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"Gosh I Miss the Cold War": Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Making In The United States, 1989-1995

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“GOSH I MISS THE COLD WAR: POST-COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING
IN THE UNITED STATES 1989-1995

by

Samantha Alisha Taylor

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate School,
the College of Arts and Letters,
and the Department of History
at The University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

“GOSH I MISS THE COLD WAR”: POST-COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY

MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES 1989-1995

by Samantha Alisha Taylor

August 2017

The end of the Cold War created a dilemma for American foreign policymakers as the strategy to contain the spread of communism became obsolete. The presidencies of George H. W. Bush and William “Bill” Jefferson Clinton were forced to create grand strategies for American national security and foreign policy to replace the forty-plus year strategy of containment that continued to rely on traditional themes and principles of US foreign policy. Both men had to overcome lingering Cold War attitudes about the United States role in the world and its national security interests. As they struggled to do this, they faced an American public that was supportive of and reluctant of American participation in conflict resolution around the world.

This dissertation argues that even as the international context changed following the end of the Cold War and during the early post-Cold War period, presidents George H. W. Bush and William “Bill” Clinton relied on pre-Cold War US foreign policy and national security strategies from the early twentieth century to devise a non-containment grand strategy. Clinton’s and Bush’s national security strategy and foreign policies returned to cooperative security arrangements that relied on international and regional institutions to respond to international and intranational conflicts that threatened to world security and stability and American interests. Their efforts occurred as post-Cold War technological advances in satellite transmissions, the growth of the internet, and

electronic email increased public opinion's and the mass media's ability to influence foreign policy decisions. This dissertation focuses on the intranational or intra-state conflicts the United States intervened in between 1989 and 1995.

Using Bush and Clinton's national security strategies, presidential documents, documents from the National Security Council, US State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency this dissertation examines the development and execution of Bush and Clinton's grand strategies. The dissertation also uses public opinion polls, newspaper editorials, and archived television news reports understand public opinion and its responses to mass media and presidential framing and agenda setting.

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my grandmother Letha Earline Taylor for praying for me and encouraging me to stand true to my convictions. To my parents Preston Sr. and Brenda Taylor for all of their emotional and financial support. Lastly, to my aunt Pamela Davis, uncle Charles Richardson, and grandfather Frank Taylor who are no longer here to see and celebrate this moment with me, but are loved and missed.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>BTF</i>	Interagency Balkan Task Force
<i>CIA</i>	Central Intelligence Agency
<i>CBC</i>	Congressional Black Caucus
<i>CSCE</i>	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
<i>DIA</i>	Defense Intelligence Agency
<i>DOD</i>	Department of Defense
<i>EC</i>	European Community
<i>EU</i>	European Union
<i>FRG</i>	Federal Republic of Germany
<i>GDR</i>	German Democratic Republic
<i>GHWBPR</i>	George H. W. Bush Presidential Records
<i>ICFY</i>	International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
<i>NATO</i>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<i>NGO</i>	Nongovernment Organization
<i>NIE</i>	National Intelligence Estimate
<i>NID</i>	National Intelligence Daily
<i>NSA</i>	National Security Advisor
<i>NSC</i>	National Security Council
<i>NSC/DC</i>	National Security Council Deputies Committee
<i>NSC/PC</i>	National Security Council Principals Committee
<i>NSS90</i>	National Security Strategy, 1990
<i>NSS91</i>	National Security Strategy, 1991

<i>NSS93</i>	National Security Strategy, 1993
<i>NSS94</i>	National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1994
<i>NSS95</i>	National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995
<i>NWO</i>	New World Order
<i>PPPWJC</i>	<i>Public Papers of the President of the United States: William J. Clinton</i>
<i>PPPGGB</i>	<i>Public Papers of the President of the United States: George Bush</i>
<i>PRD</i>	Presidential Review Directive
<i>PDD</i>	Presidential Decision Directive
<i>NYT</i>	<i>The New York Times</i>
<i>RPF</i>	Rwandan Patriotic Front
<i>UK</i>	United Kingdom
<i>UN</i>	United Nations
<i>UNAMIR</i>	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
<i>UNHCR</i>	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
<i>UNMIH</i>	United Nations Mission in Haiti
<i>UNSC</i>	United Nations Security Council
<i>UNPROFOR</i>	United Nations Protection Force
<i>US</i>	United States
<i>USIA</i>	<i>United States Information Agency</i>
<i>WCPR</i>	<i>William Clinton Presidential Records</i>
<i>WP</i>	<i>The Washington Post</i>
<i>WHOC</i>	White House Office of Correspondence
<i>WHORM</i>	White House Office of Records Management

WSJ *Wall Street Journal*
VOA *Voice of America*

CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION

Overview

The unanticipated end of the Cold War concluded the forty-year ideological conflict between communism and democratic capitalism and the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. It also ended the *raison d'être* for US involvement in international crises around the world. For forty years, the United States had intervened around the world to prevent the expansion of communism and Soviet power. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended this overarching justification for American international activism. Without this overarching justification, US policymakers struggled to create a unifying post-Cold War strategy that could duplicate the strategy of containment. This made it difficult for policymakers to present a coherent strategy of American interventions to the American public to get public support for those operations. As post-Cold War conflicts increasingly occurred within states, policymakers faced a difficult time explaining to the American public what threats those intranational conflicts posed to the United States and its interests. Another issue was the increased publicity of policy debates in the media where the public could view them, which informed public opinion to support or oppose policy decisions. This forced American policymakers and the president to sell their strategies and decisions to the American public. The increased publicity of foreign policy debates also put American policymakers in a competition with the mass media to frame international events and set the public agenda for America's response.

This dissertation argues that even as the international context changed following the end of the Cold War and during the early post-Cold War period, presidents George H. W. Bush and William "Bill" Clinton relied on pre-Cold War US foreign policy and

national security strategies from the early twentieth century to devise a non-containment grand strategy. Clinton's and Bush's national security strategy and foreign policies returned to cooperative security arrangements that relied on international and regional institutions to respond to international and intranational conflicts that threatened to world security and stability and American interests. Their efforts occurred as post-Cold War technological advances in satellite transmissions, the growth of the internet, and electronic email increased public opinion's and the mass media's ability to influence foreign policy decisions. The technological advances of the late 1980s and 1990s enabled the popularity of cable television and the rise of twenty-four-hour news channels like CNN and email. This dissertation focuses on the intranational or intra-state conflicts the United States intervened in between 1989 and 1995. It also explores the evolution of American national security and foreign policies during this period in response to the rise of intranational crises and decline of international ones. This dissertation will show that international changes occurring after the Cold War challenged American policymakers understanding of American interventions and how policymakers explained those decisions to gain public support. It will also show that changes in public opinion and mass media influences, starting as early as 1960s, changed the relationship between the president, the media, and the public about the way foreign policies were created.

Opinion polls during the 1990s, revealed a growing divide between the American public and policymakers about the direction of America's post-Cold War foreign policy. While most policymakers including Presidents Bush and Clinton wanted to maintain America's leadership role around the world, the public was divided on whether the United States needed to fulfill such a role. Also, most Americans preferred the United

States engage in multinational or multilateral interventions, and maintaining America's military presence around the world.¹ This divergence occurred at a time when the mass media's and the American public's influence was growing, and media reports presented perspectives that differed from the president's desired narrative. It also occurred as the occurrences of international conflicts, like the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, decreased and intranational or intrastate conflicts, like the coup in Haiti, emerged as the dominant threat to global stability.

These intranational conflicts created crises that did not directly threaten the United States, but because American policymakers believed in US global leadership they attempted to justify American participation in the interventions to resolve the crises. The policy decisions made regarding these intra-state imbroglios revealed two trends regarding US policy. For example, during the Persian Gulf Crisis, Bush successfully justified US participation to defend the Persian Gulf from Iraqi aggression, convinced the American public to support his policy decisions, and established a frame that the mass media mirrored. On the other hand, during the Bosnian War Bush and Clinton struggled to justify their policy to the American public, failed to establish a convincing frame for the conflict. Additionally, the media presented its own frame that focused on the humanitarian aspect of the crisis and countered the president's frame. Bush and Clinton's failure to convincingly justify their policy to the American public created divisions within public opinion and increased public opposition to the presidents' decisions. It was during

¹ Richard J. Cattani, "America In the World," *Public Perspectives*, 3, no. 3 (March/April 1992): 3-5. <https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/public-perspective/ppscan/33/33003.pdf>

the Bosnian War that pressure from American public and media encouraged Clinton to make policy changes that led to the Dayton Accords in December 1995.

This dissertation consists of several cases studies: the reunification of Germany, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian War, the coup in Haiti, and genocide in Rwanda. These examples illustrate the interdependency of public opinion, mass media, and presidential policymaking in the post-Cold War foreign policy process. Since the 1970s, the president's ability to determine foreign policy debates without significant opposition and to rely on bipartisan consensus had declined considerably. These post-Cold War conflicts occurred at a time when advances in telecommunications technology enabled real-time communications, expanded the popularity of cable television, and made the rise of twenty-four-hour cable news networks like CNN possible. These advances democratized television for the American public, which had previously been limited to the three broadcast networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC. These changes created an environment where Bush and Clinton had to publicly debate foreign policy while considering their position, the position of other Washington elites, the American public, and the mass media. Thus, in the early post-Cold War period, understanding public opinion became an important factor to successfully implement US foreign policy. It also required Bush and Clinton to work harder to make their interpretation and conception of these intranational crises the accepted frame, otherwise the mass media's frame would become the publicly accepted understanding of events.

This dissertation gets its title from a statement Bill Clinton made on 15 October 1993 during an interview with the *Washington Post*. Following the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia, Clinton said, "Gosh, I miss the Cold War. We had an intellectually

coherent thing. The American people knew what the rules were.”² Clinton’s statement was partly in response to the failed military operation to capture Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed and the publicized images of the Somalis mistreating the bodies of fallen US soldiers. It was also partially a reply to questions the failure raised about Clinton’s foreign policy agenda among the international community, the US Congress, and the American public. It was partly a reaction to the increased influence of the American public on foreign policy debates and decisions, and the public’s ability to force the government to change policy in response to a negative result of a policy decision, and mass media’s growing influence in foreign policy debates due to technological advances. Lastly, it was also a response to Clinton’s struggle to establish a widely supported grand strategy to replace the simple, general, and long-enduring strategy of containment during a period where a concise message to explain and justify US responses to international conflicts remained elusive.

George H. W. Bush

Before he was elected president in 1988, Bush had served as Vice-President to Ronald Reagan from 1981 to 1988. He had also served as US ambassador to the UN, the head of the CIA, and as a Naval flyer during World War II. Bush’s professional experiences differed greatly from his predecessor, Ronald Reagan, who had gained fame as a Hollywood actor and later entered politics as governor of California in 1966 before becoming president in 1980. During his presidency, Reagan produced a foreign policy

² Ann Devroy and Jeffrey R. Smith, “Clinton Reexamines a Foreign Policy Under Siege,” *Washington Post*, October 17, 1993, https://secure.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/doc/307677847.html?FMT=FT_

agenda with a nationalist outlook that exuded confidence in the rightness of US objectives and America's ability to achieve those objectives. Also, Reagan did not believe that the Soviet system could change. He viewed the Soviet Union as eternally and implacably hostile to the West. Reagan's hostile view of the Soviet Union and the world that led to a diplomatic style that had a propensity for simplicity.³

On the other hand, Bush was less ideologically oriented than Reagan, and his rhetoric was often less antagonistic towards the Soviet Union and leftist regimes. Bush was also less likely to make hyperbolic declarations or rely on clichés in speeches and interviews. He focused on pragmatic diplomatic negotiations and sought cooperation with friends and opponents. While Reagan was “*the Cold Warrior*,”⁴ Bush, on the other hand, had diplomatic experience from his assignments as US Ambassador to the UN and as vice president, and he could negotiate with the Soviet Union and take advantages of the changes in the East-West relationship.⁵ Bush's temperament fit the period of improved relations between the United States and Soviet Union. This was especially needed as Mikhail Gorbachev carried out his reform policies that emboldened democratic movements in the Warsaw Pact nations and weakened Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1990 allowed Bush to create a foreign policy that did not focus on containing or rolling back Soviet expansionism as Reagan's policy had. It also allowed Bush to undertake plans to reduce the size of the US

³ Robert W. Tucker, “Reagan's Foreign Policy” *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 1 (1988/1989): 1-27, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043881>.

⁴ Christopher Maynard, *Out of the Shadow: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War*, (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press) xi.

⁵ Maynard, *Out of the Shadow*, 1-5.

military because he believed that the end of the Cold War eliminated the need for a large US military force.

During Bush's 1988 presidential campaign, the Republican party's foreign policy agenda focused on ensuring the continuation of US leadership in the world and encouraging free nations to promote global peace. The Republican party's main objective remained defending the United States, its interests, and its citizens while preserving peace, stability, and security around the world by fostering democratic self-determination and economic prosperity. The Republican party also intended to have the United States engage enemies and friends from a position of strength.⁶

During his acceptance speech for the Republican presidential nomination Bush incorporated the republican foreign policy platform into his campaign pledge. He promised to pursue peace through strength, to continue working to reduce the US and Soviet conventional and strategic weapons. He also pledged to support America's modernization and technological edge, and to speak and stand for freedom in the East and West.⁷ He continued this in his inauguration speech when he stated that the United States would stay strong to protect peace. He also promised to work to continue America's new relationship with the Soviet Union as consistent with US security.⁸ During his presidency,

⁶ Republican Party Platform, "Republican Party Platform of 1988," August 16, 1988, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25846>.

⁷ George Bush, "Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in New Orleans," August 18, 1988, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25955>.

⁸ George Bush, "Inaugural Address, January 20, 1989," *Public Papers of the President of the United States: George Bush, 1989 Book 1—January 20 to June 30, 1989*, 3 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1990).

Bush attempted to implement the Republican Party's foreign policy platform by continuing the SALT talks with the Soviet Union, and adjusting US relations with NATO. However, not all of Bush's policy decisions after the Cold War adhered to the Republican platform. Bush's decision to support conflict resolution efforts by regional organizations during the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Bosnia, and Haiti did not reflect American leadership. Bush's actions during these conflicts created an image of American withdrawal from the world. This contradicted his New World Order that had called for US leadership in international collaborative efforts to resolve and end conflicts around the world. Nonetheless, Bush's presidency provided the initial steps away from Cold War attitudes and the strategy of containment. He helped the nation learn to respond to post-Cold War conflicts, and understand the costs of continuing to hold onto Cold War beliefs and strategies. As Clinton succeeded Bush as president, Clinton's ability to learn from Bush's successes and failures in the post-Cold War period foreign policy making would determine Clinton's ability to establish a successful post-Cold War grand strategy. However, Clinton would face more conflicts like Bosnia and Haiti and few like Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The spread of intranational conflicts would emerge as the largest challenge to Clinton's ability to establish and implement his post-Cold War strategies and policies.

William "Bill" Clinton

Upon taking office in 1993, Clinton became the first post-Cold War American president. The Soviet Union was no longer an ideological or military threat to the United States, and the Cold War rules of containment were no longer applicable. In the wake of democracy's "victory" over communism, the United States stood as the world's sole

superpower. Thus, Clinton tried to develop a grand strategy to guide US foreign policies that would promoted US engagement with the world and promoted global prosperity. He also wanted the United States to defend and enlarge the number of democratic governments around the world. While Bush had faced a blend of international and intranational conflicts like the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the collapse of Yugoslavia, Clinton faced intranational crises during the first two years of his presidency. The growing occurrence of intranational conflicts like illegal government changes, political opposition, ethnic violence, and genocide forced the United States to reevaluate its willingness to intervene in internal state conflicts that threatened regional stability and security even if it meant violating another countries sovereignty.

As Clinton created his national security strategy and foreign policies he contended with mixed public opinions about US post-Cold War foreign policies that Bush had. Public opinion polls taken just before Clinton started his presidency revealed that that 75 percent of Americans wanted to focus on domestic issues over foreign affairs. At the same time the public was split over letting the world get along as best it could without US interventions.⁹ Thus, Clinton faced complex public attitudes that increased the difficulties he faced gaining public support for his foreign policy decisions. The American public's disenchantment with American activism abroad was shared by the mass media and added to Clinton's struggle to keep the United States engaged in the post-Cold War world. Unlike his predecessor, Clinton lacked military and diplomatic experience. While Bush had been a young Navy pilot during WWII, Clinton had moved to Canada to avoid the

⁹ Richard Cattani "America In The World," *Public Perspectives* 3 no. 3 (March-April, 1992): 6-9, <https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/public-perspective/ppscan/33/33006.pdf>.

Vietnam draft. Whereas Bush had this experience from serving as the US Ambassador to the UN and as head of the CIA, Clinton had worked as a lawyer and local politician most of his career before running for president. Clinton's lack of diplomatic experience became apparent when he attempted to explain his foreign policy to the public even though Clinton was a charismatic speaker. Clinton's lack of foreign policy experience dampened his public confidence and his charisma making it difficult for Clinton to convincingly establish foreign policy frames and agendas during his first two years.

During the 1992 presidential campaign, while Bush trumpeted his foreign policy successes, Clinton focused on domestic issues which resonated with the American public's demand for greater attention at home than abroad. The Democratic party criticized Bush's foreign policy for not acting assertively or tough enough to global crises, "What the United States needs is not the Bush Administration's Cold War thinking on a smaller scale."¹⁰ The Democratic Party argued US foreign policy needed to restore America's global leadership position by helping the world prevent crises, deter dictators, respond assertively to aggression, punishing human rights abusers, protecting the environment, and honing America's competitive edge in the global economy to the national security strategy and foreign policies. The Democratic Party noted, "The collapse of communism does not mean the end of danger to our interests."¹¹ Democrats contended that US post-Cold War foreign policy and national security required restructuring the US military while maintaining its strength and America's ability to

¹⁰ Democratic Party Platform, "1992 Democratic Party Platform," July 13, 1992. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.ws/?pid=29610>.

¹¹ Democratic Party Platform, "1992 Democratic Party Platform," July 13, 1992. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.ws/?pid=29610>.

defend itself. This included maintaining a nuclear presence capable of deterring any nuclear threat, shifting conventional military power to where national interests were threatened, reducing military size while maintaining international obligations and improving the ability to rapidly deploy, maintaining American superior personnel and technology, and improve intelligence capabilities to provide more timely and accurate analyses of situation that can cause conflicts.¹²

Methodology

This dissertation relies on an interdisciplinary approach that combines traditional diplomatic history with mass communications studies to understand the development of post-Cold War foreign policies as policymakers navigated a new international environment and greater public influence in the policymaking process because of the advances in telecommunications technology that introduced twenty-four-hour news channels, the internet, and email. This dissertation uses the mass communications theories of framing, agenda setting, cascading activation, and the “CNN factor” on policy making.

The mass communications theory of framing refers to the way an issue is characterized in news reports can influence how the audience understands the issue. Agenda setting is that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis mass media puts on issues and events through newspaper placement or the amount of coverage they give to those issues and events, and how important the public assumes those issues and events are. Framing and agenda setting focus on the ways the media reports on the issues and the

¹² Democratic Party Platform, “1992 Democratic Party Platform,” July 13, 1992. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/?pid=29610>.

influence reporting styles and methods have on American understanding of events, and thereby what the public feels would be the proper response to those events.¹³

Robert M. Entman's cascading activation theory describes the interweaving influence on official views of events from the President to policy elites to the media then to the public, and back up, and how that effects policy decisions. Entman's cascading activation reveals the contest between the president, his supporters, and critics for political leverage theory, and shows that implementing foreign policy requires the president to reckon with the media when proposing to use of military forces and the American public as well as Washington elites. Lastly the CNN effect argues that following the Cold War, Western media has been a driving force pushing Western governments, including the United States, to undertake untenable humanitarian interventions. The CNN effect focuses on how much power the media possesses to convince governments to intervene militarily in humanitarian crises through their use of images and rhetoric that sways the audience's opinion of the crises, and pressure the government to act.¹⁴

Scholars have shown that the president and mass media have influence on the public opinion, and that public attitudes can influence the direction of mass media and the policymakers. This interdependence is an important factor for my analysis of early post-Cold War foreign policy, because after the Cold War this relationship had a growing

¹³ Dietram A. Scheufele and David Tewksbury, "Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models," *Journal of Communication* 57 no. 1, (Mar 2007): 11. <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cms&AN=24074978&site=ehost-live>

¹⁴ Robert M. Entman, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

influence on the ways that policymakers explained international situations and justified policy decisions to the American public.¹⁵ The presidential rhetoric and the president as media explores presidential agenda setting through public statements on policy agendas that and the president's ability to make the public more aware of those policy areas, and support his decisions. Jeffery E. Cohen's study on presidential State of the Union addresses shows that increased presidential attention to economic, foreign, and civil rights policies led to increased public concern towards those policies. Cohen continues that even sparse statements of policy areas could elicit a public response especially on foreign policy.¹⁶ Since televised presidential speeches are the president's main means to express their positions to the public, I examine how presidential rhetoric and the president as media through broadcast and cable television influenced public opinion, and the president's ability to sway public support for policy decisions through public statements about each crisis.

Along with presidential rhetoric and the president as media, this dissertation explores public opinion and its influence on foreign policy decisions during German reunification, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, collapse of Yugoslavia, Bosnian War, 1991 coup in Haiti, and genocide in Rwanda. This research included public opinion polls, editorials, letters to the editor, and letters to the president of the United States.

¹⁵ Gary Young and William B. Perkins, "Presidential Rhetoric, The Public Agenda, and the End of Presidential Television's 'Golden Age'," *The Journal of Politics*, 67 no. 4 (November 2005):1190-1205, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00356.x> Jeffrey S. Peake, "Presidential Agenda Setting in Foreign Policy," *Political Research Quarterly* 54 no. 1, (March 2001): 69-86, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/449208>. Matthew A. Baum and Samuel Kernell, "Has Cable Ended the Golden Age of Presidential Television?" *The American Political Science Review* 93 no. 1 (March 1999): 99-114, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585763>.

¹⁶ Jeffrey E. Cohen, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda," *American Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 1 (February 1995): 87-107, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111759>.

Throughout this dissertation, I will use the terms intranational and intra-state interchangeably to reference the multiple types of internal conflicts that states faced including humanitarian disasters, civil wars, ethnic fighting, genocide or ethnic cleansing, and illegitimate regime changes. Since intra-state imbroglios became the dominant form of conflict in the early post-Cold War period prevention and intervention methods became significant parts of Bush and Clinton's security and foreign policy strategies.¹⁷

Justifications

This dissertation consists of six foreign policy case studies and a chapter on post-Cold War mass media, public opinion, and presidential rhetoric. In this dissertation, I will analyze the reunification of Germany, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian War, the 1991 military coup of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. I chose the timeframe so that it included Bush's transition from the Cold War and the adjustments he had to make to US foreign policy for post-Cold War international situation. Following Bush's transition into Clinton's first two years as a post-Cold War. This period provided a balanced period to

¹⁷ Yossi Shain, "Multicultural Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy* no. 100 (Autumn 1995): 69-87, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149304>. Mark E. Pietrzyk, "Explaining the Post-Cold War Order: An International Society Approach," *International Journal on World Peace* 18 no. 3 (September 2001): 31-54, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20753316>. Adam Roberts, "International Relations after the Cold War," *International Affairs (Royal Institution of International Affairs 1944-)* 84 no. 2, (March 2008): 34-350 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25144768>. Alan James, "Peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era," *International Journal* 50 no. 2 (Spring 1995): 241-265, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25734052>. Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict," *Foreign Policy* no. 96 (Autumn 1994): 3-20, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149213>. Linda B. Miller, "American Foreign Policy: Beyond Containment," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 66 no. 2 (April 1990) 313-324, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2621336>. Muzaffer Eran Yilmaz, "UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era," *International Journal of World Peace* 22 no. 2 (June 2005): 13-28, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20753484>. Walter Russell Mead, "Lucid Stars: The American Foreign Policy Tradition," *World Peace Journal*, 11 no. 4 (Winter 1994): 1-17, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209380>.

explore Bush and Clinton's policies toward the post-Cold War period. The years after 1995 represent a subsequent break as the later post-Cold War period was increasingly marked by international terrorism which required a different national security strategy and foreign policies. Although it falls into my chronology I did not include the crisis in Somalia because of classification restrictions on Clinton's National Security Council documents. I am hoping that in time more of these documents will become available so that I will be able to carry out a comparison of Bush's and Clinton's policies in the future.

I chose to begin the dissertation with a chapter on the reunification of Germany because Bush's diplomatic efforts contained elements of the strategy of containment, and American diplomatic and security strategies from WWII. This included cautious cooperation with Soviet leaders while standing ready to prevent any Soviet attempts to expand communism or initiate repressive policies in Eastern Germany or Eastern Europe. This was a significant turn at the end of the Cold War and indicated that improved international cooperation was possible in the future. The reunification of Germany was the last crisis the United States responded to while abiding by the strategy of containment. It also occurred as the right dominated American politics while the left dominated American culture, which created a conflict between political conservatism and secular multicultural worldviews. As democratic revolutions occurred in Eastern Europe started to undermine Soviet influence Bush contended the same changes occurring in the United States internationally.

My second chapter explores the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that began on August 1, 1990. I will refer to this crisis as the Persian Gulf Crisis as it was referred to in the media. My use of the Persian Gulf Crisis only refers to the Iraq invasion

of Kuwait between August 1990 and January 1991. It does not include the Gulf War from January 1991 to April 1991. I made this decision to focus on Bush's efforts to create and lead the international response and coalition against Saddam Hussein and Iraq, and because it was the last international crisis that involved the Soviet Union as a world superpower. As Bush and his administration began to recognize that the Cold War was ending while the Soviet Union collapsed between 1990 and 1991, it was during the Persian Gulf Crisis that Bush began developing and espousing his post-Cold War strategy. I also chose the Persian Gulf Crisis to study Bush's efforts to gain public opinion and control the frame for the Persian Gulf Crisis. Lastly, the Persian Gulf Crisis was the last international imbroglio the United States participated in as it transitioned to the post-Cold War period. After the Cold War, the United States participated in more intranational peace efforts, thus including this chapter allows me to compare Bush's policies towards intranational conflicts as compared to international ones.

I examine the dissolution of Yugoslavia for several reasons. First, because the collapse of Yugoslavia was the first crisis the United States dealt with after the Cold War ended, whereas the Persian Gulf Crisis and the reunification of Germany occurred during the end of the Cold War. Second, the dissolution of Yugoslavia was a direct result of the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, international economic aid evaporated, and political and ethnic disagreements pushed the country toward collapse. The way Bush and the media framed Yugoslavia's collapse influenced public opinion and by extension, Bush's policy decisions. In particular, the media's focus on "ancient ethnic hatreds" made justifying an intervention for any side difficult. Yugoslavia's dissolution tested Bush's New World Order vision and his ability to apply cooperative security

arrangements as a response to intra-state conflicts. As the Bosnian War resulted from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, I examine it in the chapter following the Yugoslavia. This chapter is the first to analyze and compare Bush's and Clinton's strategies and policy decisions in the post-Cold War period, as well as their views on US leadership and intervention in intranational conflicts.

In the next chapter I analyze the 1991 coup of Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, which reveals both presidents post-Cold War commitment to defend and support democratic governments threatened by illegal government change and political opposition from enemies other than communists. Haiti also reveals the influence of race politics on US post-Cold War foreign policy, especially as the 1990s were a period where debates about racial equality and racial discord were important factors. Throughout US diplomatic history African Americans had attempted to influence US foreign policy and US policymakers had used African Americans to further national security and foreign policy goals. In the post-Cold War period, the Congressional Black Caucus emerged as strong lobbying force in the government and foreign policy. Their efforts to change US policies towards Haiti under Bush and Clinton demonstrate the Congressional Black Caucus's growing influence in Washington, and the changing nature of race in US foreign policy after the Cold War.

I examine the genocide in Rwanda as another ethnic conflict and intranational conflict to show changes that began to occur in Clinton's foreign policy regarding UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period. The genocide occurred as the American public and politicians became increasingly wary of US participation in peacekeeping efforts that dragged the United States into quagmires that had little

connection to US interests and offered little reward. The Rwandan genocide tested Clinton's re-evaluation of US participation in peacekeeping missions, and his ability to establish foreign policy frames and agendas without relying on those first established by George Bush.

Explanation of Sources

This dissertation relies on research that includes National Security Council and administration records from the Bush and Clinton Presidential libraries, U.S. State Department and CIA Freedom of Information Act websites, the United Nations Archive, and UN online records to analyze foreign policy and national security strategy. I use archived news broadcasts from ABC, CBS, NBC, C-Span, and CNN from the Vanderbilt University Television News Archive; newspaper articles and editorials from the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal*; and public statements by George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton to understand the contest between the president and media over the frames and agendas for each crisis. I also use newspaper editorials and public opinion polls by Gallup and the Pew Research Archives to get to public opinion about the conflicts and related policy decisions. Lastly, I use the White House Office of Records Management from the Bush and Clinton presidencies to access public correspondence to the presidents related to each conflict. Due to the size of the WHORM collections, this dissertation uses a sample of the letters available from the Bush and Clinton libraries. For example, the letters I gathered from the Clinton Archive on the Yugoslav conflict are mostly from 1995, with only few letters from the public before 1995. Part of this is due to public reaction or lack of response to the Bosnian crisis before 1995. The letters used on the Persian Gulf Crisis are a sampling of the 198,600 pages of correspondence Bush

received during Persian Gulf Crisis. The sample comes from letters that arrived around the time of major events during the Persian Gulf War from 1990-1991. Much of the letters in the sample are from the period between August 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait and January 1991 when Bush, with UN support, made the decision to go to war.

The mass media portions of this dissertation come from research in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* archives. By conducting keyword searches in the Vanderbilt Universities Television News Archive database of broadcast news reports from August 1968 by ABC, CBS, and NBC I gained statistical information about news broadcasts on each crisis. These searches provided key terms that were used to describe each debate as well as the length of each broadcast. Analysis of archived videos come from *Alexander Street* and *C-Span* archives available. I have gained public opinion poll data from *The Gallup Poll Monthly* and the Pew Research Center website.

Literature Review

The post-Cold War environment was set up as early as the mid-1960s when the United States faced social and political changes that included the civil rights movements, the 1964 Goldwater campaign, and the rise of the religious right in the 1970s. These changes configured the United States for the Ronald Reagan presidency which Sean Wilentz argues was a defining period for the conservative movement in the United States against liberal domestic policies. Though Reagan was mostly unsuccessful rolling back the New Deal and civil rights movements he opened avenues to undermine them.¹⁸ The domestic and foreign policies Reagan carried out occurred at a time the United States and

¹⁸ Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan: A History 1974-2008*, (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2008).

much of the West was culturally moving to the left while politics moved to the right.¹⁹ In this Reagan's foreign policy also pointed to a retrenchment of US Cold War attitudes including the belief that the United States and Russia were eternal enemies.²⁰ Reagan's domestic and foreign policies and the cultural changes occurring the in United States during the 1980s were both critical and complex. When Bush succeeded Reagan, he faced a diverging political and cultural situation at the same time the Soviet Union under Gorbachev's leadership was re-focusing its influence and power in Europe. The rise of personal computers, a more globalized economy, and the rise of MTV further pulled American society away from Cold War attitudes even as foreign policy remained dedicated to containment.

As the Cold War ended the United States faced many conflicts that occurred because the Cold War rivalry led the United States to implement regime change to contain communism. David Schmitz exploration of America's late-Cold War support for right wing dictatorships shows that United States instilled anti-American attitudes in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere to contain Soviet expansion.²¹ While Schmitz touches on the consequences of America's late-Cold War actions, Chalmers Johnson shows that these policies overextended US resources and planted the

¹⁹ Robert M. Collins, *Transforming America: Politics and Culture During the Reagan Years*, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006). Bradford Martin, *The Other Eighties: A Secret History of the United States During the Age of Reagan*, (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2011).

²⁰ Robert W. Tucker, "Reagan's Foreign Policy" *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 1 (1988/1989): 1-27, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043881>

²¹ David F. Schmitz, *The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships*, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

seeds for post-Cold War conflicts.²² In the post-Cold War period, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, collapse of Yugoslavia, and other conflicts were connected with the changes created by the end of the Cold War and the changes in US foreign policy and national security strategy. This left the US policymakers with few options to resolve those conflicts.

One change that did not occur in the post-Cold War period was of America's military presence around the world. Lloyd Gardner argues that during and after the Cold War American policymakers believed the United States could encourage progress and introduce democratic governments while eliminating anti-American attitude by using American military power.²³ These attitudes supported the continued deployment of American forces around the world. However, America cannot maintain its global military presence without consequences. In *American Empire*, Andrew Bacevich argues the continued global deployment of America's military power in the post-Cold War period threatens America's position in the long term. He contends that US policymakers' inability to create a post-Cold War grand strategy for the world's only superpower forced the United States to maintain its global military presence.²⁴ Bush and Clinton's continued reliance on America's military power around the world in the post-Cold War period did ensure post-Cold War stability and security. Repeatedly during the Cold War, Bush and

²² Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*, (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2000).

²³ Lloyd Gardner, *The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.S. Foreign Policy From the 1970s to the Present*, (New York, NY: The New Press, 2008).

²⁴ Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire, The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

Clinton demonstrated reluctance to deploy US military forces to respond to a conflict than to use it to end a conflict.

Part of this reluctance was due to strategy debates in both administrations about the framework for post-Cold War international relations: was the period unipolar or multipolar, and should the United States respond unilaterally or multilaterally. In Nigel Thalakada and Christopher Layne show that while the post-Cold War period emerged as a unipolar situation, it quickly became multipolar. Thalakada argues that the post-Cold War period reversed the power dynamic of America's Cold War alliances giving America's allies opportunities to manage and influence American power. He also shows this led American policymakers to move away from unipolarity and embrace multipolarity by encouraging America's allies to share the burdens of maintaining international stability.²⁵ This move towards cooperative security revealed a short unipolar moment and the return to a multipolar system that had existed before the Cold War. As Layne argues this shift occurred as other states began to counterbalance America's power through soft balancing – the use of diplomacy and international institutions, and hard balancing – the buildup of military power to directly challenge the United States.²⁶ Throughout the post-Cold War period, the consequences of America's global military presence was balanced against the rise of regional powers which pushed the United States towards multilaterally and cooperative security arrangements. However, this did not

²⁵ Nigel Thalakada, *Unipolarity and the Evolution of America's Cold War Alliances*, (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillian, 2012).

²⁶ Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States Unipolar Moment," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 7-41.
<http://www.jstor.org.lynx.lib.usm.edu/stable/4137515>

cause the United States to lose its superpower status. While the United States remains the world's only super power, Joseph Nye argues the United States can only maintain that status through multilateral diplomacy.²⁷ He shows that without the Cold War threat of communism the United States lacks the ability to act unilaterally around the world.

Richard N. Haass also shows that the United States can best defend its interests by relying on international organizations and multilateral undertakings.²⁸ As America's ability to deploy its military power around the world changed, so too did the influences that drove foreign policy decisions.

US post-Cold War foreign policy relies on more than debates over unipolarity and multipolarity and the consequences of America's global military presences. It also includes debates about the influence of public opinion on foreign policy making. James M. Scott and a group of international relations scholars and diplomatic historians show that after the Cold War the American President, Congress, and public each influence the development of post-Cold War foreign policies. The authors show that each group had different levels of influence, and that policymakers after the Cold War must take greater care to study the preferences of each group as for a policy can determine the level of support or opposition.²⁹ As Bush and Clinton attempted to create post-Cold War grand strategies and foreign policies to respond to the rise of intranational conflicts. Hal Brand

²⁷ Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

²⁸ Richard N. Haass, *The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War*, (New York, NY: The Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1997).

²⁹ James M. Scott, ed. *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).

contends that Bush's New World Order and Clinton's democratic enlargement struggled to calculate US goals and priorities in a changing international system.³⁰ While Bush's and Clinton's non-containment policies were unable to completely respond to the rise of intra-state conflicts, their efforts attempted to adjust to the growing multipolar international system after forty years of a bipolar one.

Other studies of American foreign policy have focused on how the post-Cold War presidents themselves have attempted to define U.S. foreign policy. Christopher Maynard's *Out of the Shadow* and James D. Boy's *Clinton's Grand Strategy* are two works that look at Bush and Clinton's roles shaping of America's post-Cold War foreign policy grand strategy. Maynard's work explores Bush's presidency as he transitioned to United States to the post-Cold War period. Throughout the book, Maynard reveals Bush's and his administration's thought processes as they responded to global changes between 1989 and 1993. Maynard reveals that Bush was a foreign policy realist, not an idealist. He contends that Bush's foreign policies were not a continuation of Ronald Reagan's policies and Bush's policies rested on his aggressive personal diplomatic style.³¹ In *A World Transformed* Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, detailed their memories and thoughts about the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Tiananmen Square protests, and the Gulf War. The diary reveals the inner thought process for Bush and his top advisor as he responded to global crises as

³⁰ Hal Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad: America's Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World*, (Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 2008.)

³¹ Christopher Maynard, *Out of the Shadow: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War*, (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008).

after the Cold War.³² Bush's foreign policy attitudes and his responses to the challenges established the post-Cold War system that Clinton inherited and would continue to adapt US foreign policy to. Boys argues the core components of Clinton's foreign policy were national security, prosperity promotion, and the promotion of democracy. He contends that Clinton's responses to the Somalia and Balkan crises, economic challenges in Mexico and Europe, and the emergence of the European Union, North American Free Trade Agreement, and World Trade Organization were crucial to the development of world politics at the start of the twenty-first century.³³ They also reveal the dual nature of Clinton's foreign policy of promoting democracy and global economic prosperity as means to promote and defend US interests after the Cold War. Bush and Clinton's responses to the post-Cold War period were based on assumptions made about global security and stability without the US-Soviet rivalry.

In an edited collection by Ellen Schrecker, scholars explore how the United States "defeat" of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a distorted discourse on the Cold War's end, prevented a postwar reassessment of the U.S.-Soviet conflict, and a final accounting of the Cold War's impact on American society. The authors reveal that post-Cold War triumphalism misrepresented the emerging period and hindered efforts to respond to the period.³⁴ Derek Chollet shows that liberals and conservatives attempted to reconcile

³² George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).

³³ James D. Boys, *Clinton's Grand Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Cold War World*, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2005).

³⁴ Ellen Schrecker ed., *Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism*, (New York, NY: The New York Press, 2004).

themselves to the post-Cold War period.³⁵ While Philip Wegner shows that the 1990s was a period of full of debates about globalization, neoliberalism and the end of history, the rapid growth of the internet, and the rise of anti-globalization. He shows that these debates increasingly dominated the political and social climate as the post-Cold War period continued.³⁶ The political and social debates of the 1990s increasingly made their influence on foreign policy decisions after the Cold War. The ways the media reported on and discussed domestic and foreign affairs further influence public opinions about America's place in the world and its responsibilities.

As the United States debated its policy choices the contest between the president, policy elites, the media, and the public affected the direction that foreign policy took. The media's role in the post-Cold War reporting on crises and explaining them to the public influenced public opinion and public support or opposition to presidential foreign policy decisions. In *Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts*, Philip Hammond examines how the British media interpreted post-Cold War conflicts. He argues that the British media's framing of the Balkan conflict as an ancient ethnic conflict influenced Western government's determination to resolve the crisis.³⁷ As the Bosnian War occurred telecommunications technology had improved allowing for instantaneous news on wars and catastrophes. Andrew Hoskins and Ben O'Loughlin's *War and Media* argue that the

³⁵ Derek H. Chollet, *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11: The Misunderstood Years*, (New York, NY: A CFR Book, 2008).

³⁶ Philip E. Wegner, *Life Between Two Deaths, 1989-2001: U.S. Culture in the Long Nineties*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009).

³⁷ Philip Hammond, *Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Media and International Intervention*, (New York: Manchester University Press, 2007)

media's role depicting wars and other crises with new telecommunications technology created a global awareness for the audience. They show that these changes affected the audience's understanding of war, and desensitized the audience to the images of war. They argue that the mediatization³⁸ of war diffuses the relationship between the causes and effects of war, and increases uncertainty for policymakers.³⁹ In a period, where intranational conflicts became increasingly common the media's ability to provide constant updates about conflicts and to desensitize the audience to those conflicts, changed the way public opinion responded to televised conflicts.

The media is not the sole source of information to drive public opinion. In "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda," Jeffery E. Cohen argues that the more attention the president gives to policy areas in their State of the Union Addresses increases public concern about those areas even if temporarily.⁴⁰ However, the rise of cable television altered the way president's increased public concern about foreign affairs. Matthew A. Baum and Samuel Kernell argue that the increased popularity and availability of cable television allowed the American public to choose whether to watch presidential addresses. They continue that this ability to choose to watch led to decreased the ratings for presidential addresses, which led networks to decrease their coverage of presidential addresses, and this encouraged presidents to reduce the number of addresses

³⁸ According to Hoskins and O'Loughlin, mediatization refers to a long-lasting process whereby social and cultural institutions and modes of interaction are changed because of the growth of media's influence."

³⁹ Andrew Hoskins and Ben O'Loughlin, *War and Media: The Emergence of Diffused War*, (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010.)

⁴⁰ Jeffrey E. Cohen, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda," *American Journal of Political Science* 39 no. 1 (February 1995) 87-107: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111759>.

they gave to consolidate their rhetorical influence.⁴¹ Continuing along this line Gary Young and William B. Perkins argue that the rise of cable networks did not negatively affect presidential rhetoric on foreign policy. They also note that the rise of cable television did not significantly diminish the president's ability to influence public concern about foreign policy.⁴² As the Bush and Clinton competed with the media over public opinion to support foreign policy decisions in the post-Cold War period, they also attempted to develop foreign policies that could respond to the international changes by relying on older foreign policy and national security frameworks. Their efforts led to a return to cooperative security arrangements and multipolar world to ensure stability and security after the Cold War.

⁴¹ Matthew A. Baum and Samuel Kernell, "Has Cable Ended the Golden Age of Presidential Television?" *The American Political Science Review* 93 no. 1, (March 1999): 99-114. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585763>.

⁴² Garry Young and William B. Perkins, "Perkins Rhetoric, the Public Agenda, and the End of Presidential Television's Golden Age," *The Journal of Politics* 67 no. 4 (November 2005): 1190-1205. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00356.x>

CHAPTER II – BUSH AND THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY

Introduction

Of the dramatic changes that occurred in Eastern Europe because of Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership and reforms, the most striking was the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union. From that point, he implemented *perestroika*—a series of political reforms—within the Communist Party that opened it to liberalism, democracy, and helped bring about the end of the Soviet Union. Between 1985 and the opening of the Berlin Wall, Gorbachev's *perestroika* produced radical political reforms in the Soviet Union that severely diminished the authoritarian power of the Communist Party. Gorbachev's policies started political competition between liberal-democrats, traditional communists, and reform-minded communists for control over Soviet policies. Additionally, Gorbachev's foreign policies led to a lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, and his refusal to abide by the Brezhnev doctrine⁴³ led to successful democratic revolutions in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, ending long-held beliefs the Cold War would continue indefinitely.⁴⁴

From the Berlin Airlift to John F. Kennedy's "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech to Reagan's call for Mikhail Gorbachev to "tear down this wall," the United States repeatedly attempted to remove the barrier between communism and democracy. On 9 November, a miscommunication from a Soviet official announced that the border was

⁴³ The Brezhnev doctrine was the Communist Party claim from 1968 that other socialist states had the right and duty to defend socialism in any part of the Socialist Commonwealth where it might be threatened. Archie Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 432.

⁴⁴ Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, 488-525.

open, and from that moment East and West Germans began reuniting.⁴⁵ With the opening of the wall came joy and hope that Cold War divisions were finally coming to an end, and a period of coexistence was beginning. The opening also started discussions on reuniting East and West Germany and integrating Eastern and Western Europe.⁴⁶

The reunification of Germany revealed that while Cold War tensions, attitudes, and practices warmed, they would not end overnight. It also revealed that Bush had led the United States and the international community through these changes. This chapter argues that Bush's strategy for the reunification of Germany was the initial step to create a post-Cold War grand strategy and foreign policies for the United States. By using earlier foreign policy methods, Bush reintroduced cooperative security strategies to American foreign policies. American presidents had used these policies throughout the Cold War as part of the strategy of containment, they had not use these policies to prevent or end international crises. The United States last used a cooperative security strategy during WWII, when Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman attempted to cooperate with the Soviet Union and Western Europe. However, the depths of mistrust revealed at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences led to the division of Europe and the world between democratic capitalism and communism. Over forty years this

⁴⁵ Frederick Taylor, *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1993*, (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).

⁴⁶ Archie Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism* (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) 488-525. Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1990*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). Archie Brown, "The Gorbachev Revolution and the end of the Cold War" 244-266 in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Endings*, vol. 3 edited by Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010). John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Michael J. Hogan, ed., *The End of the Cold War: Its Meanings and Implications*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

distrust entrenched, so that in 1989 entrenched Cold War beliefs limited Bush's ability to adjust US policies to the changing situation in Eastern Europe. These limitations prevented Bush from expanding his policies beyond countering Soviet suggestions, even as he cooperated with the Soviet Union and Western European leaders to reunite Germany.

Political Changes and Border Openings

Since no one was expecting the developments that occurred in the late-1980s, efforts to reunify Germany were caught in an environment of changing international political and security arrangements. These changes included the weakening of the Cold War dichotomy, and improved US-Soviet relations. The spread of successful democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe created instability that many, including the United States, feared would derail the reintegration of Eastern and Western Europe, and force the Soviet Union to use repressive tactics. The reunification of Germany was a microcosm of this environment. As the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France worked with the two Germanys the conflicts between Soviet desires and internal problems repeatedly required Bush to negotiate solutions that did not worsen Soviet instabilities.

Following the opening of the Berlin Wall, the political situation in East Germany became unstable: increasing numbers of East Germans relocated to West Germany, GDR citizens forced their ways into previously secured government buildings, the public stormed secret police offices searching for files, and the government lost its monopoly over the news leading to reports on environmental damage and economic issues in the GDR. These events caused the GDR communist party to lose power, and forced the GDR to establish an interim all-party government in the communist party's place. This new

government set a 6 May 1990 date for free elections to occur in East Germany to create a new government.⁴⁷ The events occurring in GDR were similar to those occurring in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The combination of these revolutions led the United States and the Western European governments to fear the instability would lead to Soviet repression in Eastern Europe. These fears ensured that Bush and his administration remained wary of Soviet actions and statements throughout the reunification process. It also led to constant analysis reports before and during the reunification procedures about possible ways the Soviet Union might undermine or prevent Germany's reunification.

In February 1990, with the momentum for reunification increasing, Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of FRG, announced plans to begin talks with GDR leaders to bring the GDR economy under the control of the FRG central bank. On 10 February, Chancellor Kohl and FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher met with Gorbachev in Moscow. During the meeting, Gorbachev informed the men that the Soviet Union supported German unity under the condition that the combined borders of the GDR, FRG, and Berlin became the permanent borders for a reunified Germany. Gorbachev's decision to support German reunification provided Bush with the space necessary to establish the method that Germany would reunify.

This process involved convincing the British, French, and Soviet Union to accept a conference that only involved the Four Powers⁴⁸ and the two Germanys. Bush would defend this plan because only the Four Powers had the authority to prevent Germany's

⁴⁷ Tom Heneghan, *Unchained Eagle: Germany After the Wall*, (London: Pearson, 2000) 39-43.

⁴⁸ Throughout this chapter I refer to Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union as the Four Powers. This is not a reference to the Allied Powers or the World War II's Grand Alliance, but to the Four Powers or Quadripartite Agreement that divided Germany after World War II.

reunification. However, Bush was only focused on uniting Germany, he did not intend to discuss German economic and security arrangements with the rest of Europe.⁴⁹ This allowed Bush to focus on maintaining cooperation between the six parties which was a more manageable task than gaining consensus with all of Europe. It also allowed Bush to focus priorities on monitoring the Soviet Union and its responses to developments in Germany and Eastern Europe.

