Security is Local: An Analysis of the Use of Community-Based Security Forces During Counterinsurgency Operations

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SECURITY IS LOCAL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF COMMUNITY-BASED SECURITY FORCES DURING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

by

Alexander Dulaney Stephenson

A Dissertation
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May 2018
ABSTRACT

SECURITY IS LOCAL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF COMMUNITY-BASED SECURITY FORCES DURING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

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May 2018

Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are the most common type of military operation conducted by the United States and other Western powers. In most cases, conventional forces intervening in an insurgency are limited in personnel and turn to local community-based security forces to mitigate this shortcoming after initial attempts fail to defeat an insurgency with the conventional forces available. While the use of community-based security forces is a common element of COIN operations, little research has been conducted to determine the factors that contribute to their successful employment. A synthesis of existing COIN and community-based policing theory provides a model to evaluate the use of community-based security forces. Six factors emerge as the most important for important for the successful employment of community-based security forces: external support and oversight, limits to territorial jurisdiction, incorporation of traditional justice system, local sustainability and accountability, and voluntary participation by local elites. An analysis of eight uses of community-based security forces during COIN operations indicates that external oversight and support is the most critical element in the success of a community-based security program, but also the balanced application of the other factors is a reliable predictor of the program’s outcome and that there is a relationship among several of the
factors themselves. These findings suggest this model is a useful planning tool for military planners and commanders.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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DEDICATION

I would like to thank my family for their support and perseverance throughout my doctoral studies. It has been a long road and I could not have done it without you. I would especially like to give special recognition to my mother, Fayre Stephenson, for her tireless proofreading support. Reading my drafts could be considered cruel and unusual punishment in some countries, but you always came through the ordeal with a smile. I would also like to thank Naomi Freeman for helping me through a tough time, bringing a smile back to my face, and helping to get this thing finished. Finally, thank you to my kids who put up with their dad reading books and writing all the time in his quest to be a doctor, “but not the kind that actually helps people.”
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<td>ADO</td>
<td>Assistant District Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Viet Nam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACO</td>
<td>Combined Action Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAG</td>
<td>Combined Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td>Civilian Irregular Defense Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Combined Action Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Civil Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>District Officer</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of South Vietnam</td>
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<td>HES</td>
<td>Hamlet Evaluation System</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang</td>
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<tr>
<td>LLDB</td>
<td>South Vietnamese Army Special Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<td>MAT</td>
<td>Military Advisor Team</td>
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<td>MCP</td>
<td>Malayan Communist Party</td>
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<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>MRLA</td>
<td>Malayan Races Liberation Army</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnamese Army</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PF</td>
<td>Popular Force</td>
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<td>QCA</td>
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<td>RF</td>
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<td>Special Forces</td>
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<td>Special Forces Group</td>
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<td>TFES</td>
<td>Territorial Forces Evaluation System</td>
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<td>USM</td>
<td>The University of Southern Mississippi</td>
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<td>USMAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<td>USOM</td>
<td>United States Operations Mission</td>
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<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>VC</td>
<td>Viet Cong</td>
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States (U.S.) military has conducted significantly more counterinsurgency (COIN) and peacekeeping operations than any other type of operation, to include the high-intensity warfare experienced during both World Wars (Boot 2014). The diminishing possibility of large-scale conventional warfare due to the threat of nuclear weapons and the Western preoccupation with stabilizing weak and developing states suggests a continued proliferation of COIN operations as the twenty-first century progresses. As recent U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight, the cost in blood and treasure required to conduct COIN operations using the current top-down, nation-building approach is often at odds with the level of commitment possessed by intervening powers. This resource-commitment mismatch and the failure of many COIN operations to produce decisive results have sparked a debate among COIN theorists concerning the validity of the top-down, state-centered COIN model. A growing number of COIN theorists now advocate a bottom-up, community-based approach to COIN (Jones 2010 and Kilcullen 2013). This dissertation tests a theory, based in bottom-up COIN theory, for the use of community-based security forces. The use of community-based security forces is one method promoted by bottom-up COIN theorists as one way to overcome the shortcomings of current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. While the use of community-based security forces is touted as a component of bottom-up COIN, in numerous cases the use of these irregular forces has led to human rights abuses and other counterproductive effects. The theory proposed in this dissertation presents variables that influence the success or failure of community-based security programs.
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, encapsulated in Field Manual (FM) 3-24: The United States Army and United States Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014), draws its foundations from the state-centric development model prevalent in Western governments and aid organizations. One flaw of the manual is that authors of FM 3-24 do not critically examine the experiences of previous counterinsurgency operations using variables outside their current model to determine what, if any, other variables influence the outcomes of COIN operations. U.S. COIN doctrine and state-building both propose that population security is one of the key elements of counterinsurgency or state-building and that states experience widespread violence because of the extent of weakness of their central governments. Therefore, these views propose that the only way to achieve security and stability is for the host nation to be the “primary actor” in providing security, while donor aid builds the structures of a modern state (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014, Fukuyama 2004 and Dobbins, et al. 2007). This is the essence of the top-down COIN approach: building a centralized state apparatus to assume the role of security guarantor. The failure of the international community and the U.S. in particular to establish functioning central governments or sustainable security in numerous post-conflict societies exposes the issues with top-down COIN methods.

This research follows the trend in recent COIN literature that proposes the state-based counterinsurgency theory is incorrect or at best insufficient because of its reliance on the unproven belief that building a traditional state-based security apparatus is the only viable way to provide security (Dobbins, et al. 2007 and Fukuyama, 2004). This view interprets Max Weber’s definition of a state as “a human community that
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory," to mean that the state must be the exclusive and not just predominant holder of force in order to function (Weber 1958). This is a Western-based view of the roles and functions of a state and presents an ideal or perfect case of societal organization and does not reflect how late developing states function. As Douglass North (1981) notes, this idealized vision of state control does not acknowledge that at best most states only enjoy a comparative advantage in the use of force. Often the exercise of violence in a weak state experiencing an insurgency is a cooperative and competitive interaction between the state, insurgents, and other non-state practitioners of violence.

Detractors of state-building theory point to the numerous failures of state-building projects to gain lasting security in many conflict prone states in Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East. These critics propose that such efforts fail because they use Western state formation as the template and demand development of a central government, democratization, and modernization at a pace that overwhelms the capacity of fragile states and societies (Paris, 2004 and Ahram, 2011). While critiques of state-building theory have led international development agencies and donors to focus on a dual strategy of top-down and bottom-up development models, little rigorous and analytical focus has been paid to applying these lessons to COIN doctrine (OECD, 2007).

The failure or inconclusive results of recent state-building projects attempted by the international community in Somalia and several Sub-Saharan Africa states and of state-centric counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan questions the practicability of state formation in fragile or failed states contending with weak institutions and non-state competitors. The alternative to establishing state monopoly of
power in countries where it never existed or where the state has traditionally been a hindrance to stability and development is to accept the devolution of violence to non-state actors and find practical ways to incorporate those non-state actors into counterinsurgency efforts (Ahram 2011).

Authors such as Seth Jones (2010) and David Kilkullen (2013) point to the need for the application of bottom-up COIN strategies, but offer models based on single cases. Jones (2010) defines bottom-up counterinsurgency strategy as leveraging existing grassroots resistance to insurgent movements to not only secure the population, but also to gain the support of the population. By gaining the support of the local population, “especially mobilizing locals to fight insurgents, providing information on their locations and movements, and denying insurgent sanctuary in their areas,” the goal of bottom-up COIN strategy is to “mobilize communities simultaneously across multiple areas” (Jones 2010, ix). Jones proposes that this method can create an unstoppable momentum against an insurgent force until “a ‘cascade’ or tipping point is created and insurgent victory is impossible” (Jones 2010, ix). This suggests a need for the establishment of the relationship between the variables influencing bottom-up COIN strategies and the outcome of the operation, as well as the relationship among the variables themselves.

One of the main foundations of this dissertation, derived from an exhaustive literature review and recent U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that COIN forces often fail to establish population security because of inadequate external security force manpower and resources. Military leaders asked to face the daunting task of defeating an insurgency are left in a quandary imposed by the competing factors of limited resources and time constraints and the requirements of speed, duration,
and resources necessary to build a strong central government and security sector necessary to defeat an insurgency. Faced with these constraints and requirements, commanders of COIN forces in most recent cases are forced violate COIN doctrine and adopt bottom-up strategies to achieve population security. One such strategy is the use of community-based security forces, which is the focus of this dissertation. These programs have produced mixed results. In Iraq community-based, security forces produced rapid gains in security in 2007 through the Sons of Iraq program, while in Afghanistan community-based security forces in the period of 2002 to the present have produced few security gains with little initial success (Human Rights Watch 2011). Earlier counterinsurgency operations by the U.S., France, Britain and Peru have also used local community security forces to overcome resource and information constraints as well as to provide rapid and persistent security in contested zones, with varying degrees of success. This practice contradicts current counterinsurgency doctrine and theory, which dictates that only the state can provide security. Instead of addressing this deficiency in counterinsurgency theory and doctrine, the use of community-based security forces has been ignored or downplayed in the 2014 revision of FM 2-34 and therefore has not been scrutinized as a necessary component of successful U.S. counterinsurgency strategies (Gentile, 2008 and Amato, 2011).

Problem Statement

Community-based security is not without its critics. Detractors highlight instances of predatory behavior by community-based security forces or their use by nefarious local powerbrokers, which hinder the effectiveness of aid and the development of state institutions (Human Rights Watch 2011). The frequency of the use of
community-based security forces and their mixed record in counterinsurgency operations, coupled with the lack of attention placed on the factors necessary for their successful implementation, demonstrates a need for further study. This problem lends itself to asking which factors and combination of factors influence the outcome of community-based security programs as a part of a larger COIN operation.

Statement of Purpose and Research Question

The impracticability of current top-down COIN doctrine and the near universal, but mixed, use of community-based security forces points to an important area of research relevant to academics and practitioners. For academics, this study refines one facet of COIN theory, further challenging the concept of the state monopoly on the use of force and providing an empirical theory for the successful use of community-based security forces. For practitioners, this study seeks to provide selection criteria for the use of community-based security forces and to set expectations for their effectiveness. Therefore, this research seeks to address the research question, “How do the variables associated with the relevant literature on community-based policing influence the outcome of bottom-up COIN operations using non-state local security forces?”

Community-based policing theory proposed by Bruce Baker provides one source of potential variables to apply to COIN community-based security programs. The overlap between community-based security and community-based policing are evident beyond the similarity in names. Community-based security programs seek to empower local populations to establish security in ongoing internal conflicts that weaken the ability of the state to secure a population, while community-based policing promotes the
establishment of security after conflict termination when the institutions of a state cease to exist or are degraded.

Community-based policing theory has been successfully tested in post-conflict countries in Africa and adherence to the principles of the theory have been found to promote accountability of security forces to the local populace and provide security and judicial services that are congruent with local practices, while maintaining government oversight (Baker 2004). Baker (2004) proposes that the critical variables required for the success of a community-based security program are the incorporation of traditional justice systems; local sustainability and accountability; voluntary participation by local elites; and external oversight. While this theory has been proven effective in post-conflict states in Africa, it has not been tested in other regions or as a component of counterinsurgency operations.

This dissertation, guided by the relevant literature discussed in the literature review, proposes that because of the higher level of violence and material capacity associated with insurgent groups compared to other non-state actors such as gangs, the most critical variable in community-security programs is sustained external oversight and support. This is a divergence from Baker’s theory, which suggests some oversight by a responsible state is necessary, but links to discredited or predatory government forces can often act as a negative influence on the acceptance of community-based policing by the local population (Baker 2010). The greater need for material and training support required to confront a trained and well-equipped insurgent force should outweigh the benefits of autonomy in cases of community-based security programs in counterinsurgency operations. This is due to the greater threat posed by a well-armed
insurgent group as compared to the low-level crime and disorganized civil unrest faced by the post-conflict community-based policing programs addressed in Baker’s research. It is a reasonable assumption that community-based security forces must be armed at a nearly equal level to the insurgent forces they confront, thus community-based security forces would require a higher level of support from government forces.

The remaining variables are unchanged from Baker’s model. In addition to oversight, limited territorial jurisdiction should also influence the ability of non-state security forces to act as predatory agents outside their social and geographic communities. Incorporation of traditional justice systems should influence the local acceptance of community-based security forces by tapping into conflict resolution mechanisms accepted by the population. This variable should also influence the ability of local trusted agents to negotiate and reintegrate marginal members of the insurgency under terms understood by the local actors in the conflict. The ability for local actors to sustain the manpower requirements of the program and accountability mechanisms should influence the long-term ownership of the program by local populations. Including local power brokers and violence specialists into community-security programs should influence the success of the program by co-opting existing power structures and minimizing the creation of powerful spoilers.

Hypothesis

Therefore, the alternate hypothesis proposed is that the degree of adherence to the factors described above and their interdependence determines the level of sustainable security attained through community-based security programs. The hypothesis can be illustrated by this formula:
security (s) = amount of sustained external oversight and support (os) + limits to territorial jurisdiction (t) + level of traditional justice systems incorporation (tj) + degree of local sustainability and accountability (sa) + level of voluntary participation by local elites (le) or s = os + t + tj + sa + le. The null hypothesis is that adherence to these factors does not influence the level of security experienced by communities participating in community-based security programs. The variables presented, based on community-based policing theory and relevant COIN theory discussed later in this proposal, addresses the unique issues and factors encountered in counterinsurgency operations and those issues critics raise with the use of non-state actors in the provision of security.

Research Approach

The research objective of the dissertation is to conduct a disciplined configurative case study of 11 counterinsurgency campaigns that include large-scale community based security programs and then use the congruence case study method to test the ability of the theory to explain the outcome of individual cases. In all military operations trade-offs between competing requirements must be made and each of these factors must be balanced to achieve success. Therefore, a model for the optimum balance between each of the factors of the model must be created. To accomplish this, a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) will be conducted to determine which conditions are necessary or sufficient for a specific outcome and the potential combination of conditions that can produce an outcome. To further test the explanatory power of the model, an additional case study will be examined after the QCA to determine if the combinations and relative strength of each variable produced by the QCA provide adequate explanation of the case.
Assumptions

Based on the researcher’s experience and the relevant historical accounts of the use of local indigenous security forces during COIN operations, three primary assumptions were made regarding this study. First, the use of community-based security forces can be a critical component of bottom-up COIN operations. This assumption is based on premise held by a growing number of military and COIN analysts that the Sons of Iraq program was a key component in the reduction of violence in Iraq during the so-called US military force “Surge” in 2007. This is a necessary assumption because if other environmental conditions are the causal variables that cause specific outcomes, the validity of this study comes into question. This dissertation continually tests the validity of this assumption by accounting for other factors that influence the outcome of all the cases studied.

Second, this study assumes that the desire for security is a universal motivation and the inhabitants of a community have a stake in stability and security of that community. Therefore, given the access to the proper resources, local actors will be motivated to provide security for themselves. This assumption is guided by Maslow’s hierarchy of needs that posits the desire for safety is one of the base human motivators. It is also based on community policing principle of local ownership that proposes that given a stake in the outcome of a program, the local population will desire a successful outcome. This assumption is necessary because if local inhabitants caught in an active insurgency are primarily motivated by other considerations, the principles of community-based policing are not valid for COIN community-based security programs.
Third, accounting for local differences in environmental and cultural conditions, community-based security programs used in previous COIN operations share similar characteristics. This is based on an initial review of the cases used in this dissertation and others outside the scope of this study. This is a necessary assumption for this dissertation because the purpose of this study is to measure the degree of membership of selected attributes the cases selected for this study share. As with the others previously noted, this assumption will be tested throughout this dissertation by accounting for other factors in each of the cases that may have been causal influences on their outcomes.

Rationale and Significance

Most counterinsurgency theorists support the use of local security forces, but are either vague in the requirements for effectiveness or provide case specific recommendations. Community-based policing in Africa and Bruce Baker’s theories on community-based policing provide an existing theoretic framework that Baker (2010) notes has not been tested outside of Africa or applied to community-based security effort during an insurgency. The model for this research intends to test the hypotheses that local ownership, incorporation of traditional justice systems, sustainability, and voluntary participation by the community and local security provider will resolve many of the concerns that arise during the implementation of a community-based security program.

This dissertation and the model presented in it will provide two additions to the existing literature. First, it will provide support for the general applicability of bottom-up COIN, which up to this point has been developed and tested using single cases. Also, a QCA of the model, which is explained in depth in the methodology chapter, will indicate the relative importance of each variable and the necessary and sufficient combination of
variables needed to produce a required outcome; this type of analysis has not been conducted before. Second, testing a modified community-based policing model will test the variables of the model outside of Africa, which has not been done before. In each of these areas this dissertation will provide a unique and necessary contribution to the existing literature.

Definitions of Key Terminology Used in This Study

Bottom-Up Counterinsurgency – The use of social networks at the local level by a national government or external force to secure the local population, isolate insurgents from the population, and gain the support of the population as a key component of a counterinsurgency campaign.

Community-Based Security – An organized activity centered at the local level that seeks to maintain social order and peace through the prevention and deterrence of internal or external armed groups seeking to displace government authority or fill gaps in governance (Jones 2010).

Counterinsurgency (COIN) – “Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014, 53).

Insurgency – “a condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency.” (Merriam Webster)

Security – The “state or condition of (individuals) being protected from or not exposed to danger” and the “protection of the interests” of a group “against some internal or external threat” (Oxford English Dictionary 2015).
Traditional Justice System – Customary structures based on social or religious tradition that investigate and resolve conflicts and disputes (Baker 2010, 93). These systems are typically outside the formal system of justice established by the state. The ability of these systems to investigate and resolve disputes and conflict relies on their informal social or religious authority.

Political Entrepreneur/Political Elite – Individuals or groups who specialize in social brokerage to include creating, defining, and coordinating social connections and representing social groups (Tilly 2003). These actors can derive their power from their position in the state or their position in formal or informal social networks such as religious or tribal leaders.

Violence Specialist – A political actor who “controls the means of inflicting damage on persons and objects” (Tilly 2003, 35). These individuals and groups can be a part of the state security apparatus such as the military or police. They can also be non-state actors such as private security companies, criminal gangs, paramilitary groups and private individuals with access to the means of force.

Research Overview

The structure for this dissertation consists of 16 parts. After this introductory chapter, the second chapter reviews the literature relevant to this study and discusses how this research is grounded in existing theory and furthers the study of counterinsurgency. The next chapter discusses the case study and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) methodology selected for this dissertation. In the next chapters, 11 counterinsurgency case studies involving community-based security programs are presented to build the necessary information required to conduct the QCA. In the second part of each case
study, a congruence analysis is conducted to assess the theory’s value in explaining the outcome of each case (George and Bennett 2005, 181-204). This exercise is useful to determine the relative importance of each variable and which variables work in concert to produce an outcome. This results in a “fuzzy set,” or a data set whose elements have varying degrees of membership in the variable in contrast to the conventional “crisp set” whose objects are either “in” or “out.” (Ragin 2008) The final section is a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of the fuzzy sets to test the necessary conditions within the theory and conclusion. A similar methodology was used successfully by International Development Program graduate Kevin Dougherty in his doctoral dissertation “Following the Principles: Case Studies in Operations Other Than War, 1945-1999” (Dougherty 2011).

Chapter Outline

Chapter 1 provides an introduction of the topic, research question, and hypothesis. This chapter also provides a synopsis of the research method. Finally, an overview of the remainder of the dissertation is included.

Chapter 2 discusses the major relevant literature with the purpose of situating the dissertation in COIN literature and defining the variables used in the dissertation. This chapter outlines the major principles of COIN and community-based policing in post-conflict countries. These principles are used to develop a proposed model for the successful application of a community-based security program during counterinsurgency operations.

Chapter 3 develops the methodology used in the dissertation. This chapter defines how the complimentary use of the congruence case study method and Qualitative
Comparative Analysis will be used to test the alternative hypothesis. Additionally, the variables tested in the research are operationalized and data sources are determined.

Chapters 4 through 8 present the following case studies: the Philippine constabulary used in the four military districts of the Philippine War, the Home Guard force used during the Malayan Emergency, the Home Guard force used during the Kenyan Emergency, the Combined Action Platoon Program during the Vietnam War, and the Harkis force using in the Algerian War. Chapters 9 through 11 present the following case studies: the local constabulary used in the Cyprus Emergency, Civilian Irregular Defense Group program employed during the Vietnam War, and finally the Regional Force/Popular Force program implemented during the Vietnam War. Each of these case studies will include an examination of the program in question focused on the variables proposed by the model. The explanatory power of the model in each case will be determined as well as a determination of a degree of variable membership for subsequent QCA analysis. Additionally, other intervening or causal variables present in each case will be determined.

Chapter 16 presents the findings of the comparative case study analysis and the QCA of cases. The data that the QCA is derived from will be presented in an accompanying appendix. The purpose of this section is to determine the explanatory power of the model as well as combinations of variables that are both sufficient and necessary to cause a positive outcome.

The final part of this chapter restates the purpose and findings of the study and its contribution to the existing body of knowledge. This section will also include concluding remarks concerning issues encountered during the study and areas for follow-on research.
To conclude and summarize this introduction, this dissertation seeks to make a unique and critical contribution to existing COIN theory and research. The use of local forces is becoming a preferred method in contemporary COIN operations. While bottom-up COIN theory has proposed causal and intervening variables which contribute to the success or failure of COIN operations, these theories are based on single case studies or anecdotal evidence. The explanatory power of the community-based security model presented in this dissertation needs to be tested.
CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this literature review is to review the current state of the debate surrounding the use of community-based security forces, ground this dissertation in the existing counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, and provide a justification for the factors that comprise the community-based security model proposed in this dissertation. The first part of the review will explore existing literature that addresses the use of local indigenous forces as a component of counterinsurgency operations. The purpose of this discussion is twofold. First, it will uncover the diverse, but sometime overlapping casual variables identified in existing studies. Second, it will identify several deficiencies in the current literature that this research seeks to address.

The next segment of the review will explore general COIN literature to establish the key principles of counterinsurgency theory that will inform the model used in this dissertation and discuss the limitations of top-down COIN theory. The first topic discussed in this section of the review is the importance of population control or as it is referred to in U.S. COIN doctrine by the more benign term, population security. Next, the constraints and requirements suggested by top-down counterinsurgency theory and related nation-building theory to achieve population control will be discussed. This discussion will bring out the impractical nature of existing top-down counterinsurgency theory in providing the competing requirements for the rapid provision of security, security force to population ratios, and resource requirements, local knowledge.

Next, this literature review will discuss the emergence of bottom-up counterinsurgency theory as an answer to the difficulties encountered in applying traditional counterinsurgency doctrine in recent COIN operations. This new perspective
on COIN proposes a reappraisal of the role of non-state actors in the provision of security and creating security at the local level. This new approach to counterinsurgency promotes cooption of local institutions, leadership, and traditions in the pursuit of population control and the provisioning of security. A review of the bottom-up COIN literature reveals that the main factors or variables proposed by theorists correlate with the principles of community-based policing developed in Africa. This literature review will discuss the principles of community-based policing relevant to bottom-up COIN, which will constitute the model proposed in this dissertation.

Existing Community-based Security COIN Research

In the period of 2005-2011, at the height of the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and the concomitant stresses on the U.S. military to meet the manpower needs required for both conflicts, several studies explored the use of irregular security forces in COIN operations. The majority of these studies used exploratory case studies of the use of irregular forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to derive lessons learned for current and future U.S. COIN operations. None of these studies developed a testable theory or model, nor do they utilize more than one or two studies to derive their results. While these studies have a different purpose and methodology from this study, several findings from each supplement or strengthen the model presented in this dissertation.

Seth G. Jones presents one of the most fully articulated models of community-based security in his 2010 Joint Forces Quarterly article, “Community Defense in Afghanistan” and his 2010 book authored with Arturo Munoz, *Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Forces*. Based on his research and experience as a civilian advisor to U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, Jones makes the case for the use of local
defense forces as a supplement to traditional top-down COIN techniques such as creating a central government led army and police force (Jones 2010, 61). Jones proposes that for a community-based security force to be successful the COIN force must be guided by several principles. These principles include developing a community security force that is congruent with local principles and institutions, accountable to the local community, and supported and supervised by an external force (Jones 2010, 61-64). The main deficiency of Jones’ work is that it is based on the single case of Afghanistan. Several aspects of Afghan culture, such as the historical use of the “Arbakai” self-defense force to counter external threats, may make it a unique case with little applicability to COIN operations in other regions. While there are potential deficiencies in the methodology and data set for this study, the findings of Jones’ were included in the source material used to develop the model used in this dissertation when they are supported by other COIN literature.

Other studies exploring the use of community-based security forces are largely similar to Jones’ work in that they focus on Iraq or Afghanistan, but they differ in research focus. Two Command and General Staff College masters’ theses typify attempt of these studies to gain lessons learned from these conflicts for application in those conflicts.

The first, “Community Oriented Policing in Counterinsurgency: A Conceptual Model,” by Jason H. Beers (2007) takes a similar approach to this dissertation in traveling current civil police theory to COIN research. In this case, Beers uses community-oriented policing theory that seeks to create formal police organizational behavior and methods that are congruent with local practices. While Beers addresses the
training and application of military and conventional police forces during COIN operations and does not study the use of community-based security forces, his research does show the applicability of using contemporary police theory in COIN studies.

The second study, “Closing the Gap: Building Irregular Security Forces,” by Michael A. Gunther (2012) overlaps in some areas with this dissertation. In his research Gunther focuses on determining the factors that contribute to the success or failure of the employment of community-based security forces in Iraq and the Malayan Emergency. Gunther finds that local accountability and oversight or as he terms it, support of the host nation government and quality of an embedded advisor force are the causal variables that determine the outcome of the use of an irregular security force. While the findings of this study lend support for the variables used in this dissertation, this study includes several issues. These issues include the limited number of cases and the inability of the researcher using a comparative case study method to determine the relative importance of each of the identified causal variables in producing an outcome.

One study that uses a different set of cases is the U.S. Army War College monograph, *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies* written by James S. Corum (2006). While Corum’s work focuses primarily on the training of indigenous police forces in the Malaya and Cyprus Emergencies, he does address the use of the use by the British of irregular Home Guard forces as a component of British COIN strategy. Corum does not explore the use of the Home Guards in enough detail to determine their impact in either of the conflicts, he does propose that their use was successful because “the British did not demand too much from part-time force” and the British instituted a degree of centralization and standardization in
their training and employment (Corum 2006, 47-48). These two points loosely agree with the variables of limited territorial jurisdiction and external support and oversight presented and expanded later in this literature review as part of the community-based security model.

This review of the existing community-based security literature uncovers a wide array of potential causal variables drawn from a limited case study population. This dissertation attempts to overcome both of these shortcomings. By using QCA this dissertation will be able to include a larger number of variables and determine the relative degree of membership each case possesses and combinations of causal variables that can produce a given outcome. Additionally, while each insurgency produces a unique mixture of conditions, using a larger number of cases drawn from widely different cultural and geographical settings should produce findings that are, if not academically transferable to other cases, more generalizable for practitioners. Given the wide array of causal factors already encountered, the remainder of this literature review will review existing general COIN literature to determine a more complete formula for the use of community-based security forces.

Security

Unlike interstate warfare with conventional militaries seeking to control territory or destroy the opposing government, in counterinsurgency warfare, control of the population is the critical factor. According to John Paul Vann, a senior U.S. official involved in pacification efforts in South Vietnam, “Security may be ten percent of the problem, or it may be ninety percent, but whichever it is, it’s the first ten percent or the first ninety percent. Without security, nothing else will last” (Sheehan 1988, 67). While
The protection of the population against violence is an important consideration, the existing literature suggests that control of the population is the more important factor, which allows the legitimate state government to establish its instructions and gain the support of the population through aid and development programs. Government control of the population in this context allows the government to administer development aid and installation of institutions while denying insurgents access and preventing their parallel attempts to establish their own institutions and legitimacy. To establish the critical importance of population security in counterinsurgency, this literature review will begin with a discussion of how current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and theory treats the subject.

According to FM 3-24 *The United States Army and United States Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (2014) securing the population is the “cornerstone” of a successful operation. This is echoed by French counterinsurgency theorist and practitioner Roger Trinquier, who proposed that gaining support for the state requires the unconditional support of the population (1964, 8). Trinquier argues that if the population lives under the threat of reprisals from insurgents and the government proves impotent in the face of insurgent attacks, the state will never gain legitimacy as the exerciser of force within its boundaries (1964, 16-17).

David Galula in *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (2006) also supports the view that security of the population is paramount, even more important than other public services and development. In his opinion, “support from the population is conditional as long as there is the threat of insurgent reprisals – no favorable minority will emerge until this threat has been lifted” (Galula 2006, 54). Galula’s answer is to
station troops among the people to allow a friendly leadership of the population to emerge (Galula 2006, 57). At its core, the purpose of population security as discussed by these three works is control of the population with the goal of providing the space and time to allow other government efforts to build government legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Therefore, ultimate success in an insurgency is the establishment of stability and the acceptance by the populace of the rule of law administered by the state (Jones, Wilson, et al. 2005, 7). As discussed in the introduction, this method requires a heavy commitment of security forces and resources and assumes a binary contestation of power between insurgents and the government. Other wielders of traditional or social sources of power are treated as actors to be co-opted, if they are addressed at all.

The center of gravity of any insurgency and the source of power for both insurgents and counterinsurgents is access to the population that is exercised by securing them (Kilcullen 2010, 7). In an insurgency, the counterinsurgent forces usually have the benefit of more manpower and resources compared to insurgent forces, but are faced with the dilemma of having to provide a blanket of security for every population center. Due to finite resources and manpower, total control of a region is usually not possible and some areas must be defended less robustly. It is in these gaps of control or in the seams of what Chinese communist guerilla leader Mao Tse Tung (2011) called the “jigsaw pattern” of areas of strong and weak government control that insurgents are able to gain access and exercise control over a population. It is in these areas where insurgents can conduct “an unceasing watch over all inhabitants” that they can implement their own system of government and security, supplanting the existing system (Trinquier 1964, 19).
Finding a method to block complete insurgent access to the population becomes the task for government forces.

Stathis Kalyvas in *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (2006, 111) agrees with the necessity of physical control of the population by proposing that possessing the military power to control the population, above prewar political and social preferences or grievances, is the critical factor in producing support from the population. According to Kalyvas, violence and the threat of violence supplements physical control of the population by acting as a coercive tool used to control the population, rather than a byproduct of conflict (Kalyvas 2006, 27).

According to Kalyvas, “control lowers the cost of collaboration, produces mechanical ascription, signals credibility, enables hearts and minds development, facilitates direct monitoring of the population, and spawns a self-reinforcing dynamic” by creating areas with the reputation for past government collaboration (Kalyvas 2006, 124-129). Control in Kalyvas’ theory also provides access to information through informants, which allows for the practice of “selective violence” the process of discriminatory punishment of only those guilty of collaboration with insurgents. The exchange of information between external forces and local actors, who possess information about local allegiances, is an economic exchange. Local actors provide information to external actors, which allow government or insurgent forces to practice selective violence. In exchange, government or insurgent forces provide local actors the opportunity to increase personal power within the community or settle old scores. This exchange between the government security forces and locals can only occur when the benefit of informing outweighs the cost of potential reprisals from insurgent groups. This favorable balance of
control creates an incentive framework to support the government when compared to indiscriminate violence such as a mass arrest conducted when the government operates without local information (Kalyvas 2006, 154).

Kalyvas’ theory highlights the importance of the largely independent role of local inhabitants, who must be co-opted if an external actor is to gain control of a population. His case study of the Greek civil war of 1945-1949 indicates the majority of civilians in an insurgency is neutral and they will collaborate or be passively neutral to whichever side controls the territory in which they live. Their loyalty can essentially be bought through the implicit promise that selective violence will not target those that are not actively supporting the insurgency. It also provides the potential for empowerment if the controlling power allows groups to act as agents in the form of militias or local security supplementing the control of the occupying power. This understanding of population control works for both government forces and insurgent groups.

The existing literature is clear that control of the population, provided either by professional security forces or non-state agents, is critical to the success of a counterinsurgency effort. Providing security would be a straightforward proposition if time and resources were unconstrained. Time and unlimited resources are not luxuries counterinsurgency forces usually, if ever, enjoy. To overcome these shortcomings security forces can use selective violence but they must utilize the knowledge and if necessary, the manpower of trusted local agents to achieve control.

Time and the “Golden Hour” for Control

Another factor working against counterinsurgent forces is time. At the moment of an external intervention or the commencement of counterinsurgency operations by the
state, time is operating against them. In what is termed “the golden hour” in the immediate aftermath of an intervention, the gap in security created by the lack or ineptitude of local security forces must be closed while external forces enjoy local popular support and international legitimacy and before insurgents organize and entrench in the local population (Jones, Wilson, et al. 2005, 19-20 and Dobbins, Jones, et al. 2007, 20). The U.S. Army counterinsurgency manual advocates quickly “stopping the bleeding” in the initial stages of a counterinsurgency campaign by rapidly establishing security, but its authors barely mention how resource-constrained commanders can accomplish this task with limited forces and local knowledge (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2006, 5-2).

What is clear is that counterinsurgency commanders must quickly flood conflict prone areas with large numbers of security forces. As David Galula put it, “insurgency is cheap, but counterinsurgency is costly - because he has neither the responsibility nor the concrete assets; the counterinsurgent is rigid because he has both” (Galula 2006, 6-7). The number of forces required depends on the severity of the previous conflict and the strength of existing state security forces. Most sources place the number of security forces required between 10 to 25 counterinsurgent forces for every 1,000 inhabitants (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2006, 1-13, Jones, Wilson, et al. 2005, 19, Dobbins, Jones, et al. 2007, vvvi). To put this in perspective, Rand researcher Seth Jones estimates that in Afghanistan this force ratio translates into the requirement of approximately 660,000 security personnel to secure the country’s population of approximately 33 million people (S. G. Jones, Community Defense in Afghanistan 2010).
Security Force to Population Ratios

The number of security forces required to secure a population results in what James Dobbins described as a “mismatch between ambitions and commitment” (Dobbins, McGinn, et al. 2003, 150). Either intervening states must provide a quantity of troops that is unsustainable by modern volunteer armies or the state facing an insurgency must recruit, train, and field the required forces. Both options are costly and the latter option runs the risk of turning loose quickly and inadequately trained security personnel on the population or requires a generation or more to build an effective and professional force. The almost complete disintegration of the Iraqi Army in 2014 after more than a decade of training by the U.S. military and billions of dollars in funding is one example of the difficulty in building a host nation Army during an active insurgency. As Dobbins, et al. (2003) note, the only modern examples of counterinsurgency forces reaching the troop levels required were in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The inability of intervening powers to provide adequate security forces to achieve population control in most cases leads to the necessity of building indigenous capacity to provide security. Two methods emerge to accomplish this task. One is the “top-down” construction of a centralized state security apparatus and the other is a “bottom-up” approach of building local capacity at the lowest levels of community. Taking the Western, Weberian view that the state can be the only entity within its borders to ‘claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’ within that territory, the U.S. has favored the approach of building local capacity through a process of state-building (Weber 1958). According to the U.S. Army counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, all efforts must support the host nation (HN) government with “U.S. forces committed to a
Although FM 3-24 does acknowledge that HN capacity and level of commitment of resources may hinder accomplishing the objectives of a COIN campaign, it makes no mention of other methods designed to achieve security (2014, 6-29). The manual also does not mention the reaction of the local population to the creation of a new government and upending or ignoring traditional sources of power and governance.

**Issues with the Top-Down Approach**

According to Starr (2006, 108), U.S. counterinsurgency and state-building efforts are flawed because of the focus on building the sovereignty of a newly constituted government at the expense of the legitimacy of the new government in the eyes of the local population. The issue this raises is that by placing legitimacy in a secondary role, the voluntary acceptance and support of the population for the government’s right to govern and its enabling institutions as well as approval of the fairness of its institutions especially security forces and judiciary is left in doubt (Starr 2006, 109). This focus on building form over function and the emphasis on building western formal rule of law systems over informal and traditional systems create the potential for the development of a predatory central government with few ties to or support from the population (Samuels 2006).

Dobbins, et al. (2007, xx) also point out that most U.S.-led state-building efforts favor deconstruction of existing state institutions as opposed to co-opting existing indigenous institutions. While in many cases the dismantlement of predatory state institutions is necessary to establish a lasting peace, much of the impetus behind these efforts is adherence to modernization theory and the belief in the superiority of western-
style government, including centralized state security apparatus (Jones, et al. 2005, 10). As Dobbins, et al. (2006) demonstrate, this approach often falls short because it does not meet the needs or expectations of the local population and the resource intensity and time required is beyond the means of intervening authorities. This is echoed by Samuels (2009) who estimates a realistic timeframe in peaceful conditions for creating a new functional central judicial and security system is twenty years and it may not even be possible if foreign legal norms are introduced, or there is weak local support for the reforms (Samuels 2006, 18). These authors highlight the importance of quickly building a system at the outset of COIN operations that incorporates traditional forms of governance that are seen as legitimate by the population.

Local Ownership as a Mitigation Method

To surmount the obstacles of manpower, time and legitimacy, Trinquier (1964, 29-30) recommends, “The inhabitant, as the focus of modern warfare, must participate in his own defense with local leaders building security organizations with a minimum of government assistance.” To enlist the support of the population the alternate method of co-optive state-building works with “existing institutions and working with formal and informal power centers to redirect competition for power from violent to peaceful means” (Dobbins, et al. 2007, xx). A lesson that is often lost is that the reconstruction of Germany after World War II, possibly the most successful state-building exercise the U.S. has ever undertaken, used this bottom-up approach to build local governance and security apparatuses (Dobbins, McGinn, et al. 2003, 15). While the post-World War II German reconstruction was not a counterinsurgency, it does present a case where adequate security and the cooption of local power structures denied residual extremist
forces the space to reorganize or access to traditional sources of power to challenge the establishment of a new state.

The benefit of establishing congruence with local social and power institutions in state building also extends to counterinsurgency. As other surveys of counterinsurgency operations have found, counterinsurgency efforts mirror the nature of the state (Kilcullen 2010, 10). A counterinsurgency strategy that relies on a security force that is organized and employed without the support of local social and political institutions is often counterproductive because it is incongruent with the local ecosystem. Often the injection of external forces has a negative effect because they disrupt the local balance of power and act with nonexistent or imperfect information, what Kalyvas (2006) calls “indiscriminate violence.” Trinquier called it “striking in a vacuum” and Kilcullen warns that imposing external forces often creates new enemies from formerly neutral parties or what he calls “accidental guerillas” (Trinquier 1964, 53-55, 61 and Kilcullen 2009).

Most counterinsurgency theorists propose some form of a grassroots approach to establishing security using a “bottom-up” counterinsurgency strategy, while leveraging local institutions linked to a developing central government (Kilcullen 2010, 4, Jones 2009, 335, Galula 2006, 47, Trinquier 1964, Thompson 1966). This bottom-up approach should tie in with legitimate local institutions, including social and religious leaders and empower them to provide security and rule of law using traditional institutions. Disagreement exists on the method to accomplish this task, either through tapping into existing social structures (Jones 2009, 339), existing leaders (Lawrence 2011) or through holding local elections to promote leadership untainted by connection to past abuses and links to the central government (Galula 2006, 47, 52-53). The purpose of either method
is to build reliable local allies, establish the legitimacy of local leaders and security forces with the population, and establish lasting post-conflict power structures that are responsive to the needs of the local population (Kilcullen 2010, 4, 12).

Kalyvas (2006) also finds that the use of militias and public safety committees is particularly effective in overcoming a state’s lack of local knowledge by tapping into private information on insurgents and collaborators (Kalyvas 2006, 107). The danger of these groups is that being armed with local knowledge; they can turn predatory or abusive by fighting local or personal disputes and becoming “vehicle(s) for internal political pressure” (Kalyvas 2006, 108 and Trinquier 1964, 34). To combat potential abuses through the decentralization of authority in the hands of committees and militias, some sort of appeals process and accountability measures must be established with oversight exercised by the state security forces (Kalyvas 2006, 183-184). This indicates that some sort of linkage to the state must be created when establishing a community-based security force.

Aligned with Kalyvas (2006), Sir Roger Thompson, the architect of the successful British counterinsurgency strategy in Malaysia in the 1950s, advocated physical control of the rural population through local self-defense forces primarily to separate insurgents from resources and to deny them the ability to conduct reprisals on pro-government supporters (Thompson 1966, 56). To win the population to the side of the government, he believed successful counterinsurgency must involve “the people in a small way in national politics which both affect and benefit them, first in the defense of their community” (Thompson 1966, 124-125). By empowering local supporters to provide their own security and connecting them with the national government, incentive
frameworks are created to gain the support of the population or at least neutrality from the majority of the population. Thompson’s use of this method in Malaysia indicates that development and reconstruction aid must be tied to the active support of the population for counterinsurgent forces. Aid must be given and taken away dependent on the actions of the local population and the behavior of the community-based security forces.

**Coopting Local Power and Social Structures**

The critical aspect of building local security forces is compatibility with local power structures. Again, as Kilcullen (2010, 36, 42) notes, what is normal and accepted in “Kandahar is not the same as Kansas” and Western intervening forces should not seek to create local security forces that mirror Western models. Instead they should build off of traditional or spontaneously created local security forces and methods. Although U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine spends a significant amount of time discussing the importance of understanding local social structure and sources of formal and informal power within a society, it spends no time discussing what should be done with this information except for the purpose of gaining “influence” within a social group (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014, 3-11). The failure to make the connection between understanding local social and political power structures and designing counterinsurgency strategy that conforms to and utilizes local norms and values leads back to the tendency of U.S. counterinsurgency forces mirror-imaging themselves in the creation of local security forces.

As Ronny Kristofferson notes in his unpublished Naval Postgraduate School thesis, “Bleeding for the Village: Success or Failure in the Hands of Local Powerbrokers” (2012), leaders of local cultural or religious power structures are critical to the success or
failure of COIN security operations. Kristofferson proposes that security programs must coopt local leaders by satisfying their needs for power, legitimacy, and status. The balancing act he determined was that intervening force commanders must achieve is balancing local leaders’ needs for these elements while coopting them in such a way that they support the rule of the central government and work to achieve stability.

To address this problem, Kilcullen proposes his “Theory of Competitive Control,” which advocates co-design of counterinsurgency efforts with the local population, “to work with rather than against a community, to help people design security into the actual fabric of the urban landscape” (2013, 21). This allows counterinsurgent forces to create a locally supported “web of persuasive, administrative, and coercive structures that control the populace because it creates a predictable environment that operates within accepted cultural norms,” which negates insurgent efforts to do the same and provides a built-in willingness in the populace to enforce and follow those structures (Kilcullen 2013, 117). The problem with Kilcullen’s theory is that he does not provide the critical factors that influence the success of these co-designed security forces.

