show that people in Africa and Latin America now have more positive feelings toward China than toward the United States" (2007, p. 9). In a British Broadcasting Cooperation poll held in 2005, of the twenty-two nations polled, almost all of the people felt that China played a more favorable roll than the United States does on a global perspective (Kurlantzick, 2007).

Table 5 below identifies many of the newer relationships that China has formed in the last ten to fifteen years. China has forged ahead considerably as it has a need mostly for natural resources but also for political backing. As a member of the United Nations Security Council, China has the ability to act in a manner contrary to that of the United States and its allies as it continues its advance to the level greatness once held by China. This also gives China the balancing power to that of the United States where China has a differing opinion as to that of the United States. Many of the states listed in Table 5 also have considerable relationships with the United States and even one of the relationships is with Washington. As this chapter continues it will identify many of the deals that China has made politically, economically, and from a security perspective.

Table 5: *China's Bilateral Partnerships*

Date	Partner	Name
Nov-93	Brazil	Long-Term Strategic Partnership
Mar-96	Russia	Strategic Cooperative Partnership
Nov-96	India	Constructive Partnership of Cooperation Oriented towards the 21st Century
Dec-96	Pakistan	All-around Cooperation Partnership Oriented Towards the 21st Century
Dec-96	Nepal	Good-Neighborly and Friendly Partnership Oriented towards the 21st Century
May-97	France	Long-Term Comprehensive Cooperation Partnership
Oct-97	United States	Building Towards a Constructive Partnership
Nov-97	Canada	Cross-Century Comprehensive Partnership
Dec-97	Mexico	Cross-century Partnership of All-round Cooperation
Dec-97	ASEAN	Good-Neighborly Partnership of Mutual Trust

Apr-98	European Union	Long-term and stable constructive partnership
Oct-98	United Kingdom	Enhanced Comprehensive Partnership
Nov-98	Republic of Korea	Cooperative Partnership
Nov-98	Japan	Friendly Cooperative Partnership
Apr-99	Egypt	21st Century-oriented Strategic Cooperative Relationship
Oct-03	ASEAN	Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity
Jun-05	India	Strategic Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity

Source: (Gill, 2005)

One of the political relationships that China has forged is with Iran. Currently there is no recent bilateral agreement but China and Iran have maintained diplomatic relations since 1971. China and Iran continue to work with each other through economic agreements, through which China provides military goods and technology to Iran and Iran provides some of the oil that China needs to continue fueling its growth. Kurlantzick feels Iran may be the best example, noting that,

Iran is probably the most obvious example of China's cultivation of isolated autocrats. Though clearly uncomfortable with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's strident anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric, the Chinese government invited him to address the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a leading summit of Chinese, Russian, and Central Asian leaders, held in China in June 2006. There the Iranian president delivered a major address on Chinese state television and touted Tehran's and Beijing's "identical" views on world issues (2007, p. 54).

China has also formed a relationship with the Philippines, while the relationship between the United States and the Philippines has declined. Filipino troops were pulled from Iraq in 2004 to free a Filipino hostage and, once this happened, the United States decreased the assistance given to

the Philippines in an effort to sway the Philippine's government to reconsider though this had little effect on the decision that had been made and within a year U.S. assistance was restored to. After this action, China invited Pilipino President Macapagal-Arroyo for a state visit offering cooperation and aid to the island (Kurlantzick, 2007). The decreased aid to the Philippines has not had any significant impact as China has provided support that was lost from the United States while in recent years much of the Philippine – United States relationship has recovered.

Another relationship that China has forged is with Sudan. China has developed this relationship as China's need for oil has grown. The relationship with Sudan provides China access to the vast quantities of oil that will keep China's growth on the pace of continued double-digit growth. As Kurlantzick notes,

In Sudan, as western nations isolated the Khartoum government for its human rights abuses and supposed links to terrorism, China stepped up its support. While the United States slapped sanctions on Khartoum, top Chinese politicians cultivated the Sudanese dictatorship, reportedly speeding up Chinese mega projects in Sudan in time for the tenth anniversary of the dictator Omar Bashir's coup, to bring him more prestige (2007, p. 54).

Goodman also supports what Kurlantzick finds and states, "China's relationship with Sudan has become particularly deep, demonstrating that China's commercial relations are intensifying human rights concerns outside its borders, while beginning to clash with U.S. policies and interests. Sudan is China's largest overseas oil project" (Goodman, 2003, p. 1). The relationship with Sudan will continue to develop as China's oil

projects expand in Sudan and as each of the states continue to support each other from the political perspective, especially on human rights issues.

Another political relationship that China has continued to develop is that with Thailand, which at one time was an ally of the United States. Thailand's former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has stated that China is one of Thailand's most important allies pertaining to diplomacy and its global relationships. In the days of China's Chairman Mao Zedong, Thai insurgents would do battle with the Chinese supporters causing disdain with the government. A complete change of direction has changed with the Thai people and its government as indicated by the actions of the Thai government in the early 2001 against the Falun Gong by denying the group's request hold an international meeting in Bangkok and cracking down on any demonstrations by the group. When the Thai government was asked why the Falun Gong was denied, the answer from the police minister was that the Thai government would like to keep good relations with China. Another area that has created a dislike for the United States among the Thais is in 1997 when Thailand's economy imploded. At the time in the early 1990s Thailand was advancing economically, but when the Thai currency was devalued in 1997, creating a downturn for the nation as a whole. During this crisis one of the beliefs by the Thai government and people was that the United States would bail them out. When this did not happen China refused to devalue the currency stating

that it would help stabilize the country and the region. China had become Thailand's ally and the people of Thailand felt that only China had helped them in the crisis (Kurlantzick, 2007).

Another relationship China has established is with Uzbekistan. This is also based on the human rights perspective where the United States had criticized Tashkent after the killing of hundreds of Uzbeks in May 2005 by what the United States called a machine gunning of civilians though Uzbekistan states that it was eliminating a group of dangerous Islamic extremists, after which China expressed its support of Tashkent (Kurlantzick, 2007).

One of the most significant relationships that China has cultivated is with Venezuela. Since the rise of President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela has had a very aggressive stance toward the United States. China has stepped in and courted Chavez, increasing its ties between the two nations with invitations of state visits to China. China has also supported Venezuela's bid for seat on the United Nations Security Council. This new relationship has included reductions in oil flow to the United States and considerable increases to China where Chavez has discussed reorienting its oil industry towards China (Kurlantzick, 2007).

Table 6 below identifies important votes held in the United Nations from 2000 through 2006. As indicated by the data within the table it is clear that China does not vote with the United States. On the few occasions that China has voted with the United States the vote is around

removing all nuclear weapons, the transfer of arms, eliminating religious intolerance, strengthening the role of the UN in elections, and the IAEA report. All of these votes, five of eighty-five with the United States, provide greater benefit to China and its ideology as to human rights, and removal of nuclear weapons that could give China greater power in a nuclear free world. Looking further into the votes raised, many are related to human rights considerations, as indicated by China's voting record, China has voted against any of the votes that have come up or have abstained from such vote where the United States has voted for such considerations. Other votes that China has voted against would be the promotion of democracy, or even 'honor crimes' against women. Further analysis of the data is contained in Chapter VI.

Table 6: *United Nations Important Votes 2000 - 2006*

UN Important Votes Years 2000 - 2006			
Important Vote	US	China	xDiff
2006			
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	N	Y	Y
2. Human Rights in Uzbekistan	N	Y	Y
3. Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People	N	Y	Y
4. Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat	N	Y	Y
5. Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons	N	Y	Y
6. Towards an Arms Trade Treaty	N	A	Y
7. Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices	N	Y	Y
8. Combating Defamation of Religions	N	Y	Y

9. Human Rights in North Korea	Y	N	Y
10. Human Rights in Belarus	Y	N	Y
11. Human Rights in Iran	Y	N	Y
12. International Trade and Development	N	Y	Y
13. Human Rights in Burma	Y	N	Y

2005

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	N	Y	Y
2. Human Rights in Sudan	N	Y	Y
3. Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People	N	Y	Y
4. Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat	N	Y	Y
5. Compliance with Non-Proliferation Agreements	Y	X	Y
6. Follow-up to Nuclear Disarmament Obligations	N	A	Y
7. Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices	N	Y	Y
8. Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in Elections	Y	Y	N
9. Human Rights in Iran	Y	N	Y
10. International Trade and Development	N	Y	Y