US Planning for German Reunification

As developments in the two Germanys revealed that German reunification would not be slowed, the Bush administration focused on understanding the attitudes and positions of Europe on German reunification. Through intelligence reports, the administration learned that many countries in Europe were uncomfortable with a quick path to German reunification, and many believed that a reunited and militarized Germany posed a threat to their national security. Bush and his staff recognized that opposition to a reunified Germany in Europe would increase tensions, and focused their efforts on establishing a consensus among the Four Powers, rather than all of Europe.⁵⁰

After the opening of the Berlin Wall, East and West German relations steadily improved, increasing German desires for reunification. As these attitudes increased Bush and the United States emerged as the main proponents of German reunification. Bush developed a three-pronged strategy capable of responding to Western Europe and the

⁴⁹ Documents related to German Reunification from folder Gray C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File, OAID CF01824-016 “Germany – Reunification” White House Counsel’s Office *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library* and folder Blackwell Robert D. Files Subject File “German Reunification 1-3,” National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*

⁵⁰ Memorandum, “GDR Crisis Contingencies,” folder Blackwell Robert D. Files Subject File “German Reunification 1-3,” National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*

Soviet Union concerns, and maintaining a cooperative environment between all six parties. The first part of Bush's strategy required him to convince Britain and France to support reunification and overcome security concerns. Secondly, Bush and his administration had to determine what the Soviet Union would gain and lose with Germany's reunification, and how those gains and losses would affect Soviet responses and policies. The second step required Bush and his administration to focus on cautious cooperation, while limiting any Soviet gains that threatened US interests in Europe. The third part of Bush's strategy focused on maintaining cohesion between the United States, Britain, and France both as a bulwark against Soviet desires, and to limit internal conflicts among the three Western Allies.⁵¹

Bush's policies towards German reunification did not follow the stark divisions of the Cold War. Instead Bush's actions resembled Roosevelt's negotiations with the British and Soviet Union during WWII. Bush began by creating a consensus with his the British and the French, as this was the easier to accomplish even though the three governments did not completely agree German reunification. However, they shared similar views of the Soviet Union and what the reunification of Germany meant for reducing tensions in Europe and reducing the Soviet sphere of influence. Bush also cautiously negotiated with the Soviet Union while keeping containment in reserve should Soviet actions threaten the process to reunification or if Soviet desires challenged US interests to greatly. Like

⁵¹ Memorandum, "Treaty Issues that May Follow Reunification" May 9, 1990, folder Gray C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File, OAID CF01824-016 "Germany – Reunification" White House Counsel's Office *George H. W Bush Presidential Library*.

Roosevelt, Bush's prioritized compromise with the Western European powers over cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Bush's strategy for the reunification of Germany closely the diplomatic efforts during the Yalta and Potsdam conferences on post-war Europe. During these conferences, the United States attempted to cooperate with the Soviet Union on the make-up of postwar Europe. The United States cautiously cooperated with the Soviet Union while attempting to limit Soviet expansion in Europe while aligning close with the Western allies. In 1945, this strategy led to the division of Europe. However, between 1989 and 1990, it provided the opportunity to reunify Germany and start reintegrating Eastern and Western Europe.

As Bush and his administration began strategizing on how to reunify Germany, their first step was to determine what was legally required to reunite Germany. Since the end of WWII, the Four Powers had divided Germany between the Soviets and the Western Allies. Thus, the administration determined that German reunification required Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union to renounce their occupational authority over Germany. It also required settling German WWI and WWII debts, establishing permanent German borders, and determining Germany's status in the EC, NATO, and other international institutions.⁵² By knowing the issues ahead of time, Bush begin developing methods to get the Four Powers to compromise on their conflicting

⁵² Memorandum, "The Legal Basis for the Devolution of Allied Rights" n.d., folder Gray C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File, OAID CF01824-016 "Germany – Reunification" White House Counsel's Office *George H. W Bush Presidential Library*.

interests without undermining Germany's reunification. He could also prepare responses for the most difficult issues.

Of these issues, the most pressing were establishing Germany's border, and East Germany's ties to the Soviet Union. The issue with Germany's border was caused by German territorial claims in Poland. Bush learned that most European states would require this issue resolved before Germany reunified. The second concern was a reunited Germany's position in Europe's security infrastructure. Since FRG was a NATO member and GDR was in the Warsaw Pact, the United States had to convince the Soviet Union to accept Germany's membership in NATO even if it did not join the Warsaw Pact. Bush's ability to get the Soviet Union to accept a reunited Germany in NATO presented the largest obstacle to German reunification. This was especially true if Bush could not provide sufficient remuneration for Soviet military and economic losses after the GDR dissolved. This encouraged Bush to implement a strategy of cautious cooperation with the Soviet Union, and to observe the changing situation in Eastern Europe and the influences it had on Soviet policy decisions.⁵³

With this knowledge, the Bush administration undertook studies understand the role of warming US-Soviet relations in the reunification process. This was necessary as the democratic revolutions in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia were pushing the Soviets to relinquish control and influence, and Bush did not want to jeopardize their

⁵³ Memorandum, "German Task Force Paper: Claims and Reparations" n.d., folder Gray C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File, OAID CF01824-016 "Germany – Reunification" White House Counsel's Office *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

revolutions as Germany reunified.⁵⁴ Bush's administration recognized that the United States could not afford a misstep in the reunification process or it risked threatening, if not undoing, the democratic revolution in those other states. In this situation, maintaining a cautious cooperation with the Soviet Union was key to prevent any act of Soviet repression in Eastern Europe. Bush also determined that German unification was not worth endangering the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, especially if reuniting Germany would provoke the Soviet Union to initiate repressive measures to regain control and influence. Bush's ability to determine which interests in Europe were most important to American security would determine the how far he was willing to cooperate with the other parties involved in Germany's reunification. It would also help him decide what interests he was willing to compromise on, and how far that compromise would reach.⁵⁵

The first hurdle Bush faced reunifying Germany was figuring out the best way to end Allied occupation powers over the two Germanys. The Bush administration determined that there were three ways to accomplish this. First, the Four Powers could stand aside and allow the Germanys to reunify since there was no legal precedent that required Allied approval for German reunification. While Bush could possibly persuade

⁵⁴ Memorandum, "The Legal Basis for the Devolution of Allied Rights" n.d., folder Gray C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File, OAID CF01824-016 "Germany – Reunification" White House Counsel's Office *George H. W Bush Presidential Library*.

⁵⁵ Memorandum, "The Legal Basis for the Devolution of Allied Rights" n.d. 3, folder Gray C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File, OAID CF01824-016 "Germany – Reunification" White House Counsel's Office *George H. W Bush Presidential Library*.

Britain and French to accept this method, the Soviet Union would require Allied approval for German reunification.⁵⁶

The second option was for the Four Powers to individually renounce their powers. However, doing so came with one major disadvantage. While the United States could convince the British, and French to renounce their occupational powers, the Soviet Union would only renounce their powers after making a separate settlement with the Germans on security and economic issues. The administration determined that any separate Soviet-German settlement could undermine Western interests in Germany and NATO.⁵⁷

The third option was to hold a conference to resolve any issues surrounding Germany's reunification. However, the administration did not prefer this method because it gave the Soviet Union an opportunity to make demands that could stall or prevent the Germans from reuniting. Yet, developments revealed that the third option was preferred by the Soviets, Britain, France, and most of Europe. Therefore, Bush prepared to participate in a conference knowing that he would have to negotiate competing interests.⁵⁸

Therefore, it was paramount that Bush maintain cooperation between the countries to prevent Cold War antagonisms from derailing the reunification of Germany.

⁵⁶ Memorandum, "The Legal Basis for the Devolution of Allied Rights" n.d. 3, folder Gray C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File, OAID CF01824-016 "Germany – Reunification" White House Counsel's Office *George H. W Bush Presidential Library*.

⁵⁷ Memorandum, "The Legal Basis for the Devolution of Allied Rights" n.d. 3, folder Gray C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File, OAID CF01824-016 "Germany – Reunification" White House Counsel's Office *George H. W Bush Presidential Library*.

⁵⁸ Memorandum, "The Legal Basis for the Devolution of Allied Rights" n.d. 3, folder Gray C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File, OAID CF01824-016 "Germany – Reunification" White House Counsel's Office *George H. W Bush Presidential Library*.

Bush's ability to manage and reach compromises among the conflicting desires would determine the success of Germany's reunification. With the fluid situation in Eastern Europe, Bush's successes and failures maintaining international cooperation during German reunification would set a standard for future cooperative security engagements after Germany's reunification.⁵⁹

To decrease the chances of disagreements undermining the conference, Bush and his administration decided to limit the talk's agenda. The Bush administration decided that the agenda would focus on getting the Four Powers to agree to a method to end occupation powers over Germany. Then they would discuss Allied troop deployments in the Germany and Berlin. They would also establish Germany's permanent borders and resolve German territorial claims in Poland. The administration's decision to limit the conference to these points was to limit the obstacles the conference would encounter that could stop the reunification process.⁶⁰

The administration also explored the main sources of tension that would emerge during the talks. Bush's staff contended that American desires to keep a reunified Germany in NATO would clash with Soviet desires for Germany to remain in the Warsaw Pact or make Germany a neutral country.⁶¹ The administration believed that the

⁵⁹ Memorandum, "The Legal Basis for the Devolution of Allied Rights" n.d. 3, folder Gray C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File, OAID CF01824-016 "Germany – Reunification" White House Counsel's Office *George H. W Bush Presidential Library*.

⁶⁰ Memorandum, "The Legal Basis for the Devolution of Allied Rights" n.d. 3, folder Gray C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File, OAID CF01824-016 "Germany – Reunification" White House Counsel's Office *George H. W Bush Presidential Library*.

⁶¹ Memorandum, "The Legal Basis for the Devolution of Allied Rights" n.d. 3, folder Gray C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File, OAID CF01824-016 "Germany – Reunification" White House Counsel's Office *George H. W Bush Presidential Library*.

Soviet Union would present the most obstacles to American desires, while the British and French were more likely to follow America's lead so long as they received satisfactory guarantees to their concerns. This would require Bush maintain America's presence in Europe as it re-evaluated its security arrangements as a counterbalance to reunited Germany.⁶²

Therefore, Bush's efforts to successfully reunite Germany would rely on his ability to get Soviet cooperation and compromises with American goals. It would also require Bush to cooperate and compromise with the British and French on their security concerns, while ensuring that none of compromises Germany made threatened German sovereignty. Even as Bush cooperated with the Four Powers, he aligned more with the Western Europeans because the Cold War had not ended. This ensured that Bush looked upon Soviet proposals warily while he attempted to maintain the warm US-Soviet, and while ensuring that American and German desires were met.

Bush's ability to navigate the competing desires of American allies, the Germans, and the Soviet Union would determine the success or failure of German reunification. At the same time, the pressure that European concerns placed on the United States revealed the growing independence of America's Cold War from US leadership in matters of their own security. While Bush contended that the United States still had important interests in Europe, the changing dynamic of the Cold War also changed US-Western European relations. Bush's ability to cooperate with a changing Europe

⁶² Memorandum Germany Task Force "Settlement of the German Question" n.d. folder Gray, C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File OAID CF01824-016 "Germany – Reunification" White House Counsel's Office *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

demonstrated his flexibility that would after the Cold War, and how he could use cooperative security arrangements to respond to larger international crises.

Bush's desire to preserve the spread of democracy in Eastern and Central Europe, meant the United States would find that the most difficult aspect of reunification would be the other Four Powers. They recognized that each country had individual concerns about Germany's position in Europe, and all shared fears that a reunified Germany would threaten Europe again. The administration recognized that Bush's ability to steer the reunification process, get all four countries to agree, and avoid any issues or debates that could stop the reunification process would test his leadership and diplomatic skills. It would also test how well the administration could work with the Soviet Union without endangering the improvement in US-Soviet relations, and avoid pushing the Soviet Union out of the process.⁶³ The administration's ability to predetermine the challenges it would face in the reunification process enabled Bush to develop responses publicly and diplomatically that could limit or reverse those obstacles. These studies also prepared the administration to undertake similar studies on conflicting interests among US allies when participating in a multilateral intervention in the post-Cold War period. By understanding its allies contradicting interests the Bush and American policymakers could better ensure international cooperation.

Along with observing the Soviet Union, Bush and his administration also monitored Western Europeans concerns about German reunification. The Bush

⁶³ Memorandum, "The Legal Basis for the Devolution of Allied Rights" n.d., folder Gray C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File, OAID CF01824-016 "Germany – Reunification" White House Counsel's Office *George H. W Bush Presidential Library*.

administration decided the best way to complete Germany's reunification was to cooperate more with the Western governments towards obtaining a consensus to limit Soviet influences in the talks. This included convincing Germany to voluntarily accept constraints and commitments that would satisfy European concerns, while also convincing the Western European leads to accept a reunified Germany with full sovereignty. This required Bush to negate Britain and France security concerns by guaranteeing American assistance against German aggression to create a united front that would discourage Soviet opposition.⁶⁴

NSC Policy Evaluations of Eastern Europe

The continued adherence to Cold War attitudes among Bush's staff and advisors hindered the administration's ability to adjust policies to European crises and conflicts. While this was true of much of Bush's administration and less so of Bush who practiced diplomatic realism, some of Bush's policymakers recognized the need for more of the administration to adapt US policies to the changing situation in Europe. Those that suggested policy changes that changing US policies would prevent the United States from endangering improved US-Soviet relations, and worsening the instabilities in Eastern Europe. Robert Blackwill, special assistant to the president for European and Soviet Affairs, and Condoleezza Rice, director of NSC Soviet and East European Affairs

⁶⁴ Memorandum Germany Task Force "Settlement of the German Question" n.d. folder Gray, C. Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File OAID CF01824-016 "Germany – Reunification" White House Counsel's Office *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

department, were among those members of the Bush's administration that supported implementing policies that were more attentive to the situation in Europe.⁶⁵

In a letter to Brent Scowcroft, Blackwill wrote that many in the administration failed to recognize the repercussions of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on the Cold War status quo and US policies. He wrote, "I am confident that we are as critically in need of such a reconceptualization/action plan as we were in the spring of last year."⁶⁶ Blackwill pointed to ending the administration's fixation on traditional Cold War strategies and interests, and urged the administration to begin formulating policies based on the existing situation.⁶⁷

Condoleezza Rice joined Blackwill in proposing the NSC adjust US policies and national security interests in response to changes in Eastern Europe. Condoleezza Rice argued that much of the administration lacked general knowledge of the Soviet Union, and the changes that perestroika had brought. Rice continued:

"The U.S. government is shaping policy toward the Soviet Union from functions and regional perspectives rather than from the point of view of the overall relationship. More importantly, these policies are developed with little

⁶⁵ Memorandum Robert D. Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft, "1990" January 19, 1990, folder Blackwill, Robert D. Files Subject File OAID CF00182-020 "[German Reunification 11/98-6/90] [1]" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*. Memorandum Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft "The Balkanization of U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Union" January 22, 1990, 1, folder Blackwill Robert D Files Subject File, OIAD CF00182-020 "[German Reunification 11/89-6/90] [1]" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

⁶⁶ Memorandum Robert D. Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft, "1990" January 19, 1990, folder Blackwill, Robert D. Files Subject File OAID CF00182-020 "[German Reunification 11/98-6/90] [1]" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

⁶⁷ Memorandum Robert D. Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft, "1990" January 19, 1990, folder Blackwill, Robert D. Files Subject File OAID CF00182-020 "[German Reunification 11/98-6/90] [1]" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

understanding of the deep chaos into which the Soviet Union is sinking or the impact our policies have on a very unstable situation there.”⁶⁸

She argued that as the Soviet Union grew more unstable the Kremlin would become overwhelmed by internal matters, and the United States would pay a heavy price for an inattentive policy towards the Soviet Union.⁶⁹ Rice and Blackwill revealed that the administration needed to adjust its policies toward the Soviet Union in ways that reflected the turmoil occurring there. The changing dynamics in the Soviet Union required a policy and strategy reassessment to avoid exacerbating the instabilities in the Soviet Union. The move to reunify Germany was one of many causes of Soviet instability, and if the administration failed to correctly analyze the strains on Soviet leaders then the Bush administration risked Soviet cooperation during Germany’s reunification. Since the reunification of German required the cooperation of the Four Powers, Bush could ill afford to implement policies that would undermine US-Soviet relations and the reunification talks. Rice’s and Blackwill’s critique of the administration’s policy weaknesses point to entrenched Cold War ideologies that were preventing policy changes.

Despite the changes occurring in Eastern Europe, the United States could not ignore that the Soviet Union remained the only other nation in the world capable of

⁶⁸ Memorandum Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft “The Balkanization of U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Union” January 22, 1990, 1, folder Blackwill Robert D Files Subject File, OIAD CF00182-020 “[German Reunification 11/89-6/90] [1]” National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

⁶⁹ Memorandum Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft “The Balkanization of U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Union” January 22, 1990, folder Blackwill Robert D Files Subject File, OIAD CF00182-020 “[German Reunification 11/89-6/90] [1]” National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

matching American military strength, and possessed the most powerful European military. This fact drove the administration's policies during the reunification of Germany as much as Cold War attitudes. In a letter to Kohl before the Two-Plus-Four talks began Bush wrote:

“Even if, as we hope, the Soviet Union withdraws all its troops from Eastern Europe, it will still remain far and away the most powerful single military power in Europe. U.S. troops in Germany and elsewhere on the continent, backed by a credible deterrent, must in my view continue to help preserve the security of the West...As our two countries journey together through this time of hope and promise, we can remain confident of our shared ability to defend the fruits of freedom.”⁷⁰

Bush's letter reveals that his administration continued to fear the Soviets would resort to military repression and resume expansionist policies in Eastern Europe in response to instability and its declining influence. If the Soviet's resorted to military force to regain control in Eastern Europe it would eliminate any improvement in US-Soviet relations, or the possibility of reuniting Germany. Despite the Soviet's continued military threat, Bush understood that he could not avoid working with the Soviets, and that his best strategy was to convince the Soviet's to acquiesce to Western preferences.

NSC Suggestions to Ensure German Reunification

Beginning in 1990, the NSC posited that the United States could develop policies that were not limited to the strategy of containment, and included policies that supported Soviet restraint in Eastern Europe and improved US-Soviet relations. The NSC contended Gorbachev's reforms had given the United States an opportunity to promote integrating

⁷⁰ Letter George Bush to Helmut Kohl, n.d. folder Blackwill, Robert D Files Subject Files OAID CF00182-020 “[German Reunification 11/89-6/90]” National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

the Soviet Union into the international system. This did not mean that the United States would not continue to monitor the Soviet Union. Instead, the NSC decided “the United States will challenge the Soviet Union step by step, issue by issue, and institution by institution to behave in accordance with the higher standards that the Soviet leadership itself has enunciated.”⁷¹ The NSC determined the best policy the US could take towards the Soviet Union was to support and encourage additional reform policies. However, for this strategy to succeed the NSC contended the policy needed to recognize that Gorbachev’s reforms came at high cost to Soviet economic and political systems, regardless of the benefits to the United States. The NSC continued that the changes Gorbachev initiated contradicted the Soviet objective for the past forty years, and if his policies create too much instability it would provide Gorbachev’s opponents with an opportunity to remove him from power.⁷² If this occurred it was highly likely that the Soviet Union would resume repressive policies to maintain influence in Eastern Europe, including restoring the communist party to power in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and GDR.

The NSC believed that if German reunification caused the Soviet Union too many problems or the GDR became too unstable, the Soviets might militarily intervene. Should the Soviet intervene in the GDR it was more likely the Soviets would also intervene in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The NSC contended that a Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe would threaten improved East-West relations and US-Soviet relations.

⁷¹ George Bush, “National Security Directive 23: United States Relations with the Soviet Union” September 22, 1989, <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd23.pdf>.

⁷² George Bush, “National Security Directive 23: United States Relations with the Soviet Union” September 22, 1989, <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd23.pdf>.

This did not mean that the other allies were not threats the reunification of Germany, but that the British and French were the less likely to act if they disapproved of the direction reunification took.⁷³

Soviet Questions

On 19 December 1989, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze posed seven questions to the European Parliament that expressed Soviet conditions to begin the reunification of Germany. These questioned included guarantees against future German aggression, the roles a reunited Germany would have in Europe, and how German would establish its permanent border and resolve its territorial claims in Poland. He raised issues about the structure and mission of Germany's military, and the possibility of a demilitarized and neutral Germany with restructured ties to Eastern Europe. He questioned what attitudes Germany had about Allied troop presence after reunification and the 1971 quadripartite agreement. Shevardnadze also raised questions about the reunification process. He questioned if German reunification would abide by the Helsinki process, if it would lead to constructive developments that overcame the division of Europe, and if the Germans were willing to include other European interests and collective action as part of the process.⁷⁴

Shevardnadze's questions came from many influences that included European fears of Germany's past and the threat a reunified Germany posed to European security

⁷³ Memorandum, Brent Scowcroft to George Bush, "Responding to Soviet Calls for a German Peace Conference" n.d., folder Hutchings, Robert L. Files Country File OAID CF01414-004 "German Reunification [2]" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

⁷⁴ Memorandum, Directorate of Intelligence "An Analysis of Shevardnadze's Seven Questions on German Unification" December 29, 1989, folder Hutchings, Robert L. Files Country File OAID CF01414-003 "German Reunification [1]" National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

and peace. There were also economic concerns as a reunified Germany would resume its place as the largest economy in Europe which would require the Western states to adjust their economic policies. From these seven questions, the administration recognized how strongly the Soviets feared the repercussions of German reunification, and that the Soviets would be less inclined to oppose German reunification if these concerns and interests were addressed during the talks conducted. They also realized that the Soviets were ambiguous about how far they would push a reunited Germany security and economic concerns.⁷⁵ Shevardnadze's questions provided the Bush administration with a foundation to understand where any Soviet opposition would occur and an opportunity to prepare solutions that would prevent the Soviet Union from hindering the process. It also made it easier for Bush to avoid any problems that would inhibit cooperation between the former, and to resolve any problems that occurred.

Following Shevardnadze's speech, the administration recognized that the Soviet Union opposed a quick reunification in preference for a phased eight to ten-year reunification process. However, with euphoria and internal support growing, the Germans were highly likely to oppose efforts to impose a lengthy timeframe for Germany's reunification, demilitarization, or neutrality. Additionally, Soviet desires to keep Germany out of NATO would be opposed by the United States and Western Europe, as they would view it as a threat to their security.⁷⁶ Thus the administration had to convince

⁷⁵ Memorandum, Directorate of Intelligence "An Analysis of Shevardnadze's Seven Questions on German Unification" December 29, 1989, folder Hutchings, Robert L. Files Country File OAID CF01414-003 "German Reunification [1]" National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

⁷⁶ Memorandum, Brent Scowcroft to George Bush, "Responding to Soviet Calls for a German Peace Conference" n.d., folder Hutchings, Robert L. Files Country File OAID CF01414-004 "German Reunification [2]" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

the Soviets to cooperate on measures that it opposed, while maintaining cohesion with the British and French. This required Bush and his staff to understand the web of contradicting interests and desires among its former WWII allies, which would prove crucial once the Two-Plus-Four talks began in the summer of 1990.

Conflicting Western European Interests

While the administration was focused on the conditions and proposals the Soviets might make, they also analyzed the interests the other countries involved had in the reunification process. The administration noted that FRG would prefer a treaty that ratified an agreement between the two Germanys. The administration posited it could convince the FRG to accept a peace conference if some Soviet conditions were acceptable, and the conditions placated the rest of Europe. In the GDR, the administration noted that the GDR would use the talks to prolong its existence as it was most likely that the FRG would absorb the GDR to create a single German state.

The administration noted that while the British and French did not agree with all the Soviet's proposals, there were some proposals those two countries agreed with. This included resolving reunification through an international conference, especially one that was slow and organized. However, neither country would publically announce their support for these proposals, and they would only support them if the FRG did. Outside of the main six, Poland expected the conference to resolve Germany's territorial claims on its territory. Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe also expected the conference to avert

Soviet repressive measures that would thwart their democratic movements.⁷⁷ While not every country that was analyzed was participating in Germany's reunification, Bush needed this information to cooperate with the other Four Powers to successfully resolve the issues around Germany's reunification. Bush would have to juggle multiple agendas to achieve as many US objectives as possible.

The administration's analysts contended that it was in US interests for the Four Powers to resolve the German situation. Additionally, analysts proposed waiting until after FRG elections in December 1990 to begin any conference between the Germans and the Four Powers on Germany reunification. However, they recognized that if the FRG agreed with Gorbachev on a peace conference it would be impossible to delay the conference until after the elections. They continued that a FRG and Soviet agreement on a peace conference should not prevent the United States from rejecting Soviet proposals for reunified Germany that was not a member of NATO. It defended this assertion that:

“Given the difficulties of managing a peace conference proposal issued by a desperate Gorbachev, our aim should be to ensure that such a Soviet initiative never comes to pass. This means using such influence as we have to slow down artfully the reunification process this year and bring some order and predictability to it—for our sake as well as Gorbachev's.”⁷⁸

The CIA added that West Europeans were worried about integrating East Germany into the EC and the monetary union. They pointed to European fears that a rushed reunification would create new problems or worsen existing ones in the EC. The

⁷⁷ Memorandum, Brent Scowcroft to George Bush, “Responding to Soviet Calls for a German Peace Conference” n.d., folder Hutchings, Robert L. Files Country File OAID CF01414-004 “German Reunification [2]” National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

⁷⁸ Memorandum, Brent Scowcroft to George Bush, “Responding to Soviet Calls for a German Peace Conference” n.d., folder Hutchings, Robert L. Files Country File OAID CF01414-004 “German Reunification [2]” National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

CIA contended that though the British and French could not slow down the move toward German reunification, the two countries might try to delay it, especially if Germany appeared insensitive to EC concerns. Along with Britain and France, Eastern European nations wanted a managed reunification process that could be used later to integrate their states into Western Europe. The CIA concluded that they expected legal reunification to complete within one year.⁷⁹ Despite these concerns from US allies and other friendly states, a unified Germany served US interests in Europe. It served US security interests as a member of NATO because it strengthened NATO, whereas a neutral Germany weakened NATO and threatened European security. In addition, reunifying Germany served a significant lessening of East-West tensions, and further opened the Iron Curtain. With this information, Bush and his administration entered negotiations with its former WWII allies to reunify Germany.

Last Minute Concerns

On 30 January 1990, the CIA reported that there were scenarios that would hinder the move toward German reunification. The CIA based its scenarios on the unstable political climate in Eastern Europe that could become a source of tension in East-West relations. The CIA argued that the scenarios were: if GDR freely elected a government that achieved impressive economic growth and resisted political and economic domination by FRG; the FRG hesitated to move forward on reunification due to popular resentment over associated costs; the four powers required a neutral Germany as a

⁷⁹ Memorandum, "Update on European Views of German Unification and the Two-Plus-Four Dynamic" April 4, 1990, folder Blackwill, Robert D Files Subject File, OAID CF00182-021 "[German Reunification 11/89-6/90] [2]" National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

prerequisite of reunification or Kohl was replaced; the Soviet Union intervened or threatened to intervene militarily; Moscow used international methods to obstruct German reunification; or refused to withdraw its troops after a settlement, especially if Gorbachev lost power. The CIA postulated these were highly unlikely to occur, but due to the political climate in Europe felt that the administration should be aware of them while preparing for the Two-Plus-Four.⁸⁰ Even as Bush prepared to convince the other Four Powers, their cooperation was constantly threatened by the changing environment in Europe and Cold War tensions. As the Soviet Union was withdrawing around the world, Soviet leaders desired to maintain some influence in Eastern Europe. However, Bush was unwilling to allow Soviet desires to affect Germany's future in Europe or American interests there.

In a memorandum that updated the situation in Europe and Germany's reunification, the CIA reported that the East German election had strengthened Kohl's negotiating position, and dashed French, British and most of Europe's hopes that the election would slow the move toward German reunification. In addition, the FRG and GDR had agreed to use Article 23⁸¹ of the FRG Basic Laws (constitution) to integrate the GDR into the FRG. It noted that the French and British supported this decision because Article 23 created an orderly path to reunification, kept Germany in NATO, and

⁸⁰ Memorandum "East/West Germany: What Could Derail Unification" January 30, 1990, folder Hutchings, Robert L. Files Country File OAID CF01414-004 "German Reunification [2]" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

⁸¹ While the main benefit of the Germans using Article 23 of Basic Laws was that it kept a unified Germany in NATO, this did not remove the 380,000 Soviet troops from the GDR or Soviet rights over Germany, Berlin, or the Soviet's ability to threaten the reunification process. This Soviet ability to derail German reunification was the main concern the United State had going into the Two-Plus-Four Talks.

preserved Allied influence in future talks on German reunification. The CIA also reported that despite the successful vote, the Germans still needed to pacify Western European nations on their stances toward the EC and border issues with Poland. This was particularly important as many European states were concerned about Germany's territorial claims in Poland, despite Kohl's public announcements renouncing those claims.⁸² These final developments in Germany, set the situation that Bush would negotiate with the Four Powers to reunify Germany. These events also answered many of the questions regarding the way that reunification would occur and a created a clearer picture of everyone's interests in Germany's reunification. This included knowing that the fiercest debates would be with the Soviet Union over Germany's role in integrated European economic and security institution. With this knowledge, Bush set out to cooperate with the other Four Powers on German reunification.

Two-Plus-Four and German Reunification

In February 1990, Secretary Baker and Bush had meetings with the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and West Germany. During these talks, Bush and Baker convinced the others that the Four Powers should resolve Germany's reunification. Upon gaining a Western consensus, Baker met with Shevardnadze and gained Soviet support for a Four Powers conference on Germany's reunification. After this, Bush and Baker convinced the British, French, and Soviets that the two Germanys should be involved in

⁸² Memorandum, "Update on European Views of German Unification and the Two-Plus-Four Dynamic" April 4, 1990, folder Blackwill, Robert D Files Subject File, OAID CF00182-021 "[German Reunification 11/89-6/90] [2]" National Security Council, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.

the conference from the beginning, and not brought in after the Four Powers had established the initial policies for reunification.⁸³

Bush and Baker also convinced the others that only the two Germanys and Four Powers should formally participate in the discussions. They argued that only the Four Powers had the legal authority to reunify Germany and the FRG opposed NATO or CSCE involvement. In between meetings at the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa, Canada, the Bush administration finalized the framework for the Two-Plus-Four talks. Baker confirmed the framework for the Two-Plus-Four Talks, and gained Gorbachev's consent that the Two-Plus-Four Talk would occur after the GDR elections in March. They also agreed to format the Two-Plus-Four Talks as a series of monthly meetings to resolve all international questions by November 1990 in time for the FRG to have all-German elections.⁸⁴

Bush and Baker's ability to get the Four Powers and Germanys to cooperate relied on the changes that occurred in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. These changes warmed US-Soviet relations, and enabled democratic movements to reintegrate Eastern Europe with the West. These changes did not eliminate Cold War attitudes, as the Bush and his administration continued to worry that the Soviet Union would resume repressive tactics in Eastern Europe. However, the negotiations that Bush and Baker conducted with

⁸³ Thomas L. Friedman and Michael K. Gordon, "Accord on Europe: Anatomy of a Decision – A Special Report; Steps to German Unity: Bonn As A Power" *NYT* February 16, 1990, <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/16/world/accord-europe-anatomy-decision-special-report-steps-german-unity-bonn-power.html>

⁸⁴ Thomas L. Friedman and Michael K. Gordon, "Accord on Europe: Anatomy of a Decision – A Special Report; Steps to German Unity: Bonn As A Power" *NYT* February 16, 1990, <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/16/world/accord-europe-anatomy-decision-special-report-steps-german-unity-bonn-power.html>

the Soviet Union demonstrated that US-Soviet cooperation was possible. Like the Yalta and Potsdam conferences ideological differences limited cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet determining Eastern and Western Europe's future was more pressing than ideological differences, especially when political changes threatened instability and European security.

Two-Plus-Four Talks

The six parties met in Bonn, FRG on 14 March 1990 to establish protocols for the following meetings, before the first Two-Plus-Four meeting was held in Berlin on 5 May. During this preliminary meeting, the participants agreed to hold all meetings on German soil alternating between the FRG and GDR. The participants concurred that all decisions would occur through consensus, and no other country could formally join the talks though Poland would be invited to participate when the talks discussed the German-Polish border. They also assented that the talks would resolve the occupational powers for the Four Powers.⁸⁵ These steps set the stage for cooperation during the talks.

Despite these agreements, the six still held significant differences on important issues that could undermine Western cohesion. The British and French wanted to resolve the German-Polish border before the talks progressed too far. There was also a disagreement on the form of the final settlement. The FRG opposed calling the resolution a peace treaty because they viewed a peace treaty as humiliating and that it insinuated that the war was not over. On the other hand, the Soviets approved describing the

⁸⁵ Memorandum, Two-Plus-Four Talks March 14, 1990, folder Rice Condoleezza Files 1989-1990 Subject File OAID CF00721 "Two-Plus-Four Germany #1 [1]" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

solution a peace treaty because the Four Powers were relinquishing their occupation powers over Germany. The Four Powers also disagreed about the scope of the talk's agenda. The Bush wanted to focus solely on ending occupation authority and legally reunifying Germany, while the Soviets wanted a broader agenda that included Germany's membership in NATO, the future deployment of Allied troops in Germany, and the status of nuclear weapons on German soil.⁸⁶ Eventually, the six agreed to a limited agenda of devolution of Four Powers for the Two-Plus-Four Talks, and that a reunited Germany and the Allies would determine Germany's security standing in the future, and not to constrain Germany's sovereignty by denying it the right to self-defense or to determine its own military and diplomatic alliances.⁸⁷

The Two-Plus-Four Talks and the reunification of Germany proceeded in monthly sessions among the six foreign ministers through the summer of 1990. In the final treaty, the Four Powers relinquished their rights, removed occupation forces from Berlin, and supported a reunited Germany's sovereignty without outside controls or constraints. The treaty established that Germany's borders were permanently established on the combined borders of FRG, GDR, and Berlin, and reunited Germany abandoned all territorial claims in Poland. Germany declared all acts of preparations for or acts of aggression other unconstitutional. Finally, the reunified Germany agreed not to produce or possess weapons of mass destruction and to reduce its military personnel to 370,000 ground, air,

⁸⁶ Memorandum Brent Scowcroft to George Bush "The First Round of Two-Plus-Four Deliberations on German Unification" n.d. folder Rice Condoleezza Files 1989-1990 Subject File OAID CF00721 "2+4 Germany #1 [1]" National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

⁸⁷ Handwritten Notes n.d. folder Rice Condoleezza Files 1989-1990 Subject File OAID CF00721 "2+4 Germany #1 [2]" National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

and naval forces combined. The Soviets agreed to remove their forces from Berlin and GDR by 1994, and the other three Four Powers agreed keep their forces in Berlin at Germany's request.⁸⁸

Conclusions

Due to Gorbachev's policies and leadership, the Soviet Union underwent a period of political reform that weakened its power and influence. These changes made it possible for the Berlin Wall to open in 1989. However, these changes did not guarantee that the Germanys would reunite. Instead, continued changes and Bush's diplomatic efforts convinced the Four Powers to end their occupation authority and support German reunification. Bush's understanding of the situation in Europe made it easier for him to manage and maintain six's Four Powers and Germanys cooperation to resolve the issues surrounding reunifying Germany. At the same time, Bush's administration began to realize that the changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union warranted a re-evaluation of US policies towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. However, Cold War attitudes were deeply entrenched and difficult to overcome. Thus, the Bush administration remained most concerned about Soviet reaction to developments in Germany and Eastern Europe. This did not prevent the Bush administration from cooperating with Soviet leaders while pushing its own preferences for Germany's future.

While the Bush cooperated with Soviet leaders to reunify Germany, those efforts resembled the Yalta and Potsdam conferences where the United States and the Soviet

⁸⁸ *Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany*, September 24, 1990, Case No. 178066CU, CO054, WHORM: Subject File, Bush Presidential Records, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

Union, discussed the future of the Europe and the world despite their ideological differences. German reunification was not another period of détente between the United States and Soviet Union. Instead the reunification of Germany would prove that the Cold War was ending. This continued as the international community responded to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. During this conflict, the United States led a multinational coalition, that included the Soviet Union, against Iraq and eventually successfully defeated Iraqi forces during the First Gulf War in Spring 1991. Bush once again demonstrated his diplomatic skills and flexibility cooperating with nations with diverging interests and agendas to successfully resolve Iraq aggression.

CHAPTER III - BUSH, THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Introduction

By 1990, US-Soviet relations had improved as the Soviet Union abandoned repressive policies that used military power to maintain influence and control in Eastern Europe. These changes led to democratic revolutions in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, the opening of the Berlin Wall, and reunification of Germany. As this occurred, the threat of war between the United States and the Soviet Union decreased as regional instabilities and conflicts rose. Diminished Soviet influence around the world allowed the United States to develop national security strategies and foreign policies that were less focused on containing Soviet expansion, and to re-evaluate US relationships around the world. These re-evaluations led some countries, like Iraq and Yugoslavia, to lose American support, as these states were no longer deemed necessary partners to defend US interests abroad. These re-evaluations also meant that the United States was more likely to support international opposition against its former friends when they acted aggressively. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, President Saddam Hussein learned quickly that the United States would no longer turn a blind eye to his aggressive acts against his neighbors in the Persian Gulf.

This chapter argues that following the reunification of Germany and successful cooperative efforts with some of its WWII allies, the United States led by Bush continued to re-evaluate US national interests and security strategies. The culmination of this re-evaluation would become Bush's New World Order that emphasized collective security, international liberalism, and the rule of law as the paths to secure global security and

stability. While this differed from the strategy of containment, Bush's New World Order continued themes in US foreign policy of global stability and international cooperation to deter aggression to defend the United States and its interests since the founding of the nation. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Bush used his military and diplomatic experiences to implement policies and strategies based on the New World Order that allowed him to gain and maintain international cooperation to end Iraq's illegal annexation Kuwait. Before his election to the presidency, Bush had served as a fighter pilot in the U.S. Navy during WWII, U.S. House of Representatives for Texas, US Ambassador to the United Nations, Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in China, and Director of Central Intelligence agency and Vice President to Ronald Reagan. These senior positions provided Bush with military, foreign policy, and intelligence experience that he would rely on during his presidency. His experiences in the UN ensured that Bush was familiar with the way the UN worked, his UN post and position as Vice President ensured that Bush had numerous contacts and relations with other foreign leaders that he could use for the Persian Gulf Crisis.

The Persian Gulf Crisis⁸⁹ also allowed Bush to publicize his views and strategies for the new period, and transition US national security strategy and foreign policies away from the strategy of containment. The change in the global environment as the international community responded to Iraqi aggression demonstrated that most Cold War attitudes had been overcome.

⁸⁹ The phrase Persian Gulf Crisis refers to the Iraq invasion and occupation of Kuwait between 1 August 1990 and 16 January 1991, as it was used in the media. It does not refer to the Gulf War waged between 17 January 1991 and 28 February 1991, which was referred to as the Persian Gulf War or the Gulf War.

Iraqi Behavior in the Persian Gulf

The Iraq invasion of Kuwait was a consequence of the Iraq-Iran War, which was fought from 1980 to 1988. The Iraq-Iran War began over Hussein's desire control Iranian oil fields along the Iraq-Iran border. During the war, Hussein borrowed billions of dollars from Kuwait. After the war ended in a ceasefire Iraq owed Kuwait a large debt. This led Hussein to bully Kuwait and Iraq's other neighbors to force them to raise oil prices, and forgive Iraqi debt from the war. Hussein's behavior peaked in July 1990 when Tariq Aziz, Iraq's Foreign Minister, delivered a letter to the Arab League that accused Kuwait of several charges. The charges included that Kuwait was guilty of military aggression against Iraq for refusing to settle the Iraq-Kuwaiti boundary dispute, refusing to forgive the multi-billion Iraqi debt to Kuwait, and pumping more oil than the agreed OPEC production quotas. When the Arab League failed to force Kuwait to provide Iraq with a satisfactory response, Hussein ordered the invasion of Kuwait.⁹⁰

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was quickly met with international outrage and condemnation. Following American leadership, the international community cooperated to isolate Iraq, and defend Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi aggression. As Bush cooperated with the other nations with interests ending Iraq's invasion, he and his administration began implementing the policy changes advocated by Blackwill and Rice

⁹⁰ Gordon and Trainor, *The General's War*, 14.

during efforts to reunify Germany.⁹¹ Bush's response to the Persian Gulf Crisis formalized the policy revisions he and his administration had initiated. Additionally, Iraqi aggression against Kuwait forced Bush to re-evaluate his policies to maintain stability in the Persian Gulf, and US interests in the region. This was part of a trend of re-evaluating US interests around the world, and understanding which allied and friendly states could support US efforts since the Soviet Union was no longer America's greatest adversary to global security.

Bush's National Security Strategy: 1990-1991

In his first national security strategy, Bush acknowledged the successful defense of American national interests during the Cold War, and he noted that in the post-Cold War period changes were occurring:

The familiar moorings of postwar security policy are being loosened by developments that were barely imagined years or even months ago. Yet our goals and interests remain constant. And, as we look toward—and hope for—a better tomorrow, we must also look to those elements of our past policy that have played a major role in bringing us to where we are today. It is our steadfastness over four decades that has brought us to this moment of historic opportunity. We will not let that opportunity pass, nor will we shrink from the challenges created by new conditions.⁹²

Bush wrote that Cold War national security strategies had focused on containing the Soviet Union expansion and dominance in Europe and Asia through diplomatic,

⁹¹ In separate memos Blackwill and Rice noted different pitfalls the Bush administration was falling into as the situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union changed. Blackwill argued that the administration needed to take notice of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe and begin adopting policies that did not rely on the strategy of containment. Rice argued that the administration was hurting its policies and successfully implementing those policies if the administration did not begin educating itself on the current situation in the Soviet Union, and began preparing for the fallout of Soviet instability.

⁹² George Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States, March 1990" Preface. <http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1990.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121138-080>.

economic, and military means. He continued that this strategy had created conditions and opportunities that allowed the United States to emerge as a global leader with a primary duty to ensure the stability of the international community. He argued that as Soviet dissolution brought changes to the international situation, America's goals, values, and responsibility to maintain global security and stability remained the same.⁹³ While the United States no longer needed to defend the world from communism, the world remained threatened by international acts of aggression and internal conflicts that threatened world stability and security.

Bush contended that America's national interests were to first deter aggression and improve strategic stability; and second to encourage greater recognition of human rights, free market principles, free elections, and restrained military spending in the Soviet Union.⁹⁴ To accomplish this, Bush continued significant principles from the strategy of containment. This included continuing the US reliance on flexible options to deter and respond to aggression. It also required the United States to seek out alliances with other states that shared American values and security interests to create a system of collective security.⁹⁵ At the same time he combined these principles with theories and policies from before the Cold War. Even as the Cold War came to an end, US policymakers had a difficult time breaking away from Cold War attitudes and strategies that had defended US national interests for over forty years. Bush realized that containing

⁹³ NSS90, 1-3.

⁹⁴ NSS90, 1-3.

⁹⁵ George Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States, March 1990" 23, <http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1990.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121138-080>.

outbreaks of aggression around the world served US interests better than containing the insolvent Soviet Union. He also noted that while the United States had the military prowess to defend its interests unilaterally, it was in America's interests to cooperate with international friends and allies.

Bush noted, "The security environment we face in the 1990s is more hopeful, but in many ways also more uncertain than at any time in the recent past."⁹⁶ He contended that the United States faced numerous questions about how to ensure international stability as global interdependence and multipolarity rose out of the disintegration of the US-Soviet bipolarity. There were also questions about the character of America's new leadership role in a post-Cold War international environment, how the United States should plan for reversals of strategic gains, and determine what risks to its interests the United States was willing to accept. Bush was also concerned about the adaptability of US forces to changing situations as the USSR collapsed, the viability of diplomatic efforts to maintain cohesion with allies and friendly countries as their common threat weakened, and the future of post-Soviet Europe.⁹⁷

From this point, Bush and his administration created a post-Cold War framework for US foreign policy to create a future that was more peaceful and hopeful than the past. It was a grand strategy that recognized the possible holes left by the end of the US-Soviet rivalry, and what those holes meant for alliances based on Cold War antagonisms. The administration also prepared to respond to changes in international conflicts, though it

⁹⁶ NSS90, 7

⁹⁷ NSS90, 7-8.

would fail to recognize that the destabilization brought by the Soviet Union's collapse would lead to intra-state conflicts that would threaten US interests. The administration also understood that the Cold War's end would force all countries to adapt their diplomatic and military strategies. It also understood that the United States would need to adjust how it established cooperative efforts and initiated multinational responses to international aggression. These insights prepared the United States for some of the chaos that would follow the end of the Cold War. After successfully using Bush's new strategy during the Persian Gulf Crisis, these insights, especially those about the nature of future conflicts, would leave Bush struggling to implement his New World Order strategy elsewhere.

In the post-Cold War era, the United States remained a superpower and a world leader, but in the new world environment without the Cold War dichotomy Bush would have to direct the world toward collective action to create a future of global stability and peace. As part of his national security strategy, Bush promoted the rule of law, diplomatic solutions for regional conflicts, maintaining regional balances of power, and promoting the spread of democratic institutions. It would also support humanitarianism, trade, and financial policies that promoted economic, social, and political progress throughout the world. It would also pledge the United States to protect democratic institutions from aggressions, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and drug trafficking.⁹⁸ Bush's 1990 national security strategy outlined the most important aspects of his New World Order—collective security and deterring aggression, and he would finalize the New

⁹⁸ NSS90, 1990, 2-3

World Order throughout preparations for the Persian Gulf War. Thus, even as Bush's post-Cold War framework was in development, he had determined the direction he wanted to take the United States—to lead the world toward collective action to deter aggression and to defend peace.

The New World Order

During this period, Bush introduced a new perspective on American national security that included a non-containment framework for his policies. However, Bush would not begin explaining this strategy until the buildup for Operation Desert Storm. The Bush called his new strategy the “New World Order,” and he in multiple statements argued his strategy would help the world eliminate terrorism, pursue justice stronger, improve security to bring about peace, and promote a harmonious and prosperous global community. He also contended his New World Order strategy would create new ways for nations to cooperate, and deter aggression.⁹⁹ Additionally, the New World Order would introduce a different type of global security that emphasized an enduring international commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes and solidarity against aggression. Bush rejected any notions that the New World Order would create a Pax Americana or was a euphemism for the United States as world policeman. Instead, he posited that the New World Order strategy would help the United States act as one of several leaders among nations and within international organizations.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Memorandum “The New World Order: An analysis and document collection, n.d.” folder Dyke, Nancy Beard Files OAID CF01473-012 “New World Order National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.”

¹⁰⁰ Memo “The New World Order”

Bush's description of the New World Order Woodrow Wilson's call for the League of Nations after WWI to avoid another world war and to bring about world peace. Bush's call for international cooperation to address aggression and crises revealed the Bush wanted the United State to be *a leader* in the global community not *the leader* of the world. Bush's strategy looked as the United States' position as the world's only superpower, and created a strategy that emphasized multilateralism while leaving unilateral action as an option when necessary to defend US interests. Even with unilateral action still available, Bush's plan for America's post-Cold War leadership had a greater emphasis on collaboration with friends and allies. The Iraq invasion of Kuwait tested the feasibility of Bush's framework in the post-Cold War world, and how far Bush's ideas would be accepted by the international community. Bush's ability to help lead the international opposition to Iraqi aggression would determine the possibilities for future international cooperation that Bush wanted to become the standard for the emerging era.

As Bush continued to discuss the New World Order strategy, the administration noted that New World Order strategy could be described by multiple principles and theories—a commonwealth of nations governed by the Rule of Law, nations joined in collective action against aggression, liberal or democratic internationalism, or a global partnership of nations pursuing peace, security, and justice. The administration noted that these many of these theories were incompatible with each other. They also noted that justifying the intervention in the Persian Gulf through some principles and theories, like the rule of law, was problematic because historically the UN charter had been applied

arbitrarily even though it was internationally accepted. Additionally, many Persian Gulf regimes did not abide by the rule of law or adhere the other theories.¹⁰¹

The multiple influences in the New World Order strategy pulled on American traditions since Woodrow Wilson and World War I, that used American leadership to encourage international cooperation to deter aggression. The New World Order strategy also demonstrated that Bush recognized that crises and conflicts would continue after the Cold War. He also accepted that without the US-Soviet rivalry he would face new challenges and had to use different means to secure international cooperation, even with support from US allies. The memo showed that would struggles similar to main struggle Bush faced would be generating consensus among international leaders that no longer had a unifying threat to their interests as he attempted to establish international cooperation. However, the crisis created by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait created a temporary threat that the world united against because it bridged any differences or conflicts among the nations.