The creation of locally supported, rule-based security feeds into Scott’s (1976, 1, 3-4) “Safety First Principle” of peasant populations who, living on the margin of subsistence and in uncertain circumstances, tend to be risk averse and seek predictability. Maintaining existing power structures is attractive to rural populations because they are known. Utilizing these existing patron-client relationships and village political organizations allows counterinsurgent forces to maintain internal stability through preexisting structures that settle disputes and maintain internal law and order and to act as the negotiator with outside forces (Migdal 1974, 80). As Migdal notes, community
political structures continue to exist after destabilizing events but, “exert influence and control in direct proportion to the nature and extent of the authority and responsibilities delegated to it by the state” (Migdal 1974, 198). Acknowledging these structures and empowering them is a quick and cost-effective way to establish security. One issue with this approach is that in countries that have experienced long and highly disruptive conflict the traditional governance structures may have been discredited or tainted with complicity with previous predatory regimes. The traditional structures may have also fractured and competing nodes of power may exist.

To balance power relationships within fragmented or multiethnic communities, incentive structures must be created to compel local internal cooperation. As Kilcullen notes, “no external aid is neutral and any external support benefits some at the expense of conflict with others” (Kilcullen 2013, 14). Aiding one group over another in an insurgency runs the risk of driving the losing group into the arms of insurgent groups or creating additional conflict. Based on the neorealist school of international relations, Fotini Christia (2012) theorizes that like states in the international system, actors in multi-party civil wars or insurgencies seek to guarantee their survival and maximize their share of post-war political control. They seek to form alliances to power balance against the most powerful rival (Christia 2012, 19). They do this without respect to ideology or ethnic considerations. When the end of a conflict is perceived by participants, they will bandwagon with the winning side, but seek to form a “minimum winning coalition” to maximize their gains and guard against commitment problems by the hegemonic member of the winning coalition (Christia 2012, 25). Therefore, counterinsurgency forces must
also create community-based security forces that mitigate these forces by disincentivizing
defection of groups to the insurgent side.

In Christia’s model, religious and ethnic identity has no causal role in the
formation of alliances, but rather shared group identities and narratives are tools or
“identity repertoires” to gain the support of followers by elites because power
maximization strategies are too difficult to gain widespread support by rank and file
members of the group (Christia 2012, 47). Considering this, counterinsurgent forces
must understand the local balance of power between social groups and seek to create
local “minimum winning alliance” in a community security force or risk driving weaker
groups to join the insurgency to balance against a newly empowered local hegemonic
group.

Deficiencies in Current COIN Research

The relative importance the factors that contribute to a successful community-
based security program remain largely unstudied. While Kilcullen (2009, 2010 and
2013) and Jones (2006 and 2009) discuss the need to design community-based security
forces to be congruent with local practices to achieve local ownership, they remain vague
on the specifics and only provide anecdotal evidence to support their claims. A testable
set of variables is needed to develop a theory for community-based security in
counterinsurgency.

U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine is also of little help with its strict state-
building focus. Field Manual 3-24’s accompanying manual on tactics and techniques
required for counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency (2009, 8-12)
does mention the potential need to raise community-based or “paramilitary” forces when
conventional forces are constrained in manpower, but again gives little guidance on the factors that contribute to a successful program. FM 3-24.2 does stress that “citizen leaders” should be selected to lead the force and paramilitary units should have standard weapons and be employed locally. However, it does recommend the members should receive salaries in contradiction to the previously discussed cases and the manual fails to discuss any other considerations for selection of the members of the paramilitary unit or their employment. Similarly, the often-quoted U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual (1940) only addresses the tactical level organizing, training, and equipping of indigenous constabulary forces and does not address the cultural and political factors required in selecting and organizing a community-based security force (United States Marine Corps 1940, 12-1 – 12-5).

Building the Model – Additional Factors

This review has identified several potential causal factors in the implementation of a successful community-based security programs. Local leadership, congruence with local customs, limiting employment only to the defense of the local community, and organic and uncompensated volunteerism with incentives tied to group compliance and support appear to be critical factors in community-based security. To develop a more complete theory, it is necessary to look outside counterinsurgency literature for cases with similar requirements for local security and constraints on the central government to provide that security.

The concept of community-based policing in developing countries provides one avenue to “travel” a theory to address this uncovered aspect of counterinsurgency (Collier and James E. Mahon 1993). While community policing in the West typically addresses
improving relations between the police force and the local community, community policing in developing countries involves the provision of security by non-state actors that “essentially police by the strength of their internally limited informal social control forces such as special interest groups, ethnic enclaves and occupational groups” (Friedman 1992). While these models address the provision of security in states with weak governments, they do not seem to provide a practical model for societies that face an active insurgent threat (Friedman 1992, 16-17).

After more than 50 years of external efforts to create Western models of policing in Africa, resource constraints and institutional fragility keep these forces from reaching effectiveness. As Wulf (2006, 97) proposes, areas where the disruptive forces of globalization have eroded the sovereignty of the state, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Westphalian ideal of state sovereignty is no longer practical and a new model of multiple layers of authority over the monopoly of force arises spontaneously. In some ways this is a return to an earlier period of development in both the United States and Africa when all policing was homegrown, volunteer, and discretionary (2002, 31). This aligns with the new focus on Human Security defined by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which calls for a re-conceptualization of security that “moves away from traditional, state-centric conceptions of security that focuses primarily on the safety of states from military aggression, to one that concentrates on the security of individuals, their protection and empowerment” (Human Security Unit 2002, 6-7). This approach, much like the bottom-up counterinsurgency approach proposed by Jones (2010), combines a top-down effort to build the norms and institutions of the state with a
bottom-up effort with local partners that support individuals and communities in defining and providing their own vision of security (Human Security Unit 2002, 10).

In this line, Bruce Baker (2007) proposes a shift in perspective from the point of view of creating government capacity to measuring the success of security sector reform by the effectiveness of security provided, regardless of the provider, from the perspective of the individual. Baker defines policing as “any organized activity that seeks to ensure the maintenance of communal order, security and peace through elements of prevention, deterrence, investigation of breaches, and punishment” (Baker 2004, 204 and Baker 2010).

During his field work in Africa, Baker finds that community-based security organizations organically arise to fill the gap in security after civil war or social disruption. In Uganda, Congo, and Sierra Leone, local security organizations offer accessible justice, congruent with local customs, and are comprised of local leaders who are accepted and known in the community. In many cases, these organizations are effective despite a heterogeneous population because they are inclusive and multi-ethnic (Baker 2007). Given the similar conditions of instability, violence, social disruption, and limited government capacity to provide effective security in both insurgencies and the conflict prone states of sub-Saharan Africa, the potential exists to appropriate the lessons learned from community-based policing in Africa and utilize them in the creation of a theory for the use of community-based security during counterinsurgency operations.

In Africa, non-state actors are estimated to provide up to 80 percent of security services (OECD 2007, 11). With state security forces unable or unwilling to provide adequate security services, Baker (2006) has found that other security organizations,
centered on existing communal organizations such as shop owners and taxi drivers, with varying degrees of authorization by the state, have spontaneously arisen to fill the gap (Baker, 2006). Since the Soviet invasion in 1979, religious and ethnic communities in Afghanistan have organized similar community-based security organizations in refugee camps and villages where the state was unwilling or unable to provide security to individuals (Tariq 2008). This establishes at least an anecdotal link between community-based policing and community-based security in counterinsurgency efforts. The following paragraphs will explore critical variables for community-based policing that can be appropriated for community-based security force development during a counterinsurgency effort.

Oversight

Non-state security organizations are not usually autonomous groups, but often seek to cooperate with state police forces to gain legitimacy, training, and resources (Baker 2010). Baker (2010) finds the connection between state security organizations to be critical to prevent both non-state and state security providers from being totally autonomous and acting with impunity and without oversight. Also, the establishment of an all-encompassing framework of policing standards for both state and non-state security organizations to guide roles, performance, procedures, and jurisdictions is critical for a successful community-based policing program (Baker 2010); this will decrease friction between state security services and the community and establish clear expectations of the roles expected by all parties. Also, an accreditation program is critical, after which non-state actors agree to the framework standards and oversight (Baker 2010).
The Organization for Economic Co-operation (2007, 22) (OECD) also finds that mutual oversight roles by the state and civil society, based on defined roles and standards is critical for the success of community-based policing. The use of community oversight councils, comprised of state security services and community leaders, could provide a method for community-based counterinsurgent forces from becoming predatory or exceeding their mandate as noted by Trinquier (1964), Human Rights Watch (2011) and Kalyvas (2006) and as an opportunity for the state to penetrate local communities (Baker 2007, 27).

Local Ownership

The next critical factor in successful community-based policing is that non-state groups providing security must have a stake in maintaining order in their area (Baker 2010). This means that members of the community-based policing effort are members of the community with a social or monetary stake in the collective success of the community. The nucleus of these community-based security organizations could be tribal groups, religious organizations, ethnic associations, youth groups, or work-based associations (Baker 2010, 10). Using members of marginal or disaffected groups within a community as members of a community-based security force could result in those individuals or groups using their new power to increase their position or status within the community. The lesson learned for community-based security in counterinsurgency is that existing legitimate power structures, leadership, and security networks should be used to prevent abuses by security forces and avoid the perception that security forces are domineering and paternalistic.
Congruence with Local Justice Systems

Baker (2004) and the OECD (2007, 22) both find that the integration of customary and traditional justice systems into community-based policing is critical for the acceptance of the program by the populace. Baker (2004, 217) notes that the conciliatory nature of traditional courts, which aim to restore social order and settle disputes peacefully between individuals, often reduces the underlying causes for violence within communities that state judicial services could not. This approach also recognizes that perceptions of security are subjective and culturally defined. By integrating traditional justice systems, which deal with issues not typically addressed by state judicial systems, support of the populace for community-based policing is increased and provides incentive structures for community participation (Baker 2007, 33). For current counterinsurgency practices, this would again require a redirection of efforts aimed at creating a western style justice system, but holds the benefit of increasing the support of the populace for the government by providing them a style of justice they understand.

Sustainability and Local Accountability

The next critical factors in community-based policing are sustainability and organizational attainability (Baker 2010, 21, 161-162). Short term efforts by donor states often lead to unsustainable security structures, which places a heavy burden on the state, engenders little ownership by the state, and is unresponsive to the community. The strength of community-based policing is that it is “accessible, understandable, affordable, and effective, and in accord with local view of justice” (Baker 2010, 39-42).
Voluntary Membership

Connected with sustainability, is the necessity for volunteerism by both the community authorizer and the security provider (Baker 2010, 99). The motive for both cannot be financial or power-based. Community-based police members should be engaged in security work part-time or available as needed. Baker (2010) provides several cases, such as in Mozambique, where members of a local security force were recruited and paid for their security work, resulting in leaders selecting individuals related to them as a form of patronage and political power building. In the best case, community-based security forces in counterinsurgency should already be providing security services to their community before they are integrated into a state-sanctioned counterinsurgency program and their participation in the program should be tied to community development aid and not personal payment. In counterinsurgency, the additional requirement of promises of development aid and the execution of support, in the form of equipment and assistance from local military units, must be provided by the state to ensure communities are not subjected to reprisals.

Summary

To summarize, the community-based policing in Africa presents five criteria that can be transferred to community-based security in counterinsurgency. First, community security should be accountable to both the community and the state. Second, local ownership with customary leadership and structures incorporated into the security force is critically important. Considerations for creating a sustainable balance of power between factions within the community must also be factored into the creation of a community-security force. Third, the integration of traditional judicial structures is
critical to gain acceptance by the population and incentives for them to use it and it is effective in meeting their needs. Fourth, long-term sustainability by the state and the community must be built into the model. Finally, entry into a security program must be voluntary with the promise of external support by the state tied to local cooperation with counterinsurgent forces.

This review of relevant counterinsurgency literature has established several competing factors in successful counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgency forces must quickly establish control of the population that penetrates the entire region affected by insurgency. To do so, states must provide levels of security forces that are rarely achieved because of their cost and they often act as an external irritant that can exacerbate local conflict and upset local balance of power. Compounding this is the difficulty, time and expense of raising state security forces in a country experiencing an insurgency. While maintaining the desire to conduct state-building, to balance these factors, counterinsurgent forces typically rely on raising community security forces to exploit their local knowledge and staying power in local communities.

Most counterinsurgency theorists support the use of local security forces, but are either vague in the requirements for effectiveness or provide case specific recommendations. Community-based policing in Africa and Bruce Baker’s theories on community-based policing provide an existing theoretic framework that Baker (2010) notes has not been tested outside of Africa or applied to community-based security effort during an insurgency. The model this research intends to test proposes that local ownership, incorporation of traditional justice systems, sustainability, and voluntary
participation by the community and local security provider may address many of the concerns that arise during the implementation of a community-based security program.
CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY

This dissertation addresses the question “How do the variables associated with community-based security influence the outcome of bottom-up COIN operations using non-state local security forces?” The complexity and number of intervening variables and the limited number of cases of large scale counterinsurgency operations lends this research project to a qualitative methodology. Use of comparative case studies will allow for an initial conclusion of the presence of a measurable consistency between adherence to the principles of community-based security and the outcomes among the cases (George and Bennett, 2005). However, a finding of consistency cannot establish a causal relationship (George and Bennett 2005).

The first method used in this dissertation is the congruence method. According to George and Bennett (2005, 181-204), the main purpose of the congruence method is to allow a researcher to test a theory within a single case or cases “to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case.” This allows for the determination of the importance of each independent variable in determining the outcome of the dependent variable.

The congruence method also allows for the determination of spuriousness, causal priority and causal depth (George and Bennett 2005, 185). This dissertation will test for potential spuriousness of correlation between variables by identifying the presence of variables unaccounted for by the model that could have caused the observed effect. Causal priority and causal depth are established by assessing the relative importance of each variable in determining an outcome and if each variable is necessary and sufficient to bring about an outcome.
Rationale for Case Study and Qualitative Comparative Analysis Methodologies

Using the congruence method to account for the different conditions and application of the variables in question presented by the 11 case studies, a variance in the application of the factors of community-based security can be observed. The result is a “fuzzy set,” or a group of cases whose relevant data have varying degrees of membership in the variable set in contrast to the conventional “crisp set” whose objects are either “in” or “out, see Table 1 for the proposed fuzzy set for this dissertation” (Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Sets and Beyond 2008). Fuzzy set analysis is applicable in this research because the sample size is small- to medium-sized (over 6 cases and under 50 cases) and the purpose of this dissertation is to test a modified existing theory rather than generate a new theory (Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Sets and Beyond 2008). Thus, after the comparative case study analysis, this dissertation will conduct a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to test the validity of the model and tie the variables to theoretical concepts and substantive thresholds. A QCA will determine if different combinations of causal conditions or what Ragin (2008) calls “causal recipes” results in similar outcomes.
Table 1. Membership of (Case Study) with Community-Based Security Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/Membership</th>
<th>Fully In</th>
<th>Mostly In</th>
<th>More In Than Out</th>
<th>More Out Than In</th>
<th>Mostly Out</th>
<th>Fully Out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Support and Oversight</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Limits to territorial jurisdiction</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local sustainability and accountability</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary participation by local elites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The use of QCA allows not only for the examination of sets of conditions necessary or sufficient for an outcome, but also for an assessment of equifinality or the principle that in open systems a given end state can be reached by many potential means and complex causality with multiple combinations of variables which result in a particular outcome. The other strengths of QCA is that it allows for the examination of “coverage” or the relative importance of different combinations of variables and “consistency” or the proportion of cases that are consistent with an observed pattern (Ragin, 2008). Because of these attributes, QCA will provide the findings of this dissertation’s applicability to a wider variety of conditions encountered by future researchers and practitioners.

The congruence case study method and QCA are not without their weaknesses. The congruence method provides within-case analysis of a theory but does not provide controlled comparison. As with other forms of qualitative research, both the congruence
method and QCA seek to impose a theory in the examination of imperfect data. Thus, QCA experiences the same difficulties in causal inference as other qualitative and quantitative methods that use non-experimental data (Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Sets and Beyond 2008). Additionally, QCA can suffer from spurious correlation between variables by excluding other potential causal variables not included in the theory.

Therefore, Ragin cautions that adherence to the “principle that ‘context matters’ is central” to the QCA method (Ragin 2000, 66). He warns “it would very hazardous to equate” two cases that have identical scores “without looking at each score’s context” (Ragin 2000, 65). For example, the application of two community-based security programs might produce a reduction in levels of violence and reduction in conventional security forces. In the one case, the program may have resulted in the displacement or dismemberment of an insurgent force, resulting in a reduction in violence and alleviating the need for external security force support. In the other case, the community-based security program may have had no discernable reduction in insurgent strength and the reduction in violence is a result of conventional forces ceding the territory to insurgents and reallocating forces to more tenable areas. To treat the two cases the same would be faulty analysis.

The combination of a congruence method case-oriented approach and QCA should mitigate the weaknesses of both methods. The congruence case study method will allow for the testing of the explanatory value of the model within individual cases while minimizing misrepresenting the conditions of the cases and allowing for the introduction of other causal variables not included in the model that could be overlooked by QCA. QCA will allow for the identification of patterns among the cases that are not apparent in
the individual cases and minimize any deceptive data present in individual cases. Taken together these two methods should provide a better understanding of the complex causality operating in counterinsurgency operations.

The Research Sample

The three main selection criteria were used to select the cases for this research. The first selection criteria is the use of a large-scale community-based security program that comprised a significant portion of the counterinsurgency effort. The main purpose of this criteria is to facilitate the measurement of impact of the community-based security program on the insurgency. The other purpose of this criteria is to improve the likelihood the cases selected for analysis have sufficient primary and secondary sources of data. Put simply, larger programs should have a better chance of being well documented and to demonstrate system-wide and not local effects.

The second selection criterion is the counterinsurgency operation must be conducted by a foreign force. This criterion was added for two reasons. First, studying cases involving external occupying forces increases the applicability of the findings of this research to future counterinsurgency operations conducted by the United States and other major powers. The majority of counterinsurgency literature is oriented to this audience and this research fills a major gap in this body of knowledge. The second reason for this selection criteria is to provide cases for analysis of the role of local actors in community-based security programs. It is a reasonable assumption that it would be more difficult to measure the influence of informal local actors in cases involving indigenous governments that are intermingled in the social and political fabric of local communities.
The third selection criterion is the exclusion of the recent use of community-based security programs in conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan. While these cases will provide fruitful avenues for future research, the outcomes of the insurgencies, let alone the community-based security programs are far from settled. Fuzzy Set QCA requires settled cases with adequate primary and secondary sources to make informed judgments on the degree of membership cases demonstrate with a model. In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, much of the relevant data remains classified and scholars have not reached consensus. This makes their usefulness for this research limited.

Using this criterion, paramilitary forces programs in counterinsurgency operations such as the French Indochina War were not selected. This is because these irregular force programs were either short duration, local experiments of limited impact to the overall counterinsurgency efforts or were not used as local self-defense forces, but rather paid guards for commercial enterprises or as with the “Maquis” in the French Indochina War, offensive behind the lines militias (Fall 1964). Other cases such as the Rondas civil defense program in Peru or the local auxiliary in Rhodesia were excluded because they were implemented by a local government and not an external occupying force.

Attention was paid to selecting cases that are like current counterinsurgencies in that they were conducted by external powers, but with as much variation as possible in other characteristics. This will facilitate external validity and generalizability of the findings while highlighting the relevance to current COIN practitioners (Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki 2008). The wide range of cases covers over a century of counterinsurgency operations occurring in varied geographical, social and political settings, and involving insurgent and counterinsurgent forces, which will assist in controlling for intervening
variables such as time, culture, and political system (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999). See table 2 for a depiction of similarities and differences among the selected cases using COIN operational environment characteristics outlined in FM 3-24 (2014). Current or recently ended counterinsurgency operations such as the recent U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were not selected because of their undecided nature and because relevant data will remain classified for the foreseeable future.

Table 2. Characteristics of sample case studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case / Characteristics</th>
<th>Time Frame</th>
<th>Counter-insurgent Force Type</th>
<th>Insurgency Type</th>
<th>Geographic Conditions</th>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>Political Setting</th>
<th>External Insurgent Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st District DNL, Philippines</td>
<td>1898-1902</td>
<td>U.S. Conventional Forces</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Island Jungle</td>
<td>Llocano ethnic group</td>
<td>Colonial</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th District DNL, Philippines</td>
<td>1898-1903</td>
<td>U.S. Conventional Forces</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Island Jungle</td>
<td>Mixed ethnic groups</td>
<td>Colonial</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd District DSL, Philippines</td>
<td>1898-1904</td>
<td>U.S. Conventional Forces</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Island Jungle</td>
<td>Tagalog Ethnic Group</td>
<td>Colonial</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd District DSL, Philippines</td>
<td>1898-1904</td>
<td>U.S. Conventional Forces</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Island Jungle</td>
<td>Llocano ethnic group</td>
<td>Colonial</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Forces, Vietnam</td>
<td>1964-1975</td>
<td>U.S. Conventional Forces</td>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>Varied</td>
<td>Ethnic Vietnamese</td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG Program, Vietnam</td>
<td>1963-1971</td>
<td>U.S. Special Forces</td>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>Mountain Jungle</td>
<td>Indigenous Highland Tribes</td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Guard Malaya</td>
<td>1952-1960</td>
<td>British Police</td>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>Jungle</td>
<td>Chinese Squatters</td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harkis Algeria</td>
<td>1954-1962</td>
<td>French Conventional Forces</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Arid</td>
<td>Berber Tribes</td>
<td>Post-Colonial</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus Emergency</td>
<td>1955-1959</td>
<td>British Police</td>
<td>Ethno-Nationalist</td>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>Greek and Turkish</td>
<td>Post-Colonial</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The cases selected for this research are 11 large-scale community-based security programs employed by external forces during counterinsurgency operations. The size of the sample was based on an initial review of major counterinsurgency operations from the 20th century. All available cases were included in the sample. As mentioned earlier, Ragin recommends a sample size of at least six be used for Fuzzy Set QCA. The inclusion of more cases than was needed to meet the minimum requirement was done to improve the generalizability of the findings and to ensure that an adequate sample was available for analysis if one or more of the cases needed to exclude if adequate data was not available or upon in-depth analysis a case did not meet the selection criteria.

The first four cases are drawn from the separate application of the constabulary program in the four U.S. military departments during the Philippines Insurrection of 1899-1903. While these cases occurred during the same conflict and period, each of these cases is separate and distinct due to geographic separation, different social and ethnic conditions, and divergent application of the general security program by local commanders. This is important to note so questions do not arise about conducting the same analysis on three nearly identical cases, thereby skewing the overall findings of the research. Having noted the differences in the cases, they all meet the selection criteria for inclusion in the study because according to Linn (2000), civilian auxiliaries were used in each of the cases.

The fifth case is the successful British use of an auxiliary local guard force as part of the Protected Village program during the Malayan Emergency of 1950-1960 (Hoffman and Taw 1991). The next case is the failed French use of the Harkis security force during the Algerian War of 1952-1962 (Horne 1977). Harki (based on the Arabic word for a
volunteer "war party") was the term used by the French government for Muslim Algerian loyalists who served as auxiliaries in the French Army during the Algerian War. The seventh case is the British application of a local auxiliary security force as part of the Protected Village program during the Kenya Emergency 1952-1960 (Hoffman and Taw 1991). The eighth case is the failed employment of a local constabulary by the British during the Cyprus Emergency 1955-1959 (Hoffman and Taw 1991). The next three cases are the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program, the Regional Force/Popular Force program, and the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program, employed by the U.S. during the U.S.-Vietnam War from 1963 to 1973 (Krepinevich 1986).

These selected cases represent six successful cases of the use of community-security forces (three military departments in the Philippines, Malaya, Kenya, and the aforementioned CAP program examples in Vietnam) and five unsuccessful cases (Algeria, Cyprus, Rhodesia, one department in the Philippines, and CIDG and RF/PF programs in Vietnam.) The criteria for successful and unsuccessful cases are defined on pages 51-53. The difference in outcomes provides the control and variation required to address the research problem and lends itself to a comparative case study method and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Yin 2009 and Ragin 2008). These cases provide numerous within-case comparisons with application of the same program, but these cases are all differentiated by method of application, location, social conditions, and leadership.

Data Collection Methods

Data collection for this dissertation will rely on archival sources for primary source documents and existing scholarly work on each the case studies for secondary sources. Primary source documents will include military reports and orders and captured
insurgent records. These documents will be obtained from archival sources such as, but not limited to, the United States and United Kingdom National Archives, personal papers donated to universities and historical societies, and archives maintained by military services. The inclusion of primary source research will mitigate the selectivity and hindsight bias inherent in historical works and fill in data gaps missing from secondary sources (Thies 2002). Additionally, the use of multiple secondary sources from the historiography of the case studies will reduce the selection effects of using one source at the expense of other viewpoints (Thies 2002). Each of the selected cases has a large archival and historical record associated with it, thereby aiding in making an in-depth data collection effort possible. Existing research by other scholars will be used as a guide to locate pertinent records. This will also serve as a check on the potential bias of secondary sources used in this research. If gaps in exist in both primary archival sources and secondary sources and if there are living participants to the events, semi-structured interviews will be conducted. The interview questions will be designed around collecting data on the specific gap in the existing written record and to control for personal bias. Again, interviews will only be conducted if primary and secondary sources are not available, but it is not in the scope of this research or research method to collect date through interviews unless multiple other sources do not exist. Whenever possible multiple primary and secondary sources will be used to collect a redundancy of data to clarify and meaning and mitigate individual source bias.

Methods for Data Analysis and Synthesis

To aid in the collection, analysis and presentation of the data needed for this study, it is necessary to operationalize the variables used in the model. Alexander George
(1979) recommends constructing a case “codebook” to structure the collection of data by “using a standardized set of questions in a controlled comparison to assure acquisition of comparable data from the several cases.” According to Yin, this will assist not only in organizing data, but also assist in identifying potential sources of evidence (Yin 2009). The following section will establish some initial structured questions to address each of the variables.

In the dissertation the data collected will be first presented and addressed in a narrative case study approach to present the variables in their proper contexts. Each variable will also be discussed separately in each case study to provide measurement and comparison of those variables across cases (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999). Ragin asserts that the “principle that ‘context matters’ is central to the configurational approach to cases” (Ragin 2000, 66). He cautions that “it would very hazardous to equate” two cases that have identically “high” or identically “low” scores “without looking at each score’s context” (Ragin 2000, 65). This makes set criteria for degrees of membership problematic at best. Therefore, decisions on degrees of membership with each variable in the model for each individual case will be made by the researcher after presenting the data for each case. A full discussion of the reasoning for selections of degree of membership with each variable will be conducted after the presentation of each case study.

Security: The Dependent Variable

As discussed in the literature review, security is the cornerstone of any COIN effort. Without the ability to provide security to the populace other efforts to build public support for the national government, such as government reforms or economic
development, will be ineffective. Therefore, the dependent variable used in this dissertation to determine the “success” or “failure” of community-based security programs is the level of security provided to the population. David Kilkullen in Counterinsurgency (2010) advocates abandoning common metrics used by military commanders to measure security levels in counterinsurgencies, such as body counts, number of enemy attacks or military access to an area. As he notes, these metrics do not accurately measure the experience of the population or their level of perceived security. Kilkullen defines security in COIN as being comprised of three components; military security, legal security, and population security (Kilkullen 2006). According to Kilkullen, military security involves the protection of the population from armed attacks and predations by insurgents, terrorists or other violent organized groups. The provision of legal security is the protection of the population under a framework of human rights, civil institutions and individual and group legal protections. Finally, population security involves the separation of the population from the insurgent groups, depriving insurgents of a base of support from sympathetic members of the population. Following traditional COIN theory, the provision of security should enable the other pillars of counterinsurgency, economic development and political reform.

Therefore, in addition to measuring the level of security by discussing the number of insurgent attacks and other associated violence such as murder and kidnapping, this dissertation will adopt Kilcullen’s method of using reports of the physical safety, political, and economic status of the local population to measure the dependent variable, security. The baseline measurement for each of these variables will be taken from the period just prior or at the start of the community-based security program.
In addition to measuring the number of violent attacks conducted by insurgents against community members, security force personnel or property in the military or civilian defined boundaries of the community, physical safety is measured by insurgent activity. Insurgent activity is defined as fund raising, recruitment, and political activity (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014). Another measure of physical safety is the number of external security forces left in the area by COIN commanders to maintain security after the program is established. The reasoning behind using this metric is that conventional security forces may be responsible for reductions in other measurements of security and it a gauge of the perception of local commanders about the insurgent threat and the reliability of the local security force.

This dissertation measures the effectiveness of community-based security programs in the political sphere using two metrics. First, a measurement of the number of inhabitants participating in local governance, judicial, and security programs will gauge the population’s perceptions of the risk of aligning themselves with the government. Second, the ability of the local government to accomplish tasks such as tax collection and education will measure the ability of insurgents to interfere with these tasks and the population’s perceived risk of participating in these activities.

The level of security will also be gauged by economic activity, which can be measured through expansion of trade and local markets, construction, and participation in government sponsored education and training programs. Economic growth or contraction is intended to measure the level of perceived risk held by the local population and acceptance of government control displayed through willingness to participate in government sponsored programs.

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Incorporation of multiple data points from these three areas provides a rich indication of the level of acceptance of government control, levels of risk perceived by the population, and the overall level of security before and after the application of a community-based security program. Also by measuring security from multiple approaches, this method minimizes the risk of biased reporting and skewed data from one source.

Causal Conditions of Community-based Security

This dissertation seeks to test the effects of five causal conditions on the security outcomes of community-based security programs. These causal conditions are external support and oversight, limited territorial jurisdiction, incorporation of traditional justice systems, local sustainability and accountability, and participation of local elites. In keeping with the QCA method, the following sections use existing definitions to describe each casual condition and establish attributes for each for use in assigning degrees of membership for each of the cases with the causal conditions. The intent of this process is not to establish specific cut points between each gradation in degree of membership, but to establish characteristics of each factor that assists the research in assigning the degree of membership of each case with the causal factor while taking into consideration the within-case context of each case that influenced the individual degree of membership.

External Support and Oversight

The first variable identified is external support and oversight by the intervening power. As Baker notes, with community-based policing, there must be some connection with the state for locally provided security to function (Baker 2010). This linkage to the state prevents or mitigates abuses by state and non-state actors and provides the
community-based security force with the tools and knowledge necessary to provide adequate security to the population.

External support and oversight can take many forms dependent on the context of each situation. Support can include direct provisioning of advisors, arms and equipment to security forces, but also sponsorship by local conventional units, information sharing, collaboration and training (Baker 2010). Expanding the community-based policing model to counterinsurgency support can also be expanded to include the provisioning of quick reaction forces and air and artillery support by conventional military units near the community-based security force. Additionally, oversight can take the form of reporting mechanisms and supervision external forces impose on community-based security forces. For each of these measures, the level of assistance and provisioning of tools necessary to counter insurgent actions in the area around the community and the level of supervision given by an external force determines the membership of each case with the causal factor of support and oversight.

In his “theory of competitive control” David Kilcullen (2013) highlights another aspect of external support and oversight. In his theory each side in an insurgency offers a range of incentives and disincentives to compel compliance and cooperation from the local population. These measures not only attract individuals into aligning themselves with a particular group, but they also include measures that also incentivizes continued membership and disincentives defection. Incentives can include connecting participation to individual cash payments, collective development aid or allowing degrees of self-governance or participation in the formal political process. Disincentives can include collective punishments such as the removal of government aid, removal of government
support in favor or other groups, or individual sanctions such as detention or removal of cash payments. Each of these actions provides a method to assist in the recruitment of individuals or groups for the program and as methods to ensure continued good behavior by members of the program or social groups which contribute members to the program.

This variable can be addressed by asking the question,

1. How did the military commander prioritize community-based security programs in relation to other requirements for material and manpower?

2. What level of material support, in the form of arms and equipment, was provided to community-based security forces?

3. What was the duration of initial training, amount of specialty training in fields such as intelligence, communications, and medicine and periods of skill-sustainment training can all be used to measure the level of support given to these programs.

4. To what extent were conventional security forces available to support community-based security forces when in contact with insurgent forces?

5. What degree of oversight was provided by conventional security force units or dedicated advisor units collocated with community-based security forces?

6. If there were dedicated advisor personnel, to what was the extent of their reporting requirement and what level of importance were those reports given by security force commanders?

Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction

In their study of Afghan community defense programs, Jones and Munoz (2010,55) determined that self-defense programs are more effective in achieving security with a minimum of human rights abuses if the local security forces are defensive in
nature. This means they are used to provide security only for their social group within their territorial limits and are not used as auxiliaries to conventional forces in offensive combat operations. The defensive or offensive orientation of a community-based security program can be determined by the degree local conventional force commanders equip and employ local security forces. Equipping security forces with weapons such as mortars, artillery and heavy machine guns indicate an ability to conduct offensive operations and to strike targets outside of the boundaries of a community. Additionally, if conventional force commanders use community-based security forces to augment conventional in offensive operations outside community boundaries in roles outside of guides knowledgeable in local terrain, indicates an offensive orientation of a local security force.

Limits to territorial jurisdiction, can be addressed by examining the following questions:

1. How did military commanders employ these forces, as local security forces or as augmentees to conventional security forces?

2. What territorial or operational boundaries did COIN commanders place on community-based security forces?

3. What standing orders, rules, and procedures were established to limit community-based security forces operations?

4. To what extent were community-based security force weapons limited to defensive arms such as shotguns or rifles and prohibited from using offensive weapons such as mortars, machine guns and anti-tank weapons?
Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems

‘Traditional’ refers to customs and usages that derive their popular authority from practices and beliefs that pre-date the arrival of the modern state. ‘Traditional’ justice systems are as varied as the local societies they derive from. Their primary role is to maintain peace and harmony in local, usually village, communities. ‘Traditional’ justice systems play a major role in the everyday resolution of disputes and maintenance of order in communities throughout the Pacific. Legal scholars use the term ‘legal pluralism’ to describe a situation where multiple forms of law co-exist within a single environment or setting. In many post-colonial countries, including each of those discussed in this paper, state laws and institutions (such as courts, lawyers, justice ministries, police and prisons) operate alongside ‘customary’ or ‘traditional’ justice mechanisms that have been integral parts of indigenous social orders since long before the arrival of the modern state.

‘Traditional’ justice actors would include community leaders, religious leaders and organizations, government officials, NGOs and a range of community-based organizations (Dinnen 2009). Additionally, status reports by military and civilian administrators would likely discuss the functioning of the local judiciary system and if external judicial support was brought in from outside the local area. The exercise of military justice systems and reports of vigilantism and insurgent courts operating in the area of operations would also give an indication of a lack of a functioning local judicial system. Incorporation of traditional justice systems can be addressed by asking the questions:

1. To what extent did the intervening power organize a local judicial system?”
2. To what degree were traditional justice systems incorporated into the community-based security program?

3. To what extent were the prevention and punishment of non-insurgency related criminal and social infractions included in the jurisdiction of community-based security forces?

4. What level of autonomy were local leaders given to punish infractions of traditional social and criminal codes?

5. To what extent did commanders allow local leaders to negotiate with insurgent leaders in matters such as disarmament and reintegration of insurgent forces?

Local Sustainability and Accountability

This dissertation defines local sustainability as the degree to which a community can maintain or continue a program with little or no application of external resources or support. This definition focuses mainly on personnel requirements and not the provision of material by accepting that in a counterinsurgency a degree of support from the national government or external intervening force is necessary to provide arms and training.

Sustainability in this context seeks to determine local support for a program by the ability of a community to recruit and maintain the membership of individual members of a security force. Rewards provided by the government such as salaries for security force members and development programs tied community participation in security programs will provide a measure of the local acceptance and support of the program. Additionally, coercive measures such as forced recruitment and punitive measures levied against communities in response to insurgent activity will indicate the level of spontaneous local support.
Linked with sustainability is accountability of security programs to local communities, which can serve as a method to promote ownership in a program and prevent abuses by security force members. The OECD (2007) defines local accountability as mechanisms that provide an “internal system of review; proactive monitoring; internal complaints mechanisms” and can include “code(s) of conduct; disciplinary system; review of performance and control of assignments; human resources: selection, retention and promotion system; freedom of information.” Additionally, inclusion of local leadership in the security force as well as mechanisms for local redress of grievances committed by a security force can be used as a measurement of security force accountability to the community. The degree to which organizers of community-based security forces incorporate any of the aforementioned methods of accountability are used in this dissertation to measure the degree of membership a community-based security program possesses.

Determining the degree of membership of the cases to the factors of sustainability and accountability are determined by asking the questions:

1. To what extent did military commanders equip the community-based security force to a level that could be sustained without external support?

2. To what degree did security force duty become the primary source of income for community-based security members?

3. To what degree were mechanism of ownership and oversight integrated into the program?”

4. To what extent was sustainment of community economic viability balanced with recruitment into community-based security forces?
5. To what degree were limits placed on the time requirements of security duties so community-based security members could maintain their livelihoods and social obligations?

Voluntary Participation by Local Elites

Charles Tilly (2003, 34) defines political entrepreneurs as individuals who “engage in various forms of brokerage: creating new connections between previously inter-connected social sites” and “specialize in activation, connection, coordination, and representation.” For this dissertation, local political entrepreneurs will be defined as individuals in positions of social power who can connect organizers of community-security programs with their target audiences and can mobilize social groups into action through application of their informal social power. Closely aligned with Tilly, Joel Migdal (1988, 33) in Strong Societies and Weak States, identifies local political entrepreneurs as individuals acting outside of the formal state apparatus who can enforce social control through the participation of citizens in social organizations that local political entrepreneurs control and locals see as legitimate. These leaders can be tribal chiefs, clan leaders, landlords, business owners or religious leaders.

For this dissertation, a local political entrepreneur is any individual who can enforce compliance of individuals in a social group through their control of any autonomous social institution. Their level of participation is determined by how organizers integrate them into the program. Integration can range from the extreme of direct command and control of the security force by local leaders to lower levels of participation in the form of advisory or oversight bodies. Different degrees of
membership of a case with this factor will be determined by the level of control afforded to local leaders.

Voluntary participation by local elites can be gauged by asking:

1. What steps did commanders take to co-opt existing local leadership into the program?"

2. To what extent did commanders negotiate with local leaders prior to starting a community security program?

3. To what degree did commanders dictate to subordinates the inclusion of local leaders would indicate the level of participation by local leaders?

4. Additionally, to what degree do insurgents target violence or intimidation against local leaders, indicating the inclusion of these individuals into the local security structure constitutes a threat to insurgent power?

Issues of Trustworthiness

One of the challenges of this study is ensuring it produces good and convincing research from imperfect and often incomplete sources and accurately portraying the experiences of participants (Bloomberg and Volpe 2012, 112). In many cases the most readily available sources of data are in the archives of the former occupying force. These records do not often capture the perceptions and experiences of the local populace and provide the biased view of a culture foreign to the local population. This raises potential validity issues with the findings of this study. To mitigate potential issues of trustworthiness, every effort was made in the data collection phase to incorporate written accounts of local participants in the community-based security program.
Validity

This dissertation includes controls to address potential issues in reliability, confirmability, and transferability to improve the validity of its findings.\(^1\) Reliability in the context of this qualitative dissertation is the ability of subsequent studies to replicate the findings of this research (Bloomberg and Volpe 2012, 113). This dissertation attempts to achieve this goal by utilizing two methods. First, linkages between the findings of this dissertation and the data will be documented and consistent data collection and analysis methods will be employed throughout the process. Additionally, inconsistencies in among the sources of data will be highlighted so follow-on researchers will be aware of their occurrence.

Confirmability in qualitative research resembles the concept of objectivity in quantitative research (Bloomberg and Volpe 2012, 114). As mentioned earlier, the researcher controlled for bias and subjectivity by conducting a continual appraisal of personal and professional biases that may influence the analysis of data. Additionally, the researcher also sought out multiple perspectives of the cases using as many sources data as possible from the available data.

Transferability or generalization to other cases is not the purpose of this dissertation. This dissertation will attempt to provide a thick description of each case to enable the reader with the context of each case, so determinations about the extent the findings of this study can be applied to comparable, but not identical, cases. The degree

\(^1\) Outside of the design of the research, the underlying method to strengthen the validity of this dissertation is to identify the personal bias I bring to the study. As a serving U.S. Army officer who has participated in several COIN campaigns, I have strongly held views on the soundness of bottom-up COIN as a method to combat insurgencies. To mitigate this bias, I will continually monitor my subjective perspectives and biases and seek to incorporate conflicting accounts of the community-based security programs used in this dissertation.
the relevance of this dissertation’s findings to the broader context of the use of community-based security forces in other cases.

Limitations of the Study

This dissertation contains several limitations inherent in qualitative research that relies heavily on historical records for data collection. The most critical limitation of this dissertation is potential gaps in the historical record of the cases. This could lead to potential bias by using a limited number of sources to determine the degree of membership the cases have with the factors of the model. Additionally, personal bias and subjectivity of the research could bias the analysis of data and formulation of findings. Finally, the limited number of cases used in this dissertation may limit the possibility of generalizing the findings of this dissertation to the analysis of other community-based security programs.

In recognition of these limitations, the researcher took the following measures to address them. First, where a gap in the historical record exists, the researcher conducted interviews with participants or subject matter experts in the individual cases. This limited potential bias by including as many perspectives and sources of data as possible. Second, the researcher omitted from the case study sample potential cases the researcher participated in or had direct knowledge. This mitigates possible bias or subjectivity by the researcher. Finally, the researcher provided the most detailed descriptions as possible and included as many influencing factors not considered by the model for each case. This will inform the reader of the context for each case and the potential for generalizing the findings of this dissertation to other cases.
Chapter Summary

In summary, this chapter provided a detailed description of the research methodology of this dissertation. The qualitative methodologies of congruence case study analysis and QCA was employed to determine the influence of the factors identified in the model used in this dissertation in the outcomes produced by community-based security programs conducted during counterinsurgency operations. The case study sample of eleven community-based security programs conducted was selected because they met the criteria of having been implemented by external intervening forces during major COIN operations. Data collection primarily relied on archival sources, but interviews were conducted when gaps existed in the archival record or sources were potentially biased. Credibility and dependability were addressed by mitigating potential researcher bias and by using multiple sources of data. The intent of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of the use of community-based security forces in COIN operations. Generalizable findings from this dissertation may be possible, but readers must acknowledge the context of each case used in this study when attempting to extrapolate the findings of this dissertation to other cases or to determine the context of these findings in the broader phenomenon of community-based security organizations in COIN.
CHAPTER IV – GUARDIAS AND INSURECTOS

The First District, Department of Northern Luzon, 1899-1902

Introduction

This chapter will explore the use of community-based security forces in the First District, Department of Northern Luzon during the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902. This case study will start with a brief overview of the aftermath of the Spanish American War in the Philippines and the initial occupation by American forces. To set further the stage for a discussion of the role of community-based security forces, this chapter will discuss the nature of the Filipino insurgency in the First District and the efforts of American commanders to quell it. After discussing the overall conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign and how American forces used local security forces defeat the insurgency, this case study will conduct a detailed discussion of the degree of membership this case demonstrates for each factor presented in this dissertation’s model. Finally, this case study concludes with a summation of the findings and an application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix.