11. Unilateral Economic Measures	N	Y	Y
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2004

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	N	Y	Y
2. Human Rights in Sudan	N	Y	Y
3. Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People	N	Y	Y
4. Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat	N	Y	Y
5. Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty	N	Y	Y
6. Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices	N	Y	Y
7. Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance	Y	Y	N
8. Enhancing the Role of Organizations to Promote Democracy	Y	A	Y
9. Human Rights in Iran	Y	N	Y

10. International Trade and Development	N	Y	Y
2003			
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	N	Y	Y
2. International Convention Against Reproductive Cloning	N	Y	Y
3. Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat	N	Y	Y
4. Illegal Israeli Actions in the Occupied Territories	N	Y	Y
5. Confidence Building Measures	N	Y	Y
6. Transparency in Armaments	Y	A	Y
7. Assistance to Palestine Refugees and Support for UNRWA	Y	A	Y
8. Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices	N	Y	Y
9. Rights of the Child	N	Y	Y
10. Strengthening the Role of the United Nations	Y	A	Y
11. Globalization and Human Rights	N	Y	Y
12. Human Rights in Turkmenistan	Y	N	Y
13. Human Rights in Iran	Y	N	Y
14. Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Y	A	Y
15. Committee 2 Provisional Program of Work	N	Y	Y
2002			
1. IAEA Report	Y	Y	N
2. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	N	Y	Y
3. National Legislation on Transfer of Arms	Y	Y	N
4. Nuclear Disarmament	N	A	Y
5. Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East	N	Y	Y
6. Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices	N	Y	Y
7. Future Operations of INSTRAW	N	Y	Y
8. Rights of the Child	N	Y	Y
9. Elimination of Racism and Racial Discrimination	N	Y	Y
10. Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture	N	A	Y

11. Globalization and Human Rights	N	Y	Y
12. Human Rights in Sudan	Y	N	Y
13. Human Rights in Iraq	Y	A	Y
14. Human Rights in the Congo	Y	A	Y

2001

1. Israeli Actions in Occupied Territories	N	Y	Y
2. Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine	N	Y	Y
3. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	N	Y	Y
4. Compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty	N	Y	Y
5. Nuclear Disarmament	N	Y	Y
6. Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East	N	Y	Y
7. Effects of the Use of Depleted Uranium in Armaments	N	A	Y
8. Human Rights and Coercive Measures	N	Y	Y
9. Globalization and Human Rights	N	Y	Y
10. Human Rights in Iran	Y	N	Y
11. Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Y	A	Y

2000

1. Israeli Actions in Occupied Territories	N	Y	Y
2. U.S. Embargo of Cuba	N	Y	Y
3. Compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty	N	Y	Y
4. New Agenda for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World	Y	Y	N
5. Reducing Nuclear Danger	N	A	Y
6. Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East	N	Y	Y
7. "Honor Crimes" Against Women	Y	A	Y
8. Promoting and Consolidating Democracy	Y	A	Y
9. Globalization and Human Rights	N	Y	Y
10. Human Rights in Iran	Y	N	Y
11. Human Rights in Iraq	Y	A	Y

Source: ("China: Voting coincidence percentages. (2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000)." 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000 #223)

China's Security Relationships and their Impact on the United States

From a security perspective, China has increased the power of its military considerably, along with developing relationships with other nations. Though China continues to state that it does not believe in formal military alliances, it does at times gain from those between the United States and Washington's allies. As the United States develops relations with states that run counter to that of China and other states, new relationships between China and those states also develop.

When Ecuador refused to exempt U.S. military personnel from prosecution in 2003, Washington threatened to stop military assistance to Ecuador. During this event China invited Ecuadorian officials to Beijing and offered assistance countering that of the United States (Kurlantzick, 2007). This relationship has continued as China has entered into Latin America from all aspects of the international system.

North Korea is one of the bigger players in the China relationship with the United States, especially from the security perspective. Given the border the two states share, China feels correctly that North Korea is an avenue for migrants to enter China. China has sold weapons and technology to North Korea and the further assertion is that North Korea in

turn sells those weapons and technology to other states. Gertz finds that China has:

- Provided fiber-optic gyroscopes to North Korea;
- Sold specialty steel for North Korean missiles;
- Shared space technology with North Korea that U.S. intelligence agencies believe was a cover for missile technology sharing; and
- Supplied accelerometers and special high-tech machinery to North Korean missile manufacturers (Gertz, 2000, p. 111).

In the region Japan provides the checkpoint for the United States.

Japan and the United States have had a long relationship that for the most part has been successful. Japan continues to host U.S. bases as North Korea is considered Tokyo's principal threat in the region, which is the main justification for the U.S.-Japan alliance (Pablo-Baviera, 2003).

Pablo-Baviera also notes,

But the China factor nevertheless places great pressure on Japan's security thinking, raising questions about the long term consequences of continuing its ODA and economic assistance to China, pushing the discourse on how Japan should become a 'normal state', and forcing Japan to seek clear assurances from the United States on the latter's defense obligations" (2003, p. 345).

To further the support of the U.S.-Japan relationship, Cha finds that, "The US-Japanese alliance has reached an unprecedented level of intimacy. Beginning in his first term, President Bush chose to reinvest in Japan as the United States' key ally in Asia and to overhaul its military posture there. This base realignment – the most significant in 30 years –

includes moving 7,000 – 10,000 U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam” (Cha, 2007, p. 102).

Russia is also in the sights of China. The Chinese-Russian relationship has grown considerably tighter since 2003. Russia and China have both protested against radar and missile sites along the border of past Russian states that the United States has proposed. Russia has become one of China’s biggest suppliers of energy and defense platforms. China and Russia have also started joint military exercises in 2005 that had scenarios of what one could consider against Taiwan (Bergsten et al., 2006).

Bush and O’Hanlon also find that the relationship between China and Russia has increased, stating:

Regarding post-Communist Russia, China developed a very friendly relationship after decades of hostility with the Communist Soviet Union. Russian presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin have held frequent summits with Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Russia is China’s main source for advanced weapons systems and an outside source of energy. The two often line up against the United States on key foreign policy issues – Iran’s nuclear program, for example (2007, p. 28).

Another important relationship that China has cultivated is that with Saudi Arabia. This is a key component of China’s strategy to guarantee access to Persian Gulf oil is the special relations it has cultivated with Saudi Arabia. The ties with Riyadh go back to the mid-1980s when China sold Saudi Arabia intermediate range ballistic missiles. Since then, the relations have grown closer. High-level visits of Chinese leaders to Saudi

Arabia culminated in 1999 with President Jiang Zemin's state visit, during which he pronounced a 'strategic oil partnership' between the two countries. China has offered to sell the Saudis intercontinental ballistic missiles (Luft, 2003).

From a military perspective, Table 7 below depicts China and the United States and the spending that is budgeted. Looking at the Table it is easy to see that China continues to increase its spending along with that of the United States. Taking purchasing power parity into perspective, there are arguments that China spends dollar for dollar what the United States spends. What should also be identified is the yearly increase in the spending of China; it is increasing at a double-digit pace with only three of the last seventeen years in the single digit range. Another item to keep in mind is that the numbers pertaining to China's expenditure do not include any purchases of weapons systems or military expenditures. The data collected is from two sources that are easily accessible providing information that can be recreated in order to support the methodology utilized in this dissertation in an effort to minimize any bias that may be induced unintentionally.

Table 7: China and the United States GDP and Military Budgets

YEAR	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA	CHINA Est
	GDP Y	Military Budget	EST Military Budget	% Change	% GDP	% GDP
1989	¥1,699.23	¥27.44	¥54.88		1.61%	3.22%
1990	¥1,866.78	¥32.07	¥64.14	14.44%	1.72%	3.44%
1991	¥2,178.15	¥32.50	¥65.00	1.33%	1.49%	2.98%

1992	¥2,692.35	¥37.00	¥74.00	12.16%	1.37%	2.74%
1993	¥3,533.39	¥42.70	¥85.40	13.35%	1.21%	2.42%
1994	¥4,819.79	¥55.00	¥110.00	22.36%	1.14%	2.28%
1995	¥6,079.37	¥63.00	¥126.00	12.70%	1.04%	2.08%
1996	¥7,117.66	¥80.80	¥161.60	22.03%	1.14%	2.28%
1997	¥7,897.30	¥92.16	¥184.31	12.32%	1.17%	2.34%
1998	¥8,440.23	¥93.47	¥186.94	1.40%	1.11%	2.22%
1999	¥8,967.71	¥107.67	¥215.34	13.19%	1.20%	2.40%
2000	¥9,921.46	¥121.29	¥242.58	11.23%	1.22%	2.44%
2001	¥10,965.52	¥141.04	¥282.08	14.00%	1.29%	2.58%
2002	¥12,033.27	¥166.00	¥332.00	15.04%	1.38%	2.76%
2003	¥13,582.28	¥185.00	¥370.00	10.27%	1.56%	3.12%
2004	¥15,987.83	¥200.00	¥400.00	7.50%	1.25%	2.50%
2005	¥18,308.48	¥247.70	¥495.40	19.26%	1.35%	2.70%
2006	¥20,940.00	¥297.93	¥595.86	16.86%	1.42%	2.84%
2007	¥23,117.00	¥350.92	¥701.84	15.10%	1.52%	3.04%