National Security Policy Toward the Middle East

After World War II, US interests in the Middle East increased as part of the policy to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union, protect Israel, and gain access to cheap oil. To contain communism, the United States initiated military and diplomatic arrangements with strategically important Middle Eastern countries including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, and others. In the 1950s and 1960s, nationalist and anti-American

¹⁰¹ Memorandum Blair Dorminey to Nicholas Rostow "The New World Order January 25, 1991" folder Dyke, Nancy Beard Files OAIID CF01473-012 "New World Order National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

movements produced regime changes in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, and other countries experienced major instability that altered America's security strategies in the Middle East. In response, the United States increased economic and military support for those countries that continued to support US policies in the region.¹⁰²

Along with political relationships, the United States has been involved with Middle Eastern oil since 1928, though it was not until after WWII that oil became a national security interest. After the end of WWII, the world's demand for oil increased, and the oil embargo during the 1970's shifted power from oil consuming countries to oil producing ones. However, the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, oil conservation measures, and an alliance with Saudi Arabia protected the United States from the oil hike in 1979 caused by the Iranian revolution and the Iraq-Iran War. The combination of those methods also lessened the influence oil diplomacy could have on the United States. By the mid-1980s, US oil policy shifted from defense against oil supply instabilities to defending oil producing countries from regional or international threats. To defend the Persian Gulf region, the United States aligned with Iraq. This relationship remained in place until the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 decreasing

¹⁰² Michael C. Hudson, "To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy toward the Middle East," *Middle East Journal* 50, no. 3 (Summer, 1996), 329-343, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328954>.

America's need to rely on Iraq to defend the oil producing Persian Gulf countries against Soviet expansionism.¹⁰³

As America's national security and foreign policies towards the Middle Eastern changed in response to the changing international situation some policies remained constant including maintaining access to oil. However, other policies the United States had implemented changed the ways the United States went about protecting its oil interest in the Persian Gulf. For instance, without the Soviet threat the United States no longer needed Iraq to defend the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the United States became less forgiving of Iraqi aggression, though the government had some difficulties expressing this change diplomatically, or acknowledging Hussein's willingness to use aggression to achieve his goals. Nonetheless, after Hussein ordered the invasion of Kuwait, the US response demonstrated how little room the United States was willing to provide Iraq to implement policies that threatened any US interests in the Persian Gulf.

¹⁰³ Hudson, "To Play the Hegemon," 329-343. Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002); From Lloyd Gardner, *The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of American Foreign Policy from the 1970s to the Present*; Shibley Telhami, *The Stakes: America in the Middle East: The Consequences of Power and the Choice for Peace* (Boulder CO, Westview Press, 2004); Janice J. Terry, *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups* (London, Pluto Press, 2005); Gardner, Telhami, and Terry discuss US foreign policy in the Middle East and its three phases. In the first phase ended in 1968 the United States engaged as the United Kingdom was withdrawing, with interests focused on business oriented policies. The second phase from 1969 to 2000 the United States pursued specific strategic allies that were friendly or moderate to prevent Soviet expansion and securing access to cheap oil. The final phase began on 11 September 2001 and was focused on ending terrorist threats against the United States and spreading democracy. The Persian Gulf Crisis occurred during the later end of the second phase when Soviet influence in the Middle East was waning, and as it a decline in American need for friendly states in the region. The also reveal the different influences of oil, lobbies, and the peace process had on US foreign policy the Middle East. Little discusses the desire of American foreign policy makers to modernize and Americanize the Middle East. discusses the cultural, psychological, political, and strategic issues of American foreign policy in the Middle East and the desire of American policy makers to modernize and Westernize Middle Eastern societies, and their frustration and anger with the slow pace and ambivalence to those changes, the resistance to democracy and resilience of autocratic governments, and violent xenophobic terrorist groups.

National Security Directive-26

Upon taking office in 1989, Bush outlined his policies toward the Persian Gulf in National Security Directive-26. In this directive Bush contended that, “access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to US national security,” and that the United States would defend vital interests in the region through military force if necessary.¹⁰⁴ In addition to defending US interests in the Persian Gulf, Bush wrote that the United States was committed to supporting collective self-defense efforts of friendly Persian Gulf countries because it would enable those states to have a more active role in their own defense and reduced the need for US unilateral actions. This included encouraging mutually beneficial and enduring cooperative security relationships with the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) created by the Iraq-Iran War.¹⁰⁵ In this NSD, continued his policies towards international cooperation Bush by using the strategy as part of his regional policies towards the Persian Gulf. He also addressed the policy changes to respond to the end of the Soviet threat in the Middle East, and the rise of anti-American attitudes.

As a means of buttressing America’s position in the Middle East and to counterbalance Iran, Bush continued friendly relations with Iraq, but caveated America’s support for Iraq to US long-term interests. This included maintaining relations also long as Iraq promoted stability in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. To encourage the desired behavior from Hussein, Bush proposed using economic and political incentives to

¹⁰⁴ George Bush, “National Security Directive-26: U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf,” October 2, 1989, <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd26.pdf>, 1.

¹⁰⁵ Bush, “National Security Directive-26

encourage Iraq to moderate its aggressive behavior and to increase America's influence there. Bush also directed the administration to create contingency policies that included economic and political sanctions against Iraq if Hussein used chemical or biological weapons. Lastly, Bush wanted policies that would encourage Iraq to stop meddling in other Middle Eastern affairs, and to play a constructive role in the Middle East peace process.¹⁰⁶

This policy recognized Iraq as a regional power the United States could rely on to promote regional stability, and it provided Bush with an opening to drop Iraq as an ally if its policies threatened Middle Eastern stability and access to oil. However, it also recognized that Iraq's usefulness was limited. While the United States wanted to pursue a policy of collaboration with Iraq, Bush also prepared to respond to any Iraqi action that undermined his policies to promote regional stability and maintain access to oil.

While Bush developed these policies, the policies were limited by assumptions about Saddam's intentions. The Bush administration believed that after fighting against Iran and incurring a large debts and destruction of the military, that Saddam was tired of war and needed time to rebuild its forces. The administration believed this weariness would encourage Hussein to rely on diplomatic coercion rather than military force. The administration also assumed that it could deter any act of aggression through diplomatic and economic methods.¹⁰⁷ Unfortunately, these assumptions were incorrect, as Saddam began rebuilding Iraq's military forces shortly after the end of the Iraq-Iran War, and US

¹⁰⁶ NSD-26

¹⁰⁷ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*, (New York: Back Bay Books, 1995) 9-11

diplomatic efforts to discourage Saddam's aggression were ineffective. This policy failure forced Bush to classify Hussein and Iraq as threats to the United States and the world. As the world recognized Iraq as a threat to every country's oil interests, Bush found an easy conflict to generate cooperation around. Bush's efforts to cooperate with the rest of the international community to develop a consensus towards Iraq brought his post-Cold War strategy to life. The Persian Gulf Crisis led Bush to issue two other NSD's as the situation changed and to develop policy responses. At the same time, Bush began working with the international community to defend Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi aggression.

National Security Directive-45

On 20 August 1990, Bush released NSD-45, which maintained that the Persian Gulf was vital to US national security, and that the United States would use military force to protect those interests if necessary. He argued that the Iraq invasion of Kuwait placed US interests in danger and outlined four principles to guide his policy response. The first principle had the United States call for Iraq to immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait. It also called for Iraq to restore Kuwait's legitimate government. Third, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the Persian Gulf's security and stability. Lastly, Bush pledged the United States to protect American citizens from any danger from Iraqi forces. Additionally, Bush directed the

United States to support the implementation of UNSC resolutions 660¹⁰⁸ and 662¹⁰⁹ Bush also instructed Baker to work with American allies and the international community to find a peaceful solution to the Persian Gulf Crisis.¹¹⁰

Bush's first policies implemented economic sanctions in line with UNSC resolution 661¹¹¹, and froze all Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets in the United States. He also started Operation Desert Shield which deployed US troops to Saudi Arabia to defend the country against an Iraqi invasion. As part of Operation Desert Shield Bush ordered US forces to protect American interests Saudi Arabia by establishing defensive positions to deter Iraqi aggression. Bush also ordered those forces to defend American allies in the region if necessary, and to enforce UNSC resolutions 660 and 661.¹¹² Bush's experiences in the UN had ingrained on him how beneficial cooperating with the UN was to protect

¹⁰⁸ UNSC resolution 660 noted that the Security Council was alarmed by the Iraq invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and determined that it was a breach of international peace and security. The UNSC acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the United Nations Charter condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded that Iraq immediately and unconditionally withdraw all forces from Kuwait. The UNSC also called upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin negotiations to resolve their differences, and decided that the UNSC would meet in the future as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with resolution 660. United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 "Iraq-Kuwait" August 2 1990, Secretary General Perez de Cuella Country File "Iraq/Kuwait-Security Council Resolutions 1990-1991" 2 August 1990-4-September 1991 S-1024-51-4-1995/0006.

¹⁰⁹ UNSC resolution 662 continued to condemn Iraqi actions in Kuwait and to demand that Iraq completely and unconditionally withdraw to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty, independence, legitimate government, and territorial integrity as the Council determined that the Iraq annexation of Kuwait was illegal. United Nations Security Council Resolution 662, "Iraq-Kuwait" August 9, 1990, Secretary General Perez de Cuella folder Country File "Iraq/Kuwait Security Council Resolutions 1990-1991" 2 August 1990-4 September 1991 S-1024-51-4-1995/006

¹¹⁰ George Bush, "National Security Directive-45: U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," August 20, 1990, <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd45.pdf>

¹¹¹ UNSC Resolution 661 ordered all UN member countries to block all imports from and exports to Iraq and Kuwait, freeze all Iraqi and Kuwait assets. United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 "Iraq-Kuwait" August 6 1990, Secretary General Perez de Cuella Country File "Iraq/Kuwait-Security Council Resolutions 1990-1991" 2 August 1990-4-September 1991 S-1024-51-4-1995/0006

¹¹² NSD-45

US interests and to execute US foreign policies. As part of his New World Order, Bush relied on the UN to implement his collective security framework, and demonstrate the UN's post-Cold War possibilities to support cooperative security arrangements and to respond to international aggression.

NSC Policy Discussions After the Invasion of Kuwait

From the start of the Iraqi invasion the NSC/PC and NSC/DC met to help Bush formulate policies to respond to additional Iraqi actions in the Persian Gulf. On 1 August NSC/DC had its first meeting on the situation in Iraq and Kuwait. During the meeting, the NSC/DC started drafting plans for the United States to coordinate with the UN and US allies to create a concerted response. The NSC/DC also discussed the Kuwait government's desire for the United States to fulfill its commitments to Kuwait. This included America's commitment to defend Kuwaiti security and sovereignty. Additionally, the NSC/DP discussed the Kuwaiti request for the United States to issue a strongly worded statement that condemned Iraqi aggression, denounced Iraq's violation of the UN Charter, and demanded Iraq to immediately cease the invasion and immediately withdraw all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.¹¹³

From its first meeting on the Persian Gulf Crisis the Bush administration decided that it was going to seek international support to oppose Iraqi aggression and end the illegal invasion of Kuwait. Bush adhered to the New World Order early in the planning process towards the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, by deciding at the beginning that the United

¹¹³ Memorandum "Minutes of Deputies Committee Meeting on Iraq, August 1, 1990," folder Has, Robert N Meeting Files OAID CF01618-016 "DC [Deputies Committee] Minutes August 1990-May 1991 Re Persian Gulf" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

States would seek a multilateral approach instead of a unilateral one. Bush's decision to create an international opposition to Iraqi aggression demonstrated Bush's commitment to cooperative security methods to respond to aggression. It was also a way to show other countries that the United States had not interests ensuring global security and stability alone, but that the United States intended to cooperate with other countries and regions.

The first actions the administration focused on was generating international support for economic sanctions against Iraq. The NSC/DC decided its first actions were to implement economic sanctions that froze Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets based in the United States to prevent Hussein from stealing from Kuwait, and to deny Hussein funds to maintain his military. The NSC/DC also made plans for members of the administration to call President Mubarak of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to request their assistance pressuring Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, copy American calls for Iraq to agree to a ceasefire, and for Iraqi forces to avoid harming American citizens and other foreigners in Kuwait. The NSC/DC decided that the United States needed to side with Kuwait in UN meetings, get as many other UN members to support US efforts, and to ask the Soviets to stop supplying the Iraqis with arms.¹¹⁴ The administrations planning demonstrated its determination to implement a multilateral approach to resolve the Persian Gulf Crisis. It also revealed that the administration knew that it faced challenges that would stymie efforts to create an international response.

Additionally, this planning would demonstrate that Bush and the United States possessed

¹¹⁴ Memorandum "Minutes of Deputies Committee Meeting on Iraq, August 1, 1990," folder Hass, Robert N Meeting Files OAID CF01618-016 "DC [Deputies Committee] Minutes August 1990-May 1991 Re Persian Gulf" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

the skills necessary to resolve post-Cold War conflicts without having to police the world alone.

As the administration drafted policies, it faced diplomatic hurdles from some of the countries it was trying to work with. These challenges included convincing the Soviet Union to work with the United States, and Middle Eastern states that were ambivalent to the US efforts. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union had provided Iraq with military supplies. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Soviets were reluctant to end their military support of Iraq, or support the sanctions and embargoes passed by the UNSC. However, the US diplomats eventually convinced the Soviet Union to stop supporting Iraq and to enforce UN sanctions and embargoes.¹¹⁵

Jordan was another state that repeatedly hindered efforts to resolve the crisis. While Jordan did not unconditionally support Iraq, it had strong ties with Saddam. This led Jordanian officials to reluctantly supported UN sanctions, and to repeatedly attempted to connect the Middle East peace process to the resolution for the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. US diplomats were less successful convincing the Jordanians to change their policies. However, the Jordanians were part of a minority that supported Iraq and where often unable to sway the members of the UN.¹¹⁶ Jordan and the Soviet Union represented some of the challenges Bush and his administration faced in their efforts to create an

¹¹⁵ Memorandum Robert M. Kimmit to William F Rope "Tightening The Iraq Embargo – Issues for Now and Later, September 20, 1990," Department of State FOIA Virtual Reading Room <https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/foiadocs/70aa.PDF>.

¹¹⁶ Cable from US London Embassy to Secretary of State, "Memorandum of Governor Sununu's Conversation with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, August 30, 1990," Department of State FOIA Virtual Reading Room https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/1-FY2013/F-2012-27371/DOC_0C05227300/C05227300.pdf.

international opposition to Iraq. Nonetheless, Bush and his administration created policies that overcame or limited any negative effects from any resistance to the international effort. However, this did not stop other challenges from emerging and hindering the multilateral effort to stop Iraq.

In the UN Security Council (UNSC), the United States struggled to work with allies to pass UNSC resolutions, and get international cooperation to enforce economic sanctions against Iraq. The British and the French repeatedly clashed with the Soviet Union over the language of UNSC resolutions. As the sanctions continued, less prosperous countries needed relief from the negative effects of sanctions on their economies.¹¹⁷ The Bush and his administration responded to these challenges by relying on cooperation and diplomacy to draft solutions. In response to the disagreements over language the United States worked to draft resolutions that provided compromised between the British, French, and the Soviet Union. The United States also established a system to help the more prosperous countries provide relief for those states suffering from the effects of UN sanctions. These efforts, further demonstrated the possibilities of Bush's New World Order's ability to create a secure post-Cold War period. Bush's policies revealed that his cooperative security strategy was focused on responding to aggression, and managing other problems that might occur.

¹¹⁷ Memorandum, Security Council Consultations October 25-27, 1990," Secretary General Perez De Cuella Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, August 1990, S-1043-57-2-2001/0001. Memorandum, "Security Council Consultations August 1990," Secretary General Perez de Cuella Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait "31 July 1990-2 February 1991," S-1043-58-1-2001/0001 Diplomatic issues discussed in Deputies Committee Meetings from August 1990 to January 1991 from folder Hass, Robert N Meeting Files OAID CF01618-016 "DC [Deputies Committee] Minutes August 1990-May 1991 Re Persian Gulf" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

In September, US officials continued diplomatic efforts to get Iraq to withdraw, and strengthen sanction enforcement among UN members. The administration also drafted an arms bill to sell aircraft and armaments to Saudi Arabia to bolster its defenses.¹¹⁸ The administration's work establishing and maintaining the coalition and concerted action required Bush and his administration to constantly adjust tactics and respond to demands. The Bush could have decided to move unilaterally at any point to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but he did not. Instead, Bush remained dedicated to collective opposition against Iraq, and used his and Baker's diplomatic skills to minimize any differences within the coalition. Bush's efforts up to this point were designed to establish a precedence for future post-Cold War international responses to conflicts and crises. It demonstrated Bush and America's determination to work with the international community to resolve conflicts, rather than relying on US unilateral action. Bush's policies demonstrated that the United States wanted to apply this strategy to US leadership in the post-Cold War period.

The Bush administration's diplomatic efforts were not limited to the UN and maintaining the coalition. Bush's policies also included diplomatic efforts to encourage opposition within the Iraqi people to force Hussein to withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait. By the end of October, the administration had initiated public diplomacy efforts through USIA aimed at convincing the Iraqi public to pressure Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, or to encourage the Iraqi people to overthrow Hussein's presidency. These efforts

¹¹⁸ Diplomatic issues discussed in Deputies Committee Meetings during September 1990 from folder Hass, Robert N Meeting Files OAID CF01618-016 "DC [Deputies Committee] Minutes August 1990-May 1991 Re Persian Gulf" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

included Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts into Iraq, films depicting coalition strength and unity, and radio addresses from Bush.¹¹⁹ These efforts continued into December, when the DOD joined the USIA to create videos that depicted coalition military power. At the same time, the VOA started “Around the Gulf” a television program that provided non-government controlled news to the Iraqi people. These public diplomacy efforts were designed to motivate the Iraqi people to pressure Hussein to abide by UN resolutions or face the consequences.¹²⁰ Public diplomacy abroad and domestic served to disseminate diplomatic policies and strategies to the public, and can be used to garner support from domestic and foreign audiences. While these efforts were unable to create change within Iraq that convinced Hussein to withdraw his efforts, they demonstrated the variability of US methods to end to invasion of Kuwait diplomatically.

As Bush outlined in NSD-46 Bush was willing to use military force to defend US interests in the Persian Gulf if necessary. However, Bush’s policies up to the declaration of war on January 16, demonstrated Bush’s desire to resolve the conflict without such measures. Even as Bush attempted to resolve the conflict diplomatically quickly accepted the necessity of military force. Bush’s decision to resort to military force set another precedence for his New World Order by establishing that there was a deadline to peacefully resolve a conflict before the United States would turn to military power.

¹¹⁹ Diplomatic issues and policies discussed in Deputies Committee Meetings during October 1990 from folder Hass, Robert N Meeting Files OAID CF01618-016 “DC [Deputies Committee] Minutes August 1990-May 1991 Re Persian Gulf” National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

¹²⁰ Memorandum Nancy Bear to Robert Gates “Persian Gulf Public Diplomacy Update—May Come Up At Today’s Deputies Meeting, December 10, 1990” folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings Files OAID 90018-002. “NSC/DC 228 - December 10, 1990 - NSC/DC Meeting on Persian Gulf via SVTS, Keywords Iraq, Kuwait, Persian Gulf” National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*

National Security Directive-54: Operation Desert Storm

On 15 January 1991, the day before the Persian Gulf War began, Bush issued NSD-54 which outlined the US military response to Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf. From his original policy directives in NSD-26, and those established in NSD 45 Bush had outlined the strategic interests the United States had in the Persian Gulf region and its determination to defend those interests. In the opening of NSD-54 Bush argued:

“prolonging the current situation would be detrimental to the United States in that it would increase the cost of eventual military action, threaten political cohesion of the coalition countries arrayed against Iraq, allow for continued brutalization of the Kuwaiti people and the destruction of their country and cause added damage to the US and world economies.”¹²¹

By publishing of NSD-54 Bush acknowledged that diplomatic efforts had been exhausted, and that a consensus had been reached among most UN members that a military operation was the only way to liberate Kuwait. In NSD-54, Bush noted that Hussein’s defiance of the UN and its resolutions had forced Bush to deploy US and coalition forces to end Iraq’s illegal occupation of Kuwait. NSD-54 established that Operation Desert Storm’s objective was the liberation of Kuwait. It also established operation objectives that included destroying Iraqi military power, and that the coalition would not invade Iraq or overthrow Hussein unless he used chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons against coalition forces.¹²² In addition to military objectives, NSD-54 also established diplomatic measures for the operation to maintain full coalition cooperation, and to avoid any events that could divide the coalition, and threaten the

¹²¹ George Bush, “National Security Directive-54: Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf,” January 15, 1991, <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd54.pdf>

¹²² NSD-54

Operation Desert Storm's success. By the time, Bush finalized his directive for the United States, he had obtained a consensus within the UN for the objectives for Operation Desert Storm.

As Bush needed the full participation of coalition partners in every aspect of the operation, he focused his diplomatic effort overcoming any differences or resistance coming from the Middle Eastern countries participating in the coalition. This included overcoming reluctance to challenge Iraq, support the United States, and opposition to Israeli military participation. Bush convinced Syria and Turkey to deploy additional forces to their borders with Iraq to distract Iraqi forces and draw their resources away from Kuwait. Additionally, He discouraged Israeli military participation by promising Israel that the United States would defend Israel from Iraqi attacks, especially if Iraq began launching attacks against Israel. Bush also had to continue to discourage Jordanian participation and support for Iraq. Bush's efforts to manage the different angles of coalition cooperation also required Bush to defend Iraq from any attempts to use Operation Desert Storm to annex Iraqi territory. This did not mean that Bush rejected removing Hussein from power. Instead, Bush was conditionally willing to implement regime if Hussein used chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, or supported terrorist acts against any coalition member.¹²³ As NSD-54 showed that Bush would have to continue his diplomatic efforts to maintain coalition cohesion once Operation Desert Storm started. Again, Bush demonstrated his determination to make international cooperation a foundation of international relations during post-Cold War period. His

¹²³ NSD-54

efforts to quell discord within the coalition, settle differences between UN members about language in UNSC resolutions, and find remedies for countries that suffered from unintended consequences of economic sanctions and embargo, demonstrated Bush's commitment to creating a secure and stable post-Cold War period.

Conclusions

As the post-Cold War period emerged, Bush used Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to share and lead the world towards his New World Order. Bush's New World Order was based on collective security, deterring aggression, and maintaining global and regional security and stability. Throughout the conflict, Bush successfully used his diplomatic experience to create international unity, and build a coalition force to end Iraq's aggression. Bush outlined his policies and policy changes through his national security strategy and individual directives on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf. From these guidelines, Bush and his administration drafted policies that allowed Bush to unite the international community against Iraq. Bush began by establishing that the United States and the rest of the world had invested interests deterring and ending Iraq's aggression to prevent conflicts and instability from dominating post-Cold War international relations. This cooperation was the basis of Bush's New World Order, and Bush's belief that using multilateral responses against acts of aggression was the key to generating global security and stability.

As Bush said, "The New World Order" was emerging. However, the question was what would the post-Cold War world resemble, and how would the United States adapt to it. This was important since the United States remained the only global superpower with

significant influence and roles around the world.¹²⁴ Bush decided that post-Cold War American leadership should focus on helping regions and the world cooperate to bring stability and security. This strategy was possible with the end of Cold War tensions, and an emerging belief that the post-Cold War period could be peaceful. Bush's desire to have the United States lead this stable and secure period, resembled Wilson's efforts after WWI to create the League of Nations to spread liberal internationalism to promote global peace and stability. Additionally, Bush's desires also remained consistent with longstanding themes and principles in US foreign policy, even as the changing international system changed the ways US foreign policy followed them. However, like Wilson's attempt, Bush would also face additional crises that would reveal that despite his desires, it was still difficult to bring security and stability to the world.

¹²⁴ Hal Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad: America's Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2008).

CHAPTER IV – THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BUSH PRESIDENCY

Following the successful reunification of Germany and international effort to end Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Bush directed his attention to the situation in Yugoslavia. The year 1989 proved to be an eventful year for Europe: democratic revolutions in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, the opening of the Berlin Wall, and the beginning of the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, like the German Democratic Republic and the Warsaw Pact, was born of the Cold War. Throughout the Cold War the United States and NATO relied on Yugoslavia to act as a bulwark against Soviet expansion into Western Europe. To keep Yugoslavia's support, the United States and other governments provided Yugoslavia economic aid, which the Yugoslav government used to finance government spending and to promote economic prosperity as the Yugoslav economy faced difficulties throughout the Cold War.

However, Gorbachev's reforms and the warming of US-Soviet relations decreased the Soviet threat to the United States. Thus, the Bush administration and NATO determined that Yugoslavia was no longer needed to defend Western Europe from Soviet aggression, and there was no longer a need to provide Yugoslavia economic aid. Without international economic support, the Yugoslav government and economy destabilized worsening ethnic tensions and political divisions that emerged after Josip Broz Tito's death in 1980. The destabilization of Yugoslavia threatened to destabilize the rest of Europe and presented a challenge to US security interests in Europe and maintaining European stability and security. In 1990, the Bush was focused on preserving European stability as Germany reunified and re-stabilizing the Persian Gulf region and the world

after the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. These conflicts were given higher priority over Yugoslavia even though the Yugoslav conflict also had the ability to destabilize a world region. After the international community had resolved the issues in Germany and Kuwait, Bush and Western European leaders focused on solving Yugoslavia's ethnic and political divisions. Unfortunately, by the time that occurred those tensions had turned into democratic and secessionist movements in Slovenia and Croatia that were spreading to other Yugoslav states.¹²⁵

This chapter argues that following the diplomatic successes in Germany and the Persian Gulf, Bush had established a new cooperative security strategy for the United States that he could use to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia. This strategy followed US foreign policy themes of international cooperation and maintaining global stability and security. However, Bush's attempts at collaboration with NATO and later the UN failed to resolve the Yugoslavia's crisis. There were several reasons this collaboration failed: the United States and NATO's delayed response to the crisis, internal divisions in NATO, strategy disagreements between NATO and the United States, Bush's decision to not to have any leadership role in NATO efforts or to help bridge divisions in NATO, and Bush's insistence that the solution maintain Yugoslavia's integrity. Bush's decision to withhold US leadership was uncharacteristic of Bush, but it reflected the public's growing hesitancy to the United States policing the world and attempting to resolve all

¹²⁵ Leslie Benson, *Yugoslavia: A Concise History*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004). Alastair Finlan, *The Collapse of Yugoslavia, 1991-1999*, (New York: Osprey, 2014). Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*, (London: Penguin Books, 1993). Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995). John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, *Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1990-1993*, (New York: Routledge, 2000).

international conflicts. These factors combined to produce the first failure of Bush's New World Order. Bush's inability to use the New World Order to resolve the Yugoslav crisis revealed the limitations of cooperative security, especially when that cooperation lacked any US leadership.

Yugoslavia's March Toward Disintegration

Ever since the Ottoman Empire reached as far as Eastern Europe, the Balkans had experienced ethnic divisions and conflicts. After World War I the allies created Federal Republic of Yugoslavia out of six republics—Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia—with internal borders along ethnic and historical lines. During WWII, the ethnic divisions and animosities worsened as the Serb and Croat Chetniks collaborated with the Nazis, while communist Partisans supported the Allies. Throughout the war the Chetniks and the Partisans committed atrocities against each other. After WWII, the Allied Powers supported Josip Broz Tito and the communists and their efforts to establish a communist government in Yugoslavia. Tito established the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and installed a satellite of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in each republic's government. Under Tito's leadership Yugoslavia was espoused as the model middle way between a planned economy and a capitalist economy, and Yugoslavia enjoyed economic prosperity with limited ethnic conflicts. Following Tito's death in 1980, no other leader emerged capable of managing Yugoslavia's ethnic divisions. At the same time, the federal government proved incapable of responding to political, economic, and national challenges. As tensions

increased ultranationalist groups spread propaganda reminding the Yugoslavs about the atrocities from WWII encouraging ethnic fighting and Yugoslavia's collapse.¹²⁶

Shortly after Tito's death the first cracks in Yugoslav unity emerged in student demonstrations in Kosovo, and calls for an Albanian republic in Kosovo. As more students protested for an independent Kosovo state, the Serbs responded with demands for a Greater Serbia in Yugoslavia. Additionally, the non-Serb majorities in Kosovo and Sarajevo began calling for separation from Serbia. By 1986, Serb nationalism emerged to oppose Albanian nationalism in Kosovo. This Serb nationalism evoked national myths and argued that the Serbs bore the brunt of the economic burdens of Yugoslavia's modernization. That year, Slobodan Milošević was elected the head of the Serbian republic through appeals to the Serb nationalism. Following his election, Milošević removed all liberal communists from the government and gained the Yugoslav army's support becoming the sole leader of Serbia. He also encouraged anti-Muslim sentiments, which had been grown along with Serbian nationalism. Like Serbia, Slovenia experienced a rise in nationalist sentiments. Slovene intellectuals drove the Slovene national movement duplicating Serbian arguments that Yugoslavia's modernization had retarded Slovene efforts to modernize and fix their economy.¹²⁷

As the world focused on German reunification and then Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Croatia and Slovenia held free elections that brought democratic officials and new governments to power. In response, the Yugoslav Army tried to disarm the national

¹²⁶ Leslie Benson, *Yugoslavia: A Concise History*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004) 73-80.

¹²⁷ Benson, *Yugoslavia*, 132-154

defense installations in Croatia and Slovenia, but Croat and Slovene forces rebuffed the army. Following these altercations, Croatia and Slovenia began illegally buying weapons to prevent future retribution from the Yugoslav government. On 23 December 1990, Slovenia held elections, during which an overwhelming majority voted for independence from Yugoslavia. By mid-March 1991, Milošević had turned his attention toward creating Greater Serbia. On 3 May 1991 Croatia voted to secede from Yugoslavia. After the election in Croatia and Slovenia, the Croat and Slovene governments announced they would declare their independence on 26 June. However, Slovenia declared its independence on 25 June. The Slovenes also cut off power, communications, and water to the Yugoslav army bases in Slovenia to prevent the Yugoslav army from stopping Slovene secession.¹²⁸

As Yugoslavia's dramatically changed internally, it faced similarly significant changes to its international standing. During the Cold War Yugoslavia refused to align with the Soviet Union or the United States. As a non-aligned nation, Yugoslavia gained military and economic support from the United States to counter Soviet expansion. Yugoslavia's non-aligned status also allowed it to get loans from Western European governments. So that by the end of the Cold War Yugoslavia had borrowed over twenty billion dollars in r loans from the United States alone. As US-Soviet relations and the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe weakened Soviet influence and power, Yugoslavia's international standing and its security importance diminished. Also, the changes occurring among the former Warsaw pact nations made them more suitable

¹²⁸ Benson, *Yugoslavia*, 1-3, 132-162.

candidates for monetary aid than Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia's economic resources dried up, the economic problems increased domestic turmoil and decreased the government's ability to prevent ethnic conflicts.¹²⁹

The crisis in Yugoslavia was caused by the end of the Cold War and the strategy of containment. Without the Soviet threat, the United States and NATO no longer found viewed Yugoslavia as a security partner to help defend Western Europe from Soviet expansion. This re-evaluation led these countries to end their economic support for Yugoslavia, which the government had become entirely dependent on to function. The governments growing decay sparked economic problems that antagonized ethnic divisions. The rise of ethnic hostilities was worsened by ultranationalists in Yugoslav states who urged the states to secede from the Yugoslav federation. The secession of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina sparked an ethnic conflict the Balkans that also threatened to destabilize Yugoslavia's neighbors and the rest of Europe. As the crisis in Yugoslavia threatened the rest of Europe, Bush began drafting policies to support NATO efforts to mediate a resolution to the conflict.

National Security Policy Toward Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe

In his 1990 national security strategy review, Bush continued to focus on the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. He wrote that communist states "were mired in stagnation, paralyzed by outmoded static ideologies that stifle innovation and productivity. Poor economic performance, especially in contrast with the West, has

¹²⁹ Benson, *Yugoslavia*, 132-155.

discredited a system that prided itself on its mastery of economic forces.”¹³⁰ He continued that in response to the changes occurring in the East, the United States and its Western European allies were dedicated to overcoming Cold War divisions in Europe. To achieve this, Bush wanted to ensure the core of post-Cold War Europe rested on democratic institutions and values, and that a high priority was placed on quickly decreasing force levels and improving stability. The United States would also support economic development, democratic institutions, and overall stability in Eastern Europe.¹³¹

Even as he promoted core US foreign policy values of promoting and defending democratic institutions, decreasing aggression, and improving global stability, Bush was unable to implement this national security strategy equally as he did not mention Yugoslavia or the Balkans. Instead Bush remained focused on Eastern Europe and former members of the Soviet States, even as US –Soviet Relations improved. This fixation allowed Bush to miss the crisis happening in Yugoslavia and its role in European security and stability. At the same time, Bush was preoccupied with the reunification of Germany and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. So, these two situations combined to create a policy vacuum towards Yugoslavia that Bush would have to respond to in 1991.

In his 1991 national security strategy review, Bush discussed changes to US-European relations. He noted that changes in Eastern Europe created a greater need for NATO members to cooperate and deter aggression in Europe. Additionally, NATO needed to continue to serve as a channel for American involvement in Europe. He posited

¹³⁰ George Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States, March 1990” 5, <http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1990.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121138-080>.

¹³¹ Bush, NSS90, 11.

that the United States should use its membership in NATO to prevent aggression among NATO member states.¹³² These notes established that Bush intended to help Europe adapt NATO from a Cold War alliance against the Soviet Union into a European cooperative security institution similar to the UN. By refashioning NATO into a cooperative institution, Bush hoped to encourage New World Order strategies and principles in Europe. By maintaining an active role in NATO and other European security institutions, and maintaining America's military presence in Europe.¹³³ He's plan would also allow the United States to remain active in European security discussions and to encourage cooperative actions against aggression.

Bush also noted in his national security strategy that Soviet influence had frozen disputes between and within Eastern Europe countries. He used the crisis in Yugoslavia as evidence that the collapse of the Soviet Union had unleashed security problems on Europe. Bush contended that the Yugoslav government had managed to suppress ethnic animosities during the Cold War, but without the Cold War competition, fighting between ethnic groups was creating security problems.¹³⁴ Tito overcame Yugoslavia's ethnic divisions by creating a communist government that focused on representing everyone as a Yugoslav communist first and their ethnicity second. Tito also promoted economic reforms which also discouraged ethnic divisions, by using economic aid he

¹³² George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States 1991, 6, <http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1991.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121158-580>.

¹³³ Bush, NSS91, 6

¹³⁴ Bush, NSS91, 6-7

received from the United States in return for standing against Soviet communism.¹³⁵ Bush suggested creating policies that relied on the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and NATO to resolve the turmoil.¹³⁶ Bush's decision to rely on CSCE and NATO leadership to resolve the Yugoslav crisis fit within the parameters of Bush's New World Order. Through this policy, the CSCE and NATO would cooperate to establish mediation between the Yugoslav states to resolve their differences so that Yugoslavia would survive. This was essential to Bush's post-Cold War strategy, since Europe would have to respond to conflicts caused by the collapse of governments sponsored by the Soviet Union or the United States during the Cold War. However, this policy limited Bush's ability to exert American influence in the mediation process, to reinforce NATO decisions, and resolve disagreements in NATO.

Contradicting Views of Yugoslavia and America's Response

As Bush was drafting his policies towards Yugoslavia, NSC and CIA analysts studied the situation in Yugoslavia. While the NSC and CIA agreed on the fundamentals about the situation in Yugoslavia, they differed about the ability of the United States to prevent Yugoslavia's dissolution. The analysis papers the NSC and CIA analysts provided Bush and his advisors revealed their divergences. The NSC paper focused on the impact Yugoslavia's impact would have on US interests while the CIA focused on the feasibility of any US policies to influence the situation in Yugoslavia and prevent its collapse.

¹³⁵ Benson, *Yugoslavia*, 111-131.

¹³⁶ Bush, NSS91, 6-7

In the NSC paper, the analysts noted the dissolution of Yugoslavia would cause local, regional, and continent-wide problems in Europe. In addition, the ethnic makeup of Yugoslavia would cause violence as the individual states attempted to separate from the federation. The authors argued that US interests were served by a repeating the developments in the former Soviet states in a united Yugoslavia:

“Our interest in avoiding violence among the Yugoslavs and instability at the Balkan and European levels, our interest in promoting political democracy, market-based economies, and enhanced respect for human rights, as well as relevant principles of international law and relevant international covenants all would seem to point in the direction of preserving Yugoslavia’s unity.”¹³⁷

This paper established that Bush’s security goal in Yugoslavia should resolve the conflict, keep Yugoslavia united, and encourage democratic reform. This analysis contradicted the democratically decided secession movements in Yugoslav states. It also reversed Bush’s policies that supported German self-determination during Germany’s reunification. The administration would not reconcile this contradiction as it supported NATO and CSCE efforts to mediate a solution. Instead, the Bush administration would exacerbate this contradiction as it continued to implement policies in Yugoslavia designed to prevent Yugoslavia’s dissolution while supporting democratic reforms. The NSC analysis also dissented with the CIA national intelligence estimate on Yugoslavia that presented a different evaluation of the situation in Yugoslavia and the possibilities for the success of US policies there.

¹³⁷ Memorandum, to Robert Kimmit, Paul Wolfowitz, Admiral David Jeremiah, and Richard Kerr "Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia: Discussion Paper" October 11, 1990, folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings Files, OAID 900017-006, "NSC/DC 212 – October 12, 1990-NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia," National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*

On 18 October 1990, the CIA issued NIE 15-90 "Yugoslavia Transformed." It opened:

"Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within one year and will probably dissolve within two. Economic reform will not stave off the breakup. Serbia will block Slovene and Croat attempts to form an all-Yugoslav confederation. There will be protracted armed uprising by Albanians in Kosovo. A full-scale, interrepublic war is likely, but serious intercommunal conflict will accompany the breakup and will continue afterward. The violence will be intractable and bitter. There is little the United States, and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity. Yugoslavs will see such efforts as contradictory to advocacy of democracy and self-determination."¹³⁸

CIA analysts argued that the collapse of Yugoslavia was inevitable and caused by the Yugoslav's inability to create an all-Yugoslav political movement after the Titoist vision collapsed. They noted that without an all-Yugoslav movement nationalism, local, and economic aspirations would determine Yugoslavia's future. They continued that neither the Communist Party nor the Yugoslav National Army would keep Yugoslavia together. At the same time, historic religious antagonisms and cultural identification in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia would serve as strong factors that would worsen the conflict. The analysts wrote they did not believe it was possible for any option other than dissolution to succeed. They pointed to diverging ideas about government and economic reforms between the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs.

The authors also attempted to predict the situation in Yugoslavia once the collapse began. The analysts predicted that the collapse would start sporadic and spontaneous ethnic violence that would progress into a civil war. They also noted that the Serbs would encourage ethnic uprisings among Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

¹³⁸ NIE 15-90, "Yugoslavia Transformed" October 18, 1990, iii, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1990-10-01.pdf>

further spreading the ethnic violence.¹³⁹ Unfortunately, Bush and his advisors ignored NIE 15-90 because it contradicted their security strategy for the Balkans and Europe.¹⁴⁰ Instead, the Bush administration's followed the advice presented in the NSC paper and initiated policies designed to keep Yugoslavia united even as Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia, voted to secede from Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was collapsing Bush prioritized American security strategy over the realities of the situation in Yugoslavia. Part of this was a desire to recreate the successes in Germany and Kuwait in Yugoslavia. Additionally, the administration miscalculated the challenges posed creating a cooperative security solution to an intranational conflict versus an international one.

NSC/DC Meetings on Yugoslavia, 1990-1992

During the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the NSC Deputies was primarily responsible for crafting US policies, and established Americans initial position and strategy towards Yugoslavia. From October 1990 to the end of Bush's presidency, the NSC/DC met twenty-nine times to discuss policy options and the situation in Yugoslavia.¹⁴¹ The NSC/DC proposed the administration plan for the rapid collapse of Yugoslavia accompanied by escalating cycles of inter-ethnic violence, Serbian repression of the Albanian population in Kosovo, and splintering of the Yugoslav Army along ethnic

¹³⁹ NIE 15-90 "Yugoslavia Transformed," iii-vi.

¹⁴⁰ CIA, "Yugoslavia from National Communism to National Collapse: US Intelligence Community Estimative Products on Yugoslavia, 1948-1990 (Washington, D.C: Government Publishing Office, 2006).

¹⁴¹ Finding Aid, "NSC/DC Meeting-George H. W. Bush Administration (1989-1993) https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsc_and_dc_meetings_1989-1992-declassified.pdf.

lines as Yugoslavia moved toward a civil war. The committee suggested starting consultations with principal allies and regional institutions, and consider using the UNSC or CSCE to mediate between the parties. The NSC/DC believed that if the CSCE could successfully resolve the Yugoslav conflict, then the CSCE's could establish a precedence for future CSCE efforts to mediate disputes, like the UN's response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.¹⁴²

The NSC argued that the United States could not prevent Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina from declaring their independence then the United States should follow traditional principles on recognizing new states. However, the NSC caveated this policy that the United States should only recognize those states if the Yugoslav government did not contest their independence. The NSC posited that if the declaration of independence were contested then the United States should encourage the seceding states to continue mediation.¹⁴³ From the beginning the NSC designed strategies and policies around keeping Yugoslavia from disintegrating and recreating the successful cooperative action against Iraq. The administration also decided that it would only grant recognition conditionally. These decisions limited Bush's policy choices, even as the administration hoped to use international mediation efforts to resolve Yugoslavia's conflict. However, the NSC's decisions rested on a selective analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia, and a

¹⁴² Memorandum "Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia Discussion Paper" October 11, 1990, 7, folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings File OAID 90017-006 "NSC/DC 212 Oct 12, 1990 - NSC/DC Meetings on Yugoslavia "Keywords: Yugoslavia," National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

¹⁴³ Memorandum "Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia Discussion Paper" October 11, 1990, 5, folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings File OAID 90017-006 "NSC/DC 212 Oct 12, 1990 - NSC/DC Meetings on Yugoslavia "Keywords: Yugoslavia," National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*

miscalculation of America's or the CSCE's ability to effectively influence political and social divisions in Yugoslavia to resolve the conflict. This foundation prevented the administration from adjusting to the situation in Yugoslavia and the growing inevitability of dissolution.

Based on its findings, the NSC/DC recommended that the United States should encourage Yugoslavia to adopt democracy, pressure the Serbs to democratize, and push all Yugoslav groups to deal with their affairs through a federation government. NSC/DC also suggested that the United States needed to clearly explain that US assistance was only for a united Yugoslavia, and announce that the United States would not recognize declarations of independence from Yugoslav republics. The NSC/DC recommended that the United States oppose any Yugoslav military action to prevent the states from seceding. It argued that any forceful repression of independence threatened the democratic process and democratic aspirations in Yugoslavia. Lastly, committee encouraged Bush and the State Department to work with the EC to develop a policy consensus towards Yugoslavia to facilitate cooperative actions.¹⁴⁴

As the NSC/DC continued to layout US policy principles towards Yugoslavia, the committee continued to contradict the principles and strategies it had proposed earlier. The NSC did this by refusing to recognize the seceding states, while refusing to support Yugoslavia's use of force to maintain public order and prevent the states from seceding. This policy also contradicted with the government's right to use force to maintain public order and how to support the use of one without violating the other. Another issue was

¹⁴⁴ Memorandum "Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC/DC Oct 12."

the NSC/DC determination of policy without including any references to NATO and CSCE policies towards Yugoslavia. By establishing its Yugoslavia policies this way, the administration established few alternatives for any disagreements with Europe as the situation in Yugoslavia progressed. This would make it difficult for the United States to fully support CSCE and NATO initiatives to mediate the Yugoslav conflict.

From Yugoslav Unity to Deterring and Containing the Yugoslav Conflict

In January 1991 after three months of deadlock and increased violence in Yugoslavia, the NSC/DC changed its policy direction to focus on crafting policies that deterred and contained the escalating violence in Yugoslavia. This policy included responding to Yugoslav army's human rights violations, getting the CSCE to focus on Yugoslavia, and getting the EC to lead negotiations between the parties to end the conflict.¹⁴⁵ From January to July the United States attempted to encourage the CSCE and EC efforts to create an agreement between the Yugoslav states that would end the ethnic division and violence. Unfortunately, the CSCE and EC were unable to convince the Yugoslavs to mediate their differences. In July, the NSC/DC decided to change US policies again to respond to the EC's failed mediation efforts, and increased Serbian violent repression against the seceding states.¹⁴⁶

As the NSC/DC recognized American policies in Yugoslavia and Europe were failing to end the conflict, the administration redirected its policies to prevent the conflict from affecting any other areas in Europe. Bush and his advisors also began to recognize

¹⁴⁵ Memorandum "Summary of Conclusions

¹⁴⁶ Memorandum Bob Hutchings and Tony Wayne to David Gompert, "Public Line in Response to JNA Occupation of Croatia" July 17, 1991, folder Gompert, David C. Files, Subject Files OAID CF01306-005 "Yugoslavia [2]" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

that the CSCE and EC were less capable of exerting their influence within Yugoslavia or encourage the parties to reconcile their problems. At the same time, members of Bush's National Security Affairs department recognized the test that the Yugoslav conflict was placing on America's role and relationships with Europe. In particular, the unwillingness of the United States to take a leading role in mediation efforts was hampering Europe's cooperative security arrangements and endangering Bush's New World Order.

David Gompert, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, sent a memorandum to Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, that critiqued American leadership in Europe during the Yugoslav crisis. Gompert argued the United States faced increased international pressure to take the lead in Europe as the EC's mediation and peacekeeping efforts floundered in Yugoslavia and Milošević realized his "Greater Serbia". He contended that if the United States wanted to continue to claim that it was European power in the post-Cold War period, then the United States should expect Europe to look to the United States for ideas and direction.¹⁴⁷

Gompert continued that if the United States, like the EC, failed to create a plan to end Yugoslavia's conflict, then two things would happen that were against US interests. He posited that a civil war would break out consuming some or all of Yugoslavia, and the civil war would have the ability to affect other Balkan countries. Second, the United States would lose domestic and international confidence in NATO, CSCE, and the New World Order. He argued the Bush administration had to make a choice: the United States

¹⁴⁷ Memorandum David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft "Yugoslavia and American Leadership" August 5, 1991, folder Gompert, David C. Files, Subject Files OAID CF01306-004 "Yugoslavia [1]" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

and EC push the CSCE to create a large-scale peacekeeping force and the United States takes a more assertive mediator role, or the United States can encourage the French, British, and Dutch to intervene in Yugoslavia without NATO or the CSCE.¹⁴⁸ He noted implementing one of the options would affect US policy agendas. He wrote that using the CSCE would strengthen CSCE's standing as a European collective security institution, but using the CSCE could hinder efforts to establish NATO in the post-Cold War as the foundation for European security. On the other hand, having the French, British, and Dutch act unilaterally would support independent European security arrangements, which would undermine any attempts to promote cooperative security arrangements in Europe.¹⁴⁹ Gompert's analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia and America's policy choices revealed significant interests at stake for the United States, Europe, and Yugoslavia. He also revealed that the United States needed to take a firm stand and greater leadership in CSCE and EC to prevent the situation in Yugoslavia from worsening or threatening US interests in Europe.

Along with his policy analysis, Gompert described possible European reactions to America's policy choice. In Yugoslavia, Milošević would oppose either action since it prevented him from creating Greater Serbia, but the Yugoslav army would not forcibly resist a European peacekeeping force. The Europeans would oppose allowing the British, French, and Dutch to deploy peacekeepers out of fears the peacekeepers would face violence from paramilitary units in Yugoslavia. Gompert noted that the United States

¹⁴⁸ Memorandum David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft "Yugoslavia and American Leadership" August 5, 1991.

¹⁴⁹ Memorandum David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft "Yugoslavia and American Leadership" August 5, 1991.

could easily overcome any opposition or initial resistance in the EC to either option. He continued that the only way either policy would succeed was for the United States would to fully support the policy it chose. He continued that if the United States continued to enact lukewarm policies, the United States should not expect the Yugoslav crisis to resolve itself. He argued that it was likely that the Europeans would try to mediate a solution if the violence worsened again. However, without US support and direction European efforts were unlikely to succeed. He continued that:

"We will shortly need to decide not only which approach we favor but, as importantly, whether the U.S. will get behind the wheel. We will not need to be visibly in the lead, nor will the White House need to play a role. Moreover, direct U.S. involvement in either the peacekeeping or peacemaking effort will continue to be unnecessary if not unwise. At most, we might appoint a senior Yugoslavia crisis coordinator, reporting to Secretary Baker."¹⁵⁰

As Gompert's memorandum reveals the policies established by the NSC towards Yugoslavia were failing to push the parties towards resolving the conflict. Additionally, Bush's reliance on the CSCE to lead mediation efforts was revealing divisions with the CSCE membership on the best way to bring peace back to Yugoslavia. Bush's reliance on European cooperative institutions was jeopardizing Bush's efforts to establish cooperative security as the strategy for the post-Cold War period. Additionally, the Yugoslav conflict would reveal how little influence international actors had to address internal causes of intranational conflicts. The inability of the CSCE, NATO and the United States to encourage the Yugoslav parties to accept mediation and end the conflict revealed the difficulties external parties would have in the future resolving intra-state conflicts.