After the rapid defeat of the Spanish Army and Navy by U.S. military forces and their erstwhile Filipino revolutionary allies in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the U.S. Army settled into an occupation of the Philippine Islands. This occupation force settled into its mission of incorporating the former Spanish colony into the American system through a process of “benevolent assimilation” and assuming the “white man’s burden” of civilizing the Filipinos. The First District of the Department of Northern Luzon was held up as a success in the early months of the occupation with U.S. forces quickly establishing local civil government and security forces. This early success turned
into a potential failure in the summer of 1900 as insurgent attacks increased and U.S. commanders realized that the majority of the new local government officials were either members of the insurgency or actively facilitating the insurgents. By September of 1900, the commander of the district, Brigadier General (BG) Samuel B. M. Young realized that he did not possess the number of soldiers required to pacify the district and the district might be lost (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 3, 30). The dire situation in the First District quickly turned around and by May 1901 the insurgency had been broken and new civil government and security forces loyal to Manila and the U.S. was in place throughout the district.

The rapid improvement in security can be attributed to several factors. Within three months of Young’s report, U.S. troop levels doubled by November 1900 and a new and dynamic commander, BG J. Franklin Bell, assumed command in February 1901, instituting several changes in strategy. The defeat of the anti-imperialist platform of William Jennings Bryant in the American presidential election of November 1900 and the capture of the insurgencies’ national leader Emilio Aguinaldo also reduced the morale of the insurgents. Additionally, indigenous scout units drawn from the local Ilocano ethnic group were expanded at the same time as more U.S. forces arrived in the district.

Possibly the most dramatic improvements in security occurred after Bell permitted his subordinates to expand their cooperation with Crispulo Patajo and his Guardia de Honor forces. These irregular auxiliaries provided security in towns, allowing U.S. forces to patrol aggressively in the countryside for insurgent groups. More importantly, Patajo and his followers identified the majority of the insurgent support networks in the district and either guided U.S. forces to them or captured insurgents
themselves. As Colonel William P. Duval noted years later, “in short, without this man’s (Patajo) devoted aid, no such success could possibly have been achieved in anything like so short of a time at all.”

This case study highlights the importance of external oversight and support as well as the need to limit the territorial jurisdiction of indigenous security forces. Additionally, the different levels of external oversight and support provided by the United States to several local security forces, including the Philippine Scouts, local constabulary, and Guardia de Honor forces appears to be in inverse proportion to the level of local accountability and sustainability experienced by each of these groups. In several instances during the early part of the insurgency, community-based security forces committed abuses against the local population and competing social groups. American commanders quickly addressed these issues by improving oversight and limited independent operations of indigenous security forces outside of their own villages or neighborhoods. This case also demonstrated some influence of incorporating local elites into the security program through the cooption of the Guardia de Honor leadership and the formation of the Federal Party by Filipino elites.

While this case illustrates the importance of the previously mentioned factors of the model, the case of the First District does not demonstrate the significance of incorporating traditional justice systems or the necessity of local accountability or sustainability. The short duration of the Philippine Insurrection may be one mitigating factor in the relative unimportance of these factors in influencing the success of American commanders’ use of community-based security forces to defeat the insurgency.

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2 U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, B.M. Young Papers 1900, Box 1, Personal Correspondence
Although there is little evidence in the historical record to measure security levels through economic, political and social development, the rapid defeat of the insurgency and the inability of the insurgents to recover from their defeat indicate that the United States was successful in its efforts to pacify the First District.

Background

The American involvement began on May 1, 1898 with Commodore George Dewey’s destruction of the Spanish Pacific Squadron in Manila Bay. As a stopgap measure before U.S. Army forces arrived in the Philippines, Commodore Dewey promoted the creation of a Filipino Army. Formed around the resistance leader Emilio Aguinaldo, the Filipino Republican Army quickly gained control of Luzon, minus the capital and the naval base at Cavite, which the Spanish held until surrendering to U.S. forces. While serving the purpose of maintaining the U.S. initiative against the Spanish in the Philippines, the Filipino Army soon became a major concern for U.S. forces in the Philippines. By August 1898, U.S. forces defeated the main body of the Spanish Army and seized Manila. In addition to taking the honor of capturing, the capital and receiving the surrender of their former colonial overlords away from the Filipinos, the U.S. also further enraged Filipino nationalists by making it clear that the U.S. intended to annex the islands, not give them independence. An uneasy truce between the two armies was broken in February 1899 and the Philippine Insurrection began.

The armed and organize Filipinos under Aguinaldo first sought to defeat the United States in conventional open warfare. Set piece battles occurred throughout the remainder of 1899 with the better-trained and equipped U.S. forces usually prevailing against the Republican Army. By November 1899 U.S., forces had trapped the
Republican Army in the central plains of Luzon. Faced with annihilation or surrender, Aguinaldo choose to disperse his force throughout the Philippines with his subordinate commanders returning to their native regions with their remaining forces and the task to conduct guerrilla warfare (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 3, 88). At this point, the most challenging portion of the Philippine Insurrection faced the American forces as the Filipinos created a decentralized insurgency with Aguinaldo serving as a figurehead leader and each American commander encountering a different threat influenced by local culture and conditions.

The Philippines that the U.S. occupied in 1899 contained formidable terrain and a factionalized and hierarchical society. The main island of Luzon held half of the Philippines 1899 population of seven million. The formidable terrain and jungles on Luzon separated the five major ethno-linguistic groups of the island with the Ilocano forming the majority of the estimated 531,000 inhabitants of the First District of the Department of Northern Luzon. Comprised of seven provinces and a total area of 8,000 square miles, 80 percent of which was mountainous, the First District presented guerrilla forces with rugged terrain to hide in and U.S. forces a daunting environment to control (Linn 1989, 3, 30 and Ochosa 1989, 109).

The population of the First District of the Department of Northern Luzon in 1899 also presented challenges for U.S. forces. The population of the district was rigidly divided into classes because of the Spanish colonial system. Two groups, the principales and the illustrados, comprised the elite of Filipino society. The principales, native-born land-owning Filipinos, comprised the political and economic elite of the Philippines. The illustrados, composed of western educated Filipinos and exposed to the ideas of the
Enlightenment and 19th century nationalism, formed the other component of the Filipino elite (Linn 1989, 3-4).

The Filipino revolt against the Spanish in the 1890s and the subsequent war with the United States created numerous political and religious factions seeking control in the First District. The first group, the Katipunan was a secret society created in 1892 by Andres Bonifacio (Miller 1982, 33). Originally an organization with quasi-religious foundations and appeal to the working and lower classes, the group was transformed into a secular and nationalist revolutionary movement by Emilio Aguinaldo, who seized control of the group from Bonifacio in 1896 (Miller 1982, 34). Aguinaldo created an uneasy coalition within the group to include conservative and liberal illustrados looking to maintain differing levels of the status quo without Spanish rule and radical lower and middle urban and rural Filipinos who wanted to create a new political and economic system (Silbey 2007, 13). When the Filipino Republican Army dispersed and formed guerrilla units, Aguinaldo used the Katipunan society to form the shadow government of the insurgency. Katipunan committees formed in pueblos and barrios with all duties that included all the functions of government to include the collection of taxes and the additional responsibilities of assisting guerillas in the field and forming local militias to augment the operations of the regular guerrilla force. The Katipunan committees also ensured the loyalty of the population through the administering of secret oaths and rights and secret police to enforce adherence to those oaths (Gates 1973, 160). This function of ensuring the support of the local population was the most important task undertaken by the Katipunan committees and possibly had an impact larger than any influence exercised by the regular guerrilla force.
The other major group operating in the First District was the Guardia de Honor. Formed in the mid-nineteenth century by Dominican friars with the name Guardia de Honor de Maria and the purpose, as the name implies, to instill devotion for the Virgin Mary, the group grew throughout the First District area. The political and social turmoil in the 1890s, culminating in the revolution against Spain, transformed the group into a conservative movement tinged with millennialism oriented against external authority and devoted to charismatic quasi-religious leaders (Sturtevant 1966). Once the Katipunan Committees formed the local governments of the short-lived Philippine Republic after the defeat of the Spanish in 1899, conflict between the Guardia de Honor members and the Katipunan dominated republican government broke out. After rejecting the leadership of the new local governments, several groups of the Guardia de Honor were roughly treated by the guerilla groups (Ochosa 1989, 55). This led to open conflict between the groups from starting in October 1898 and continued after the U.S. Army occupied the region in December 1898 (Sturtevant 1966).

After the defeat of the Filipino Republican Army, one American observer in the region estimated there were approximately 3,500 Filipino soldiers in the district in addition to an unknown number of local defense forces raised by the majority of villages (Linn 1989, 31). Upon receiving the order to conduct guerilla warfare from Aguinaldo, the local commander of the Filipino force, General Manuel Tinio, divided his regular forces into detachments of twenty men with local and regional commanders to coordinate the actions of the detachments (Ochosa 1989, 108-109).

This was the situation Brigadier General (BG) Samuel B. M. Young received on December 20, 1899 when Major General (MG) Elwell S. Otis, Military Governor of the
Philippines, placed him in command of the newly formed First District of the Department of Northern Luzon. To assist him in establishing security and the conditions necessary to transition to a civil government, MG Otis allocated BG Young a force of approximately 4,000 soldiers divided between two regiments and two separate battalions (War Department 1901, Vol 1. Part 3, 31). If not allowing for soldiers not available due to illness or injury, this force provided BG Young with a security force to population ratio of approximately 1:132.

In the early months of 1900, Young rapidly dispersed his force into small detachments to secure as many population centers as possible. In keeping with the “Benevolent Assimilation” policies advocated by MG Elwell S. Otis, commander of the U.S. Army pacification force, Young embraced the development of local government and security forces by ordering General Order (G.O.) 43. G.O. 43 ordered the establishment of civil governments by mandating that officers spend at least one day a week organizing governing councils and impressing on the population the need to form security forces to capture insurgents and criminal bands. This order also reminded the officers of the First District the need to impress on local leaders the necessity for towns to provide their own security with the U.S. Army forces providing a supporting role (Linn 1989, 35).

The results of Young’s efforts were seemingly impressive with local governments and police forces established in 63 towns by the end of March 1900. Development projects also expanded public education with 203 schools established by June 1900, enrolling a quarter of the 44,716 school-age population in the district. Even with the fast pace of development, reports from the first half of 1900 indicated the population was
pleased with the American occupation (Department of Northern Luzon 1900, 395/2180).  
This progress proved illusory, based on incorrect reporting by officers hampered by a lack of manpower to collect accurate information coupled with a limited ability to understand the local languages (Linn 1989, 36-37). In a rush to organize local governments, American officers failed to identify insurgent leaders operating in the district and local officials sympathetic to the insurgent cause. By maintaining the links to these local officials, the guerrilla force in the district was able to exercise control over large numbers of local governments. Coupled with the credible threat of assassination, one quarter of assassinations recorded by the district command in 1900 were of local officials, one commander estimated that the insurgents controlled every town in his province (U.S. Senate 1902 and (U.S. Senate 1902, 100 and Letter Sent LTC Robert L. Howze to CPT John G. Balance, 20 May 1900, 395/4043). While Washington could still muster overwhelming force, and succeeded in killing over five hundred insurgents in numerous small unit engagements during period between April and August 1900, the insurgent control of the civil government and the frequency of small unit attacks showed the U.S. was not in control of the First District (Wheaton 1900, 1).

After a short lull in fighting during the monsoon season in July and August 1900, fighting in the First District spiked. This was a concerted effort by the insurgents to influence the U.S. presidential election in favor of the anti-imperialist platform of William Jennings Bryan, who it was hoped would end the American occupation and grant Philippine sovereignty. Spurred on through correspondence with members of the U.S.

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3 U.S. National Archives, Record Group (RG) 395/2180, Department of Northern Luzon 1900
Anti-Imperialist Society violence and resistance against U.S. occupation erupted in areas previously considered pacified by the Army (Sexton 1939, 254-255).

In a report submitted to the War Department by BG Young in September 1900, the general described the situation in the First District as dire and the reversal a complete surprise by reporting that,

On the 1st of August affairs seemed so promising in Bangued that the commanding officer recommended that the form of civil government provided by General Order 40, Office Military Governor, be put into force. An election was called for August 30. In the meantime, the insurgent leaders so intimidated the voters that only 26 registered and 21 voted out of a population of 13,000.

Young further described the security situation throughout the First District as so perilous that “it would be dangerous to place a detachment smaller than a company in a pueblo” and that the area was so insecure that he did not send out patrols “with less than a hundred rifles.” Young closed the report predicting an imminent collapse of American control in the district and the “delivering up to the insurgents all natives that have shown themselves friendly to us” if he did not receive an additional two regiments of U.S. troops as soon as possible (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 3, 31).

Alarmed by BG Young’s report and taking advantage of new U.S. volunteer regiments arriving in the Philippines to replace the state volunteer regiments ending their enlistments in the summer of 1900, Major General Arthur MacArthur, who replaced MG Otis as Governor General in June 1900, doubled the troop strength in the district. In
August, Young had 3,985 U.S. troops under his command with 10 percent bedridden by sickness. By October the number increased to 4,897 and peaked in November at 5,866. Additionally, subordinate commanders in the district were allowed to double the number of Filipino auxiliaries. The Native Scouts expanded from 245 men in September to a peak of 568 by March 1901, expanding the Native Scouts’ existing companies to six. Young also appointed Crispulo Patajo as chief of detectives for the First District and tasked him to stop two particularly violent insurgent bands and then to recruit and lead local auxiliaries in Ilocos Sur and Abra, two of the most violent provinces in the district. Young and his subordinate commander for Ilocos Sur and Abra, Colonel William P. Duvall reported later that Patajo could muster between 500 and 800 local fighters for his auxiliary force in his home district of La Union. The members of this force, including Patajo until his appointment as district detective, were not paid a salary; instead, they were paid bounties for each rifle or insurgent leader they turned over to the Americans.

By December 1900 the tide had turned in the First District against the insurgents. A number of factors contributed to this turn of events. The 50 percent increase in American forces undoubtedly improved the ability of the United States to provide security by carrying out more offensive operations and securing previously ignored population centers. From October 1900 until the end of the insurgency in May 1901, Army forces were on a constant offensive. In addition to more patrolling by local garrisons that limited civilian travel between provinces, mobile forces conducted sweeps

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4 U.S. National Archives RG 395/2181, Department of Northern Luzon 1900
5 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/2133, Department of Northern Luzon 1900
6 U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, Samuel B. M. Young Papers 1900, Box 1, Personal Correspondence
of border areas and suspected guerilla bases (War Department 1901, 33-36). These operations limited ability of guerilla forces to move and to mass in large numbers and reduced guerilla access to their local support networks and the food and supplies they provided.

McKinley’s defeat of William Jennings Bryan in the presidential election of November 1900 sapped the morale from the insurgent forces, who had pinned their hopes on influencing a political solution to the U.S. occupation (Ochosa 1989, 198). As BG Young noted, the “result of the presidential election has had a reassuring effect in convincing both sides of the probable permanency of the policy of the United States” (War Department 1901, 33). As Young identified, in addition to disheartening the insurgents, the McKinley victory also emboldened pro-American Filipinos and provided a final push for undecided Filipino elites into the American camp. This shift in support expanded the Filipino Federalist Party, which had languished since its formation by conservative Filipino elites in early 1900 (Miller 1982, 157). The Federalist Party rapidly expanded from Manila into the First District and by February 1901 all of the provinces in the district had one or more Federalist Party committees. By March, the committees were had gained enough support among the populace to negotiate with insurgent groups for their surrender. By March, this strategy started to bear fruit with five insurgent officers surrendering to the Ilocos Sur Federalist committee on March 11, 1900.

Finally, a new commander, BG J. Franklin Bell replaced BG Young as the commander of the district in February 1901. BG Bell proved to be an enthusiastic supporter of recruiting native irregular auxiliary forces. Bell’s operations in Ilocos Sur provide a good example of this expansion of the Guardia de Honor auxiliary force that
had been so effective in La Union into other provinces of the district. After U.S.
intelligence determined the organization of the insurgents and their support network in
Ilocos Sur, Patajo brought 50 of his Guardia de Honor force into the province and
proceeded to recruit an additional security force of 150 men from the Igorrote ethnic
group that had a history of bad relations with the insurgents (Linn 1989, 59). Bell
garrisoned the Igorrote villages to provide protection and support, allowing the Igorrote
auxiliary groups to pursue the insurgents in the mountains (War Department 1901, Vol 1,
Part 5, 38-39). After five weeks of operations, the main insurgent leader and his group
surrendered in 15 April, ending insurgent operations in Ilocos Sur. Bell admitted that
U.S. forces could not have hunted down the insurgents in Ilocos Sur without the
assistance of the Igorrote, likening searching for insurgents in the mountains to “hunting
for a needle in a haystack” (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 5, 37).

Bell utilized native auxiliary forces in neighboring Abra province immediately
following the successful operations in Ilocos Sur. In the last two weeks of April 1901,
six U.S. infantry companies, three native scout companies and “a lot” of native auxiliaries
trapped General Tinio’s command in the mountains east of Ilocos Sur (War Department
1901, Vol 1, Part 5, 39-40.) On April 30, 1901, General Tinio surrendered at Siniat,
citing a lack of food, the garrisoning of all the towns, and the Igorrote support for the
Americans as reasons for their surrender (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 5, 40). In the
space of four months, over five thousand insurgents and members of their part time
support infrastructure had been killed, captured or surrendered, breaking the back of the
insurgency in the First District. After May 1, 1901, the First District forces reported no
further engagements with insurgent forces (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 5, 41). In
recognition of the improved security, Major General Adna R. Chaffee, Military Governor of the Philippines turned over two of the six provinces, Benguet and Pangasinan July 1901, to full local civilian control and local constabularies, which were under local civil control, were in the lead role for security in all six provinces (Philippine Commission 1902, 13, 33). Further information corroborating the improved security in the First District does not appear to be available. As reported by the Philippine Commission, as Brian McAllister Linn (1989, 92) notes, the pacification of the First District was the most complete in all of the Philippines with generally peaceful conditions after April 1901 and a successful reintegration of former insurgents after their defeat.

External Oversight and Support

The United States created a bifurcated system for the use of indigenous forces in the First District, which resulted in a mixed record for oversight and support. In the case of the Philippine Scouts, the U.S. Army provided substantial oversight and material and operational support. The U.S. Army provided similar oversight and operational support to the Philippine Constabulary, but provided far less material assistance. In the case of the volunteer forces provided by Crispulo Patajo, the U.S. provided almost no oversight or support.

From their inception, the first category of the Filipino auxiliary forces, the Philippine Scouts and Philippine Constabulary were under close supervision by American forces. The first and most numerous of this category, the Philippine Scouts, are better thought of as having been an adjunct to the regular forces of the U.S. Army. They were organized along the lines of American units had at least one American officer, seconded from the U.S. Army, in direct command of each company of a hundred men (Wollard
The American officers were with their Filipino units during operations and garrison duty and were required to submit frequent reports on their status and operations. The level of oversight of these units was considerable, especially after unsupervised Macabebe Scouts terrorized several villages in the early stages of the U.S. occupation in November 1898. This included one case that resulted in the conviction by court martial of Scout members for rape, robbery, and assault (Wollard 1975, 40). In all the reported actions for 1900 and 1901, all actions by Philippine Scouts were under the supervision of an American officer.

The second organization in this group, the Philippine Constabulary, did not play an important role in the dismantling of the insurgent force. The expansion of this force occurred after the defeat of BG Tinio in April 1901 when the U.S. Army forces and Philippine Scouts pulled back into a supporting role in providing security the district. The expansion of this force was rapid and is another indication of the defeat of the insurgents. The constabulary increased from 87 Filipino enlisted constabulary in July 1901 to 683 in July 1902, indicating a growing support for the program and the increased security in the district (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 10, 387 and Philippine Commission 1902, 192).

The Philippine Constabulary was also closely supervised by the U.S. All of the officers and inspectors of the force were U.S. citizens, usually former U.S. Soldiers who had been mustered out of service in the Philippines (Wollard 1975, 90-91). Although Filipinos would earn commissions after a time, U.S. citizens formed the bulk of the leadership of the constabulary into the 1930s (Wollard 1975, 197-245).
The material and operational support for the constabulary was much less than that given to the scout units. In 1900 and 1901 the quantity and quality of the arms carried by the constabulary were inadequate. The 1901 report by the Philippine Commission described the weapons given to the constabulary as “a motley collection or Remington shotguns, captured Remington rifles, and old .45 caliber revolvers” (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 10, 184). While BG Young sought to increase the number of constabulary in the First District starting in February 1901, obtaining arms from the military government in Manila consistently hindered the expansion of local police forces (Linn 1989, 50).

Operational support of the constabulary was somewhat better. The manpower added by the increase of U.S. forces and Philippine Scouts in the summer of 1900 allowed the district commander to establish more outposts in important occupation centers. This increased the proximity of Army detachments to constabulary headquarters and by the fall of 1900 reports of police forces abandoning their posts in the face of insurgent attacks ceased to occur (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 3, 30-41). The Philippine Scouts slowly took over more of the support of the constabulary as U.S. forces drew down in late 1901 and 1902. The Constabulary Act of January 30, 1903, passed by the U.S. Congress, formalized this support by allowing civil authorities to use the Scouts whenever they needed more personnel to address an emergency (Wollard 1975, 98-99).

The other category of indigenous security forces, irregular auxiliaries, received little oversight or support. Formed around Crispulo Patajo and his Guardia de Honor followers in the spring of 1900, the local auxiliaries enjoyed a largely free hand in conducting their operations after establishing their pro-American sentiments. Numerous
allegations of “every kind of excess and abuse, robbing and maltreating the peaceful inhabitants” were lodged against the Guardias de Honor, culminating in the Philippine Commission’s representative in the district, Otto Scheerer requesting an investigation by the military governor. The U.S. Army officers in the district actively defended Patajo during the investigation and downplayed the excesses of the Guardia de Honor as either untrue or lodged by those who were sympathetic to the insurgent cause (Linn 1989, 44-45).

The Guardia de Honor also received little support from U.S. forces. As a volunteer force with no official backing, Patajo’s forces received little training or support from the U.S. They were not given arms and according to Colonel William Duvall, the commander at La Union, had to be loaned five rifles from U.S. forces to be able to conduct an operation against an insurgent group (Young 1900, Box 1, Personal Correspondence). It is possible that Guardia forces received assistance from the U.S. when their members joined the constabulary and formed pro-American police forces, but Army officers in the district did not report this information.

Overall, the level of oversight and support provided by the U.S. forces in the first district was not strong, but there was an attempt at oversight of the more formal indigenous forces in the district. The high level of supervision and adequate material support given to the Philippine Scouts and Constabulary, who outnumbered the irregular forces in the district, mitigated the lack of oversight and support give to Patajo’s forces.

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7 U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, Samuel B. M. Young Papers 1900, Box 1, Personal Correspondence
8 U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, Samuel B. M. Young Papers 1900, Box 1, Personal Correspondence
Therefore, the degree of membership of this case for the variable of oversight and support can be judged to be more in than out.

**Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction**

The degree of limits to territorial jurisdiction is also mixed for this case and is to some extent inverse to the level of oversight and support provided by U.S. forces. In the case of the Philippine Scouts, U.S. commanders made some effort to limit where the scouts were employed, but as an adjunct to regular U.S. forces, they were subject to being sent wherever needed. In contrast, U.S. commanders took more steps to limit employing the Philippine Constabulary and local auxiliaries to areas near their local communities.

After losing control of Scouts from the Macabebe scouts in November and December 1900, BG Young concluded that part of the problem had been that the Macabebe scouts were not operating within their own ethnic community (Wollard 1975). All the companies created after this incident were drawn from local ethnic groups and employed in regions dominated by those ethnic groups (Wollard 1975). The ethnicity of the scout companies is easy to determine after February 1901 when a formal program for the scouts was established (Fritz 1977, 526). After February 1901, all scout companies were referred to by their ethnic composition and not named after their commanding officer as was the case of the initial scout companies. In the case of the First District, all the scout companies operating in the district after February 1901 were comprised of members of the Ilocano ethnic group, which formed the majority of the population in the First District (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 3, 30-41). So, while the Philippine Scouts operated as a mobile force anywhere within the First District and theoretically
anywhere in the Philippines, there was an effort to limit their operations to areas inhabited by their ethnic group.

The Philippine Constabulary was even more restricted than the Philippine Scouts. During the planning for the constabulary, the Philippine Commission studied and rejected the concepts underpinning the Spanish *Guardia Civil* police force. The Spanish colonial government had purposefully assigned police of one ethnic group to control other ethnic groups in an attempt to “divide and rule” by playing on tribal and ethnic tensions to maintain order (Wollard 1975, 101). Instead, constabulary personnel were to be assigned to duties as close as possible to the community where they enlisted.

In the first district, BG Young and then BG Bell took the additional step and defined areas of responsibility for local leadership and the constabulary. Issued in May 1900, BG Young issued Circular Letter No. 1, which required all inhabitants to be registered and issued travel documents if they left their community. The letter also held the police force and the *presidente* or mayor, liable for all infractions within their jurisdiction and for damage to infrastructure caused by the insurgents (Linn 1989, 49). In addition to establishing accountability, it also defined the territorial limits of each community.

The local auxiliaries controlled by Patajo were also restricted in their territorial jurisdiction. This limitation was more due to the extent of local support for the Guardia de Honor and not constraints placed on Patajo by Army commanders. Although BG Young installed Patajo as the Chief of Detectives for the entire district, the Guardia de Honor did not operate outside of the areas of their greatest support; La Union, Benguet, Ilocos Sur, and Pangasinan (Sturtevant 1966 and War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 5,
30-41). In the areas Patajo maintained active networks, he was able to generate popular support and install Guardia de Honor infrastructure and leadership in formerly insurgent controlled towns. In the operations in Ilocos Sur in January through May 1901, Patajo brought a small cadre of fifty supporters from La Union, but recruited the bulk of his auxiliary force, 150 men, from local villages (Linn 1989, 59). While Young’s reports indicate the use of local guides in the other provinces of the district, there is no indication of attempts to use the Guardia de Honor followers outside the areas of their base of support.

Overall the use of community-based security forces in the First District are “more in than out” concerning their degree of membership with limits to territorial jurisdiction. The Philippine Scouts were deployed only with the boundaries of their ethnic communities, but could technically be sent anywhere they were needed by U.S. commanders. The Philippine Commission designed the Philippine Constabulary to be employed within defined boundaries and their Filipino police officers were to be used as close to their own village as was practical. Coupled with the boundaries defined by BG Young for the area of responsibility for each village, the Philippine Constabulary was even more constrained by territorial boundaries. The Guardia de Honor forces were not limited by predetermined boundaries, but were limited to areas where they enjoyed popular support.

Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems

The community-based security forces used in the First District were “more in than out” in their degree of membership with the incorporation of traditional justice systems. BG Young and BG Bell did make some attempts to utilize traditional justice systems, but
these attempts were largely stopgap measures in the pursuit of achieving the ultimate goal of the adoption of a U.S. style justice system. Two areas indicate the preferences of the First District commanders concerning the use of traditional justice. The first is the reestablishment of the judicial system in 1900 and the second are the measures taken to limit misbehavior by the security forces.

While the Spanish justice system was not the traditional justice system of the inhabitants of the First District, it was the predominant judicial system in the Philippines for over 370 years. In a letter to President McKinley, BG Young expressed his opinion that it was best to keep the Spanish law code in place as, “the Spanish laws for the government of these people are very complete and if they had been honestly administered would have, with a few changes, given them and excellent government.”  

Young established civil courts based on Spanish law in two provinces by March of 1900 and allowed local mayors to act as arbiters in towns that did not have courts. Ultimately, Young sought to replace the Spanish criminal code with one derived from the U.S. criminal code, but was hesitant to move to swiftly because of a lack of local lawyers capable of interpreting and applying the U.S. system. Young’s opinions about the superiority of the U.S. legal code and the inability of Filipinos to operate effectively operate a legal system seem to be based mostly in his racist view that “many of these people are half savage and commit many violations of the laws and usages of civilized warfare, which render them liable to the extreme penalty prescribed.”  

This view led

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9 U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, Samuel B. M. Young Papers 1900, Box 1, Personal Correspondence
10 U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, Samuel B. M. Young Papers 1900, Box 1, Personal Correspondence
Young to believe that the Filipinos would have to be limited in their ability to operate a system of justice without oversight and tutoring by the U.S.

Local Sustainability and Accountability

The degree of membership for the First District with the condition of local sustainability and accountability is more in than out. The local police and scouts were reliant on funding outside of the district, while the auxiliary groups under Patajo were voluntary and did not receive external support. BG Young and BG Bell both stressed the importance of local sustainability and accountability through their written orders and by the control mechanisms; they implemented to achieve these goals.

On the same day, the First District command was created, General Young issued G.O. 43, which authorized the creation of civil governments and police forces. He stressed the importance of local sustainability to his officers and urged them to convince the populace that the burden of self-protection lay upon the individual towns. Between January and March 1900, Young supervised the election and installation of a presidente (mayor), town council and police forces in 63 towns (Linn 1989, 35). While the speed of creating local governments and the ignorance of local language and social dynamics hindered the creation of control mechanisms loyal to the central government and allowed the insurgents were able to install individuals sympathetic to their cause in many local governments, the importance of local sustainability is evident.

The local police forces in the First District were a mixed case of local sustainability. Young realized that many of the towns in the First District were too small or poor to bear the burden of fielding a police force large enough to confront a determined guerrilla force and therefore they needed outside support. In his
correspondence to President McKinley and other officials, he stressed the need to supplement local efforts with external support. The Philippine Commission echoed Young’s reservations by noting in its annual report to Congress,

"The towns, many of them, are so poor that it is impossible for them to support a large or even adequate police force. In order that the municipal police force should be effective against ladrones it is necessary that they be properly armed with rifles. In a town, however, which can only afford five or six municipal policemen, the distribution of rifles to the police only offers a temptation to large bands of ladrones to capture the police and take their rifles, this increasing the number of arms held by the ladrones" (Philippine Commission 1902, 33).

This issue of needing police forces to be able to defend themselves against insurgent threats created the quandary of how to create a constabulary larger than local economy could sustain, but to minimize the cost to the American taxpayer. The solution the Philippine Commission implemented was that while the supplemental funds for the police forces did come from outside the district, the funds were provided by the Filipino treasury, which the commission managed. So, while not sustainable by the local economy, the constabulary was limited by what the national economy could bear (Wollard 1975).

The forces under Patajo showed the greatest local sustainability. They received no outside support or even sanction from officials above the district level. Patajo, in his role as chief of detectives, received a monthly salary; his Guardia de Honor forces received no salary and therefore had to maintain independent means of generating income. While the Guardia de Honor members did receive a 30-peso bounty on all insurgent weapons and the advertised rate on all insurgents they captured, they did not

11 U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, Samuel B. M. Young Papers 1900, Box 1, Personal Corresponence
12 U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, Samuel B. M. Young Papers 1900, Box 1, Personal Corresponence
receive a salary for their efforts (Linn 1989, 43). Beyond these unpredictable sources of income, the only motivations for the Guardia de Honor members were their personal motivations to settle grudges against insurgents and their loyalty to their organization.

The case of the first district did not exhibit strong accountability to the local population. Of the three forces, the constabulary was most accountable to the local population. On May 22, 1900, BG Young issued Circular Letter Number 1, which mandated that local government register all of their male inhabitants and required all males traveling within the district to possess a travel card issued by the town mayor. The letter also delineated what constituted insurgent acts and held the local government responsible for enforcing the compliance with the instructions in the letter and for the actions of the local police force. This allowed local Army commanders to punish not only those who violated the law, but also local government officials (Linn 1989, 49). While not a formal mechanism for local civil oversight of the constabulary, it did provide the local inhabitants to report abuse by the constabulary to the local Army forces.

The Philippine scouts and the Guardia de Honor forces did not have any accountability to the local population. Beyond local ties, the Philippine Scouts, who worked directly for the U.S. Army had no mechanisms for local accountability. This led to the reports mentioned earlier of Macabebe scouts raping and pillaging towns in the first district when their U.S. Army commanders lost direct control of them.

The Guardia de Honor forces had even less controls over their actions. Although they also had local ties in the district, their first loyalty was to the Guardia de Honor society. This led to numerous abuses by Guardia forces after they assumed control of local government and sought to settle scores with insurgent sympathizers. This led to
several complaints by Philippine Commission representatives, Phelps Whitmarsh and Otto Scheerer, to their superiors in Manila.\textsuperscript{13} These complaints led William H. Taft, the head of the Philippine Commission to report to Secretary of War Elihu Root that U.S. commanders in the district had created “a system of terrorism by using a secret society” (Linn 1989, 45). While BG Bell did not head these warnings, and expanded the use of the Guardia de Honor, he did warn his subordinates in his Circular Letters Number 19 and 22 to investigate alleged abuses and to be wary of false denunciations of insurgent activity by those looking to settle old scores (Bell 1902).

Voluntary by Local Elites

The degree of membership of this case to the voluntary participation of local political leaders and violence specialists is mostly in. While there was some voluntary participation by local leaders, U.S. commanders used mostly coercive measures to gain the support of local elites. This reliance on coercive measures can be explained in part by the cultural racism held by most of the U.S. commanders. BG Young described the Filipinos as “suspicious people by nature” with inadequate education and native leadership (Young 1900, Box 1, Personal Correspondence).\textsuperscript{14} In Young’s estimation, this required the use of the coercive methods used by “Spanish and other European nations” to “inspire rebellious Asiatics, individually and collectively, with a greater fear of the reigning government than they had of the rebels” (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 3, 32).

\textsuperscript{13} U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, Samuel B. M. Young Papers 1900, Box 1, Personal Correspondence
\textsuperscript{14} U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, Samuel B. M. Young Papers 1900, Box 1, Personal Correspondence
The one case of voluntary participation of by a local elite was Crispulo Patajo. In March 1900, the presidente of Bauang turned Patajo over to the Americans under the pretense that he was a ladrone or bandit. Motivated by a desire for retribution against the insurgents, Patajo denounced the presidente as an insurgent and then offered to reveal all the insurgent leaders and infrastructure in the area (Linn 1989, 42). Reports from Young and his subordinates demonstrate that Patajo was an elite with considerable influence among the Guardia de Honor by his ability to rapidly raise hundreds of his supporters for no compensation beyond a small reward for captured insurgents and leaders (Ochosa 1989, 133).

Patajo appears to be the only elite of note who collaborated with U.S. forces without coercion. Coercion remained the main instrument used by U.S. commanders to gain the support of local leaders. BG Young believed that due to the hierarchical structure of Filipino society the elites were the key to winning the support of the population. He told his officers,

To successfully deal with the common people, the headman, the leaders, the principales are the ones we need to influence. The common hombre is dominated body and soul by his master. He is simply a blind tool, a poor downtrodden ignoramus, who does not know what is good for him and cannot believe an American. We cannot appeal to him direct. You can no more influence him by benevolent persuasion than you can fly. He is going to do whatever he is told to do by his master or his leaders, because he is incapable of doing anything else. Therefore, to succeed in our purpose, we must make it to the interest of his leaders to order and counsel him to do that which we want him to do. To bring this effort we must make the principale the object of our special study and effort (Bell 1902).

In the spirit of this guidance, the efforts by BG Bell revolved around making in it in the interest of local leaders to turn against the insurgency by punishing neutrality as heavily as active participation in the insurgency. Local leaders would be punished as
active members of the insurgency unless they demonstrated their support of the American cause. Bell ordered that, “the only acceptable and convincing evidence of the real sentiments of either individuals or town councils should be acts publicly performed as must inevitably commit them irrevocably to the side of the Americans by arousing the animosity and opposition of the insurgent element” (Bell 1902).

While this was the main strategy to compel the support of the local elites for the American effort, there were some other cases like that of Patajo. One such case was the use of the Filipino catholic clergy, who were opposed to the insurgent dominated Katipunan secret society. Through an Army chaplain, BG Young persuaded the local clergy to oversee a series of mass meetings in the spring of 1900. The priests led those who attended the meetings in taking the Oath of Allegiance to the U.S. and renunciation of the Katipunans. While the effectiveness of the oath taking ceremonies on decreasing the support for the insurgency is debatable, the act of presiding over the ceremonies forced the priests, a powerful force in Filipino society, to come off the fence on the side of the Americans (Linn 1989, 55).

Overall, U.S. commanders did not actively seek the voluntary participation of local elites in security efforts. Crispulo Patajo is the one exception to this trend and the efforts of his group were significant in dismantling the insurgency. Besides Patajo the efforts of the U.S. commanders in the district centered around coercing local elites into positions where they would have to support Washington or risk severe punishment at the hands of the Americans.
Conclusion

The case of the defeat of the insurgency in the First District, Department of Northern Luzon is a clear victory for the counterinsurgency forces that relied heavily on community-based security forces to overcome shortages in conventional forces. While some of the other cases examined in this dissertation will require more careful analysis to determine the overall contribution and effectiveness of community-based security forces, the contributions of the Guardia de Honor forces, along with the locally recruited scouts and constabulary, had distinct positive effects on the outcome. As the American commanders admitted, without the use of local forces, the United States would have been unable to locate, let alone defeat the insurgent forces. Other factors such as the outcome the 1900 U.S. presidential election and the capture of rebel leaders did reduce the strength of the insurgents, the rapid defeat of the insurgency in a three-month period can be linked to an expansion of the Guardia de Honor forces under BG Bell.

An interesting finding in this case is the apparent link between the level of external oversight and the limits to territorial jurisdiction. As noted in Table 3, American forces provided uneven, but high levels of oversight to local security forces, in particular forces that were used outside of their ethnic or social boundaries. It is somewhat intuitive that auxiliary or irregular forces without the discipline of regular forces either need to be controlled by ties to their local population or have direct supervision by regular forces. The Philippine scouts misbehaved when their supervision by their U.S. Army leaders broke down and subsequently were not allowed to operate without American leaders. Constabulary forces had American leaders and were limited in their operations outside
their communities, while the Guardia de Honor forces did not have American officers assigned to them, but were not employed outside of their areas of support.

As noted in Table 3, American commanders had little interest in incorporating traditional justice systems, except as a stopgap measure until an American style of justice could be introduced to the Philippines. It is unclear if this had any negative effect on security operations or if local leaders continued to implement traditional justice systems and American officers did not record these practices in their reports. A disdain for the Filipino justice system and Filipino elites led to U.S. efforts to coerce compliance rather than coopt existing systems or gain voluntary cooperation from elites.

Additionally, American commanders paid some attention to local sustainability and accountability at least on the national scale. The Philippine Scouts and Constabulary were both eventually paid from national revenues and were limited in size and equipment to levels that could be sustained by the national budget. The Guardia de Honor was sustained by local economies and local commanders supplemented the pay of members with performance based rewards such as bounties on captured insurgents and weapons. These groups were also accountable to the local population in an inverse proportion to the level of oversight provided by the American Army. This indicates a connection between external oversight and local accountability as dual methods to achieve control over security forces and mitigate abuse of the population.

This case also demonstrated some attributes of the voluntary participation of local leaders in security efforts. While the effectiveness of the Scouts and Constabulary were not tied to enlisting the efforts of local leaders, the cooption of the leader of the Guardia de Honor and the promotion of the Federal Party did assist in the effectiveness of security
operations conducted by the American Army. In the case of the Guardia de Honor, the benefits of possessing local knowledge and a pool of motivated and dedicated manpower proved to be an important factor in the final operations against insurgent forces.

Although there is little evidence in the historical record to measure security levels through economic, political and social development, the rapid defeat of the insurgency and the inability of the insurgents to recover from their defeat indicate that the United States was successful in its efforts to pacify the First District. In addition to providing an example of the relative importance of community-based security forces in the outcome of a counterinsurgency campaign, the case of the First District does demonstrate the relative importance of each factor presented in this dissertation’s model. In the following case studies, the connection established between external oversight and support and local sustainability and accountability will be explored as a potential modification of the existing model.

Table 3. Membership of First District, DNL with Community-Based Security Variables.

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<tr>
<th>Variable/Membership</th>
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CHAPTER V - SCOUTS AND AUXILIARIES

The Fourth District, Department of Northern Luzon

Introduction

This chapter will explore the use of community-based security forces in the Fourth District, Department of Northern Luzon during the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902. This case study will start with a brief overview of the aftermath of the Spanish American War in the Fourth District and the initial occupation by American forces. To set further the stage for a discussion of the role of community-based security forces, this chapter will discuss the nature of the Filipino insurgency in the Fourth District and the efforts of American commanders to quell it. After discussing the overall conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign and how American forces incorporated local security forces to defeat the insurgency, this case study will conduct a detailed discussion of the degree of membership this case demonstrates for each factor presented in this dissertation’s model. Finally, this case study concludes with a summation of the findings and an application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix.

The following examination of the Fourth District will show it demonstrated a high level of membership to the factors of external oversight and support as well as the cooption of local elites. Formed in April 1900, the Fourth District, Department of Northern Luzon experienced a low-level insurgency characterized by extreme acts of violence perpetrated by both sides of the conflict against each other and the civilian population. Faced with a shortage in American soldiers to provide security, the district commander, Brigadier General Frederick Funston, implemented a counterinsurgency plan that relied on leveraging the influence of elites in the district and the extensive use of
indigenous scout companies and irregular auxiliaries. This plan succeeded in defeating the insurgency in the district by the spring of 1901 and facilitated the capture of the national insurgent leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, by Funston.

While this case illustrates the importance of the previously mentioned factors of the model, the case of the Fourth District does not demonstrate adherence to incorporating traditional justice systems, but does demonstrate adherence to local accountability or sustainability through Funston’s reliance on community leaders providing locally equipped security forces and collective punishments for insurgent activity. The short duration of the Philippine Insurrection may be one reason why the other factors of the model played little part in the success of the American commanders’ use of community-based security forces to defeat the insurgency. Although there is little evidence in the historical record to measure security levels through economic, political and social development, the rapid defeat of the insurgency and the inability of the insurgents to recover from their defeat indicate that the United States was successful in its efforts to pacify the Fourth District.

One important fact to note in the presentation of this case study was the difficulty encountered in uncovering the extent and details of the use of indigenous forces from the archival record. Part of the difficulty lay in the reporting requirements established by the U.S. War Department. Having not been in a large-scale conflict since the Civil War, the systems and structure of reporting by commanders to civilian authorities was an ad hoc affair. The Congress required annual reports and periodic reports to oversight committees from each of the district commanders, but the format and content was left largely to the discretion of the commanders in the field.
Having entered the military at the start of hostilities with Spain, Frederick Funston was one of the best known combat leaders of the period, having earned the Medal of Honor for his actions against the Spanish in Cuba and for his early actions in the Philippines. In addition to being a brilliant and self-taught combat commander, Funston was a somewhat shameless self-promoter (S. C. Miller 1982, 168-169). This penchant for self-promotion colored much of the reporting that emanated from the Fourth District and his memoirs. While a large community-based security program comprised of both Ilocano Scouts and auxiliary forces existed in the Fourth District, Funston’s reporting focused on his more dramatic exploits. For example, in Funston’s annual report to Congress for the period July 1900 to June 1901, Funston mentioned no other activity other than his successful operation in March 1901 to capture the national insurgent leader Emilio Aguinaldo. During this period, Funston’s forces raised 15 companies of indigenous fighters, dismantled insurgent support networks, and defeated the main insurgent units in the district. None of these are mentioned in his reports and receive scant attention in his memoirs.