	US	US	US	US	VARIENCE	VARIENCE
	GDP \$	Military Budget	% Change	% GDP	% Change	% GDP
1989	\$5,401.00	\$302.46		5.60%		-3.99%
1990	\$5,737.00	\$298.32	-1.39%	5.20%	15.82%	-3.48%
1991	\$5,934.00	\$272.96	-9.29%	4.60%	10.62%	-3.11%
1992	\$6,240.00	\$299.52	8.87%	4.80%	3.30%	-3.43%
1993	\$6,578.00	\$289.43	-3.49%	4.40%	16.83%	-3.19%
1994	\$6,964.00	\$278.56	-3.90%	4.00%	26.27%	-2.86%
1995	\$7,325.00	\$271.03	-2.78%	3.70%	15.48%	-2.66%
1996	\$7,697.00	\$269.40	-0.61%	3.50%	22.63%	-2.36%
1997	\$8,186.00	\$270.14	0.28%	3.30%	12.05%	-2.13%
1998	\$8,626.00	\$267.41	-1.02%	3.10%	2.43%	-1.99%
1999	\$9,127.00	\$273.81	2.34%	3.00%	10.85%	-1.80%
2000	\$9,708.00	\$291.24	5.98%	3.00%	5.24%	-1.78%
2001	\$10,040.00	\$301.20	3.31%	3.00%	10.70%	-1.71%
2002	\$10,373.00	\$352.68	14.60%	3.40%	0.44%	-2.02%
2003	\$10,828.00	\$400.64	11.97%	3.70%	-1.70%	-2.14%
2004	\$11,466.00	\$458.64	12.65%	4.00%	-5.15%	-2.75%
2005	\$12,042.00	\$445.55	-2.94%	3.70%	22.19%	-2.35%
2006	\$12,641.00	\$442.44	-0.70%	3.50%	17.56%	-2.08%
2007	\$13,279.00	\$451.49	2.00%	3.40%	13.10%	-1.88%

Source: Data was compiled from ("Historical tables: Budget of the United States Government", 2005), ("National Bureau of Statistics of China", 2006).

China has continued its military build-up in all areas. The biggest increases are in its Navy though. China is developing a blue water navy that not only protects its shore but also is capable of reaching distant shores. Looking at Table 7 above it is evident that China's military budget increases at a greater rate than that of the United States with twelve of the seventeen years at greater than ten percent over than that of the United States. The three years post September 11, 2001 are the years where the United States spends greater than that of China. One of the items that one has to also consider in the published budget of China's outlay is that China does not include its entire military spending budget in what it publishes. China excludes purchases of military goods from its budget. China's advancement in its military capabilities are outlined in the 2007 Annual Report to Congress which identifies concern with this increase in spending.

China's rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with global aspirations is an important element of today's strategic environment – one that has significant implications for the region and the world. The United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China, and it encourages China to participate as a responsible international stakeholder by taking on a greater share of responsibility for the health and success of the global system. However, much uncertainty surrounds the future course China's leaders will set for their country, including in the area of China's expanding military power and how that power might be used (CONGRESS, 2007).

What China has gained from its increased expenditures in its military budget is more hardware, greater technology, and better training

for its military personnel. Much of the investment that China has made is analyzed within the 2007 Annual Report to Congress:

The pace and scope of China's military transformation has increased in recent years, fueled by continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, and far reaching reforms of the armed forces. The expanding military capabilities of China's armed forces are a major factor in changing East Asian military balances; improvements in China's strategic capabilities have ramifications far beyond the Asia Pacific region. China's strategic forces modernization is enhancing strategic strike capabilities, as evidenced by the DF-31 intercontinental range ballistic missile, which achieved initial threat availability in 2006. China's counter space program – punctuated by the January 2007 successful test of a direct-ascent, anti-satellite weapon – poses dangers to human space flight and puts at risk the assets of all space faring nations. China's continued pursuit of area denial and anti-access strategies is expanding from the traditional land, air, and sea dimensions of the modern battlefield to include space and cyber-space (CONGRESS, 2007).

One of the concerns that the United States admits is that in its current configuration, its military is strained. With the war on terror, the Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan, the United States would find it difficult to take on another fight.

Though the United States military is spread thin, it still has the most technologically advanced military in the world and one of the advantages that the United States currently has because of the wars it is involved in is the ability to test new technologies real time. The arsenal of the United States is vast, with advanced fighter systems that have capabilities that no other country has. The ability the United States has with the ability to hit multiple targets on a single strike has been advanced along with the ability

for precision strikes at targets provides the United States with great ability to provide the security that the United States must maintain.

Conclusions

Many of the growth elements and relationships that have developed economically, politically, and militarily are viable reasons that it will take time for China to 'fully' develop. One of the things that is driving this growth and development of relationships is that China is in need of natural resources. China is developing at a very rapid pace, well over eight percent yearly for the last 25 years and for China to be able to provide the resources needed to ensure this growth continues will be a primary focus. China had made political and economic deal between The China National Petroleum Corporation and the Russian oil giant Yukos in order to provide a pipeline to route the vast oil supplies to China for use though this deal as fallen through and Russia has dismantled Yukos. China is trying to now route the oil through Kazakhstan, but this has been rather slow. China currently has to remain dependent on the shipping channels to supply the quantities of oil needed to continue its growth. China is developing alliances or at least making deals to help resolve the shortages such as with Venezuela, Africa and the Middle East for much of its oil needs. China also continues to consume resources other than oil at a very quick pace. China's consumption of aluminum, copper, nickel, and iron ore has doubled within only 10 years from 7 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2000

which has now reached 20 percent of the worlds supply and is likely to double again by 2010 (Zwieg & Jianhai, 2005).

Concerns over resources could also create tense situations. China could presume a threat from the United States fearing that there will be a block of natural resources or at least try to destabilize any efforts of China to purchase at the increasing rates that it has. China will need to continue its search for natural resources through the increase of both political and economic deals that could come at the expense of the United States. As China's need increases the supply could decrease causing an increase in costs for the needed resources, which in turn could change trade deficits and prices for those natural resources that the two states will continue to bid for the limited supply thus causing increasing tension between China and the United States.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter puts forward a detailed analysis of the data presented in Chapter's IV and V, focusing on the growth of China's economy, the extent of its regional and global political influence, and its military capabilities as opposed to those of the United States since the end of the Cold War. China has improved its position in these three areas at a very rapid pace relative to the position of the United States during that period. The comparison will support the hypothesis of this dissertation, which states: As a result of its growing demand for natural resources to fuel its expanding economy and military capabilities, China has used the development of economic, political and security relationships with other states in the international system to increase its power significantly relative to that of the United States since the end of the Cold War. China's efforts to achieve these objectives are in accordance with the behavioral tendencies of rising powers in the international system under the tenets of realism and neo-realism. Through its actions in these areas, China has made significant gains in power relative to the United States, helping to balance American power. The dependent variable in the hypothesis is China's acquisition of the natural resources necessary to expand its economy and military power, and its related global standing relative to that of the United States. This dependent variable is driven by the growth of

the independent variables, which are the relationships that China has developed with other states economically, politically, and militarily. The data presented in Chapters IV and V demonstrate that China has acquired the natural resources it needs from external sources through the economic, political, and security relationships it has built with other states and international organizations since the end of the Cold War in 1989-90. The balance of the chapter will assess the extent to which those relationships has met China's demand for natural resources and the resultant growth of its economy and military capabilities. It will do so in the contexts of sections comparing China's and America's power and influence in terms of demographics, economics, politics and security. In each case, it will demonstrate that China's behavior is in line with the tenets of realism and neo-realism, both of which were explained in detail in the literature review.

Demographics

Considering the most basic characteristics of China and the United States, one could first compare the demographics of each state. Looking at China first, one would find that China is the most populated countries in the world and since 1949 has been divided by two governments. There is a Communist People's Republic of China (PRC) and the anti-Communist government of the Republic of China on Taiwan (Nationalist China). From a geographic perspective, China is 3,692,213 square miles, excluding

Taiwan, and has a population of 1,311,281,000 people, excluding Taiwan (*Political Handbook of the World 2005 - 2006*, 2006).