¹⁵⁰ Memorandum David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft "Yugoslavia and American Leadership" August 5, 1991, folder Gompert, David C. Files, Subject Files OAID CF01306-004 "Yugoslavia [1]" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

Following Gompert's memorandum, the NSC implemented some policy changes but did not deviate far from the original strategy developed by in October 1990. As Bush and his staff worked with Europe to resolve the Yugoslav conflict, the United States continued to face difficulties collaborating with the CSCE and NATO to mediate an end to Yugoslavia's conflict. The administration also ignored Gompert's suggestion that the United States take on greater a leadership role in the CSCE and NATO to end the conflict in Yugoslavia. Instead of adjusting policies to promote the changes it desired more effectively, the Bush administration continued ineffective policies that were not helping resolve the Yugoslav conflict and endangered the feasibility of Bush's New World Order. The conflict in Yugoslavia would prove that post-Cold War intranational conflicts required different resolution methods and a deep understanding of local politics and culture for international efforts to succeed.

In September, the NSC/DC decided the United States should assertively argue against instant recognition of the seceding Yugoslav states. The NSC/DC suggested two policies. First, the Bush administration could promote a policy that recognized Slovene and Croat independence, with the knowledge that their independence would exacerbate ethnic violence in Yugoslavia. Second, they could encourage a policy that isolated nationalist Serbia's leaders to pressure other Serbian leaders to agree to an internationally supervised cease-fire and negotiations. The committee noted that the major drawback of the isolation policy was that it required EC consensus to nonrecognition of the seceding states to work efficiently. However, the NSC/DC also wanted to follow and support those

efforts the CSCE's lead, and the CSCE was moving to recognize the seceding states.¹⁵¹ This put US policy in a contradictory position. The United States supported CSCE policies, and the administration did not want it to appear like the United States wanted to take over mediation efforts. However, the United States opposed recognizing the independent states, or ending negotiations. This strategy put the Bush administration in a position to undermine CSCE efforts to resolve the conflict in Yugoslavia and limit further violence. It also endangered Bush's New World Order, and Bush's post-Cold War revisions of the CSCE and NATO.

The Move Toward Recognizing Seceding States

In December, the CIA released an analysis explaining which European countries supported recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. The CIA noted that Germany was leading efforts to recognize Slovenia and Croatia within several weeks, but that this would not hinder efforts to settle the conflict between Serbia and Croatia over Croatian Serbs. The CIA contended that Germany was pushing for recognition to force the Serbs to accept a settlement within previous borders and limit their ambitions. The CIA noted that Germany hoped its strategy would prevent the civil war from transforming into an international conflict. The agency also noted that CSCE debates on recognizing the former Yugoslav states had increased pressure on the United States to become more involved. Additionally, several US European allies were indicating that only US pressure could delay the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. If the CSCE agreed to recognize the

¹⁵¹ Memorandum "Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia: Strategy for Consideration" September 18, 1991, folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings File OAID 90020-034 "NSC/DC 312 September 18, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia," National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

two states, then the CSCE expected the United States to have direct involvement in the crisis.¹⁵² This divergence between the US strategies and CSCE strategies added to the difficulties the cooperative arrangement faced. The lack of consensus within the CSCE and between the CSCE and the United States highlighted different priorities. It also revealed that without a strong leader a consensus was unlikely to emerge, and Bush's desire to establish international cooperative security as the international strategy would flounder against intra-state conflicts.

Shortly after the CIA released this report, the NSC/DC discussed the possibility of copying the EC policy for Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to earn formal recognition from the United States. It also discussed America's response to the CSCE decision to implement a similar policy for recognition by 15 January 1991. During discussions committee members argued that continuing America's policy against recognition kept the United States and EC divided and undermined CSCE efforts to stop Serb aggression.¹⁵³ The NSC/DC also that the policy led the international community to question America's resolve to end the Yugoslav crisis through EC-lead mediation efforts if the United States did not support CSCE efforts. The committee believed that by mirroring EC policies those problems could be avoided, but it would not stop the Serb

¹⁵² Memorandum CIA Office of European Analysis "Yugoslavia: Implications of International Recognition" December 11, 1991, folder Gompert, David C. Files, Subject Files OAID CF01306-005 "Yugoslavia [2]" National Security Council *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

¹⁵³ Memorandum "Deputies Committee Meeting "Yugoslavia: Policy Paper" December 23, 1991, folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings File OAID 90018-029 "NSC/DC 250 January 25, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia via SVTS, Keywords: Yugoslavia," National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

military from forcefully carving up those states even after they were recognized.¹⁵⁴ As 1991 was closing, the Bush's NSC/DC committee began proposing policies that mirrored the CSCE's. It also accepted that continued divisions between the United States and CSCE were hindering peace efforts. As Bush and his advisors began to implement this policy change they also began to invest US energies towards better supporting CSCE negotiation efforts. However, US reluctance to support and mirror CSCE efforts began negatively affected Bush's New World Order cooperative security efforts.

The Bush administration initiated this policy change on 13 December. That day during its meeting the NSC/DC decided that the United States would implement a policy of earned recognition for former Yugoslav states. The committee had the State Department develop the criteria for the states to gain US recognition, and establish evaluations for American humanitarian aid and ways to expand it if necessary. The NSC/DC also decided to support the Vance-Carrington negotiations, and to support UN peacekeeping efforts.¹⁵⁵ The policy changes that the NSC/DC initiated began to bring US policies towards Yugoslavia back in line with Bush's New World Order. These policies dedicated US support to European-led strategy with mediations led by UN special envoys Cyrus Vance and Lord Carrington. The changes in US policy towards the collapse of Yugoslavia reflected the Bush administration's coming to terms with the reality that the

¹⁵⁴ "Deputies Committee Meeting "Yugoslavia: Policy Paper" December 23, 1991, folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings File OAID 90018-029 "NSC/DC 250 January 25, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia via SVTS, Keywords: Yugoslavia," National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

¹⁵⁵ Memorandum "Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Meeting on Yugoslavia December 13, 1991, folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings Files OAID 90021-013 "NSC/DC 325 – December 13, 1991- NSC/DC Meeting re: Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia" National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

Yugoslav federation would not survive because of internal problems the international community was not influential enough to change from outside.

To prevent a policy division from reoccurring between the United States and Europe, The NSC/DC suggested the United States consult with the EC and NATO about de-recognizing Yugoslavia to prevent any implications or semblance that the United States or NATO usurping CSCE. The NSC/DC suggested having discussions with UN Secretary Vance about his intended approach to the peacekeeping mission, and what assistance he would seek from the United States if the UN approved deploying a peacekeeping force.¹⁵⁶ As Bush and his advisors increasingly accepted that Yugoslavia's divorce was unpreventable, they increased their efforts to buttress European efforts to prevent the dissolution of Yugoslavia from exacerbating the violence and instability in the Balkans. This policy change demonstrated that Bush and his staff was dedicated to the New World Order. However, Bush's prioritization of the US interests by maintaining Balkan stability through Yugoslav unity rather than attempting to mediate a better path to dissolution supported the problems in Yugoslavia and created divisions between US and European policies.

¹⁵⁶ Memorandum "Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Meeting on Yugoslavia December 23, 1991" folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings File OAID 90021-018, "NSC/DC 330 December 23, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia" National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

By 16 January 1992, the NSC/DC finalized the method for recognizing the former Yugoslav states.¹⁵⁷ The committees' method began with supporting the cease-fire and the UN peacekeeping force that Vance recommended to the UN, and tied US recognition to former Yugoslav states cooperation with the future peacekeeping mission. After the former Yugoslav states had demonstrated their willingness to cooperate with the UN and Vance then, the United States would recognize a state.¹⁵⁸ However, the Bush administration continued to delay Slovenia and Croatia throughout February, even though forty-five other countries recognized them. However, The United States was not the only country that delayed recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. Greece refused to recognize Macedonia which stalled the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Greece argued that it could not recognize the country of Macedonia because the name "Macedonia" had significant historical and cultural value to Greece. Bosnia-Herzegovina's recognition was delayed as the EC waited for the results of its independence referendum among its Muslim, Croat, and Serb population. The EC believed it was likely that Bosnia-

¹⁵⁷ In an unofficial brainstorming paper commissioned by the NSC/DC, the committee reveals that the Bush administration had come to view the crisis in Yugoslavia within American interests. The committee wrote that it was in American interests to keep the former Yugoslav states within the borders of former Yugoslavia, and to prevent the conflict from moving outside of former Yugoslavia's borders. US interests were also served by creating a neighborhood of independent and democratic states in the Balkans, to strengthen US-European ties, to support further mediation efforts to end the Yugoslav crisis and to keep CSCE principles and processes intact. The committee noted that it was no longer in US interests to have a unified Yugoslavia or a dominant regional power, especially one that was communist and authoritarian. Memorandum, "Serving US Interests in the Yugoslavia Crisis," folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings File, OAID 90021-018, "NSC/DC 330 December 23, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia" National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

¹⁵⁸ Memorandum, "An Approach Toward Recognizing Yugoslav Republics, n.d." Folder H-files NSC/DC Meetings File OAID 90021-018 "NSC/DC 330 December 23, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia" National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

Herzegovina would vote for independence even though it would exacerbate ethnic tensions in the country.¹⁵⁹

On 21 February, the UNSC approved a resolution to create a peacekeeping force for former Yugoslavia. In preparation to recognize the independent states, the State Department decided to mirror the Commonwealth of Independent States set up by the former Soviet countries, which included clear distinctions between recognized statehood and conducting of diplomatic relations. The State Department offered five recognitions policy strategies. First, only recognize Croatia and Slovenia. Second, immediately recognize Croatia and Slovenia while delaying recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia pending consultations with the EC. Third, recognize, Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina but not Macedonia. Fourth, recognize all four independent states. Fifth, recognize Croatia and Slovenia, and recognize Bosnia and Macedonia when the EC recognizes them. Of these five options the State Department recommended recognizing Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia, but not Macedonia.¹⁶⁰ This strategy discussion revealed that the Bush administration continued to face difficulties cooperating with Europe. At the same time the situation in the EC revealed that it still faced difficulty coming to a consensus among its members. These issues hindered cooperative action to resolve the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The difficulties the United States and EC faced creating viable

¹⁵⁹ Memorandum Thomas M. T. Niles to James Baker “Recognition of Yugoslav Republics” February 26, 1992, Department of State, https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/July2014/F-2013-09365ER2/DOC_0C05521915/C05521915.pdf.

¹⁶⁰ Memorandum Thomas M. T. Niles to James Baker “Recognition of Yugoslav Republics” February 26, 1992, Department of State, 3-4 https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/July2014/F-2013-09365ER2/DOC_0C05521915/C05521915.pdf.

policies to respond to the intranational conflict in Yugoslavia revealed their difficulty adjusting to this growing post-Cold War style conflict.

In preparation for a foreign ministers meeting on international Yugoslav policy, the State Department advised Baker delaying recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina risked intimidation from Serbian hardliners and Croats for Bosnia to accept its partition along ethnic lines rather than gaining recognition. They noted that if Bosnian Serbs and Croats attempted to push for partition with would create a civil war in Bosnia. However, if the international community could create a policy consensus and concerted response then it was possible for the international community to stabilize Yugoslavia and move it toward a peaceful solution consistent with CSCE principles.¹⁶¹

The department also advised Baker there was no option to recognizing Bosnia since it had voted for independence on 3 March. Additionally, recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina would make it difficult for Serbia and Croatia to leave the mediation efforts. The State Department believed that recognizing the four Yugoslav states would hinder Milošević's designs for a Greater Serbia out of parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It suggested recognizing Serbia and Montenegro as a Yugoslav state and continue diplomatic relations with the new Yugoslavia on the condition that it acknowledged and respected the territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav republics. It was also important to pressure the new Yugoslavia to grant the ethnic minorities in Serbia the same rights it demanded the Serb minority in Croatia. Baker was encouraged to get a US-EC

¹⁶¹ Memorandum Thomas M. T. Niles to James Baker "Recognition of Yugoslav Republics: Your Meeting with EC Foreign Ministers in Brussels, March 10, 1992" March 5, 1992, U.S. Department of State https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/July2014/F-2013-09365ER2/DOC_0C05521926/C05521926.pdf

recognition of Bosnia, a strong warning against Serbian efforts to destabilize Serbia, and joint support to encourage cooperation among Bosnian ethnic groups to find a way to coexist.¹⁶² As the State Department's memo explained the foreign ministers meeting in March would have ramifications for future international cooperation resolving the dissolution of Yugoslavia and preventing a civil war in Bosnia. The memo relayed that Baker's ability to negotiate with the European foreign ministers and come to a consensus about policy towards former Yugoslavia was paramount to any attempts to limit further violence caused by Yugoslavia's end.

On 10 March, Secretary Baker met with EC Foreign Ministers to formalize a US-EC agreement on recognizing Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. In preparation for his meeting, the State Department acknowledged that the United States and EC did not agree on which states to recognize. The State Department admitted that it would be difficult to reach an agreement because the Greeks continued to stall efforts to recognize Macedonia, and several EC members remained ambivalent about recognizing Bosnia out of fear that ethnic divisions among Croats, Muslims, and Serbs would start a civil war.¹⁶³

Following the foreign ministers meeting, Baker reported that though the meeting had provided the EC and United States with an excellent opportunity to coordinate their

¹⁶² Memorandum Thomas M. T. Niles to James Baker "Recognition of Yugoslav Republics: Your Meeting with EC Foreign Ministers in Brussels, March 10, 1992" March 5, 1992, U.S. Department of State https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/July2014/F-2013-09365ER2/DOC_0C05521926/C05521926.pdf

¹⁶³ Memorandum Thomas M. T. Niles to James Baker "Recognition of Yugoslav Republics: Your Meeting with EC Foreign Ministers in Brussels, March 10, 1992" March 5, 1992, U.S. Department of State https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/July2014/F-2013-09365ER2/DOC_0C05521926/C05521926.pdf

policies on the Yugoslav crisis, they were unable to reach an agreement on recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina or Macedonia. However, Baker and the other foreign ministers concurred that Greece could no longer delay the vote to recognize Macedonia, and they set 6 April as an informal deadline for EC action.¹⁶⁴ Baker's meeting with European diplomats revealed that the United States and the EC had not completely overcome their policy disagreements. It also revealed that entrenched policies among EC members and the United States would continue to hinder cooperative actions towards Yugoslavia. At the same time, Baker's report revealed that those disagreements were decreasing as the United States and Europe found increasing strategies to agree on.

On 3 April Thomas M. T. Niles, US ambassador to the European Union, informed Baker that the European and Canadian Affairs office recommended two policy options to the NSC in response to EC recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 April. The analysts recommended the United States recognize Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina on or shortly after 7 April if the EC recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 April. However, if the EC did not, then the analysts recommended that the Bush administration take no action towards recognizing any of the former Yugoslav republics. Instead, they suggested that Bush send a letter to the President of Macedonia informing him of America's intent to recognize Macedonia after the issues with Greece were resolved, while Baker sent letters to the Presidents of Serbia and Montenegro expressing American willingness to begin discussing future relations between the United States and Montenegro and Serbia

¹⁶⁴ State Department Cable "Yugoslavia: Secretary Baker's Meeting with the EC-Council on March 10 in Brussels" March 20, 1992, State Department https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/5-FY2014/F-2013-09365/DOC_0C05418578/C05418578.pdf

as a new Yugoslavia. They also supported removing sanctions against Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia while keeping sanctions in place against Serbia. They noted the Bush administration explain the sanctions were conditional upon the end of Serbia's blockade of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁶⁵ On 7 April 1992, the United States formally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia.

Conclusions

Bush and his administration's response to the collapse of Yugoslavia was hindered by its focus on the reunification of Germany, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, and the reintegration of former Warsaw pact nations into Western Europe. At the same time that Bush successfully implemented the New World Order in the Persian Gulf, the conflict in Yugoslavia led many to expect that Bush's application of the New World Order in Yugoslavia would continue to demonstrate the capabilities of post-Cold War cooperative security methods on the regional scale. However, Bush's policies towards Yugoslavia did not successfully translate the New World Order to respond to Yugoslavia's intra-state conflict. Instead, several policy decisions at the beginning of America's response made it difficult to influence change in Yugoslavia. The first decision was based on a national strategy assessment that US interests in Europe were served with a united Yugoslavia. This decision created an impediment that prevented the administration from readily adapting to the situation in Yugoslavia. Additionally, this

¹⁶⁵ Memorandum from Thomas M. T. Niles to James Baker, "Next Steps on Yugoslavia," April 3, 1992, Department of State https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/July2014/F-2013-09365ER2/DOC_0C05521939/C05521939.pdf

policy contradicted with American principles and values on democracy and self-determination that Bush and his administration had pursued in Germany.

The next policy decision Bush and his advisors made was to avoid taking a leadership role and to support CSCE later UN sponsored negotiations with Yugoslav representatives. This policy limited American influence in European discussion and American policymakers' ability to create a consensus among the European states. When the administration decided to change policies, the changes focused on addressing violence and restoring stability to prevent instability from spreading to the Balkans and Europe. At the same time, the Bush administration encountered policy disagreements with the CSCE and EC which preferred a stronger US presence in negotiations. However, Bush viewed the Yugoslav conflict as a crisis the CSCE, NATO, and EC should resolve. Thus, Bush pursued a Europe-led strategy to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia. However, after forty-plus years of directing Western European foreign policies, this proved difficult and negatively affected resolution efforts with the EC. Additionally, the EC and NATO were unable to recreate the UN's collective efforts against Iraq even with Bush's support.

As the conflict in Yugoslavia threatened to destabilize the Balkans and the rest of Europe, and endanger the democratic revolutions occurring in Eastern Europe, NATO, with US support, attempted to mediate a solution. Unfortunately, NATO efforts would prove unsuccessful and the Yugoslav federation collapsed. However, the collapse of Yugoslavia did not end the ethnic conflict in the Balkans. Instead, the collapse of Yugoslavia led to a conflict in Bosnia as Bosnian Serbs attempted to ethnically purify Bosnian territory to annex to Serbia to create Greater Serbia. While Bush's policy and strategies failed to prevent Yugoslavia from collapsing they remained in line with core

US foreign policy principles of international cooperation, deterring aggression and ensuring global security and stability.

CHAPTER V – BUSH, CLINTON, AND THE BOSNIAN WAR

Following the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, ethnic violence erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina after it declared its independence. In Bosnia, Serbian nationals working with Slobodan Milošević and Serbia carried out a campaign of ethnic cleansing to create Greater Serbia out of parts of Bosnia. Bosnian Serbs with support from the Serbian army and Serbian government systematically forced Bosnian Muslims and Catholic Croatians to flee their homes, sent them to concentration camps, or systematically killed them. As it had during the collapse of Yugoslavia, the international community attempted to stop the violence through collective actions that included UN sanctions and negotiations. The Bosnian War was one of several international crises that President Clinton would inherit from his predecessor, President Bush. Lacking foreign policy experience, Clinton would initially continue Bush's policies before implementing his own. Clinton and Bush made policy decisions based on transcendent values that have shaped US foreign policy throughout the twentieth century that included defending and spreading democracy, deterring aggression through international cooperation, and ensuring American stability and security. While American presidents used different methods the values at the heart of those policy decisions did not change.

This chapter argues that both Bush and Clinton relied on similar understandings of international cooperation but relied on different methods and leadership styles to resolve the Bosnian War. Bush preferred a European-led cooperative arrangement that focused on humanitarian relief, while Clinton gradually introduced American leadership into international mediation efforts and redirected the focus of UN sanctions to end the war in Bosnia. Both men also continued to abide by traditional US foreign policy themes

and principles as they worked with the European community to restore stability and security to the Balkans. While Bush and Clinton's methods differed, the principles guiding their decisions remained the same. Thus, Clinton's method allowed him to bring more American pressure against the Bosnian Serbs, Serbia, Bosnians, and Croats to mediate a solution. However, Clinton, like Bush, struggled to find a strategy that effectively used outside influences to end the intra-state conflict in Bosnia.

Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Muslims, Croats, and Serbs in Bosnia began fighting amongst themselves over territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs gained support from Croatia and Serbia to defend the areas where their ethnic group was a majority. At the same time, Bosnian Muslims attempted to maintain the cohesion of Bosnia as contiguous state. During the fighting, Bosnian Serbs with support from Slobodan Milošević and Serbian military forces initiated ethnic cleansing to remove Bosnian Muslim from areas of Bosnian to create Greater Serbia, while Bosnian Croats supported by Croatia annexed Bosnian territory they historically claimed as part of Croatia.¹⁶⁶ This policy of ethnic cleansing eventually led to dramatic scenes of refugee streams, cities under siege, and tales of genocide, as the international community attempted to convince the three parties to end the fighting, and punish Bosnian Serbs and Serbia for its policy of ethnic cleansing.

Bush's Policies and the Bosnian War

After recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent country, Bush confronted continued violence in former Yugoslavia as the Croatian, Muslim, and Serb

¹⁶⁶ Ed Vulliamy, *Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) 3-25.

ethnic groups fought for control of territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the Bosnian War the Serbs carried out ethnic cleansing to remove non-Serbs from areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina to create Greater Serbia. As the Bush administration prepared to respond, the CIA released a NIE report analyzing the situation and the methods available to respond and contain the violence. The analysts wrote, “nothing short of large-scale, outside military intervention—which no European country is now prepared to undertake—can end the fighting in Yugoslavia.”¹⁶⁷ The report continued that a UN peacekeeping mission would not resolve the conflicting territorial claims and growing animosities among Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and Albanians. Also, the greatest obstacle to peace was Serb-inspired fighting in Bosnia to create Greater Serbia. The CIA argued that the only way to the international community could prevent the violence from destabilizing the rest of Europe was by using all available sanctions and rewards to exploit internal problems in Serbia that would force Serb leaders to participate in settlement negotiations.¹⁶⁸

As the CSCE focused its attention on resolving the conflict in Bosnia, Bush applied his Yugoslav strategies towards Bosnia. This included not deploying US forces to enforce peace in Bosnia. Bush also remained committed to supporting European policy decisions towards Yugoslavia and using international cooperation to end the fighting there. However, the administration did support sanctions to pressure the parties to mediate a solution to the civil war. As the United States and international committed

¹⁶⁷ NIE 29 15-92 "A Broadening Balkan Crisis: Can It Be Managed? April 23, 1992, *CIA Library Reading Room* <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1992-04-01.pdf>

¹⁶⁸ NIE 29 15-92

worked to establish sanctions against the parties in Bosnia, they agreed that humanitarian aid was needed in Bosnia.¹⁶⁹

In June 1992, the UN passed resolution 757,¹⁷⁰ which encouraged UN members to ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies to those displaced by the Bosnian conflict.

In support of UN resolution 757, Bush analysts studied humanitarian needs in Bosnia-Herzegovina to establish US humanitarian policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The analysis explained that humanitarian aid was critically needed in Bosnia since the UNHCR and ICRC had stopped delivering aid to Bosnia because of guerrilla fighters and refused armed escorts to deliver humanitarian aid. They also noted that without UNHCR and ICRC humanitarian supplies, Croatia was the only country delivering help to Sarajevo. The analysis also described that the UN's inability to broker a cease-fire had hindered efforts to set up the Sarajevo airport to deliver aid.¹⁷¹ As the administration decided how to deliver the much-needed aid to Bosnia, it also discussed ways to cooperate with allies to ensure that humanitarian supplies reached Bosnia with as little interference as possible. To accomplish this the NSC/DC developed a diplomatic strategy

¹⁶⁹ Memorandum "Summary of Conclusions of Deputies' Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia," folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings File OAID 90022-019 "NSC/DC 357 June 04 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia, National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

¹⁷⁰ UNSC Resolution 757 imposed stiff sanctions against Belgrade for its aggression in Bosnia, called for a trade embargo on Serbia and Montenegro, and "Demands that all parties and others concerned create immediately the necessary conditions for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the establishment a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport." United Nations Security Council Resolution 757 S/RES/757 [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/757\(1992\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/757(1992))

¹⁷¹ Memorandum "Humanitarian Aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina June 2, 1992" folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings File OAID 90022-019 "NSC/DC 357 June 04 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia, National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

to get consensus from European leaders to support US efforts and use their influence in former Yugoslavia to prevent any hindrances to US humanitarian deliveries.

The NSC/DC suggested getting Russia and European allies to deliver *démarches* to Belgrade that expressed US intentions to provide aid to Bosnia, and that the United States expected Serbia to unblock the Sarajevo airport, withdraw their forces from the area, and respect the UN-brokered agreement that had opened the airport. The NSC/DC argued that rather than making a simple decision for or against US participation in delivery efforts, that the administration needed to determine which circumstances warranted the US involvement.¹⁷² It explained that the advantages of providing humanitarian aid demonstrated American concern for Bosnian, supported Bosnia's president, increased Serb opposition against Milošević, tempered Milošević's aspirations, pressured Croatia to stay out of Bosnia, and a US commitment increased the operations probability of success. However, the disadvantages were that the situation in Bosnia could worsen and endanger the lives of American soldiers, aid could remain undistributed at the airport, the EC could become reluctant to follow through leaving the United States to carry the greatest share of the burden, guerrilla attacks on aid deliveries could resume, and there would be calls to expand humanitarian deliveries beyond Sarajevo.¹⁷³

This analysis of US humanitarian policies revealed that the Bush administration did not want the United States to be provide humanitarian relief for Bosnia if the

¹⁷² Memorandum "Humanitarian Aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina June 2, 1992" folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings File OAID 90022-019 "NSC/DC 357 June 04 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia, National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

¹⁷³ Memorandum "Humanitarian Aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina June 2, 1992" folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings File OAID 90022-019 "NSC/DC 357 June 04 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia, National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

Europeans were not willing to participate. To prevent the United States from bearing the burden of the relief efforts unilaterally or becoming caught in a quagmire in Bosnia. Especially when CIA, NIE, and NSC memos demonstrated there was little resolve among the Europeans to assertively end the conflict or start a peacekeeping operation. The CIA report reaffirmed the costs to end the violence in Bosnia, and the lack of willingness among European states to undertake the necessary actions to end the violence. Recognizing that no country was willing to deploy their military to stop the violence in Bosnia and that a UN peacekeeping mission would not resolve the issues causing the violence, the NIE recommended international sanctions against Serbia. While the international community recognized the violence occurring in Bosnia there was little drive to introduce forceful policies that would pressure all sides to mediate a solution to the conflict. Bush's decision to consider supporting humanitarian relief while encouraging NATO and UN to resume theirs revealed that the United States, like Europe, was hesitant to forcefully intervene in the Bosnian intra-state conflict.

Balkan Task Force Established

During a meeting on 4 June to discuss the memorandum on humanitarian aid to Bosnian, the NSC/DC concluded that the situation in Bosnia had deteriorated further and there were no signs that the violence would abate soon. International efforts to help Sarajevo had also stalled as the UN was unable to deliver humanitarian aid to Sarajevo or open the Sarajevo airport. However, the states were enforcing the sanctions. In an attempt to better develop policies to respond to Bosnia Bush agreed to establish a group dedicated to examining the situation in Bosnia and to propose solutions that could successfully

deliver aid to Bosnia.¹⁷⁴ Shortly after this meeting, the Bush administration established the Balkan Task Force, and its first report described the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia.

The BTF was created on 12 June 1992 and headed by Jim Carson, CIA Chief of Security Issues Division, and made up of analysts from the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other agencies as needed. The BTF's objective was to ensure the efficient use of American resources and US intelligence analysis by centralizing and coordinating the development and implementation for America's response to Bosnia. It also centralized and coordinated sanctions monitoring according to UNSC resolution 757, coordinated general and tactical military intelligence analysis, and drafted contingency plans to support the delivery of aid to Bosnia.¹⁷⁵ Bush established the BTF's original mission to focus solely on America's humanitarian policies towards Bosnia. Since Bush was not prepared to expand US support any further, the BTF's objectives remained narrow in focus. Bush's formation of the BTF reveals that US policies towards the Bosnian conflict needed more resources to analyze the situation and readily recommend policy changes. The BTF was not tasked with developing recommendations for policies toward ending the conflict in Bosnia or international cooperation. However, the BTF did provide situation reports on the effects the Bosnian conflict was having on the rest of Europe.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ Memorandum, "Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia June 4, 1992," folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings File OAID 90022-019, "NSC/DC 357 June 04 1992 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia, National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

¹⁷⁵ Memorandum "Establishing The Interagency Balkan Task Force, June 12, 1992" *CIA Library Reading Room*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1992-06-12.pdf>

¹⁷⁶ Memorandum "Establishing The Interagency Balkan Task Force, June 12, 1992" *CIA Library Reading Room*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1992-06-12.pdf>

In an August intelligence memorandum, the BTF reported that the violence in Bosnia had created a “terror campaign that threatened to destroy civil society and inflict famine and disease on a large population.”¹⁷⁷ The report noted that the Serb policy of ethnic cleansing had created a severe refugee problem with over 1.3 million Bosnians displaced internally, 500,000 refugees had fled to Croatia, and 9,000 killed in the fighting. It continued that in response to continued fighting and increased domestic and international pressures the Western European governments would have to revise their refugee policies.

It also described the destruction of residential areas, government buildings, major thoroughfares into the cities were blocked, and most of Bosnia’s airports. Additionally, municipal services including electricity, water, and sewage treatment were erratic and scarce in urban areas, and rural fighting was pushing refugees into urban areas exacerbating the conditions there.¹⁷⁸ The BTF agreed that the humanitarian situation would worsen during the winter of 1992-1993 and that, “the current conflict and atrocities are a result of residual resentment over acts committed by all sides during the Second World War.”¹⁷⁹ The BTF report continued to blame the violence on “ancient hatreds,” while describing the humanitarian disaster. Bush decided to continue US cooperation with Europe to provide humanitarian relief to the Bosnians. He also

¹⁷⁷ BTF Memorandum, “The Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia: Problems and Outlook,” August 19, 1998, *CIA Reading Room* <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1992-08-19.pdf>

¹⁷⁸ BTF Memorandum, “The Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia: Problems and Outlook,” August 19, 1998, *CIA Reading Room* <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1992-08-19.pdf>. 1-6

¹⁷⁹ BTF Memorandum, “The Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia: Problems and Outlook,” 13.

continued to resist deploying US military forces even as the Europeans began planning to deploy their forces to Bosnia.¹⁸⁰

Bush's strategy towards Bosnia was primarily focused on devising ways for the United States to support humanitarian relief efforts for the civilians displaced and suffering from the Bosnian War. His strategy was also devised to prevent the United States from deploying its military forces to try and end a political conflict that required diplomatic resolution efforts not an outside enforced peace. Bush also focused on allowing the Europeans to resolve its own security concerns, so that Europe could establish post-Cold War cooperation frameworks. However, Bush remained dedicated to America's core foreign policy themes and principles of deterring international aggression, supporting international efforts to resolve crises, and defending US interests around the world.

Clinton and the Bosnian War

In November, the Bush had lost his re-election bid for the American presidency to Bill Clinton. When he assumed the presidency, Clinton initially continued Bush's focus on humanitarian relief for Bosnia. At the same time, the Clinton administration started to draft its national security strategy for the United States. First Clinton's administration

¹⁸⁰ Memorandum, "Issues Paper" folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings File OAID 90023-015, "NSC/DC 371A August 21, 1992 – Small Group Meeting on Bosnian-Herzegovina, Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina, National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

needed to “decide what it wants to achieve and what price it is prepared to pay to get it.”¹⁸¹

In his 1994 NSS, Clinton outlined that European stability was vital to US security. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States had an unparalleled opportunity to contribute to a free and undivided Europe. Part of this strategy required the United States to work to end the Bosnia War, and to prevent the war from enveloping Europe and its new democratic countries. To do this the United States needed to stem the flow of refugees, stop civilian deaths, and confirm NATO’s centrality to post-Cold War European security. Clinton also acknowledged the violence in Bosnia demonstrated that military forces remained relevant, and that the United States faced difficult decisions about the use of its military power to respond to post-Cold War intranational and international conflicts.¹⁸²

Clinton’s first steps upon taking office was to recognize the threat the Bosnian War posed to US interests in Europe. He also reaffirmed NATO’s role in European security, and America’s role as a NATO member in European security. Clinton’s security strategy also recognized that the United States needed to create a strategy to determine when military interventions were feasible options for intranational conflicts. Clinton’s national security strategy also demonstrated reluctance to deploy US forces as part of a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, though US interventions in other intranational conflicts

¹⁸¹ “1993-01-22, Presidential Review Directive 1 re U.S. Policy Regarding the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia,” Clinton Digital Library, accessed November 6, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12299>, 1.

¹⁸² William Clinton, *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* 1994, (Washington, D.C.: Government Publishing Office, 1994) 21.

were possible. The national security strategy also revealed that Clinton was not willing to usurp the EC and NATO but desired greater cooperation with those institutions. Clinton first national security strategy went further than Bush's strategy in recognizing the future threats that intranational conflicts posed to US interests. However, like Bush, Clinton also lacked a clear strategy for preventing and responding to those conflicts. As he continued to comprehend and respond to the Bosnian War

In his first Presidential Review Directive,¹⁸³ Clinton outlined a new policy focus based on campaign promises to do more in Bosnia. This included relying on intelligence documents inherited from the Bush administration. While Clinton's first policy decision was to continue delivering humanitarian aid to Bosnia, he also directed Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey, and Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell to consider the policy options available for Clinton to consider beyond enforcing the no-fly zone in Bosnia.¹⁸⁴ Through his directive, Clinton provided his advisors and their staffs with the initial direction he wanted his Bosnian policies to go. He also established that for the Bosnian War, the United States would continue to take a support role in international efforts to end the conflict.

¹⁸³ The Presidential Review Directive (PRD) series is the mechanism used by the Clinton Administration to direct that specific reviews and analyses be undertaken by the departments and agencies. The Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) series is used to promulgate Presidential decisions on national security matters.

¹⁸⁴ National Security Council and National Security Council Records Management Office, "PRD-1 - U.S. Policy Regarding the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed November 12, 2015, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/44141>.

Clinton requested his advisors consider methods to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, end Serbian aggression, reverse Serbian territorial gains, punish Serbia for its actions, provide additional support to the Vance-Owen negotiations, reaffirm and better explain Bush's Christmas demarcate¹⁸⁵ and how the administration planned to implement it. Clinton sought ideas on how to pursue concerted action with European allies and the world community to place economic and military pressure on Serbian leaders to end the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia and participate in negotiations. He also asked for clarification on ways the administration could tighten sanctions against Serbia, deny Serb military forces access to land and water transportation routes, increase international efforts to establish a war crimes tribunal, encourage Milošević's opposition in Serbia, and other options that did not involve a US military intervention and the costs of each strategy. Lastly, Clinton asked his advisors to consider all possible actions except military force such as alternatives to air dropping humanitarian supplies, the best options to provide defensive military supplies to the Bosnians, and actions the U.S. could take to help implement the Vance-Owen plan if it was accepted.¹⁸⁶

Clinton's policy directive revealed that he wanted to implement more assertive policies in Bosnia. However, he wanted to continue humanitarian relief and wanted to

¹⁸⁵ On December 25, 1992, Bush sent Slobodan Milošević a letter warning him that the United States would deploy its military forces against Serb military forces in Kosovo and Serbia if the Serbs provoked additional fighting in Kosovo. Bush also warned Milošević the United States was willing to use military forces to defend UN peacekeepers if the UN decided to increase enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia. Art Pines, "Bush Warns Serbia Against Escalation: Balkans: Administration hints at U.S. intervention if ethnic fighting spreads to the province of Kosovo," *LA Times*, December 29, 1992, http://articles.latimes.com/1992-12-29/news/mn-2755_1_bush-administration.

¹⁸⁶ PRD-1

avoid deploying American forces to end the conflict. While Clinton wanted to be able to fulfil Bush's warning to Milošević, Clinton remained hesitant to deploy US forces to intervene. Clinton's advice request revealed that he was initially focused on diplomatic and non-military options to force the Serbs to participate in the Vance-Owen process, and that he wanted to end Serbian support for Bosnian Serb actions. Clinton's request also revealed that he wanted to maintain US support and cooperation with the international community to end the Bosnian conflict. However, Clinton did not ask for any recommendations on increasing American leadership in efforts to end the Bosnian War.

Additionally, these initial steps demonstrated that the Clinton wanted to implement more aggressive policies to end the Bosnian war, but with little deviation from Bush's policies. Instead, the administration wanted more aggressive policies versions of Bush's policies. As the administration continued to respond to the violence in Bosnia and negotiation efforts stalled or failed, the administration was forced to reconsider initial policies and the best ways to achieve them.

Clinton Keeps the Balkan Task Force

Another holdover from Bush's presidency was the BTF. Clinton decided to continue the BTF, and expanded its mission beyond recommending humanitarian policies to include working with the NSC to guide discussions and policy strategy options. This decision allowed Clinton to take advantage of a resource dedicated and experienced with studying the Bosnian War to provide additional policy recommendation. At the end of March, the BTF issued a paper on Serbian war goals, it noted:

“The central Serb goals in Bosnia have been and remain the destruction of Bosnia as a viable independent state and the incorporation of Serb-claimed regions into a greater Serbia. The current Bosnian Serb offensive in eastern Bosnia should be

seen in this context; it appears aimed at eliminating the few remaining Muslim enclaves in the region. Barring the introduction of an external force strong enough to compel them to desist, the Serbs are unlikely to stop until they have achieved that goal.”¹⁸⁷

It continued that the Vance-Owen Plan encouraged the Serbs to accelerate their efforts to force the international community to recognize Serb territorial gains before a settlement was reached. The BTF noted the Serbs continued to resist the Vance-Owen Plan because the map only recognized Serb territorial gains in the Bosnia's Drina River Valley. The BTF concluded that the Vance-Owen Plan had not encouraged the Serbs to stop their actions, because the Serbs knew continued violence in Bosnia would prevent the international community from implementing the Vance-Owen Plan or any other peace agreement. This encouraged the Serbs to eliminate the few remaining eastern Bosnian Muslim enclaves the Serbs to gain military and demographic control of the region.¹⁸⁸

The task force contended that the siege of Sarajevo had little military value to the Serbs, especially since the Serbs lacked the personnel to engage in house-to-house fighting necessary to claim the city. Instead, the siege of Sarajevo was a Serb plan designed to destroy Sarajevo as a symbol of a multi-ethnic Bosnia. The siege was also designed to pressure Izetbegovic to leave the talks, so the Serbs were not the only party opposed to the Vance-Owen Plan.¹⁸⁹ The BTF memorandum concluded that Serb “actions reflect political reality; there is little doubt that Serb ‘agreement’ to a version of the Vance-Owen Plan will not imply compliance with the letter or spirit of an accord. The

¹⁸⁷ “1993-03-23B, BTF Memorandum re Serb War Aims,” Clinton Digital Library, accessed November 6, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12318>. 1

¹⁸⁸ “1993-03-23B, BTF Memorandum re Serb War Aims,” 1

¹⁸⁹ “1993-03-23B, BTF Memorandum re Serb War Aims,” 2.

Serbs are not likely to withdraw from any territory they occupy barring the arrival of an international force able and willing to compel them to do so.”¹⁹⁰ As the BTF reported the Serbs were the main culprit for the continued violence in Bosnia. The BTF report showed that the Serbs were taking advantage of the international community’s reluctance to militarily intervene to annex Bosnian territory and drive out non-Serbs from those areas. It also revealed the difficulties Clinton and his administration faced ending the Bosnian War, if the international community was reluctant to respond forcefully enough to pressure the parties to negotiate a settlement. However, Clinton established in PRD-1 that he too was reluctant to deploy American military power to Bosnia to end the conflict.

The BTF analysts contend that if the international community successfully undertook the mission then the Serbs would grudgingly comply while encouraging guerrilla attacks. The BTF argued, though difficult, the administration could implement policies that pressured the Serbs to alter their policies. It suggested lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia to encourage Serb cooperation. However, the BTF noted that the United States would have difficulty persuading the UN, Russia, and EC to support the policy change because they would argue lifting the embargo endangered UN troops and humanitarian operations. The BTF’s alternative policy suggestion was to tighten sanctions against Serbia further, which would increase pressure against Milošević. However, this policy would radicalize Serbian public opinion and increase the influence

¹⁹⁰ “1993-03-23B, BTF Memorandum re Serb War Aims,” 2.

of ultra-nationalists, which would require the United States to increase aid to Macedonia, Romania, and Bulgaria to gain their cooperation.¹⁹¹

The BTF's policy recommendations revealed another issue Clinton faced in his efforts to encourage the international community to pressure the parties to negotiation: the lack of consensus among the international community on policies to end the Bosnian War. The BTF report revealed that while the United States supported lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia, other members of the community opposed it fearing danger to their troops and the humanitarian mission. Like the international community's reluctance to deploying military forces to Bosnia to forcibly end the war, the opposition to this policy demonstrated the international community's limits on intervening in intra-state conflicts beyond supporting negotiations. This opposition to ending the arms embargo against Bosnia was one policy that repeatedly stymied Clinton and his administration's efforts at international cooperation to end the Bosnian conflict. As Clinton increased the assertiveness of his policies and introduced American leadership to the peace process, international opposition to more forceful policies gradually decreased.

NSC Meetings 1993-1995

From 1993 to 1995 Clinton used various responses to end the Bosnia conflict and slowly abandoned Bush's policies towards Bosnia. During the first two NSC/PC meetings, the Clinton administration discussed Bush's strategy and ways to use the BTF

¹⁹¹ "1993-03-23B, BTF Memorandum re Serb War Aims," 2-3

under NSC Director for Europe Jenonne Walker's leadership¹⁹² The NSC/PC also established three categories of actions to pressure the Serbs to end their campaign. The first category focused on humanitarian policies including air drops and closing Serb detention camps. The second dealt with sanctions and public diplomacy in Serbia. The third category explored policies that included American military power, including air power, and ending force restrictions on UNPROFOR.¹⁹³ Early in 1993, Clinton and his advisors had a strategy foundation for Bosnian policies. Clinton initially decided to continue several of Bush's policies towards Bosnia. This included the BTF, Bush's warning to Milošević against spreading violence to Kosovo, limiting American military involvement to end the fighting, and cooperating with the UN and EU. At the same time, Clinton altered these policies to fit his strategy.

The NSC/PC agreed early on that the United States was willing to use force to implement an agreement. As part of this, the committee had the military draw up a possible military intervention in Bosnia. The intervention included targeting Serbian military, industrial, and government sites, and required American access to allies' airbases, and deploying US Naval forces to the Balkans. The military noted that the intervention would lead to high civilian casualties and increase refugee flows out of the Balkans, European allies would oppose a military intervention, and it would alienate

¹⁹² The NSC/PC discussed Bush's humanitarian aid policies and strategy to delivering humanitarian aid by air power if needed, continued support for UN/EC mediations, limiting US support for the Vance-Owen plan, refusing to recognize Serb territorial gains, condemning war crimes, enforcing the Bosnian no-fly zone, and ending the arms embargo against the Bosnians.

¹⁹³ "1993-01-29 BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia January 28, 1993," *Clinton Digital Library* accessed November 20, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12303>, 1-2

Russia.¹⁹⁴ The NSC/PC also discussed European opposition to ending the arms embargo against Bosnia and US support for Bosnian Muslims. The committee discussed European threats to abandon the peace process if the United States insisted on ending the embargo forcing which would force the United States negotiate unilaterally with the three groups. They noted that this situation isolated the United States from its allies and limited US options.¹⁹⁵

The administration's discussion on cooperation with the EU and UN revealed that while the United States had accepted and was reluctantly willing to militarily intervene in Bosnia to end the war or end the arms embargo against Bosnia, America's allies were not ready to make that step. Instead, EU and UN remained dedicated to negotiating an end to the conflict, and remained determined to avoid military entanglements in Bosnia before a peace agreement was reached. At the same time, while the EU and UN had confidence the Vance-Owen negotiations would succeed, Clinton and his administration were less confident and believed the Vance-Owen Plan was not aggressive enough. The differences in strategy preferences between the United States and the international community were not lost to Clinton and his advisors. However, Clinton's commitment to an international approach to end the war, required him to make compromises with the international community to bring peace to Bosnia.

¹⁹⁴ "1993-01-29 BTF Memorandum re: Principals Committee Meeting on Former Yugoslavia, January 28, 1993," *Clinton Digital Library* accessed November 20, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12303>, 3.

¹⁹⁵ 1993-02-04, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia February 3, 1993," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed November 6, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12306>, 1.

To compromise American policies with the international community, Clinton's advisors debated US diplomatic strategy beginning with four broad approaches:

1. Replacing the Vance-Owen Plan with a more aggressive US approach,
2. changing the Vance-Owen map for one more morally acceptable and enforcing it,
3. ending US participation in EU-led negotiations while maintaining pressure on all parties to accept the agreement,
4. focus US efforts on providing humanitarian aid to Bosnia and ending all US political and diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.¹⁹⁶

The NSC/PC immediately eliminated the first and last options as placing too restrictive on US strategy. The continued diplomatic discussions based on the third and second option.¹⁹⁷ As policy disagreements with EU limited Clinton's strategy choices, Clinton's advisors set aside military options and focused on humanitarian and diplomatic strategies that worked "in parallel with the Allies and Russia rather than in concert" that included a two-track strategy—humanitarian aid and acquiescing to Vance-Owen negotiations.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ 1993-02-04, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia February 3, 1993," Clinton Digital Library, accessed November 6, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12306>, 1.

¹⁹⁷ 1993-02-04, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia February 3, 1993," Clinton Digital Library, accessed November 6, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12306>

¹⁹⁸ 1993-02-04, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Yugoslavia February 3, 1993," Clinton Digital Library, accessed November 6, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12306>, 2.

While Clinton was unwilling to break with international efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia, the divergences between American policy goals and the international community's goals hindered efforts to end the intranational conflict.

Clinton's Policies Towards the Vance-Owen Plan

Since 1991 Lord David Owen, EU Envoy to the UN Secretary-General had worked to create a negotiated settlement that would end the fighting in Bosnia. In the first half of 1993 the Vance-Owen Plan was the international community's best chance to end the Bosnian War. In 1993, Cyrus Vance, Special Envoy to UN Secretary-General joined Lord Owen and together the men created the Vance-Owen Plan. The Vance-Owen Plan created a Bosnian constitution, military solution, and established Bosnian territorial boundaries and ethnic provinces based on ethnic population. The Vance-Owen Plan relied on the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia's provisional constitution, plan to demilitarize Bosnia, and a map that divided Bosnian into ten provinces with proportional representation in the government. The map also rejected most of the Serbs territorial gains outside of the Drina River Valley.¹⁹⁹

The Vance-Owen map would cause the Serbs and Muslims to reject the plan initially while the Croats accepted it. The Serbs rejected the plan because it voided their territorial gains in Bosnia, and the Bosnian Muslims rejected the map because it recognized Serbian territorial gains through ethnic cleansing.²⁰⁰ The Vance-Owen Plan

¹⁹⁹ "Report of Secretary-General on the Activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia" folder Working Group on Bosnian Herzegovina 21 October 1992 – 11 December 1993, ICFY E-1835-1-2011/0195

²⁰⁰ Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, New York: Penguin Books, 1997, 276-279.

compromised the international committee's commitment to reject territorial acquisitions made through aggression or genocide. This compromise was the main problem Clinton and his administration had with the Vance-Owen Plan, and why they wanted to push for a "more morally acceptable" map.²⁰¹ While the Clinton administration worked to support a Vance-Owen settlement, the administration discussed their disapproval of the Vance-Owen Plan. The discussed their moral apprehension to recognizing any of the Serb's territorial gains from ethnic cleansing. Another issue was the large number of troops required to implement the plan.²⁰² While the Clinton administration disliked the Vance-Owen Plan, they were unwilling to reject it because they were not ready to lead mediation efforts.²⁰³ Despite Clinton and his advisors' antipathy to the Vance-Owen Plan, their commitment to an international effort to end the Bosnian conflict and reluctance to take over leadership of the settlement overruled their opposition. Even as the Clinton administration hoped the Vance-Owen Plan would succeed the administration drafted contingency policies and continued to work on providing humanitarian aid to Bosnia.

Following its initial meetings, the NSC/PC and NSC/DC continued to meet as the Vance-Owen negotiations progressed, and the international community held high hopes the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims would accept the Vance-Owen Plan. By April the Muslims and Croats had signed the Vance-Owen Plan. In preparation for an agreement,

²⁰¹ BTF Memorandums on NSC/PC Meetings on January 28, 1993, February 3, 1993, and February 5, 1993. *Clinton Digital Library*.