While Funston did not record his plan or its results as thoroughly as other professionally trained commanders during Philippine Insurrection, the data that is available shows that community-based security forces were critical in Funston’s operations. The use of local security forces to secure the population allowed Funston to use his regular forces as mobile raiding elements that could attack guerrilla forces wherever they concentrated. Community-based security units and sympathetic local elites prevented the insurgents from establishing shadow governments and support networks in population centers. Additionally, Funston’s cooption of local elites and use
of community security organizations facilitated his most daring operation, the capture of
the national insurgency leader, Emilio Aguinaldo. While Funston ignored some elements
of the community-based security model, such as establishing local governments or police
forces, Funston’s use of Filipino auxiliaries demonstrated adherence to several of the
conditions presented by the model.

Background

The Fourth District was comprised of the provinces of Nueva Ecija and Principe
in the northeastern section of the island of Luzon and held a population of 130,000 in an
area of 2,040 miles. The area had been a center of revolutionary activity against the
Spanish in the 1890s and produced many of the top leaders and soldiers in the Republican
Army. The population was divided among three ethnic groups; the Tagalogs and
Papangans in the south and Ilocanos in the north. Of these three groups, the Tagalogs
were the most active supporters of the insurgency, although their support was tepid at
best and they were divided among several competing factions (Linn 1989, 66).

Of the two provinces, Nueva Ecija was the more important of the two, with 95
percent of the population. In addition, the province produced a large amount of the rice
consumed throughout the Island of Luzon making it critical for the overall economy
(Linn 1989, 64-65). Therefore, control of Nueva Ecija became a key objective for both
the U.S. and insurgent leaders and most of the fighting occurred in this province.

In December 1899, when BG Funston took command of the newly formed Fourth District
he had 2,400 soldiers and one company of Macabebe Scouts spread out across the district
(U.S. War Department 1899-1902, I:4:263, 217-38, 262-288). This gave Funston a
security force to population ratio of 18:1000 during the height of the insurgency. While
this is close to the minimum 20:1,000 ratio suggested by COIN literature, these ratios are deceptive. The force was spread out over a large area in small garrison outposts without the ability to provide mutual support between garrisons or an offensive force to strike into insurgent strongholds. The majority of his force could not speak the local language adequately to communicate with the population and at any given time during this period, approximately 12 percent of his force was medically unfit for duty at any given time due to infection by tropical disease and injury (United States Army 1899-1902, 2263, LS BK 1, LS 398). Additionally, Funston was forced to send a quarter of his force to the neighboring Fifth District in May and June 1900 to assist in efforts to recover American prisoners captured during an insurgent ambush of an American patrol (Funston 1911, 348-354). Throughout Funston’s tenure of command in 1900 to June 1901, he was faced with the conundrum of possessing too few troops to secure population centers and the need to take the offensive against insurgent bands in the mountainous regions of the district.

Unlike the intense fighting occurring throughout the First District of the Department of Northern Luzon after the dissolution the Filipino Republican Army during the period from November 1900 to June 1901, the insurgency in Fourth District took on different and deceiving characteristics. According to the district commander, Brigadier General (BG) Frederick Funston,

The country was so quiet that it was deemed safe to make the trip without escort, though we took the precaution to carry carbines in addition to our revolvers…The condition of the country seemed perfectly normal, the towns being full of people and the usual work going on in the field. There was not a sign of the war to be seen, though there had been brisk campaigning through this region… If anyone imagines that this was a

15 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/2263, United States Army 1899-1902, Letters Sent (LS) Book 1, LS 398
desolated country, with the inhabitants fleeing to the woods and mountains for shelter, he is entitled to imagine again. The tendency of the people was to flock to the garrisoned towns for shelter from their own ruthless countrymen, they have no fear of the troops. I have no doubt that in the year 1900 Nueva Ecija raised as much rice as it ever did; at least all suitable land was in suitable cultivation. And yet there was a nasty little war going on all of the time. It was certainly an odd state of affairs (Funston 1911, 314-315).

What Funston observed was a weak guerrilla army that struggled to create the shadow government and civilian support network needed to sustain a viable insurgent movement. Between the months of December 1899 to March 1900, the insurgent leaders attempted to establish these support structures using acts of terror and intimidation of local leaders and the population as an expedient to gain acquiescence of the population, if not their support.

The insurgency was initially led by General Panteleon Garcia who was ill and hid for most of 1900 and his subordinate Colonel Pablo Padilla. According to Funston, “neither of these men were of much force and energy and both were soon captured” but they were succeeded in the fall of 1900 by Brigadier General Urbano Lacuna, “a man much more capable than either of them” (Funston 1911, 318). While Lacuna was more dynamic than his predecessors, he had to spend much of his time building the combat strength and support systems necessary to fight American forces on a large scale. Therefore, insurgent actions were mainly comprised of ambushes and sniping throughout the majority of the hostilities.

Part of the reason for the weakness of the insurgency in Nueva Ecija was that the province had produced several of the national leaders of the insurgency who focused their efforts at the national level and fought with the Republican Army during the 1899 to 1900 campaigns. As Linn (1989, 66) notes it is possible that because the strongest and
most charismatic local leaders were absent during the brief Philippine Republic
government of 1899, a strong insurgent infrastructure and shadow government were not
established before the occupation by the U.S. Army. Additionally, national leaders such
as Manuel Tinio took their supporters to fight in the battles for control of the more
strategically important population centers in the First District during the guerrilla actions
of 1900 and 1901 (Linn 1989, 66).

While the insurgent force was weak during the first few months of 1900, it was
still able to continue a harassment campaign against small and isolated U.S. forces and
intimidation and assassination against pro-U.S. local leaders (Linn 1989, 64). During this
period, Funston admitted the difficulty of “exterminating the enemy,” because “when
pursued too closely, they hid (sic) their rifles and scatter to their homes, and no longer
wear uniforms or a distinctive insignia but use the dress of noncombatants of the country”
(S. C. Miller 1982, 143). A stalemate emerged during this period, with U.S. forces
incapable of identifying insurgents because of cultural and linguistic barriers and neither
side powerful enough to hold lasting control over the population or strike a decisive blow
against the other side.

This stalemate during the winter of 1900 broke in March when the regular
insurgent forces attempted to stage several large conventional attacks against U.S. forces
requiring him to abandon several population centers to concentrate his forces to blunt the
attacks. While Funston was successful in defeating or spoiling the insurgent attacks,
these actions took his forces away from securing the population and allowed the
insurgents space to organize and launch attacks (Linn 1989, 70-71). Despite the respite
brought by the monsoon season in the summer of 1900, Funston faced an invigorated
guerrilla force under a new more competent insurgent leader, Lacuna, with a force that was too small to conduct major operations against insurgent strongholds while maintaining control of population centers.

While the introduction of Lacuna and 200 insurgent fighters from outside the district invigorated insurgent forces enough for several large-scale attacks, the insurgency still faced the hurdles of a weak support system and shadow governments (Funston 1911, 318). Lacuna was a native of Nueva Ecija and set out upon his arrival in the district to remedy these deficiencies. He was largely unsuccessful in these attempts because of Funston’s intelligence network and local auxiliaries who dismantled the networks before they could embed themselves in the population (Linn 1989, 72). During this period, he also changed the military strategy of the guerrillas by abandoning further direct confrontation with U.S. Army forces and adopting an expanded hit and run strategy of ambushes and sniping that would build insurgent morale while his agents built local support networks (U.S. War Department 1899-1902, 19 May, I: 7:120). While Lacuna struggled to overcome initial shortcomings, he was successful in coalescing the insurgency into a unified command that could coordinate operations within the framework of a sustainable strategy and wait until an opportunity to strike arose (Linn 1989, 72).

This opportunity occurred in the late summer of 1900 when Funston’s forces that had been temporarily assigned to other districts had yet to return and the monsoon limited the maneuverability of American heavy infantry. Lacuna launched several large attacks on population centers during this period, but these attacks were defeated. Funston credited his success to the district’s indigenous intelligence network, the support of local
elites and local auxiliary forces who Funston noted functioned better than U.S. forces in the monsoon and knew the terrain (Funston 1911, 318). This operational defeat and the resulting loss of insurgent manpower and weapons in the district forced Lacuna to fall back on terrorist campaigns to force local leaders to support the insurgency. In November, insurgent leaders extended this strategy to the entire population and guerrilla forces conducted large-scale reprisals on entire towns not supporting the insurgency.

This strategy backfired on the insurgents, losing them the support of the population and inducing the population to seek refuge in towns garrisoned by the Americans and creating a humanitarian crisis that Funston called “pitiable” (Funston 1911, 373). Funston was quick to capitalize on the extreme measures of the insurgents and used the dissatisfaction of local elites and segments of the population to enlist the population in the fight against the insurgents.

Under BG Funston, a self-taught soldier with only three years in uniform, U.S. forces in the district developed a counterinsurgency strategy of pitting the local elites against the insurgents and using local auxiliary forces to secure population centers and to use local knowledge to locate and destroy insurgent units. This strategy overcame shortages in American security force personnel and allowed Funston to use American and local scouts as mobile strike groups to destroy guerrilla units outside of population centers. While Funston lacked the staff training necessary to produce an articulated counterinsurgency strategy, he did intuitively seize upon several of the conditions present in the district to apply several of the factors in the community-based security model to his advantage.
One of those opportunities was an existing tension between ethnic groups within the district. The most significant ethnic rift existed between the Tagalog, who dominated the insurgency and Ilocano, who were immigrants to the province. Socioeconomic tensions between the groups had been simmering across Luzon and were enflamed when the national insurgent leader Emilio Aguinaldo executed the Ilocano insurgent leader and Commander in Chief of the Republican Army, Antonio Luna, in June 1900. This rift between the Tagalog and Ilocano provided a large segment of the population ready to turn against the insurgency (Sexton 1939, 166 and Funston 1911).

Colonel Lyman W. V. Kennon, commander of the Thirty-fourth Infantry, spearheaded the efforts to raise local scout and auxiliary units from the Ilocano population in the district. The self-titled “Father of the Ilocanos,” Kennon forged a relationship with the Ilocano community early in 1899 when he used Ilocano prisoners of war as a labor force to build a local transportation network. Kennon’s humane treatment of the Ilocanos helped him build close ties with the local Ilocano leader, Francisco Madrid, who was assassinated in January 1900 by insurgents (Congress 1902, 1001). The death of Madrid and then Luna in June 1900 dissolved any remaining support the Ilocano in the district had for the insurgency. In the subsequent months, Kennon succeeded in leveraging these grievances and his personal relationship with Ilocano to raise a significant local security force.

In addition to Kennon’s relationship with the Ilocanos, one of the other probable reasons for the success in raising local security forces was Funston’s treatment of the local population. In contrast to the insurgent practice of individual and collective reprisals, Funston employed relatively humane practices designed to win the support of
the population, especially local elites. As the insurgency wore on, Funston continued to soften his treatment of the population in areas contested by the insurgents. For example, in 1900, Funston ordered the arrest of the local chief and the burning of houses near an insurgent attack, but by January 1901, Funston threatened reprisals only if attacks repeated after a warning. As a result, Funston reported that attacks on telegraph wires had reduced and were down to probably three or four times a month, which is not bad considering the district was in a state of war. It is always done by a small band and usually in an uninhabited locality. It is improbable that they remain anywhere in the vicinity and hunting down the three or four men who have probably done it is a very futile performance. I cannot see the expediency of burning the barrios in the vicinity of where a wire has been cut as the damage is almost invariably done by people from elsewhere. I think the unarmed and defenseless people in the barrios could not prevent wire cutting if they were so disposed.16

Compared to the insurgent commander’s “most relentless policy” of group retribution and assassination for those who aided the Americans, whose savagery Funston said caused “cold chills” to creep over him and resulted in the burning of several towns, Funston’s policy of humane treatment drew the population toward active conflict with the insurgency in early 1901 (Funston 1911, 356, 374).

At the urging of Kennon, Funston received permission in June 1900 to raise a company of fifty scouts as a stopgap to mitigate impending U.S. troop reductions due to pending expiration of enlistments that summer. Once Kennon had demonstrated to Funston that the Ilocano were reliable allies in early 1900, Funston became a strong supporter of the Ilocano Scouts calling them “splendid marchers and fighters were as trustworthy as the Macabebes, and that is saying a great deal” (Funston 1911, 319).

16 U.S. National Archives RG 395/2263, box 4, 3 Jan 1901, Department of Northern Luzon.
Funston again received permission to increase the number of scouts in the district to 150 by July 1900, and 240 by October 1900. By December 1900 they were increased to 480, and the Department of Northern Luzon authorized them to be divided into four companies of 120 in February 1901 by Special Order 19. (U.S. Army 1901, Part 1, Vol 3, 312).

While Funston obtained permission for a large increase in the number of scouts over a six-month period, Kennon continued to push Funston throughout 1900 to increase the number and often exceeded the scope of his orders in his use of the Ilocano (Linn 1989, 81). By January 1901, Kennon had raised 15 companies of native scouts, each with between 100 and 120 members (U.S. Army 1901, Part 2, Vol I, 74 and Part 1, Vol 3, 74). It is not clear from official correspondence how Kennon paid or equipped these additional scout companies or why he was not questioned about the discrepancy between the authorized number of scouts and the number of companies listed on Fourth District unit lists. Linn (1989, 81), assumes Kennon financed some of these forces by accounting for them as laborers or guides and interpreters to U.S. units. What is clear is that the Fourth District raised almost half of the 31 native scout companies in the four districts Department of Northern Luzon and a third more than the next closest district. By doing this Kennon increased the overall strength of the security forces available to Funston by 60 percent. The scout’s effectiveness was not only numerical. Their ability to identify insurgents among the population and knowledge of the local terrain increased the effectiveness of security operations to the point that in December 1900 Funston reported that the scouts had captured more insurgent weapons than his regular forces (Linn 1989, 82).
Another aspect of Funston’s COIN strategy was the cooption of the elites within the district. While he did not articulate this as part of his plan, he was aware of the benefit the support of local elites afforded his efforts in defeating the insurgents, stating in his memoirs:

One of the unique features of this period of the war (1901), at least so far in the Fourth District was concerned was the pleasant social relations between the officers of the American garrisons and the better class of the people in the towns. We would often come back to San Isidro from a raid into the bosque, and that same evening attend a baile or other social function given at the home of some prominent resident (Funston 1911, 355).

In addition to building social relations with the local elites of the district, he also made great efforts to maintain elites in their positions and incorporate them into the new American organized government, even if they had served in the insurgent government. These efforts included forgiving or overlooking coerced and reluctant support of the insurgents by elites, often inviting a local leader to his headquarters and telling him “the amount of his latest contribution and the date thereof, and then allowed to go, it being known that most of the people were acting under compulsion” (Funston 1911, 373). In addition to indicating the penetration of the insurgent network by Funston’s intelligence service, Funston’s lenient treatment of local elites demonstrated his willingness to bring them into the new political order without their having to fear a loss of stature or power.

Funston’s building of relationships with the elite and trusting them to guide their people in the defense of their communities started to produce results by 1901. Representative of several similar cases, the elite of Nueva Ecija grew tired of the fighting in January 1901 and formally supported the Americans, declaring to the insurgents that local auxiliaries would fight them if they entered the village. Funston reported to the
Department of Northern Luzon commander that elites were shifting their allegiance and a “very decided tendency to actively aid us” was developing in the district.\textsuperscript{17} By February 1901, at least ten towns, including the major population centers, had formed vigilante groups that killed or captured several insurgents and turned their weapons over to American forces (Linn 1989, 75). As demonstrated by these examples, Funston was not interested in developing local governance during the height of the insurgency, but he did use existing elites and power structures to control community-based security forces in his district.

In addition to securing population centers, Funston relied heavily on his indigenous scouts during his offensive operations in 1901. In addition to knowledge of the local terrain and local contacts, the scouts could maneuver in the dense and swampy terrain of the district better than American forces (Funston 1911, 318). Funston leveraged these qualities and their ability to blend in with the population and the insurgents in several covert missions designed to surprise insurgent forces, including his most successful mission, which resulted in the capture of the overall insurgent leader, Emilio Aguinaldo.

Funston’s capture of Emilio Aguinaldo is instructive of not only Funston’s daring and flare for the dramatic, but also key aspects of the community-based security apparatus that he created in 1900. On February 8, 1901, a small group of insurgents carrying dispatches for Aguinaldo was presented to an American garrison by the mayor of a Pantabagan. A local auxiliary force that detained the group had turned them over to the mayor who had switched his allegiance to the Americans. The mayor convinced the

\textsuperscript{17} U.S. National Archives. RG 395/2263, Box 1. United States Army 1899-1902

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leader of the insurgent group of the hopelessness of his cause and to turn himself over to the Americans (Funston 1911, 384-386; Sexton 1939, 233 and 260; and MacArthur 1901, 57-58).

The leader of the insurgents, an Ilocano named Cecilio Segismundo, assisted Funston and his staff to decipher the letters and divulged the location of the guerilla leader’s base. After deciphering the letters that directed four insurgent leaders in Nueva Ecija to each send him 100 men, Funston developed a plan to capture Aguinaldo. Funston devised a plan to infiltrate Aguinaldo’s base with 80 indigenous scouts acting as guerillas and four American officers, including himself, acting as prisoners. He convinced Segismundo to accompany the group to act as a guide and to provide the necessary signals and passwords to infiltrate the rings of security around the base (Funston 1911, 391-392 and Sexton 1939, 261).

On March 6, 1901, after a month of planning, the group embarked on a Navy gunboat to infiltrate closer to the insurgent base and bypass several layers of insurgent security. The group was comprised of four Americans, 80 scouts dressed as insurgents, the insurgent Segismundo, and three other insurgent leaders who had switched their allegiance to the Americans. Over the course of two weeks, the group bluffed its way through insurgent checkpoints using forged letters and passwords provided by the former insurgents. On March 23, 1901, the group infiltrated Aguinaldo’s camp and the former insurgents, not the Americans, seized Aguinaldo and took him prisoner (Funston 1911; Sexton 1939, 262-264 and U.S. Army 1901, Part 1, Vol IV, Appendix D, 130).

The mission that captured Aguinaldo demonstrates several aspects of Funston’s counterinsurgency plan for the Fourth District. The capture of Aguinaldo’s messages by
a local auxiliary force, coupled with other anecdotal evidence of local security forces capturing and executing insurgents, gives some idea of the level of mobilization of the population to provide their own security.\textsuperscript{18} The second aspect the raid illustrates is the cooption of local elites in the fight against the insurgency. The mayor of the town where the insurgents had been captured had served in that position for the insurgency and had changed his allegiance after the American occupation (Funston 1911, 387). Finally, the raid would never have been possible unless Funston had a high degree of faith in the allegiance of the local scouts and the former insurgents who had been incorporated into the American-backed system.

By July 1901, the main insurgent groups and leaders had all been captured or had surrendered and the Philippine Commission and BG Funston deemed the key province of Nueva Ecija sufficiently free of violence and organized to be declared pacified and pass under the control of a civil governor (Philippine Commission 1902, 13). Funston had ignored the establishment of civil governments or police forces until after the insurgency had been defeated. The removal of U.S. Army forces and rapid expansion of the Philippine Constabulary in Nueva Ecija from 36 in June 1901 to 159 provides some evidence of the success of pacification efforts (Philippine Commission 1901, 387 and Philippine Commission 1902, Vol X, Part 1, 190). The activities of the constabulary, which patrolled 19,586 miles and encountered no insurgent activity while capturing from individuals 23 rifles, four pistols, and stolen livestock and property is indicative of the overall reduction of violence and the level of security existing in the district. (Philippine Commission 1902, Vol X, Part 1, 193)

\textsuperscript{18} U.S. National Archives. RG 395/2263, box 4. United States Army 1899-1902
External Support and Oversight

General Funston and Colonel Kennon provided considerable support and oversight for the Native Scout companies raised in the Fourth District. Colonel Kennon learned early in 1899 of the value of using local security forces to combat the insurgency and the reliability of the Ilocanos in northern Nueva Ecija. As an early advocate for raising companies of scouts from the Ilocano, Kennon earned the nickname, “Father of the Ilocanos” and created friction between himself and his superiors who were more skeptical of using local security forces (Linn 1989, 81). The scouts in the district were equipped almost at the level of a U.S. soldier. Each member of the scouts was provided with a somewhat antiquated Springfield rifle, a .45 caliber pistol and ammunition (Wollard 1975, 68). Additionally, each member of the scouts was paid $40 a month and provided with standard U.S. Army rations (Wollard 1975, 67). The provision of this material support in a district that maintained tenuous lines of supply, demonstrates a desire by Kennon and Funston to maintain the operational effectiveness and morale of the Scouts.

Another demonstration of the commitment of Kennon and Funston to the scout program was in the area of manpower support, which also provided a high level of oversight. For each of the Native Scout companies two officers had to be detailed from their normal duties in Army units to command them. This was a burden for a district that was shorthanded at the start of the insurgency and had U.S. companies assigned to the district with regimental headquarters in other districts (Linn 1989, 70). This meant that officers in direct command of soldiers conducting counterinsurgency operations had to be
taken away from Kennon’s combat units and not culled from officers engaged in staff work in headquarters units (Funston 1911, 319).

It is difficult to determine the extent of support of oversight and support beyond these basic measures, but there are indications it was extensive. Kennon exceeded the 250 scouts authorized by General MacArthur, the commander of the Division of the Philippines in January 1901 by at least a thousand if the number of companies formed during this period were manned to the prescribed levels. Also, Kennon formed several auxiliary forces comprised of Ilocanos to augment American garrisons and as local militias. Kennon does not mention any indigenous leadership or organizational structure for these forces and only mentions the use of auxiliary forces obliquely in reports of operations in his area, so their organization and reporting mechanisms are unclear. However, in these dispatches, Kennon refers to “Ilocanos” (auxiliaries), who conducted combined combat operations with U.S. forces that killed or captured insurgents, so it is not unreasonable to assume that Kennon provided these forces with some sort of weaponry without the permission of his superiors.19

Another indication of the level of oversight provided by U.S. forces is that while scouts and auxiliary forces were used throughout the district, no complaints were recorded against these forces in either military or civil records. This is in direct contrast with the level and number of complaints lodged against the scout and the Guardia Civil forces in the First District.20 This indicates that unlike in the First District, U.S. officers

19 U.S. National Archives RG 395/3248, Letters Sent 83, 94, and 142, United States Army 1899-1902; and Kennon to Adjutant General 4th District DNL Letters 7 and 8, 30 June 1900.
20 U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, Samuel B. M. Young Papers 1900, Box 1, Personal Correspondence.
assigned to scout units or to oversee auxiliary units did not lose contact with their indigenous forces or allow them to harass the population.

**Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction**

Funston displayed little inclination to limit the operational areas of the indigenous forces that were under his direct control and this case demonstrated a “mostly out” degree of membership with this factor. In his memoirs, he relates numerous instances of using Ilocano Scouts throughout the district on quick striking raids to destroy enemy forces, but usually with American soldiers supervising them. In fact, Funston regularly used the scouts outside the boundaries of their communities in covert operations. In these operations, the scouts were used in areas where their identities would be unknown and they could pass as insurgents to enter guerrilla strongholds (Funston 1911). This also appears to be the case for auxiliary forces with the only restraint on their employment or area of operations being the extent of their knowledge of the local terrain (Congress 1902, 1001).

**Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems**

During his command of the Fourth District, Funston showed little interest in developing local governance or judicial structures. Until the summer of 1901, Funston did not attempt to establish any civil government and only later as one of the steps to turn control over to the Philippine Commission (Philippine Commission 1902, Vol X, Part 1, 193). In contrast to attempting to allow local justice systems to exercise control, Funston steadfastly employed the military justice system in the district. One case that occurred in March 1900 demonstrated Funston’s desire to keep the judiciary in the hands of military officials.
After capturing two officers from the insurgent army who were suspected of torturing and killing several local scouts, Funston ordered an immediate execution under the authority of General Order 100 that authorized martial law and the administration of military justice. His response that although “this recital will cause cold chills to chase themselves up and down the spinal columns of a good number of people…so that it might be as well to state that this execution was absolutely legal as any that ever-followed trial by jury. If I had taken the two men to San Isidro, I could not have legally executed them and they would have to await the results of a trial…The moral effect of this summary action was most beneficial” (Funston 1911, 333). This case and the previously mentioned episodes of town leaders turning over insurgents to military officials indicates that little effort was made to incorporate traditional justice systems into indigenous security organizations.

Local Sustainability and Accountability

The Filipino forces raised by the U.S. in the first district can be divided into two groups, the Native Scouts and local auxiliaries. These groups had different sources of funding and levels of accountability to the populace. This produced a mixed result in the case of the Fourth district with membership in this category being more out than in. The Native Scouts raised in the district were not sustainable by the local economy and external funding sources were necessary. During the height of the insurgency from the fall of 1900 to the spring of 1901, the funding for the scouts came exclusively from external sources. By January 1901, U.S. commanders in the district raised 15 Native Scout companies, which were all paid and equipped by the U.S. Army using U.S. Army funds and weapons shipped from the United States until July 1901 when insular funds
were used to pay salaries and (Wollard 1975, 66-68). It is unlikely that the largely agrarian economy the district could have fielded and supported a force of this size without outside assistance.

The Native Scouts were also largely unaccountable to the local population. Commanded by U.S. Army officers, the scouts reported to the military chain of command to the district commander. However, there was a check to the behavior of individual scout members. At the time of enlistment, each enlistee had to present the recommendation of the presidente of his home barrio and the local official was held responsible for guaranteeing the character and reputation of the enlistee.21 This recommendation also carried the potential threat that if a scout deserted or committed a crime, his local leader would bear some of the responsibility and the community would lose face.

For the local auxiliaries, nothing is recorded discussing accountability to the local populace or considerations of local sustainability. It can be assumed that since these forces were organic to the towns that organized them and they received no regular pay from American forces, auxiliary forces were sized to a level that would permit the normal functioning of the local economy. Additionally, since these forces were organized as a popular response to excesses by the insurgents, it is reasonable to assume they were attuned to the needs of the local population, even if it is unclear what type of accountability mechanisms constrained their actions. This assumption is supported by General Funston’s reliance on local elites to maintain order and his punishment of elites and collective punishments of communities where insurgent activities occurred. This use

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21 U.S. National Archives, RG 407/314, Box 73, Adjutant General Order, Department of Northern Luzon, January 20, 1901.
of collective policing of communities indicates a reliance on collective acceptance of local security forces and security measures. This indicates a “more out than in” degree of membership with this factor.

Voluntary Participation by Local Elites

This case possesses full degree of membership with the factors of involvement of local elites and oversight and support. Funston carefully cultivated his relationship with local elites. In addition to developing social relationships with local leaders, he was successful in coopting them into the security framework of the district. By overlooking coerced contributions to the insurgency, he allowed the existing elites to remain in power. The elites of the district responded to this treatment and the violent repression of the insurgents by forming community security forces and actively turning against the insurgents.

The effect of elite collaboration was ruinous for the insurgency. In June 1900, a captured report from an insurgent leader decried, “the disastrous moral effect produced in the situation of the country by the innumerable voluntary and other surrenders of prominent persons who filled important offices under the revolution” (Philippine Insurgent Records 1900). In addition to preventing the insurgents from establishing a shadow government or support network, elites loyal to the Americans prevented insurgent movement within the towns of the district and actively sought to turn insurgents away from their cause as in the case of the insurgent courier who participated in the capture of Aguinaldo.
Conclusion

While Brigadier General Frederick Funston did not articulate a coherent counterinsurgency plan, perhaps because of his lack of military training, the case of the 3rd District, DSL was successful. Funston established local security with community security forces, freeing American forces from static defensive duties and enabling them to conduct raids deep into enemy territory. Indigenous forces produced improved local security, allowing communities to recover from the conflict, but without concerted assistance from the Americans. This produced a “Mostly In” degree of success. The counterinsurgency strategy that grew out of his instinctual assessment of the situation in the Fourth District evolved as a definable course of action. Reflected in Table 4, his plan relied on coopting elites in the district to organize their constituents in their own defense and to use existing ethnic rifts to raise indigenous scout companies and irregular auxiliaries. Prone to daring action, Funston focused on bold offensive action, in the course of which he relied heavily on indigenous forces. Funston’s gamble to allow his forces to expand the use of indigenous forces beyond the scope of his authority, demonstrates his reliance on indigenous security forces to defeat the insurgency and establish security in the district. To undertake his mobile operations with his regular forces he relied on auxiliaries and local elites to secure population centers and disrupt guerrilla support activities. This plan succeeded in defeating the insurgency in the district by the spring of 1901 and facilitated the capture of the national insurgent leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, by Funston.

While the details of how Funston organized and managed community-based security forces are not as well documented as other cases, the available data does show
that community-based security forces were critical in the success of Funston’s operations. As shown in Table 4, this case demonstrated mixed adherence to the factors presented in the community-based security model. Funston and his subordinate Colonel Kennon raised many more local security force units than other districts. As reflected in Table 4, they provided high levels of support and oversight to the forces they raised, especially to Ilocano scout companies. This case demonstrates mixed adherence to limits to territorial jurisdictions as Funston used the scouts and auxiliary forces throughout the district and did not place territorial boundaries on their operations, while there is no indication that other local security forces operated outside their ethnic or community boundaries. While using scout units outside of their communities was often a critical aspect in Funston’s covert operations to infiltrate insurgent strongholds, as seen in other cases, high levels of oversight by regular security forces offset any potential issues encountered by using indigenous security forces outside of their traditional territorial boundaries.

While he supported and monitored indigenous forces, Funston paid little attention to the long-term development of security structures. He was an ambitious officer who carefully cultivated his public persona as a dashing commander by focusing his attention on daring offensive operations to defeat the insurgency and as noted in Table 4, he paid little attention to linking local security forces to local governance structures. Other than the scout units funded by the national military command, Funston and his subordinates were forced to make local security forces sustainable by communities beyond providing them with weapons and ammunition. This provides a mixed case of sustainability and accountability with scout units operating completely independent of their local
communities and local elites responsible for the sustainment and accountability of the remainder of the indigenous security forces.

As the chart in Table 4 indicates, and alluded to above, Funston assiduously cultivate his relationship with local elites and sought incorporate them into the security apparatus of the district as an expedient to defeating the insurgents. These efforts rewarded him with allies in the Filipino elite, especially among the Ilocanos, who organized their constituents into local security forces that prevented the insurgents from developing an effective support network in the district. While his efforts were critical in defeating the insurgency, he also benefitted from the weakness of the insurgent groups he was fortunate that the insurgency was weak in manpower and organization in the district and lacked the support structures necessary for maintaining a long-term struggle. This weakness led the insurgents to resort to intimidation of the population, which further accelerated popular disaffection with the insurgent cause and drove the elites and minority Ilocano to support the American cause.

Although there is little evidence in the historical record to measure security levels through economic, political and social development, the rapid defeat of the insurgency and the inability of the insurgents to recover from their defeat indicate that the United States was successful in its efforts to pacify the Fourth District. In addition to providing an example of the relative importance of community-based security forces in the outcome of a counterinsurgency campaign, the case of the First District also demonstrates the relative importance of each factor presented in this dissertation’s model.
Table 4. 
Membership of Fourth District, DNL with Community-Based Security Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/Membership</th>
<th>Fully In</th>
<th>Mostly In</th>
<th>More In Than Out</th>
<th>More Out Than In</th>
<th>Mostly Out</th>
<th>Fully Out</th>
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<td>External Support and Oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limits to territorial jurisdiction</td>
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<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Local sustainability and accountability</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Voluntary participation by local elites</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
CHAPTER VI - COUNTERINSURGENCY ON A SHOESTRING:

The Third District, Department of Southern Luzon, the Philippine War 1899-1903

Introduction

This chapter will explore the use of community-based security forces in the Third District, Department of Southern Luzon during the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902. This case study will start with a brief overview of the aftermath of the Spanish American War in the Philippines and the initial occupation by American forces in the Bicol region of Southern Luzon. This chapter will discuss the nature of the Filipino insurgency in the Third District and the efforts of American commanders to quell it. After providing an overview of the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign and the use of local security forces to defeat the insurgency, this case study will include a detailed discussion of the degree of membership this case demonstrates for each factor presented in this dissertation’s model. Finally, this case study concludes with a summation of the findings and an application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix. As this case study will demonstrate, while efforts to field local security forces were hampered by a lack of material support from higher commands, the use of community-based security forces proved essential to defeating the insurgency by 1903.

This case study highlights the importance of external support and oversight and gaining the voluntary support of local elites when attempting to use community-based security forces. Throughout the period covered in this case study, the Department of Southern Luzon and the national command failed to support efforts of local commanders to field community-based security forces by withholding the arms and funds. The limited supply of arms and equipment prevented American commanders from using indigenous
forces to augment the limited number of American troops in an offensive role or to free up American forces from static defensive roles. This case study will show that this failure lengthened the duration of the insurgency, which lasted a year longer than it did in other districts.

Despite limited external support, American commanders in the Third District were successful in coopting local elites and using the influence of elites to raise and regulate local security forces. Due to limited sources of supply and funding, American leaders relied on the use of intangible sources of power such as building the prestige of local elites to co-opt them. The use of intangible sources of power coupled with granting local elites with a high level of decision making authority to regulate their communities and dispense available resources, American commanders provided elites with the tools necessary to recruit community-based security forces. Using these methods, American commanders expanded their control over the population while expending small amounts of resources.

By necessity American commanders also demonstrated high levels of adherence to the factors of local accountability and traditional justice systems. American commanders granted local leaders and clergy wide latitude in organizing their communities and regulating the lives of the population. American commanders also adhered by necessity with the factor of limits to territorial jurisdiction as they did not have the means to raise independent scout companies able to conduct independent operations outside local community support networks.

This case also demonstrates a high degree of membership in the areas of traditional systems of justice and local sustainability. Due to limited manpower and
resources, American commanders chose to leave the existing legal codes in place as a means of gaining popular support for the new local governments and because it required the least amount of oversight by American forces. Additionally, limited external funding required all functions of local government, including the provisioning of security, to be sustainable by the local tax base. Throughout the district, American commanders allowed local leaders to decide the level of taxation their communities could bear and the number of security personnel was based off of that calculation and the local security threat.

While the conclusion of the insurrection in the Third District was not marked with a defeat of insurgents in a climactic battle, the piecemeal surrender of insurgents in the period of 1901-1902 and the end of insurgent activity by 1903 marks this case as a successful counterinsurgency operation. Unlike the other Philippine Insurrection cases used in this dissertation, the effect of community-based security forces can be seen as the decisive element in defeating the insurgency. Outside events such as the surrender of national insurgent leaders had little effect on the intensity of the insurgency and organized resistance ended only after the population was organized to defend against insurgent influence.

Background

After the rapid defeat of the Spanish Army and Navy by U.S. military forces and their erstwhile Filipino revolutionary allies in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the U.S. Army settled into an occupation of the Philippine Islands. The occupation force was tasked with the mission of incorporating the former Spanish colony into the American economic and political system through a process of “benevolent assimilation.” The Third
District of the Department of Southern Luzon was a critical region in this overall process of pacifying the Philippines. The Bicol region of Luzon, which encompassed the boundaries of the Third District, was a major production center for hemp fiber and was a major source of raw materials for the American rope industry (Sibley 2007, 135). The supply of hemp was seen by American leaders such as Secretary of War Elihu Root as vital for paying for the occupation of the Philippines and the wellbeing and growth of the American rope industry (Lynn 1989, 96, 103). To sustain the flow of hemp the main missions of the American forces in the region were to secure hemp production and shipping areas while establishing civil government to ensure a long-term flow of hemp to American manufacturers.

Brigadier General William Kobbè led the American forces during the initial occupation of the region in January 1900 with orders directing him only to “render a sufficient quantity of hemp available for the American market as soon as possible” (War Department 1901, 1:7:15). Kobbè and his forces succeeded in occupying the main ports of the region by the end of January 1900 and set about reestablishing the hemp trade in the region. However, Kobbè was hindered by an insufficient number of soldiers and was unable to pursue the insurgents or establish an effective buffer to allow the inhabitants of the region to bring their hemp into the ports without being harassed by the insurgents (Lynn 1989, 99-101). This characterized much of the insurgency in Bicol with the Americans unable to pursue the insurgents or secure the population outside major towns because of a lack of forces and the insurgents unable to eject the Americans from the towns due to the superior American firepower.
In the summer of 1900 Kobbè was ordered out of the Third District to command pacification efforts in Mindanao and Jolo. He was replaced by Brigadier General James M. Bell (no relation to BG James Franklin Bell) (War Department 1901, 207). Bell’s efforts to pacify the region were hampered by the same problems that faced Kobbè. During the remainder of the insurgency from July 1900 to the summer of 1902, Bell had approximately 2,600 American soldiers to secure a population of over 600,000 and an area of over 5,600 square miles. Added to this, American troops were ravaged by disease and many units were reduced to a point that made it “almost impossible to conduct normal security operations.”

Compounding the lack of personnel, Bell also faced severe shortages in riverine transportation and communications equipment (Lynn 2000, 282). The situation became so bad by the May of 1900 that BG Bell reported to the Commander of the Department of Southern Luzon that shortages in manpower compared to the size of the pacification requirements made it, “impossible to comply” with the demands of securing towns while conducting operations in the field against the insurgents. By March 1900 American forces in the Third District were stretched so thin that BG Bell reported that “the troops of this command have now reached the point beyond which it will be almost impossible to get supplies to them from this point.”

This lack of manpower and resources forced Bell to decentralize control of American efforts in the district and experiment with arming local security forces using the limited means available. Bell determined by conducting experiments with arming

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22 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Dorst to CPT, 1 June 1900.
23 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, BG Bell to Assistant Adjutant General (AAG), 27 May 1900 RG 395
24 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Adjutant General's Office 1900-1904, BG Bell to AAG DSL, 5 Mar 1900.
limited numbers of police in May 1900 that for a limited amount of money ($25 Mexican) per policeman, he could field an effective police force across the province and overcome his lack of American troops. As early as July 1900 Bell requested arms and ammunition to begin equipping local security forces.

Confronting the American forces, the insurgent forces commanded by Major General Vito Belaramino faced equal challenges. Treating the region as a secondary effort in the overall conflict, national insurgent leaders sent few supplies to the region and only 200 rifles (Taylor 1971, 5:180-181). Faced with these shortages and a reduced income from the American control of hemp exports, Belaramino chose a Fabian strategy of attrition and exhaustion. To accomplish this strategy, he ordered his forces to move the inhabitants of the region into the hills where “the Americans cannot reach us and we can have our own government.” Belaramino hoped this would allow the insurgents to maintain control of the population while denying American forces the same ability until the Americans were forced to leave due to exhaustion and lack of progress (Lynn 2000, 279). While this strategy eventually worked against the insurgents by denying them the ability to establish support networks and shadow governments in towns and villages, it initially hindered American pacification efforts by denying them access to the majority of the population.

This stalemate between the Americans and the insurgents characterized much of the fighting during 1900. The insurgent strategy worked for the most part to deny the Americans the ability to gain the support of the population through development

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25 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, BG Bell to AAG 27 May 1900.
26 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Bell to Quarter Master, 1 Jul 1900.
27 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, MAJ Hugh D. Wise to AG 47 INF, 5 May 1900, 1:5:340-42
programs and reducing the flow of much needed hemp and the revenues it provided. However, the strategy began to break down in the summer of 1900 due to several developments. The most important development was that the population, forced to leave their homes and fields for the hills and without the revenue from the hemp trade, could not produce enough food to sustain themselves and the insurgents. This loss of crops was coupled with a rinderpest outbreak that killed much of the livestock in the region. In addition, this destruction of most of the cultivated fields and storehouses outside zones of occupation by American forces reduced the food supply. All these factors led the population to abandon the insurgents and return to the towns (Lynn 2000, 281).

The final factor that broke the stalemate occurred during the fall of 1900 when American forces co-opted aid of the aid of local elites and clergy who had remained in towns. Through loyal local leaders and the clergy, American forces established local security forces and negotiate the return of most of the population. Faced with a diminished population and tax base, Bell had amended Kobbé’s initial order to create civil governments with full civil services and ordered his subordinate commanders to appoint only mayors or presidentes and police forces sufficient to maintain order.28

According to Lynn (2000, 283) the village presidente became the focal point for defeating the insurgency. “In return for business contracts, patronage, and considerable autonomy, he encouraged people to return to the town, recruited guides and local auxiliary and identified insurgents” (Lynn 2000, 283). Local American commanders armed local security forces recruited by presidentes, but were limited in their efforts because the district and national commanders refused to authorize the official creation or

28 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, General Order 7, 27 April 1900.
arming of militias until the summer of 1901. When General Arthur MacArthur did authorize the arming of militias, the quartermaster in Manila sent inadequate number and kinds of weapons.

While the use of community-based security forces produced remarkable results in 1900 and the first half of 1901, its full potential was not realized because of this lack of external support. Higher echelon commanders continued to resist the growth of indigenous security forces because of a mistrust of the local population’s loyalty. This hindered efforts to create local scout units that were used in other districts as mobile strike forces to destroy insurgent groups in their wilderness camps. By the end of 1901, the strength of the insurgency had been broken with most of the population living in government controlled villages. However, personnel and equipment shortages continued to plague the Americans and prevented them from completely stamping out the last pockets of insurgents until 1903 (Lynn 1989, 117).

While American forces and their local allies were unable to stamp out the insurgency for several years, the counterinsurgency effort was successful measured by several external sources. By July 1901 external examinations by the Philippine Commission and the Army determined the two provinces of the district, Albay and Sorsogon, to be pacified to an extent necessary to warrant transition to full civil control. The establishment of local chapters of the Filipino Federalist Party in 1901 was also seen as another positive development that would facilitate further defections from the insurgent cause (United States Philippine Commission 1901, 12, 14).

29 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/4085, Department of the Army 1900-1904, AAG 10th USV Infantry to Co Liga, 7 October 1900.
30 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, MG MacArthur to AG, DSL
Economic and human security also increased during this period, indicating a diminishment of the insurgency and an overall increase in security. By May 1901 security had improved to the point where U.S. Forestry officials were in place in both districts to manage the development of the timber industry (United States Philippine Commission 1901, 42). This led to the first harvesting and export of lumber and gutta-percha rubber since the outset of hostilities (United States Philippine Commission 1901, 45). This allowed local planters to realize a return of $150-$200 per acre of rubber plantation, up from no income generated from exports during 1899-1900 (United States Philippine Commission 1901, 47). Improvements in security also allowed for an expansion of modern health care in the region. Health clinics were opened in all towns and cities and a leprosy hospital was opened in Ambos Camarines with 500 patients admitted for treatment (United States Philippine Commission 1901, 53).

The marginalization of the insurgency by the summer of 1901, the transition to civil government, and improvements in economic development and health care indicate the counterinsurgency efforts in the Third District were effective. Faced with a lack of manpower and resources, the commanders of the Third District had no other course of action than the indigenous security forces to defeat the insurgency. In the following sections, this case study will explore the degree this case conformed to the model presented in this dissertation.

External Support and Oversight

As mentioned in the background discussion of the case, external support and oversight for the community-based security efforts in the Third District were low throughout the insurgency due to a lack of weapons and manpower. This lack of support
is most evident in an external inspector general report that investigated the status of
efforts to raise local police and militias submitted by Major William Johnson in
November 1900. In his report Major Johnson found that out of the 23 towns he
inspected “In only one police post, Tabaca, Albay Province, did I find the municipal
police armed with revolvers.” Johnson found that in some other towns local
commanders had provided police officers with captured insurgent rifles or loaned arms
from their unit armories, but “the majority of the police are armed only with bolos, clubs,
daggers, or spears; some without even those useless toys.”