In comparison, the United States is number one in the world when looking at economic production and productivity and is third in population. The land area of the United States is 3,732,396 square miles and America has a population of 291,968,000 from 2004 census estimate (*Political Handbook of the World 2005 - 2006*, 2006).

Comparing the two, both are very similar in land area, though China has about four times the population of the United States. One similarity between China and the United States is its major cities. Both countries have large metropolitan areas with vast populations, financial centers, and cultural centers. The change in China's population from 1978 to 2006 is quite dramatic. Most recent data shows that in 1978 China's rural population was 82.08% of the population with 17.92% residing in the urban areas. In 2006 the rural population was at 56.10% and the urban population 43.90%, a considerable change. ("National bureau of statistics of china", 2006) The latest census data for the United States was in the year 2000. That data indicates that 79.22% of the population of the United States lived in urban areas and only 20.78% resided in rural areas ("USDA economic research service", 2007). Though both are very similar, China is just now fully developing its middle class. As the population of China has had access to the outside world its middle class has developed a want

for a life full of the things that the people in the United States and other developed countries have attained.

The people of China have had a taste of what the United States has and now many are moving to the cities for a piece of the good life, though it is not always that good. Just as the cities of the United States are crowded with pockets of poor and homeless, the cities of China are even more crowded, polluted, and congested. As represented by the number of Chinese moving from rural to urban centers, approximately 30% of the population has migrated to urban centers since 1978. The influx of western nightclubs, with Porsches lined up to park, along with crowds of young people talking on cell phones and listening to rap music, is ever growing, looking for a part of the 'good life' (Fishman, 2005). This can be the move that many hope to use as the leap forward into what the people of China see in the United States. Before 1989 one of the differences between China and the United States is that the vast majority of the population of China lived in the rural countryside, just the opposite of the United States during the same period. Over the past seventeen years there has been a shift of the population. This move of China's population from the rural countryside into the urban areas of China's major cities as identified in this dissertation has been one of the driving factors that have facilitated the need for the additional resources that China has to secure in order to sustain the growth that has occurred over the past seventeen years. For China to support such a population shift it has

needed to secure a greater supply of natural resources in order to continue this shift from outside China's borders, as China does not possess the quantity needed to support its growth. If China cannot supply the needed resources to support its growth, the moves could not continue as the population could not continue to grow, as there would not be enough resources to sustain the increase.

The data presented in this dissertation will support the argument that China has increased its ability to acquire the needed resources through the increase of economic, political and security relationships with other states around the globe. The data will also support that China's efforts to achieve these objectives are in accordance with the tendencies of a rising power in the international system under the tenants of realism and neo-realism.

Economics

From an economic perspective, China has made great strides, growing its GDP nearly 10 percent yearly for the last nineteen years. Granted, the United States still maintains its position as the world leader, but China is closing the gap and continues to do so. Much of this growth has been in Asia, the region where China has expanded its trade considerably. In examining China's recent trade activity outlined in Chapter's IV and V, it is clear that China has developed a good trade relationship with the Asian region. In 2003 China increased its trade with

the Asian region by 36.5% over 2002, stimulated by imports from the Asian region, which were up over 42%. It is important to note that China's trade practices in the region are relatively balanced, basically the opposite of its trade with the West.


This growth in China's trade is the result of the development and expansion of its relationships with other states. Those trade relationships, in turn, have helped to satisfy China's demand for natural resources as a means to fuel its vibrant economic growth. Looking back at Table 1 in Chapter V, one sees China's sustained GDP growth for the last nineteen years. This growth was considerable, particularly when compared to that of the United States during the same period. The table shows China's GDP growth in the double digits in most of those years. From 1993-95, that growth was phenomenal, exceeding 20 percent during those years. The only slowdown came between the years 1997 and 2002, where the growth rates were just below 10 percent, though these rates still exceeded the growth rates of the United States during the same period. The biggest gains against the United States in GDP growth occurred from 1992-1995, with gains in the range of 20 percent.

In examining China's focus on its economic relationships, one finds that China has been focusing on 'failing' states, states where the political stability of the central government is weak or ineffective and many times is run by regional warlords or tribal chiefs as in the Sudan, who have considerable control of the region of a state, along with the control of

natural resources in the area. China has also developed relationships with states whose political ideology is similar to that of China, especially when it comes to countering the influence of the United States. One of the best examples is China's relationship with Latin American states, especially Venezuela. Under the administration of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, criticism against the United States has increased considerably. In 2005 oil supplies from Venezuela decreased to the United States after an oil strike in Venezuela and remained constant to China. At the time this alone drove the price of a barrel of oil to a 21-year high of \$54 a barrel. Kurlantzick (2007) has also suggested that if Venezuela shifts its oil exports to China and away from the United States it could cause major economic problems for the United States. China has invested over \$2 billion in Venezuela and has entered into a joint venture with Venezuela's state owned oil corporation, Petroleos de Venezuela, allowing the Chinese oil company to manage much of the oil fields in its control. Not only has China developed deeper relationships with Latin American states, it has also made substantial investments in African states such as the Sudan, where China has invested over \$4 billion in its oil industry and Middle Eastern states such as Iran, where China signed a deal with Iran to develop one of its largest fields, giving China access to possibly the world's largest gas reserves. These deals are needed to sustain China's growth through greater access to exterior sources for natural resources, especially oil and natural gas where China has moved

into second place behind the United States in imports of these resources. As seen in Graph 1 below, the increase in the number of exports to China of other states economies as a percentage of that countries total number of exports is increasing, especially in the Asian region, relative to exports from those states to the United States and the member states of the European Union. As China has increased its economic growth, it has also increased its trade with regional partners, thus helping those economies in the process. As one can see in the 1990s, exports of these selected economies were consistent across all regions. It is clearly evident exports from states in East Asia to China have expanded considerably during this period. The data utilized for this graph ran from 1990 through 2005 with the 2005 numbers estimated by averaging yearly growth over the last twenty years.

Graph 1: *China's Sources of Exports (as a percentage of total exports from other countries' economies as a percentage of GDP of each economy)*




Source: Calculated from Table 3 in Chapter V

Graph 2 below depicts China's imports from other states as a percentage of total imports of China. There is clearly a reduction found in the levels of China's imports from the United Kingdom and the United States relative to those from Taiwan and ASEAN. China will continue to expand its economy as Beijing continues to attempt to bring Taiwan back into the fold and as China begins to play a bigger role in ASEAN. Another aspect of Graph 1 and Graph 2 is that as a percentage, the total number of imports is increasing and the total number of exports of regional economies is also increasing as a percentage of the respective economies. The data utilized for this graph is the latest available data and

covers the period from 1990 through 2005 with the 2005 years are estimated based on the yearly averages over the last twenty years.


Graph 2: *China's Source of Imports (as a percentage of total imports into China)*



Source: Calculated from Table 4 in Chapter V


In considering China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, one can understand how quickly China's economy has grown since 1990. As illustrated in Graph 3 below China's growth is considerable against that of the United States, and as the American economy has continued to grow steadily, the Chinese economy has done so at a faster rate. Clearly, China has made considerable gains from an economic perspective relative to those of the United States. China's ability to sustain its economic growth over the considerable period is testimony to China's increased economic power and ability to grow its economy.

Graph 3: *China's Gross Domestic Product In Chinese Yuan vs. U.S. Dollar*



Source: Calculated from Table 7 in Chapter

Using the 1996 conversion rate for Yuan to Dollars, Graph 4 below depicts the growth curve of China vs. that of the United States with Chinese Yuan converted to U.S. Dollars. Both rates are steady even at the expense of the Yuan converted to the 1996 rate. It is attributable to China's growth that the economy of China remains positive to that of the dollar and that the continued growth rate remains consistent. The true variance is the size of the U.S. economy when compared to that of China. China still has some needed growth, and if China can maintain its current growth rates, China will eventually catch up to the United States taking into account no other variables.