²⁰² In numerous intelligence reports including NIE 29 15-92 "A Broadening Balkan Crisis" and NIE 93-22 "Prospects for Bosnia" CIA analysts warned that a large-scale open-ended military deployment was required to enforce a settlement in the Balkans.

²⁰³ "1993-02-05, Minutes of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 5, 1993," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 14, 2015, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12307>.

Clinton's advisors began debating the roles the United States would take to implement the Vance-Owen Plan.²⁰⁴ As the deadline approached to accept the Vance-Owen Plan, Milošević continued to hold off on the agreement. In April, Lord Owen met with Milošević and other Serbian leaders and personally presented the plan. After this meeting Milošević signed the Vance-Owen Plan, and sent it to the Serbian parliament for final approval. Milošević accepted the plan to reduce international pressure and economic sanctions against Serbia, and because he believed the international community would not provide the military force necessary to enforce the Vance-Owen Plan.²⁰⁵

As the Clinton administration waited for Serbian parliament to agree, the NSC/PC drafted requirements for US military support for the settlement. The NSC/PC required the parties to abide by the settlement and their fighting. However, if the parties ignored the settlement and fighting continued, US forces were prevented from deploying to Bosnia.²⁰⁶ Even as the NSC/PC confirmed US willingness to help implement and enforce the agreement, it also worked to protect US military forces entering an unresolved conflict where American soldiers would get caught between opposing sides. Along with the safeguards, the NSC/PC requested the CIA establish a method the administration could use determine which party was responsibility for refusing to comply with the

²⁰⁴ Summaries of Deputies Committee Meetings on Bosnia March 4-9, 1993 in National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 20, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614>.

²⁰⁵ Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*, 276-279.

²⁰⁶ Memorandum "Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting On Bosnia, March 13, 1993" in National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 20, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614>.

Vance-Owen settlement.²⁰⁷ As it appeared possible the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats were reaching an agreement, the administration determined that the United States would participate in multinational efforts to implement and enforce a settlement. Even as Clinton broke with Bush's strategy, he still followed the EC's lead though he increasingly pressured the EC to act more assertively.

Between March and May, the administration concentrated on collaborating with the UN and NATO to implement the Vance-Owen Plan and discussions in the UNSC to develop concerted responses in case Serbia refused to sign the agreement. There was a general consensus in the UN that the UN should enact harsher sanctions against Serbia if it refused the settlement.²⁰⁸ As the mediation efforts continued into April, the Serbs were the only party that had not signed the agreement. Despite Milošević's arguments for signing the agreement, the Serbian Parliament disagreed and refused to ratify the plan.²⁰⁹

The Vance-Owen Plan's failure forced the Clinton administration to re-evaluate its strategy. The administration decided to continue encouraging EC efforts to create a new peace settlement. The administration also continued to review the possibility of deploying US forces, and disagreed about sending US airpower to support NATO safe havens or defending UNPROFOR. The NSC/PC decided to send Secretary Christopher to

²⁰⁷ Memorandum, "Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, March 25, 1993," in National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 20, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614>.

²⁰⁸ "Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Teleconference on Bosnia, March 4, 1993, 1-2 in National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 20, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614>.

²⁰⁹ Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*, 279.

discuss strategy options with European foreign ministers, and the committee discussed contingency plans in case the Europeans rejected any of the proposals. These contingencies included taking unilateral actions, abandoning the negotiations completely, adopting the European approach to military force, try to contain the fighting to Bosnia, start punitive airstrikes against Serbia to force Serbia to accept an agreement, support the UN cease-fire, or to make no changes. These debates were not significantly different from the discussions the administration had in January, except that the administration added the use of force to the options list.²¹⁰

After the defeat of the Vance-Owen Plan, the international community continued its efforts to get the Bosnian parties to agree to a settlement. The United States continued to push for ending the arms embargo on Bosnia and preventing the fighting from spreading beyond Bosnia. In September, another agreement was attempted by the British on HMS *Invincible*, but it failed as the Bosnian Muslims continued to oppose any map that recognized Serb territorial gains and the Serbs rejected any settlement that did not. In response, the Clinton administration began working to establish cooperation between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats to limit fighting in Bosnia.²¹¹

The Clinton administration's policy discussions following the rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan demonstrated that the plan's failure had reinvested the administration into the possibility of deploying American forces to Bosnia. At the same time, the

²¹⁰ "Summary of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 6, 1993," in National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 20, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614>.

²¹¹ Summary of Principals Committee Meetings May 17, 1993 to October 2, 1993 in National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 20, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614>.

administration did not deviate far from its policy discussion at the start of Clinton's presidency. The administration remained dedicated to an international effort to end the Bosnian War, and to avoid acting unilaterally.

1994

In February 1994, Secretary of State Christopher, NSA Anthony Lake, and Vice President Al Gore met with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and the Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic. This meeting began a US-led effort to create cooperation between Bosnian and Croat governments. On 1 March the Muslims and Croats finalized the Washington Agreement.²¹² The Washington Agreement established a cooperative framework for a confederation agreement between the Bosnian government and Bosnian Croats. On 18 March, Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic and the Bosnian Croat Leader Zubak signed a constitution that created a confederation for those Bosnian areas with Croat and Muslim majorities.²¹³ The Washington Agreement, stopped the fighting between the Muslims and Croats making it possible for the Muslims to receive weapons through Croatia.²¹⁴ The Clinton administration's efforts to create the agreement between the Bosnian government and its Croat population demonstrated it was possible to reduce the fighting the Bosnian conflict. The Clinton administration's ability to influence an intranational conflict like Bosnian revealed that international pressure was viable.

²¹² "Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 18, 1994," in

²¹³ "Washington Agreement" March 1, 1994, *United States Institute of Peace, Peace Agreements Digital Collections*
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/washagree_03011994.pdf

²¹⁴ Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*, 321-323.

In April, the Serbs launched an attack on the city of Gorazde, which the UN had designated as a safe haven. Clinton administration responded by urging the UN to tighten sanctions against Serbia, increased US forces in UNPROFOR Macedonia and provided more equipment to UNPROFOR.²¹⁵ It also discussed how the international community was enforcing the heavy weapons exclusion zones in Bosnia and how to make those zones more effective.²¹⁶ On 23 April, the administration discussed the possibility of NATO airstrikes against Serb artillery in retaliation for Gorazde. They also decided to send Christopher and Albright to discuss America's "unhappiness" about the UN's refusal to authorize NATO airstrikes against the Serbs with Secretary General Boutros-Ghali.²¹⁷ The NSC/PC also discussed plans for possible NATO airstrikes on 24 April if the Serbs refused to abide by the ceasefire and remove their weapons from Gorazde.²¹⁸ The Washington agreement and the attack in Gorazde established a turning point for Clinton's Bosnia policies. Following these two events the Clinton administration

²¹⁵ "Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 1, 1994," in National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 20, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614>.

²¹⁶ "Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 18, 1994," in National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 20, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614>.

²¹⁷ "Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 23, 1994, 1:30pm-2:30pm," in National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 20, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614>.

²¹⁸ "Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 23, 1994, 5:00pm-5:30pm" in National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 20, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614>.

"1994-04-23, Minutes of the Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, April 23, 1994," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 14, 2015. <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12351>.

gradually adopted a more aggressive diplomatic strategy to end Bosnia's war. While Clinton would slowly introduce more assertive policies, policies of humanitarian aid, participating in international peace efforts remained core components of Clinton's policy. These core policies, especially cooperation with the international community would provide the main hindrances to Clinton's more assertive policies.

As 1994 continued, the US reaffirmed its policy to only participate in peacekeeping measures under NATO auspices and continued to support negotiation efforts. Yet the makeup of the international negotiation team was changed as the US and Russian envoys, and representatives from UN, EU, and ICFY created the Contact Group, to handle negotiations following settlement failures in 1993.²¹⁹ The Contact Group began drafting a new settlement in April. The first change the Contact Group made was to the division of Bosnia. The first settlement divided gave the Bosnians 34 percent, the Croats 17 percent, and Bosnian Serbs 49 percent of Bosnian territory. This map also recognized the settlement reached in the Washington Agreement and recognized the Muslim and Croatian territories as a confederation.²²⁰ In concert with the Contact Groups strategy, the Clinton administration tried to encourage Bosnia to accept the Contact Group's Proposal for a 51/49 territory division with Serbia, and reiterated the US's commitment to supporting a viable settlement that ended the conflict. They also decided if the Serbs remained the only holdout to the Contact Group proposal then the US would tighten

²¹⁹ "Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 20, 1994," in National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 20, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614>.

²²⁰ James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 260-264

sanctions against Serbia.²²¹ When the Serbs rejected the Contact Group plan in July the United States to push for increased sanctions against Serbia in the UN. The irony of the Contact Group's division of Bosnia was that it accepted some Serbian territorial gains even though the Clinton administration had disagreed with the Vance-Owen Plan for the same reason. However, following the failure of the Vance-Owen Plan and several other efforts, the destruction of Bosnia, and the population changes forcibly created by Serbian ethnic cleansing, the international community had little power to overturn the ethnic changes in Bosnia. Nonetheless, the Clinton administration remained determined to pressure the Serbs to accept a settlement that stopped the fighting.

During the summer, Secretary Christopher attempted to convince the Contact Group to implement more robust options to punish the Serbs for refusing the settlement. The administration recognized that it was becoming frustrating trying to convince the other Contact Group members they needed to implement more forceful actions against Serbia.²²² Along with the Contact Group, the Clinton administration faced resistance in the UN to strictly enforce the existing zones of exclusions, end the arms embargo against Bosnia, and to a proposed Omnibus Sanctions resolution that included options to loosen or tighten sanctions against Serbia based on Serb actions in Bosnia.²²³ Despite these

²²¹ "1994-06-06, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia May 31, 1994," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 14, 2015, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12357>.

²²² 1994-07-26D, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting no Bosnia July 27, 1994," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 14, 2015, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12362>.

²²³ 1994-08-12A, BTF Memorandum re Principals Committee Meeting on the Balkans August 10, 1994," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 14, 2015, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12364>.

challenges, the administration continued to push for more forceful policies against the Serbs.

Throughout 1994 the administration's strategy continued as it had during 1993. However, the Washington Agreement and the attack on Gorazde had encouraged the Clinton administration to implement more aggressive action. Beginning with its role in the Contact Group, the Clinton administration began exercising American leadership and encouraging more assertive policies in the international community. Additionally, after disagreeing with the Vance-Owen Plan for its morally ambiguous map, the Clinton administration increasingly accepted that there were no good options for a Bosnian solution because no morally acceptable settlement would satisfy all parties or the morally acceptable solutions created residual local-level conflicts for the new governments handle.

Policy Re-evaluations After Two Years

In 1995, Clinton reassessed the Bosnian War and its impact on UN security concerns. Clinton argued that while the Bosnian War did not threaten US security or warrant an American unilateral military action, it remained a threat to post-Cold War security that the United States could not ignore. Therefore, Clinton focused US policy towards Bosnia on obtaining a political settlement that preserved Bosnia's territorial integrity, provided all Bosnians a viable future state, prevented the war from spreading into Europe, stopped refugee flows, ended ethnic cleansing, and reinforced NATO's central role in post-Cold War European security.²²⁴

²²⁴ William Clinton, *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1995* (Washington, D.C.: Government Publishing Office, 1995).

When compared to the NSS93, NSS94 only differed with the additions of objectives to achieve a political solution to the conflict and creating a viable Bosnian state. Clinton's decision to continue participating in international efforts to end the Bosnian War, even though the war did not threaten US interests, demonstrated Clinton's commitment to keeping the United States engaged in the world. These changes revealed that after two years of participating in unsuccessful international efforts to end the Bosnian conflict, the Clinton administration was ready to end the conflict, and start a peacekeeping mission. The US faced several hurdles to achieve its goals. It faced divisions within the international community and the Contact Group over the strength of punitive policies, and the best method to convince all three parties to agree to a settlement.

In January, the administration agreed the US had to avoid all appearances of departing from its commitment to the Contact Group despite continued hindrances to negotiations. The administration also decided they needed to deal with the possible end of UNPROFOR in Bosnia at the end of March if the UN did not extend its mandate.²²⁵ In February the administration assessed its policies and noted it had successfully prevented the war from spreading, kept relief supplies available, and maintained cohesion with its allies. However, the administration had been unable to produce a political settlement that all parties accepted, and it had not reversed enough Serb territorial gains to convince the Bosnians and Croats to agree to a settlement. They noted the US lacked leverage with the Bosnian government and Croats and had been unable to effectively use economic

²²⁵ "Summary of Conclusions on Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, January 20, 1995" in

sanctions against Serbia to pressure the parties to accept a settlement. They also noticed that none of the parties had a peacemaker, and that Milošević was unwilling to make the Serbs stop fighting. In a policy review, it stated that:

"If we stay on our present course the prospects are for an escalation of the war in Bosnia and a new war in Croatia, with the potential unraveling of our limited achievements to date and increased pressures for U.S. involvement... If the war escalates, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia, Bosnia or both will become increasingly likely—creating the prospect of U.S. troops on the ground in former Yugoslavia in a hostile environment, the outcome we have most sought to avoid."²²⁶

At this point the administration recognize it had failed to prioritize its policies in any meaningful way, and that it had strategic choices to make based on Clinton's 1995 national security strategy. These options included continuing current policies, adopting a neutral position, and focusing on containing the fighting, arguing for the international community to isolate Greater Serbia and impose UN sanctions, supporting the Bosnians, and applying military force through UNPROFOR or NATO air strikes to pressure the Serbs to accept a settlement.²²⁷

In early 1995, the administration continued to focus on political and democratic measures to create a political settlement in Bosnia. As the year continued the administration realized that diplomatic and political methods were not yielding the results they desired. However, America's limited leverage and the needed to maintain international cooperation the administration could ill afford to end its diplomatic efforts,

²²⁶ "1995-02-27B, NSC Paper re Former Yugoslavia Policy Review", *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed November 16, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12413> 2.

²²⁷ "1995-02-27B, NSC Paper re Former Yugoslavia Policy Review", 3-6.

providing humanitarian relief, and containing the conflict.²²⁸ The administration's numerous policy re-evaluations up to 1995 revealed the administration was unable to find satisfactory solutions to its disagreements with the international community on policy choices. At the same time the administration remained committed to using international pressure to convince the parties to settle the conflict, even though the international community was unable to place sufficient pressure on the parties to accept an agreement.

In February, the Clinton administration attempted a new method to end the war. It did this by attempting to convince Milošević to recognize Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and the other former Yugoslav states.²²⁹ However, Milošević rejected the administration's suggestion because it "would be tantamount to recognition of the Izetbegovic government, a move which would be counterproductive as it would drive the Bosnian Serbs into a war fever."²³⁰ Milošević also replied that the only way to convince the Serbs would be full and immediate sanctions relief.²³¹ The administration floundered through the rest of the summer trying to convince Milošević to accept the recognition plan.

²²⁸ "1995 – 03-17, Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia March 17, 1995," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 15, 2015, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12427>.

²²⁹ Summary of Principals Committee Meetings February 1995, Bosnian Declassified Documents, *Clinton Digital Library* https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?collection=37&sort_field=Dublin+Core%2CDate&sort_dir=a

²³⁰ 1995-04-12, Department of State Cable re Milosevic on Bosnia Recognition," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed February 15, 2016, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12431>.

²³¹ "1995-04-12, Department of State Cable re Milosevic on Bosnia Recognition,"

Dayton Accords

In August, the Clinton administration started plans for a US-led peace settlement. The administration planned to work in conjunction with the Contact Group to negotiate with the Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs to finally achieve a settlement. In Geneva, the Contact Group drafted the principles of an agreement that included recognition of Bosnia and a political settlement to the conflict. The Contact Group also agreed to use NATO Forces to implement the peace plan after it was accepted.²³² As 1995 headed to a close, the Clinton administration prepared to lead negotiations between Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia to settle the conflict and begin restoring peace to the Balkans.

The Clinton administration's efforts at the end of 1995 culminated the gradual changes it had implemented following the Washington Accords and the bombing of Gorazde. Ever committed to international cooperation, the administration introduced American leadership to the Contact Group and upcoming negotiations that was able to leverage international pressure to convince the parties to accept US-led negotiations. Like the Vance-Owen Plan before it, the Clinton administration's attempt to end the conflict would reveal Clinton's ability to participate and lead international efforts to resolve other intranational conflicts.

Throughout November 1995 at Wright-Patterson Airforce Base near Dayton, Ohio, Secretary Christopher, EU Special Representative Clark Bildt and Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov negotiated with Croat, Bosnian, and Serb presidents

²³² 1995-09-05A, Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia September 5, 1995," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed December 15, 2015, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12529>.

to settle the Bosnian conflict. The first days of the conference began with positive steps, and all three presidents attended all the sessions. The Serbs were not emotional and provided constructive feedback to various proposals while the Bosnians pushed for the end to the arms embargo.²³³ The opening days of the Dayton Conference started the negotiations on a positive note. However, this positive beginning did not predict a good outcome for the US-sponsored negotiations, especially when territory remained the biggest hindrance to a settlement.

As the Bosnian parties worked on the map, constitution, elections, and the federation of Bosnia, Milošević tested Contact Group members.²³⁴ On 8 November Kerrick reported that the Serb and Bosnian presidents had agreed to a joint meeting with the US delegation to discuss the Bosnian constitution, election issues, and the map.²³⁵ Beginning 9 November, the US delegation led intensive talks on the constitution, election, and the map.²³⁶ As the conference continued, progress was made on the constitution and federation while map discussions stalled. The Clinton administration resolved the impediment by proposing a map while Secretary Christopher conducted intensive talks with the Bosnians and Serbs about the map. In December, the Bosnian, Croat, and Serb presidents signed The Dayton Accords in Paris after agreeing to a map,

²³³ 1995-11-02 Don Kerrick to Tony Lake re: Dayton SITREP #1 November 2, 1995, 900pm," *Clinton Digital Library* accessed January 8, 2016, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12579>.

²³⁴ 1995-11-04- Don Kerrick to Tony Lake re: Dayton SITREP #2 November 4, 1995, 1020pm," *Clinton Digital Library* accessed January 8, 2016, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/show/12580>.

²³⁵ 1995-11-08 Don Kerrick to Tony Lake re: Dayton SITREP #4 November 8, 1995, 100am," *Clinton Digital Library* <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12582>.

²³⁶ 1995-11-09, Don Kerrick to Tony Lake re: Dayton SITREP #5 November 9, 1995, 200am," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed January 8, 2016, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/show12583>.

constitution, and establishing elections.²³⁷ However, concerns remained about the international community's ability to enforce the agreement and Bosnian Serb reactions since many were unaware of the agreement until the last minute.

The Clinton administration's ability to conduct the peace conference at the end of 1995 was due to a determined effort to pursue an aggressive diplomatic effort. The administration faced considerable challenges encouraging the allies to support aggressive policies and early humanitarian strategy inherited from the Bush administration. While Bush had encouraged EC to lead efforts to resolve the Bosnian War, Clinton and his administration attempted a strategy with greater US participation. Nonetheless, both administrations had focused on limiting US military involvement in Bosnia. Both administrations recognized that any military intervention to enforce a Bosnian peace settlement would be large-scale and for a long duration.

Conclusions

Bush and Clinton developed different strategies towards the Bosnian War, while relying on the same principles of US foreign policy to guide their decisions. While Bush's strategy towards Bosnia was an adaptation his strategy used during the dissolution of Yugoslavia and heavily relied on European mediation efforts, Clinton's strategy took Bush's strategy and incrementally introduced more American leadership and assertive policies to pressure the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats to accept a peace settlement. Bush's strategy focused on humanitarian relief and supporting European leadership. Clinton's

²³⁷ Dayton SITREPs 6-12 Don Kerrick to Tony Lake November 10-17, 1995, *Clinton Digital Library* "Bosnian Declassified Documents"
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/browse?collection=37&sort_field=Dublin+Core%2CDate&sort_dir=a

strategy was repeatedly bogged down by policy disagreements with Europe that were less inclined to adopt more forceful policies, especially over the use of military force and ending the arms embargo against Bosnia.

In 1994, the signing of the Washington Accord by the Bosnians and Croats and the bombing of Gorazde encouraged Clinton to implement a more aggressive diplomatic strategy that pushed for tighter sanctions against Serbia and ending the arms embargo against Bosnia. However, Europeans remained opposed to these sanctions. In 1995 the Clinton administration used its leadership skills and led an international conference that settled the Bosnian War in Dayton, OH. The signing of the Dayton Accords was possible because Clinton effectively used American influence to bring the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats to the negotiation table.

Throughout the conflict in Bosnia, Clinton and Bush created policies based on US foreign policy core principles of international cooperation against aggression. While both presidents faced difficulties creating strategies to respond to the intranational conflict their strategies and policy decisions demonstrate the timelessness of US core principles to defend the United States and the deter aggression around the world. The Bosnian War was not the only intranational conflict that posed different and additional challenges to American foreign policymakers. The coup in Haiti would also test Bush and Clinton's ability to implement policies based on US foreign policy principles and respond to the growing influence of race.

CHAPTER VI – THE COUP IN HAITI: BUSH AND CLINTON

Introduction

Since the 1950s the United States had faced increasing pressures from African-Americans and other peoples of color in the United States for social, economic, and legal equality. These demands inspired the Civil Rights Movement of the mid-twentieth century, which resulted in African Americans making significant strides to improve their situation and standing in the United States. African-Americans have always had some interest in US foreign relations²³⁸ and during the Cold War US foreign policymakers relied on African Americans to defend against the Soviet threat.²³⁹ In the post-Cold War period, American society continued to face questions about race and race relations at home, but also how the United States would respond to race in post-Cold War international relations. As African Americans gained political power they increased their influence in American foreign policies towards African and the Caribbean.²⁴⁰ The

²³⁸ Brenda Gale Plummer shows in *Rising Wind*, that African American interest in US foreign policies has existed since the eighteenth century. In *Rising Wind* Plummer shows that along with an interest in US foreign policies, African Americans have attempted to influence foreign policy decisions as well. Analyzing African American efforts between 1935 and 1960, Plummer shows that African American interests went beyond civil rights and US policy towards Africa. She shows that during this period, US racism encouraged African American dissent from mainstream American agenda, and demonstrates African American race was the central perspective for understanding US foreign policy.

²³⁹ In her book *Satchmo Blows up the World*, Penny von Eschen described American foreign policymakers' efforts to send Jazz musicians around the world as part of American public diplomacy efforts during the Cold War. US policymakers dispatched these jazz musicians to counter Soviet arguments of American racism. Von Eschen shows that in addition to playing jazz, these musicians also discussed the United States in ways that contradicted the United States narrative on US race relations. At the same time, these musicians made connections with non-white countries.

²⁴⁰ In "Multicultural Foreign Policy" Yossi Shain argues that in the post-Cold War period American diasporas—ethnic groups that retain cultural, religious, racial, or national affinity for their ancient lands—are dedicated to foreign policies connected to their homeland and other related diasporas around the world. He argues that since the 1980s African Americans have become the largest voices calling for US intervention policies in the Caribbean and Africa.

overthrow of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991 was one test of racial politics in US foreign policy, especially as African Americans gained more power to influence US foreign policy after the 1980s.

This chapter argues that Bush and Clinton's responses to the Haitian revolution reflected their understandings of the place of race in US foreign policy after the Cold War. Throughout the twentieth century US foreign policymakers relied on peoples of color to promote US foreign policy and improve relations in non-Western countries. Bush's and Clinton's policies continued this strategy and demonstrated their understanding and interests in relying on peoples of color to support US foreign policy goals and US relations around the world after the Cold War. While Bush and Clinton did not rely on African American diplomats as part of their responses they did acknowledge lobbying efforts by the Congressional Black Caucus on US policies towards Haiti. relations. The Congressional Black Caucus's lobby efforts were especially influential in Clinton's decisions in 1994. During the Haitian coup, both presidents had to decide how they were going to defend democracy after defeating communism from internal threats in Latin America and elsewhere. Bush's policies followed his New World Order national security strategy and relied on negotiations led by the Organization of American States (OAS) to diplomatically resolve the coup and restore democracy to Haiti. As he had in Bosnia, Clinton initially adopted Bush's policies. However, Congressional Black Caucus lobbying efforts increasingly pushed for a change in US immigration policies towards Haitian refugees, to take more aggressive actions against coup leaders in Haiti, take leadership in OAS negotiations, and agree to deploy US military forces to Haiti. The

Congressional Black Caucus also supported Aristide's efforts and defended Aristide's reputation against those that support the Cédras regime.

The Haitian Coup

After decades of military rule and a five-year period of revolving governments, Haiti freely elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the first democratic president of Haiti in 1990. During his presidency, Aristide implemented social reforms to curtail drug trafficking and government corruption. Unfortunately, Aristide's policies introduced changes that angered Haitian elites that benefited from the drug trade and government corruption. On 30 September 1991, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras led the Haitian army in a coup that ousted Aristide and exiled him to Venezuela. Cédras then established a three-man junta with himself, Lieutenant-Colonel Philippe Biamby, and Lieutenant-Colonel Michel-Joseph François. During its rule, the Cédras regime carried out numerous human rights violations that included political murder, mutilations, and rape against Aristide supporters and others in Haiti. To gain support for his return to Haiti, Aristide relocated to the United States where he lobbied for international assistance from the OAS and the UN. Aristide also petitioned the United States for support and gained support from the CBC and liberal members of Congress.²⁴¹

Bush's Policy Strategy Regarding the Haitian Coup

In his 1991 national security strategy, Bush acknowledged that Latin America and the Caribbean believed the United States was only interested in their region when the Western Hemisphere was threatened. He argued that in the post-Cold War period the

²⁴¹ Leon D. Pamphile, *Contrary Destinies: A Century of Occupation, Deoccupation, and Reoccupation of Haiti*, (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2015), 90-97

United States had to promote mutual common destiny of all the regions in the Western Hemisphere, especially as the Western Hemisphere had become more significant to US interests after the Cold War as democracy spread there. The United States proximity to Latin America and the Caribbean made the United States more susceptible to threats from instabilities in those countries. Bush also acknowledged that the Western Hemisphere was on its way to becoming completely democratic with the introduction of democracy in Haiti and Panama, and the restoration of democracy in Nicaragua. Bush noted that these democracies were fragile and the United States needed to support them.²⁴²

In his 1991 national security strategy Bush posited that the United States could no longer have waxing and waning interests in Latin America and the Caribbean. The opening of the region to democracy and the decline of Soviet influence required the United States to make greater efforts improve its relations there. This included supporting democratic governments that were emerging in the region as a recognition of the common interests the United States had with Latin and Caribbean countries. However, Bush did not outline how the United States would improve relations with Latin and Caribbean countries in his security strategy, or how the United States would support the fragile democracies in the United States. After promoting right-wing dictators in Latin America and the Caribbean as part of the strategy to contain communism,²⁴³ the United States faced significant challenges improving its relations with Latin America and the

²⁴² NSS91, 8

²⁴³ In his work *The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989*, David F. Schmitz examines US Cold War policies to support right-wing dictatorships around the world as a method to prevent Soviet expansion. Schmitz reveals the US antipathy to governments that appeared anti-American, anti-capitalist, and leftist, were often opposed or covertly overthrown in America's attempts to defeat the Soviet Union. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Caribbean after the Cold War. Nonetheless, Bush was dedicated to reinvigorating cooperative security to promote international stability and security in the Western Hemisphere.

Bush's initial policy response to the Haitian coup included publically condemning the coup and the illegal government. However, Bush decided against taking a leadership role in the resolution process. Instead, he used the strategy he was using in Yugoslavia—American supported UN and OAS-led negotiations to respond to Haiti's crisis. Bush's strategy promoted cooperative action.²⁴⁴ Due to a combination of American foreign policy values and Bush's preference to avoid deploying the US military to intervene in political conflicts, and that regional security and cooperation institutions were better situated to mediate regional instabilities.²⁴⁵ By supporting OAS diplomatic efforts, Bush encouraged the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to settle the conflict between the Haitian junta and President Aristide so Aristide could return to power and restore democracy to Haiti. Bush's decision not to put the United States in a leadership role was to encourage cooperative action, a sense of common destiny and mutual responsibility with OAS members. As part of his support for OAS policies towards Haiti, Bush declared a national emergency towards Haiti, and prohibited financial transactions between Haiti and the United States on 4 October.²⁴⁶ On 28 October, He issued a second order that expanded the prohibited financial transactions between the United States and

²⁴⁴ Letter Lee M. Peters to Rollin Darbous November 4, 1991 274928, CO064, WHORM Subject File, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*

²⁴⁵ George Bush, *PPP1991*,

²⁴⁶ George Bush, "Executive Order 12775: Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Haiti," October 4, 1991, Federal Register 56, 50641-50642

Haiti.²⁴⁷ Bush's policies towards Haiti began by economically isolating Haiti and establishing that the United States did not recognize the junta's government. As he had in Yugoslavia, Bush pushed for a collaborative effort to resolve Haiti's crisis rather than adopting a unilateral response. As the Cédras regime solidified its control and international sanctions took hold, Haitians began fleeing the violence and worsened poverty in their country. The refugees fled to the Dominican Republic, Latin American nations, and the United States.

Eventually, the refugee flow caused by the Haitian crisis began affecting American immigration resources. Bush responded by establishing a refugee processing center at Guantanamo base in Cuba. Through November the refugee flow to the United States increased and overcrowded the center at Guantanamo. This led Bush to abide by the 1981 US-Haiti immigration agreement. This agreement by Reagan and Haitian dictator Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier allowed the United States to interdict Haitian refugees at sea and return them to Haiti without following traditional asylum practices.²⁴⁸ Bush defended his decision by arguing that most of the refugees were fleeing the economic sanctions in Haiti, not the military junta. The administration decided to begin repatriations with the Haitian refugees in Guantanamo. The Haitians were returned to Port-au-Prince aboard a US Coast Guard cutter. The Haitians were only allowed to return to the ship if their life or safety was in immediate danger where the United States would provide humanitarian assistance. The administration also decided it would suspend

²⁴⁷ George Bush, "Executive Order 12779: Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Haiti," October 28, 1991, Federal Register 56, 55795

²⁴⁸ Ruth Ellen Wasem, "U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants" *Congressional Research Service* January 15, 2010 <http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P4230.pdf>

repatriation if any Haitian migrants were brutalized by the illegal government upon disembarking. However, the Haitians had to return to US ships under their own power.²⁴⁹

While Bush's executive orders demonstrated the United States supported OAS diplomatic efforts to resolve the Haitian crisis, and Bush's commitment to international cooperation. Bush's refugee policy opened the Bush administration to questions about its commitment to defend human rights abroad. Unlike the conflict in Yugoslavia where America's distance from the conflict protected the United States from threats to its interests, America's proximity to Haiti ensured the country received some of the refugees fleeing the military junta and international economic sanctions against Haiti.

As Bush responded to the crisis in Haiti, the CBC pressured Bush to ensure that the Aristide was returned to power and democracy was restored to Haiti. The CBC was founded in 1971, and is the successor to the Democratic Select Committee founded by Congressman Charles Diggs. The Democratic Select Committee was created to bring African American Representatives to meet sporadically. In 1969 African American Congress members began coordinating their efforts in response to the Nixon presidency that led to a protracted confrontation between African American Congress members and the president and led to a sense of common purpose and identity. The CBC also emerged at a point that the Civil Rights Movement was in decline and the African American community was placing emphasis on political accomplishments. The original CBC

²⁴⁹ State Department Cable, folder "NSC/DC 328 – December 19, 1991 – NSC/DC Meeting on Haiti, Keyword Haiti," OAID 90021-016, H-Files NSC/DC Meetings Files, National Security Council, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*

mission was as “Congressmen at large for twenty million Black people.”²⁵⁰ As the CBC continued it expanded its mission from a domestic focus to include foreign policy as well.

CBC efforts to discuss Bush’s policies towards Haiti was part of the CBC’s growing influence in Congress and foreign policy discussions. Beginning on 1 October 1991 the CBC and its members began contacting Bush and his administration with policy advice and encouraging Bush to adopt “all diplomatic means to restore the legitimately elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide...and encourage you to call on the United Nations and the Organization of American States in seeking a peaceful resolution to this conflict.”²⁵¹ The CBC encouraged Bush to seek international cooperation to end the Haitian coup, but it did not encourage Bush to act unilaterally. The CBC also connected the rise of democracy in Haiti to America’s mission to spread democracy abroad, “As totalitarianism collapses in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the United States must reaffirm its commitment to the democratic roots of Haiti.”²⁵² The CBC’s letter to Bush indicated it concerns about the situation in Haiti, and connected Haiti’s crisis to US interests.

During Bush’s presidency and the early part of the coup, the CBC exercised few attempts to influence Bush to adjust his policies in Haiti. This would change as the crisis continued, refugees continued to flee to the United States and military junta refused to

²⁵⁰ Marguerite Ross Barnett, *The Congressional Black Caucus*, *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 32, no. 1 (1975) 34-50.

²⁵¹ Letter, Congressional Black Caucus to George Bush October 1, 1991, 275265 CO064 WHORM Subject File, Bush Presidential Records, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*

²⁵² Letter, Congressional Black Caucus to George Bush October 1, 1991, 275265 CO064 WHORM Subject File, Bush Presidential Records, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*

cooperate with international mediators. The CBC would increase its influence on policy decisions during Clinton's presidency. As Bush and Clinton struggled to determine America's role in the post-Cold War period, and how the United States would encourage international cooperation, the CBC gained influence in US foreign policy decisions towards Haiti. While CBC efforts were less assertive during Bush's presidency, Clinton's presidency created more opportunities for the CBC to influence foreign policies. In particular, the CBC would prove capable to convincing Clinton and other policymakers that the Haitian crisis posed a significant risk to US interests that warranted a US intervention to restore Aristide and democracy to Haiti. At the start of the Haitian coup, race did not heavily influence Bush's foreign policy. Though he faced opposition for his immigration policies towards the Haitian refugees, most of the critics opposed the repatriation of Haitian refugees for humanitarian reasons. Additionally, the CBC was less outspoken of Bush's policies.

Race and Clinton's Foreign Policy

Three months after beginning his presidency, Clinton had his first White House meeting with Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. After the meeting, Presidents Clinton and Aristide held a joint press conference. During the conference Clinton said it was important to him and to the United States to restore democracy to Haiti and return President Aristide to power. He continued, "I want to make it clear in the strongest possible terms that we will not now or ever support the continuation of an illegal government in Haiti...And I want to make it clear that the United States is committed

strongly to a much more aggressive effort to restore Mr. Aristide to his presidency.”²⁵³ Many including the CBC viewed Clinton's statement as a change in his policy direction. However, it was not until 1994 Clinton carried out America’s commitment to return Aristide to Haiti. While Bush had been less influenced by race in his foreign policy decisions, the growing prominence of race and racial interactions in public debates between Bush’s and Clinton’s presidency required Clinton to pay greater attention to America’s policies in the Caribbean and Africa as he implemented his national security strategy of engagement and enlargement. He did this by connecting the Haitian coup to US interests promoting and defending democracy around the world.

One of the reasons that Clinton’s Haitian policy differed from Bush’s was because of increased CBC lobbying and the changing race demographics in the United States. In 1990, the Census Bureau noted that minorities made up 25 percent of the population, and were on track to constitute a majority of the population by 2050.²⁵⁴ These demographic and political changes shifted the priorities Clinton gave to non-Caucasian countries in his foreign policy decisions. Additionally, Clinton had a strong connection with African Americans having won 75 percent of the African-American vote in 1992. During his two terms, Clinton appointed seven African Americans to cabinet positions and 14 percent of his federal judge appointments were African American.²⁵⁵ Also US race relations

²⁵³ William J. Clinton, "Remarks with President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti and an Exchange with Reporters, March 16, 1993," *Public Papers of the President of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1993 Book 1 January 1 to July 31, 1993*, 309 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994).

²⁵⁴ Roderick J. Harrison and Claudette Bennett, "Racial and Ethnic Diversity" in *State of the Union* vol. 2 Reynolds Farley, ed. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995), 141-146.

²⁵⁵ William J. Clinton "The Clinton Presidency Building One America" in *Eight Years of Peace, Progress, and Prosperity*, 101 <https://clinton5.nara.gov/media/pdf/eightyears.pdf>.

repeatedly dominated the domestic public agenda in the 1990s. In 1991, the broadcast of the beating of Rodney King by the Los Angeles police raised issues of police brutality and minorities, and the 1992 Los Angeles riots following the acquittal of those continued the discussion brought those discussions back to the public agenda. In 1995 the O.J. Simpson murder trial returned American race issues to the forefront of the public agenda.

Clinton's childhood also mirrored that of many African American voters. He was from a working-class background and had been raised by a single mother who struggled to support him. On the Arsenio Hall Show during the 1992 presidential campaign Clinton famously played the saxophone demonstrating his affinity for jazz music and other music forms based on African American culture.²⁵⁶ In 1998, Toni Morrison called Clinton "the first black president" after his impeachment trial for having a marital affair with Monica Lewinsky. Morrison argued that Clinton's treatment mirrored the treatment African American men received when they appeared to get out of their social place.²⁵⁷ These characteristics and the environment in America during the 1990s, presented opportunities for Clinton to continue and expand the influence of race in American foreign policy.

Clinton's Foreign Policy Agenda for Haiti

When Clinton became president, he began as he had for all of the crises he inherited from Bush by continuing some of Bush's policies and implementing his own that put greater international pressure on the Cédras junta to step down.²⁵⁸ In his 1994

²⁵⁶ Bill Clinton, *My Life*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004).

²⁵⁷ Toni Morrison, "Comment" *The New Yorker*, October 5, 1998, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1998/10/05/comment-6543>

²⁵⁸ Pamphile, *Contrary Destinies*, 97.

National Security Strategy, Clinton argued that the world still needed American leadership and that exerting American leadership abroad, deterring aggression, encouraging peaceful resolutions to conflicts, opening foreign markets, and supporting democratic regimes would make America safer and more prosperous. Clinton continued that it was in US interests to assist, defend, and restore new democratic governments around the world.²⁵⁹ Clinton also claimed that Haiti provided the United States with an opportunity to demonstrate its support and to increase the international community of democratic governments. As well as improve US national security and defend national interests. Clinton contended in the post-Cold War period, the United States had to be willing to take immediate and public positions to stop the overthrows of democracies. He posited the best ways to do this was by strengthening the pillars of civil society, and supporting internal efforts to combat corruption and political discontent by encouraging good these new democracies to adopt democratic governing practices. At the same time, Clinton called for selective engagement to prevent the United States from becoming the world's policeman. He further defended selective engagement as a way for the United States to focus on those challenges that were most relevant to US interests, and to engage in those conflicts where the US involvement had the most impact. Part of this selective engagement established America's defense and promotion of democracy was a tertiary priority to ensuring US military capabilities, and promoting cooperative security

²⁵⁹ William J. Clinton, *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, preface, 1, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994),

measures that opened foreign markets to encourage global economic growth and supported American prosperity.²⁶⁰

Both presidents agreed in their national security strategies that America's defense and promotion of democracy came after defending the United States from acts of aggression, and maintaining America's military capabilities around the world. However, they differed in their strategies for defending democracy and determining when to limit American activism abroad. Where Bush's limited engagement in international conflicts was done to encourage a cooperative environment where regional powers and institutions, and the UN could lead efforts to deter aggression and resolve conflicts without US leadership. Clinton's selective engagement encouraged the United States to cooperate from a leadership position and a supportive role. Clinton strategy also accepted the United States needed more policies to engage with the non-Western world that would bring prosperity and stability. Bush and Clinton's responses to the Haitian crisis further revealed their understanding of race's influence in foreign policy decisions.

By the time Clinton became president, the OAS and UN had issued several economic sanctions against Haiti. Clinton adopted OAS and UN economic sanctions to his foreign policy. First, he authorized immigration officials to deny entry to the United States to any Haitian national and their immediate family members who had impeded the negotiations to restore Haiti's constitutional government. He also authorized the Treasury Department to freeze any US-based Cédras regime assets. Lastly, Clinton directed Secretary Christopher to consult with the OAS on ways to tighten sanctions, and he

²⁶⁰ Clinton, *NSS94*, 18-20.

directed Secretary Christopher and Ambassador Albright to consult with the UN to develop additional sanctions against the junta.²⁶¹ On 16 June, the UNSC passed resolution 841 authorizing a trade embargo of Haiti to take effect on 23 June,²⁶² which Clinton supported with Executive Order 12853 freezing the property of any Haitian supporting or doing business with the junta.²⁶³

Clinton's initial policy decisions toward the illegal government in Haiti continued Bush's strategy. Clinton also issued executive orders that supported OAS and UN economic sanctions by denying the Cédras regime access to financial assets in the United States or denied any Cédras supporter to entry to the United States to flee Haiti's economic hardships. Within Clinton's first year, the Cédras regimes stalling and refusal to abide by negotiations eventually encouraged Clinton to implement more assertive policies against the Haitian junta. At the same time, these issues with Haitian negotiations encouraged the CBD to lobby for changes in US policies towards Haitian refugees and isolating the Cédras regime.

Accord de Governors Island: A Sign of Hope?

On 3 July 1993, after several months of UN and American economic sanctions, Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Lt. General Raoul Cédras met at Governors Island, NY to sign an agreement that would end the military junta's control of Haiti and

²⁶¹ William Clinton, "Statement on Sanctions against Haiti, June 4, 1993," in *PPPWJC, 1993 Book 1*, 810,

²⁶² UNSC Resolution 841 "Haiti" S/RES/841/1993 16 June 1993
[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/841\(1993\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/841(1993))

²⁶³ Executive order 12853 also prohibited the sale or supply of petroleum or its products, any arms, military vehicles, and equipment, and police equipment by a US citizen or from a US vessel to any Haitian individual or entity. William J. Clinton, "Message to the Congress on Further Sanctions Against Haiti, June 30, 1993," *PPPWJC, 1993 Book 1*, 961.

restore Aristide to power. In the *Accord de Governors Island*, Aristide and Cédras agreed to allow UN and OAS representatives into Haiti to observe Aristide's return. In return, Aristide promised to grant amnesty to the Cédras and the other members of the junta according to Haiti's constitution. Additionally, the international community agreed to end its economic sanctions against Haiti, to facilitate Haiti's economic recovery. The parties agreed that Aristide would return to Haiti as president on 30 October 1993, and the junta leaders would resign their power to UN and OAS observers by 30 October.²⁶⁴

Unfortunately, the Cédras regime reneged on their commitment to the *Accord de Governors Island* in October. When international observers arrived in the harbor at Port-au-Prince, the junta instigated a mob that prevented international observers from disembarking off their ships forcing them to leave for the United States.²⁶⁵ Clinton responded to the Cédras government's refusal to abide by the *Accord de Governors Island*, by issuing executive order 12872. Executive order 12872 froze the US-based assets of forty-one Haitian military officers and civilian supporters, as well as those who had supported the mob's obstruction of the *Accord de Governors Island*.²⁶⁶ Clinton also

²⁶⁴ "Accord De Governors Island, July 3, 1993," United Nations Files of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali Haiti-Accord De Governors Island 3 July 1993.

²⁶⁵ Pamphile *Contrary Destinies*, 100-102.

²⁶⁶ William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12872 of October 18, 1993, Blocking Property of Persons Obstructing Democratization in Haiti, *Federal Register* 58, no. 201 (October 20, 1993): 54029, <https://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/fedreg/fr058/fr058201/fr058201.pdf>

authorized the deployment of US Naval Forces to help re-establish UNSC resolutions 841, 873, 875, and a petroleum and arms embargo of Haiti from.²⁶⁷

In the first year of his presidency, Clinton and his administration supported international efforts to convince Aristide and the Cédras junta to agree to a negotiated settlement to the Haitian crisis. The international pressure led the two Aristide and Cédras to sign the *Accord de Governor's Island* in July 1993. The *Accord de Governor's Island* was a major breakthrough for international resolution efforts and demonstrated that international efforts were a viable method to resolve intranational conflicts. The accord demonstrated that regional institutions could manage their own security and stability. It also fulfilled Clinton's national security strategy to promote and defend democratic governments. Unfortunately, the Cédras regime reneged on their promise to step down from power. Like the conflict in Yugoslavia, the Cédras' regimes actions demonstrated that ending intranational conflicts went beyond getting the parties to make an agreement. The international community also had to demonstrate that there were consequences for refusing to abide by international agreements. The military junta's rejection of the agreement was also a turning point for Clinton's policies towards Haiti. Following junta's refusal to step down the CBC increased its criticisms of Clinton's policies and increased pressure on Clinton to implement more assertive policies against the Cédras regime to ensure Aristide's return to Haiti and restore Haiti's democracy.

²⁶⁷ William J. Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Haiti, October 20, 1994," *PPPWJC, 1993 Book II*, 1782. UN Resolution 841 established a trade embargo on petroleum and its products, arms, ammunition, and military vehicles and equipment to Haiti as recommended by the OAS to begin 23 June 1993. UN resolution 873 gave the UN authority to impose additional measures against Haiti if it continued to obstruct the arrival of UN observers. UNSC Resolution 875 called on member states to cooperate with the legitimate Haitian government to implement measures that would enforce the provisions of resolutions 841 and 873 to apply a trade embargo of Haiti

Clinton, the CBC, and Haitian Policy Decisions after *Accord de Governors Island*

Throughout the Haitian crises, the Clinton administration received numerous letters from members of Congress questioning, supporting, and criticizing his policy decisions. One of the most vocal supporters of American action in Haiti was the CBC, led by Representative Kweisi Mfume. The CBC was a Congressional body that pooled the strength of individual African American Congress members to lobby for domestic reforms and policies that affected the lives of African Americans, and influence American foreign policies towards the Caribbean and African countries.²⁶⁸ Throughout Aristide's exile, the CBC was the leading proponent encouraging Clinton to implement stronger policies against the junta and end the interdiction and forced repatriation of Haitian refugees. The CBC also promoted a positive public image of Aristide, countered allegations Aristide had violated human rights in Haiti, and challenged those that opposed stronger American opposition to the Cédras regime. The first policy success the CBC had was convincing Clinton to end US Coast Guard interdictions and forced repatriation of Haitian refugees.²⁶⁹

The CBC achieved its goals through correspondence and meetings with Clinton. The first letters Clinton received from CBC members came in December 1993. One letter from Charles Rangel criticized CIA reports that publically defamed Aristide by charging Aristide of instability and inflexibility. Rangel also wrote the CIA reports against Aristide

²⁶⁸ "Congress" in *The Politics of Race: African Americans and the Political System*, Theodore Rueter, ed. (New York: M.E. Sharp, 1995) 193-198.

²⁶⁹ Letters, Congressional Black Caucus to William J. Clinton 1993 to 1994, folder Inter-American Affairs, National Security Council, *William Clinton Presidential Library*.

undermined America's support in Haiti.²⁷⁰ Along with challenging negative reports of Aristide in the government, the CBC also challenged those assertions in the media. In a C-Span interview in July 1994, Representative Catherine Meeks argued against claims that Aristide has numerous human rights violations.²⁷¹ The CBC's efforts to encourage Clinton to change his policies included public campaigns to defend Aristide's character and present him as defending Haitian democracy from an illegal overthrow. These efforts focused on Aristide's rightful place as Haiti's president, and that the United States had a responsibility to restore democracy to Haiti.

In March 1994, the CBC started attacking Clinton's Haitian policies as "ineffective and counterproductive," and that US lukewarm policies encouraged the Cédras regime to carry out violence and political suppression. They contended that the administration drastically needed to change its policy to avoid appearing to undermine democratic change in Haiti. The CBC urged Clinton to implement more sanctions and restrictions against Haiti. They suggested Clinton apply a total embargo of Haiti, a no-fly zone, deny visas to Haitian military leaders, and freeze Haitian military officials supportive of the Cédras regime US-based assets. The CBC also encouraged the president to deploy a multinational border patrol to stop violations of the embargo along the Haiti-Dominican Republic border, and to stop intercepting Haitian refugees at sea and

²⁷⁰ Letter, Charles D. Ragnel to William J. Clinton, December 23, 1993, folder Inter-American Affairs, OAID 302, "Haiti 1994 [Folder 1] [6]," National Security Council, *William Clinton Presidential Library*.

²⁷¹ "US Occupation of Haiti, C-Span Live July 13, 1994," *C-Span*, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?58631-1/us-occupation-haiti>

returning them to Haiti.²⁷² Clinton did not immediately apply all of the policy suggestions from the CBC. However, by the time Clinton decided to militarily intervene in Haiti he had implemented all of the CBC's policy suggestions. The CBC's efforts to keep the Haitian crisis a significant foreign policy crisis gradually influenced Clinton to implement more assertive policies against Haiti and to lead a multinational military intervention to end the coup.