Major Williams also found that while the local police had served effectively in
most areas when they were employed as guides to American Army forces or undercover
intelligence agents; many had been “wounded, some killed, by bolo men, where a
revolver would have saved them.” Johnson found that the police had been effective in
keeping order within the towns of the district and by doing so, made "themselves
obnoxious to the insurgents and their sympathizers to such a degree that it is unsafe for
them to be without some means of self-defense.” To overcome this dangerous
deficiency he reported to Army Headquarters in Manila that a minimum of 339 revolvers
were needed to make up the shortfall to equip the 366 policemen employed in the Third
District.

31 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Inspector General (IG) report to Commander, U.S. Forces.
32 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Inspector General (IG) report to Commander, U.S. Forces.
33 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Inspector General (IG) report to Commander, U.S. Forces.
34 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Inspector General (IG) report to Commander, U.S. Forces.
In response to this report and repeated requests from BG Bell, the commander of the Department of Southern Luzon relented and authorized weapons to arm the local police. However, Bell complained that the weapons that had been promised by the command were not delivered or in such small numbers or of the wrong type. Instead of sending rifles or pistols as requested by Bell and recommended by Johnson, the quartermaster sent 200 antiquated black powder shotguns. On November 27, 1900, Bell complained in a report that these weapons were not only ineffective, but also dangerous for the user because they were slow to load and wreathed the firer in a cloud of white smoke that identified his firing position.35

This lack of suitable weapons severely hampered the efforts of American forces to establish local civil governments and the efforts of presidentes to maintain control of their communities. Colonel Joseph Dorst, one of Bell’s subordinate regimental commanders, reported three instances in July 1900 of presidentes being threatened or killed by insurgents because of a lack of arms and ammunition provided to the police. He further reported several cases in August 1900 of police running away from their posts because they had no firearms. This trend continued into the fall of 1900 with American forces unable to secure local leaders and unable to give them sufficient arms to defend themselves. Several reports during this period recount presidentes complaining to American officers of insurgents threatening to kill or abduct presidentes or other officials.36

35 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Bell report to DSL AG, 27 November 1900.
36 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/117, Adjutant General (AG) Office 1900-1904, COL Howe to AG DSL, LS 114, 22 October 1900 and RG 395/3669, Department of the Army 1900-1904, MAJ Wise to AG, 47th Infantry, 1 July 1900.
Conditions in the other Third District sector commanded by Colonel James Lockett were similar to those in Colonel Dorst’s sector. Supplies were so limited that in response to one presidente’s request for arms, COL Lockett recommended to a mayor that he organize a police force and “turn out his people armed with bolos and go after these marauders.”

It is unclear if the presidentes took Lockett’s advice, but facing an enemy armed with repeating rifles with a population armed with machetes could not have been a heartening prospect.

To make up for the lack of weapons provided by higher headquarters, several commanders in the Third District issued captured weapons to police forces in the spring and summer of 1900. The quantity of weapons lent to local police is not reported but, according to the report submitted by Major Johnson in November 1900, the number and quality of the weapons were deficient to adequately arm the local police forces.

To add insult to the injury of failing to provide arms for the local police, the national command in Manila prohibited the practice of loaning weapons to local police. The reason for this order was a fear of losing weapons to the insurgents through loss or black-market sales. No reports of lost weapons were submitted by American forces in the Third District, so it seems likely that this was a blanket order based off incidents in other districts and did not reflect conditions in the Third District.

Oversight in the Third district was also very low. This was due to the limited number of American forces in the district and conscious actions by higher headquarters. A lack of forces was the factor that most crippled oversight. On November 8, 1900

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37 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Col Lockett to AG 3 DSL 8 November 1900 395.
Colonel Lockett complained to Bell about his inability to supervise *presidentes* in his sector. His ability to provide oversight was so limited that several of the *presidentes* in outlying areas had to report conditions in their towns by letter and he did not have the ability to verify their reports.\(^3^9\) In several cases this lack of oversight resulted in abuses of power and criminal behavior by police forces in towns not garrisoned with US troops. In several outlying villages police were charged with making illegal arrests and highway robbery for either political or monetary gain.\(^4^0\)

Unlike the Department of Northern Luzon, the Department of Southern Luzon did not embrace the Native Scouts program, which as in other districts could have facilitated oversight. The commander of the Department of Southern Luzon did not authorize the Native Scout program until January 1901 and when he did it took on a form much different from the program in Northern Luzon. Unlike the companies raised in the north that were comprised entirely with native forces with a small cadre of American officers and sergeants, the Native Scout program in the south was limited to one squad comprised of one corporal and seven privates that were integrated into existing American companies.\(^4^1\) This prevented the rapid expansion of security forces and the economy of using a few American soldiers to oversee a large indigenous unit.

Overall this case demonstrates “mostly out” adherence to external oversight and support. There was some oversight provided by commanders and even the District Provost Judge to local judges, but there was little oversight provided to local leaders and security forces. However, General Kobbè established a requirement for town councils to

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\(^3^9\) U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Col Lockett to AG 3 DSL, 8 November 1900.  
\(^4^0\) U.S. National Archives, RG 395/4084, Department of the Army 1900-1904, LT Watson to AG 10 February 1901.  
\(^4^1\) U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, AG to 3rd District Commander, 23 January 1901.
provide to local commanders a monthly report on collections and expenditures to prevent misappropriations and corruption.42

This case provides an interesting example of external commands actively seeking to limit the ability of local commanders to support indigenous security forces with arms and equipment. While the efforts to raise local security forces was ultimately successful, the frustrated reports of local commanders make it evident that more progress would have been made sooner with higher levels of external support.

Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction

The local security forces raised in the Third district were restricted to their communities unless accompanied by American forces. According to Major Johnson in his inspector general report, the authority of local police across the district was limited. They could only operate in their jurisdiction “with authority to patrol or make arrests only within their barrio or neighborhood.”43 While there were incidents of local security forces abusing their power by making politically motivated arrests or robbing travelers crossing their jurisdiction, there were no reports of them conducting extralegal activities outside their jurisdiction. This is in stark contrast with other districts that experienced scout units abusing populations outside of their ethnic or community boundaries.

When American forces did use local police as guides and informal scout units to infiltrate insurgent strongholds they operated as a part of a larger American force that could monitor their activities.44 This practice continued into 1901 with the limited use of

42 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, COL Lockett to AAG 3 DSL, 31 July 1900 and U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, William Kobbè Papers, General Order 2, 1899.
43 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, COL Lockett to AAG 3 DSL, 31 July 1900 and U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, William Kobbè Papers, General Order 2, 1899.
44 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, CPT Livingston to AG 47th Infantry.
Native Scouts that were integrated into larger American units and were not used as independent elements.\textsuperscript{45}

Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems

American commanders in the Third District demonstrated a high degree of sensitivity to the use of traditional justice systems as a method to gain the trust and compliance of the local population. This theme started with the publishing of General Kobbè’s General Order Number 2 published in July 1899. Through this order, Kobbè required his subordinate commanders to establish municipal councils in each town with an elected President and “as many representatives or headmen as there may be wards or barrios in the town.” Kobbè charged the President and town council to maintain “public order and regulation of municipal affairs” and to “formulate rules to govern.”\textsuperscript{46} The municipal council was also charged with establishing a police force, regulating markets and the transfer of property.

Kobbè insisted the traditional justice systems remain in place during American occupation. He stressed to his subordinates in a message clarifying his Order Number 2 that while he did “not wish to interfere with the methods you employ to carry out the provisions of the order. The community under your command and entrusted to your care has different interests and a different language from some of the others, and it may be that the people prefer rules to which they have been accustomed and which are more or less peculiar to their town.”\textsuperscript{47} In the version of Kobbè’s order that was posted throughout the command the reliance on existing law was expanded to give the town

\textsuperscript{45} U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, AG to 3rd District Cdr, 23 Jan 1901.
\textsuperscript{46} U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, William Kobbè Papers, General Order 2, 1899.
\textsuperscript{47} U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, William Kobbè Papers, General Order 2, 1899.
Presidente and council “all those which in the administrative and governmental departments were granted to him by Spanish laws in force here before August 13, 1898: Provided always that these attributes are not incompatible with the sovereignty of the United States and do not conflict with the orders of the military authority.” Perhaps out of the necessity created by manpower shortages which prevented the enforcement of a new legal system, Kobbè chose to incorporate the existing legal system that had been in place for over three hundred years and was therefore familiar to the population.

Due to the removal of Spanish judges after the defeat of the Spanish, Kobbè’s order expanded the role of the local councils by giving them judicial authority using Spanish law as a framework for civil cases and limited authority for criminal cases with military oversight (Kobbè 1899). Kobbè allowed mayors to act as justices of the peace to execute civil legal matters and administer fines and punishments for minor crimes in accordance with local customs. “In accordance with local custom” Presidentes were also allowed to establish the price of fines and levy fines for minor offenses such a failure to maintain adhere to local sanitation codes.

The Third District case demonstrated a high degree of membership with the incorporation of traditional justice factor. It is unclear if this was done out of a desire to preserve local traditions or because a lack of manpower prevented the imposition of a new justice system in the district. In either case, the decision to maintain the existing legal code allowed local leaders to quickly establish control with a minimum of confusion or conflict with the local population.

48 U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, William Kobbè Papers, General Order 2, 1899
49 U.S. National Archives, RG 93, Adjutant General’s Office 1900-1904, COL Dorst to AG DSL 21 SEP 1900.
50 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, CPT Noble to COL Dorst 16 June 1900 and CPT Noble to COL Dorst 19 June 1900)
Local Sustainability and Accountability

The Third District also exhibited a high degree of membership with the factor of local sustainability and accountability. In addition to maintaining traditional justice systems, Kobbè’s Order Number 2 also stressed that local government and security forces should be funded by local sources such as “the proceeds of taxes, license fees, market rents, etc.” and that salaries and the size of government could only expand with the “increase with the prosperity of the population of the place.”

After a local government was established in a village, Kobbè and Bell dictated that their subordinates allow the presidente and council to set rates for taxation and salaries for municipal employees and approving other expenditures. Under the supervision of American commanders, the town councils adjusted prescribed salary for mayors to fit local budget and established number of police desired to maintain security in areas not garrisoned by American soldiers. In areas that could not raise funds sufficient to pay for a security force did not get one.

The American leaders increased local accountability by requiring the inclusion of community social and religious leaders in decision making. To prevent Presidentes and town councils from abusing their positions and setting up an unsustainable taxation regime, “the Presidente of each town had to call together the head men of the barrios and with such a council to consider the subject of taxation.” These community leaders also had input on setting taxation levels and setting the pay of mayors, police, and teachers and setting the number and rank of local police forces.

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51 U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, William Kobbè Papers, General Order 2, 1899
52 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/117, Adjutant General's Office 1900-1904, MAJ Cole to AG 3 DSL, 24 May 1900
53 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, CPT Winterborn to AAG 9 July 1900
54 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, MAJ Cole to AG 3 DSL, 24 May 1900
The final measure of local control and accountability was inadvertent. Since the commanders of the Department of Southern Luzon and National commanders resisted the creation of Native Scout units until June of 1901 and then limited them to a subordinate role within American units, the potential to use indigenous security units outside their social or ethnic boundaries were severely limited (War Department 1901, 75). By not creating mobile units that were funded and commanded by external entities, American forces created indigenous forces that were limited to operating within their traditional boundaries.

In summary, the Third District exhibited a high degree of adherence to local control and sustainability. This was due to external and internal factors. Local commanders were unable to oversee and sustain community-based security forces due to limited manpower and other resources. Village presidentes and councils were forced to create security forces that could be sustained by local economies. Lacking external support, local security forces were obligated to gain the trust and support of local communities that paid their salaries. The determination of the size and composition of local security forces were determined by a bottom up process that included not only elected officials, but also local religious and social community leaders. This created a security system that while suffering from some abuses of power did not experience the more frequent and serious depredations that occurred in other districts.

Voluntary Participation by Local Elites

The Third District demonstrated a high degree of adherence to the factor of voluntary participation of local elites. The degree of adherence to this factor was determined in the most part by the lack of manpower and resources as with this case’s
adherence to the other factors in the model. Due to the inability of American commanders to supervise each village or directly incentivize cooperation with the American occupation forces, they were forced to incentivize participation of local elites by indirect methods. American commanders did this in several ways.

American commanders gave local leaders wide latitude in governing their communities. Local leaders could set the terms of local trading contracts for hemp and other goods that were the source of external funds in their communities. They were also able to establish reward for their supporters with government contracts and other forms of political patronage. This process was a double-edged sword. Local leaders were able to provide direct economic and political benefit for themselves and their supporters, but were then directly accountable for the behavior of their communities. Once they had enjoyed the benefits of collaboration with the Americans, they were forced to assist in the defeat of insurgent forces.

American commanders also increased the prestige of local leaders in the eyes of the population using the limited means they had available. In many cases this involved bringing district and national commanders and political elites to meet with local elites to increase the perception among the populace of the patronage afforded to their local leaders. In other cases, it involved providing passes for travel outside village boundaries to supports or local politicians and clergy.

The final technique used to gain the support of local elites was the suppression of their rivals through coercive means. In several cases local leaders arrested and jailed individuals and groups in opposition to local elites. In other instances, contracts and trade agreements were denied to opposition leaders to weaken them financially.
Early in the American occupation of the Third District, American commanders delegated the issuance of passes to move outside of communities to Presidents and Priests. Mayors were empowered to issue passes to inhabitants that allowed them to move between communities. COL Dorst, one of the two regimental commanders in the district realized that this increased the prestige of the mayors, but also “made them responsible for the good conduct of their citizens.” If local leaders vouched for inhabitants who abused the privilege of their travel pass, the local leaders would be held accountable and possibly lose their privileged position in the new Filipino government.

General Bell increased this codependent relationship by requiring each member of local councils to maintain order within their neighborhood and allowed them to hire assistants to assist in these duties. In most cases the local tribal headman of the town or some other powerful local would be designated by the local leaders of the town council as the vice-president of the town and the Lieutenant of Police. The powers of the lieutenant of police were based on existing Spanish law, but were also bolstered by the informal social power possessed by the individual.

This not only shifted responsibility for compliance to the local headmen, but them complicit because they were to enforce American imposed laws, which forced them to punish citizens found to be in violation. As one officer in the Third District, James Parker, noted this practice also had the secondary effect of promoting the compliance with American edicts by the population (Parker, 352). This occurred because citizens could give insurgents the excuse that they would be punished by their presidente if they

55 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, COL Dorst to AG 3 DSL 27 AUG 1900
56 U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, William Kobbé Papers.
did not follow American imposed laws. This shifted the blame off them and onto local leaders who could rely on some degree of protect by American forces or the local police.

American commanders worked diligently to co-opt the informal power of the Roman Catholic clergy of the region. As General Bell noted, “If the priest can be made to come back to his house and live the natives will follow and remain quiet.”

At the start of the insurgency the local clergy supported the insurgency and in most cases fled to the hills with their parishioners. As the hardships of living outside of villages increased in 1900 many clergy returned to their churches as the population trickled back to their communities. Local commanders sought to co-opt the power of the priests by including them into the process of establishing civil governments. The most concrete of these methods included allowing the priests veto power in the selection of members of the security forces.

Providing them with this power offered them some ownership in the process, but also made them complicit in the use of the local security forces to maintain order and combat the insurgency.

Local commanders also afforded the clergy privileges that they could use to lure the remainder of their followers back to their villages. In return for medical support, passes for parishioners, and interceding on the behalf of parishioners in legal matters, the clergy preached accommodation to American policies, verification of reliable inhabitants, and building relationships between the Americans and the local population. According to John Schumacher, while at the outset of the insurgency there was widespread support of the insurgent cause, as American resolve to remain in the Philippines and the fruits of

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57 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/2240, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Letter Sent 9
58 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Department of the Army 1900-1904, CPT Winterborn to AAG, 9 Jul 1900.
59 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/3668, Department of the Army 1900-1904, MAJ Wise to AG 47th Infantry, 1 July 1900.
collaboration became apparent, the clergy in Albay and Sorsogon largely switched sides and accommodated American occupation (Schumacher 1982, 174).

In several cases American commanders also played the civil government against the local clergy to increase the power of one of the groups depending on which side could benefit the American cause the most. According to Colonel Dorst, he often transferred powers between groups to increase the power of the local Presidente. These practices included giving local Presidentes the power to marry couples in civil ceremonies and officiate at other ceremonies usually reserved for the recalcitrant clergy in his area of operations.60

Local commanders also used other methods to undercut the power of local governments through economic and judicial means. In several cases local commanders denied lucrative contracts to individuals seen to be potential supporters of the insurgency. Local commanders also used their power of arrest and military trial to remove individuals who attempted to undercut the power of local mayors by imprisoning them or confiscating their property.61 While this practice does not seem to have been widespread, the example provided by the imprisonment of a few rival local elites would have had chilling effect on others who may have opposed American occupation.

One of the more creative, cost effective, and widespread practices used to co-opt local elites was the use of official visits and the conferring symbols of official power. Local commanders frequently used inexpensive methods such as arranging visits with national military and political leaders like the head of the Philippine Commission,

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60 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Dorst to AAG 22 Jul 1900.
61 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Dorst to AAG Sep 18, 1900
William Howard Taft, to build the prestige of local leaders. Local commanders also boosted the prestige of local leaders by providing them with American security escorts while they travelled between towns (Parker 1929, 356). This practice also created a visible link between the powers of local leaders to their relationship with the American occupation (Parker 1929, 354). This method was also employed by BG Bell who used his visits to increase local leaders “prestige and influence among the natives.”

In each of these visits Bell would make a conscious effort to identify local leaders and extoll their virtues to the gathered villagers. Bell also bestowed local mayors with batons and badges of honor and blessings from the local priest to enhance their power and prestige among the local population.

American commanders also used economic incentives to gain the support of local elites. In some cases, this meant empowering local leaders to organize public works projects and supporting these efforts with material and logistical support (Parker 1929, 357). In other cases, the economic support to local elites was more direct. By controlling the major ports in the district, American forces controlled the export of hemp, the main export crop of the region. MG Otis, the overall commander in the Philippines in 1900, allowed elites with ties with the insurgency to trade their hemp because of political pressure from America to maintain the hemp supply. He also allowed this trade to continue not only because of political pressure from home, but because it tied elites to the U.S. government. He credited this with a shift in sentiment from local elites in support of the American (Sibley 2007, 135).

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62 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Col Dorst to CPT Murray, 1 June 1900.
63 U.S. National Archives, RG 395/117, Adjutant General's Office 1900-1904, COL Howe to AG, 10 Jul 1900, Letters Sent 798.
This practice was also extended to the local level. American commanders allowed *Presidentes* to restrict the hemp trade to benefit their followers by barring certain buyers and allowing their followers to set prices for hemp and rice. In 1901, members of the nascent Federal party accused, who in many cases were in opposition to the sitting local councils, accused the *Presidentes* of several cities of recommending to American forces that they blockade villages that opposed the local *Presidente* by claiming they were insurgents.\(^4\)

Empowering local *presidentes* also appears to have retarded the growth of party politics in the district. In 1901 the Federal party established eight local committees in Albay, eight in Ambios Camarines, and two in Sorsogon in the first six months of 1901, but these local party committees did not seem to have much power over the population (United States Philippine Commission 1901, 165). Unlike in other districts the Federal party was not able to broker the surrender of insurgents or arms during entire period to Federal Party committees in 1901 (United States Philippine Commission 1901, 166-167). This suggests that most local elites did not join the party because they were already in positions of power and did not need the party to gain access to power as elites in other districts did.

**Conclusion**

While the case of the Third District, Department of Southern Luzon did not demonstrate a decisive defeat of insurgent forces because American forces could never gain the manpower necessary to root out the insurgents in their jungle hideouts, it was a success and does demonstrate the importance of using community-based security forces

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\(^4\) U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Federal Party to District Commander 2 May 1900.
in counterinsurgency. Much of the use of these forces was out of necessity. BG Kobbè and his successor BG Bell could barely sustain the forces they had in the district and were denied the resources they needed to expand their offensive operations, so they were forced to rely on local elites to raise local security forces. Additionally, this case was not influenced to the degree of other Philippine Insurrection cases by outside events such as the surrender of national insurgent leaders which had little effect on the intensity of the insurgency.

As depicted in Table 5, this case study highlights the inverse relationship between the factor of external support and oversight and the factor of gaining the voluntary support of local elites when attempting to use community-based security forces. Throughout the period covered in this case study, the Department of Southern Luzon and the national command failed to support efforts of local commanders to field community-based security forces by withholding the arms and funds. The limited supply of arms and equipment prevented American commanders from using indigenous forces to augment the limited number of American troops in an offensive role or to free up American forces from static defensive roles. This lengthened the duration of the insurgency, but also created community-based security forces that relied on popular local support.

Despite limited external support, American commanders in the Third District were successful in coopting local elites and using the influence of elites to raise and regulate local security forces as shown in Table 5. Due to limited sources of supply and funding, American leaders relied on the use of intangible and indirect sources of power such as building the prestige of local elites and providing them the ability to control local economic activity to co-opt local elites. The use of intangible sources of power coupled
with granting local elites with a high level of decision making authority to regulate their communities and dispense available resources, American commanders provided elites with the tools necessary to recruit community-based security forces. Using these methods, American commanders expanded their control over the population while expending small amounts of resources.

As shown in Table 5, by necessity American commanders also demonstrated high levels of adherence to the factors of local accountability and traditional justice systems. American commanders granted local leaders and clergy wide latitude in organizing their communities and regulating the lives of the population. Again, out of necessity, American commanders also retained traditional justice systems and included mechanisms to ensure a security forces a level of accountability to the local populace by including local social leaders and allowing clergy the ability to veto the membership of police recruits. Due to limited manpower and resources, American commanders chose to leave the existing legal codes in place as a means of gaining popular support for the new local governments because retaining those exiting legal systems required the least amount of oversight by American forces. Additionally, limited external funding required all functions of local government, including the provisioning of security, to be sustainable by the local tax base. Throughout the district, American commanders allowed local leaders to decide the level of taxation their communities could bear and the number of security personnel based off that calculation and the local security threat.

American commanders demonstrated a high degree of adherence to the factor of limited territorial jurisdiction (see Table 5). First, out of a lack of resources they could not equip most mobile Native Scouts. Second, they were prevented from raising majority
indigenous scout companies by their higher headquarters that insisted on integrating small numbers of scouts into existing Army units. The effect of both constraints was the limiting of community-based security forces within their communal boundaries.

While the conclusion of the insurrection in the Third District was not marked with a defeat of insurgents in a climactic battle, the piecemeal surrender of insurgents in the period of 1901-1902 and the end of insurgent activity by 1903 marks this case as a successful counterinsurgency operation. Additionally, the increase in economic activity and improvement in healthcare across the district indicates an improvement in security.

In addition to providing an example of the relative importance of community-based security forces in the outcome of a counterinsurgency campaign, the case of the Third District also demonstrates a possible inverse relationship between levels of external support and oversight and the other factors in presented in the model.

Table 5.
Membership of Third District, DSL with Community-Based Security Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/Membership</th>
<th>Fully In In</th>
<th>Mostly In Than Out</th>
<th>More In Than Out</th>
<th>More Out Than In</th>
<th>Mostly Out</th>
<th>Fully Out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>External Support and Oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local sustainability and accountability</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary participation by local elites</td>
<td>X</td>
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</table>
CHAPTER VII - BEFRIEND AND DEFEND:

Introduction

This chapter will explore the use of community-based security forces by the United States (U.S.) Marines in Vietnam from August 1965 until May 1971. Following a brief overview of the entry of the U.S. Marines into the Vietnam War, then this chapter will provide a chronological overview of the establishment and evolution of the Combined Action Program. During this overview of the program, this chapter will include a discussion on the organization of the program, the training provided to Marine participants in the program, and the internal and external factors that influenced it. Next, after the pertinent details of the Combined Action Program are presented, this case study will include a detailed discussion of the degree of membership the case demonstrates for each factor presented in this dissertation’s model. Finally, this case study concludes with a summation of the findings and an application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix. This case study will demonstrate that the Combined Action Program was highly successful given its limited scope and demonstrated high degrees of membership with several of the model’s factors.

To avoid confusion, this case study uses several terms and acronyms that need to be defined before proceeding. The Combined Action Program, the program employed by the U.S. Marines in Vietnam to secure the Vietnamese population by partnering Marine squads with local militias, will be referred to either by its full name or as “the program.” The main component of the program, the Combined Action Platoon, will be referred to as CAP. The Third Marine Expeditionary Force or III MEF was the overall
command for Marine Forces in the northern section of the Republic of South Vietnam that was designated as the I Corps Tactical Zone or I Corps. I Corps comprised the provinces of Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai (Hemingway 1994, 2). A Marine Lieutenant General commanded III MEF and shared joint responsibility for security in I Corps with an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Major General. The III MEF Commander controlled all U.S. Marine forces in I Corps and the ARVN I Corps commander controlled all South Vietnamese security forces in I Corps including irregular forces such as the Popular Force (PF) village militias that partnered with the Marines in CAPs.

While this case demonstrates a degree of membership with all the factors in this dissertation’s model, this case also highlights the importance of external oversight support and oversight and local sustainability when attempting to use community-based security forces. Throughout the existence of the Combined Action Program, the Marines operated the program using manpower and equipment available to them, but had no additional support from the U.S. Military Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV). The Marines of III MEF also were forced to limit the scope of the program because of their requirement by MACV to conduct large conventional unit actions in support of General William C. Westmoreland’s attrition strategy. This lack of external support diminished the overall effectiveness of the program because manpower shortages limited the combat power of individual CAPs and prevented Marine commanders from establishing a large network of interconnected CAP protected villages in I Corps.

While limited external resources hindered expansion of the program, the sustained and intensive oversight by Marine squads produced an impressive increase in overall
security and development in villages participating in the program. While controlling for inflation in the U.S. reporting systems, PF platoons participating in the program improved at a higher rate than un-partnered PF platoons and were able to provide security for their villages after the Marines moved to another village.

The Marines participating in the program also demonstrated high levels of adherence to the factors of local accountability and voluntary participation by local leaders. Due to the dual command structure in I Corps, the Marines did not command the PF platoons in the program. This required Marine leaders to cooperate and share leadership responsibilities with PF and village leadership to conduct any operations.

While the overall U.S. strategy in Vietnam ended in failure, the Combined Action Program was a success. Given the limited scope of the program, it brought sustained security to 20 percent of the villages and over 400,000 inhabitants in the I Corps region (Southard 2014, 10). Over 93 PF platoons assumed sole security for their villages and none of the villages defended by these platoons reverted back to Viet Cong control during the duration of the program (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970).

Background

In 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade to Vietnam with the mission of defending airbases at Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai, which were being used to fly bombing missions in North Vietnam and in support of ARVN forces (Walt 1970, 25). In August 1965, Lieutenant Colonel William W. Taylor, the Marine battalion commander was charged with securing ten square miles surrounding Phu Bai Air Base (Kopets 2002). Taylor, with a battalion of approximately 900 Marines and without knowledge of the local population or terrain, had to provide a defensive
perimeter deep enough to prevent indirect fires from mortars in a heavily populated area. The population of the area lived in six villages, each comprised of a main village and several satellite villages. In response to the battalion’s manpower and intelligence limitations, Taylor and his staff looked to an underutilized source of manpower, the six Popular Forces (PF) platoons that ostensibly defended each village (Gortzak 2014, 138; Thomas C. Thayer 1977, 33; and Walt 1970, 105).

The PF, founded by the Saigon government in 1955 as a civil guard and integrated into the regular security force command structure in 1964, were charged with securing the area around their village and if needed to assist regular Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) soldiers to combat larger Viet Cong or North Vietnam Army (NVA) formations (Zappia 2004). While PFs comprised as much as half of the reported manpower of ARVN, they were at the bottom of the hierarchy of prestige in the South Vietnamese security forces. They were poorly equipped, trained and led (Walt 1970, 105). PF’s organization was simple. The largest PF formation was a 35-man platoon. Each platoon was led by a sergeant and all other members of the platoon were privates. PF members were paid a small monthly stipend by the government, but were part time soldiers with normal village jobs (Peterson 1989, 23).

Seen by most South Vietnamese as a way to avoid conscription in the army and stay at home, the PF avoided combat with the Viet Cong if possible. However, PF units suffered from casualty rates twice as high as regular ARVN units and a corresponding high desertion rate (Corson 1968, 178 and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 5, 14). Their level of effectiveness was so low that in 1969 the MACV commander General Creighton Abrams complained that PF platoons “couldn’t fight their way out of a paper
sack!” (Gortzak 2014, 142). Despite these shortcomings, Lt. Col. Taylor and his staff recognized that what PF did possess, knowledge of the local human and geographical terrain, was what the Marines lacked.

Lt. Col. Taylor envisioned that Marines could teach the PF combat skills and improve their aggressiveness by example and with Marines access to firepower and medical evacuation if a PF member was wounded. The pairing of units was relatively easy. The 36-man PF platoons were organized into three squads of eleven men and a three-man headquarters element and 15-man Marine squads were divided into three, four-man fire teams with a three-man headquarters element. This allowed each Marine fire team to pair with a PF squad. (Walt 1970, 106).

Taylor integrated six of his rifle squads with the six PF platoons over the month of August 1965 (Kopets 2002 and Klyman 1986). In the plan devised by Captain John J. Mullin, Taylor’s civil affairs officer and local liaison officer, a Marine squad would live full time with the PF platoon in a village complex (Peterson 1989, 23). This would allow the Marines to provide constant mentorship of the PF platoon and to become familiar with the social structure of the village. The initial experiment using three Marine squads near the Phu Bai Air Base was a success and Taylor expanded to the planned six combined platoons. Attacks on the air base originating from those villages ceased and Viet Cong influence in the villages decreased to undetectable levels (Corson 1968, 178).

The senior Marine commander of III Marine Amphibious Force and I Corps, Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Lewis Walt, along with Fleet Marine Force Pacific Commander, Lieutenant General Victor “Brute” Krulak, believed that securing the population and denying the Viet Cong access to villages was the only realistic method to
achieve victory in Vietnam. Based on their study of Marine operations building local security forces in Central America prior to World War II and apprised of the experiment at Phu Bai, Walt and Krulak saw Combined Action with the PF as an economical method to achieve population security while continuing to follow General William Westmoreland's large unit “search and destroy” strategy (Walt 1970, 29 and Corson 1968, 175). They also believed that raising the effectiveness of the PF would provide a credible local security force that could provide sustainable security after the Marines had left. In essence, the Marines sought to “work themselves out of a job” by clearing an area of communist influence and leaving behind a competent security force that would allow for the phased withdrawal of U.S forces in Vietnam (Gortzak 2014 and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 7).

After studying the initial successful test of the Combined Action Platoon concept in late 1965, General Walt moved forward with a plan to expand the program. The first step of this plan was to establish Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) for each of the Marine infantry units in I Corps. The unit responsible for a TAOR was tasked with securing the population in these areas, dismantling the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), and expanding the reach of the South Vietnamese government. As U.S. involvement in Vietnam expanded, these TAORs enlarged to include over half of the 2.7 million people living in the I Corps area of responsibility (Corson 1968, 175). Marine units in each of these TAORs would be responsible for providing Marine squads to partner with local PF forces while maintaining adequate forces available to combat large VC and NVA units.

Lt. Gen. Walt expanded the program in 1966 from Phu Bai to the other two original air base enclaves. In January 1966, Walt reached an agreement with the ARVN
I Corps Commander, Major General Nguyen Chanh Thi, to release six PF platoons near the Da Nang Airbase for the program (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 33-34).

According to the agreement, Marines would not command PF units and employment and unit operations would be taken only as cooperative actions.

Despite the initial success, General William Westmoreland, the overall commander of U.S. military forces in Vietnam refused to support the program as it did not fit into his attritional warfare strategy. This meant that Marine commanders in the period of 1965 to 1968 would have to man CAP squads from their own units without receiving replacements to keep their regular units at full strength (Corson 1968, 178).

Despite the cost, the program continued to expand in 1966 with forty-nine platoons operating around the three airbases (Corson 1968, 179).

Another impediment to the program occurred in the first half of 1966 when ARVN commanders temporarily suspended expansion of the program. To relieve regular ARVN forces from static security duties and combatting Viet Cong units, ARVN commanders moved PF platoons out of their villages and used them to provide security for district headquarters and as assault troops to attack Viet Cong strongholds. The decision proved disastrous with over 40,000 PF members or 25 percent of the force deserting in 1966. In comparison, no desertions were recorded for CAP PF units during this timeframe (Klyman 1986, 6). Internal South Vietnamese government power struggles and a resulting ARVN command changes coupled with pressure from Lt. Gen. Walt reversed the decision and PF forces were no longer used outside of their villages by June 1966 (Corson 1968, 178). During the period after this agreement was reached the
program continued to expand on a provisional basis with 41 CAPs established in the remainder of 1966 (Peterson 1989, 32).

In February 1967, Walt and Krulak were unhappy with the uncoordinated nature of the program, but pleased with the performance of the platoons (Peterson 1989, 32). They directed Walt’s subordinate, Major General Nickerson, the 1st Marine Division commander, to appoint Lieutenant Colonel William R. Corson as the first director of the provisional Combined Action Group to coordinate the employment and support of CAPs for the entire I Corps (Corson 1968, 180).

To further ensure the survival of the program after he relinquished command at the end of 1967, on May 4, 1967 General Walt routed a memorandum through General Krulak to the Commandant of the Marine Corps requesting a formal adoption of the Combined Action Program. This resulted in the official incorporation of the program into the Marine Corps force structure and allowed the program to have its own Table of Organization, allowing it to be formally allocated personnel and equipment (Peterson 1989, 39). It is interesting to note that this request travelled through Marine Corps administrative channels and not MACV, which was commanded by General Westmoreland who continued withhold support for the program. Through the remainder of the program all personnel and equipment allocations came from the Marine Corps budget and not from MACV (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 25).

The second half of 1967 saw further expansion and organization of the program. Corson formalized the “CAP school” at Da Nang that provided Marines selected for the program with two weeks of training on cultural awareness, language training, and small unit combat skills (Peterson 1989 and Southard 2014, 24). While the program expanded
to 75 platoons in 1967 and became more of a drain on Marine battalions, III MEF assumed formal command of the program in October 1967, removing command and support requirements from subordinate units, and placing the program under the direct supervision of the III MAF deputy commanding general (Thomas C. Thayer 1977, 33 and Peterson 1989, 47).

During this period, a CAP chain of command was created that assisted in control of the platoons, but also coordination with the parallel Vietnamese chain of command. The Combined Action Force (CAF) command, headed by a colonel was created to oversee the entire program. Under the CAF, four Combined Action Groups (CAGs) were created to synchronize Marine CAP actions with ARVN provincial-level management of the PF platoons. Beneath the CAGs were Combined Action Companies (CACOs). CACOs would coordinate with district chiefs. Since district chiefs exercised direct control of PF platoons, CACOs allowed sustained U.S. input in the employment and management of PF platoons (Peterson 1989, 69). This organizational model would remain largely unchanged for the rest of the war.

1968 marked a year of extreme trial and change for the program. While the CAPs performed a peripheral role in largely urban fighting of the Tet offensive of 1968, CAPs caused several delays in the movement of NVA units into their attack positions and correspondingly suffered proportionally heavy casualties (Southard 2014, 13). The losses caused by the Tet offensive caused Marine leaders to order a shift in tactics for all the CAPs. To reduce the vulnerability of CAPs to attack from large communist formations, the CAF commander, Colonel Byron Brady dictated that all CAPs would be “mobile” (Peterson 1989, 60 and III Marine Amphibious Force 1970). Instead of being tied to
fixed defenses in the village, CAPs would have no fixed base and would continually move between satellite villages in the hamlet system. The intent of this change would be not only to reduce the vulnerability of the platoons by creating a moving target, but also to prevent Viet Cong access to villages by making a moving screen of ambushes around the villages.

This change of tactics proved to be controversial among CAP veterans. The debate over this change revolved around the purpose of the program, to kill the enemy or to provide security for the population. Corson, who had rotated back to the United States in late 1967, believed it undercut one of the purposes of the platoons, to create a visible symbol of pacification and government control as well as providing a location of refuge for local leaders (Peterson 1989, 60-61). The military results of the mobile CAP concept were convincing. According to III MEF briefings the number of CAP casualties went down while the number of enemy killed increased (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970). While destruction of the enemy increased, population security and connection with the local population demonstrated by civic action programs decreased after 1968 (Peterson 1989, 62). The reduction of civic action was mitigated somewhat by an increased interaction with more villagers because the platoon rested in different villages when not patrolling during the day (Klyman 1986, 10).

While the Tet offensive was a temporary shock to the U.S. military, Marine commanders continued to support the program. By the end of 1968 III MEF had expanded the program to 114 CAPs. At its high-water mark, CAPs provided security for over 400,000 villagers or almost 15 percent of the population in I Corps (Brush 1994).
1969 saw the sustainment of the program at 114 CAPs and a high operational tempo with almost 145,000 patrols and ambushes reported for the year (Peterson 1989, 67). However, 1969 also brought the Nixon Administration’s plan of “Vietnamization” of the conflict and a corresponding reduction of U.S. forces. In 1970 and 1971 the Marine contributions to CAPs were reduced in proportion to reductions in conventional forces (Southard 2014, 29-30).

Several inter-service conflicts arose during this period as the U.S. Army focused its efforts on pacification, sought to unify command and reduce duplication of effort. In March 1970 the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), an agency subordinate to MACV sought to gain control of the CAPs by arguing that they duplicated other CORDS efforts (Hemingway 1994, 11). While the CAPs were reduced, the Marines sought to stave off outside control of the program by using existing Marine units to fill the gaps created by troop reductions. In 1970 the Marines created the Infantry Company Intensified Pacification Program, later renamed Combined Unit Pacification Program that paired conventional Marine squads with PF platoons (Hemingway 1994, 13). While it is unclear how effective these units were, they did not receive any special training prior to partnering with PF platoons. By 11 May 1971 the final CAG and all its subordinate units were deactivated and one month later the final Marine brigade left Vietnam.

While the U.S. lost the Vietnam War and failed to implement an effective overall strategy to defeat the communist insurgency in Vietnam, the Combined Action Program was successful. The Marines documented the program and subsequent historical analysis and interviews with participants makes the task of measuring the effectiveness of the
program relatively easy. To attempt to measure the effectiveness of the program, this case study will focus on the ability of the CAPs to provide physical security to the population participating in the program as the main measure of effectiveness. Other measures of effectiveness this case study uses are the ability for the Viet Cong to recruit in program villages, numbers of Viet Cong killed by CAPs compared to un-partnered PF platoons, and improvements in the quality of life in villages under the protection of CAPs.

One of the most important successes of the program came in the form of sustained population control. The first stage of this process for the Marines was to gain an understanding of the number and location of the population. Marine CAP squads were able to conduct accurate censuses of their villages and monitor the movement of people faster than PF platoons not in the program. This practice proved to be effective in reducing the ability of the Viet Cong to recruit from the population. Corson (1968, 185) reported that in 1967 that only one tenth of one percent or approximately 170 of the 170,000-people living in CAP villages could not be accounted for by the Marines. If enemy strength estimates of nearly 40,000 in I Corps during this period were correct, Corson proposed that CAP efforts must have put a strain on their recruiting efforts (Corson 1968, 185).

The program allowed the Marines to secure a large portion of the population with little expenditure of Marine manpower. At the height of the program in March 1970, over 425,000 people or 85% of the population in I Corps living in 810 hamlets were protected by CAPs or PF platoons formerly paired with Marine squads (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 6 and Southard 2014, 27). This was accomplished by a force of
approximately 2000 Marines and Navy Corpsmen and 3000 PF soldiers (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 1).

While estimating the number of Viet Cong killed is relatively easy to calculate, it is more difficult to determine the effectiveness of the CAPs in removing Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) or the support structures and “shadow government” installed by the communists in most contested villages. In many areas, the VCI had operated since at least the founding of the National Liberation Front in 1960 and many villages PF leaders reached informal non-aggression agreements with local VC commanders. Kopets (2002) and Peterson (1989) argue that the program was less effective than advertised by the Marines. Interviews with CAP veterans support this thesis (Peterson 1989, 89).

The CAPs were highly effective in neutralizing armed Viet Cong presence in villages. According to III MEF reporting in 1969, CAPs comprised thirteen percent of the PF platoons in the I Corps Area of Operation, but accounted for 36 percent of the enemy killed and 49 percent of weapons captured by PF platoons. Combined Action Platoons accounted for 17 percent of the total communist casualties claimed by all units in III MEF from 1966 to 1970, while comprising less than 2 percent of Marine personnel assigned to III MEF. Additionally, the CAP kill ratio (enemy killed compared to friendly dead) was 14:1 and the PF average in I Corps was 3:1 (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 10 and Thayer 1977, 31).

While Kopets and Peterson are probably correct that the CAPs were unable to completely dismantle the VCI in their villages, the CAPs did make it difficult for Viet Cong agents in the VCI to conduct their operations. This assertion is supported from several sources. In 1969, independent South Vietnamese public opinion surveys in 30
CAP villages reported that the people in these villages felt more secure with a CAP operating in their area. (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 13). Also, anecdotal evidence from several CAP reports of local officials moving back to their homes in villages and hamlets and of local elections and censuses being conducted by the government of South Vietnam without interference from the Viet Cong indicate that the population had less fear of VCI activities after the implementation of the program (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 4). Finally, there are several instances of entire hamlets moving into areas protected by CAPs that suggest villagers sought to escape areas where the VCI was able to operate with impunity (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 16 and Klyman 1986).

In addition to improving physical security in the participating villages, CAPs also improved local governance, another measure of overall human security. In January 1967, MACV instituted the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), an automated program designed to compile and analyze the state of pacification efforts in rural South Vietnam (The Simulmatics Company 1968, 9) The HES compiled 140 monthly and quarterly indicators that measured the status of areas of security and governance ranging from the presence and activity of friendly and enemy security forces, police, and civil administration, education, and local economic activity (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009, 340). The HES rated hamlets in these categories on a scale of 1 through 5 with five being the highest rating of full government control or economic development (Sorely 1999, 71). While not a perfect measure of security, governance, and economic activity, it provides a method to compare hamlets participating the Combined Action Program with those that were not.
In 1967, after only a year of participating in the program, the average security score for CAP hamlets was nearly twice that of the average security score in I Corps. The CAP hamlet score on the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) was 2.95 out of 5 and the I Corps average was 1.6. CAP PF forces improved twice as fast as un-partnered platoons and local governance also improved (Thayer 1977, 33). Also in 1967, 93 percent of villages with CAPs had elected village councils compared to 29 percent in non-CAP villages. Over 80 of village chiefs in CAP villages felt secure enough to sleep in their homes, while less than 20 of village chiefs in non-CAP villages felt safe enough to do so. Even after the Tet offensive of 1968 disrupted security across I Corps, CAP hamlets continued to outperform other hamlets in most indicators with CAP hamlet HES scores increasing by an average of .17 and non-CAP hamlets decreasing by an average of .34 points after the communist attacks (Corson 1968, 186).