Graph 4: *China's Gross Domestic Product Converted to U.S. Dollar*


Source: Calculated from Table 7 in Chapter V

Once purchasing power parity (PPP) is applied to the Yuan, the picture compared to that of the United States changes considerably. The rate of China's GDP growth outperforms that of the United States considerably. Granted, China's economy is not as large as that of the United States, and there is no way to predict the future. However, if China continues at its current growth rate, it will eventually possess the world's largest economy. China's economic advances against those of the United States have moved China to the desired level to maintain a balance of power against the United States. With the addition of the purchasing power parity of Chinese Yuan in China, the real value of the Yuan in China is evident. To further the point on purchasing power of the Yuan in China, when applied to goods purchased in China the equilibrium that is held between the two currencies would be approximately the same in each of

the two countries. What purchasing power does for the Yuan in China when applied to a fixed definition of goods and services would also approximately be equal between the two countries. Therefore, when purchasing goods and services within its state, China has a relative advantage in the amount of goods and services purchased when compared to the United States purchasing the same basket of defined goods and services in the United States. China's true ability to purchase military goods is an indicator that identifies the real growth of China in all aspects relative to that of the United States.

Graph 5 below further illustrates China's GDP growth and how it compares with that of the United States when purchasing power parity is applied and illustrates the value of the Yuan in China as compared to the Dollar in the United States.

Graph 5: *China's Gross Domestic Product with Purchasing Power Parity Applied*



Source: Calculated from Table 7 in Chapter V

The evidence presented on the economic growth of China since the end of the Cold War supports the hypothesis presented in this dissertation. The advances that China has made relative to the United States in economic growth have been sustained over the time period measured. When measured against the United States, China has grown at a pace that has surpassed the United States when purchasing power is applied.

As China's demand for natural resources has increased, China has developed the economic relationships that have been needed to support the increased growth that has also increased China's standing in the international system as a superpower that has the ability to balance the power of the United States. With the movement of approximately 30% of China's population from rural areas to cities, China's demand for the

needed resources to grow its economy and sustain the population has increased markedly. In keeping with the tenets of realism and neo-realism, China is acting in a manner that is consistent with the need to provide economic security to the people of China through the development of economic deals around the globe as illustrated by the supporting data presented in this dissertation. The most important aspect of realism and neo-realism is that security is the most important factor, and economic security would fall under one of the five security categories. The economic sector defines how a State actor gains access to the needed resources in order to sustain economic welfare and political power (Buzan & Little, 2000). Another important aspect to consider is that China is acting as the unitary decision maker in a rational manner that is for the good of the people. China's actions are maintained through a consistent manner in order to protect the economic security of China and its people. Since the end of the Cold War, China has maintained these aspects of realism as they relate to the tenants of realism and neo-realism and supports the hypothesis this dissertation posits as it pertains to economic growth relative to that of the United States. Over the last two decades China has managed to court many investors that have redirected much of its foreign investment to China and as noted in Chapter IV China now receives some 61% of the investments in the region, which has provided China with the funds necessary to continue its growth. Along with the investments China has received, there has also been considerable

Chinese investment in the oil rich nations of Venezuela, Sudan, and Russia, which have helped to secure the needed oil, and gas supply that facilitates China's growth and supports the growing need for the people of China to as the population moves into its growing cities.

China's accession into the World Trade Organization has also helped to bolster its standing in the world. With 1.3 billion people at the ready to provide labor needed to continue its economic growth, the numbers also provide a source of consumption of the goods that China will need to import from other countries, which are ready to make the required economic deals.

Politics

Two separate Chinese governments were formed in 1949. One, the People's Republic of China (PRC), governs the mainland and its territories; the other, that of the Republic of China (ROC), governs the island of Taiwan. The PRC is a communist government and the ROC is a nationalist government. China contends that Taiwan is a territory of mainland China and should fall under its 'one China' policy.

The United States began as 13 British colonies along the Atlantic seaboard, the 'United States of America' declared itself an independent on July 4, 1776, and gained recognition as a sovereign nation at the close of the Revolutionary War in 1783. In 1787, the United States of America

adopted a federal constitution that became effective March 4, 1789

(*Political Handbook of the World 2005 - 2006*, 2006).

As China has increased its power, it has made great strides in the political arena. China has become more active in its role as a member of the United Nations and as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. There is a close relationship between the growth in China's political influence and its economic growth. China's need for natural resources to sustain its growth has also led directly to the development of many of China's newest political partnerships.

China's need for these resources has forced it to develop more political allies. China at one time did not focus on how the rest of the world governed itself. Since the end of the Cold War, China has had to step up and accept many political challenges. For the most part, China is at odds with the ways in which the United States and its allies have managed the international system with their desire for the development of a more democratic world. China has held its ground and has begun to secure allies that have a political ideology that is comparable to Beijing's and runs counter to that of the United States, especially in Latin America. Considering China's voting record on important votes held by the United Nations Security Council has been almost completely in opposition to that of the United States. As illustrated in Graph 6 below, in the 85 important votes held between 2000 and 2006, China has voted with the United States only five times and either abstained or voted against the United


States on the other votes. Important votes are those votes in the United Nations Security Council that are defined as directly affecting American interests and that the United States has thus lobbied for. The most current examples here is that when the United States voted to adhere to human rights considerations in Iran in 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, and also in Iraq in 2000, and 2002, China voted to keep out such oversight and as China has continually stated that a state should have the sovereignty to dictate how it will govern its people and that external actors, whether states, international organizations or non-governmental organizations, should stay away. The same vote outcome was also identified with North Korea, Burma, and Belarus. In looking at the various important votes, one can see that many are concerned with human rights. China and the United States have had differing opinions on the subject of human rights for a considerable time, well before the events that fell upon China over Tiananmen Square. The United States and many of its allies had voiced strong opinions on these events and the actions of the Chinese government and had voted to keep China out of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for some time as China had kept its reputation of human rights violations and did not voice any statement of future change. China holds the belief that each sovereign state has the right to act in the manner it deems necessary to govern and that other states should keep out of its decisions.

The important votes that are with the United States are such that would only hold positive results for China. Since the events of 11 September 2001, China has supported the United States on the subject of terrorism. After the events of September 11, 2001 China has been a strong ally in its support against terrorism, though China continues to trade arms to state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran. China continues to be a voice against terrorism. China also votes with the United States on the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance, another hypocritical act as China continues to quell various religious activities in the state. Overall, the incidence of China voting against the United States is the case with the theme on human rights or a states sovereignty to do, as it wants within its borders.

China's voting record in the United Nations when human rights are concerned has been an astounding zero votes with the United States. Two of the states especially concerned with vote are Sudan and Iran. In both cases these two states have agreed to large deals pertaining to oil and gas reserves that China has needed to continue its growth economically. In the political sector outlined by Buzan and Little (2000), China's behavior is also consistent with the tenants of realism and neo-realism where China has developed relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition with states that give them legitimacy. Generally the states that fall into this category also have similar ideologies. States like Venezuela, Iran, Sudan, and Syria fall into this category and as

depicted in Chapters IV and V, have made deals with China to provide the natural resources like oil and natural gas which are needed to fuel China's continued growth.

Graph 6: *China's Voting Record on Important Votes*



Source: Calculated from Table 6 in Chapter V

Along with voting records that are generally against that of the United States, China has also had a run in joining International Governmental Organizations (IGO). China has moved from just over 20 percent of the memberships that the United States had in 1979, to just at 80 percent of the United States' memberships by the year 2002, a figure that has remained constant since that date. China has begun to play a more involved role at the international level rather than retain the insularity that once characterized its behavior. Inclusion and acceptance of China in these IGOs has given Beijing another avenue to voice its opinion and sell its ideology, gaining new political friends and allies along the way. By

joining these IGOs, China can now work to influence the decisions and ideologies of other governments from within the framework of these organizations. By working closely with states that have an ideological view of the internal system, China has developed closer ties from the political perspective. States such as Venezuela, Cuba, Iran, and Russia now working with China to determine what influences states should have on the sovereignty of other states and how they are governed. As the evidence provided in Chapter V supports, China has grown its political strength with each new deal its makes, especially when such deals are forged with states whose perspectives run counter to those of the United States ideologically. China also holds a permanent seat within the United Nations Security Council. This provides China with great power as to having the ability to interface and influence other states as to the security and actions that the United Nations and states that act unilaterally will be challenged.

Graph 7: *China's Memberships in IGOs as a Percentage of US Memberships*



Source: (*Yearbook of international organizations*, 2001)

China's behavioral tendencies remain consistent with the tenants of realism and neo-realism. China, in an effort to secure the resources it needs to continue its growth is acting as the unitary decision maker for the good of the state. China's continues to advance its political relationships, which have also increased since the end of the Cold War. China has managed to develop political and ideological relationships with states that have built distrust with that of the United States. The best example to date is with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who has voiced his opinions against the United States and its policies. China has also built political relationships with Brazil, Russia, India, and Pakistan, along with its long-standing relationship with Iran, which has also grown in the last seventeen

years. The ideological relationships, or what Buzan and Little (2000) have depicted as the societal or socio-cultural sector where the state, China in this case, develops and sustains cultural relationships with similar thinking states as supported in this dissertation.