In May, Representative Cynthia McKinney wrote that she was offended by Ambassador Swings suggestion that Haitian boat people were only economic refugees, and that such messages undermined America's moral ground to restore Aristide and democracy to Haiti. She informed Clinton that Americans wanted him to display leadership abroad and that he needed to "set a clear and workable path for the return of Aristide and democracy to Haiti; devote all necessary resources to achieve the goal." Representative McKinney urged Clinton to enlist support from among Aristides Congressional supporters and "to not to shy away from aggressive, affirmative measures" and "to stand for democracy and with Haiti."²⁷³ Clinton responded to McKinney's letter informing her that he was working to strengthen sanctions and that the United States had

²⁷² Letter, Congressional Black Caucus to William J. Clinton, March 18, 1994, folder Inter-American Affairs, OAID 302, "Haiti 1994 [Folder 2] [1]," National Security Council, *William Clinton Presidential Library*.

²⁷³ Letter, Cynthia A. McKinney to William J. Clinton May 4, 1994, folder Inter-American Affairs, OAID 302, "Haiti 1994 [Folder 2] [2]," National Security Council, *William Clinton Presidential Library*.

adjusted immigration procedure to allow Haitian boat people to apply for political asylum status.²⁷⁴

In May, the administration acknowledged that CBC suggestions were consistent with Clinton's strategy. The administration decided to encourage additional cooperation with the CBC to help the administration restore democracy to Haiti.²⁷⁵ The administration also scheduled meetings with the CBC to discuss Haitian policy and Clinton's decisions. This included discussions on intensifying UN sanctions, making more assertive diplomatic policies, ending the policy of interdiction and forced repatriations to avoid a humanitarian disaster, supporting the UNMIH, and discussing other developments in Haiti and US policies responses.²⁷⁶ As Clinton continued to deal with the crisis in Haiti, he increasingly implemented policies the CBC recommended. This shift increasingly moved the United States towards a military intervention to restore Aristide to power. This strategy did not prevent disagreements between the CBC and the Clinton administration. Instead the CBC's influence in the Clinton administration and on Haitian policies made Clinton and his advisors more receptive to CBC criticisms and more likely to adopt CBC policy suggestions. This administration's policy changes were not supported by all of

²⁷⁴ Letter, William J. Clinton to Cynthia A. McKinney, May 26, 1994, folder Inter-American Affairs, OAID 302, "Haiti 1994 [Folder 2] [2]," National Security Council, *William Clinton Presidential Library*.

²⁷⁵ Memorandum Lawrence G. Rossin to Anthony Lake "Letter from Congressional Black Caucus on Haiti, May 9, 1994, Inter-American Affairs, OAID 302 "Haiti 1994 April-May [2]," National Security Council, *William Clinton Presidential Library*.

²⁷⁶ "Meeting with Congressional Black Caucus on Haiti Talking Points" n.d. "Inter-American Affairs OAID 302 "Haiti 1994 April-May [5]" National Security Council, *William Clinton Presidential Library*. Memorandum Michael Andricos to Anthony Lake "Suggested Talking Points for the Presidential Meeting with the Congressional Black Caucus, July 22, 1994, Inter-American Affairs Feinberg, Richard OAID [507] "Ref Safe Drawer Files Haiti [3]," National Security Council, *William Clinton Presidential Library*.

Congress. Some Congress members disagreed that US policies towards Haiti needed to change or become more involved in the negotiation process.

While the CBC supported stronger US involvement in Haiti, Congressional Republicans opposed greater US participation in Haiti, including a military intervention. Several leading Republicans informed Clinton that they firmly opposed any policy that sent US troops to Haiti to restore Aristide to power. They also found it troubling that Clinton was considering military intervention, and wrote the "persistent and widespread political problems affecting the Haitian people deserved the attention of the United States of America. But it is in the essences of leadership in such a situation to make use of only diplomatic and humanitarian methods best suited to the complicated political realities."²⁷⁷ Republican opposition to increased US involvement in Haiti focused on keeping the United States out of a complicated political conflict. Republicans agreed with the Clinton administration that the United States should pay some attention to the crisis, but Republicans argued that the Clinton's policies should focus on humanitarian and diplomatic policies. Republican suggestions to focus on diplomatic and humanitarian solutions followed Bush's policies towards Yugoslavia and the Haitian policies. Despite the opposition, Clinton carried out the changes to his policies leading up to the deployment of US forces to Haiti as the last option to restore Aristides democratically elected government to Haiti.

²⁷⁷ Letter, Bob Michel, Newt Gingrich, Dick Armey, Henry Hyde, Joseph McDade, Benjamin A. Gilmer, Floyd Spence, and Larry Combest to William Clinton, May 5, 1994, folder Inter-American Affairs OAID, 302 "Haiti 1994, [Folder 2] [2]," National Security Council, *William Clinton Presidential Library*.

The Move Toward A Military Intervention in Haiti

In the spring of 1994, the Clinton administration began preparations for a military intervention in Haiti. In an undated Haitian policy paper, the Clinton administration's Haitian observers argued that diplomatic policies were unlikely to pressure the Cédras regime's rule to step down and allow Aristide to return. They argued that current US policies further entrenched the military regime. They argued that the longer the US followed diplomatic policies it increased violence, human rights violations and economic and physical resource destruction in Haiti, and encouraged continued refugee flows. Mirroring CBC arguments, the author contended that the administration needed to initiate more assertive policies that directly confronted the military regime. They recommended a strategy that forced the Cédras regime to surrender or face capture by US troops during a military intervention. They noted that after the Cédras regime was removed then the Haitian parliament should pass an amnesty law for officials of the illegal government. Next, US forces should escort Aristide back to Haiti as he calls for calm, and the UN should deploy peacekeepers to maintain law and order. As part of the rebuilding process, the Haitian observers recommended establishing a system to retrain and rehabilitate the Haitian legal system, and the Haitian military and paramilitary personnel. They also called for the demolition of 1915 circa US military infrastructure the Cédras junta had used to maintain control of Haiti.²⁷⁸

Upon deciding to intervene in Haiti, the Clinton administration adopted most of these recommendations as part of mission for the US-led multinational intervention in

²⁷⁸ "Haiti: A Policy Option To Resolve The Protracted Crisis, n.d.," folder Inter-American Affairs, OAID 302, "Haiti 1994 April-May [3]," National Security Council, *William Clinton Presidential Library*.

Haiti. Even as Clinton made these preparations he continued cooperative and diplomatic efforts to end the military regime demonstrating that a military intervention was a last resort, like Bush had in response to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. At the same time, Clinton recognized that continuing diplomatic and humanitarian methods would not remove the military junta from Haiti. Clinton's decision for a military intervention recognized he had reached an impasse and the limits of peaceful cooperative action, and that the threat of force or force itself were the only options left.

In July 1994, after repeated international efforts failed to restore Aristide and democracy to Haiti, the UN authorized its members to use all means necessary to remove the Cédras regime from power in Haiti.²⁷⁹ From July to September, the Clinton administration continued its efforts to remove the military leaders through diplomatic measures.²⁸⁰ This included Clinton's last diplomatic attempts to negotiate the Cédras regimes and four executive orders that established a complete embargo against Haiti and the Cédras regime.²⁸¹

²⁷⁹ "United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 "UN Mission in Haiti" July 31, 1994, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/940\(1994\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/940(1994)).

²⁸⁰ "United Nations Mission to Haiti: Training or Occupation" in National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified documents concerning Haiti," *Clinton Digital Library*, accessed November 23, 2015, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47970>.

²⁸¹ Executive order 12914 on 7 May 1994 denied Haitian junta members, regime supporters, the police, government employees, and family members access to all of their financial resources in the US and authorized the United States to prevent any flight but scheduled commercial passenger flights from leaving or entering Haiti. Executive Order 12917 on 24 May 1994 prohibited the importation of Haitian goods into the United States and the exportation of American goods to Haiti and banned the sale of medicine, medical supplies, and food stuff to the junta or those connected to it directly or indirectly. On 10 June 1994 Clinton issued executive order 12920, which prohibited any payments or financial transfers from the United States to Haitian individuals involved in, with, or supporting the junta. Executive order 12927 issued on 21 June 1994, froze all US property belonging to members of the Cédras regime, their supporters, and their immediate family.

Before UNSC resolution 940, Clinton's strategy gradually increased the assertiveness of America's policies towards Haiti, intensified pressure against the Cédras regime, and expanded America's leadership in the negotiation process. After the UN authorized its members to use force to remove the Cédras regime from power, Clinton put the United States in a firm leadership role in cooperation with Aristide to create and deploy a multinational military force to restore Aristide to Haiti. Clinton's work with the CBC encouraged this policy shift. Clinton's work with the CBC on US policies towards Haiti were due to the CBC's lobbying efforts for the United States to take a more forceful stand against the Cédras junta.

On 8 September Clinton approved Presidential Decision Directive-28 (PDD-28). In PDD-28, Clinton outlined US policies for Latin America and the Caribbean, beginning with a determination that it was a long-term US strategic goal to foster democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean as part of US efforts to promote the spread of democracy around the world. Clinton established that the United States would do this by encouraging and requiring state militaries to respect democratic governments, human rights, and civilian control of the military. It would also foster a greater respect for democracy within the military and develop greater civilian participation in the country's defense policy. PDD-28 also called on the United States to quickly respond to coups in Latin America and the Caribbean that threatened to or did overthrow democratic governments. Clinton also charged the United States to work with the OAS and UN to defend and if necessary restore those governments.²⁸² Clinton's decision directive firmly

²⁸² Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-28 "US Policy Towards Latin America and the Caribbean September 8, 1994" *Clinton Digital Library* <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12751>

established his belief that the United States had a responsibility to defend and restore democratic governments in the Western Hemisphere as a way to protect the US interests. It also cemented Clinton's directive to send US forces as part of a multinational military intervention in Haiti. PDD-25 also reaffirmed Clinton's engagement and enlargement strategy by combining US engagement to promote global security and stability with enlarging and protecting the world's democratic governments.

On 10 September, Clinton authorized Operation Uphold Democracy to start on 20 September. This gave Clinton ten days for one last attempt to peacefully end remove the Cédras regime from power. On 16 September, as US forces prepared to leave for Haiti, Clinton dispatched a diplomatic mission that included former President Jimmy Carter, retired General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nun to Haiti. The combination of mobilizing US forces to Haiti and Carter-Powell-Nun negotiations convinced the Cédras regime to relinquish power. On 19 September US troops deployed to oversee Aristide's return and Haiti's transition back to democracy.²⁸³

Conclusions

Bush's policy towards the Haitian crisis focused on supporting OAS negotiations between Aristide and the Cédras regime. While Bush publically condemned the coup, he only initiated economic sanctions that abided by OAS sanctions against Haiti. Bush's policies continued his New World Order directive to sponsor cooperative actions against aggression. His Haiti policies also relied on the same strategy for the Yugoslavia crisis, which focused on encouraging regional institutions to resolve the crisis, rather than using

²⁸³ Pamphile, *Contrary Destinies*, 107.

American leadership to establish a settlement between Aristide and Cédras. During Bush's presidency, he had little collaboration with the CBC. Though the CBC initially supported Bush's policies towards Haiti, as the crisis continued and Bush's refugee policy went into effect, the CBC began to criticize Bush's Haitian policies. However, Bush was less influenced by CBC lobbying as Clinton was and continued to interdict and repatriate Haitian refugees.

During Clinton's presidency, debates African American interactions with the police and the justice system, and continued racial inequality increasingly dominated public discussions. The CBC and other groups for peoples of color worked to keep these issues on the public agenda. This increased the pressure on Clinton to work with the CBC on his Haiti policy. Thus, Clinton's policies evolved into an aggressive stand against coup leaders in Haiti. Between 1993 and 1994, Clinton's increasingly implemented policy suggests from the CBC. These policies increased US pressure on the Cédras regime to end their control of Haiti. The CBC was most responsible for making US policymakers focus on the Haitian crisis. The CBC's lobbying efforts continued their tradition of encouraging the US to pay more attention on its policies towards the Caribbean and Africa. The CBC's influence and Clinton's security strategy of engagement and enlargement combined to lead Clinton towards a military intervention to restore democracy to Haiti. As Bush and Clinton implemented policies in Haiti that continued to abide by long-standing policy themes and principles, they faced challenges as they incorporated race into those themes and principles. Race became a significant theme in US foreign policy during the Cold War and policymakers attempted to refute Soviet claims of US racism. After the Cold War, race remained a part of international

relations as non-Western countries gained international power. The challenges Bush and Clinton faced with race in US foreign policy mirrored the racial challenges American society faced in the 1990s, as the African American community continued to push for economic, legal, and political equality after the Civil Rights Movements ensured African Americans were no longer treated as second-class citizens.

CHAPTER VII – CLINTON AND THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

During the post-Cold War period the United States faced two crises that involved the targeted killing of ethnic populations, the first in Bosnia and the second in Rwanda. In Bosnia, the ethnic violence occurred after the collapse of Yugoslavia which led the Serb, Croat, and Muslim populations to fight over territory in Bosnia. In Rwanda, the genocide occurred after a truce ending the Rwandan civil war between the Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Forces and the Hutu government failed following the death of Rwanda's president in a plane crash. Additionally, the genocide occurred at the same time the United States was responding to the crises in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia. The convergence of these crises occurring during the same period tested America's ability to participate in peacekeeping operations around the world. It also led the American public and US Congress to question America's participation in international peace efforts. These issues led the Clinton administration to undertake policy re-evaluations towards US participation in multinational peacekeeping operations. The public's concerns about America's extensive participation in peacekeeping operations in response to intranational conflicts and desires to limit such participation created contradicting influences on Clinton's policy decisions towards Rwanda.

This chapter argues that as genocide occurred in Rwanda, Clinton attempted to alter how the United States cooperated with regional and international peace efforts, while maintaining America's commitment to engage with cooperative security efforts in non-Western countries and regions. Clinton initiated the changes, outlined in Presidential Decision Directive-25, in response to public concerns that the United States was participating in too many unsuccessful peacekeeping missions that were overextending

US resources. PDD-25 attempted to balance traditional US foreign policy principles of supporting international efforts against aggression to promote stability and security and limit the possibilities the United States would participate in a peacekeeping mission that was likely to fail or become a quagmire. Clinton's re-evaluations of America's policies towards peacekeeping operations placed new limits on his national security strategy, foreign policy decisions, and American support for international cooperation that contradicted traditional policy themes and principles.

Origins of Rwandan Genocide

On 6 April 1994, Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana's jet was shot down killing him and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira. In Washington, DC, Kevin Aiston, the State Department Rwanda desk officer, informed Prudence Bushnell, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of State, of the crash. Bushnell drafted a memo to Secretary Christopher warning that after the Rwandan and Burundi presidents were confirmed dead there was a high probability of violence erupting in the two countries. She advised Secretary Christopher, "Our strategy is to appeal for calm in both countries. Soon after Habyarimana's death was confirmed, the Hutu military killed moderate Rwandan politicians including the Rwandan Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. Soon after the death of Rwanda's moderate politicians, the Hutus started killing moderate Hutu and Tutsi civilians. Over 100 days after the death of Rwanda's president, hardliner Hutus killed approximately 800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutus."²⁸⁴

²⁸⁴ Samantha Power, "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide, (New York: Basic Books, 2002) 329-330.

The Rwandan genocide was caused by ethnic divisions that originated during Belgium colonial rule of Rwandan. Under Belgium control the Tutsi minority were given privileged status and control over Rwanda and the Hutu, which the Tutsi used to discriminate against the Hutu majority. When Rwanda gained independence in 1962, the Hutu gained control of Rwanda and carried out retaliatory discrimination and violence against the Tutsi. In 1990, the Rwandan civil war began when the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a group of mostly exiled Tutsi, invaded Rwanda. From 1990 to 1993 the RPF gained territory against Hutu government forces.

In 1993, Tanzania negotiated the *Arusha Accords* between the RPF and Rwandan government with support from the major Western powers. The *Arusha Accords* ended the civil war, and created a power-sharing government between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The accords also established a UN peacekeeping mission that deployed over 2,000 UN forces to monitor the ceasefire and assist in demilitarization of the country. UN peacekeepers were also assigned to help provide a secure environment for Tutsi exiles to return to Rwanda. Despite efforts to introduce peace into Rwanda, Hutu extremists opposed the Arusha Accords. The Hutu extremists also feared Tutsi retribution since the Arusha Accords did not grant amnesty to anyone that committed human rights violations during the war.²⁸⁵ These fears combined with their continued hatred and mistrust of the Tutsi. Once the Rwanda's president was dead the extremist Hutu acted to remove Tutsi and moderate Hutus from Rwanda. The violence in Rwanda was another post-Cold War intranational ethnic conflict. While Rwanda's genocide was not related to the end of the

²⁸⁵ Power, A Problem from Hell, 331-335

Cold War, it still had the potential to establish a strong precedent for the US post-Cold War policies. As other presidents had during earlier parts of the twentieth century and as he had during the Haitian conflict, Clinton had to decide how he was going to respond to a non-Western conflict. He also had to decide how to support peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda following changes he made to the way the United States participated in and supported international peacekeeping efforts.

Changes to US Peacekeeping Policies

During the post-Cold War period, the international community faced repeated problems establishing, deploying, and sustaining peacekeeping missions. The difficulties surrounding international peacekeeping missions led the American public and American Congress to publicly debate US participation in future peacekeeping operations, and the continued viability of peacekeeping missions as a method to restore stability and security around the world. In response to these debates, the Clinton administration re-evaluated US policies for peacekeeping missions. However, as the world's superpower, changing America's role in the UN and UNSC would change dynamics within the UN and the way the UN responded to international crises. The American public and Congressional reluctance to continue to support and participate in UN peacekeeping missions led Clinton to alter US policies towards UN peacekeeping missions.

In Presidential Review Directive-13, Clinton noted that the post-Cold War period had more intranational conflicts than international ones. Additionally, the increased breakout of intranational conflicts created more international demand for UN peacekeeping missions to resolve those intra-state conflicts. However, the UN had not updated its policies and peacekeeping structures to respond to the increased frequency of

intranational conflicts and increased demand for peacekeeping missions. In PRD-13, Clinton established that the United States needed to re-evaluate the role of UN peacekeeping operations in US foreign policies. This policy re-evaluation had to include an understanding of the post-Cold War period's increased demand for UN peacekeeping, and re-evaluations of US roles and participation in the UN.²⁸⁶

Clinton defended the policy re-evaluations as a necessary step to improve America's response to the higher costs and requests for peacekeeping operations after the Cold War. PRD-13 focused on re-evaluation US policies towards financial support for peacekeeping operations, the probability of the mission's success, and how easily UN members would support any peacekeeping mission. Clinton's call for his advisors and staff to re-evaluate US policies towards UN peacekeeping missions included understanding the role UN peacekeeping missions played in US foreign policies. In particular, the ways that peacekeeping missions served US interests. and whether peacekeeping mission undermined America's ability to act unilaterally.²⁸⁷

The PRD also encouraged Clinton's advisors to analyze America's reliance on international organizations and operations as a means to downsize US military forces, as well as respond to changes in public and Congressional attitudes towards peacekeeping operations. Clinton also had his administration analyzed international repercussions of

²⁸⁶ "Presidential Review Directive/NSC-13" February 15, 1993, National Security Council and National Security Council Records Management, "PRD-13 – Multilateral Peace Keeping Operation, February 15, 1993," Clinton Digital Library accessed December 19, 2015, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36558>.

²⁸⁷ "Presidential Review Directive/NSC-13" February 15, 1993, National Security Council and National Security Council Records Management, "PRD-13 – Multilateral Peace Keeping Operation, February 15, 1993," Clinton Digital Library accessed December 19, 2015, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36558>.

the international community's increased reliance on UN peacekeeping missions to secure regional stability. In particular Clinton wanted to understand which countries or regions were more dependent on UN peacekeeping missions to resolve internal crises.²⁸⁸

PRD-13 introduced a post-Cold War re-evaluation towards UN peacekeeping missions. This included understanding their successes and failures. It also required the Clinton administration to reconsider how the United States determined how it would support and when it would participate in UN peacekeeping missions. These reconsiderations would lead to significant changes in the way the United States responded to calls for peacekeeping missions around the world. Additionally, it would change the way the United States influenced the world to support these types of operations. Traditionally the United States has provided much of the military and financial support for UN peacekeeping operations. However, the analysis requested by Clinton would introduce changes that revealed America's growing reluctance to peacekeeping missions, and increased pressure for peacekeeping missions to demonstrate the possibility of success before the United States participated.

In the fall of 1993, Clinton's advisors responded to PRD-13 with Presidential Decision Directive-25 "US Policy to Reform Multilateral Peace Operations." In PDD-25 the Clinton administration outlined changes the United States would make to its roles in UN peacekeeping missions. The administration began by reducing America's overall financial commitment to the UN. This included reducing America's financial

²⁸⁸ "Presidential Review Directive/NSC-13" February 15, 1993, National Security Council and National Security Council Records Management, "PRD-13 – Multilateral Peace Keeping Operation, February 15, 1993," Clinton Digital Library accessed December 19, 2015, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36558>.

responsibility for peacekeeping missions to 25 percent from 31.739 percent.²⁸⁹ In the UN, the United States was the largest financial contributor to UN operations. At the same time the United States also owed a significant debt to the UN for previous peacekeeping missions.²⁹⁰ By reducing America's financial responsibilities by 6.739 percent the United States would either force other UN members to make up the difference or force the UN to cut the costs of its operations, especially peacekeeping operations.

In addition to reducing America's financial responsibilities to the UN, PDD-25 established new benchmarks for peacekeeping proposals to meet before the United States would participate in a peacekeeping operation. These benchmarks were established to ensure that the United States was participating in peacekeeping operations that would succeed and not drag the United States into a quagmire. The criteria were also designed to focus American resources to those missions that were the United States could effectively support peace.²⁹¹ At the same time, the Clinton administration recognized that UN peacekeeping missions provided the United States with a method to respond to security threats in the post-Cold War period multilaterally. They argued that peacekeeping missions acted as force multipliers for US efforts to promote peace and stability around the world. However, to ensure that the United States could get the

²⁸⁹ National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents Concerning PDD-25, Peacekeeping," Clinton Digital Library, accessed December 19, 2015, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36623>.

²⁹⁰ PRD-13

²⁹¹ National Security Council and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents Concerning PDD-25, Peacekeeping," Clinton Digital Library, accessed December 19, 2015, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36623>.

maximum return from peacekeeping missions without placing too high a burden on the United States, peacekeeping missions had to meet certain criteria first.²⁹²

In PDD-25 the Clinton administration outlined eight requirements peacekeeping proposals had to meet before the United States would agree to participate. First, the proposed peacekeeping mission advanced American interests in the country or region. Second, peacekeeping operation was in response to a threat or breach of international peace due to international aggression, a humanitarian disaster, an illegal government change, or gross violation of human rights. Third, the proposals established clear objectives for the mission, and the mission was to either a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations²⁹³. Fourth, a ceasefire already existed for peace keeping missions that did not fall under Chapter VII of the UN Charter²⁹⁴. Fifth, due to significant threats to international or regional peace the peace operations were authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Sixth, the United States could financially afford to support and

²⁹² NSC and NSC Records Management Office, "PDD-25-US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, 5-3-1994," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12749>, 1.

²⁹³ According to the UN peacekeeping operations are deployed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement. Peacekeeping forces are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in early peacebuilding activities. Peace enforcement refers to coercive measures that includes the use of military force authorized by the UN Security Council to restore international peace and security in areas the Security Council had deemed a threat to the peace, breach of peace, or an act of aggression. United Nations, "Peace and Security" www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace/shtml.

²⁹⁴ UN Charter Chapter VII peacekeeping operations are authorized if peace negotiations as established in Article 41 fail to solve the conflict. Under Article 42 if the Security Council considers that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. Charter of the United Nations Chapter VII: Action With Respect To Threats To The Peace, Breaches Of The Peace, And Acts Of Aggression June 26, 1945 <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/>

participate in the operation. Seventh, the political, economic and humanitarian costs of UN inaction outweighed UN action. Eighth, the peace operation's duration was set and connected to clear objectives and a realistic criterion for ending the operation.²⁹⁵

The guidelines established by PDD-25 introduced restrictions on US involvement in UN peacekeeping missions to protect the United States from endangering its interests and over-extending its resources. However, these new guidelines would have unintended consequences on US relations with the UN and international community that would emerge as the UN attempted to respond to the genocide in Rwanda. These unintended consequences included limiting US leadership in the UN and discouraging other UN members from participating in peacekeeping operations in Rwanda. It would also lead the international community to question America's interests in the global community, and Clinton's strategy to keep the United States engaged with the world.

Initial Response to Rwandan Genocide

Following the outbreak of violence in Rwanda, American and other foreign governments prioritized evacuating their own citizens from Rwanda, before they worked on establishing a new peacekeeping mission to Rwanda. By 9 April, the United States had successfully evacuated all Americans from Rwanda by ground or French flights. Following the evacuation of US personnel, the Clinton administration supported Belgium's efforts to evacuate their citizens as violence escalated in Rwanda. Part of this support included cooperating with the French to secure the Kigali airport and airspace for

²⁹⁵ "Annex 1," in NSC and NSC Records Management Office, "PDD-25-US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, 5-3-1994," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12749>.

Belgium to deploy its troops to defend Belgium citizens in Rwanda.²⁹⁶ During the violence, the Hutu military killed UN personnel. The deaths of UN personnel by the Hutu military encouraged the Clinton administration to push the UNSC to end the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), “we make a lot of noise about terminating UN forces that aren’t working. Well few could be as clearly not working. We should work with the French to gain a consensus to terminate the UN Mission.”²⁹⁷

The failure of the UN peacekeeping forces to prevent the violence from renewing in Rwanda led the administration to conclude that attempting to maintain a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda would put more people in danger, and was not worth the risk. The United States was not alone in prioritizing the safety of its citizens, and helping other governments protect and evacuate personnel. However, the United States viewed the renewed violence in Rwanda as evidence that a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda was not a good investment of international resources. Richard Clarke’s email arguing for the United States to support efforts in the UN to end UNAMIR demonstrated America’s increased reticence to peacekeeping missions when the parties were unwilling to abide by their own agreements. Many viewed the failure rates for UN peacekeeping missions towards intranational conflicts, like the failure of UNAMIR, demonstrated the UN

²⁹⁶ “Richard A Clarke Email Rwanda: Next Steps for Sunday and Beyond, April 9, 1994” in National Security Council Global Issues and Multinational Affairs Office and Susan Rice, “Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda,” Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

²⁹⁷ “Richard A Clarke Email” Rwanda: Next Steps for Sunday and Beyond, April 9, 1994” in National Security Council Global Issues and Multinational Affairs Office and Susan Rice, “Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda,” Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

needed to re-evaluate how it designed and implemented peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period.

As the violence overtook Rwanda, the CIA reported that the outbreak of violence had ended all efforts by the Hutu government and RPF to abide by the Arusha accords. The CIA also reported that renewed violence had undermined the UNAMIR mandate, fueled massive refugee flows, threatened to rekindle ethnic violence in Burundi, and threatened to destabilize the region. They continued as the RPF attempted to gain control of the Rwandan government the fighting between the Hutu and RPF would be worse than the civil war because the RPF would attempt to gain control of the Rwandan government.²⁹⁸ The CIA's analysis revealed that the intranational ethnic violence in Rwanda, similar to the Bosnian War, would create refugee flows that would create humanitarian crises on Rwanda's borders that would destabilize other countries and possibly the region. At the same time the analysis gave the Clinton administration the evidence it needed to argue against continuing UNAMIR. The administration also understood that unless both sides were ready to stop fighting it was unlikely that a new mission would succeed.

On 11 April, Richard Clarke repeated his call for the United States to support calls to end the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. He also asked NSA Tony Lake for guidance on a response to a UN request for US assistance to remove its forces from Rwanda. Clark noted that the UN was likely to request a US airlift to facilitate the quick

²⁹⁸ Memorandum "Rwanda: Background to Crisis, April 9, 1994," CIA folder Steinberg, Donald African Affairs OAID 633 "Rwanda, Jan-July 1994 [10]" National Security Council, William Clinton Presidential Library.

withdrawal of UN forces from Rwanda. He continued that the French would attempt to withdraw their troops along with UN forces while Belgium deployed it's to defend and support the evacuation of its citizens.²⁹⁹ Lake responded that the United States "was inclined to help. But decision should go to Principals."³⁰⁰ At the beginning of the fighting the Clinton administration was willing to support international efforts to withdraw foreigners and UN forces from Rwanda. At the same time, the administration was slow establishing a policy response to Rwanda beyond evacuating American citizens from Rwanda, and ending UNAMIR. Part of this was because the United States has traditionally given foreign policies towards Africa a low priority. Another reason was because the United States was also dealing with the coup in Haiti and the Bosnian War as well as the Rwandan genocide, similar to the way the collapse of Yugoslavia got lost behind German reunification and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Historically, the African continent has been a low priority in American foreign policy, as US foreign policy traditional focused on US relations with Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Yet Clinton wanted to support the development of democracy, economic development, and conflict resolution there. In particular, Clinton wanted to address the roots of African conflicts, and encourage resolution efforts to internal disputes and continue US support for humanitarian missions. However, Clinton did not

²⁹⁹ Richard A Clarke Email "Rwanda Decision May Be Required" April 11, 1994," in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

³⁰⁰ Nancy C. Emery, Email, "Re: Rwanda: Decision May Be Required," April 11, 1994, in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

want to commit the United States to supporting long-term humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.³⁰¹ While Clinton argued that Africa was “one of our greatest challenges for a strategy of engagement and enlargement,” this did not make Africa a high national security interest.³⁰² Clinton’s interest in post-Cold War Africa was related to implementing international and internal policies that would support the growth of democracy and economic development, while continuing to support limited humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. However, the policy re-evaluation of international peacekeeping operations would further limit Clinton’s ability to engage in post-Cold War Africa, and to support peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda. The power of this policy re-evaluation also limited the influence of race, even as debates about race relations in the United States caused by the Rodney King beating, the LA Riots, and OJ Simpson murder trial increased the influence of multiculturalism in the United States and US foreign policy.

As the violence overtook the area, the UN started deliberating the future of UNAMIR. Many members including the United States supported ending UNAMIR rather than expanding UNAMIR’s mission. The CIA noted that African countries were conditionally willing to participate if adequate logistical support and equipment were provided. However, many western governments were reluctant to provide some of the

³⁰¹ William J. Clinton, *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 26-27, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994).

³⁰² Clinton, *NSS94*, 26.

required troops to field a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda.³⁰³ The CIA also noted that any expansion of UNAMIR faced contradictory desires from the Hutus and the RPF. The Hutu military wanted the UN to deploy a force large enough to enforce a cease fire and backup a political settlement while the RPF wanted a peacekeeping mission to augment the 2,500 UN force already in Rwanda.³⁰⁴ Along with the contradictory desires of the opposing parties, Belgium and France had withdrawn their forces they had deployed as part of UNAMIR to avoid being drawn into the Rwandan Civil War. Other UN members supported withdrawing their forces from UNAMIR in after the Hutu military had killed sixteen UNAMIR members.³⁰⁵

As the Clinton administration considered its next steps in Rwanda, it joined the majority of UN members in withdrawing its forces from UNAMIR and Rwanda. Clinton's decision to withdraw US forces from UNAMIR and to support international efforts to end the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda was the start of a cycle of hesitancy in international efforts to resolve the Rwandan genocide. Following the withdrawal of US citizens from Rwanda and supporting efforts to end UNAMIR, the Clinton administration adopted the policy guidelines established by PDD-25 for US participation in international peacekeeping efforts.

³⁰³ National Intelligence Daily, April 5, 1995, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room accessed December 18, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000836137.pdf

³⁰⁴ National Intelligence Daily "Rwanda: Risks to An Expanding UN Force" April 6, 1994," CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000836133.pdf

³⁰⁵ "Rwanda: Tutsi Military Poised to Attack, April 11, 1994", in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

Following the successful evacuation of Americans and other foreigners, the Clinton administration started drafting policies and strategies for the US response to Rwanda. During a NSC meeting on Rwanda, the Clinton administration decided that America's main strategy was to carry out humanitarian relief by resettling Rwandan refugees and those displaced inside Rwanda. However, any US force deployed to Rwanda would be focused on providing security for International Committee of the Red Cross humanitarian aid deliveries and rather than deliver humanitarian aid. It also decided the United States would support international efforts to establish a new cease-fire between the Hutu and the RPF. During this first policy meeting, there was no discussion about America's position in the UN on UNAMIR, its mission, or deploying US troops as part of a peace enforcement mission to Rwanda.³⁰⁶ From this initial meeting the Clinton administration decided that the situation in Rwanda was a humanitarian crisis, and that the United States would provide security for humanitarian aid deliveries for those Rwandans displaced by the conflict. This fit within Clinton's national security strategy and the increased selectivity the administration planned for post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. However, PDD-25 also made policies towards Rwanda contradictory to Clinton's desires to keep the United States engaged in the world. By establishing onerous prerequisites for American participation, PDD-25 effectively kept the United States out of proposed peacekeeping missions to Rwanda.

³⁰⁶ "Handwritten notes of Meeting on Rwanda and Angola April 12, 1994" in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

Thirteen days after the violence began in Rwanda, the administration received an appeal from Human Watch, a NGO that monitored human rights violations, to oppose the quick withdraw of UNAMIR because the mission was supposed to be protecting 25,000 Rwandans from the genocide.³⁰⁷ Up to this point the Clinton administration had treated the violence in Rwanda as a resumption of the civil war that was stopped by the *Arusha Accords* in 1993. With the appeal from Human Watch, the administration received one of the first calls for aid to end the Hutu-led genocide against the Tutsi and their Hutu supporters.

In response to the letter from Human Watch, Eric Schwartz asked Susan Rice and Donald Steinberg, “if true shouldn’t it be a major factor informing high-level decision making on this issue? has it been?”³⁰⁸ The Clinton administration responded by investigating Human Watch’s claims, but did not change the administration’s policies. Additionally, there was no further discussion of genocide in Rwanda until the end of April in preparation for UN discussions about peacekeeping in Rwanda. The Clinton administration’s reluctance to describe the violence in Rwanda as a genocide, and its determination to withdraw UNAMIR forces from Rwanda contradicted Clinton’s statements in his 1994 national security strategy to improve US relations with the African continent and encourage resolution efforts for internal conflicts. It also contradicted

³⁰⁷ Eric P Schwartz to Susan E. Rice and Donald K Steinberg Email “Pullout of UNAMIR, April 19, 1994,” in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, “Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda,” Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

³⁰⁸ Eric P Schwartz to Susan E. Rice and Donald K Steinberg Email “Pullout of UNAMIR, April 19, 1994,” in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, “Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda,” Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

PDD-25 guideline that allowed the United States to participate in peacekeeping missions where substantial human rights violations were occurring.

On 20 April, the administration resumed discussions on the refugee issue in Rwanda, and the status of the UNAMIR forces protecting Rwandans in a Kigali soccer stadium. They noted that rather than the 25,000 Human Watch had claimed, the remaining 2,100 UNAMIR forces were protecting between 6,000-12,000 Rwandans in the Kigali soccer stadium. The meeting participants discussed UNAMIR assets, and noted UNAMIR personnel lacked the necessary equipment to fully equip their forces let alone defend the Rwandans seeking refuge in the stadium.³⁰⁹ This information did not encourage the administration to alter its policies, and it continued to focus on humanitarian aid. Additionally, the administration resumed plans to push the UN to recall UNAMIR forces after its mandate ended. The NSC/DC began discussion on where to relocate the Rwandan refugees that were relying on UNAMIR protection in preparation for UNAMIR's withdrawal.

After discussing the status of the UNAMIR, the NSC/DC presented four options to withdraw UNAMIR forces the Rwandans under UNAMIR's protection from Kigali. The first option relocated UNAMIR into RPF controlled area. The committee noted that while this option was the easiest to carry out it was also the most dangerous. The second option was to relocate UNAMIR and the Rwanda refugees to Tanzania. Unfortunately, twenty thousand Rwandan's had already fled there to escape the violence. Additionally,

³⁰⁹ "Handwritten Meeting Notes "Rwanda: Refugee Issue" April 20, 1994 in in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

there were numerous logistical difficulties including safely travelling hostile Hutu controlled territory, and in order to relocate UNAMIR and the Rwandans the United States would need permission from the Tanzanian government. The penultimate option was to relocate everyone north of the violence, but it required the UNAMIR and the Rwandan refugees to travel a long distance, it was logistically difficult, and there were less resources available in the north. The final option was to withdraw UNAMIR and the 12,000 refugees to Uganda, leave the Rwandans in refugee camps, and establish a UNHCR operation. The committee was concerned that if the 12,000 Rwandans were relocated to Uganda it would encourage more refugees to flee there, increasing the refugee population from 12,000 to 250,000.³¹⁰

The committee also discussed the repercussions of UNAMIR's continued presence in Rwanda. They noted that while UNAMIR provided a safe location for Rwandans fleeing the violence, it placed UN personnel in danger and pressured other countries to deploy their troops into a highly unstable situation to participate in a peace operation.³¹¹ At this point neither Clinton nor his administration were not ready to deploy US forces to a peace operation in Rwanda. Instead they remained focused on withdrawing UNAMIR and the refugees they were protecting to reduce pressure for the international community and the United States to deploy additional forces to protect the Rwandans from the violence.

³¹⁰ "Handwritten Meeting Notes "Rwanda: Refugee Issue" April 20, 1994 in in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

³¹¹ "Handwritten Meeting Notes "Rwanda: Refugee Issue" April 20, 1994 in in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

The Clinton administration's focus at the start of the Rwandan genocide was to protect American and foreign citizens and UN personnel from the violence in Rwanda. This priority limited the administration's ability to draft responses to stop the violence in Rwanda before all foreign personnel were safely evacuated from Rwanda. At the same time, the Clinton administration's attentions were divided between responding to the crises in Bosnia and Haiti. As Bush had responded to the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War, Clinton was unwilling to deploy US forces to enforce peace in Rwanda and to end the ethnic violence occurring there. Both Clinton and Bush were reluctant to intervene in ethnic conflicts where one ethnic population was attempting to eliminate the other. While Clinton would gradually move to pressure the Bosnian parties to reach a settlement, Clinton did not implement similar strategies towards Rwanda. Instead, Clinton remained fixed on humanitarian relief and supporting African-led negotiations between the Hutus and the RPF.

Reports of Genocide

On 28 April, the NSC/DC issued a discussion paper that described the situation in Rwanda. The report noted that by 28 April 100,000 Rwandans had been killed, the government and RPF continued to fight, and paramilitary forces were massacring Tutsi and moderate Hutus while radio stations called for additional killings. At the same time, the remaining 270 UNAMIR forces were trying to protect 12,000 Rwandans at Kigali stadium, and 500,000 Rwandans had fled to the borders of Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire

where the refugees were denied permission to cross the borders and needed humanitarian assistance.³¹²

The NSC/DC outlined six short-term policy objectives that the Interagency Working Group had identified. First, the United States needed to pressure the RPF and Rwandan army to stop killing Rwandan civilians. Second, the United States should support UN and non-government organization efforts to re-establish a ceasefire in Rwanda. Third, the United States should encourage and help Tanzania and other African countries' efforts to pressure the RPF and Hutu military leaders to restart peace negotiations. Fourth the administration had to prevent the violence from spreading to neighboring countries. Fifth the US government needed to push the UN to expand humanitarian efforts in Rwanda. Finally, the administration needed to prevent similar violence from erupting in Burundi.³¹³ These short-term policy objectives focused on diplomatic methods that could end the violence in Rwanda, establish humanitarian relief, and contain and prevent further violence and destabilization in the region. None of these objectives included a long-term objective for US policies towards Rwanda. Instead the administration focused policies were embedded with traditional themes of promoting security and stability and international cooperation to thwart aggression to achieve short-term goals it believed were most likely to succeed.

³¹² Richard Clarke Email, "Rwanda DC Paper April 28, 1994, in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

³¹³ Richard Clarke Email, "Rwanda DC Paper April 28, 1994, in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

The State Department carried out an action plan based on the NSC/DC's policy discussions. The State Department's action plan that included a vigorous foreign policy program and talking points for meetings with the Secretary General, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) leaders, concerned European states, and regional leaders. The paper also included suggestions for the OAU to deploy a peacekeeping force to Rwanda, begin preventative diplomacy, deter aggression in Burundi, establish an arms embargo against Rwanda, initiate a human rights or genocide investigation, and prepare implement a UN operation to protect the Rwandan refugees. The NSC/DC planned to review the paper the first week of May. It also planned to express American support for UNSC resolutions that established an arms embargo, a genocide investigation, and refugee assistance in Rwanda.³¹⁴ The discussion paper was a continuation of the Clinton administration's humanitarian policy for Rwanda, but expanded to produce more diplomatic pressure to encourage the Rwandan's to stop fighting and killing. It also avoided deploying US forces to Rwanda unless the conditions in PDD-25 were met. At the same time, the Clinton administration continued to encourage regional multinational institutions to lead and initiate cooperative peace efforts to end the conflict.

The Rwandan Peacekeeping Mission and PDD-25

As May began and the violence continued, the Clinton administration decided to materially support any OAU and other regional efforts to protect Rwandan refugees and end acts the genocide in Rwanda. The administration also continued to avoid deploying

³¹⁴ Richard A Clarke, Email, "For Sandy's Approval: Draft DC Summary, April 29, 1994," in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

US forces to help end the violence in Rwanda. The United States also started broadcasting Clinton's 30 April appeal to the Rwandans to stop fighting and re-enter peace negotiations through international radio broadcasts. The administration recognized that though the parties heard Clinton's appeal the leaders were ignoring it. By this time, the United States was sending delegates to work with regional African leaders to create a peace plan to end the fighting and develop methods to protect and provide for Rwandan refugees. US officials were also contacting RPF and Rwandan government leaders daily in an effort to maintain pressure to convince both sides to agree to a new ceasefire and new negotiations. Lastly the State Department had assembled \$15,000,000 in emergency humanitarian relief assistance for the refugees along Rwanda's borders.³¹⁵

Since Clinton and his advisors were determined to avoid deploying American forces to Rwanda and risking American lives to end the conflict, the United States had focused its policies on providing humanitarian relief to Rwanda and supporting UN and OAU efforts to end the conflict in Rwanda. The Clinton administration's reasons for this policy were based on the guidelines established in PDD-25 that set criteria for US participation in multinational peacekeeping operations. It was also based on America's participation in peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia which was dividing the administration's attention and US resources. In this situation, the international community was attempting to resolve multiple intranational conflicts occurring concurrently, which prevented it from engaging in each crisis equally. This meant that the

³¹⁵ Email "Additional Actions on Rwanda," May 1, 1994 Donald K Steinberg, in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

Rwandan genocide was competing for attention against crises that had been ongoing when the fighting resumed in Rwanda. It also increased US reluctance to participate in another peacekeeping mission in a country where the peacekeeping forces might be deployed for a long period.

The UN peacekeeping mission to Rwanda was the first test of PDD-25 on US policies towards multinational peace operations. On 3 May, Samuel Berger met with Kofi Annan, UN Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping. During the meeting Berger provided Annan with a copy of PDD-25, and informed Annan that that the Clinton administration had concerns about the proposed peace operation to Rwanda, and that the United States was not committing troops for UN peacekeeping operations. Berger informed Annan that the Clinton administration hoped the UN received enough troop commitments from the other countries to carry out the peacekeeping operation. Berger also stated that the United States would attempt to provide financial and logistical support for a UN mission to Rwanda, including fifteen million dollars for emergency relief efforts.³¹⁶

From the first attempts to deploy peacekeeping forces to Rwanda, the Clinton administration's implementation of PDD-25 limited US participation in military efforts to end the violence. It also pushed the United States towards a more selective involvement in peacekeeping efforts. During the crises in Bosnia and Haiti, the United States increased its participation and leadership roles. However, using PDD-25 to guide US

³¹⁶ Email "Your Meeting with Kofi Annan Tuesday May 3, 1994 at 12:15pm" Susan E. Rice to Samuel Berger May 3, 1994 in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

policies towards peacekeeping missions prevented the administration from adopting a similar strategy to resolve the conflict in Rwanda. Since the United States had increased its requirements for participating in peacekeeping missions, it forced the rest of the international community to provide the support the United States would not. However, even with US financial and political support the OAU and UN were unable to overcome the hindrance that US reluctance to participate created in other countries.

The effects of PDD-25 and the Clinton administration's position on post-Cold War peacekeeping operations was most evident during Vice President Al Gore's meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on Rwanda. Before the meeting, the NSC Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office gave Gore talking points that explained US concerns about policy towards Rwanda. The talking points noted that the United States believed the international community needed to provide more support to create a lasting solution in Rwanda, and that the United States wanted to explore UN proposals further. The talking points also encouraged Gore to stress America's continued commitment to providing humanitarian relief, implementing the embargo, and supporting UNHRC investigations in Rwanda. Gore was also instructed to inform Boutros-Ghali the United States was interested in creating a protective zone on the Rwandan border to provide international support for the refugees.³¹⁷

Gore was also given points for expressing America's main reservations against General Dallaire's peace enforcement proposal. The talking points focused on Dallaire's

³¹⁷ Email "Final Rwanda Talking Points, May 7, 1994" Susan E Rice to Donald K. Steinberg and Richard A. Clarke, in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

proposal for a large deployment of peace enforcement forces mandated to end the fighting, restore law and order, and pacify the population. The United States was not concerned that Dallaire's proposal would lead to mission that was more complex than the mission to Somalia. There were also concerns that the Rwandans would attack UN troops as they carried out operations, the lack of member commitments for troops, and the high improbability that the UN would successfully raise enough troops for such a large-scale operation. Other US concerns included the logistical difficulties staging the mission out of the Kigali airport because it was at the center of the civil war, the mission mandate and timeline were unclear, and there were few chances of success. Despite American reservations, Gore was to express that the United States had not ruled out or in any response. The talking points suggested that Gore conclude the meeting by explaining to Boutros-Ghali that the United States was willing to support a viable and clear peacekeeping proposal UN mission if American troops financial resources, air power, and equipment were available.³¹⁸

The reservations listed at the end of Gore's talking points were closely tied to CIA and State Department memos on possible dangers a UN force faced in Rwanda. The memos pointed to the difficulties experienced in Somalia as a warning to the difficulties the UN mission would face in Rwanda. In particular conducting a peacekeeping operation in a country where the parties had not agreed to a cease-fire would require the UN to deploy a large force to enforce peace. The mission risked becoming part of the

³¹⁸ Email "Final Rwanda Talking Points, May 7, 1994" Susan E Rice to Donald K. Steinberg and Richard A. Clarke, in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

political entanglements between the two sides, which increased the troops exposure to attacks from either side. Talking points reconnected these concerns to PDD-25 guidelines for US participation in multinational peacekeeping operations.³¹⁹

As the talking points reveal the United States had significant reservations towards Dallaire's proposed peacekeeping mission to Rwanda based on previous experiences in Somalia and the situation in Rwanda. While the Clinton administration was wary of deploying US troops to participate, the administration did not rule out the possibility of providing financial and logistical support once the UN decided to deploy a mission to Rwanda.

As the genocide continued into May, the Clinton administration remained committed to a humanitarian policy strategy to support Rwandan refugees. The NSC/DC meetings continued to discuss General Dallaire's proposal for an expanding UNAMIR's mandate, and UN plans to forcefully stop the killing by deploying a UN force. They also explored diplomatic efforts to protect Rwandan refugees along the Tanzanian, Ugandan, and Zairian borders. This included discussing the creation of safe zones, and scheduling humanitarian airlifts for supplies as diseases were spreading through the refugee camps. They analyzed the positions of the RPF and Rwandan government in relation to future

³¹⁹ Memorandum from CIA to John Brims, Susan Rice, and Colonel Baltimore, "Rwanda PKO," in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office, and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, accessed December 19, 2015, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>. 91-95.

peace efforts. They also discussed French plans to deploy the Foreign Legionnaires to limit the fighting and deliver humanitarian aid.³²⁰

Conclusions

Throughout the Rwandan crisis, the Clinton administration adhered to PDD-25 and focused on policies directed toward humanitarian aid rather than deploying US forces as part of a peacekeeping mission. In the post-Cold War period, the Rwandan episode showed that the United States continued to selectively engage in world crisis. However, selective engagement made it difficult for the United States to encourage cooperative actions to deter aggression and to participate in multinational peace operations. The creation of Presidential Decision Directive-25 towards US policies in multinational peacekeeping missions added to the difficulties the Clinton administration faced encouraging international cooperation while limiting US participation to financial and logistical support. In addition, the PDD-25 hindered others who pushed for UN peacekeeping missions to end the violence in Rwanda.