The program also facilitated an improvement in other aspects of human security, including access to healthcare and sanitary sources of water. During the duration of the program, CAP Navy corpsmen provided over four million medical treatments and trained over 9,000 villagers in basic medical care (Brush 1994). Additionally, the Marine squads assigned to the program provided access to U.S. development aid and facilitated development projects generated and undertaken by the population of the hamlets. This not only increased ownership of the programs, but also directed aid toward areas of need identified by the inhabitants.

Another indicator of the success of the program is the view of the Viet Cong about the program. In several captured documents VC leaders indicated to their superiors and adjacent commanders that they were frustrated by how CAPs limited their
movements with captured documents warning other VC units that “You could not move anywhere because the Marines were always in the way” (Schwartz 1999, 66). To remove the threat posed by the CAPs to their freedom of movement and access to the population VC and NVA commanders attacked several CAPs with battalions to remove the threat (Klyman 1986). If the program had been ineffective, it is doubtful the VC would have warned their commanders about the problem or expended the resources to destroy them.

The final measure of the success of the program comes from military commanders and counterinsurgency experts. Most of these military professionals supported the program and lauded its benefits. According to General Walt, the commander of III MEF from 1965 to 1968 and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1968 to 1971, claimed in his memoirs that “no other US program in the Vietnam War as successful, as lasting in effect, or as useful a tool for the future” (Walt 1970, 105). This sentiment is echoed by noted counterinsurgency expert Sir Roger Thompson who studied the program as an advisor to MACV in the mid-1960s and commented that, “the use of CAPs is quite the best idea I have seen in Vietnam, and it worked superbly” (Andrew F. Krepinevich 1986, 174). In addition to these positive evaluations of the program the most positive endorsement of the value of the program came from ARVN commanders in I Corps. During the American troop reductions in 1970, the ARVN I Corps commander told the III MEF Chief of Staff, “I don’t care what else you do, but please don’t take the CAPs” (Klyman 1986, 15).

The Combined Action Program was not without problems. All the available literature and interviews with CAP participants negatively critique the limited training CAP Marines received upon entering the program, the limited Vietnamese language skills
of the Marines, and an uneven selection process. A survey of Marine participants in the CAP reported that they felt training was weakest teaching Marines Vietnamese culture and how to gain the acceptance of villagers and their participation in the program (Campbell 1968, 37). Additionally, the overall CAP program suffered from a lack of a unified plan to place CAPs in an interlocking and mutually supporting network of villages to create the “oil spot” effect described in classic counterinsurgency theory (Krepinevich 1986, 173 and Brush 1994). Despite these limitations and a lack of support from MACV throughout the life of the program, the program was successful my all objective measures. In the following section, this case study will examine the level of adherence to the factors of the model the Combined Action Program exhibited.

External Support and Oversight

The Combined Action Program demonstrated a high degree of external oversight and support in the form of the embedded Marine squads at the village level and oversight from III MEF leadership. Embedding Marines with the PF platoons allowed for sustained and intensive interaction with the PF. Oversight by the III MEF leadership provided the program with the attention that ensured the program received the manpower and material necessary to be effective and shielded the program from outside influences.

Oversight by the III MEF leadership also ensured ownership of the program by not only the Marines, but also their ARVN counterparts. From the inception of the program a CAP platoon could not be constituted and the Marine CAP squad in that platoon could not relocate to another village to partner with a new PF platoon until criteria set by III MEF had been met and the Commanding Generals of III MEF, later the U.S. Army XXIV Corps that replaced III MEF and the ARVN I Corps granted their
approval (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 2). This indicates continuous monitoring by both the Americans and their Vietnamese counterparts.

The oversight by Marines was not perfect. Gortzak (2014, 138) asserts that the effectiveness of the Combined Action Program was influenced by leadership quality, operational control, and recruiting of the members of the Marine CAP squads. Although Marine commanders required CAP Marines to be volunteers, have excellent service records and combat experience, these requirements were often ignored by subordinate Marine commanders. Marine commanders were required to provide a quota of Marines from their units for CAP duty, but they would not receive replacements for those Marines. In many cases Marine commanders would “volunteer” misfits and substandard performers from their units for CAP duty. In other cases, Marines volunteered for CAP duty to get away from their units and into duty that they hoped was easier than serving in an infantry company. As the program expanded in 1969 and selection for the program was moved to replacement depots in the United States, the selection criteria were relaxed and the overall quality of CAP Marines declined (Gortzak 2014, 146). Cursory or poor training also hindered the effectiveness of Marine oversight of the program. A universal theme in CAP literature and participant’s accounts is that poor language and cultural training prevented CAP Marines from effectively doing their jobs (Southard 2014, 49-69).

Lack of full support by MACV hindered the full effectiveness of the program. Marine battalions that were responsible for material and personnel support for the CAPs often were faced with the prospect of doing without key personnel and equipment since they were not guaranteed replacements. Often when units moved they would take all
their equipment with them, leaving a CAP without key equipment such as radios and machineguns (Peterson 1989, 36). Often CAP Marines were forced to conduct “midnight requisitions” or steal equipment necessary to conduct their mission (Corson 1968).

Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction

From the inception of the program, limiting the area of operations of the combined platoons to the traditional boundaries of the village complex became a guiding principle. As the III report on the program stressed, the CAP is “wedded to the people and the governmental structure of a particular geographical locality. The CAP is only concerned with only the enemy who enter (sic) or live in the CAP Tactical Area of Operation. The CAP’s geographical locality is thus fixed” (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 7). This focus on village defense and building local governance, not destruction of the enemy demonstrated a high degree of membership with the factor of limits to territorial jurisdiction (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 2).

Additionally, the members of the Popular Force platoon were all recruited and lived in the villages they protected. In one case, the members of the PF platoon were “related to 160 of the 200 families in our hamlet” (Corson 1968, 193). Except for the brief period of mismanagement by ARVN commanders in 1966 where PF platoons were removed from the program and used outside their villages with disastrous results, CAPs were never used outside their villages.

Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems

The CAP program demonstrated a “Mostly In” membership to this characteristic. Of the limited amount of training CAP personnel received, much of it involved how to integrate themselves into the social fabric of village life. First Lieutenant Paul Ek, the
commander of the first CACO and an officer with training in counterinsurgency and Vietnamese, spend time to instruct the CAP Marines in their place in the social structure of the village and how to interact in social settings so, they would be seen “not as an occupational force, but as members of the village, while at the same time carrying out their primary mission” of providing security (Klyman 1986, 4). This sensitivity to maintaining the traditional social structure and observing local customs can be interpreted as the most basic form of observing traditional justice structures.

The Marines also did not usurp the authority of the village chief and all non-security matters were deferred to him for decision (Corum, 1968, 165). As one CAP Marine recalled, a PF stated that “when we (Marines) came we didn’t try to impose a new way of doing something on them; we took their old ways and tried to show them how they could do it better” (Klyman 1986, 5). In the realm of local justice mechanisms, the Marines in the program did not introduce new structures or leaders, but maintained existing structures and leadership to minimize the disruptive nature of introducing the Marine squads into village life.

Local Sustainability and Accountability

The Combined Action Program demonstrated “mostly in” degree of membership with local sustainability and accountability. While there were mechanisms designed to give the local population and leaders a say in the conduct of the Combined Action Platoons, ultimate authority lay with the district chiefs who were appointed by the central government. While this is true, the ability of the Marine squad leaders depended to get the PF platoons to do anything and to get intelligence from the local population depended on being responsive to the local population. Additionally, since the program was not
fully supported by MACV and was taken from the finite resources of the Marines, the program had to rely on manpower and resources available in the villages making it sustainable.

At the inception of the program in August 1965 local accountability was a central feature when Lt Col. Taylor August established a “Civilian Military Advisory Council” composed of village representatives and military commanders to discuss problems of mutual interest (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 29). Through this council and regular coordination meeting with local leaders, all non-military CAP actions were conducted with the approval of village chiefs and all military actions were conducted after consultation with the village chief (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 30). This consultation with local leadership engendered ownership of all projects that were approved by the councils and were also designed to ensure sustainability by relying on agreed upon local labor to construct the project and use as little outside assistance as possible. Captain R. E. Williamson described the philosophy of the CAP program as a “do it yourself attitude” towards village defense (Williamson March 1968, 42).

In addition to being locally planned and executed, most CAP civic action programs were conducted outside of normal U.S. pacification programs, which the Marines found to be too slow and cumbersome to quickly respond to the needs of the population (Corson 1968, 189). This also meant that most of the CAP development aid and security operations were sustainable by the local population because they required little external inputs.

To operate outside of formal development channels and to foster local ownership of the CAPs, Corson implemented a program of sponsoring local co thoung, Vietnamese
chess matches and other fundraisers, that provided collective community budgets for
development. These funds were used for community development projects and village
defenses. This maintained Vietnamese pride by allowing them to buy needed materials
and giving them ownership in the projects (Peterson 1989, 40). Community funds were
managed by public councils and the amounts collected and disbursed were advertised in
the community to demonstrate community ownership and official accountability

Other mechanisms also fostered accountability and sustainability. In addition to
recruiting all PF personnel from local villages and requiring them to keep other
employment to supplement their income, other elements of the program fostered
accountability and sustainability. A high degree of local accountability was achieved
through one of the program’s biggest tactical weaknesses, a lack of unity of command. In
the program Marine and PF leaders only commanded the personnel assigned to their
respective units, so the Marine squad leader only commanded the Marines and the PF
platoon leader only commanded PF personnel; no one was in overall command. While
the lack of unity of command in the platoons caused problems with coordinating the
actions of the Marines and PFs, it fostered leadership within the PF that would eventually
lead to the turnover of security responsibilities to independent PF platoons and required
Marines to gain the cooperation of their Vietnamese counterparts (Peterson 1989, 26).
Coupled with the small U.S. footprint that Minimum U.S. footprint that was designed to
be “small enough not to be an abrasive factor in the life of the hamlet” shared command
meant that to get anything done they had to gain the support of local leaders, which
provided an accountability mechanism into the program (Corson 1968, 190).
Finally, the overall cost of the program was much more sustainable not only for the villagers, but also the South Vietnamese and U.S. governments. According to Fleet Marine Force, Pacific briefing materials (1967, 24) the annual costs of a popular force platoon was approximately $12,000 a year and a Marine squad cost $52,000. In comparison to the annual cost of $173,000 for a full Marine platoon, the program was clearly much more sustainable than full U.S. involvement.

Voluntary Participation by Local Elites

The Combined Action Program demonstrated a “more in than out” membership with the factor of voluntary participation. As mentioned in the previous section, the platoons adhered to a dual command structure with the PF Platoon leader. In turn, the PF platoon leader was directly responsible to the PF platoon under the operational control of the local District Chief (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 1). Additionally, district leaders had veto power over the program because Combined Action Platoons were formed only on the joint agreement of the district chief and the senior Marine commander in the area (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 18). While this was an attempt to gain Vietnamese buy-in for the program it did not extend control of the program down to the lowest level, the village. Finally, the PF platoon leader had no disciplinary authority over the members of the platoon; this authority being withheld at the district level. All authority rested with the district chief and to a lesser extent the village chief (Corson 1968, 181). These examples show there was an attempt at voluntary participation, but it only extended down to the district level chief whose appointment was approved by the central government.
The Marines were aware of the imperfect command structure that marginalized leadership at the lowest level. In 1970 a Marine study of the program found that the program’s PF chain of command was not in harmony with the spirit of political reforms enacted in 1966 and 1967 that were intended to give village chiefs more autonomy and power (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 15). In practice, the reform laws were watered down in security matters and did not give village chiefs control of PF units, but only allowed a village chief to request PF support in his village (Thayer 1977, 39). Due to the U.S. troop withdrawals at the time it appears that the report’s recommendation to fix this shortcoming was not acted upon by Marine leadership in Vietnam.

While official control lay with the district chief, day to day, informal leadership lay with the PF platoon leader and the village chief. While CAP Marine squad leaders often assumed tactical command of combined platoons, this was a temporary condition. The CAP units spent most of their time not in direct combat and the PF platoon leader exercised operational control of his men. Negatively, this led to instances of the PF commander ignoring the counsel of his Marine counterpart or refusing to participate in combined operations or training sessions, but it does indicate a level control by local leadership (Gortzak 2014).

This assertion is supported by the program’s first director, Lt. Col. Corson, who insisted that for the program to work, CAPs required the voluntary participation of local leaders. As Corson (1968, 181) notes, “By most of the accepted criteria for an effective military organization a CAP cannot exist, for a number of reasons: there is not unity of command; discipline is chaotic and arbitrary; (and) the PF is torn between two masters.” The program worked because “outside of combat the Marine sergeant and the PF platoon
leader share responsibility for the well-being of the entire platoon and operate on a basis of mutually agreed-to courses of action with respect to training, administration and allocation of housekeeping work” (Corson 1968, 181-182). This philosophy of joint control indicates that while there was no formal empowerment of local leadership in command of the PF platoon, there was de facto control agreed to on the ground.

Conclusion

The Combined Action Platoon can be considered an imperfect success. The program was never expanded to include more than 20 percent of the villages in I Corps and was periodically disrupted by the large unit war being waged between the U.S. Marines and the North Vietnamese Army, especially during the Tet offensive of 1968. The program also never gained the support of the overall American command, MACV. This limited the scope of the program and the resources available to it, including the quality of the Marines participating in the program and the amount of training they received. This made the program uneven in its effectiveness. Overall, the program was successful in increasing human security in the areas it applied with increases in physical security, governance and economic development.

The Combined Action program also demonstrated strong adherence to the model presented in this dissertation (see Table 6). The program highlighted the importance of external oversight with the rapid improvement of PF platoons in the program compared to those operating independently. Also, this case demonstrated a compelling case for limiting territorial jurisdiction with the near collapse of PF units when they were used outside of their villages in 1966, while PF platoons in CAPs maintained their cohesion and had no desertions.
This case also demonstrated a “mostly in” degree of membership with incorporating traditional justice systems and local accountability and sustainability. While the program was hindered by having to work within the existing system that gave most power to the district chief who was appointed by the central government, the program sought to cause as little disruption as possible in the lives of villagers and did not seek to introduce new forms of governance or justice systems. Throughout the existence of the Combined Action Program, the Marines operated the program using manpower and equipment available to them with little support from the U.S. Military Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV). This limitation coupled with mechanisms designed to gain local support such as Civilian Military Advisory Councils and community development funds fostered local accountability and sustainability.

The limitation of operating within the existing governance structure established by the Saigon government also limited the program’s adherence to the factor of voluntary participation by local elites to a “mostly in” degree of membership. While real power lay with the Saigon appointed district chief, the Marine squad leaders had to gain the support of the PF platoon leaders and village chiefs to conduct operations and train the PF members due to the parallel chains of command. The need to gain the cooperation of local leaders mitigated the overt chain of command.

Limited external resources hindered expansion of the program, but the sustained and intensive oversight by Marine squads produced an impressive increase in overall security and development in villages participating in the program. Controlling for inflation in the U.S. reporting systems, PF platoons participating in the program
improved at a higher rate than unpartnered PF platoons and provided security for their villages after the Marines moved to another village.

While the overall U.S. strategy in Vietnam ended in failure, the Combined Action Program was a success. Given the limited scope of the program, it brought sustained security to 20 percent of the villages and over 400,000 inhabitants in the I Corps region (Southard 2014, 10). Over 93 PF platoons assumed sole security for their villages and no former CAP village reverted to Viet Cong control during the duration of the program (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 2).

Table 6.
Membership of CAP Program with Community-Based Security Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/Membership</th>
<th>Fully In</th>
<th>Mostly In</th>
<th>More In Than Out</th>
<th>More Out Than In</th>
<th>Mostly Out</th>
<th>Fully Out</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>External Support and Oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limits to territorial jurisdiction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local sustainability and accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voluntary participation by local elites</td>
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<td>X</td>
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CHAPTER VIII - MISSION CREEP


Introduction

This chapter will explore the use of community-based security forces by the United States (U.S.) Army Special Forces in Vietnam from October 1961 until December 1970. Following a brief overview of the Montagnard ethnic groups in the Central Highlands of Vietnam and the entry of the U.S Army Special Force Vietnam War, then this chapter will provide a chronological overview of the establishment and evolution of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program. During this overview of the program, this chapter will include a discussion the organization of the program and the internal and external factors that influenced the program’s development. Next, after the pertinent details of the CIDG program are presented, this case study will include a detailed discussion of the degree of membership the case demonstrates for each factor presented in this dissertation’s model. Finally, this case study concludes with a summation of the findings and an application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix. This case study will demonstrate that the CIDG program started with high degrees of membership with all the factors of the model and was highly successful in providing security to the indigenous peoples of the Central Highlands of Vietnam. However, the program ultimately failed because as the program evolved after 1963, supporting conventional military requirements resulted in a failure to adhere to most of the factors in the model and population security was lost in the Central Highlands.
As American involvement increased in Vietnam during the period of 1964 to 1968, the CIDG program moved away from being a means to provide the Montagnards with the means to defend themselves from the communist Viet Cong (VC) in their traditional homeland. Instead the program became an instrument designed to provide intelligence to conventional U.S. units and provide security on South Vietnam’s border with Laos and Cambodia to prevent communist infiltration from North Vietnam. This translated into a program that relied on paid semiprofessional paramilitary forces to instead of voluntary membership or local sustainability. CIDG forces were sent far outside their traditional homelands to wherever planners from the U.S. Military Advisory Command – Vietnam (MACV) felt large communist units might infiltrate across the border. While the Special Forces continued to conform superficially to Montagnard culture and traditional justice systems, after 1964 the CIDG took on the organization and other characteristics of a military force.

One of the largest shortcomings of the program was the failure of the South Vietnamese government to provide adequate oversight and support of the CIDG program, especially when CIDG village complexes were deemed secure and the U.S. turned them over to the government for incorporation into existing security programs. This was due to several factors. First, the lowland ethnic Vietnamese typically treated the Montagnards as racial inferiors and were loath to provide them with adequate resources. Second, the successive South Vietnamese governments starting with the Diem regime were concerned about arming thousands of disaffected ethnic minorities in a region where government control was tenuous.
Coupled with USMACV directing the program away from population centers and into sparsely populated border areas to contribute to the conventional war effort, South Vietnamese distrust of the program meant that after the rapid success of the program in 1963 to 1964, the program failed. In spite of having over 40,000 men under arms in the CIDG program by 1967, the program failed to provide security to the Montagnard population and failed to close the border, a mission CIDG forces were not equipped or trained to accomplish (Kelly 1973, 82).

Background

The Central Highlands of Vietnam had been avoided by the lowland Vietnamese throughout most of their history, considering it an untamed frontier rife with disease and inhabited by ethnically distinct Austronesian-Malayo-Polynesian tribal peoples whom they considered to be moi or savages (Hickey 1982). Much like Native Americans inhabiting the Great Plains before the mid-nineteenth century, lowland Vietnamese considered the region and its inhabitants to be “politically unimportant peoples” because of the ruggedness of the mountainous and jungle terrain in the region that was unsuitable to agriculture (Michaud 2000, 336-337). This afforded the Montagnards a degree of autonomy until the French entered the region to exploit it to produce rubber, tea, and coffee. The inhabitants of this area were called Montagnard by the French after the name they gave to region of the Central Highlands, Plateaux Montagnards du Sud. (Prados 1995, 72).

In the 1960s Montagnards constituted the largest ethnic minority in South Vietnam with 600,000 to a one million people divided into 29 major tribes (Rheault 1977, 247). As depicted in Figure 1, while they comprised only 14 percent of the population,
they inhabited 75 percent of the territory of South Vietnam with the majority ethnic lowland Vietnamese clustered along the coastline (Kelly 1973, 20). Prior to their exit from Vietnam in 1954, the French had allowed the Montagnard tribes to govern their districts and villages under French provincial administrators.

Figure 1.

Distribution of Ethnic Groups in South Vietnam (Kelly 1973, 21)
The majority of Montagnard tribes practice unilateral decent based on matrilineal or patrilineal decent and adhered to a form of animism that required them to situate their homes and fields in harmony with the spirits they believe inhabit their surroundings (Benge 2010, 3). Of the major tribes participating in the CIDG program, the Rhadé, Mnong, Jarai practice matrilineal descent, while the Bru practice patrilineal decent. These practices dictate a strict prescription for married children to live with either the mother or father’s family. This results in married daughters living with their mother or “matrilocal” residence (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 22). This results in the Montagnards living in carefully placed longhouses housing an extended family of a dozen or more and the extended families conducting around slash and burn agriculture supplemented with hunting and gathering in congruence with natural signs that indicate the wishes of local spirits (Hickey, Sons of the Mountains 1982, 27)

Decent systems and animism also dictate specific leadership roles for the Montagnards. One such specialized role is the “water chief” who is responsible for organizing villagers to build canals or repair rice paddy dikes prior to the planting season and coordinating with other water chiefs in other hamlets for overall resource allocation (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 28 and Hickey, Sons of the Mountains 1982, 31). According to Gerald Hickey village leaders are selected by adult villagers by virtue of age, wealth, or experience and most leadership roles stayed within select lineages (Hickey, Sons of the Mountains 1982, 37-40)

Animism permeates the lives of the Montagnards with individuals and tribes consulting supernatural forces in all aspects of their lives (Hickey, Sons of the Mountains 1982, 23). This empowers other important figures in Montagnard leadership including
shamans and sorcerers. These individuals or in some cases village leaders and heads of households officiate over the rituals that punctuate every phase of Montagnard life (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 25).

After years of benign neglect by the French and then the lowland Vietnamese, the Central Highlands became important to both the governments of North and South Vietnam after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in the highlands of North Vietnam in 1954. According to one South Vietnamese general the similarities between the Central Highlands and the region surrounding Dien Bien Phu in North Vietnam led leaders on both sides of the conflict to believe that “those that control the Tay Nguyen (Central Highlands) hold the key to all of South Vietnam” (Benge, 2010, 4). This sentiment was echoed by General Vo Nguyen Giap, the victor of Dien Bien Phu and key strategist in the communist war effort, who said that "to seize and control the highlands is to solve the whole problem of South Vietnam" (5th Special Forces Group 2000, Annex 2, 23).

The North Vietnamese needed routes to infiltrate men and supplies into South Vietnam and base areas close to South Vietnamese population centers to support the efforts of the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong or VC) to overthrow the government of South Vietnam. The mountainous area of the Central Highlands provided them with a rugged and sparsely populated area to do this (Harris 2013, 3). Starting in the mid-1950s North Vietnamese communists infiltrated the Central Highlands to gain Montagnard support. The Viet Cong promised highlanders political autonomy in return for their support against the government of South Vietnam and would take Montagnard leaders north to show them tribal autonomous zones in North Vietnam and the benefits of supporting the communist cause (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 70)
By 1962 the Viet Cong had failed to recruit the Montagnard tribes into the National Liberation Front using their promises of regional autonomy. The Viet Cong leadership felt their soft approach had not gained expected results and in 1962 they took a firmer approach, using intimidation and violence to force Montagnard support. Coupled with friction caused by most of the Viet Cong cadre being lowland Vietnamese, Viet Cong demands for food and manpower heightened Montagnard animosity against the communists which created the opportunity for the CIDG program in late 1962 (Pike 1968, 251).

The government of President Ngo Dinh Diem not only wanted to block an obvious route for communist infiltration into the lowlands, but also wanted to integrate this undeveloped area into the nation and as space to relieve overpopulation in coastal areas (Harris 2013, 7). The Diem government relocated refugees from the North into the highlands. They distributed the best lands to the refugees and started collect taxes and banned the Montagnards from using crossbows, their traditional tool for supplementing their diet with game (Rheault 1977, 247).

The Diem regime installed lowland Vietnamese provincial governors to facilitate assimilation, but also replaced the Montagnard district chiefs with lowland Vietnamese the regime deemed more reliable (Prados 1995, 73). The lowland Vietnamese who moved into the Central Highlands were typically received the bulk of government aid and were overtly racist toward the Montagnards who they considered backward at best or at worst less than human. This opinion was typified by one Vietnamese woman explaining to an American official that Montagnards had tails like monkeys (Prados 1995, 73). As Gerald Hickey (Free in the Forest 1982, 48) learned in his extensive research in the
region, the lowland Vietnamese were tone deaf to the possibility that the Montagnards might be hostile to attempts to assimilate them into Vietnamese culture. In fact, Hickey noted that most government officials thought the Montagnards should be grateful to learn what they perceived as superior Vietnamese culture and political systems.

Coupled with the systemic and individual racism displayed by the lowland Vietnamese towards the Montagnards, the Diem government’s official policy of assimilation of relocating lowland Vietnamese to the highland fueled Montagnard fears that they were being subjugated by the government in Saigon (Prados 1995, 73). The Vietnamese resisted integrating Montagnard officials into the formal government structure because they spoke French, but not Vietnamese and were typically thought of as less capable than ethnic Vietnamese. As one province chief commented, “One Vietnamese clerk is worth three highland clerks.” (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 34)

The hostility of the South Vietnamese government drove the Montagnards into the communist camp by the 1960. While for the most part the Montagnards desired to be left alone by both sides, by early 1961, U.S. embassy reports estimated that over 50% of the rural population in the highlands were VC sympathizers.” (5th Special Forces Group 2000, 12). In September 1961, a report from the U.S. Embassy estimated there were two VC battalions and several hundred irregular guerrillas operating near Darlac province, the Central highland province with the largest Montagnard tribe, the Rhadé (Harris 2013, 9).

As part of the Kennedy administration’s plan to assist the government of South Vietnam by isolating the Viet Cong from their source of support in North Vietnam, the Central Intelligence Agency began developing plans to train small groups of tribesmen in the Central Highlands to conduct surveillance operations along North Vietnamese
infiltration routes (Prados 1995, 72). As part of this effort, the first U.S. Army Special Forces teams deployed to Vietnam in May 1960 to train Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) ranger units to conduct surveillance and commando raids in border areas (Prados 1995, 71).

In 1961 David A. Norwood and aid worker with the International Voluntary Services organization became concerned with the growing strength of the Viet Cong among the Rhadé tribe in the Central Highlands. He also observed that Viet Cong demands for food and manpower alienated that Montagnards (Harris 2013, 8). He approached U.S. Army Colonel Gilbert Layton, an officer on attached to the Central Intelligence Agency station in Saigon. The two came up with a plan to establish village defense groups among the Rhadé. The CIA Station Chief, William Colby embraced the concept and thought that after a proof of concept test could be applied outside of the Rhadé tribes (Prados 1995, 75).

Colby obtained approval for the program from the Diem regime during the same month, but with several caveats. Diem was wary of arming a population that was potentially antagonistic to his government. In order to maintain control of the program and to have it fit within his overall strategy of assimilating the highland populations, Diem required ARVN participation in the program. This came in the form of ARVN Special Forces (LLBD) being in overall command of the individual Village Defense Program camps (Prados 1995, 77).

In October 1961 a Special Forces medical sergeant, Layton, and Nuttle, who signed on as a contractor for the CIA, travelled to the Central Highlands to convince the Rhadé tribal leaders to adopt the program. Nuttle and Layton negotiated with the Rhadé
leaders that in return for weapons to defend themselves from the VC and aid from the South Vietnamese government, they would also claim nominal allegiance to the government while in reality they would really be fighting for their family and land (Harris 2013, 12-13 and Prados 1995, 77). The Rhadé leaders agreed to participate in the program and the village of Buon Enao was selected as the test for the program, which the CIA named the Village Defense Program (Prados 1995, 75).

As the CIA readied the weapons and other logistical requirements for the experiment, the inhabitants installed a perimeter fence around the village and dug bunkers for protection and as a symbol of the new allegiance to U.S. and South Vietnamese governments (Prados 1995, 75). As designed by Layton and Nuttle, the Village Defense Program had three goals. The first was to increase the security of minority populations. The second was to improve the relationship between the Saigon government and minority populations. The third was to promote sustainable economic development (Ahern 2010, 98). By January 1964, the CIA gained the support of the U.S. Army that provided Special Forces Operational Detachment A-113, commanded by Captain Ronald Shackelton to train and advise the tribesmen. On February 14, 1962, the Special Forces team ascended into the Central Highlands and started to train the inhabitants of Buon Enao (Prados 1995, 75). The operation was controlled, funded, and supplied by the agency separately from the Military Assistance Program and conducted on the Saigon government side by Diem’s Presidential Survey Office, his personal clandestine-activity agency, which commanded the South Vietnamese Special Forces (Cosmas 2006, 78).
The centerpiece of the Village Defense Program was the Area Development Center (Ahern 2001, 53). This center served as the village complex hub for the management of all political and economic development programs as well as the headquarters for the village defense system (Ahern 2010, 54). Through the Area Defense Center, the villagers the planners of the early CIDG program not only sought to promote security, but also sustainable economic development to show the benefits of allying with the government (Kelly 1973, 11-12).

Except for a small stipend provided for members of the strike force companies and a food allowance for CIDG members participating in training, the CIDG program did not provide direct monetary aid. Instead the program sought to spur economic development by providing materials such as scrap metal from Army salvage dumps to promote a blacksmith trade and foot powered sewing machines to develop a sewing industry (Ahern 2010, 57). The program was designed to be defensive with stationary hamlet militias and a company size mobile reaction force focused on defending the villager’s homes and land. Colonel Layton’s guiding principle for the program was to motivate the Montagnard by “Giv(ing) them something to fight for and something to fight with” (Ahern 2010, 54 and Moore 2007, 73).

The early CIDG program also focused on improving the health of the Montagnards. In addition to programs to improve sanitation and prevent chronic diseases, Special Forces medics trained health workers for each village and managed a central dispensary for treating serious cases. By the third month of the program, the Special Forces medics had trained medics for 88 villages and over 5,000 patients received medical care that month (Ahern 2010, 56).
The centerpiece of the program was providing the Montagnards with the ability to defend themselves against communist incursions into their territory. The military organization of the security plan contained two parts. The first element, the village defenders, later called the hamlet militia, formed the bulk of the personnel in the program. They were given two weeks of training and then organized into village security units with the size of the unit depending on available manpower and the local VC threat. The village defenders were part time and not paid for their services beyond a food stipend during their initial training period (Moore 2007, 45).

The second element in the program was the strike force. This was a company size (approximately 100-150 personnel) element that provided security for the Special Forces camp and Area Development Center. This force would also have acted as a quick reaction force in the case of a large-scale attack against any of the village defense units. The members of the strike force were full time members of the program and were given extra training and paid a salary (Moore 2007, 45).

The typical CIDG camp contained one U.S. Special Forces team, one South Vietnamese Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB) Special Forces team, four CIDG companies, and a reconnaissance platoon. CIDG companies were organized by tribe and each company was responsible for security of the villages corresponding to their tribal affiliation (Prados 1995, 77). To coopt the Rhadé leadership and to prevent Viet Cong infiltration, tribal leaders were required to vouch for the loyalty of each person volunteering for the program (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 76).

As depicted in Figure 3, the program rapidly expanded and by April 1962 the village defense program included forty villages with 14,000 inhabitants defended by 975
tribesmen (Prados 1995, 75). The pilot program was deemed a success with most roads in the district considered secure and the number of refugees leaving the district lower than in other surrounding districts (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 79). By October 1962 five additional Area Development centers were established. By this time over 60,000 villagers were protected by 10,600 village defenders and 1,500 strike force personnel (Harris 2013, 25).

Figure 2.
Buon Enao December 1961-April 1962 (Sherman 2000, 14)

The CIA station in Saigon and U.S. military deemed the pilot program a success with as shown in Figure 2, the entire Dar Lac province and it’s 140,000 inhabitants assessed as secure and village forces killing over 200 VC and capturing 460 (Ahern 2010, 59). CIA officials in Saigon proposed enlarging the U.S. Special Forces contingent to thirty-nine detachments and a establishing a group headquarters and to train, arm, and
equip a projected 100,000 irregulars. The U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group agreed and by December 1963 the program was expanded to all four tactical zones in South Vietnam and the Special Forces rapidly trained over 43,300 village militia and 18,000 strike force members from Montagnard tribes and other religious and ethnic minority groups (Prados 1995, 76).

While a success in securing large territories and thousands of disaffected minority groups from communist influence, the rapid expansion of the program began to raise concerns among American and Vietnamese officials. On June 28, 1962, the Kennedy Administration’s “Special Group” interagency committee for covert action decided the CIDG program had grown too large for the CIA to manage. The committee decided that the CIA and Department of Defense roles would switch with the Department of Defense becoming the lead agency and the CIA would assume a supporting role (Ahern 2010, 91-92). This was in response to perceptions in the Kennedy Administration that one of the causes of the failed paramilitary operation at the Bay of Pigs the year earlier had been caused partly because the size of the operation was beyond the capabilities of the CIA to manage. The Bay of Pigs prompted the creation of National Security Action Memorandum 57 that directed that whenever a paramilitary program became too large to be considered covert, the Department of Defense would be the responsible agency for the program (Bundy 1961). In keeping with this memorandum, the CIDG program as it was now called would be transferred over to the Army (Prados 1995, 77).

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65 Increase in force level, Paramilitary Forces (including Civil Guard, Self Defense Corps, and Civilian Irregular Defense Group), Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, subject files, 1963; http://hv.proquest.com/historyvault/docview.jsp?folderId=016488-001-0286&q=&position=-1&numResults=0&numTotalResults=193
This transfer was strongly supported by the Department of Defense, in particular the Army Staff. The Army Staff, which had a bias toward conventional operations and a distrust of the CIA and paramilitary operations wanted to regain control of the Special Forces in Vietnam. According to General William Depuy, the Army Staff “thought the Special Forces had a role to play, but we didn’t want them to play it under the CIA” and the Army “wanted to play its own game (Krepinevich 1986, 72). Henceforth the Special Forces and the CIDG program would be a component of the overall conventional strategy to defeat the communist insurgency.

The decision to shift responsibility of the program also coincided with the first large American military expansion in Vietnam in 1963. As conventional military considerations took on greater importance, John Richardson, who replaced Colby as
station chief and had less involvement in the program, shifted the focus of all CIA paramilitary operations in December 1962 from undermining the communist influence in South Vietnam to supporting conventional military operations. This guided all new expansion of the CIDG program towards the Laotian and Cambodian borders. The primary mission of the CIDG in these new areas would not be population security, but to act as early warning for communist forces crossing the border into South Vietnam.66

The CIDG program would reduce the number of hamlet militia and focus the majority of effort on fielding and employing reconnaissance platoons to monitor the border and strike companies. These companies would be used to attack VC base camps and interdict men and material being infiltrated from North Vietnam and to support regular ARVN units (Krepinevich 1986, 73-74). All existing Village Defense Program camps that did not contribute to this mission would be transferred into other population security programs (Ahern 2010, 106-107). As Thomas L. Ahren Jr. notes, this was the point when the Village Defense Program began to shift from community defense to mobile conventional operations designed to destroy communist forces (Ahern 2010, 95).

The CIA and the Army agreed on the changeover and instituted Operation Switchback in the fall of 1962 to shift responsibility for the program. As part of the operation, the Village Defense Program was renamed the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program the Special Forces activated the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in Vietnam to manage all Special Forces activities in Vietnam. As the unique logistical requirements of the program did not fit within traditional Army funding

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66 U.S. National Archives, RG 472, Box 142. 5th Group Evaluation of CIDG in II CTZ 28 Mar 70, p132.
programs, the CIA did not completely end its involvement in the program and continued to purchase weapons and equipment to arm CIDG members.\(^{67}\)

The Diem government was also becoming alarmed at the rapid expansion of the program and high officials were unaware of the how large the program had grown in only a few months. The Diem regime became aware of the size of the program in February 1962 at a celebration held in Buon Enao to celebrate the success of the pilot program and turn it over to the South Vietnamese government. General Ton That Dinh, the II Corps commander and Ngo Dinh Nhu, the president’s brother attended the ceremony. During the celebration Dinh informed Nhu that the Americans had armed 18,000 Montagnards and had “put an army at my back” (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 80). This alarmed Nhu who was concerned that the Montagnards, who had resisted assimilation into the South Vietnamese state, now had the means to resist and could possibly fight for autonomy.

Because of this growing concern and a fear that the program was creating allegiances to forces other than the government, the South Vietnamese government attempted to end the village defense portion of the CIDG program and reclaim the weapons issued to the village militias.\(^{68}\) As part of the reorganization of the program only the CIDG companies located on Special Forces/LLBD compounds would be the only forces allowed to retain their arms (Prados 1995, 82).

Throughout the spring of 1963 139 of the 214 villages in the CIDG program were folded into the Strategic Hamlet program which was controlled by the province chiefs


\(^{68}\) U.S. National Archives, RG 472, Box 6. CIDG support by US, 5th Group Correspondence.
installed by the central government.\textsuperscript{69} According to Hickey, the province chiefs were unable to support the villages and attempted to repossess the weapons issued to CIDG members with only approximately 2,000 of the over 20,000 weapons recovered. Additionally, ARVN support for the CIDG villages was slow and grudging and development projects such as health clinics were moved to areas dominated by ethnic Vietnamese.\textsuperscript{70} As these villages were converted into strategic hamlets, the strike force companies were removed from their villages and sent to border surveillance camps on the Cambodian border without notifying the strike force members in advance (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 87).

During the period of 1963 to 1965 the South Vietnamese government continued to inflame Montagnard bitterness though it’s continued unofficial policy of assimilation and resettlement of ethnic Vietnamese to the highlands. Gerald Hickey, an anthropologist and preeminent expert on the Montagnards witnessed several land title distribution ceremonies during this period and saw that two-thirds of the titles were given to ethnic Vietnamese (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 137).

While there had been several Montagnard autonomy movements in the 1950s and early 1960s, Montagnard dissatisfaction came to a head in 1964 due to the botched turnover of the CIDG program (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 47-89 and Ahern 2001, 114). This led several tribal groups to form the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Peoples (FULRO). This movement was led by a highland elite that coalesced

\textsuperscript{69} U.S. National Archives, RG 472, Buon Enao closeout meeting June 1963, 5th SFG A Detachment records.
due to the assimilation policies of the South Vietnamese government (Hickey, Sons of the Mountains 1982, 413-418).

On August 1, 1964 FULRO issued a manifesto promising to end the domination of the Montagnard by the Vietnamese and demanding the adoption of the Statute Particulier or policy of self-determination and regional autonomy which had been proposed by the French in 1951 (Hickey, Free in the Forest1982, 95). The growing frustration of the Montagnard and the growing unification of the tribal groups under FULRO led to a CIDG mutiny in five CIDG camps in the vicinity of Buon Enao on September 19 and 20, 1964. In each of the camps the CIDG soldiers detained their U.S. Special Forces advisors and captured or killed the LLDB teams in the camps (Prados 1995, 80-81).

The mutiny ended eight days later when an ARVN regiment surrounded the FULRO headquarters and General Nguyen Khanh, the leader of the military junta controlling South Vietnam in 1964, negotiated a settlement with the FULRO leaders. He rejected their demand for regional autonomy, but promised other reforms such as reinstating the Montagnard tribal courts, increasing the number of Montagnard officers in ARVN, and putting LLDB officers of Montagnard descent in command of several CIDG camps. These concessions were seen as superficial by most of the FULRO leadership, which proved to be correct and friction between CIDG units and the South Vietnamese government continued with uprisings occurring in July and December 1965 (Prados 1995, 81-82). Additionally, several FULRO leaders crossed the border into Cambodia to continue the fight against the central government with 1,000 to 2,000 strike force members and their weapons (Moore 2007, 76).
1965 marked the beginning of the US conventional unit build-up in South Vietnam, which caused a further shift in the priorities of the CIDG program. According to the 5th Special Forces Group report on the CIDG program published in 1971, the conventional American units arriving in Vietnam knew little about the regions they operated in. This ignorance of the operational environment led U.S. units to become dependent on intelligence collected by CIDG units. Operational control of all Special Forces units had already been transferred to the senior American military advisor in each Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) and in 1965 control was again transferred to the senior American commander in each CTZ (5th Special Forces Group 2000, 22). This ensured that CIDG units would fit into the operational plan for each zone and focus on the priorities of the conventional force.

The pressure to generate intelligence for the growing number of American divisions and corps forced the U.S. Special Forces to focus almost exclusively on collecting intelligence at the expense of population security. Intelligence collection on the borders and other communist infiltration routes became the primary mission for the CIDG program from 1965 to 1970.71 The CIDG program and its covert offshoots in the MACV Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG) were successful in this mission and they produced over 40% of all MACV ground combat intelligence, but at the expense of population security (5th Special Forces Group 2000, 29 and Kelly 1973, 87).

The end of the CIDG program started in 1969 with the adoption by the Nixon administration of “Vietnamization” or the turnover of all war fighting responsibilities to the South Vietnamese and a drawdown of American ground forces. The drawdown

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71 U.S. National Archives, RG 472, Box 141, CIDG Camp Construction Memo 25 April 1967, Page 123
directed that by the beginning of 1970 envisioned the discontinuance of the entire CIDG program. A combined Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) and MACV planning committee was convened on 20 March 1970 to affect a smooth and orderly termination of the CIDG program. The committee recommended that the CIDG forces be reduces from over 32,000 to 24,000 and that all remaining CIDG camps be converted to ARVN units between the months of August and December 1970. The border security mission would continue to be the main focus of the program and the mission would be assumed by CIDG units converted into ARVN Ranger Battalions. After these conversions were completed in December 1970, the CIDG program ended and all U.S. Special Forces returned to the United States. (5th Special Forces Group 2000, 30).

The CIDG program can be viewed as an overall failure. While the initial CIA program was successful in securing the population of the Central Highlands, after Operation Switchback any security gains were lost and the region returned to being contested territory (Kelly 1973, 41). Hickey recounts substantial bitterness among CIA officials he interviewed in the 1970s. Most complained that all the political and economic elements of the program were dropped in favor of a purely military operation and the entire purpose of the program was ignored. In their words, the focus of the program turned from a defense of the population and the U.S. military “turned them all into ‘kill operations” (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 81).


73 U.S. National Archives, RG 472, Box 141. Extract from AB-144, May 1969, Page132
The program’s success in border surveillance and interdiction is questionable. By 1966 the Special Forces had established 25 camps spaced approximately twenty-seven kilometers apart along the Cambodian and Laotian border (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 157). According to Krepinevich, the effective distance each base could support was twenty kilometers so communist units could effectively skirt the areas covered by CIDG companies and infiltrate South Vietnam unimpeded (Krepinevich 1986, 74). To cover these gaps, CIDG units conducted long range patrols that were ineffective because CIDG units were too poorly trained to operate without intense oversight by their U.S. advisors (Kelly 1973, 52). CIDG killed 90% of the enemy killed by Vietnamese forces.\textsuperscript{74} Even though CIDG forces claimed 90% of the enemy killed by Vietnamese security forces, a dubious statistic given the inflated body counts in Vietnam, the additional long-range patrols had no noticeable effect on communist infiltration with numerous VC and North Vietnamese Army units skirting the areas patrolled by the CIDG forces.\textsuperscript{75}

After Operation Switchback, CIDG companies were moved to locations outside of their homelands to meet military considerations and frequently had no connection with the local population. This allowed the Viet Cong to infiltrate villages in CIDG areas, coerce support from the population, and mass several large-scale attacks against CIDG camps with no warning from the local population (Kelly 1973, 54-55). The attack on Nam Dong on July 6, 1964 where Captain Roger Donlon won the first Medal of Honor earned during the Vietnam War is an example of this with two VC battalions infiltrating through a nearby village with no warning from the villagers. By moving CIDG members

\textsuperscript{74} U.S. National Archives, RG 472, Box 141, CIDG Camp Construction Memo 25 April 1967, Page 123
outside of their homelands, they prevented the collection of intelligence on local communist efforts and they also created new hardships among the Montagnards.