The data presented in this dissertation regarding the growth in China's political influence has also supported the hypothesis. In particular, at the end of the Cold War, China belonged to only twenty percent of the number of organizations as the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, China has increased its memberships to eighty percent of that of the United States, giving it greater voice at the global level and helping it renew past and develop new relationships with states and organizations that have increased its access to the natural resources needed to expand its economy and military capabilities.

Security

Security is another area where China has made marked advances. China has increased its spending as a percentage of GDP since 1989 and has also worked hard to develop a more modern defense that can provide the security a superpower must have. China is the third strongest economy in the world and moving to second very quickly. This growth has helped to fuel the modernization of China's military services. Keith (2001) identifies that China's military modernization is not just something going unnoticed, but that China was growing its military through increased

spending and hiding that additional spending through creative accounting practices.

In looking at China's military, from an air superiority perspective, China's forces are vast. There are two aspects to China's air forces in both the Air Force and the Navy Air Force. Referring back to Menges (2005), the combined military forces of the Chinese Air Force and the Chinese Naval Air Force has over 426,000 personnel. Tactical fighters number at over 1,360 active aircraft. There are also 228 bombers with 776 close air support aircraft. According to Menges, military analysts feel that the numbers could increase considerably by 2005.

China's Navy is also very large in numbers of personnel and equipment. Though much of the equipment is old, China is on a path to develop a highly technical Navy with the ability to travel the globe as it protects its interests abroad and along its shores. Currently there are approximately 260,000 naval personnel supporting 63 destroyers and frigates. China also has 62 diesel submarines with five nuclear attack submarines. What China has done over the last seventeen years is to modernize its fleet by replacing many of its ships with fewer but more effective ships, giving China blue water capabilities that can cover the globe. This aspect of China's security not only gives China the capability to secure its ports and coastlines and also provide many of its new allies with additional support if needed. The largest component of China's military in terms of manpower is its Army. China has the largest ground


force in the world and has also increased its capability through training and technology. Currently Chinese active forces number 1.6 million and a reserve force that is estimated at another 1.5 million troops. One other aspect of China's ground forces is that there is another five hundred thousand forces in the People's Armed Police which functions as China's internal security force. Over the last seventeen China has placed greater emphasis on modern warfare using special operations trained forces which number approximately twenty percent of the combined ground forces.

Another aspect of China's military is its new focus on technology. China understands that the forces of the developed world are highly advanced technically and that to defend its interests, it will have to combat this highly computerized military of what could be at some point in time its enemy. China has developed a new military division that is trained in new technologies. These troops are needed to counter the vast military forces in the area that are dependent on complex electronic systems. China has moved into the realm of asymmetric warfare that has trained troops to counter the newer technologies of states like the United States, Japan, and Taiwan.

Looking past the sheer numbers of China's military from the size of its force alone, China's budget is also growing. Graph 8 below depicts China's military budget in U.S. Dollars. From the perspective of the graph, there does not seem to be any respective gain relative to that of the

United States. One reason for this is China does not include any military purchases within its budget numbers, nor does it provide fully accurate numbers. From another prospective, the budget that China spends on its military buys a considerably larger supply of goods within China than if China was buying the same items from the United States. As an example, if the United States were to spend \$35 million on a fighter aircraft with the aircraft built and paid for in America. If one were to apply the IMF PPP rate of 2006 used in this dissertation, China would build the same aircraft in China but would spend \$5 million. Applying the PPP rate the number would equal \$35 million spent in China. Granted, the Chinese do not currently have the technology to build the same fighter aircraft, but Chinese Yuan spent in China go as far or farther than U.S. dollars spent in the United States. There are estimates that China's actual spending is at least twice that of what it publishes.


Graph 8: *China and the United States Military Budgets in US Dollars*



Source: Graph calculated from Table 7 found in Chapter V


Looking at Graph 9, purchasing power parity is included along with a second graph of China's estimated real spending. One can see that with either calculation, its published spending and its estimated spending, China has made considerable gains compared to the spending of the United States, even with the jump in the U.S. spending after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. At this point in time, the U.S. budget grows considerably and only in the last few years has it begun to fall back.

Graph 9: *China and the United States Military Budgets with Purchasing Power Parity applied*



Source: Graph calculated from Table 7 found in Chapter V

Looking at military spending as a percentage of GDP in Graph 10, it is also visible that China's spending on a year-to-year basis also has grown relative to that of the United States. Only in the years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks does the United States spend more from a GDP perspective than China spends. Another aspect is there are only three periods in the last seventeen years when China has spent less than ten percent of its GDP on its military budget, and that is just what is published or included when China presents its information. It is important to remember that China does not include external purchases of military goods as part of its budget.

Graph 10: *Military Budget as a Percentage of GDP*

Source: Graph calculated from Table 7 found in Chapter V

China's increased spending over the last seventeen years has moved China closer to the United States in its spending as a percentage of gross domestic product. China's increase over the last seventeen years has closed the gap with the United States considerably. Looking back at Graph 9, China's estimate exceeds the spending of the United States when one considers China's true estimated spending. From the perspective of realism and neo-realism China has provided the needed military security and as a rising power in the international system China has the ability to provide security for itself, but also its new allies in the system. China's increased spending has been made possible by the increased economic activity. As China's economy has grown over the last seventeen years, China's increased revenues have provided a surplus that China has been able to direct to its military spending. The increased

military spending in newer hardware and technologies will be needed to secure the resources in the event of conflict. As the tenants of realism and neo-realism posit, securing not only a sovereign border but also its assets abroad. China's developments over the last seventeen years have produced a military that has this needed ability to secure these assets, especially around the globe with its newly found allies. The increased military capabilities bring greater confidence in China's ability to ensure the security of the resources that China needs to acquire and continue its current growth. One of the main concerns of rising powers is the ability provide the security and hard power that will allow that power access to the resources needed. China's growth in gross domestic product and greater revenues has provided the needed monies to support the growth in its military.

China, with its powerful military, can calm the fear of a newly acquired ally that has aligned with China to balance the power of the United States. As this dissertation has posited, China is now the balancing power against the United States and other states will align with China, especially those with similar ideologies like Venezuela, Iran, Sudan, and Cuba. China's ability to counter the power of the United States will ease the fear of states that would like to stand up against the United States, now have that ability to align with a state that can support its opinion and ideology.

In the area of alliances, Harris and Cooper (2000) find that China accepts that sovereign countries are entitled to form alliances though through history China's only real formal alliance was with the Soviet Union that lasted from 1950 to the early 1960s and ended on a bad note between the two states. China's position is based on resistance to domination by the United States, what China would like to see is an alternative to formal alliances but what China identifies as a new security concept, or a global collective security. China feels that dialogue as opposed to conflict should be the method that states should resolve problems (Pablo-Baviera, 2003).

However, China's position on specific pairs of allied relationships will still depend on their assessment of whether such alliances are perceived as useful to its own goals, or instrumental only to a U.S. hegemonic agenda or the defense of Taiwan. As long as no explicit linkage between alliance goals and containment of Chinese power is made, pragmatic factors may still come into play after all, where China still expects to get some benefit from alliance systems. What China intends to achieve through the relationships of other alliances that do not include China is that ability to keep arms length from states like Korea though it does have power and influence through its position in the region allowing states like Japan providing the greater military influence in the area. Because of this relationship China is able to extend its strategic role with little cost. What China is working to improve in the area, though, is a

collective security by allowing the United States to continue its relationships in the area rather than the vacuum that would be created if the United States pulled out. If China can continue its current strategy in this area, it will give China time to continue to grow its capability without being perceived as challenging the United States or any of its allies in the region.

In the years to come, it will be interesting to follow how China will react to formal alliances as China still positions itself as the leader in promoting collective security although China has the largest military in the world from a personnel perspective. China is easily the biggest threat in the region to those states not aligning itself with China's ideology. Looking at China's 'new security concept', China's advances in the region is at the expense of the United States and its allies in the region and that China is looking to promote a bipolar balance of power with that of the United States (Lovell, 2003).

From a security perspective, it is important to remember that China does not believe in formal military alliances, as China would like to see a collective security arrangement with all states participating. One of China's most important allies, though there is no formal military agreement, is with Russia. China and Russia have voiced their opinion against the missile defense system that the United States has proposed with Poland and the Czech Republic.