While Clinton had desired to introduce more American interest in the African continent, his policy strategies towards the genocide in Rwanda contradicted that national security strategy. At the same time, Clinton and his advisors' attention was divided between the crises in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia. In Somalia, the United States was participating in a UN peacekeeping mission, while in Haiti Clinton was preparing the United States to start a multinational peacekeeping operation. These crises pushed

³²⁰ This refers to all the Handwritten meeting notes on Rwanda from May 9, 1994 to July 20, 1994 in National Security Council, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office and Susan Rice, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda," Clinton Digital Library, <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>.

Rwanda into a lower priority for US national security and foreign policy decisions. Even so, the Clinton administration attempted to encourage the OAU to led international efforts to resolve the Rwandan genocide by pressuring the Hutu and RPF to accept a cease-fire and negotiations for a new government.

CHAPTER VIII POST-COLD WAR CRISES FRAMING AND AGENDA SETTING AND PUBLIC OPINION

Scholars have shown that the 1960s was a crucial period in the evolution of mass media and communications, and the public's ability to influence the media and foreign policy. The civil rights movements of the mid-twentieth century and the anti-Vietnam War movement enabled and encouraged America's media outlets to challenge the frames and public agenda settings established by American presidents. This period was pivotal to establishing the media's ability to challenge public debates and to sway public opinion away from the cold war consensus, as the media rose as a national power capable of challenging the American government's authority. At the same time, the increased competition between cable television and the three broadcast networks decreased the president's ability to rely on dedicated television coverage to express his policies and set the frames and agendas for American policies. After the end of the Cold War, telecommunication technology advances gave the media greater abilities to challenge the president's frames and agendas, to influence public opinion to redirect American foreign policy debates, and to force foreign policy changes.

In this chapter I argue that between 1989 and 1995 Bush, Clinton, and the US mass media competed to define and contextualize foreign crises for the American public to produce support or opposition for foreign policy decisions. I contend that in the post-Cold War period, the introduction of new telecommunications technologies changed the way the media and presidents influenced public opinion. These new technologies also altered the public's relationship with American presidents and the way the American public and public opinion influenced presidential foreign policy decisions. The expansion

of satellite communications enabled the start of twenty-four-hour cable news networks, like CNN, that kept Americans informed of domestic and foreign events. At the same time, the introduction of the home computer, public access to the internet, and electronic mail (email) provided the American public with easier methods to express opinions to policymakers and the media. The increased presence of the public's opinion and the media after the Cold War, forced Bush and Clinton to debate their foreign affairs framing and agendas with political opponents, the media, and the public to get public support for their decisions. Bush and Clinton's success depended on their ability to establish a frame and agenda the public easily accepted and the media supported. However, if the media or political opponents presented convincing counter-frames and agendas then Bush and Clinton were less successful gaining public opinion.

Theories on the Relationships between Mass Media, the President, and American Public Opinion

In response to the growing anti-Vietnam War movement American president Richard Nixon said, "In each nights TV news and each morning paper the war was reported battle by battle but little or no sense of the underlying purpose of the fighting was conveyed."³²¹ Nixon continued that the lack of context made it appear that the United States was fighting a war without a purpose or objective, and the media's "relentless and literal reporting" on human suffering and the sacrifices of American

³²¹ Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 350 quoted in Daniel C. Hallin, *The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989) 3.

soldiers demoralized the American public.³²² As Nixon's statement reveals the media's ability to move public opinion behind or against for the president's foreign policy decisions by establishing counter frames and agendas to the president's. It also reveals that the media's focus on presenting entertaining and dramatic stories without context prevented the American public from fully understanding foreign affairs and encouraged public opinion to oppose foreign policy decisions that failed to end human suffering.

Robert Entman explains that the relationship between policy elites, the media, and public is an important factor in foreign policy decision making. He explains that the power dynamic in this relationship is best explained as a cascade of frames and agendas started by the president that flow downward to the media and public. Entman's cascading activation theory shows that after the president and other policy elites express their opinions on foreign policy that the media chooses to support or oppose those opinions. This president and other policy elites respond to the media's coverage of the policy debate. At the same time, the public absorbs the messages from the president, policy elites, and the media, and makes its own opinion to approve or disapprove of the media and policymakers, which is then fed back up to the media and policymakers. The public's opinion is reflected in future news coverage and policy elites adjusted messages or policy decisions.³²³ Entman's theory established that foreign policymaking is not isolated to policy elites. Instead, foreign policymaking is a complicated process where the media,

³²² Daniel C. Hallin, *The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989) 3.

³²³ Robert Entman, *Projections of Power*, 1-9.

policymakers, and the American public interact with each other at different power levels influencing changes as policies and events are publicly debated.

During the post-Cold War period, ABC's *World News Tonight* had an average viewership of 11.1 million Americans, CBS's *Evening News* had 9.9 million, and NBC's *Nightly News* had 9.4 million views for a combined total of 30.4 million American adults watching the evening news on broadcast television.³²⁴ It meant that at any time approximately thirty million members of the American public had some access to news about foreign events. The media's news coverage of the changing international environment after the Cold War included depictions of the continued violence and instability around the world following the fall of communism.

These depictions encouraged the American public to view the post-Cold War period as chaotic. Additionally, the media's use of images of starving refugees, mutilated bodies, and suffering women and children appealed to the public's morality. These images could move the public to pressure the government to intervene in a crisis or conflict. At the same time, images of people American soldiers who were deployed to a country to provide humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping could turn public opinion against the intervention. The media's influence on public opinion is not new. However, the increased pressure the media can bring on governments due to technological changes during the later decades of the twentieth-century has led to the CNN effect. In response to

³²⁴ "Network Evening News Ratings" March 13, 2006, Pew Research Center, www.journalism.org/numbers/network-evening-news-ratings/

the CNN effect presidents now had to engage in media diplomacy as well as hard and soft diplomacy to achieve policy successes.³²⁵

As the Cold War ended many Americans hoped for a peaceful and stable period. However, conflicts, crises, and instability plagued the post-Cold War period from the start. Few Americans considered these crises direct threats to the United States compared to the threat the Soviet Union posed for the previous forty years. Additionally, few Americans supported the United States acting as the world's policeman though many recognized that the United States was the world's only superpower. Americans were also less supportive of deploying American forces abroad to respond to conflicts that were not international acts of aggression, and placing American troops under UN command. Instead, much of the American public turned its attention to domestic issues, most Americans ignored or divested in foreign affairs that did not directly affect their lives.³²⁶

Scholars have also shown that unlike the president, the American public does not have a sophisticated understanding of foreign affairs to influence US foreign policy. This is important as surveys have revealed that only one third of the American public is interested in foreign affairs and US foreign policy. Part of this is due to the public's tendency to ignore or avoid foreign policy news it considers too distant or confusing. However, this lack of knowledge does not prevent the American public from having an

³²⁵ Eytan Gilboa, "Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects." *Diplomacy and Statescraft* 12 no. 2 (June 2001): 1-28 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592290108406201>.

³²⁶ Andrew Kohut, ed. "America's Place in the World: An Investigation of the Attitudes of American Influentials and the American Public on International Politics" Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, 28-32, 41.

opinion about foreign policy or world problems.³²⁷ Instead, Americans continue to express their opinions about foreign affairs and US foreign policies even when those opinions are based on limited information and challenges the presidents understanding of foreign events.

George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton had to navigate this changing power dynamic between themselves and the media to defend and promote their foreign policy decisions to the American public. This included establishing their frames and agendas for the foreign affairs the United States was involved to gain public. Clinton's and Bush's ability to successfully establish their frames and agendas determined their ability to gain public support, and prevent the media from establishing counter frames and agendas Each president had to confidently and concisely justifying why the conflict or crisis warranted his policy decision. However, if the president failed to convincingly accomplish this, then the mass media was open to set its own frame and agenda, and gain the ability to sway public opinion against the president.³²⁸ Additionally, if the president's ratings are below 50 percent the president has less influence on public opinion than when his ratings are about 50 percent.³²⁹In this situation, the president's ability to use media outlets to disseminate his views determined how successfully he could lead foreign policy debates,

³²⁷ Powlick and Katz, "Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus," 31-35.

³²⁸ Jeffrey S. Peake, "Presidential Agenda Setting in Foreign Policy," *Political Research Quarterly* 54, no. 1 (March 2001): 69-86. Jeffrey Cohen, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda," *American Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 1 (February 1995): 87-107.

³²⁹ Jordan and Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 227-237.

and thereby implement the foreign policy agenda he desired. However, the president does not have unquestioned influence.

Along with the rise of media diplomacy America's presidents also had to respond to the negative effects cable television had on ratings and popularity of televised presidential statements. In the age of cable television, the American public could choose to ignore presidential statements by changing the channel. The increased popularity of cable television and the American public's ability to watch something other than presidential addresses has decreased media coverage of these addresses, and encouraged presidents to reduce the number of addresses they give.³³⁰ However, presidential rhetoric and statements about foreign affairs remains a strong influence on public opinion despite of the cable television's popularity.³³¹

As early as the late 1970s, scholars have shown that public opinion can shape and change foreign policy especially "when opinion changes are large and sustained."³³² However, public opinion is not developed in a vacuum. The news the public watches and reads has its own frames, agenda setting, attributes of responsibility, and policy preferences that may or may not diverge from those established by the president. Like the president, television news has a substantial effect on collective public opinion, while each source television news uses has a different level of influence to newspapers. Televised

³³⁰ Baum and Kernell, "Has Cable Ended the Golden Age of Presidential Television?" *The American Political Science Review* 93 no. 1, (March 1999): 99-114. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585763>

³³¹ Garry Young and William B. Perkins, "Perkins Rhetoric, the Public Agenda, and the End of Presidential Television's Golden Age," *The Journal of Politics* 67 no. 4 (November 2005): 1190-1205. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00356.x>

³³² Donald L. Jordan and Benjamin I. Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The Role of TV News," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36, no. 2 (June 1992): 227.

news broadcasts use of commentators including anchors, field reporters, experts, research studies, and special commentators have a greater influence on public opinion than special interest groups, demonstrations, and foreign news sources.³³³ The ability of the media to use these sources effectively to influence public opinion does not enable the media to tell the public what to think. Instead the media and president are competing to tell the American public what to think about and to determine what events are important.

The media's ability to influence public opinion relies on journalists' abilities to "focus our attention and influence our perceptions of what are the most important issues of the day."³³⁴ From the location of a story in the broadcast or newspaper, the size of the headline, the length of the newspaper article, and reporting on a story day-after-day the media can direct public attention to issues and events it deems important for the public agenda. In this way, the media sets the public agenda and influences what the American public thinks about. This also provides the media with the ability to encourage specific policies for the government to implement.³³⁵

The media's ability to influence public opinion and set the public agenda is as important as the way it frames those issues. The way the mass media frames or chooses to describe an issue or event, can affect the way the public understands what is occurring. It can also affect public opinion in strongly enough that the change in public opinion forces the president to change his foreign policy. Philip Hammond argues that the

³³³ Jordan and Page, "Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 227-237.

³³⁴ McCombs, *Setting the Agenda*, 23.

³³⁵ McCombs, *Setting the Agenda*, 23-24.

European media's descriptions of the collapse of Yugoslavia and Bosnian War as an "ethnic conflict" was "really a refusal of explanation: the tendency to down-play or ignore historical and political factors...and to suggest instead that conflict is somehow inevitable and incomprehensible."³³⁶ Additionally, the use of a civil war frame implies that all sides are equally to blame whereas an ethnic cleansing and genocide frame established that one side has more responsibility for the conflict.³³⁷ As Hammond demonstrates with his study on reporting on Yugoslavia and Bosna, the frames the media uses influences the ways that people understand an issue, positively or negatively, and intervenable or not.

Since the 1960s mass media scholars have debated media's power to influence public opinion and change foreign policy. Following the introduction of real-time communications via satellite communications and the twenty-four-hour cable news network, CNN, media scholars termed this theory "the CNN factor."³³⁸ The CNN factor refers to the process by which the media influences foreign policy by evoking responses in the audience through concentrated and emotionally biased news coverage, which in turn applies pressure to governments to adopt policy responses to the covered conflict or crisis.

The CNN factor Originally referred to the effect CNN broadcasting had on the Persian Gulf. Since then the theory has been applied broadly to refer to all real-time

³³⁶ Hammond, *Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts*, 5.

³³⁷ Hammond, *Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts*, 5-6.

³³⁸ Piers Robinson, *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention*, (New York: Routledge, 2003) 2.

communications technology via the news media.³³⁹ Virgil Hawkins shows that there is a downside to the CNN factor. Hawkins argues that it is impossible for the media to give every conflict high priority coverage. This creates imbalanced coverage which means that a conflict that is potentially more relevant to US national security or humanitarian interests is overlooked. This lack of coverage prevents public pressure from building to a point that it pressures the government to create a policy response to the conflict. Hawkins contends that the media's inability to cover every conflict leads to an absence of policy towards those conflicts not covered by the media because the government has little incentive to become involved.³⁴⁰ During the post-Cold War period when multiple conflicts occurred concurrently this lack of media coverage had significant effects on US foreign policy.

The "other side of the CNN factor" shows that without public opinion and interest in an issue there is no motivation for the media to include an issue in the public agenda or for the government to develop policies. This relationship is why public opinion, and mass media's influence on public opinion are important to policymakers and their ability to direct mass media frames and agenda.³⁴¹ This relationship is also why presidents attempt to frame foreign affairs according to their preferred foreign policy strategy so that the public will support that policy and the president's decisions. When the media and public

³³⁹ Robinson, *The CNN*, 2.

³⁴⁰ Virgil Hawkins, "The Other Side of the CNN Factor: The Media and Conflict," *Journalism Studies* 3, no. 2 (2002): 225-240.

³⁴¹ Philip J. Powlick, "The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials," *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 4 (December 1995): 427-451. Philip J. Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz, "Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus," *Mershon International Studies Review* 42, no. 1 (May 1998): 29-61.

opinion diverge from the president's frame and agenda they can force the president to change his foreign policies in ways that undermine his policy goals or US interests. As the United States responded to the post-Cold War period under Bush and then Clinton's leadership, their foreign policies elicited different responses from the media and public opinion that affected how both presidents implemented their national security strategy and foreign policies.

Presidential Statements, Public Opinion, Media, and German Reunification

As democratic revolutions swept Eastern Europe and Germany, many Americans viewed them as initiating a period of peace and stability, even as those changes brought instability and fears. At that time, Americans were focused on a peaceful future, even as policymakers feared the instability in Eastern Europe posed significant threats to the United States. As Warsaw Pact members broke away as the Soviet Union refused to intervene, these events were viewed as evidence that America's cold war strategy of containment was successful as against the Soviet Union and communist expansion. In the months after the opening of the Berlin Wall as Europe supported and opposed German unification, most Americans supported it. Also, most Americans did not believe a reunited Germany would attempt to dominate the world again. The broad base of support for German reunification crossed generational lines, including most of those that had lived through WWII.³⁴²

³⁴² Robin Toner, "Clamor in the East; Survey Finds Americans Favor a Reunited Germany," *NYT* December 1, 1989, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/427493259?accountid=13946>.

Additionally, a solid majority of Americans believed that reuniting Germany was a good thing for Western security and international security arrangements. Part of this was because few Americans feared the changes occurring in Europe, or believed the changes in Europe would weaken the US-European military alliances. Most Americans also believed that the benefits of reduced US-Soviet tensions outweighed the drawbacks caused by any instability in Eastern Europe.³⁴³

These opinions improved Bush's ability to successfully carry out his policy to reunify Germany even as Europe remained reluctant to endorse German reunification. While Bush enjoyed a high level of public support for German reunification, he still faced criticisms and opposition to his policies. To offset the influence of the opposition and maintain public support, Bush made public statements that explained the situation in Germany in ways that justified his policies, and established that German reunification was a boon for US interests and security. The high levels of public support also limited the media's ability to diverge greatly from Bush's framing and agenda for Germany's reunification.

Bush had to continue to convince the American public that German reunification was a boon for US interests and European. However, this was not an uphill climb as most Americans viewed German reunification positively. To maintain public support for his efforts to reunify Germany Bush had to frame the events in Germany as improving European security and economy, and describing Germany's reunification as the German citizens right to determine the future of their country. Bush did this by issuing statements

³⁴³ Larry Hugick, "Public Embraces Changes in Eastern Europe With Few Exceptions" *GPM* no. 291 (December 1989): 3 -5.

that embraced the German people's desire for unification, justified the merits of reunification in terms of American, European, and world interests, and defended the Germans' right to self-determination. By doing this and doing it repeatedly, Bush established a frame and agenda for German unification in the United States that many Americans accepted, even as strong opposition in Europe and American critics challenged Bush's perspective.

Bush's frame included expressions of confidence in the German people's ability to unite under democracy and avoid the militarism and totalitarianism that had led the country to follow a leader into a second world war and the most infamous case of genocide. He did this with repeated statements urging the American public and Europeans not to fear, "and there are some that worry about it...But what I say is as I tried to the other day: This is 1989. And we can learn from history, but we also can look to the future. And my view is: Let this matter be determined by the people in Germany."³⁴⁴ He also established that the opening of the Berlin Wall and reunification of Germany were positive changes for Europe, the world, and the Cold War environment.³⁴⁵ He also connected German reunification with a warming of the Cold War and greater international peace and security. The day the border opened Bush said, "Clearly this is a long way from the harshest Iron Curtain days, a long way from that," and that the world was closer to a "Europe whole and free," as Eastern Europe reconnected with Western Europe, democracy spread among the eastern governments, and enjoyed the benefits of

³⁴⁴ George Bush, "Interview with Foreign Journalists, November 21, 1989," *PPPGB 1989*, 1588-1589.

³⁴⁵ *PPPGB 1989-1990*.

the Helsinki Final Act³⁴⁶.³⁴⁷ Bush also succeeded because the media embraced the celebratory attitudes from Germany during the opening of the border, and presented it to the American public.

As the Europeans gathered to prepared to reunify Germany, the 57 percent of Americans that reported that they had followed media discussions about German reunification. During the same poll 82 percent of Americans believed the American press had done a good or excellent job covering the events and discussions about Germany's reunification.³⁴⁸ Both percentages remained constant between January and March 1990 as the American public consistently agreed that the media had done either a good or excellent job covering Eastern Europe and German reunification efforts, and about half report maintaining current about the situation.³⁴⁹ The high level of public interest in events in Eastern Europe and Germany encouraged the media to cover events there, and

³⁴⁶ The Helsinki Final Act was part of a European conference on security issues in 1954 that the Soviet Union wanted to have with other European countries after WWII. However, the United States and Western Europe were reluctant to agree due to fears that the conference would strengthen the Soviet Union and encourage communist expansionism. As a result, no action was taken until the early 1970s with the rise of détente. In 1972, the Helsinki consultations began and went through the creation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1973 and lasted until 1975 when the Helsinki Final Act was signed by the United States, Canada, and European country except for Albania. The Helsinki Final Act had four sections, the first had ten principles covering political and military issues, territorial integrity, border definitions, peaceful settlement of disputes, and confidence building measures between rival militaries. The second focused on economic issues, and the third emphasized human rights, including migration freedoms, the reunification of divided families, cultural exchanges, and freedom of the press. The fourth established details for future CSCE meetings. Department of State, "Milestones 1969-1976: Helsinki Final Act, 1975," Office of the Historian <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/helsinki>.

³⁴⁷ George Bush, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on the Relaxation of East German Border Controls, November 9, 1989," *Public Papers of the President of the United States: George H. W. Bush Book 2 July 1 to December 31, 1989*, 1489 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 1990).

³⁴⁸ Times Mirror News Index, April 5-8, 1990, *Pew Research Center*, pewresearch.org.

³⁴⁹ This information was taken from survey questions obtained through a question search for "Germany" limited to November 11, 1989 to December 31, 1990 in "Any Topic" through the Pew Research Poll Database.

report on the process to reunify Germany. However, the media did not completely follow the frame that Bush set as foreign affairs commentators and experts questioned Bush's policy decisions.

As Bush issued statements validating the reunification of Germany, the American media kept the American public informed about events in Germany, and the various expert opinions about the developments towards German reunification. The media focused much of its attention on the opening of the Berlin Wall itself, and then reported on the reunification process as it unfolded in Europe.³⁵⁰ From 9 to 15 November, the American public received daily news reports about the border opening and the movement of East Germans to West Germany.³⁵¹ The media's frame of the opening of the Berlin Wall and German reunification resembled Bush's frame that the changes in Germany demonstrated the success of America's strategy of containment and that German reunification was a positive event. Along with news reports about the daily situation, cable news channels like C-Span and CNN provided editorial style expert analysis of events. The reports by C-Span and CNN added to the American public's understanding of events in Germany. While some experts focused on explaining the events to the American public others criticized or opposed Bush's foreign policy decisions towards German reunification. However, Bush's critics were unable to overturn Bush's framing and agenda.

³⁵⁰ This information is based on statistical research using the Vanderbilt University Television News Archive with a keyword search for "Berlin Wall" and "German Reunification" limited to November 9, 1989 to December 31, 1990.

³⁵¹ Information based on content analysis of new broadcast summaries from Vanderbilt University Television News Archive using a phrase search from "Berlin Wall" between November 9, 1989, to December 31, 1990.

In an episode of C-Span's *Current Issues* the commentators, Hans-Henning Horstmann, Counselor of West Germany, Robert Gerald Livingston, and Ulrich Schiller, bureau chief of *Die Zeit*, discussed the history of the Berlin Wall and discussed the ramifications of the wall's opening. The commentators discussed the history of the Berlin Wall so that the current generation of the American public could understand the walls' significance, and better comprehend why its opening in 1989 was so significant. The commentators spent most of the discussion explaining the ramifications of a future democratic revolution in East Germany, and connected the opening of the German border to the larger democratic revolution occurring in Eastern Europe.³⁵² These editorials combined with the daily reports on the situation in Germany and helped move the American public support Germany's future reunification. It did this by having experts explain the events in Germany as a winding down of the Cold War and introducing a peaceful transition to democracy in Europe.

However, the media also produced reports and editorials from experts, especially in major newspapers, that questioned the ramifications of German reunification for US interests, global security, and Bush's ability to lead the nation through the changes. Many of the newspaper criticisms immediately following the opening of the Berlin Wall focused on Bush's ability to respond to the changes occurring in Europe. Many experts and commentators worried that Bush's reserved and calculated mannerisms threatened America's role in Europe moving forward. They were also wary that his policies were ill-suited for the growing revolutionary environment. Some commentators, like Walter

³⁵² *Current Issues* "Opening of the Berlin Wall," November 18, 1989, *C-Span.org* <https://www.c-span.org/video/?9958-1/opening-berlin-wall>

Mossberg and Robert Greenberger feared that Bush's inactivity would allow the Soviet Union to dominate future security debates in Europe. They were particularly concerned the Soviet Union would lead a move to replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact with a new system that did not include the United States or one did not give the United States a strong presence in Europe.³⁵³

These comments reveal that underneath the positive feeling about the changes in Eastern Europe, there were many experts and policymakers that continued to hold onto Cold War fears of the Soviet Union and believed that Gorbachev or the Soviet Union could retaliate or attempt to suppress democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe. There were also commentators that continued to believe the United States needed to have a strong presence in Europe to deter any Soviet aggression or expansion. These editorials feared that Bush did not recognize the gravity of the situation and feared that his policies were threatening US interests and security. Despite the concerns that foreign policy analysts and commentators expressed they were unable to challenge the positive attitudes and framing of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe.

Like the editorials that criticized Bush's policy decisions, editorials also opposed German reunification. Those that opposed Germany reunification argued that the

³⁵³ Walter S. Mossberg and Robert S Greenberg, "Policy Void: Upheaval in Europe Test Bush's Capacity For Leadership of West—As Summit Nears his Caution May Risk Ceding Influence to Soviets and U.S. Allies—A Rift Inside Administration" *Wall Street Journal* November 14, 1989, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/398120200?accountid=13946>.

situation in Germany threatened US and European security.³⁵⁴ These discussions attempted to sober the exuberance created by television broadcasts of Germans dancing on the Berlin Wall or the flood of East Germans to the West. These editorials placed German reunification in context of the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe, and reminded the audience that the Cold War continued. However, these editorials did little to diminish public opinion towards the reunification of Germany. Instead, Bush's positive frame and agenda for Germany's reunification remained steady even as the media produced reports and specials that did not always follow Bush.

Presidential Statements, Public Opinion, Media, and Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

The Iraq invasion of Kuwait was the last conflict of the Cold War. Bush's and his administration's diplomatic skills ensured that international cooperation ended Iraq's aggression and illegal territorial acquisition. While many Americans opposed the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the American public was divided on the appropriate response and why the United States was involved in resolution efforts. Most Americans believed that oil was the main reason that the United States was involved, and much of the public did not support a military intervention in Kuwait. Additionally, the American public still

³⁵⁴ "One Germany: Not Likely Now" *NYT*, November 19, 1989, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/427430000?accountid=13946>. John Goshko, "For U.S. East Germany May Pose Greater Test than Poland Or Hungary," *The Washington Post*, November 9, 1989, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/307226539?accountid=13946>. George Kennan, "The Wall Falls: This Is No Time for Talk of German Reunification," *Washington Post*, November 12, 1989, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/408003174?accountid=13946>.

suffered from the Vietnam Syndrome and feared the United States would get involved in a conflict it could not escape.³⁵⁵

As the Iraqi invasion continued into November, Americans increasingly became wary of the prospects of a US military operation against Iraq. Most Americans continued to oppose a military intervention to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. However, Bush gained much of the population's support for his policies, though that support had diminished to 65 percent, from an 80 percent high depending on Bush's decisions to deploy US forces to Saudi Arabia. Bush also managed to convince most Americans that the United States was not involved in the Iraqi situation because of oil by November, though 38 percent continued to believe the US motivated by oil interests and only 23 percent believed it was to stop Iraqi aggression³⁵⁶

The changes that occurred in public opinion towards between November and December followed the UNSC's decision to use all means necessary to remove Iraq forces from Kuwait. While most Americans supported the decision to use force, the public remained divided if Kuwait was worth going to war over. Additionally, 56 percent believed that "Bush should tailor policy to what polls say."³⁵⁷ The polls reveal that even as Bush successfully garnered and kept public support, the public did not completely accept Bush frames or agenda. Instead the public while supportive continued to hold

³⁵⁵ George Gallup, Jr. and Frank Newport, "The Persian Gulf Crisis: American Opinion Throughout the Month of August," *The Gallup Poll Monthly* no. 299 (August 1990): 2-23.

³⁵⁶ George Gallup, Jr. and Dr. Frank Newport, "Wary American Favor Wait and See Posture in Persian Gulf," *The Gallup Poll Monthly*, no. 302 (November 1990): 13-

³⁵⁷ George Gallup, Jr. and Frank Newport, "Hostage Release Doesn't Change American Views of Persian Gulf Crisis," *The Gallup Poll* no. 301 (December 1990): 10-12.

opinions to that diverged from those Bush tried to spread throughout the public. Public opinion also ensured that the media kept the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the public agenda, and that the media presented competing frames of the situation.

Along with public opinion polls, Bush also received 198,680³⁵⁸ pages of correspondence from the American public expressing their support, opposition, fears, suggestions, and information request about the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the future Gulf War. This level of correspondence before email was readily available to much of the public demonstrates the American public's determination to contact elected officials to express their opinions. Most of the authors expressed support for Bush's policy decisions, a significant portion also made policy suggestions, or asked Bush to clarify policy decisions. As much of the nation was concerned that the United States was repeating the mistakes of the Vietnam War, many Vietnam War veterans wrote to express their support. They also encouraged Bush to provide American forces all the resources they needed to do their jobs, win any future war, and return home. Many veterans recommended limiting political and civilian influences on the generals' abilities to make military decisions and successfully wage any war.³⁵⁹

As Bush also received many letters from the family members of military personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf. These were letters written by children, and

³⁵⁸ The George H. W. Bush Presidential Library provided the number of pages from their inventory of Bush's Persian Gulf Letters Mail File Collection.

³⁵⁹ Letters to George Bush between August 1, 1990 and January 15, 1991 from the Public Mail Files Persian Gulf War Files OAID 60007, White House Office of Correspondence, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

parents they expressed their support and their fears for their loved one deployed abroad.

One mother wrote:

Dear Mr. President, I want you to know that my family and I stand behind your decision to send troops to the Middle East. I do not say this lightly since four of my five children are in military service. My twins are already over there and the other two could be soon. I fully understand what this conflict could cost my family and our nation in the lives of our bravest and best young people. But I also realize that aggression against a peaceful neighbor cannot be tolerated and the interests of our nation and the civilized world must be protected.³⁶⁰

The letters Bush received followed trends in public opinion polls about the public's understanding of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and their support for Bush's policy decisions. These letters also provided Bush and his administration with an abundance of knowledge about American concerns, and what steps Bush needed to take to reduce those concerns and gain more public support.

During the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, Bush's framed the Iraq invasion of Kuwait as an act of aggression, and that the United States was involved to end Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf and to defend Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi aggression. With statements like, "We have seen too often in this century how quickly any threat to one becomes a threat to all. At this critical moment in history, at a time the cold war is fading into the past, we cannot fail. At stake is not simply some distant country called Kuwait. At stake is the kind of world we will inhabit."³⁶¹ He presented the US mission as defensive, and argued that he would deploy enough US personnel and equipment to the region to deter further Iraq aggression.

³⁶⁰ Letter, Patricia A. Witzke to George Bush August 20, 1990 183171SS [3] ND016 WHORM Presidential Records *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

³⁶¹ George Bush, "Radio Address to the Nation on the Persian Gulf Crisis, January 5, 1991" *PPPG 1991*, 11.

As it became increasingly apparent that a military intervention was the only way to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait. Bush promised that US military forces would have the resources and equipment to defeat Iraq. Bush also countered any arguments that the United States was involved because of oil. Bush also used the Iraq invasion of Kuwait to explain his national security strategy that promoted international cooperation to promote stability, security, and peace around the world. From the beginning of his response to Iraqi aggression, Bush established that his policies would rely on diplomatic measures and international pressure to get Iraq to leave Kuwait.³⁶²

He also attempted to override any fears the United States would end up bogged down in the Persian Gulf like it had in Vietnam, by reminding the public that the United States was working with the international community not unilaterally, “As the deployment of the forces of many nations shows and as the voted in the United Nations show, this is not a matter between Iraq and the United States; it is between Iraq and the entire world community...All the nations of the world are lined up to oppose aggression.³⁶³ He also had to defeat the Vietnam Syndrome³⁶⁴ which was the strongest barrier against public approval for a US intervention in Kuwait. Bush began by stating that he did not want to involve the United States in a war in the Persian Gulf, “I want peace. I want peace not war...No one wants to see a peaceful solution to the crisis more

³⁶² Qualitative analysis of Bush’s statements about the Iraq invasion of Kuwait or the Persian Gulf Crisis between August 1, 1990 and January 16, 1991 in *PPPG 1990* and *PPPG 1991*.

³⁶³ George Bush, “The President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 22, 1990,” *PPPG, 1990*, 1158.

³⁶⁴ The Vietnam Syndrome, emerged after the US failure to defeat communist forces during the Vietnam led the American public to become risk averse to proposed military interventions fearing it would drag the United States into another unwinnable conflict. Ian Buchanan, “Treaties on Militarism,” *symplokē* 14, No. 1 and 2, Discouragement (2006), 152-168 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40550718>

than I do. And at the same time no one is more determined that I am to see Saddam's aggression reversed."³⁶⁵ As the deadline to intervene in Kuwait approached Bush adjusted his, "if there must be war, we will not permit our troops to have their hands tied behind their backs."³⁶⁶ In both types of statements Bush reaffirmed the intervention was defensive in nature and a last resort to Iraq's aggression.

He framed America's response to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait as a way to establish America's roles and responsibilities for the future to "forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order."³⁶⁷ Bush's framing was successful as most of the media and the public accepted that the US involvement in the Persian Gulf was to deter further Iraqi aggression. They also supported Bush's agenda that with the international cooperation against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait the world could move closer to deterring aggression and security stability and peace. For the most part, the media abided by Bush's frame and agenda for the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. However, this did not mean that the media did not report on opposition and criticism to Bush's policies. Instead, Bush's frame and agenda were more easily accepted by the public than opposition. As a result, the media followed Bush's frames and agendas.

The media played a role developing public opinion towards the Iraq Invasion of Kuwait. From 1 August 1990 to 16 January 1991, the three broadcast networks aired 1,112 segments on either the Iraq invasion of Kuwait or the Persian Gulf Crisis. In August the ABC, CBS, and NBC aired 372 news reports on the situation in the Persian

³⁶⁵ George Bush, "The President's News Conferences," November 30, 1990, *PPPGB 1990*, 1720.

³⁶⁶ George Bush, "The President's News Conferences," November 30, 1990, *PPPGB 1990*, 1720.

³⁶⁷ George Bush "Address to the Nation" *PPPGB 1991*, 44.

Gulf. Most of the news reports lasted between one and eight minutes with the longest lasting thirteen minutes. These news broadcasts provided updates on events related to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, including diplomatic efforts, the invasions effect on oil prices, and interviews and press statements by Bush and other foreign leaders.³⁶⁸ Public opinion polls reveal that most Americans paid attention to the news about Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, and a majority agreed that the press was covering the situation well.³⁶⁹ At the same time most of the public believed the media had kept the public well informed about the conflict in Kuwait.³⁷⁰

Most of the news reports on the invasion of Kuwait adopted Bush's frame and agenda for the Persian Gulf Crisis. Also, some television and newspaper commentary criticized and opposed of Bush policies. However, these were in the minority, though US newspapers had more present articles that did not fit or challenged Bush's frame an agenda.

National, regional, and local newspapers used titles like "Iraq's Naked Aggression," "Hussein Must Be Stopped," "Isolate Iraq," and "The US Stands Up Who Else," which ensured that the public understood that Iraq was the antagonist and that the United States and the world had united to stop Hussein's aggression in the Persian Gulf.

³⁶⁸ Statistical information from Vanderbilt University Television News Archive <https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu> by conducting a phrase search for "Iraq invasion of Kuwait," "Persian Gulf Crisis," and "Persian Gulf" with a date limiter of August 1, 1990 to January 16, 1991.

³⁶⁹ "Times Mirror News, "News Interest Index Poll," *Pew Research Poll Database*, www.pewresearch.org. Poll question results obtained through a keyword search for "Iraq" with a date limiter of August 1, 1990 to January 16, 1991 at the Pew Research Center Website. These results are from questions 5 through 8 of the Times Mirror News Poll taken in November 1990.

³⁷⁰ Times Mirror News Interest Index Polls August 9-12, 1990 and November 8-11, 1990, found using a keyword search for "Iraq" in the poll question database in the Pew Research Poll Database by *Pew Research Center* at www.pewresearch.org.

These titles also supported Bush's frame and agenda: that Iraq had illegally invaded Kuwait, that the United States would respond defensively to protect the rest of the Persian Gulf from additional Iraqi aggression, that the United States and the world condemned and opposed Iraq's actions, and the international community was cooperating to end the invasion of Kuwait.

At the same time editorials continued arguments that America's involvement was connected to oil and easy access to Persian Gulf oil. Gary Sick, former National Security Council member during the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, argued that Hussein invaded Kuwait to gain control of Persian Gulf Oil and OPEC. He argued that the United States had to act to stop Hussein because neither the United States nor its allies could afford the long-term threat Saddam posed to regional and international stability.³⁷¹ While Sick continued the arguments that oil was a strong reason for US participation he framed it as a defensive measure to defend US national interests from Hussein's aggression. In this way Sick's editorial presented mild deviations from Bush's desired frame, while continuing to push's frames of international cooperation and defensive actions. Other editorials undermined Bush's efforts to reduce the Vietnam Syndrome. They argued that Bush had limited his options by deploying American forces to Saudi Arabia and dedicated American forces and reputation to ensuring that Hussein was defeated and no longer capable of threatening the Persian Gulf.³⁷² By challenging Bush's frames through critiques of policy decisions the media prevented Bush from

³⁷¹ Gary Sick, "Hussein Must Be Stopped" *NYT* August 3, 1990
<http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/427778947?accountid=13946>.

³⁷² Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. "Gamble in the Gulf" *Wall Street Journal* October 1, 1990,
<http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/398188273?accountid=13946>.

creating a consensus on his policies even as he gained approval from most of the public. This lack of consensus forced Bush to constantly argue for his policies in the public debate, and kept public concerns in the agenda. However, even without a consensus Bush's frame and agenda became dominant and allowed him to gain the public support he needed to carry out his policies.

Public Opinion, Media, Presidential Statements, and the Collapse of Yugoslavia

The collapse of Yugoslavia occurred as Germany was reunified and Iraq invaded Kuwait. In 1989, public opinion polls revealed that only 28 percent of Americans were paying close attention to news coming out of Europe.³⁷³ In 1990, much of the American public was focused on events and news on the Persian Gulf Crisis.³⁷⁴ It was not until the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991 that Bush and the American public turned their attention to the situation in Yugoslavia. However, some members of the American public with an interest in Yugoslavia contacted Bush to make the situation in Yugoslavia a higher US priority. Many of these individuals worked for human rights organizations that had connections in Yugoslavia of these the members of Human Rights Watch were the

³⁷³ Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, "Public Interest and Awareness of the News," December 14, 1989, *Pew Research Center*, <http://www.people-press.org/1989/12/14/news-interest-index-4/>

³⁷⁴ Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, "Public Interest in Gulf Crisis Unabated," September 14, 1990, *Pew Research Center*, <http://www.people-press.org/1990/09/14/public-interest-in-gulf-crisis-unabated/>. Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, "Gas Prices Rival Gulf for Public Attention," October 10, 1990, *Pew Research Center*, <http://www.people-press.org/1990/10/10/gas-prices-rival-gulf-for-public-attention/>. Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, "Gulf Still Top Story: Interest in Faltering Economy Surges," November 15, 1990, *Pew Research Center*, <http://www.people-press.org/1990/11/15/gulf-still-top-story-interest-in-faltering-economy-surges/>. Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, "Divided Public Focused on Gulf News: Braced for Bloody War" January 10, 1991, *Pew Research Center*, <http://www.people-press.org/1991/01/10/divided-public-focused-on-gulf-news-braced-for-bloody-war/>.

most determined to convince Bush to act in Yugoslavia.³⁷⁵ These observers described political purges, and assassinations, attempted to assassinations, and press censorship by the Serb ultranationalists and hardline leaders in the Yugoslav government.³⁷⁶ The letters continued as Bush worked on German reunification and the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. They described the worsening situation and Serb atrocities against the Albanians in Kosovo, Croatians, and Muslims.³⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch was also the first to connect Serb atrocities and human rights violations with a desire to create Greater Serbia out of Kosovo and Bosnia.³⁷⁸ Along with Human Rights Watch proponents Bush received letters from Americans of Croat, Muslims, Serb, and Albanian heritage urging Bush to defend human rights and self-determination for those states that democratically voted to secede from Yugoslavia.

Despite these pleas Bush did not establish a frame to defend human rights violations in Yugoslavia or promoting the democratic movement and self-determination for the Yugoslav states. Instead Bush promoted Yugoslavia's unity and using diplomatic measures to resolve the differences between the states. Bush also refused to acknowledge

³⁷⁵ This is a summary of the letters in the Bush Presidential Library White House Office of Records Management Collection related to Yugoslavia: Letters CO176 WHORM Subject File Bush Presidential Records *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

³⁷⁶ Letter Timothy Deal to Marija Ann Levic September 16, 1988, CO176 001725 to 003031 WHORM Subject File Bush Presidential Records, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*. Letter Marija Anna Levic to George Bush December 12, 1988, 001725 CO176 WHORM Subject File, Bush Presidential Records, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

³⁷⁷ Letter Myfit Demirali to George Bush March 17, 1989, 013768 CO176 WHORM Subject File Bush Presidential Records *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*. Letter Zenun Nezajti to George Bush March 15, 1989, 014159 CO176 WHORM Subject File Bush Presidential Records *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*. Letter John G. Rowland to George Bush April 24, 1989, 031087 CO176 WHORM Subject File Bush Presidential Records *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

³⁷⁸ Letter Marija Ann Levic to George Bush April 4, 1989, 031284 CO176 WHORM Subject File Bush Presidential Records, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

that the Serbs perpetrated more human rights violations than the other groups. In a response to one of the Human Rights Watch letters the administration noted:

“The United States government does not favor the position of any particular nationality within Yugoslavia. We believe it would be wrong to take sides in a situation in which rights and wrongs are passionately debated and difficult for outsiders to discern accurately. Our hope is that the Yugoslav people will solve their current problems in a way which will protect the rights of all Yugoslav citizens.”³⁷⁹

On 7 May 1991 Bush issued his first statement on Yugoslavia through his press secretary Max Fitzwater. This statement and those that followed demonstrated Bush’s frame and agenda for Yugoslavia. The United States joined the international community expressing American concerns about the situation in Yugoslavia and condemning the violence there. Bush also espoused US support for Yugoslavia’s unity, and urged the parties in Yugoslavia to respect human rights and democracy.³⁸⁰

In another statement released through Fitzwater, Bush announced he had sent a letter to Yugoslav President Mesic expressing his concerns about the situation in Yugoslavia and urging Mesic to re-establish civilian control over the military and restore peace to the country, and to continue cooperating with the United States, EC and others for a peaceful resolution. In the statement via Fitzwater, Bush expressed hope that all Yugoslav parties would open a dialogue on Yugoslavia’s democratic future. Fitzwater

³⁷⁹ Letter Michael M. Hornblow to Myfit Demirali March 20, 1989, 013768, CO176 WHORM Subject File, Bush Presidential Records, *George H. W. Bush Presidential Library*.

³⁸⁰ George Bush, “Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on President Bush’s Meeting with President Francesco Cossiga and Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy, May 7, 1991 *Public Papers of the President: George Bush, 1991 Book 1 January 1 to June 30, 1991* 483 (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1992).

noted that Bush also reiterated American support for EC efforts to resolve the Yugoslav crisis.³⁸¹

Of the few times that Bush personally made a statement about the Yugoslav crisis occurred during a meeting with Italian leaders. In one statement, Bush discussed European efforts to help the Yugoslav's resolve their problems peacefully, and that the United States along with Europe supported a collective resolution of the conflict.³⁸² He also established that the collapse in Yugoslavia was a European matter.³⁸³ As the conflict in Yugoslavia continued and demonstrated that the federations collapse was inevitable Bush adjusted his frame to oppose the Yugoslav government's use of force to keep the federation together. Throughout the crisis Bush made few references to the human rights violations Human Rights Watch described in their letters. Bush's frame and agenda for the collapse of Yugoslavia connected it to the changes occurring in Eastern Europe as the Soviet Union lost power and influence opening opportunities for political reform.³⁸⁴

The American media like Bush diminished the importance of the collapse of Yugoslavia to US interests and national security to the American public. The media did not add Yugoslavia to the public agenda until the spring of 1992. By that time, the

³⁸¹ George Bush, "Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Yugoslavia, July 2, 1991," *Public Papers Of The President of the United States: GB 1991 Book 2 July 1 to December 31, 1991*, 814 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992).

³⁸² George Bush, "The President's News Conference with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, May 20, 1991, *PPPGB 1991*, 528.

³⁸³ George Bush, "Remarks on the London Economic Summit and an Exchange with Foreign Journalists, July 8, 1991," *PPPGB 1991*, 833.

³⁸⁴ Analysis of Bush's most often repeated framing and agenda for the Yugoslav conflict from public statements Bush made about the collapse of Yugoslavia in his statements from July 1990 to April 7, 1992 in *PPPGB 1990-1992*.

republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia had declared their independence from Yugoslavia through democratic elections. Between 1989 and 1992 satellite technology improved making it possible for news channels to produce near simultaneous reports from around the world. However, the media only reported on the crisis in Yugoslavia in 1989 eight times. These eight broadcasts focused on ethnic and general unrest and rioting in Yugoslavia, and the longest was two and a half minutes long, while most lasted twenty seconds.³⁸⁵

Even though the crisis in Yugoslavia was also connected to changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the media gave reports on Yugoslavia a low priority. This included the media's coverage of the secession votes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia. It was not until summer of 1991 that the broadcast networks reported on the situation in Yugoslavia frequently and repeatedly. It was not until reports emerged that the Serbs were carrying out ethnic cleansing in Bosnia that the situation in the Balkans was in the American media every day. However, by that point Yugoslavia no longer existed as a country, and the conflict had become a difference crisis between the former Yugoslav states.³⁸⁶ The media's reporting of Yugoslavia framed the situation as a political conflict with occasional references to ethnic divisions and human rights violations. The media followed Bush's framing of the collapse of Yugoslavia deviating by its focus on the ethnic divisions in Yugoslavia as the source of the conflict.

³⁸⁵ Statistical information is taken from Vanderbilt University Television News Archive using Word searches for "Yugoslavia" and "Bosnia" mostly from January 1, 1989, to December 31, 1992.

³⁸⁶ Statistical information is taken from Vanderbilt University Television News Archive using Word searches for "Yugoslavia" and "Bosnia" mostly from January 1, 1989, to December 31, 1992.

One of the ways the media framed the conflict was through special reports on Yugoslavia where experts discussed the situation that explained the conflict's foundations. One C-Span special report "History and Politics of Yugoslavia," included discussions between John Lampe, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center, and Dusan Zupan, Washington Bureau Chief of Tanjug Yugoslavia's News Agency. At the beginning Lampe challenged notions that the crisis was caused by an age-old animosity between the groups. Instead, Lampe argued that Yugoslavia's conflict was caused a lack of contact between the parties, political changes that had led to the rise of secessionist movements, democratic movements, and ultranationalists' and communist hardliners opposition to change. Zupan added to by pointing to the fall of communism as the spark that started the issues Lampe pointed to.³⁸⁷ Special reports like this one did not stray far from the media's frame and agenda. They did not discuss human rights violations by the Yugoslav government, though some attempted to challenge the ancient hatreds frame. Instead the special reports tended to abide by the media's frame and agenda for the collapse of Yugoslavia.

American newspapers also framed the collapse of Yugoslavia as a conflict caused by ancient ethnic hatreds. They also presented the conflict as a European matter that the EC was failing to resolve, and were the earliest media source to discuss the humanitarian violations occurring during the conflict, and pointed to Slobodan Milošević as one of the main culprits encouraging the conflict. American newspapers also allowed for multisided discussions of the conflict. In the *New York Times*, one editorials "Bullying in the

³⁸⁷ John Lampe and Dusan Zupan "History and Politics of Yugoslavia," *C-Span* video, July 3, 1991, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?18713-1/history-politics-yugoslavia>.

Balkans,” denounced Milošević for encouraging ethnic hatred for political gain and endangering Yugoslavia’s stability and existence.³⁸⁸ Three editorials responded to each from a different perspective. Zivorad Kovacevic, Yugoslavia’s Ambassador to the United States, criticized the article for painting a misleading picture of developments in Yugoslavia. Kovacevic contended the situation in Yugoslavia was created by legal and democratic means, and blamed militant Albanian separatists for the violence in Kosovo.³⁸⁹ Joseph J. Dioguardi, the President of the Albanian-American Civic League, agreed with the author of “Bullying,”³⁹⁰ and Jerome Davidovich criticized the author for relying on the ancient hatreds frame.³⁹¹ This did not stop other editorials from continuing to blame ancient hatreds for the violence in Yugoslavia.³⁹² Other editorials debated the validity of keeping Yugoslavia together, and how to do it. Those that supported unity asserted that unity granted the member states greater autonomy than secession. They argued that seceding from Yugoslavia fueled resentments among ethnic minorities within the seceding states, and encouraged those minorities to make radical demands of the

³⁸⁸ “Bullying in the Balkans” *New York Times* April 10, 1989, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/427158440?accountid=13946>

³⁸⁹ Zivorad Kovacevic, “Yugoslavia Can Work It Out Without Heckling” *NYT* April 22, 1989, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/427152008?accountid=13946>.

³⁹⁰ Joseph J. Dioguardi, “World Must Keep Eye On Yugoslav Tensions” *NYT* May 6, 1989, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/427192051?accountid=13946>.

³⁹¹ Jerome Davidovich, “Mussolini in Balkans” *NYT* May 13, 1989, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/427223326?accountid=13946>.