Arguably the CIDG program harmed the Montagnard population. According to Hickey (1993, 41) the CIDG program removed the most able-bodied males from the villages, resulting in most of the food production work to shift to women and the elderly. This caused a drop-in food production and lengthening the time required to harvest crops that caused food insecurity among the Montagnards. Additionally, the CIDG program caused large dislocations among the Montagnards. No CIDG program was successfully converted into other existing security programs, leaving a security vacuum in their wake.\textsuperscript{76} When the population of areas not protected by CIDG units were coerced by communist cadres, they were faced with two options. If they did not want to follow their men to remote border camps, they were forced to move to refugee camps. In these camps, they received little support from the government and were often discriminated against in favor of ethnic Vietnamese refugees (Hickey 1993, 103).

In the next section of this case study, the adherence of this case to this dissertation’s model will be analyzed. In keeping with Fuzzy Set QCA methodology, the assessments of other researchers, corroborated with primary sources, will be used to determine the case’s adherence to the model. The use of the assessments of others will mitigate bias in the assignment of degrees of membership.

\textsuperscript{76} U.S. National Archives, RG 472, 5th SFG Records. “Resume of the Conversion of CIDG to Regional Forces Status” November 1968.
External Support and Oversight

The CIDG program demonstrated a “mostly out” degree of membership with the factor of external support and oversight. While the program was run by the U.S. and the Special Forces equipped and paid the CIDG members, the intent of the program throughout its existence was to be a joint venture between the U.S. and the South Vietnamese (Rheault 1977, 247). As Kelly (1973, 17-18) notes, the major problem during the entire history of the program was a lack of commitment by the government of Vietnam. For the most part South Vietnamese participation in the program was a detriment either through a lack of initiative, ineptness, or outright displays of antagonism towards the Montagnards.

The South Vietnamese Army’s lack of support manifested itself most glaringly in the frequent refusal of ARVN commanders to assist CIDG forces that were attacked by large Viet Cong or NVA units. During the first three years of the program, CIDG camps at Plei Mrong, Nam Dong, and Dong Xoai were surrounded by VC regiments and nearly wiped out while the ARVN unit assigned to provide a quick reaction force either refused to relieve the camps or arrived well after the battle was over (Prados 1995, 79). In response to this problem, 5th Special Forces Group established company size strike forces in each CIDG camp and battalion sized Mobile Strike Forces at larger headquarters areas each comprised of ethnic Chinese Nung mercenaries who received specialized ranger training (Prados 1995, 79).

In addition to failing to support existing CIDG camps, the South Vietnamese hindered the expansion of the program and the transition of existing CIDG villages out of
the program and into other security programs. As Colonel Gilbert Layton, the original architect of the program, commented,

> each new offshoot was plagued by the ineptness, inefficiency, jealousy, corruptness, or subversiveness (sic) of civilian bureaucrats and military commanders…When the average Vietnamese civilian or military official moves into an area that has been restored to the sovereignty of Vietnam he ordinarily manages to antagonize the population and restore Viet Cong prestige. In short, the Viet Cong as an opponent is a secondary problem. The Vietnamese official is the real obstacle to success (Ahern 2010, 60).

More fearful of the enabling a Montagnard separatist movement and infected with a racial bias against the Montagnards, the South Vietnamese actively undermined the program when the Americans turned over oversight to them.

The example of this behavior by the Vietnamese occurred at Buon Enao, the pilot of the CIDG program. After achieving almost complete security of the region in less than a year, the turnover of Buon Enao was a complete failure. According to the 5th Special Forces Group after action report of the program (2000), by 1963 any gains in security made by the program in 1961 and 1962 were lost in the first months of 1963. As mentioned earlier, part of the original agreement with the South Vietnamese, the U.S. would turn over administration of secured villages to the provincial and district chiefs. As soon the transfer was enacted, problems arose. As the Army assumed control of the CIDG program, one of the unintended consequences was a breakdown of coordination between CIDG camps and district and province leadership. Previously, CIA case officers acted as the liaison between the Special Forces teams advising the CIDG forces and South Vietnamese government officials (Ahern 2010, 105-106). As part of Operation Switchback, the CIA reassigned their case officers, removing the direct oversight over
how the South Vietnamese officials administered the program. Problems arose almost at once.

A MACV study in December 1963 found that Vietnamese support for development projects in Montagnard areas was “non-existent” (Kelly 1973, 62). The province chief, Colonel Le Quang Tung, diverted funds to areas inhabited by Vietnamese settlers and stopped paying the CIDG strike force (Kelly 1973, 42 and Hickey 1993, 103). Noted to be openly hostile to the program, Colonel Tung also arbitrarily limited the number of Montagnard personnel on any CIDG camp to 300 without regard to the local threat (Ahern 2010, 97). Additionally, the province chief attempted to reclaim most of the weapons distributed to the Montagnards and moved CIDG strike force members out of their villages and divided up the companies to other areas he deemed more important. Kelly (1973, 41-42). These actions drove the Montagnards back into neutrality or at worst active opposition to the government as demonstrated by the widespread FULRO uprising in 1963.

In addition to a failure to support the program, the South Vietnamese failed to provide adequate oversight. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. designed the CIDG program to be a joint venture between the U.S. Special Forces and the Vietnamese LLDB with the ARVN Special Forces team leader in command of all Vietnamese forces to include CIDG members. In reality, the LLDB soldiers were of poor quality with most lacking the initiative or leadership qualities necessary to make the program effective.

In the Buon Enao pilot, the Vietnamese LLDB teams assigned to the CIDG program manned with Montagnards making up at least half the team, but after the expansion of the program, no attention was paid to the ethnic makeup of the LLDB teams.
(Kelly 1973, 24 and Harris 2013, 16). Overt racism by the Vietnamese LLDB team members towards the Montagnards diminished their ability to lead the CIDG members. One Special Forces officer noted that, “unless an American is present when the Vietnamese camp commander is issuing any type of order to the Montagnard commander, the latter will not obey” (Ahern 2010, 60).

As these examples have shown, the South Vietnamese not only provided poor support and oversight of the program, but in many cases actively undermined it. This was due mostly to the justifiable fear that Montagnards would use their newly acquired ability to defend themselves to challenge the authority of the repressive South Vietnamese government. Additionally, the poor quality of South Vietnamese officials and soldiers hindered their ability to manage the CIDG program.

Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction

The CIDG program demonstrated a “fully out” degree of membership with the limits to territorial jurisdiction factor of the model. The initial concept of the CIDG program was defensive and was as its original name the “Village Defense Program” implies, it was intended to provide the means for villagers to defend themselves and their land (Rheault 1977, 247-248). However, with Operation Switchback the focus of the program shifted to border surveillance and offensive operations that sometimes took the CIDG members far from their villages and into areas dominated by other ethnic groups or well outside the Central Highlands (Moore 2007, 73 and Rheault 1977, 252). In many cases new CIDG camps resembled “frontier forts,” placed in areas with no local population, but along likely communist infiltration routes (Rheault 1977, 250).
MACV made the shift in focus to mobile, offensive operations official by directing as part of Operation Switchback that Special Forces teams end the training of hamlet militia by April 1964 (5th Special Forces Group 2000, Annex 2, 18). The end of the hamlet militia signaled the transition of the CIDG into a mercenary force that could be sent anywhere military necessity required. While the stated guideline for the program was to use CIDG forces only within their local area, this did not happen in practice.\textsuperscript{77} As Figure 4 illustrates, 1963 forty camps were opened in border areas or along communist infiltration routes and eight camps were closed that did not fit into the U.S. conventional battle plan. During this expansion and reorganization, strike companies were regularly moved out of their home areas to man new camps (Kelly 1973, 37). At the height of the Vietnam War in 1968-1969, the practice of moving CIDG companies into different ethnic regions became so widespread that over fifty percent of CIDG companies were assigned outside their tribal regions (5th Special Forces Group 2000, Annex 2, 75-77).

\textsuperscript{77} U.S. National Archives, RG 472, CIDG Documents. Staff Study “Use of CIDG to Counter Guerrilla Threat in SVN,” July 1966.
Moving CIDG companies to areas without considering the ethnic makeup of strike companies or the impact on security in villages left without security had a negative impact on the morale of the CIDG members (Thompson and Frizzell 1977, 250 and Rheault 1977, 250). In 1962 and early 1963, no members of the strike force companies left the program. As companies moved to new locations after Operation Switchback, Montagnard desertions increased and recruitment efforts fell, so that from a strength of 38,000 in January 1963 the number of CIDG members fell to 19,000 in January 1964. (Ahern 2010, 109). For those who did join the CIDG, moving CIDG companies outside their tribal regions forced their families to become refugees and move into urban centers or refugee camps (Hickey 1993, 103, 168).

Gerald Hickey’s fieldwork among the Montagnards in the 1960s provides several examples of the lack of limits to territorial boundaries in the CIDG program. One example, although anecdotal was the popularity of a female singer from the Jarai tribe
that sang sad ballads about Montagnard forces being helicoptered to distant place to fight (Hickey 2002, 194). Hickey also witnessed several examples of the negative impact of the employing CIDG members outside their traditional homelands.

Two examples were the CIDG camps at Nam Dong and An Diem at both camps there were not enough of the local Katu tribe to man strike companies or they were not interested in the program. Therefore, the Special Forces brought in lowland Vietnamese from the coastal city of Danang (Hickey 1993, 137). In both cases, the CIDG leadership was antagonistic to the local population and the local population in turn allowed the VC to stage their forces in adjacent villages for attacks that overran both camps (Hickey 2002, 121-139).

Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems

The CIDG program demonstrated a “mostly out” degree of membership with the incorporation of traditional justice systems. As with the other factors in the model, there is a stark shift in degree of membership after Operation Switchback. When the CIA administered the program, there was a strict observance of local customs and traditional justice systems. In several cases CIA case officers modified security plans to adhere with local customs and left discipline and punishments to local leaders. Local leaders were responsible for selecting and disciplining the CIDG members and during training each member had to vouch for the loyalty of his neighbor (Kelly 1973, 26 and Harris 2013, 17).

This focus on local customs and operating the program within traditional justice systems motivated most of Special Forces soldiers in the program to undergo tribal initiation rights and officially joining the tribes they were advising (Prados, 1995, 78).
Ahern (2010, 58) provides one anecdote to illustrate the strict adherence to local justice systems in the early program. At one village participating in the Buon Enao pilot, the Special Forces team in the village ignored the execution of a Rhadé tribesman by village elders. The villagers beat the man to death with a shovel in retribution for his murder of another man’s wife, who he had beaten to death with a shovel (Ahern 2010, 58).

After Operation Switchback, the CIDG became a predominantly military organization with little regard for local justice systems. Special Forces soldiers continued to be inducted into the dominant tribes represented in their CIDG companies to gain their trust (Sochurek 1965). In several cases Special Forces soldiers leveraged local justice and systems to defuse tensions between the Montagnards and Vietnamese officials. In one case Hickey (2002, 185) observed Special Forces soldiers compelling a local shaman, the King of Fire, to pass a negative judgment on the FULRO rebellion to persuade CIDG members to lay down their arms. Despite these isolated or superficial attempts to utilize traditional justice systems, there was no overt attempts to incorporate traditional justice systems into the CIDG program.

Local Sustainability and Accountability

The CIDG program demonstrated a “fully out” degree of membership with the factor of local sustainability and accountability. In keeping with this case’s degree of membership with the other factors of this model, the CIDG program started with a high degree of membership with this factor and then reversed after Operation Switchback.

One element of the early program designed to promote sustainability that was abandoned after Operation Switchback was the Truong Son Cadre Program. Through this program the CIA train Montagnards in basic medical care, intelligence collection,
administration, education, and agriculture and to act as liaisons with provincial
governments. The purpose of this program was to build an indigenous force of
administrators, security, and medical personnel who could sustain the subordinate
programs of the overall CIDG program after the U.S. advisors moved on to another area
(Benge 2010, 6). After Operation Switchback, CIA case officers administering this part
of the program were withdrawn and U.S. Special Forces and Vietnamese officials did not
attempt to replace them (Kelly 1973, 63). While the Special Forces continued to provide
medical aid to the inhabitants around their camps, no attempt was made build a locally
sustainable system (Kelly 1973, 155).

The early program also demonstrated a high degree of accountability, but the
focus on local ownership was abandoned after Operation Switchback. An integral part of
the program was the “village defense leadership team” the included Special Forces
advisors, district officials, and tribal leadership. This group met weekly to discuss the
status of the program and address any issues the villagers had with the security forces or
development programs (Harris 2013, 19). After Operation Switchback and the
curtailment of the hamlet militia and development programs, the village defense team and
the Area Development concepts were abandoned (5th Special Forces Group 2000, Annex
2, 17).

The most critical element of sustainability, matching the size of the security force
to a level sustainable by the local population was also abandoned after Operation
Switchback. In the early CIDG program, hamlet militia and strike force companies were
sized to levels sustainable by local manpower and appropriate to the local threat (Kelly
1973, 27). When the priority of the program shifted from population security to border
security, local sustainability was ignored. CIDG companies were standardized along the lines of conventional infantry companies and no regard was given to the number of personnel an area could provide or sustain. Also, the village militia became a secondary priority and few were trained after the summer of 1963 (Moore 2007, 74) (5th Special Forces Group 2000, Annex 1, 5).

In the early CIDG program, each CIDG force differed in size depending on the local population and the security threat. To make CIDG units interchangeable and similar in capability, in March 1964 5th Special Forces Group published a table of organization and equipment (TO&E) that standardized the size and equipment of CIDG strike force companies (Kelly 1973, 47). When local resources could not supply the needed manpower for a standard CIDG camp Special Forces commanders recruited strike force members from other regions and transported them along with their families to camps along the border (Hickey 1993, 137, 139).

To induce recruits to join the CIDG and move away from their homes, the Special Forces were forced to offer pay and incentives higher than offered by the ARVN (Kelly 1973, 34 and 5th Special Forces Group 2000, 28). The need for CIDG manpower only increased as the war progressed. Seen as a cost-effective alternative to American or ARVN units, in mid-1965 the CIDG program was expanded to include Mobile Strike Force or “Mike” force battalions designed to act as quick reaction and exploitation forces for CIDG camps (5th Special Forces Group 2000, 27). At the height of the CIDG program in 1968 there were nineteen Mike force battalions operating throughout Vietnam, with the majority operating in and around the Central Highlands. Each of these battalions had three companies with approximately 600 CIDG members (Benge 2010, 5).
The establishment of Mike force battalions were the final evolution of the CIDG program away from a locally sustainable security force to a conventionally equipped paramilitary force that required total support from external sources. The leadership of the 5th Special Forces Group admitted in their after-action report that this had been a mistake and “that commitment to the border surveillance presented a serious departure from Special Forces doctrine and methods the program came to rely on financial remuneration rather than desire of locals to defend their village against the VC” (5th Special Forces Group 2000, 24).

Voluntary Participation by Local Elites

The CIDG program displayed “mostly out” membership with voluntary participation by local elites. As with all the factors in the model, the CIDG program displayed a high degree of membership until Operation Switchback in 1963. During the initial experiment at Buon Enao, David Nuttle, an American aid worker and later a CIA contractor, befriended the Buon Enao village chief Y-Ju who became part of the overall leadership team for the program (Harris 2013, 15). Rhadé leaders, many of whom had learned English from protestant missionaries and saw the benefits of participating in the program, were enthusiastic to join the program and served as key members of the village defense leadership teams (Hickey 1993, 40; Harris 2013, 25 and Moore 2007, 46). According to Master Sergeant L.R. Fisher, one of the Special Forces soldiers assigned to the Buon Enao project, “Within the first week, they (Rhadé Tribesmen) were lining up at the front gate to get into the program. This kicked off the recruiting program, and we didn't have to do much recruiting. The word went pretty fast from village to village” (5th Special Forces Group 2000, 13).
The completion of Operation Switchback ended most of the non-military elements of the program and this resulted in a diminishment of relationships with local leaders (Ahern 2010, 107). Moore (2007, 86) did find that the traditional governance structure in villages participating in the CIDG program remained largely unchanged throughout the existence of the program because of benign neglect by American and Vietnamese forces. Unlike the VC, U.S. forces did not attempt to install replacement ruling structures or coopt local leaders. He found that in most cases the power and prestige of local leaders was increased with the addition of the armed force provided by the program if the CIDG companies remained in their village (Moore 2007, 98). However local leadership was not formally integrated into the structure of the CIDG units unless the local leader joined the CIDG program and were selected to lead by the Vietnamese.78

After Operation Switchback, all expansion and overall management of the program stating in late1963 went through district or province chiefs rather than through tribal leaders (5th Special Forces Group 2000, Annex 2, 14). By failing to incorporate local leaders into the security structure, the CIDG program provided competing leadership organizations the opportunity to mobilize the newly armed CIDG members for their own purposes, often under the noses of U.S. and Vietnamese advisors. The FULRO uprising is the best example of this phenomenon. FULRO members created a parallel leadership structure within the CIDG units, collected taxes on CIDG members, and extorted potential recruits for bribes to join the force. The Special Forces assigned to the camps infiltrated by FULRO were caught unaware of the problem and seven of the eight camps in the Buon Enao were taken over by FULRO (Hickey 1982, 165-166, 169-170).

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78 U.S. National Archives, RG 472, CIDG Documents. CIDG Outgoing Officer Questionnaire 1964.
The CIDG program demonstrated that failing to incorporate local leaders into the program presents numerous dangers for a community-based security program. The program started with a strong commitment to coopting local leadership. By shifting to a purely military focus the program excluded local leaders and forced them to seek alternative avenues to maintain their power and mitigate abuses by the government of South Vietnam.

Conclusion

As the previous section has demonstrated and as shown in Table 7, the CIDG program demonstrated little adherence to any of the factors in the model and was also an overall failure in protecting the population and territory in the Central Highlands from communist influence. The program exhibited stark contrast between the initial success of the program that also adhered closely to the model and the failures of the program after Operation Switchback.

While the U.S. Special Forces provided adequate arms and other supplies, the CIDG program failed to demonstrate adequate external oversight and support. Vietnamese racism and fears of Montagnard separatist movements hindered the government of South Vietnam from supporting CIDG villages during or after their partition in the program. This resulted in any gains won during the establishment of the program in an area being lost after American forces moved to another area.

After Operation Switchback, any attempt to keep CIDG forces operating in their home areas was abandoned. During the American buildup in 1965, the CIDG forces were subordinated to the attrition strategy practiced by American forces. CIDG forces were sent to border areas far outside their homelands, often with disastrous results.
Sending CIDG companies outside their home areas negatively impacted adherence to other elements of the model such as local accountability and sustainability and voluntary participation by local political entrepreneurs.

While Special Forces soldiers adhered to a superficial observance of traditional justice systems by following Montagnard cultural practices, the CIDG program ignored any meaningful incorporation of traditional justice systems. Coupled with a failure to coopt local elites, the CIDG exacerbated Montagnard-Vietnamese relations, resulting in the FULRO rebellion. Additionally, by excluding Montagnard leadership, the Viet Cong were able in many cases to operate freely in CIDG camps because CIDG forces had little connection to the villagers they were nominally protecting.

The CIDG program demonstrated a tragic opportunity lost. The program started with a strong adherence to the factor of the model and enjoyed a rapid success in securing large portions of the Central Highlands. By abandoning the mission of population security in favor of supporting conventional forces, the CIDG program ultimately failed.

Table 7.
Membership of the CIDG Program with Community-Based Security Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/Membership</th>
<th>Fully In</th>
<th>Mostly In</th>
<th>More In Than Out</th>
<th>More Out Than In</th>
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<th>Fully Out</th>
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<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local sustainability and accountability</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Voluntary participation by local elites</td>
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CHAPTER IX - TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE

South Vietnam’s Territorial Forces

Introduction

This chapter will explore the use of community-based security forces or territorial forces by the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) and the United States (U.S.) during the Vietnam War from 1961 to 1975. During this overview of the program, this chapter will include a discussion of the organization of the program and the internal and external factors that influenced the program’s development. Next, after the history of the territorial forces is presented, this case study will include a detailed discussion of the degree of membership the case demonstrates for each factor presented in this dissertation’s model. Finally, this case study concludes with a summation of the findings and an application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix. This case study will demonstrate that the territorial forces varied in degrees in membership with the factors in the model, but failed to adhere consistently with any of the factors and failed to provide adequate population security.

The Territorial Forces, comprise of Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF) respectively were formed in 1963 from the existing paramilitary Civil Guard and People’s Militia that were formed in 1956 by the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem (Cao Van Vien; Ngo Quang Truong; et al. 1980, 139). The RF were organized as volunteer, locally recruited company-sized units that provided security in the provinces that they were recruited. The PF forces were comprised of volunteers operating as platoon sized units intended to provide security for villages against squad sized Viet Cong (VC) units and VC political infrastructure (VCI). Both forces were originally
designed to be locally recruited and employed in the area where they were recruited.

During the first year of the program’s existence in 1963, the RF was a fulltime paid force, but the PF was a part time, unpaid force.

As will be discussed in the following sections of this case study, both forces never received adequate support and supervision during their existence. During the early existence of the program from 1963 to 1968 the territorial forces received inadequate arms and equipment from the U.S. in order to create a large and modern Army of South Vietnam (ARVN). This period of inattention by the U.S. and GVN allowed the VCI to insinuate itself into the fabric of rural South Vietnam. Starting in 1968 after the Tet Offensive, U.S. military and civilian official realized that securing the countryside was the key to defeating the communist insurgency. Unfortunately, while the U.S. exponentially increased material and training support for the RF and PF, they never established a system that would provide sustained oversight over the program by the GVN or U.S. forces. The result was a local security force that depended on the hit or miss quality of local leadership.

The territorial force program did not to adhere to the other elements of the model. The territorial forces and local civilian leadership were not authorized by the GVN to enforce traditional justice systems, except for the period between 1969 and 1971. Even during this period, the GVN watered down this authority in an attempt to maintain the power of the central government.

In addition to limiting the ability of local security forces from exercising local justice systems, throughout the history of the program, RF and PF units were frequently deployed outside of their territorial jurisdictions by GVN officials. Throughout the
Vietnam War territorial forces were increasingly turned into regular military forces and expected to assist ARVN and U.S. forces in large scale conventional operations as the war shifted from a guerrilla war into a conventional conflict. This negated their greatest strength, knowledge of the local environment, and reduced the morale of their personnel due to extended absence from their families.

The territorial forces also exhibited little adherence to local sustainability. Village and Hamlet leaders had no authority over the RF and PF units in their sector. Even after reforms in 1968 granting them tactical control over those forces, the legislation that provided them with this authority diluted this power by allowing them only the ability to recommend individuals to district and province chiefs, but the power to appoint and discipline territorial forces was reserved at the district and province level. Coupled with the frequent deployment of RF and PF forces outside their home areas resulted in a division between the populace and the territorial forces.

Additionally, the program lacked local sustainability. While the PF were designed to be a part time force with the members of the force being volunteers who made the bulk of their income from their previous employment, as the security situation in South Vietnam deteriorated, the PF forces became a full time military force that relied on external funding to maintain the program. This conflicted with centuries old Vietnamese practices for raising militias that severed another link between the populace and the territorial forces and caused the territorial forces to collapse when American funding was withdrawn.

Finally, the territorial force program failed to win the voluntary participation of local elites. Throughout the program, RF and PF leaders were either military officers
assigned from other areas or elected by officials outside the community they served. This process was contrary to the traditional rural Vietnamese methods for leadership selection and created considerable discontent in the RF and PF units and created leaders that were beholden to the central government and not the local populace.

Throughout the history of the territorial forces, RF and PF units were universally regarded as poorly supervised, led, motivated, and equipped. While the U.S. improved the training and equipment of the RF and PF, they were never able to overcome the deficiencies in supervision and leadership. This resulted in local security forces that were more interested in self-preservation than defending their communities. The majority literature on the territorial forces agree that the opportunity to turn the territorial forces into an effective local security force was in 1963 to 1964. This was the period before the VCI became firmly entrenched in village life and the evolution of the conflict into a pseudo-conventional war with the introduction of large U.S. and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) conventional units.

As this case study will demonstrate the territorial forces were on the whole an ineffective force in the fight to secure the rural areas of South Vietnam. RF and PF forces demonstrated little adherence to the elements of the model and failed to provide an effective counter to the VC, VCI, and NVA. While some of the deficiencies were addressed in the period after 1968, the fundamental flaws of a lack of supervision and the other elements of the model that promote a connection to the local populace were never adequately addressed. In the following section this case study will provide an overview of the evolution of the territorial forces and the political and military factors that influenced the program.
Background

The use of community-based militias dates to the eleventh century and was based on the provision of collective provision of manpower by the village and not individual conscription (Jenkins 1971, 35-37). This system was first disrupted by the French in 1950 when they formed the Vietnamese Armed Forces as a conventional military based on the Western model. The French also formed South Vietnamese auxiliaries in the 1950s to man static defenses around villages and critical infrastructure, but the main focus was on building a large conventional army to prevent invasion by conventional Viet Minh units (Hoang 1980, 13-14).

The auxiliaries received varying degrees of support from the French in the period of 1950-1955 dependent on the perceived loyalty of the ethnic or religious group comprising each auxiliary unit (Hoang 1980, 16). After the exit of the French from Indochina in 1955, the South Vietnamese government organized the existing auxiliary regiments into the Civil Guard (CG), later the RF and the Self Defense Corps (SDC), late the PF (Collins 1975, 8). Under this program the civilian province chiefs were responsible for recruiting and commanding Civil Guard units and the Interior Ministry was in administrative control and support of the overall program (Hoang 1980, 19).

The focus on developing a large conventional South Vietnamese Army resumed in 1956 when the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (USMAAG) took over military assistance to South Vietnam from the French. Influenced by the Korean War, the American military leaders of USMAAG, agreed to expand the CG and SDC to 59,000 and 60,000 respectively, but were primarily concerned with preparing the South Vietnamese military for a conventional attack by the North Vietnamese (Hoang, 1980, 7
and Collins 1975, 8). This conflicted with the desires of South Vietnam’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem who wanted to organize a large paramilitary army comprised of professional officers and manned with territorial units drawn from rural areas. As a condition for continued U.S. aid, the Vietnamese were persuaded to adopt a plan the directed majority of resources towards building a small, well equipped professional army filled with fulltime draftees and designed for mobile warfare (Hoang 1980, 64 and Brigham 2006, 5).

Diem continued to advocate for strengthening the Civil Guard into the early 1960s, but his concern was not population security. Always concerned about challenges to his regime, especially from the army, Diem wanted to equip the Civil Guard to the same level as the army to create a counterbalance against a coup (Nag 2002, 122). USMAAG continued to resist GVN requests to turn the CG and SDC into a fulltime paramilitary, citing a 1960 study conducted by Michigan State University that recommended USMAAG train and equip the CG into a rural constabulary force that focused on policing duties (Ngo 1981, 188 and Hoang 1980, 66).

The security situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate in 1960 and 1961 after the communist National Liberation or Viet Cong (VC) launched their armed struggle for control of South Vietnam. It became apparent to U.S. leaders that increased support of the GVN would be needed to prevent a communist takeover of the country. In response, the Kennedy administration in early 1961 approved a counterinsurgency plan developed by the U.S. embassy in South Vietnam. The counterinsurgency plan authorized an increase in the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and to improve rural security $12.7 million to increase in the Civil Guard to 68,000 and reduce and convert the SDC
into a 40,000-man People’s Militia (PM) (Hunt 1995, 14). This plan was agreed to by the Diem regime and subsequently formalized in the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations (Cao, et al 1980, 139).

Problems arose immediately because under constraints of U.S. legal code restricting military aid to non-military forces, the U.S. military could not train or equip the Civil Guard because it fell under the Ministry of Interior. Prior to 1961 United States Operations Mission (USOM), the field agency for United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided aid to the Civil Guard. Since USOM and USAID were not legally allowed to distribute lethal military aid, the Civil Guard languished as second-class citizens behind the army and were supplied with abandoned or captured French and Japanese weapons (Hunt 1995, 13 and Krepinevich 1986, 219).

Diem yielded to U.S. demands and in 1961 transferred the Civil Guard to the Ministry of Defense, however province chiefs still commanded the units (Hoang 1980, 66-68). This arrangement remained in effect from 1960 to the end of 1964 with province and district chiefs maintaining operational control of the territorial units and the Army responsible for training and supplying the units (Collins 1975, 41).

In addition to the CG and PM, the Diem regime’s ill-fated Strategic Hamlet program also formed self-defense units by lending weapons to villagers who would then have to capture weapons to sustain their defenses. The Strategic Hamlet program collapsed by 1963 because the government lacked the capacity to support the its rapid expansion and villagers resented being forced to move out of their ancestral lands into new and usually poor accommodations in Strategic Hamlets. This resulted in poorly
trained and motivated self-defense units that were easily cowed by superior VC units (Hoang 1980, 27-28).

In 1963, after a military coup overthrew the Diem regime, the Strategic Hamlet program was abandoned and the Civil Guard and People’s Militia were renamed Territorial Forces with two components, the Regional Forces (RF) and the Popular Forces (PF). The PF organized into platoon size units whose members were drawn from the village/hamlet complex where a PF platoon operated. The mission of the PF was to defend villages from small VC forces, to prevent the agents of the VC political infrastructure (VCI) from establishing themselves in villages, and defend critical infrastructure. The RF operated as companies within a single district with its full-time members drawn from the district. The purpose of the RF was to create a buffer around villages, keeping communist units large enough to overwhelm PF platoons away from the villages in the province. (Hoang 1980, 36-38).

In 1964 with the security situation rapidly deteriorating and the GVN debilitated by purges as the military government consolidated its power, the GVN launched the “Victory Plan” to pacify the countryside (Ngo 1981, 7). The plan was designed to expand and improve the quality of the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) and to a lesser extent, the territorial forces. Prior to 1964, there was no training program for territorial units that according to General James Collins (Collins 1975, 42) resembled “armed gangs of young men” or “private armies” that had been rapidly pressed into national service. As part of the Victory Plan all territorial forces would receive a standardized basic training program with RF receiving four weeks of annual refresher training and PF platoons receiving two weeks (Collins 1975, 42).
Between 1964 and 1966, the territorial forces continued to increase in size with the RF growing from 92,000 to 141,000 and the PF expanding from 159,000 to 176,000 (Hunt 1995, 39). During this period territorial forces were integrated into the South Vietnamese Armed Forces and the staff of the territorial force program were integrated into provincial headquarters and staffed with ARVN personnel to improve coordination. Additionally, RF and PF logistics units were integrated into ARVN units to improve territorial force supply issues (Ngo 2010, 189). While these reorganizations were designed to address dire problems in the territorial units, they coincided with the “Americanization” of the war with the introduction of American ground combat units and the shift in the war from an insurgency to a quasi-conventional war. This shift in focus drew the attention of American and South Vietnamese leaders away from overseeing the reforms to fighting the conventional war. As a result, the territorial units continued to languish into 1967 with poor leadership, ineffective organization, and resource scarcities (Krepinevich 1986, 215).

As U.S. units increasingly took over the mission of attacking large communist units, the ARVN was given the mission of pacification with over 60 percent of ARVN infantry battalions assigned to pacification support. In October 1966 Manila Conference, U.S. and South Vietnamese agreed to the Combined Campaign Plan for 1967 that formalized this division of labor (Cao et al 1980, 141). This left the RF and PF without a clearly defined role and reduced expectations for performance (Ngo 2010, 196). An attempt was made in 1967 to improve the employment of the territorial forces through the creation of RF and PF commands. These command elements did not command territorial forces, but rather managed logistics and training. The district and province chiefs
employed the forces in the field. After the coup against the Diem regime, all civilian province and district chiefs had been replaced with ARVN officers to ensure regime loyalty (Collins 1975, 72). This created a bifurcated system where the territorial force commands had no interest in their effectiveness, the province and district chiefs had no interest in properly equipping them and both organizations were staffed with individuals interested in maintaining the favor of their ARVN superiors.

In addition to these less than effective organizational changes, a shift in South Vietnamese military thinking about the relative worth of the territorial forces occurred during the conflict due to the pressure exerted by the Americans to adopt a western style of warfare. This led ARVN leaders to press for the expansion of the conventional conflict and the modernization of the ARVN at the expense of the territorial forces, according to South Vietnamese General Hoang Ngoc Lung (1980, 1985). By 1967 the South Vietnamese had adopted all American field manuals as their own doctrine and ARVN officers resented being relegated to pacification missions. This led them to give grudging, if any support to support of territorial units while they enviously watched the American fight the “real war” against the NVA and Viet Cong main force units (Hunt 1995, 75). This is ironic because throughout the war, except during the 1972 communist Easter Offensive, territorial forces suffered more casualties and inflicted more enemy casualties than the ARVN between 1965 and 1972 (Thayer 1985, 106). In spite of the territorial forces fighting the brunt of the war in rural villages, ARVN support remained poor throughout the war. On average territorial forces in contact receiving artillery support or ARVN ground unit support after waiting over an hour and up to a day respectively (Hoang 1980, 53).
In 1967, as control of the countryside shifted in favor of the VC, American civilian and military leaders began to shift their thinking about the importance of the “other war” of pacifying the communist insurgency in the rural areas of South Vietnam. American leadership in Washington and Saigon recognized that one of the problems of the pacification program was there was no overall control of the numerous pacification programs with each agency administered their own programs with little coordination. In 1967 President Lyndon Johnson appointed Robert Komer as Special Assistant to the President for Pacification in an attempt to gain cabinet level coordination over the pacification effort in Vietnam. During his first visit to Vietnam in 1967 Komer found that the majority of territorial units were poorly led and equipped with RF and PF units using second or third hand WWII-era weapons handed down from ARVN units (Colby 1989, 241).

After an aborted attempt to coordinate all civilian pacification programs through the Office of Civil Operations under the State Department in the first part of 1967, MACV formed the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development program (CORDS) in May 1967 with US military and civilian organizations melded into a single entity at the province and district level under the direction of Komer. (Jones 2013, 118-119 and Cao, et al 1980, 131).

As the first director of CORDS, Komer realized that the territorial forces were an underdeveloped asset in providing the security necessary to allow political and economic development programs to take hold. In May 1967, he successfully lobbied General William Westmorland, the MACV commander, to have responsibility for advising and assisting the RF/PF shifted from the MACV Operations section to CORDS. According to
Hunt (1995, 91) this decision was critical for the temporary improvement of the RF/PF between 1968 and 1970.

Under his rapid pacification plan, titled “Operation Takeoff,” Komer planned to improve the equipment and training of the territorial forces as quickly as possible. Komer first gained the approval of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and MACV Commander General William Westmorland to deploy an additional 2,243 American advisors to train the territorial forces. To put this increase in perspective, in 1967 the advisor to territorial force member ratio was 1 to 929 and the ARVN ratio was 1 to 23. This increase constituted a 2,076 percent increase in territorial force advisors (Hunt 1995, 106-108).

The 2,243 advisors would be formed into 353 Military Advisory Teams (MAT) whose mission was to train territorial units. MATs were made up of two company grade officers and three noncommissioned officers and an interpreter. Each team was assigned three to six RF companies or an unspecified number of PF platoons (Cao, et. al 1980, 131). To maximize the number of RF companies or PF platoons a MAT could advise in their tour of duty, the teams would advise RF and PF units from their formation in basic training and accompany them until they reached an acceptable level of proficiency and then move to another unit (Hunt 1995, 108-109).

CORDS also focused on expanding and modernizing territorial units. RF/PF units received a higher priority for weapons than ARVN units. In 1968 territorial units received a higher priority for weapons over the ARVN and received over 200,000 weapons of which 100,000 were modern M16 rifles (L. Sorley 1999, 72 and Colby and McCargar 1989, 254).
At the urging of Komer, in March 1968 South Vietnam’s President Nguyen Van Thieu suspended all discharges from the army, recalled all reservists younger than 38 with less than five years of service and lowered the draft age to sixteen to facilitate an expansion of the ARVN and territorial forces and to recover from losses incurred during the communist Tet Offensive (Hunt 1995, 152). To formalize and expand President Thieu’s decree, the national legislature passed the General Mobilization Law in June 1968 that widened the ages of males available for conscription into the security forces. The law also favored enlistment into the RF and PF by allowing men over the age of 31 to volunteer for the territorial forces in lieu of service in the ARVN (Sorley 1999, 15). The effect of these actions was to increase the attractiveness of the territorial forces as an alternative to compulsory service the ARVN. As a result, the RF grew from 98,000 in 1967 to 196,000 in 1970 and the PF grew from 134,000 to 226,000 during the same period (Thayer 1985, 97). The territorial forces were further expanded to include a new unpaid reserve militia, the People’s Self-Defense Force. This force was comprised of all able-bodied males not serving in the regular or territorial forces. The government planned to have over four hundred thousand members trained by the end of 1968 (Hunt 1995, 152). The expansion was so large that territorial units comprised over half of South Vietnamese armed forces by 1969, but they still received less than five percent of the total war costs (Cao, et al 1980, 142 and Sorley 1999, 73).

Another focus of Operation Takeoff was the improvement of GVN support for the territorial forces. One attempt was to increase the rank of officer in charge of the territorial program with the intent of raising the visibility of the program within the Ministry of Defense. Bowing to Komer’s request, South Vietnam’s President Thieu
expanded the RF/PF staff and upgraded the RF/PF commander from a colonel to a lieutenant general (Blaufarb1977, 244).

Unfortunately, the officer assigned to lead the territorial forces, Lieutenant General Nguyen Duc Thang, an officer held in high regard by the Americans for his motivation and integrity, resigned in disgust in January 1968 over the incompetence, corruption, and lack of leadership demonstrated by GVN officials at all levels who were involved with the program. (Hunt 1995, 131-132). Thang’s resignation provided a high-level demonstration of the inability of the GVN to overcome embedded institutional corruption and incompetence needed to adequately support the territorial forces.

The final element Komer introduced as the head of CORDS was an attempt to measure the level of training and effectiveness of the territorial forces. This was due in part because he found that the performance of territorial units varied so widely that MACV staff officers had difficulty establishing population and area security trends (Daddis 2011, 116). In response MACV introduced the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) in 1968.

The TFES collected quantitative data about territorial forces from American district advisors. The monthly reports included data such as the total number of combat operations RF and PF units conducted, friendly and enemy casualties, and weapons lost and captured. The report also asked advisors for subjective rankings of unit leadership, aggressiveness, and morale. The early versions of the TFES through 1970 proved to be ineffective because American advisors judged RF/PF units by American military standards and improvement in unit effectiveness was equated with increased enemy body
counts not in improvements in population security or reductions in the VCI. (Daddis 2011, 172).

The other tool Komer used to indicate the effectiveness of the territorial forces and the overall pacification effort was the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). The HES rated villages and their satellite hamlets by rating them using six alphabetic rankings based off dozens of separate data inputs provided by district chiefs and, in parallel, their American advisors. The top three rankings (A, B, and C) indicated a village was totally secure to mostly secure, D and E indicated “contested” villages, and V denoted villages under communist control. Komer’s goal for Operation Takeoff was to improve security in 1,000 contested villages and bring them up to at least a C ranking (Colby 1989, 254).

The HES experienced issues with reliability and accuracy from its inception because it was essentially a report card on district and province chiefs. In order to maintain favor with the central government it was in their interest to minimize reporting of enemy activity and inflate the effectiveness of territorial units. HES reports that included reductions in security or increases in communist influence would often result in the GVN firing district chiefs (Herrington 1982, 193-195).

Coupled with the inherent bias of those collecting HES data, the HES also had structural defects. As ARVN Brigadier General Tran Dinh Truong (1980, 14) notes, the HES and other reporting mechanisms did not accurately measure the presence of VC infrastructure. Instead it collected data on quantifiable occurrences such and the number of acts of violence, the presence of territorial forces, elections and the presence of local government. These could correlate with the absence of communist influence or complete communist control and the complicity of the local population. As subsequent evidence
presented in this case study, when coupled with a reluctance of local officials to submit negative data, the latter was more likely in many cases.

In early 1969 General William Westmorland was replace as MACV commander by his deputy, General Creighton Abrams. Abrams realized that pacification was the key to defeating the communists, not destroying enemy formations. He instituted the “one war” concept. The one war concept was intended to give the pacification effort an equal emphasis with the conventional war that had garnered the majority of the US and GVN effort from 1965 to 1968. A major part of the one war concept was to increase efforts to improve and expand the territorial units (Daddis 2011, 174).

At the urging of Komer and Abrams, the GVN continued to institute a series of reforms in 1969 designed to improve the rural population’s support for the government. In addition to allowing the popular election of village governing councils and empowering those councils to disperse development funds, the central government gave village chiefs operational control of PF platoons for the first time (Colby 1989, 279). In spite of the increased infiltration of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units in to South Vietnam, the pacification efforts of the GVN and CORDS seemed have an effect on rural security. By January 1969 the government had raised the HES scores of over 1,000 hamlets into relatively secure status from contested or enemy controlled, so that only 195 remained contested or enemy controlled (Hunt 1995, 197). However, the HES scores were illusory. In 730 of the hamlets territorial force commanders had to serve as village chiefs because the security situation would not permit elections or the population could not be convinced to participate in government sponsored elections could not find local
officials. In 61 hamlets that were considered secure there was no government aligned leadership at all (Hunt 1995, 199).

Unfortunately for the efforts to improve the territorial forces, the implementation of the One War concept overlapped in late 1969 with Nixon administration’s plan for “Vietnamization,” the withdrawal of U.S. forces and turnover of responsibility for fighting communist forces to the ARVN. As part of Vietnamization, the RF/PF assumed the tasks of pacification and development from the ARVN to give the army the ability to take over from American units in the mobile mission of attacking large communist formations. The territorial forces also had to take over defending critical infrastructure like power plants construction facilities and food production plants (Hoang 1980, 50). This increasingly took the territorial forces away from their primary mission of village security.

This shift away from the villages is demonstrated by the TFES which reported that the PF were the primary security for 47 percent of the population in 1969, but only 39 percent in 1972. During the same time period, the RF were primary security for 16 percent in 1969 and 7 percent in 1972 (Thayer 1985, 156-157). Instead the territorial forces increasingly conducted offensive operations away from their home areas. During the 1969 to 1972 period, the percentage of RF offensive operations rose from 57 percent to 76 percent of total operations and PF offensive operations rose from 23 percent to 40 percent (Thayer 1985, 160). This shift in focus was direct result of PF platoons taking over district security missions from the RF because RF companies had to conduct missions against larger VC and NVA units outside their areas of operation that had previously been the responsibility of the ARVN (Hoang 1980, 52). The practice of
sending territorial units outside their home areas reached its height when RF units deployed with ARVN units into Cambodia during the invasion of that country in 1970 (Hoang 1980, 53).

This approach seemed to bring results with HES reports promoted by US and GVN officials indicating that more than 90 percent of the population lived in hamlets secured or mostly secured by government forces by that start of 1970 (Daddis 2011, 174). The security situation was more precarious. While 90 percent of the population lived in villages with a C rating or higher, only half the population lived in villages rated “B” or mostly secure and less than 10 percent were in “A” or fully secure villages (Colby 1989, 278 and Komer 1970, 13).