What is evident as the data in Chapter IV and Chapter V support is that China is increasing in military power. China has increased its spending on par with the United States in procuring new hardware and technologies. China's ability to balance the United States has grown considerably as the data presented in this dissertation supports and is consistent with the behavior of a rising power and the tenants of realism and neo-realism through the ability to provide greater security within its sovereign borders and around the globe in support of its assets and allies providing the natural resources China needs to continue its growth.

Since the end of the Cold War, China has increased its power significantly relative to that of the United States. With a population of over 1.3 billion people, China has a need for natural resources that cannot be satisfied within its borders. China has had to develop its relationships from three perspectives, economically, politically, and militarily in order to ensure that it will be able to fulfill its needs now and in the future. China's actions and behavior have been consistent with the tendencies of a rising power within the international system and under the tenants of realism and neo-realism providing the security, economically, politically, and militarily to its people.

Conclusions

The evidence presented in this dissertation support the hypothesis as China has increased its power economically by growing its gross

domestic product at an average rate of 8-10 percent per year as a result of its increased access to natural resources from non-domestic sources.

This growth is a considerable rate when compared to that of the United States. This growth has been accomplished through the development of economic relationships that have increased considerably around the globe. China has developed its relationships with resource rich states that usually have ideologies that run counter to that of the United States.

China has also grown its political influence by reaching out to states that have a different ideology than that of the United States as well as some that have a similar ideology. China has increased its standing in International Governmental Organizations by 60 percent of that of the United States and has also stepped up its voice within the United Nations countering many of the votes of the United States. China's soft power in the realm of international relations and international systems has benefited from its change in tactics by pursuing the relationships that will help China to secure the resources that it needs to sustain its rapidly growing economy and need for natural resources. China continues to court world leaders as China's need for political relationships grow which in turn supports the need to satisfy the need to secure natural resources. China's efforts are in line with the tenants of realism and neo-realism as China facilitates its growing power by ensuring it sits as a world leader.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, this dissertation considered the research question that states, what factors have driven China to increase its power relative to that of the United States through the development of economic, political and security relationships with other states in the international system since the end of the Cold War?

More significantly, the dissertation was designed to examine and assess the extent of the validity of the following hypothesis: As a result of its growing demand for natural resources to fuel its expanding economy and military capabilities, China has used the development of economic, political and security relationships with other states in the international system to increase its power significantly relative to that of the United States since the end of the Cold War. China's efforts to achieve these objectives are in accordance with the behavioral tendencies of rising powers in the international system under the tenets of realism and neo-realism. The evidence submitted in this dissertation supports the contention that China has made significant gains relative to that of the United States since the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Soviet Union and the communist governments it supported in the states of Central and Eastern Europe from 1989-91 left a void in the balance of power opposing the superpower of the United States in the international system. As the evidence presented in this dissertation supports, China has filled that void

and increased its power significantly relative to that of the United States. China has expanded its economic and military power and political influence considerably over the past seventeen years. From the realist perspective, a state's sovereignty, security, and needs are of utmost importance and through any means necessary, China has increased its ability to maintain its sovereignty and security through the growth of its economic, political, and security relationships relative to that of the United States by expanding its economy at a considerable pace that has surpassed that of the United States and has managed to sustain that growth for the past nineteen years. China has also increased the percentage of military spending against domestic GDP at greater levels than that of the United States in every year since 1989, except for the two years post- September 11, 2001. And lastly, China has increased its influence in the political arena by increasing its voice outside its borders through China's acceptance into international governmental organizations, giving China a podium to voice its opinions and ideology. Over the last seventeen China has also increased its bilateral relationships with other states. Since 1993 China has signed 17 bilateral partnerships based on mutual trust and cooperation.

In answering the research question, what factors have driven China to increase its power relative to that of the United States through the development of economic, political and security relationships with other states in the international system since the end of the Cold War, this

dissertation posits that the need for natural resources is the primary factor that has driven China to expand those relationships, thus providing the avenue to secure access to the resources needed to continue its growth. The dependent variable therefore is China's acquisition of natural resources, which are necessary to continue to expand its economy, military power, and political standing relative to the United States. China's need for resources has been driven by China's growth in its economy and military. Increasing each of these areas is consistent behavior for a rising power in the international system and is consistent with the tenets of realism and neo-realism, which is to provide for the security of the state, economically, politically, and militarily, and to maintain its sovereignty by performing as a unitary actor for the whole in a rational manner. One of the major tenants of neo-realism as Waltz (1979) identifies is the pursuit of power by a state, which explains China's actions since the end of the Cold War. By increasing power, a state will increase its ability to provide for its people, which is exactly what China has done since the end of the Cold War. China has increased its security relationships, economic relationships, and its political relationships as supports the hypothesis posited in this dissertation. The independent variables are the economic, political, and security relationships China has built with other states and international organizations since the end of the Cold War. China has developed these relationships that have been identified in Chapters IV and V, which support the hypothesis that has been presented.

As this dissertation has identified, China has an increased need for natural resources due to the substantial growth of its economy over the last seventeen years. In order for China to secure the needed resources, that are required to fuel this growth, China has used economic relationships with other states in the international system to increase its power significantly relative to that of the United States since the end of the Cold War. The economic relationships identified in this dissertation support the hypothesis that China has managed to increase both the number and extent of its economic relationships with other states over the last seventeen years, in order to secure the resources to fuel China's economic growth, which has been between eight and 10 percent each year since 1989. With a country of over 1.3 billion people, China does not have the needed natural resources within its borders to support its population and the ensuing growth of its economy. As China's population moves into the urban cities, China's need to acquire resources to continue to fuel its economic growth rate has also increased.

The second independent variable is the development of political relationships, which have also had to increase in order to secure resources needed to fuel its growth. The data presented in Chapter's IV and V support the hypothesis that China has used the development of political relationships with other states in the international system to increase its power significantly relative to the United States since the end of the Cold War. As the data presented in this dissertation support, China

has increased its political relationships relative to that of the United States. China's increased activity in international governmental organizations has increased by 60% of those the United States belongs to over the last seventeen years. This growth in political relationships and the bilateral partnerships that China has signed since the end of the Cold War with resource rich states has given China access to the additional resources it needs in order to continue its growth.

The third independent variable is the development of security relationships with other states. Over the last seventeen years China has increased its military capacity considerable relative to that of the United States by increasing its military hardware, technologies, and relationships with other states in order to secure its resources and assets at home and abroad. As the data presented in Chapter's IV and V support, China's growth in this area is on par with that of the United States. China's security relationships with other states have provided the security needed to comfort its allies with an ability to balance the power of the United States that has had an impact on states that balance with China. One of the most important relationships that China has developed is with Russia, which has provided China with much of the oil that it has needed to fuel its growth. Though China has no security relationship with Sudan, China does have access to much of Sudan's oil, and it could be assumed that China would protect its assets here and elsewhere China holds assets in states where there is an agreement with China.

Strengths and Weaknesses

The viability of this hypothesis lies in the acceptance of realist principles and the assumptions that lie within. A state's sovereignty and security are of the most important matters of the state acting in a rational unitary manner for the good of the people. Another aspect on the central arguments of realism and neo-realism that explain China's behavior is that with realism is about maximizing power, and with neo-realism the focus is the need to pursue power to ensure a state's survival which is exactly what China is doing by increasing its military, political relationships, and its economic relationships in order to secure the resources needed for its people. China has a need to provide for its people and that is inclusive of economic, political, and security matters within its borders and the assets and allies it has around the globe. China's need for natural resources has increased considerably over the last seventeen years, and as natural resources become scarce, there will be escalations and conflict over those scarce resources. The state that has the ability to secure those resources will have the upper hand. China, by growing its economic, political, and security relationships will increase its ability to secure those resources.

Alternative Arguments

One of the opposing arguments to this hypothesis and the theory of realism and neo-realism is that of liberalism and neo-liberal institutionalism. The main concept of the realist positions of this

dissertation is the sovereignty and security of a state and the tendencies of a rising power to expand its military security, economic security, and political security. The counter argument of liberalism and neo-liberalism would support that economic growth would be the compelling explanations for the actions that China has undertaken over the last seventeen years. Considering China's economic and political growth in this period, this could be a plausible argument, though the one outlier would be China's increase in military spending which would null this argument.

China's cooperation with other states within the international system would also add to the liberalism and neo-liberalism argument. China, over the last seventeen years has increased its participation within the international system considerably and has provided humanitarian relief and support around the globe and its communication between individuals and groups around the globe. The factor that nulls this argument is with its sovereignty, where China's actions suggest that other states within the system should have no say in Chinese political matters.