³⁹² Davidovich, “Mussolini in Balkans,”; Kovacevic, “Yugoslavia Can Work It Out Without Heckling,”; “In Yugoslavia, The Old European Order Passes; Hands Off” *NYT*, November 15, 1990, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/427887372?accountid=13946>; For Yugoslavia Unity Still Holds Best Hope: Uneasy Status Quo,” *NYT* March 25, 1991, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/428000989?accountid=13946>.

states.³⁹³ Those that supported Yugoslavia's dissolution, pointed to the fact that Yugoslavia existed because Tito had forced the nations into a federation and not because they had volunteered to form it. The supporters of dissolution also pointed to the political differences among the Slovenes and Croats that favored non-communist governments, and Serbs that wanted to remain communist.³⁹⁴

The media's framing of the collapse of Yugoslavia was similar to Bush's and failed to bring the conflict into the American public's awareness and onto the public agenda. Thus, the media did not bring any public pressure on Bush to change his policy. Like Bush, the media argued that ancient hatreds caused the collapse of Yugoslavia, even as some parts of the media unsuccessfully challenged that frame. Bush's and the media's frames for the collapse of Yugoslavia dismissed the political and economic factors in the crisis as irrelevant, this allowed the frames to oversimplify the collapse of Yugoslavia. Additionally, this frame applied universal guilt to the Yugoslavs for the federations collapse and the violence that followed. This trapped the media as well as Bush and Clinton when the Bosnian War erupted between the Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and Croats.

Public Opinion, Media, Presidential Statements, and the Bosnian War

The dissolution of Yugoslavia destabilized the Balkans, and gave the Serbs, led by Slobodan Milošević, an opportunity to carryout ethnic cleanse Bosnia of its Muslim and Croat populations to create Greater Serbia. While the collapse of Yugoslavia was not well covered in American media and it was discussed as a political crisis, the Bosnian

³⁹³ "A Single Yugoslavia, Pluralized," *NYT*, December 29, 1989, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/427456499?accountid=13946>.

³⁹⁴ "Divorce Yugoslav Style" *NYT* February 22, 1991, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/427965219?accountid=13946>.

War with Serbs ethnically cleansing Bosnian Muslims and Croats to create Greater Serbia became a humanitarian crisis. The Serb ethnic cleansing in Bosnia incensed American public opinion which led the media to give on the Bosnian War more attention. The increased media attention pressured Bush and Clinton to create a policy response to the war.

In 1992, 37 percent of the American public reported following news reports on the Balkans,³⁹⁵ and in January 1993, 48 percent noted that they were following news reports about the war in Bosnia. However, most of these Americans opposed a US military intervention in Bosnia to end the conflict or defend Bosnia from Serb aggression.³⁹⁶ However, the 37 percent of Americans aware of the situation in Bosnia believed the United States had a “moral responsibility to stop ‘ethnic cleansing’,” and 34 percent believed a military intervention was justified if it defended US national security interests or prevented the fighting from spreading to other parts of the region.³⁹⁷ Additionally, 51 percent of Americans favored increasing America’s role in the peacekeeping talks.³⁹⁸ The polls also revealed that the American public understood the crisis in Bosnia as a humanitarian disaster or as a strategic concern. The polls show that while they supported American involvement ending the war, the public excluded the

³⁹⁵ News Interest Index Poll question September 10-13, 1992, "Do you happen to know the name of the ethnic group that has conquered much of Bosnia and had surrounded the city of Sarajevo?" Only 20 percent accurately answered Serbs, and 37 percent followed the news stories about the civil war in Bosnia. Poll questions gained through a keyword search for Bosnia at Pew Research Center www.pewresearch.org/

³⁹⁶ Times Mirror News Interest Index Survey conducted between January 3-6, 1993 Questions 18 F1 and 18F2 based on telephone interviews with 1,216 adults. *Pew Research Center* www.pew.org.

³⁹⁷ Saad, “Majority Would Back,” 12.

³⁹⁸ Lydia Saad, “Majority Would Back Military Effort in Bosnia,” *The Gallup Poll Monthly* no. 329 (February 1993): 12.

involvement of US military forces. As they confronted the Bosnian War, Bush and Clinton responded. Bush adopted a humanitarian frame for the war caused by ancient ethnic hatreds, which Clinton adopted when he became president.

Bush started establishing his frame in the summer of 1992 as reports emerged that the Serbs were carrying out ethnic cleansing campaigns against Bosnian Muslims. Bush also set the Bosnian War as part of the European agenda, while the United States provided humanitarian assistance to Bosnia.³⁹⁹ Bush's agenda that he did not believe that US troops should intervene in political problems around the world.⁴⁰⁰ Especially when the Bosnian War was caused by an "age-old animosities" or a "century's-old feuds," which Bush used to equally apply guilt to the Bosnians for the violence.⁴⁰¹

After winning the presidency in 1992, Clinton began setting his frames continued some of Bush's frames that the Bosnian War as a humanitarian crisis, that the United States should not deploy its military. However, Clinton also gave more publicity to the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and placed more blame on the Serbs for the violence in Bosnia. Clinton also increased America's involvement in international efforts in Bosnia and made those efforts part of the agenda US agenda in Bosnia.⁴⁰²

³⁹⁹ Presidential Statements and responses to questions from journalists regarding the Bosnia between May 21, 1992 and January 3, 1993, *PPPGB 1992-93*.

⁴⁰⁰ George H. W. Bush, "The President's News Conference in Munich, Germany July 8, 1992," *PPPGB 1992-93*, 1102.

⁴⁰¹ George H. W. Bush, "Remarks on the Situation in Bosnia and an Exchange with Reporters in Colorado Springs, August 6, 1992," *PPPGB 1992-93*, 1315.

⁴⁰² William Clinton, Public Statements regarding foreign policy decisions regarding Bosnia in 1994, *PPPWJC 1993-1995*.

During the Bosnian War, the media competed with Bush's and Clinton's frame and agenda for the Bosnian War. Unlike Bush and Clinton, the media focused on presenting the Serbs as the guilty party in the Bosnian War. The media did this by focusing its reporting of the Serbs human rights violations and policy of ethnic cleansing against non-Serbs in Bosnia. It did this by reporting on Muslim and Croat efforts to defend themselves from the Serbs and the suffering of women, children, and the elderly in Bosnia. It also attempted to link Serb actions to the Holocaust. However, this frame was mitigated by media frames that focused on ancient ethnic hatreds as the root causes of the conflict.⁴⁰³ Even as the media emphasized the humanitarian disaster side of the Bosnian War, it adopted Bush's and Clinton's framing of ethnic hatreds causing the violence in Bosnia.

Television media's framing of the Bosnian War did not change during Clinton's presidency. Between 20 January and 31 December 1995, the NBC, CBS, and ABC evening news reported on events in Bosnia one thousand times.⁴⁰⁴ The television news reports continued to describe the Bosnian War as a civil war between the Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs. The reports also discussed the situations in Bosnian cities under Serb attack, US policies, peace attempts, and ethnic cleansing. However, most the reporting was on the civil war, and much of these reports were less than a minute long.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰³ Framing based on summaries of news reports on "Bosnia" from May 1992 to December 1995 on the *Vanderbilt Television News Archive* <http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu>.

⁴⁰⁴ Statistical information from Vanderbilt Television News Archive <https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu> using a keyword search for Bosnia between January 20, 1993, to July 4, 1993.

⁴⁰⁵ Statistical information from Vanderbilt University Television News Archive <https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu> using a keyword search for Bosnia between January 20, 1993 and December 31, 1995.

During a brief report on the history of Yugoslavia, NBC anchor and foreign correspondent, Garrick Utley, discussed the history of the Balkans and former Yugoslavia. In under two minutes, Utley connected the twentieth century ethnic conflict in the Balkans with the 1914 Serbian assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand that started WWI, and atrocities the parties committed during WWII. He also described Josip Broz Tito's Cold War efforts to suppress ethnic divisions in Yugoslavia up to his death in 1980, when ethnic tensions returned and caused Yugoslavia's collapse. At the end of his report, Utley stated the Europeans refer to the Balkans to as "the tinderbox" because of the regions repeated ethnic conflicts throughout the twentieth century. His finished the report saying, "The result is now familiar. History repeating itself,"⁴⁰⁶ During this report, Utley delivered few historical details, and provided little context for the conflict. He also parroted the administration's views of the conflict the conflict.

Another news report by NBC's John Cochran reported on Bush's and the international community's efforts to deliver humanitarian relief to Bosnian. Cochran noted that most UNSC members and American allies opposed using airpower to protect convoys delivering aid because they did not believe air power would protect the convoys from snipers and guerrilla attacks.⁴⁰⁷ This report demonstrated that the United States was not alone in its refusal to use military force to resolve the conflict in Bosnia.

⁴⁰⁶ Garrick Utley, "Nationalism and the Balkans in the 20th Century," August 8, 1992, *NBC* <http://highered.nbclearn.com/portal/site/HigherEd/browse?cuecard=6010>

⁴⁰⁷ John Cochran, "The West Isn't Sure About Intervention in the Balkans," August 8, 1992, *NBC* <http://highered.nbclearn.com/portal/site/HigherEd/browse?cuecard=6109>.

Television reports were not the only source of information the public received from the media. American newspapers' editorial sections provided the American public with more nuanced coverage of events and policy debates. Newspaper editorials criticized Bush for not implementing a more aggressive policy against to Serb aggression. Several articles argued that Bush's response to Bosnia was a failure to uphold his New World Order standards to deter aggression and encourage international cooperation. Like some television news reports, newspapers also drew comparisons between Serb actions in Bosnia to the Nazis and the Holocaust.⁴⁰⁸ However, these criticisms had little influence changing Bush's policies towards Bosnian. Clinton would also receive this criticism as the media and a significant minority of the public pushed for more aggressive policies to curb Serb violence.

When Clinton began drafting policy towards Bosnia, he also faced criticisms for not implementing more aggressive policies against Serbia. However, the media noted that while some critics desired more aggressive policies from Clinton, most of the public agreed with Clinton's less forceful policies. Leslie Gelb wrote:

“While most Americans seem generally content with Clinton's handling of foreign affairs, most foreign policy experts, diplomats and pundits mercilessly accuse him of being clueless about U.S. interests and inept in wielding power. Where most Americans feel utter relief in the president's reluctance to act tough and threaten military intervention, professionals warn darkly of presidential naiveté and dangerous inaction. Where just plain folks applaud the president's mainly minding the troubled store at home, the foreign policy elite – children of American empire, a generation reared in the excitement and primacy of foreign

⁴⁰⁸ Dominant themes in editorials from *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *New York Times* on the Bosnian War published between April 6, 1992 and January 19, 1993.

policy – feel both disinherited by the Cold War’s end and genuinely alarmed about a world drifting toward perpetual violence.”⁴⁰⁹

He continued that Bosnia represented problems with Clinton’s foreign policy decisions: no ethical ballast, no strategic center, no conviction, no steadiness, and a failure to take responsibility. Gelb also compared Clinton to Bush and noted that while Bush’s foreign policy was no better than Clinton’s, Bush delivered on the policy promises he made.⁴¹⁰

Samuel Berger responded to Gelb’s article in “What America Needs: Less Gelb.” Berger argued that US foreign policy was not supposed to satisfy foreign policy experts, and he also contested Gelb's claim that Clinton was ignoring the world. He pointed to Clinton’s foreign policy accomplishments that included over one hundred meetings with foreign leaders in 1993, a dozen foreign policy speeches, and eight country visits. He also pointed to Clinton’s success obtaining three of his strategic goals: putting the economic policy back in foreign policy, adapting the US military to the post-Cold War period, and enlarging the world’s community of free market democracies.”⁴¹¹ The American media had mixed success challenging Bush’s and Clinton’s frames for the Bosnian War. The media adopted Bush’s and Clinton’s frames that the war was a humanitarian disaster. However, the media put more emphasis on ethnic cleansing than either president but only succeed in pressuring Clinton to increase his efforts to address ethnic cleansing in his

⁴⁰⁹ Leslie Gelb, “Can Clinton Deal With the World?: His Passive Foreign Policy Is Popular but Perilous,” *The Washington Post* March 6, 1994, accessed January 8, 2016, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/307721669?accountid=13946>.

⁴¹⁰ Gelb, “Can Clinton Deal With the World?”

⁴¹¹ Draft article by Samuel R. Berger, “What America Needs: Less Gelb” March 10, 1994, in National Security Council, Office of Press and Communications, and Philip PJ Crowley, “Foreign Policy – General [1],” *Clinton Digital Library*, January 8, 2016, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/48503>.

decisions. The media also challenged Bush and Clinton's foreign policy. However, Bush and Clinton enjoyed public support for their policies so the media was only able to exert limited pressure on the presidents to take more aggressive policies.

Public Opinion, Media, Presidential Statements, and the Haitian Coup

The 1991 coup d'état of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide received most of its press coverage immediately following the coup and once the Haitians began fleeing to the United States. However, the public's response to the Haitian were not measured until two years later when the public was split over their approval or disapproval of Clinton's Haitian policies.⁴¹² Some Americans noted that the United States would not have gotten involved in Haiti if not for the Congressional Black Caucus.⁴¹³ By May 1994, 44 slightly less than half of the American public was following news reports on Haiti.⁴¹⁴ As Clinton approached the start of the military intervention in September, 60 percent of the public was following news stories about the intervention.⁴¹⁵ However, most Americans opposed using US military force to restore democracy to Haiti.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹² International Policy Opinion Survey October 21-23, 1993 "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Bill Clinton is handling the situation in Haiti?" *Pew Research Center* www.pewresearch.org. This survey question was found using a keyword search for Haiti.

⁴¹³ Email, Rob to Jennifer W. O'Conner, July 13, 1994, folder WHO [Haiti or Operation Uphold] OAID500000 "[06/29/1994-09/19/1994]" Automated Records Management System (Email) *William Clinton Presidential Library*.

⁴¹⁴ News Interest Index Poll May 12-15, 1994, "How closely did you follow news stories about the continued unrest and violence in Haiti?" *Pew Research Center* www.pewresearch.org. This survey question was found using a keyword search for Haiti.

⁴¹⁵ People, The Press, & Politics September 9-11, 1994, "How closely did you follow news stories about discussion of a US invasion of Haiti?" *Pew Research Center* www.pewresearch.org. This survey question was found using a keyword search for Haiti.

⁴¹⁶ People, The Press & Politics Poll July 12-25, 1994, "Please tell me if you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose using American military force, if necessary, to restore democratic government to Haiti." *Pew Research Center* www.pewresearch.org. This survey question was found using a keyword search for Haiti.

Following the Carter mission to Haiti that convinced the Cédras regime to resign, American opinions began to change. Between 19 and 25 September opinion polls revealed that more Americans supported sending troops to Haiti, and more Americans approved of the way that Clinton had handled the situation in Haiti. Additionally, of those surveyed, 51 percent believed the invasion would reduce or stop the flow of refugees, but only 37 percent thought the intervention would stop human rights abuses. Most Americans also believed that the United States would accomplish its goals and quickly withdraw from Haiti.⁴¹⁷ The American public's initial disinterest in Haiti and its continued opposition to military interventions in political intranational conflicts allowed Bush to focus little attention on Haiti. However, the Congressional Black Caucus increased its lobbying efforts to increase US involvement restoring Haiti's democratic government. Eventually this pressure would push Clinton to change the frame and agenda for Haiti to support a military intervention.

Shortly after the coup, Bush began establishing his frame. He denounced the coup, expressed concern for Haiti's people, and announced the United States would support OAS diplomatic efforts to end the coup.⁴¹⁸ Bush adopted a similar frame for Haiti as he had for Bosnia, the United States was concerned about the situation in the country, but Bush had confidence the regional institutions could resolve the crisis diplomatically and the United States supported the regional institutions diplomatic efforts. Bush did not mention the possibility of deploying US forces to restore Aristide or state that any US

⁴¹⁷ Frank Newport and Leslie McAneny, "Haiti Yields Clinton Small 'Rally Effect,'" *The Gallup Poll Monthly* no 348 (September 1994) 18-19.

⁴¹⁸ George Bush, "Exchange with Reporters, October 2, 1991, *PPPGB 1991*, 1247. George Bush, "The President's News Conference, October 4, 1991," *PPPGB 1991*, 1263.

interests were at stake in Haiti. This established that Haiti had little place on the public agenda and that it was a Latin American-Caribbean problem to resolve, not an American one.⁴¹⁹ Bush's frame remained in effect through the Haitian crisis though Clinton would unsuccessfully change the frame in 1994.

Clinton's initial frame for Haitian crisis differed little from Bush's, it was not until CBC lobbying efforts pressured Clinton to change Haitian refugee policies and stronger diplomatic measures against the Cédras regime that Clinton began to change the frame and agenda for Haiti. In June 1994, Clinton started by trying to reframe the coup as a threat to democracy and that restoring Haitian democracy was in US interests, and that it would stop the flow of Haitian refugees.⁴²⁰ However, the public which continued to adhere to the frame Bush established in 1991.

Once Clinton made the decision to authorize Operation Uphold Democracy, he and his administration continued to push and adopt their frame and agenda to gain public support for the intervention. Clinton added human rights concerns, ending the refugee flows, and defending democracy to his frame and agenda.⁴²¹ During an address to the nation on 15 September Clinton once again attempted to justify his decision and frame the situation in Haiti to gain public support.⁴²² However, by waiting until the eve of the

⁴¹⁹ Analysis of Bush's public statements on Haiti from October 1, 1991 to January 20, 1993 in *PPPG 1991-1993*.

⁴²⁰ William J. Clinton, "Statement on Sanctions Against Haiti, June 4, 1993," in *PPPWJC 1993*, 810.

⁴²¹ William J. Clinton, "Interview with Wire Service Reporters on Haiti, September 14, 1994," in *PPPWJC 1994*, 1550.

⁴²² William J. Clinton, "Interview with Wire Service Reporters on Haiti, September 14, 1994," in *PPPWJC 1994*, 1550.

intervention, Clinton's efforts faced significant hurdles to convince the American public that the intervention was the correct policy decision and to get their support. By waiting so close to the beginning of the intervention Clinton also lost the ability to establish the frame and agenda for Haiti. This put Clinton in an uphill battle to change an established and well-accepted frame, that only a minority adhered to.

During Bush's presidency, the broadcast networks produced 125 reports on events in Haiti. Of those reports sixteen included discussions on the coup, seventy-two discussed the refugees and refugee policies, four talked about the military, five mentioned Aristide, and ten discussed OAS efforts to end the coup. US news reports spent more time framing the crisis in Haiti as a refugee crisis with little time dedicated connecting the refugee flow to the illegal government change and the junta's rule. The news reports also framed the refugee flow as a response to economic sanctions against the Cédras regime and diminished the importance of the Cédras regimes violence as a pushing the Haitians to flee.⁴²³

As the crisis in Haiti extended into Clinton's presidency, the media's depictions of the coup, Aristide, the plight of Haitian refugees, actions by the Cédras regime, remained the same. Television news media produced another 565 reports on events in Haiti. Five hundred and five of the reports covered general developments in Haiti, eleven reported on Clinton's foreign policies, seventy-one reported on Haitian refugees and refugee policies, forty-one discussed Aristide, one report discussed the coup itself, and

⁴²³ Statistical and qualitative information provided by Television News Archive at Vanderbilt University, www.tvnews.vanderbilt.edu using a word search for Haiti between September 30, 1991 and January 19, 1993.

five examined the Cédras regime's military leaders.⁴²⁴ However, the media's frame deviated little from the frame established during Bush's presidency.

The media continued to focus on the refugees fleeing to the United States and US support for OAS efforts. While the television news did not include any overt signs of race in its frame, race played a covert part of the media's framing of Haiti. One way this occurred was during C-Span's debate on an intervention in Haiti between Representatives Carrie Meeks and Charles Canaday. Meeks was a Democratic congresswoman and CBC member and Canaday was a Republican Congressman. Canaday was an outspoken opponent of the intervention and repeatedly stated that it was not the best way to end the refugee flow from Haiti, while Meeks, supported a military intervention to return Aristide to power. Meeks also repeatedly and adamantly disagreed with Canaday's remarks arguing he ignored widespread violence under the Cédras regime as a source of the refugee flow and defended Aristide from Canaday's criticisms.⁴²⁵ The Canaday-Meeks debate revealed the sharp divisions along political and racial lines over Clinton's Haitian policies especially his decision to deploy US forces as part of a military operation to restore Aristide to Haiti. As it had in the C-Span debate, the CBC emerged as one of the main proponents of Clinton's Haitian policies and the military intervention to restore Aristide and democracy to Haiti.

American newspapers also adopted Bush's frame the same frame. At the same time newspaper editorials allowed Aristides proponents and opponents to present their

⁴²⁴ Keyword Search on Vanderbilt University Television News Archive, <https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu> for "Haiti" date limitation to January 20, 1993 to October 30, 1994

⁴²⁵ "US Occupation of Haiti, C-Span Live July 13, 1994," *C-Span*, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?58631-1/us-occupation-haiti>

framing of the coup. Aristide's detractors focused on charges that Aristide had violated the human rights of his political opponents in Haiti.⁴²⁶ While Aristide's supporters denounced the coup and called for the restoration of Aristides democratically elected government.⁴²⁷ They denounced Aristide's opponents for disseminating propaganda and criticized foreign leaders that listened to Cédras regime supporters.⁴²⁸

Newspaper editorials also criticized US policy towards Haitian refugees. Many editorials argued the United States should not abide by the 1981 immigration agreement Reagan made with Duvalier to repatriate Haitian refugee, and that the United States should apply the same asylum laws to the Haitian refugees. Some editorials compared the repatriation of the Haitians to America's refusal to accept the German Jews on the *St. Louis* fleeing Nazi Germany.⁴²⁹ Editorials also criticized Bush's justification that he was repatriating Haitian refugees fleeing the economic devastation and not political repression. They called on Bush to end the economic sanctions against Haiti because the sanctions were not encouraging the Cédras regime or the army to stop violating their

⁴²⁶ Raymond Joseph, "The Americas: Haiti's Turmoil Creates Diplomatic Quagmire," *Wall Street Journal* October 11, 1991, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/398339600?accountid=13946>.

⁴²⁷ "Haiti in Danger" *The Washington Post*, October 2, 1991, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/307452956?accountid=13946>. "Haiti, by No Means Lost" *New York Times*, October 2, 1991, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/428256009?accountid=13946>.

⁴²⁸ "President Aristide: Outstanding Democrat," *WP* October 13, 1991, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/307444102?accountid=13946>

⁴²⁹ Naomi Flink Zucker and Norman L. Zucker, "Give the Haitians Safe Have," *NYT* December 3, 1991, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/428329911?accountid=13946>. Anna Husarska, "The Americas: Haitian Refugees Being Sent Back to Hell," *WSJ*, March 6, 1992, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/398263997?accountid=13946>. Stephen J. Solarz, "The Americas: Lady Liberty Must Not Reject Haitian Refugees," *WSJ* June 5, 1992, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/398389265?accountid=13946>.

political opponents' human rights.⁴³⁰ Others urged the administration to tighten the embargo against the Cédras junta as long as it continued to obstruct Aristide's return.⁴³¹ These editorials showed that the media's framing of the Haitian refugee crisis was tenuously connected to the Cédras regime's atrocities. It also revealed that the public debate on Haitian policy was focused on the effectiveness of diplomatic pressures against a military dictatorship.

There was not discussion of US responsibility to defend democracy and restore Haiti's democratic government, and there was no connection between Haitian democracy and US security and national interests. However, when Clinton introduced democracy into the Haitian frame editorials argued against Clinton's arguments. Some editorials argued that it was an impossible mission because the Haitian military and police would reject international efforts to retrain them.⁴³² Other American commentators argued against a United States invasion to rescue Haiti's democracy.⁴³³

As the military intervention approached foreign policy analysts like Anthony Lewis connected Clinton's inability to gain public approval to the post-Cold War period and the public's general opposition to US activism abroad. He noted that without an

⁴³⁰ "Backward Priorities on Haiti," *NYT*, May 27, 1992, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/428532339?accountid=13946>. Henry F. Carey, "The Americas: Lift the Embargo of Haiti Before There's No Haiti Left," *WSJ*, January 10, 1992, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/398243115?accountid=13946>

⁴³¹ "Haiti: Tighten the Embargo," *NYT*, January 30, 1992, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/428335661?accountid=13946>

⁴³² "Haiti: Mission Impossible," *New York Times* October 10, 1993, Late Edition (East Coast), <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/429313874?accountid=13946>.

⁴³³ "On The Dock in Haiti," *Washington Post* October 12, 1993, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/307684236?accountid=13946>.

imminent threat like communism it was more difficult to get American support for policy decisions. He continued that post-Cold War political and humanitarian crisis were more difficult to convince the American public were threats to US interests.⁴³⁴

After Clinton's address on 15 September, most editorials mirrored public opinion and opposed Clinton's decision to intervene in Haiti. They focused their criticisms on Clinton quick progression from diplomacy to military options in Haiti, while continuing diplomatic efforts to end the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda.⁴³⁵ Other argued that Clinton had been swayed by a small group of people in Washington—without mentioning the CBC—who cared about Haiti and pressured Clinton to take more aggressive actions even though Haiti was not a significant problem to most Americans.⁴³⁶

Bush's frame for Haiti was similar to his frame for Bosnia. He focused on supporting regional efforts at a resolution and not using US forces to resolve a political conflict. Clinton started with Bush's frame, and then attempted to change the agenda and frame for Haiti just before he deployed US military forces to Haiti. His efforts were unsuccessful, as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. noted in his editorial, if Clinton intended to change US policies in Haiti he should have started framing and setting the agenda months

⁴³⁴ Antony Lewis, "Abroad At Home; Foreign Policy Morass," *NYT* October 11, 1993, A.17 Late Edition (East Coast)
<http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/429312988?accountid=13946>.

⁴³⁵ "To The Shores of Port-au-Prince" *NYT* September 16, 1994
<http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/429876173?accountid=13946>. Anna Quindlen, "Public & Private: The Face-Saving Invasion" *NYT* September 17, 1994,
<http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/429879755?accountid=13946>.

⁴³⁶ Albert R. Hunt, "Politics & People: The Fumbling Foreign Policy Team," *The Wall Street Journal* September 15, 1994,
<http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/398553937?accountid=13946>; "How Did We Get Here" *Newsweek*, September 25, 1994, <http://www.newsweek.com/how-did-we-get-here-188458>.

before the intervention was to occur to gain public support.⁴³⁷ This allowed the media to continue Bush's frame and increase public opposition to Clinton's strategies.

Public Opinion, Media, Presidential Statements, and the Genocide in Rwanda

The genocide in Rwanda presented Clinton with several foreign policy and public relations opportunities. The genocide was the first crisis that Clinton could set his own frame and agenda for without having to continue, compete, or revise from Bush. It was a crisis that Clinton could bring into public awareness and quickly get public support for his policy decisions. A month into the genocide only 34 percent of Americans were aware that a genocide was occurring in Rwanda and were following news coverage.⁴³⁸

Clinton missed the opportunity to establish a strong frame and agenda for the Rwandan genocide that garnered public support for his policy decisions. During the Rwandan genocide, Clinton issued six public statements specifically about Rwanda, but none of these statements acknowledged that a genocide was occurring in Rwanda. Instead, Clinton's described the violence as a civil war. He established America's agenda was evacuating Americans from Rwanda, providing humanitarian aid, and supporting OAU negotiation efforts to get the Hutus and RPF to accept a cease-fire.⁴³⁹ Most of these

⁴³⁷ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Board of Contributors: Houdini in the White House," *WSJ* September 21, 1994, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/398466393?accountid=13946>.

⁴³⁸ News Interest Index Poll May 12-15, 1994, "How closely did you follow news stories about the tribal massacre in Rwanda?" Pew Research Center www.pewresearch.com Through poll question search for "Rwanda."

⁴³⁹ Qualitative analysis of Clinton's statements regarding Rwanda and the genocide in Rwanda between April 1994 and August 1994. *PPPWJC 1994*.

statements were made in response to questions from reporters during exchanges on topics other than situation in Rwanda.⁴⁴⁰

Clinton's first statement to bring attention to the situation in Rwanda expressed his shock and sadness about the deaths of the Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira. Clinton established that their deaths were tragic blows to the Rwandan and Burundian people. He expressed his horror that the Rwandan security forces were using their president's death to murder Rwandan politicians and others.⁴⁴¹ Following this statement, Clinton's statements discussed US efforts to evacuate Americans and diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. However, Clinton did not discuss the ethnically motivated and genocidal quality of the killings the security forces were carrying out.⁴⁴² It was not until July that Clinton acknowledged that a genocide had occurred in Rwanda as he announced the closing the US embassy in Rwanda in protest of the new governments support for acts of genocide.⁴⁴³

Throughout the conflict in Rwanda, Clinton's frame focused on the political discord causing violence in Rwanda. He established that America's agenda in Rwanda was to deliver humanitarian aid for those fleeing the violence and protecting American lives by evacuating from Rwanda and keeping US forces out. Compared to his remarks

⁴⁴⁰ Qualitative analysis of Clinton's statements regarding Rwanda and the genocide in Rwanda between April 1994 and August 1994. *PPPWJC 1994*.

⁴⁴¹ William Clinton, "Statement on the Deaths of Leaders of Rwanda and Burundi, April 7, 1994," *PPPWJC 1994*, 635.

⁴⁴² William Clinton, "Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters in Minneapolis, April 8, 1994" *PPPWJC 1994*, 643. William Clinton, "The President's Radio Address, April 9, 1994," *PPPWJC 1994*, 659-660. William Clinton, "Remarks on Bosnia and an Exchange with Reporters, April 10, 1994" *PPPWJC 1994*, 660-661.

⁴⁴³ "Statement on the Closing of the Embassy of Rwanda, July 15, 1994," *PPPWJC 1994*, 1257.

about Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia, Rwanda had a low priority in Clinton's foreign policy agenda. While Clinton's frame and agenda was late acknowledging the genocide in Rwanda, the American television and newspaper reports introduced genocide into the frame soon after the violence began and attempted to push Rwanda higher on the public agenda. Part of this was due to television reports from Rwanda and from human rights observer's first-hand reports of the violence.

The media's reporting on the situation in Rwanda repeatedly challenged Clinton's agenda for the conflict, but not his framing. The media focused on the killings in Rwanda and the need for an outside presence to restore peace. Additionally, television coverage of the fighting and genocide in Rwanda as extensive as some crisis like Persian Gulf Crisis, and Haiti, as ABC, CBS, and NBC produced 244 segments and specials on Rwanda over 116 days. These segments ranged from ten-seconds to twenty-nine minutes in length, with most lasting between one and two minutes. Most of the segments described a civil or tribal war occurring in Rwanda, with only ten reports describing the killings as a genocide rather than massacres, ethnic slaughter, or tribal violence. While media coverage on Rwanda at the beginning focused on the plights of Americans there were mentions of the violence but the focus was on the fighting between the Hutus and Tutsis. During April, the media reported on events in Rwanda daily though it was not until 28 April that the media first described the killing in Rwanda as a genocide.⁴⁴⁴ Still the media beat Clinton to introducing genocide into the frame three months before the president.

⁴⁴⁴ This statistical information comes a "Rwanda" keyword search conducted on the TV News Archive at Vanderbilt University website at <http://dev-tvnews.library.vanderbilt.edu>. The TV News Archive at Vanderbilt University contains all news broadcasts from CBS, ABC, and NBC from 1968, an hour of CNN since 1995, and Fox News since 2004.

While television news reports added genocide to their frames, American newspaper editorials were discussing events in Rwanda and describing the violence as a genocide by mid-April. They also criticized the United States and UN for failing to act to end the violence. During an interview with *Washington Post* reporters, Monique Mujawamariya, a human rights observer in Rwanda who had managed to escape the genocide in Rwanda, discussed the acts of violence and intimidation carried out by extremist Hutu. She described Hutu human rights violations back to December 1993 shortly after the last cease-fire was established. Mujawamariya argued that the international community had failed to prevent the violence from restarting by not adapting to the changing situation in Rwanda, not accounting for the long-term threat of violence between the Hutu and Tutsi, and failing to recognize the reality of the situation in Rwanda. She rejected claims that the violence in Rwanda was inter-tribal fighting or an ethnic conflict, and that the killings were separate from the civil war.⁴⁴⁵ Mujawamariya's interview was one of several articles and interviews that witnesses gave on the genocide in Rwanda.⁴⁴⁶

She was also one of many that criticized the Clinton administration and media for describing the genocide in Rwanda as tribal violence or as an inter-tribal war. Her interview also contrasted with public statements from Clinton and his administration by focusing attention to the genocide occurring Rwanda hidden by focus on the resumed civil war. Mujawamariya and others that argued a genocide was occurring in Rwanda

⁴⁴⁵ "So That The World Does Not Forget Rwanda," *WP* April 24, 1994, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/307758176?accountid=13946>.

⁴⁴⁶ Louise Mushikiwabo, "Rwanda's Genocide Is Not Random Tribal Violence," *WP* May 6, 1994 <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/307749749?accountid=13946>.

challenged Clinton and the media's framing. Others argued revealed that contrary to Clinton's statements Africa remained a low priority for US foreign policy, and African crises generated little concern within the international community. Editorials that criticized Clinton's slow response to Rwanda also pointed to the post-Cold War challenges related to crises where the president could not easily justify deploying US military forces to restore peace.⁴⁴⁷ One editorial noted that the problem lay with policymakers' failure to establish or articulate a clear standard to respond to intranational brutality and aggression that had low stakes to national interests.⁴⁴⁸

Other commentators criticized Presidential Decision Directive-25 for enabling the United States to prevent the UN from acting aggressively or sending a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda. These editorials argued that despite administration arguments of supporting international actions to end the violence in Rwanda, Clinton's policies had done the opposite by forcing the UN to focus on humanitarian efforts for refugees on the borders.⁴⁴⁹ Along with the criticism brought by the policy decisions, the Clinton administration was also criticized for refusing to describe the violence in Rwanda as a genocide, despite the numerous reports from human rights observers that it was occurring. Several commentators noted that the United States refused to describe the killings as genocide to avoid encouraging calls for a US military intervention as required

⁴⁴⁷ "Massacre in Rwanda: Where's the Outrage," *USA Today* May 2, 1994, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview306649678?accountid=13946>.

⁴⁴⁸ Stephen Engelberg, "If and When: From Pall of Sarajevo to the Shores of Who Knows Where," *NYT*, May 1, 1994, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/429767316?accountid=13946>.

⁴⁴⁹ Paul Lewis, "UN Backs Troops for Rwanda But Terms Bar Any Action Soon," *NYT* May 17, 1994, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/429743074?accountid=13946>.

by the 1952 UN Convention on Genocide that called for the signers to prevent the crime and punish those that committed it.⁴⁵⁰ While Clinton tried to frame the conflict in Rwanda as a civil war, media reports and interviews with survivors repeatedly challenged this frame and Clinton's agenda for the crisis. The media's coverage of the situation in Rwanda demonstrated that the media was capable challenging the president's frame and eventually forcing the president to change his frame. However, the media was not able to generate enough public opinion to pressure Clinton to change his policies towards Rwanda.

Conclusions

Framing and agenda setting for the American public is a multifaceted mechanism that includes the president, the media, and the public. The President attempts to establish the initial frame and agenda. The president's efforts are challenged by political opponents and proponents in public debates. The media describes these debates and either adopts all or parts of the president's frame and agenda or not. As these crises reveal the president's frame is often supported by the media with little or moderate changes. At the same time the president and the media alter their frames and agenda based on public opinions of the presidents' policies and media coverage of events.

As Bush and Clinton strove to support international stability and security through international cooperation, and protect the United States from as the international situation changed in the post-Cold War period they had to get public support for their policy

⁴⁵⁰ "U.S. Aides Avoid Labeling Horror" *NYT*, Jun 10, 1994, <http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/429791316?accountid=13946>.
Thomas W. Lippman, "Administration Sidesteps Genocide Label in Rwanda" *WP* June 11, 1994
<http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/307762428?accountid=13946>

decisions. This required Bush and Clinton to describe and explain crises and their policy responses to the American public using language that fit within the American public's world views and foreign policy preferences. The tone, rhetoric, and frequency of their presidential statements on foreign events reflected the level of importance a crisis had to the United States, and how much attention the American public and mass media should pay to those events as well. However, this did not mean that the public or the media would completely agree with the president's position. In the post-Cold War period, the function of public opinion in a democracy to influence, limit, and guide leaders' policy decisions ensured that presidents and other policymakers participated in policy debates, expressed their views on the situation, and justified their decisions in ways that informed the public.

The media serves to keep the public informed, even if that requires the public to contradict the government. It is also dependent upon the media's ability to cover an event in a way that forces that crisis higher up the public agenda. However, does not possess an omnipotent ability to equally cover every crisis around the world in a way that sways the public and policymakers. Additionally, when the media fails to substantially cover a crisis, or conflict it increases the possibility for the government to develop a policy vacuum.

CHAPTER IX - CONCLUSION

In 1993, Bill Clinton stated, “Gosh, I miss the Cold War. We had an intellectually coherent thing. The American people knew what the rules were.”⁴⁵¹ Not just the American people, but American policymakers understood that during the Cold War the United States was fighting to preserve democracy and free market capitalism from the Soviet Union and its desire to spread communism. The end of the Cold War threw those rules to the wind, and left post-Cold War policymakers searching for a new grand strategy for US national security and foreign policies. At the same time, American society was still coming to terms with changes that occurred during the 1960s with civil rights movements, the rightward turn of American politics, and leftward turn of American culture. American media was changing in response to telecommunications advances that enabled instantaneous transmissions of news reports around the world which led to the rise twenty-four-hour news channels and cable television, and the rise of the internet and growing popularity of email. These advances changed the way American received news and information and connected with each other and their elected officials. Internationally, the United States was re-evaluating its global military presences, responding to anti-American attitudes around the world, and responding to increasing numbers of intranational conflicts that threatened regional and international stability and security. Following the temporary rise of a unipolar international system, the United States

⁴⁵¹ Ann Devroy and Jeffrey R. Smith, “Clinton Reexamines a Foreign Policy Under Siege,” *Washington Post*, October 17, 1993, https://secure.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/doc/307677847.html?FMT=FT_

emerged as a world super power in multipolar system as regional powers and institutions balanced America's global military presence.

Even as the international system encountered rapid change George Bush and Bill Clinton relied on pre-Cold War US foreign policy and national security strategies from the early twentieth century to devise a non-containment grand strategy after the Cold War. Clinton's and Bush's national security strategy and foreign policies returned to cooperative security arrangements that relied on international and regional institutions to respond to international and intranational conflicts that threatened to world security and stability and American interests. Their efforts occurred as post-Cold War technological advances in satellite transmissions, the growth of the internet, and electronic email increased public opinion's and the mass media's ability to influence foreign policy decisions.

For forty years, the strategy of containment guided the US presidents' policy decisions, from the Berlin Airlift, the Korean War, Vietnam War, using African American jazz musicians as ambassadors, to supporting totalitarian governments, the United States adopted policies designed to protect democracy and capitalism around the world. In many ways, the Cold War stymied the American diplomacy. It did this by forcing the government and American policymakers to comprehend international relations through one lens that simplified international relations to a black and white issue. While the singular focus made it easier to explain US policy decisions to the public and to gain public opinion, it also set the United States up for difficult a transition once the Cold War ended.

The end of the Cold War made the containment strategy and its singular vision for US strategies and policies obsolete. Without a similar universal strategy, US international relations returned to the pre-Cold War emphasis on cooperative security arrangements, and multinational responses to international crises. This system struggled to respond to post-Cold War conflicts in areas where the United States or the Soviet Union had provided governments with military and economic support to counter the plans of the other. Without the Cold War dichotomy suppressing internal discord, previously suppressed ethnic or political divisions re-emerged and sparked intranational political or humanitarian crises that Bush and Clinton found difficult to resolve. As the Cold War ended, Bush transitioned US foreign policy and national security away from the strategy of containment and towards cooperative security arrangements. Clinton continued this direction and added global economic prosperity as another means to defend US security and interests. Bush and Clinton also broke with America's postwar tradition of decreasing US military force and maintained America's super power military presence around the world, which they attempted to use to maintain global security and stability. However, neither president could create a strategy that used America's military strength to deter and respond to intranational conflicts that frequently threatened global stability and security after 1991.

Bush's attempt led to the creation of the New World Order, while Clinton's attempt created a strategy of engagement and enlargement. Both presidents believed that creating a post-Cold War grand strategy provided the government with direction for foreign policies and the United States future role in the world. They also believed that like the policy of containment, their strategies could provide the American public with an

overarching understanding of America's global mission and foreign policy agenda.

However, neither president's grand strategy was entirely original. Their plans borrowed ideas and theories from the first half of the twentieth century, at times reenacting past international events.

George Bush served as the transition president to the post-Cold War period. This positioned Bush to create a grand strategy that future post-Cold War presidents could use if his strategy was successful. However, Cold War ideologies were hard to overcome during the Bush presidency. It was not until the collapse of the Soviet Union when Bush was no longer felt he needed to the strategy of containment that he established new rules for US foreign policy. Bush's post-Cold War strategy became the New World Order. It promoted collective security and international cooperation to maintain global and regional security and stability. It also encouraged working with international institutions like UN and NATO to deter aggression and if necessary to create coalitions to end conflicts. Bush's New World Order harkened back to the notions of international cooperation advocated by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Bush's response to the Persian Gulf Crisis was the best implementation of his New World Order strategy. He successfully created international opposition to Iraqi aggression, sustained and guided that cooperation through the to the end of a successful war that removed Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Bush also gained the support of the American public for his policy decisions. This included overcoming the Vietnam syndrome and significant opposition to a military intervention to liberate Kuwait up to the 16 January 1991.

While Bush favored collective action to resolve crises, he did not support United States leadership in every attempt to deter aggression and resolve crises. Instead, Bush

engaged American leadership when a crisis posed significant threats to US national interests, as he did during the unification of Germany and the Persian Gulf Crisis. When global crisis did not threaten vital US national interests, such as the Haitian coup and Bosnian War, Bush encouraged regional powers and institutions to take the lead while the United States supported their leadership. The disadvantage of this strategy was that it limited Bush's ability to influence policy decision and led to policy differences between the US and the regional institutions. This policy was supposed to encourage collective action between various states as Bush desired in the New World Order. However, many of the regional efforts failed to provide the same level of assertive leadership the United States had traditionally provided, due to internal divisions over policy decisions.

While Bush borrowed foreign policy ideas from the early twentieth century, Clinton pulled from Wilsonian foreign policies and other mid-twentieth-century foreign policies. His strategy of engagement and enlargement included the promotion and defend democracy and supporting global economic prosperity. While communism no longer threatened democracy, dictators, totalitarian governments prevented countries from embracing democracy, while and coups threatened new democratic governments. In his national security strategy, Clinton discussed participating in missions that were relevant to US national security interests and where the US could do the most good.

Between 1993 and 1995, Clinton attempted to implement a foreign policy strategy that kept the United States engaged in world affairs, especially in ways that helped to end crises. Clinton's presidency was less focused on encouraging collective action, than with maintaining US participation in international developments and supporting the growth of democracy. Unlike Bush, Clinton was more willing to take aggressive actions when

international crises were not a threat to international events. Clinton also developed foreign and national security strategies that were more selective when deploying US military forces abroad.

Both Bush and Clinton created national security and foreign policies based on the roles they believed the United States should fill in the post-Cold War period. Bush and Clinton developed and pursued policies per their strategies, whether that was directing international cooperation in a new era of peace and security or engaging with the world and promoting the spread of democratic governments. Their ability to enact that strategy through policy had varying degrees of success. While both presidents attempted to keep the United States involved in global events, the rise of intranational conflicts that violated human rights and created humanitarian crises challenged both strategies. Unfortunately, neither grand strategy provided a standard rule or set of rules to guide policymakers. Instead, Clinton and Bush enacted policies that frustrated international efforts by limiting US participation and with it that of other countries. As the sole super power the United States had much sway on the international community and when the United States proved unwilling to act assertively neither did the international community.

While Bush and Clinton differed in their approaches, both presidents adopted similar responses to intranational crises. In both Yugoslavia and Rwanda these men encouraged regional institutions and states to resolve the conflicts in their neighboring countries while the United States provided support. In both crises, the United States retreated from leading resolution efforts even as developments demonstrated that US leadership was likely the only way to generate a forceful response. Bush was called out for this strategy and how it undermined his New World Order after executing it so well in

response to Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. The public also criticized Clinton for this tactic, but because his foreign policy framework appeared less grandiose, his decisions came under less attack. Also, Clinton demonstrated that he was willing to adopt stronger policies against those that engaged in violence as he did against the Serbs in Bosnia and the Cédras regime in Haiti.

The difference in US responses to international and intranational crises emerged during the Persian Gulf War, the Bosnian War, and the Rwandan genocide. Following Iraq's invasions of Kuwait, Bush successfully led a coalition to push Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. However, neither Bush nor Clinton could unite the international community to stop the intranational conflicts in Bosnian War and the genocide in Rwanda, where conflicts were caused by one ethnicity attempting to eliminate the other. As the Persian Gulf Crisis revealed, it was easier to convince countries united to oppose the aggression of one state against another than it was to unify the international community against a state perpetrating violence against its own people.

In a period when the American public was less inclined to pay attention to international events and less supportive of US involvement in foreign crises, presidents needed to explain foreign policy decisions in a way that kept the public focus but also supportive of policy decisions. American attitudes were especially relevant when mass media reports on global crises informed and influenced public opinion. Both presidents recognized that intranational conflicts were difficult for outside powers to influence, while American morality made it difficult to ignore the crises. Also, refusing to participate in resolution efforts undermined American principles and values. How could the United States argue it defended human rights and democracy while it stood by as a

state violated those ideals? In responding to intranational conflicts Bush and Clinton were questioned about US involvement in intranational crises especially when they did not threaten US national security interests. Thus, intranational conflicts proved to be the most significant challenges to both men's grand strategies. American foreign policy makers were not the only ones challenged by this situation; many Americans questioned America's role in a world without a global threat.

During the 1990s, while American public supported US participation in international affairs, the public was less supportive of US involvement in peacekeeping missions. Many Americans had believed that the end of the Cold War would make the world safer and more peaceful. Instead, they continued to hear about violence and crises occurring throughout the world and appeals for international aid. During the Cold War the Soviet Union and the expansion of communism were the greatest threats to the United States, but in the post-Cold War period, that threat no longer existed. If no other country was powerful enough to threaten the United States then, what was America's purpose in the world, and who was the biggest threat to the United States? If there was not global power strong enough to threaten the United States, then the United States was not responsible for policing the world. These public attitudes led Bush and Clinton to frame and justify American interventions around the world in ways that answered these questions.

After the Cold War, changes in telecommunication technology, the development of cable television, and twenty-four-hour news networks affected the mass media's role in American society. However, many Americans continued to get much of their evening, weekend, and serialized news broadcasts from CBS, NBC, and ABC. These news reports

provided the American public with basic information about world events. However, most regular news broadcasts discussed foreign news for less than two minutes, unless it was a special report which could last thirty minutes to an hour. Newspapers and editorial sections provided the in-depth analysis and context that television news reports lacked. The lack of attention was visible if a crisis did not threaten American interests or had little relevance to most American's lives. However, crises that posed significant threats to US interest or were relevant to much of the American population received much news coverage.

The Persian Gulf Crisis with over one thousand news broadcasts and special reports was the most televised event in the early post-Cold War period. The next highest reported crisis was Somalia and the US intervention there with over 800 reports. The US intervention in Haiti, Bosnia, and Rwanda received approximately 500 reports, and the fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification of Germany had less than 400. Many of the reports on the crises relied on stereotypes, traditional narratives, and understandings of regions and peoples. In Bosnia, the media described the crisis as an ancient feud, and often described the genocide in Rwanda as a tribal war or civil war. The ways mass media described these conflicts and the reasons for them influenced how American public understood and rated their importance in the same way presidential framing did.

Americans' expressed their opinions of US foreign policy by corresponding with the president and writing editorials to newspapers. It is difficult to completely gauge the influence public opinion had on Bush's and Clinton's foreign policy. However, both presidents took steps to recognize how the American public felt about various issues, and attempted to gain public support for foreign policy decisions. Sometimes they succeeded

other times they did, and depending on the crisis and the president's determination of the crisis importance to US security he was willing to act without public support. As Clinton did when he decided to undertake the US intervention in Haiti even though the public's opposed a military intervention to restore Haiti's democratic government. Bush never faced this problem, though he often faced public opposition to his policy decisions.

After the end of the Cold War, George Bush, Bill Clinton, the American public, and the American media attempted to understand the world's changing situation. The rise of intra-state conflicts and the difficulties the United States faced determining when to intervene to re-establish stability and peace plagued Bush and Clinton's foreign policy and national security strategies. The American public added to the challenges they faced as the public was reluctant to deploy American military force to police the world, even as the United States maintained its military preponderance of power. Intranational conflicts and technological changes combined to change the way the American media reported on foreign affairs. The increased ability of reporters to quickly describe crises around the world and the introduction of twenty-four-hour news channels introduced new ways to influence public opinion and presidential foreign policy decisions.

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