Closing Thoughts and Future of Sino-American Relations

Since the end of the Cold War China has developed into a superpower that can offset the power of the United States within the international system. As the evidence presented in this dissertation supports, China has increased its power significantly as an economic and political player at the global level. China has developed relationships with

new allies in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Within each of these regions of the world China has courted the leaders, made huge investments, and provided support on the international level in the political arena. China has also increased its presence as it has grown its memberships in international organizations considerably. By doing so, China has increased its ability to influence other members, voice its opinions, and counter the power and influence of the United States and its allies as necessary. This is especially true in the realm of economics as the corporations waiting at the gate attempt to get the business and labor of the 1.3 billion people within the borders of China when the Chinese government allows such entrance. Also presented in this dissertation is the growth of China's 'soft power,' along with its 'hard power,' as it has developed into a superpower. China has managed to befriend many of the leaders of states that have values running counter to those of the United States and its allies across the globe and has enhanced its military through training and technology it has gained from other states like Russia or through the observation of the United States. From a political perspective, China has changed its method of dealing in international politics from a quite closed border government to a government that is more vocal and outwardly reaching, influencing governments that have ideologies that run counter to the United States and especially states that are rich in natural resources like oil and natural gas. States like Venezuela or the Sudan, where China has spent billions of dollars

investing in research and production in gathering what China needs to fuel its growth, natural resources have developed into China's ally, supplying China with the needed resources to fuel its growth. The increase in China's memberships in international governmental organizations and as a member of the United Nations Security Council where it continues to vote counter to that of the United States on agenda items that are important to the United States remains constant. Possibly the most important new membership is China's admission to the World Trade Organization has also given China a podium to voice its direction as to the realm of trade. One of the major topics at the World Trade Organization is the topic of intellectual property and technology transfer. These two areas have been a benefit to China as it has grown its infrastructure and military through advances in these two areas. China is also a member of the Asian Development Bank, which provides help to its developing member countries in reducing poverty and improving the quality of life. China has donated \$20 million dollars in funding the People's Republic of China Regional Cooperation and Poverty Reduction Fund in an effort to strengthen the capacity of developing member countries. The Asian Development also publishes the Asian Development Outlook, which is an analysis of the 44 member countries. The 2008 outlook suggests that China will continue its economic growth though it will be moderate(*Asian Development Outlook 2008 Update*, 2008).

Though China is not a member of ASEAN, China and the ASEAN have met regularly since 1991. The cooperation between the two is considered to be deepening in trust and cooperation. The member countries along with China are called the 10+1 cooperation, which plays a considerable role in strengthening the partnership. Looking at the trade between China and the ASEAN members, growth between the two has increased considerably since 1991.

As a country with 1.3 billion people, China has the resources for not only consumption but to fill the inexpensive labor force that other states utilize. Over the last seventeen years over 30 percent of the rural population have moved to urban areas to fill labor needs created by the exceptional growth. China and the United States are now on par with each other as the percentage of the urban populations is within a point or so of each other at 55%. With the United States comprising of about 300 million people, using round numbers, which would equate to 165 million people. Considering China's numbers with a population of 1.3 billion people, 55% of that population would equate to 715 million people, more than four times that of the United States.

China and Russia have also begun joint military operations that could not only be considered a military operation but a political statement. In August 2005, China and Russia held joint military operations for the first time in 40 years. China. This operation is considered to counter that of the United States and its allies as the controlling world power over

international affairs. China is currently consumes approximately 45% of Russia's arms exports. Since 2000 China has bought some \$2 billion dollars of Russian military weapons systems, including aircraft, destroyers, and submarines. Prior to striking this deal, China and Russia had reconciled its border disputes indicating cooperation between the two countries. China and Russia have also joined forces to counter the desire of the United States working with Poland and the Czech Republic on the installation of defensive missile and radar sites along the border in an effort to counter possible attacks from Iran or other rogue states.

China's soft power is enhanced by China's 'hard power' as the growth and capabilities of China's military have become more efficient and modern in more ways than just hardware. China's military training has also developed as a result of the incorporation of newer technologies and training enhancements gained through not only Russia but also through the United States. China and the United States have held frequent exchanges and dialogues between military leaders of both countries since 1996, mainly to discuss regional security but also to develop a mutual understanding and the development of trust between the two countries. The senior military leaders of China and the United States also work as a consultative body on military and maritime safety, and to establish a mechanism for dialogue to manage problems that may occur in the future. China and the United States have also agreed to exchanges between the

two militaries through training, logistics, and through the military academies.

China has spent as much on security as the United States has, though as a percentage of GDP, China has outpaced the United States over the last seventeen years. One assumption that has been made is that China's military spending figures are low. As with GDP over producing, many think that China spends at least twice as much on its military than it says it spends. It is important to remember that China does not include external spending for military goods in its published military budget. Looking back at Chapter VI (Analysis), there are both depictions as to China's spending, as it is important to truly understand the whole picture.

Along with China's political and military gains supported in this dissertation, China has grown and sustained its economy for more than two decades and it appears that it will continue. China's economic growth since 1989 is also seen as exceptional. China has been able to maintain its substantial growth indicating that this is not just a glitch in the economy. With China's 1.3 billion people, corporations outside of China are working hard to gain, maintain or increase existing access and act in a fashion that will open new markets helping to drive growth. This continued growth within China continues as China continues to court heads of State, other dignitaries, and heads of corporations that will bring growth to China.

One of the most important assumptions made is that the statistics on China's growth that have been published are accurate. Looking at China's GDP growth over the last seventeen years, China's GDP growth has been phenomenal. There are, however, those who do not believe the statistics to be completely true. There are those that do not believe that China has grown at the pace that is published and that there are inconsistencies in the numbers.

The literature review for this dissertation is of great value as it lays the foundation and basis on the many theories as to a State's growth, international systems, international relations theories, and alliance theories as to a State's behavior and how a balance of power is produced within the international system. From the realist perspective, China has touted that it is a sovereign state and that all other states should keep to themselves, especially when it comes to human rights issues. The problems around Tibet as China continues to maintain control of the area and Tiananmen Square killing of protesters alone have brought light the problems within China's governing authority. One of the major areas China continues to have it around the issue of human rights. Looking at the United Nations and what the United States considers important votes, China has continued to voice its opinion of a states sovereignty through its continued vote against human rights issues and regulation. In the past the United States has led the charge against China through sanctions and support of keeping China out of organizations like the World Trade

Organization. Though the United States continues this support for human rights much has changed in the last seventeen years as China's soft power and new relationships with states of similar ideology have come to its aid and China has been allowed membership into the World Trade Organization and has even given China most favored nation status. From the economic perspective, China has also developed the needed relationships required to maintain its economic growth and infrastructure needs through access to natural resources such as oil, natural gas, and hard metals.

China's continued growth also suggests that to support such growth China will need to secure the natural resources needed to maintain this growth. Much of China's political and economic relationships are centered on securing the needed resources for much of the future as it continues to grow. China's relationships with Cuba, Venezuela and the Sudan are good examples as China invests huge sums of money in development and exploration for resources while at the same time developing relationships with states that have similar ideologies.

Only time will tell what the future holds for China and the United States. If China can continue its growth in the areas supported by this dissertation, China not only balances the Power of the United States but also could surpass the United States as the world's greatest superpower. China and the United States will continue to exist and work together as the effects of global economies, trade, and labor forces expand, so they will

continue to work with each other to set policies that can be cohesive in growing both economies and infrastructures. In times of national disasters, China and the United States have worked together supporting each other and other states in need. After September 11, 2001 China came to the support of the United States in supporting the war on terror and continues to do so, though there is some hypocrisy as China continues to trade with terrorist states. There will also continue to be conflict and disagreement as the sovereignty of each state will also be of focus by the leaders heading both China and the United States as each state continues to expand its power.

Currently the future of Sino-American relations appears it will maintain a stable relationship with support for terrorism and humanitarian aid around the globe from both countries. China's will continue to voice its opposition to interference from outside governments as to any decisions made within its sovereign borders. China's ability to provide a labor force to the world will also continue to grow as states, especially the United States, will look for outside labor at rates that could not be found within its borders. China's ability to maintain this labor force will also continue to grow as education and training of its people increases. U.S. corporations will also look to China to provide the cost benefits needed to grow the bottom line and increase profits. China and the United States will continue to work together to maintain world order and a common balance between

the two states though both nations have differing ideologies and perspectives on maintaining this balance.

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