In addition to the 50 percent of the population living under marginal government control or total communist control, the reporting began to display that most territorial forces were probably not contesting communist control in favor of tacit cease fires to ensure their own survival. The most damning evidence of the ineffectiveness of the territorial forces was reported in 1970 when MACV analysts found that territorial force activity did not correlate to improvements in population security (Daddis 2011, 174). In fact, improvements in security increased at the same rate among hamlets without territorial forces as those with them (Thayer 1975a, 169 and Tran 1980, 171-172). Rand researcher Mai Elliot (2010, 386) found that security improvement reported in South Vietnam reported by the HES bore less of a correlation to GVN security force operations than to lulls in communist activity due to preparations for future attacks or recovery from previous attacks.
There are several other factors unrelated to the territorial forces that could have influenced the indications that security had improved while in reality security had deteriorated in rural areas. The most important was that by 1969 the conflict had shifted into a quasi-conventional war fought mostly by North Vietnamese forces (Elliott 2010, 386 and Tran 1980, 17). The communists by this point in the war had shifted to large scale conventional attacks in their final push for control and the insurgency became less of a priority. This shift to large scale operations also meant that the territorial forces were forced to operate only in areas where large ARVN formations could shield them from large scale NVA and VC attacks.

In areas where ARVN was ineffective or nonexistent, the territorial forces were forced to acquiesce to communist influence and turn a blind eye to VC units operating in their territory. This is supported by numerous anecdotal accounts from numerous locations throughout South Vietnam during the latter years of the war. For example, in 1970 CORDS official John Paul Vann found from numerous field visits that in the II Corps region in northern South Vietnam, most local officials and RF and PF leaders paid “insurance” to the local VC to be left alone (Sheehan 1988 and Hunt 1995, 259).

This pattern of territorial forces acting in the interest of self-preservation occurred in other areas of South Vietnam. In Long An province west of Saigon, American advisors reported that RF and PF units had reached a “tacit ceasefire” with the VC and only patrolled at times and places where they knew the VC would not be (Herrington 1982, 46). Jeffrey Race in his in-depth study of the province confirmed this behavior when he noted that RF and PF platoons “were often placed to protect themselves, but not the population” (Race 2010, 231) Advisors in Hu Nghia Province, adjacent to Long An,
observed similar instances of tacit ceasefires with most PF units intentionally avoided contact with the enemy. One advisor reported that PF platoons would make “slow gradual sweeps through the assigned area. Occasionally we came across something just as a blind hog would stumble on an acorn in the forest sometimes.” (Bergerud 1991, 265). In the Hau Nghia province, advisors attributed the reluctance of territorial forces to confront the VC was the removal of the “security umbrella” of U.S. forces in 1969 and 1970 that shielded them from reprisals from larger communist forces (Faugstad 2010, 36).

Another problem that plagued the effectiveness of territorial forces throughout their history was the corruption endemic to the GVN political system. Province and District chiefs had to purchase their positions with bribes to officials in the central government. Pay for government employees was kept at such low levels that they were forced to be corrupt in order to survive, while they had to continue to pay bribes to their superiors to keep their positions. One prime area for district chiefs to skim resources was the territorial forces. The main method the officials used was to keep “Ghost Soldiers” or fictitious soldiers kept on the roles so they could take money from the payrolls (Hunt 1995, 39). According to Neil Sheehan (1988, 514) it was a poorly kept secret in Vietnam during the period of 1969 to 1972 that the most territorial units had far fewer personnel than they kept on their payrolls, in some cases less than fifty percent of their reported strength.

The result of the territorial forces being thrust into new roles often left with support and endemic corruption was their continued poor performance in the latter four years of the war. The March 1971 TFES rated half of the RF/PF units unsatisfactory,
forcing CORDS to keep its advisor teams training the territorial units for six months after its planned withdrawal of the teams in June 1972 (Hunt 19995, 258). Territorial units continued to perform poorly throughout 1971 prompting one CORDS officer to quip, “there has been no deterioration in the quality of RF/PF, but the quality is so low that this statement if somewhat irrelevant” (Hunt 1995, 259).

In 1972, the security situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate as the last American combat troops withdrew. To fill the security vacuum left by American forces, territorial forces increasingly had to support ARVN units in battle or combat large enemy formations on their own. RF companies were merged into battalion sized units and deployed outside their province leaving PF forces the only units available to confront VC and NVA units main force units in battle. An analysis at the close of 1972 found that on average territorial force offensive operations outside their home areas increased 50 percent on average from 1971 levels (Thayer 1975a, 221). Territorial forces, especially the PF platoons continued to deteriorate with the increasingly dire security situation with CORDS report indicating that a “general pessimism and defensive attitude” had taken over most territorial forces (Thayer 1975b, 253).

In spite of the poor performance of the territorial forces and the continued inadequate support for RF and PF forces by the ARVN, MACV urged the South Vietnamese to expand the territorial forces at the expense of the regular forces. The main reason behind this push was because regional forces were less expensive for field and maintain (Hoang 1980, 75). As the U.S. continued to disentangle itself from Vietnam, the U.S. Congress progressively reduced funding to the GVN. This culminated in 1973 when the congress cut all funding for the South Vietnamese Armed Forces and CORDS
terminated its oversight of the territorial forces when it ceased operation in January 1973 (Cao, et. al 1980, 137). This resulted in severe shortages among the territorial forces as the ARVN reserved most war stocks for their own use (Hoang 1980, 59). In last period of the war until the fall of the GVN in April 1975, the territorial units had “lost their place” as the war shifted to conventional operations with progressively larger NVA forces invading from the north (Thayer 1975a, 227).

The territorial force program in South Vietnam can be considered a failure. In spite of the large amounts of resources the U.S. invested in the program in the later stages of the Vietnam War and marginal improvements in performance, the program never achieved widespread security in the rural areas of South Vietnam. Most analysts and historians agree that in addition to numerous shortcomings that will be discussed in subsequent sections, the main failing of the program was timing. Support for the program came too late to make a difference. Before 1965 and the shift in the conflict to large scale conventional operations, the territorial forces could have combatted the growing communist influence in the countryside. By 1965, communist cadres had over five years to insinuate themselves into the fabric of rural society (W. E. Crouch 1971, 30). In addition, the destruction of rural infrastructure and social fabric also destroyed the motivation for rural South Vietnamese to defend their villages against the communists. As South Vietnamese General Ngo Quang Trung (2010, 206) observed, once “their houses, gardens, and rice fields - most of which had been inherited through generations of hard toil - had been destroyed, there was absolutely nothing that could attract the people to a new village, much less cause them to defend it.” The war became a struggle for individual and family survival and not the defense of the community.
ARVN Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho (1980, 158) agreed that the territorial force concept only worked where the “motivation and self-interest” of villagers to protect their communities existed. In a 1967 survey of PF members by the Simulmatics Corporation, the researchers reported that once there was no motivation to defend their community against attack, the primary motivation for a majority of PF members became avoiding service in the ARVN and protection of their family. The report further indicated that for the majority of PF members, reaching an accommodation for peaceful coexistence with the VC was an acceptable option to protect their families (Worchel, et al. 1967, 19). With no reason to fight for the central government or their communist, the average PF soldier never progressed to being “little more than a gate guard” defending their armed camps outside of villages (W. E. Crouch 1971, 27).

After 1965, the RF and PF were never capable of dismantling the VC infrastructure, especially when saddled with the endemic corruption of GVN officials and poor support from the ARVN (Andrade 1990, 49). Viet Cong acts of terrorism against the GVN at the village level continued to undermine any stability gained by the expansion of the territorial forces. Between 1966 and 1969 the Viet Cong assassinated 1,153 officials, 1,863 government employees and 15,015 civilians in villages providing further disincentive for territorial forces to support the government in the fight against the communists (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009, 338). This was a conscious effort by the VC who did not want to kill the territorial forces, rather to keep them trapped in their outposts and away from the population (Bergerud 1991, 210, 215, 264).

The program was further hobbled because U.S. officials in MACV and CORDS never had a clear picture of the security situation in rural areas or of the performance of
the territorial forces. The tools they used to analyze the war such as the HES reported unrealistically high percentages of the population living in secure areas. According to Robert Komer, the first director of CORDS, the HES could measure observable data that may or may not have correlated with levels of security, but “the HES could not measure the perceptions of the population” (Komer, Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam 1970, 10). Subsequent analysis of HES data found that areas recorded as controlled by the government could also have been controlled by the Viet Cong and the apparent improvements in the territorial forces were illusory (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009, 352). Having established that the territorial forces can be considered a failed case, this case study will now examine the degree of membership the program had with each of the factors of the model.

External Support and Oversight

Throughout the existence of the territorial forces the U.S. and GVN provided inconsistent and inadequate support and oversight. While the American leaders attempted later in the war to improve material support to the territorial forces it came too little, too late. Both the Americans and ARVN leaders never provided adequate oversight of the program, even in the later stages of the war. The problem of inadequate oversight and support was well known among policymakers early in the conflict and was identified as one of the main causes for the poor performance of the territorial forces and one of the biggest mistakes of the war (1972, 44, 146). The lack of support fatally crippled the territorial forces because as one declassified report from 1965 put it, “No man who constantly feels aggravated at receiving lower pay while doing most of the fighting who knows that if wounded in action he will have to fend for himself, and who knows that if
he is killed his family will have no income, is likely to fight wholeheartedly, whatever his commitment to a cause” (W. E. Crouch 1971, 40). As the preceding quote and the following discussion will demonstrate, the territorial force program displayed a “mostly out” degree of membership with the external support and oversight factor of the model.

In the early stages of the conflict the U.S. and GVN provided the least amount of external support for the territorial forces. From 1956 to 1960 the United States Operations Mission (USOM), the field agency for United States Agency for International Development (USAID) at the U.S. Embassy in South Vietnam provided external aid to the territorial forces. This was because the territorial forces fell under the GVN Interior Ministry and not the Defense Ministry (Hunt 1995, 13). Due to this administrative arrangement USOM was not legally allowed to distribute military aid. This forced the GVN to arm the territorial forces with discarded Japanese or French weapons leaving them outmatched by the better equipped VC forces (Krepinevich 1986, 219). According to the official Army history of the training of the South Vietnamese armed forces, the territorial forces were “unprepared, untrained, and unequipped” during the critical period when the communist insurgency was gaining strength and embedding itself in rural South Vietnam (Hunt 1995, 13).

After 1964, neglect of the material needs of the territorial forces increased as the U.S. focused on building the ARVN into a large conventional force. According to Robert Komer (1972, 31) during the period of 1964 to 1967, MACV “scrupulously avoided” diverting resources to territorial forces “regardless of circumstances” in order to build ARVN forces. Several small-scale operations to improve the effectiveness of the territorial forces were undertaken during this period, but according to Hunt (1995, 14)
they were half-hearted and quickly abandoned. Additionally, American military leaders did not want to expend effort or resources on pacification or the territorials because they considered them to be a constabulary force and not a paramilitary, therefore the territorial forces were “civilian business” (Komer 1972, 137).

When Robert Komer assumed the role as Special Assistant to the President for Pacification and later CORDS chief 1967, he found that the majority of territorial units were still being equipped with second or third hand WWII era weapons handed down from ARVN units (Colby 1989, 241). This enraged Komer who noted that the U.S. spent over $14 billion for bombing and conventional operations and $850 million the entire pacification program of which the territorial forces were only a part (Komer 1972, 40). While support for the territorial forces improved under Komer’s “Operation Takeoff,” discussed earlier, the damage from the initial years of neglect had been done. Komer admitted later in his analysis of American pacification efforts that efforts to improve the territorial forces were too late and a similar effort before 1965 could have produced successful results (Komer 1972, xi).

The neglect of the territorial forces was mirrored by the GVN which from 1964 to 1968 spent less than 5 percent of its defense budget on territorial forces (Thayer 1985, 167). Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen (Dong 2010, 77), the last chief of staff of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces Joint Staff, admits that the territorial forces never received the support they needed. This was especially true in the early years of the conflict when the focus was on building the conventional army and that what support they did give to the territorial forces was “completely trial and error” (Dong 2010, 77).
The GVN also starved the territorial forces of manpower until reforms were enacted in 1968, which proved to be too little, too late to provide the manpower necessary to reverse the gains of the communist insurgency. The most intense weakening of RF and PF manpower occurred during the period on conventionalization of the conflict during the period of 1964 to 1966. During this period American and GVN leaders gave a higher priority for manpower to the ARVN that prevented planned increases in the territorial forces (Krepinevich 1986, 219). The diversion of manpower during this period also extended to trained leaders. From 1964 to 1967 RF companies had on average only 42 percent of the officers required to lead RF companies (Komer 1972, 155).

Robert Komer also complained that the district and province administrative apparatus, which was staffed exclusively by military personnel, was also allowed to atrophy in favor of expanding the ARVN during this period (Komer 1972, 20). This proved to be detrimental to the effectiveness of the territorial forces because in 1963 province and district chiefs were given control of RF and PF units in their areas in addition to administering all civil matters. In many cases province chiefs were tasked with controlling territorial forces equaling up to two divisions with no additional staff (Ngo 1981, 184-185).

Attempts to improve the material support for the territorial forces had the opposite result in many cases when ARVN units were tasked with supporting them in addition to their internal support requirements. The most acute shortfalls came in the form of support for territorial units in contact with communist forces. In 1964, ARVN units assumed responsibility for medical evacuation for injured RF and PF members. The additional requirement without corresponding increases in capabilities taxed medical
units “to the limit of their capabilities according to ARVN Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen (2010, 55). The ARVN also failed to provide other forms of support to territorial units. In 1966 to 1967 ARVN units provided artillery support to RF and PF units in contact in only 17 to 45 percent of cases and with ground forces in only eleven percent of cases (Thayer 1985, 164 and Krepinevich 1986, 221)... Even after 1968 ARVN units were frequently unable to provide an effective screen to keep large communist units from threatening smaller RF and PF units because they were overburdened with pacification missions as well as conducting conventional attacks against large NVA formations (Hunt 1995, 48).

The lack of material support proved to be one the most influential factors in the demoralization of the territorial factors (Bergerud 1991, 167). In a survey conducted in 1967 of 1300 PF members in nine provinces, 60 percent of PF members reported that their pay and equipment were unsatisfactory, impacting unit morale and effectiveness and 98 percent responded that their unit “needed help” (Williams 1967). While CORDS under Robert Komer addressed many of the material needs of the territorial forces including pay and equipment, most experts, including Komer agree that the damage to the program caused by a lack of resources was done by 1967 (Collins 1975, 93; L. Sorley 1999, 72; and Colby and McCargar 1989, 254). The qualitative inferiority of territorial forces in the early years of the conflict created a psychological inferiority among territorial forces that they were never able to overcome (Ngo 2010, 202).

The larger failing of both the American and South Vietnamese governments was the inability of either to provide adequate oversight to the territorial force program. This was due to several factors including the relationship established between both nations,
institutional inertia in both governments and the pervasive corruption existing in the GVN. As a result of all these factors, territorial forces never received sustained oversight and their performance suffered because of it.

One of the enduring conditions that prevented adequate oversight of the territorial forces was the relationship between the U.S. and the GVN. Throughout the war, U.S. leaders were careful to give the appearance of a partnership between the US and South Vietnam with the U.S. in strictly an advisory role (Komer 1972, 34). Throughout the war, regardless of the level of U.S. involvement, this partnership and advisory relationship prevented the U.S. from forcing GVN officials to perform in return for U.S. aid.

According to the Pentagon Papers, American leaders identified oversight of the territorial forces as a major problem impacting their effectiveness as early as 1965 (US Department of Defense 2010, 17631-17633). Several proposals were presented to American leaders in Saigon and Washington. These included the “encadrement” or integration of U.S. and South Vietnamese security forces that was favored by President Lyndon B. Johnson. General Westmoreland, the MACV commander, opposed this proposal because in addition to language and logistics problems, it would give the appearance that the U.S. had taken control of the war effort, (US Department of Defense 2010, 16531-16533).

In a desire to keep the appearance of the GVN as the lead actor in the conflict, Westmorland chose to increase the training advisory effort. This also played into the institutional inertial of the U.S. military. According to The Pentagon Papers, Westmorland chose to treat the problems with RF and PF unit effectiveness as a problem
of technical proficiency and not operational oversight because he thought operational advisors were not an effective use of U.S. personnel (US Department of Defense 2010, 17759-17761). Although previous studies had shown that training of territorial forces without sustained operational oversight was ineffective as early as 1965, Westmorland chose to ignore this information (US Department of Defense 2010, 17631-17633). His thinking was that the American Army was already advising the training of territorial forces, so increasing that effort should bring results (US Department of Defense 2010, 17595-17596).

The initial American advisory effort for the territorial forces was modest. In 1963 five U.S. advisors were assigned to oversee RF/PF training centers. By 1965 MACV had increased to the number to 150, but this was small portion of the 1,820 advisors that were assigned to every ARVN unit down to battalion level (Hunt 1995 18). The shift in focus by American leaders to pacification in 1968 resulted in improving the effectiveness of territorial forces becoming a main priority. Prior to 1968 American advisors had only overseen the territorial force training centers and not operational RF and PF units. To improve existing territorial units, MACV created Military Advisory Teams (MAT) (Collins 1975, 120). MATs would meet their RF or PF units in training, following them through their training and then back to their villages for a period up to two months when they would be deemed operationally effective (Ngo 1981, 205). This temporary oversight was implemented because MACV did not believe there was the manpower available to station U.S. advisors permanently with each RF company and PF platoon. Westmoreland wanted 354 teams fielded in 1968. In spite of test in 1967 that showed
this method of temporary oversight brought “no significant improvement in the territorial forces” the plan was implemented in 1968 (Krepinevich 1986, 220).

MAT teams were marginally effective when they were with RF and PF units. In spite of limited language training and translators, short tours of duty that gave advisors only cursory knowledge of local conditions, the teams improved the effectiveness of the units they advised (Cao et al 1980, 155). Once problem was that the program as designed could not provide consistent and enduring oversight of territorial forces. In 1968 to 1971, U.S. advisors to territorial units comprised only one percent of the overall advisory effort and never exceed a ratio of 1 advisor for every 100 territorial force members (Ngo 2010, 210 and Komer 1972, 125-126). This was during the period when Territorial forces grew by 58 percent to eventually comprise over half of the South Vietnamese security forces (Thayer 1985, 166). The 350 advisory teams could not provide any sustained oversight of a force of over half a million (Collins 1975, 91)

Territorial units performed well when provided advisors and working under the supervision of ARVN or U.S. units (Thayer 1985, 167). As long as U.S. or ARVN units provided an adequate shield from large communist units and oversaw the territorial units, RF and PF units performed adequately (Bergerud 1991, 222, 225, 267). According to Bergerud (1991, 296 and Worcel, et al. 1967, 26-27) HES data and individual observations indicated that effective RP and PF security operations was usually concentrated with units that received the most support and oversight. However, the gains in effectiveness were in most cases temporary. When U.S. units moved to secure new areas or advisors moved to their next unit, territorial units lost all motivation to conduct operations against the communists within a few months (Andrade 1990, 92-94, 197).
According to one American colonel, RF and PF operations devolved into “a charade with everyone playing his part” with territorial unit entering into non-aggression pacts with the communists and pretending to patrol. (Bergerud 1991, 296).

Institutional inertia in the form of U.S. military units focusing on the missions they had trained for, namely large scale conventional combat also impacted the effectiveness of the territorial forces. After CORDS was established in 1968, the plan for pacification was for the U.S. forces would destroy communist main force units, the ARVN would clear areas of enemy forces and oversee pacification efforts to provide space for territorial units to dismantle local Viet Cong political infrastructure and guerrilla units. In theory this seemed like a logical plan, but by adding non-military pacification duties, a mission they were not trained for, overtasked ARVN units and distracted them from securing territory and supporting territorial units (Cao, et al 1980, 149 and Daddis 2011, 116). This also left RF and PF units with a mission they were not trained to execute and with reduced expectations for performance (Ngo 2010, 196).

Finally, the territorial units continued to demonstrate consistent and sustained effectiveness because of the systemic corruption and ineptitude in the GVN. According to Robert Komer, the inability of the U.S. to force reform within the GVN or to adopt performance based accountability measures was the most important factor in the U.S. failure in Vietnam and was never adequately addressed throughout the war (Komer 1972, vii-ix, 26) (Ngo 1981, 19-22). Effectiveness was seen as a problem of technical competence in administration, logistics, and training, but not operational effectiveness. According to Komer, this focus on competence and not effectiveness resulted in a lack of “leverage” by U.S. advisors who could not force results (Komer 1972, 122-124). This
was especially true with the territorial forces after 1968 when they became a key element in pacification and Vietnamization (Komer 1972, 29 and Vietnam Task Force 1969, Part IV.3, p. 45)

The U.S. continually asked the ARVN to assume responsibilities and did not institute the controls needed to monitor and ensure results. Each new administrative restructuring of the territorial force program was beyond the abilities of ARVN leaders. This started in 1964 when district chiefs, who were politically appointed junior officers that were often reassigned due to power struggles in the GVN, were given control of the territorial forces and were overwhelmed (Komer 1972, 111). These junior officers, who were usually not from the area, without additional staff, and also administering all civil programs in their district, were responsible for controlling three to six RF companies, 40 PF platoons and coordinate operations with hundreds of village and hamlet officials (Cao et al 1980, 152). Overtasking and often a lack in initiative resulted in little interaction between district officials and territorial units and as much as a year would elapse between visits by district officials (Ngo 2010, 195 and Worchel, et al. 1967, 25). This resulted in the status of territorial units reported to U.S. and GVN officials was usually based off reports that were usually “matters of faith” rather than observable fact (Ngo 2010, 198 and Tran 1980, 107-108, 164).

The ability of the ARVN to provide oversight did not improve with Vietnamization in 1969. To bolster the strength of the ARVN and improve oversight, territorial forces were formally merged into the Army in 1969. The burden of controlling the territorials was somewhat mitigated by creating RF battalion headquarters capable of controlling two to five RF companies (Ngo 2010, 190). However, ARVN field
commanders were still responsible for managing civil and military pacification programs in addition to managing ARVN and territorial forces, which according to one ARVN general, “placed and unmanageable administrative burden on the ARVN and control was impossible” (Dong 2010, 79). As U.S. forces withdrew the burden on the ARVN only increased as ARVN battalions had to focus 60 to 70 percent of their time on offensive operations against NVA units (Thayer 1985, 63). The new territorial force headquarters then became responsible for managing pacification programs that they were not trained or equipped to do and had previously taken up to 80 percent of ARVN capacity (Tran 1980, 37). This resulted in the territorial forces executing the pacification to become “like most things in Vietnam, it has been cumbersome, wasteful, poorly executed, only spottily effective in many respects” (Komer, Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam 1970, 7). By 1973 the situation had deteriorated to the point that the ARVN had no strategic reserve and was unable to conduct supervision of the RF and PF (Komer 1972, 140). The RF lost their ability to support PF units that resulted in a reduction in the aggressiveness of the territorial forces (Joes 2001)

While territorial forces took over 60 percent of casualties and inflicted 33 percent of enemy casualties caused by South Vietnamese security forces between 1967 and 1972 they were never given adequate support or oversight during the entire Vietnam conflict. (Thayer 1985, 164). In the initial phase of the war from 1964 to 1967 the qualitative inferiority of territorial forces and the failure of ARVN forces to come to their aid left RF and PF forces no option but “to defend themselves and their families by retreating into their fortified camps outside of villages” (Thayer 1975a, 145). American efforts after 1968 did improve their material inferiority, but the institutional inability for the
Americans or GVN to provide sustained oversight doomed the territorial forces to ultimate failure.

Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction

During the initial phases of the Vietnam War until 1964, territorial forces were restricted to their village complex for the Popular Forces and district for Regional Forces. As the conflict escalated, Regional Forces were increasingly sent outside their districts to support ARVN forces. This practice had a cascading effect that forced the Popular Forces to operate outside their village boundaries to assume the district duties left by the RF. This practice continued to expand as GVN turned the RF companies into conventional forces and expanded their use outside their province. Additionally, district officials routinely employed PF platoons outside their villages to secure infrastructure and placed PF camps away from villages. As the following section will demonstrate, the territorial force program displayed a “mostly out” adherence to the principle of limits to territorial jurisdiction.

Assignments away from their homes remained a chronic issue for the territorial forces throughout their existence. One of the finding 1967 Simulmatics Corporation survey of PF members found that in addition to complaints of low pay and poor equipment, the other main complaint from PF members was that PF platoons were misused by province and district chiefs. According to the report, the majority of PF members complained that they were routinely sent out of their villages to defend bridges and government buildings or on offensive operations. The report concluded this was the result of a lack of motivation by ARVN officers and their desire to avoid onerous or dangerous tasks. As one USOM official reported ARVN battalions often preferred to “sit
on its collective duff, while using the Regional and Popular Forces for search and clear operations (Worchel, et al. 1967).

Frequent assignments away from their homes was cited as one of the main reasons for the high level of desertions among territorial forces. Desertion rates in March 1967 were 12.5 and 17.7 per thousand for the RF and PF. When interviewed deserters reported that separation from their families, low pay, and poor leaders as the main reasons for leaving their units. Assignments away from home remained a main cause for desertions after reforms in 1968 addressed pay and equipment shortcomings. While reforms reduced desertions, they remained high into 1971 with rates for RF at 11.7 and PF at 9.1 per thousand. (Hunt 1995, 258).

As American forces withdrew from Vietnam, the practice of sending Regional Force companies outside their district increased as they were expected to assume a more offensive role against large NVA formations (Hunt 1995, 259). To combat large communist forces, the Regional Forces were organized into battalions in 1969 with the mission to act as mobile reserve forces and deployed for up to two months away from their provinces to include accompanying ARVN units during the 1970 invasion of Cambodia (Thayer 1985, 34-35, Ngo 2010, 197 and Tran 1980, 47). By 1973 all RF companies were formed into 360 battalions and those battalions were further grouped into RF mobile groups of two or three battalions for use outside of their province. According to ARVN Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong (2010, 190-191) by the last years of the war the RF were a fully conventional force and “had lost all of their local character.” The removal of RF companies from districts required PF platoons to operate outside their villages for extended periods. To address the additional stress placed on PF members to
provide for their families, the GVN created a system to provide them with additional rations while they were deployed (Tran 2010, 231-232).

The deployment of territorial forces proved to be a continuing problem for moral and also decreased their operational effectiveness. According to ARVN Lieutenant General Ngo, sending the RF and PF out of home territories deprived them of their greatest advantage, knowledge of the local terrain and populace and they performed poorly because of it (Ngo 2010, 197). The territorial forces demonstrated “mostly out” adherence to territorial limits. First this was caused by misuse by ARVN officers and later because of the exigencies of the American withdrawal and escalation of the conflict.

Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems

The territorial force program demonstrated a “fully out” adherence to the principle of incorporation of traditional justice systems. While reforms in 1968 increased self-rule and increased the freedom of villages to regulate themselves, overall justice system and methods used to regulate the territorial forces were externally imposed and traditional systems were suppressed for much of the conflict. While reforms devolved some power to the population, no attempt was made to return the underlying foundations for the sustainment of the territorial forces or justice system.

The imposition of an individual-based western style of raising and maintaining the territorial forces proved to be a major source of friction between the GVN and the rural populace. The traditional Vietnamese system for military service traced its roots back to the Ly Dynasty in the eleventh century. Under this system the raising of security forces was the collective responsibility of villages. Under this system villages provided forces dependent on population and population density and families were not expected to
bear a disproportional burden. Villages were responsible the conduct and were collectively punished for the desertion of their recruits. This established collective responsibility and the ability of the village to discipline the soldiers they provided (Jenkins 1971, 35-37).

Under the Diem regime, the traditional system of village self-regulation was discarded and replaced with an alien village election process (Tran 1980, 155). This was most evident with the territorial units that became a tool for the politically connected to avoid military service and their duty for collective defense. The 1967 Simulmatics report found that a majority of PF members resented that the rich members of the PF used it as a method to escape military service and that while they did not pull their duties there was no internal method to discipline them (Worchel, et al. 1967, 6).

The 1968 reforms by the GVN that were mentioned earlier and will be addressed in the following section addressed accountability, but there is no record of any attempts by the GVN to reform the basis for military service on traditional customs. There was also not attempt to empower local officials or the territorial forces to enforce customary law. Therefore, the territorial forces demonstrated a “fully out” degree of membership with the principle of incorporation of traditional justice systems.

Local Sustainability and Accountability

Throughout the conflict in Vietnam, the territorial forces lacked mechanisms to promote local sustainability and accountability. As mentioned in the previous section recruiting for the territorial forces departed from the traditional methods for recruiting. The western model for individual recruiting placed heavy and unequal burdens on the rural population to provide manpower for the security services. Also, the practice of
paying territorial forces that was adopted after 1963 distorted local economies and created an unsustainable system that crumbled after American aid was withdrawn. Additionally, corruption and the desire to maintain regime stability created an unaccountable system that was unresponsive the needs of the rural population. Reforms after 1968 addressed some the issues creating this system, but were abandoned or diluted in the interest of regime stability. This created a security force that demonstrated a “mostly out degree” of membership with the principle of local sustainability and accountability.

Under the Diem regime, the territorial forces, in particular the Popular Forces, were designed to be a part time security force. The temporary stipends they received while at initial or annual sustainment training was intended to supplement their existing income while they were unable to work. As the security situation deteriorated in rural South Vietnam, PF platoons were consolidated into village outposts, usually some distance from their hamlets. By 1967 the Simulmatics survey of PF members found that the majority lived in fortified camps near the village headquarters. This caused them to move their families into the camps with them and their full-time security duties prevented them from continuing their previous occupation (Worchel, et al. 1967, 23). The adoption of the “Victory Program” and the integration of the territorial forces into the armed forces addressed this problem by instituting pay scales for the territorial forces and turning them into full time soldiers (Hoang 1980, 36-39).

The removal of large numbers of working age males from the rural economy and into the security forces and the infusion of outside sources of money created runaway inflation in rural South Vietnam. In the period between 1964 and 1971 the retail price
index of rice in South Vietnam rose 833 index points (Dong 2010, 48-51). The modest pay increases granted by the GVN never kept pace with inflation (Ngo 2010, 192). Living on inadequate fixed salaries that their leaders often skimmed, faced with inflation and supply shortages, territorial soldiers were presented with few options to service. Rand Corporation researchers surveying territorial forces found this created a situation where RF and PF members, who were concerned with the survival of their families and physically removed from the villages in armed camps, often coerced or stole from villagers to survive (Elliott 2010, 379). The extent of this behavior is supported by interviews with villagers conducted by the Simulmatics Corporation in 1967 that reported most villagers expressed “resentment of the poor behavior of the RF and PF” (Worchel, et al. 1967, 13).

The sheer size of the territorial forces, which expanded to over 500,000 by 1971 and comprised over half of the South Vietnamese armed forces, created a force unsustainable by the rural Vietnamese (Thayer 1985, 156-157). In addition to the size of the force was the logistical support required to sustain the territorial forces. In a case of “mirror imaging” the U.S. added capabilities such as organic artillery to the territorial forces as they attempted to create a force that could assume the role of the ARVN as they assumed the missions of withdrawing American units (Komer 1972, 41). This created a force that was only sustainable with to U.S. support. As U.S. aid fell in 1971 and 1972 and the mission of the RF/PF grew, the effectiveness of the territorials began to decline with increased desertions and equipment shortages (Hunt 1995, 261).

In addition to creating a force that was unsustainable by rural villages, the U.S. and GVN also never instituted mechanisms to make the territorials accountable to the
local population. Under the Diem regime, most provincial and district leadership and administrative positions that controlled the territorial forces were filled with regime loyalists who were from urban areas or had escaped North Vietnam. According to Hunt, these officials did not understand or care about the needs of the rural population (1995, 12). In 1963, ARVN officers replace all Diem loyalist territorial units as well as in district and province governments, but most ARVN officers were also from urban areas, so the same problems remained (Jenkins 1971, 20).

Corruption also motivated province and district officials to use the territorial forces for their own ends. Most officials gained their positions through bribes paid to senior officials who expected continued bribes if officials wanted to keep their positions. To keep this system of bribes functioning, officials used the widespread practice of filling the territorial personnel rolls filled “ghost soldiers” or “potted-tree soldiers” who had either died or deserted. These were men who had either died or paid a bribe for false discharge papers so they could go home (Sheehan 1988, 514).

Coupled with the systemic corruption of the system, GVN instituted a leadership selection system that prioritized regime loyalty over accountability to the people. This was particularly acute with PF platoons, which had the closest proximity with the rural population. Instead of allowing the population or local leadership, PF platoon leaders were appointed by the province chief. Additionally, the province chief was the only official authorized to discipline PF platoon leaders (Ngo 2010, 194). This created a system where PF leaders were only responsive to district and province leaders and primarily interested with continuing corrupt practices within the territorial forces.
In 1969, the GVN, at the urging of CORDS, instituted reform of local governance with the aim of improving the responsiveness of the GVN to the needs of the local populace. The reforms included the election of village councils in all secure villages and empowering village councils to develop and enact development projects without the approval of district or province officials (Colby 1998, 264-265, 277). In practice, the elections were heavily influenced by district and province officials and most village councils were packed with people loyal to higher officials in a process that Lieutenant General Tran Dinh Tho (1980, 156) called “wholesale appointment under the cover of a ballot.”

Subsequent reforms included granting village chiefs control of the PF platoons in their villages. As with the elections, this change was diluted by the GVN. While the village chief could direct the employment of the PF platoon, district and province chiefs retained the power to remove, reward or discipline PF platoon leaders (Race 2010, 274). Even if the village chief could motivate the PF platoon leader to conduct operations, the district and province chiefs controlled other levers of power. The most important power the district and province chiefs held was the ability to request support from ARVN units. As one village chief complained, “We have to notify the district in advance of an operation; the district chief immediately radios back that we can go on the operation if we want, but if we get into trouble, don’t expect reinforcement, artillery, or medical help for the wounded” (Race 2010, 274). The denial of support remained a persuasive tool to keep the PF platoon leader in line with the wishes of the district and province chiefs and not the local population.
In 1971 with the security situation in rural population, the small amount of control gained by the population was curtailed. In an effort to ensure the loyalty of village leadership, the GVN suspended Village elections and restored the power to appoint village chiefs to province chiefs (Bergerud 1991, 318). Additionally, the government assigned junior officers to villages as assistant chiefs with the responsibility for coordinating security (Ngo 1981, 19). After these two changes were enacted, the rural population lost any meaningful means to hold the territorial forces accountable.

In spite of the lack of sustainability and accountability demonstrated by the territorial force program through most of its existence, the territorial force program demonstrated a “mostly out” degree of membership with the principle of local accountability and sustainability due to the temporary reforms in place between 1969 and 1971. The rapid expansion of the territorial force program, the decision to turn territorial force members in to full time soldiers, and the evolution of the forces into a conventional army created pressures on rural villages that were unsustainable with the reduction of U.S. aid after 1972. Additionally, the GVN created a system that directed the loyalty of the territorial forces to district and province chiefs instead of the population and denied the population any mechanisms to ensure the accountability of the territorial forces.

Voluntary Participation by Local Elites

The territorial forces demonstrated a “fully out” degree of membership with the principle of voluntary elites. The method implemented for selecting leadership adopted by the GVN ran against the traditional concept of collective defense practiced by the Vietnamese. Leadership for PF platoons was drawn from within the platoon, membership in program was usually not voluntary. Additionally, leadership within the
province RF companies was not drawn internally or from existing leadership within the province. In many cases informal leadership within the territorial units rested with someone other than the official leadership.

The original concept of voluntary participation practiced by the territorial forces until 1963 conformed to the Vietnamese tradition of village self-government with village defense a shared responsibility. In the traditional practice of village self-defense, the local population, at the request of the government, formed a small cadre of security personnel through a process of popular consensus. This created a system without formal leadership, but a collective force guided by popular will and consensus. Membership in village security forces was voluntary and temporary. Additionally, consideration of family circumstances were taken into consideration with families without the means to supply manpower exempted from service (Dong Van Khuyen, 78).

The system enacted by the GVN did not adhere to any of the characteristics of the traditional village defense system. The major departure from the traditional system weakening and then jettisoning of the voluntary nature of service in the territorial forces. As the program expanded in 1963, the government started to conscript men into RF and PF units if there were not enough volunteers on an ad hoc basis (Crouch 1971, 25). While the GVN still tried to man the RF and PF with volunteers, conscription of territorial force members when quotas were not met was formalized in 1964 (Collins 1975, 42).

Even when members of the territorial forces enlisted, their participation was usually not voluntary. The main motivations of most territorial force members for joining the RF and PF were avoidance of the ARVN draft, being forced to join, and a
desire to be near their family (Worchel, et al. 1967, 5). Most PF members joined the territorial forces not to defend their villages, but to avoid fighting and to be left alone by both sides of the conflict (Worchel, et al. 1967, 7). Robert Komer, the head of CORDS from 1968 to 1970, admitted that most members of the RF and PF were not volunteers, but joined to escape being drafted into the ARVN (Komer 1970, 5). The perceptions of most other American civilian and military officials echo this observation (Williams 1967).

In addition to the rank and file members of the territorial force not being volunteers, most leaders were not the natural or existing local leaders. One of the chronic problems of the territorial forces was they were weak and corrupt at all levels (Hunt 1995, 258-259). Due to the corruption of the GVN system, national leaders selected province and district leaders that would support the regime and provide them with a revenue stream. The district and province leaders in turn selected territorial force leaders who would support and enrich them. This created territorial units that were ineffective due to poor leadership (Bergerud 1991, 167, 310).

When surveyed, PF members indicated poor leadership as a major issue in their units. PF members complained that they could not select their leader and indicated favoritism as a common criterion used to select PL platoon leaders. They also complained that there was no process for removing ineffective leaders (Worchel, et al. 1967, 10-11). Most interesting for this case study, most PF members indicated that they favored someone else in the platoon or the village to be leader, which indicates that the existing traditional leadership in villages was excluded from leading PF platoons (Worchel, et al. 1967, 20).
The RF forces also suffered from chronic leadership issues. The main issue that faced the RF was they did not have enough leaders the GVN deemed to be qualified. Instead of developing leaders from within the RF or seeking out existing leaders in the community, the GVN decided to assign ARVN officers and sergeants to RF companies starting in 1965. The number of ARVN officers increased from 878 in 1965 to 10,800 in 1970 when the majority of officers and sergeants in the RF were from the ARVN. In addition to excluding local leadership, this practice caused resentment among ARVN officers who considered the RF inferior to the ARVN and saw the assignment hurt their opportunities for promotion and awards. (Ngo Quang Truong 2010, 194).

The territorial forces demonstrated a “fully out” degree of membership with the principle of voluntary participation. If they were not drafted into the PF, PF members rarely joined PF platoons to protect their villages. They’re most common motivations were to avoid the draft and to stay close to home. While the individuals selected to serve as PF platoon leaders usually came from the village the platoon was defending, leaders in the PF were typically not the natural or traditional leaders in villages, but men chosen for their loyalty to district and province chiefs. RF companies also did not have leadership drawn from within the units or from the community. To bolster the effectiveness of RF companies, the GVN imported leadership from the ARVN instead of selecting local leaders.

Conclusion

The territorial force program was an overall failure in that it failed to provide effective security for the rural population of South Vietnam. The program evolved from a volunteer, community-based security force into a quasi-conventional force designed to
conduct offensive operations against the communist forces. During the critical early phase of the conflict when the communist insurgency was gaining strength in the countryside, American and South Vietnamese leaders ignored the program in favor of building the ARVN into a conventional force designed to prevent a Korea War style invasion from the North. When American and GVN leaders did recognize the potential of the program and diverted resources to the program, the program continued to be beset with problems because territorial units never received sustained oversight. After 1968, the territorial forces enjoyed a year of improved performance under the Accelerated Campaign Plan, but quickly evolved into a quasi-conventional force designed to fill the security gaps created by the withdrawal of American forces. Coupled with inability of the GVN to oversee the program, the rapid expansion of the program in the later stages of the war caused the territorial forces to continue to be beset with corrupt and inadequate leadership and ineffective units. All of these issues forced territorial force members to be more interested in protecting themselves and not their communities.

The territorial forces demonstrated little or no adherence to the model presented in this dissertation (see Table 8). The program highlighted the importance and interconnection of external support. The U.S. and GVN starved the program of resources in the early years of the conflict and provided little oversight. When they provided resources later in the war, both governments failed to provide adequate oversight.

Also, this case demonstrated a little adherence to limits to territorial jurisdiction. Although the intent of the territorial forces was to employ PF platoons to defend their villages and the RF to conduct operations within their district, this was frequently ignored by the ARVN officers who commanded both forces. PF platoons frequently defended
infrastructure or headquarters outside their village and were typically stationed in camps outside their villages. The RF companies also frequently operated outside their districts for extended periods, practice that increased because of Vietnamization after 1969.

This case also demonstrated a “fully out” degree of membership with incorporating traditional justice systems and “mostly out” with the principle of local accountability and sustainability. The GVN gave village chiefs no power to apply traditional Vietnamese governance or justice mechanisms and created a manpower and resource intensive security force that was unsustainable by rural communities without large amounts of external support. Additionally, district and province chiefs maintained most of the power over territorial forces and installed leaders that were beholden to them and not the local population. The lack of connection with their communities and inadequate pay encouraged many RF and PF members to prey on the local population for their survival.

The failure of the GVN to select the natural or traditional rural leadership in favor of selecting individuals loyal to the regime caused the program to demonstrate a “fully out” adherence to the principle of voluntary participation by local elites. Poor leadership continued to be a major problem with the majority of territorial forces. Dissatisfaction with their leadership and desiring others in the community to command PF platoons was a reoccurring complaint made by PF members. In the case of the RF, ARVN discarded any attempt to select leadership from within the RF and assigned ARVN soldiers to almost all RF leadership positions. As a result, most analysts identified poor leadership as one of the major reasons for the poor performance of territorial forces.
The failure of the territorial force program was one of the major causes for the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War. The territorial forces were the only countrywide security forces whose primary mission was to secure the rural population from the communist insurgents. The territorial forces provide a fascinating case of how the varying application of the different factors of the model being inconsistently influenced the effectiveness of the program. While the U.S. addressed issues in training and equipment, the U.S. and GVN were never able to overcome their institutional issues in order to address the other structural problems of the program.

Table 8.
Membership of the Territorial Forces with Community-Based Security Variables.

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<th>Variable/Membership</th>
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<td>External Support and Oversight</td>
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<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System</td>
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CHAPTER X - COUNTERINSURGENCY ON THE CHEAP BUT WITH A PRICE

The Kikuyu Home Guard

Introduction

This case study will explore the use of the community-based security force, the Kikuyu Guard, by the British colonial government in Kenya during the Mau Mau Rebellion from 1952 to 1960 and its adherence to the model presented in this dissertation. The case study’s overview will include a discussion of its organization and the internal and external factors that influenced the program’s development. Next, after the history of the Kikuyu Guard has been presented, this case study will include a detailed discussion of the degree of membership the case demonstrates for each factor presented in this dissertation’s model. Finally, this case study concludes with a summation of the findings and an application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix. This case study will demonstrate that the Kikuyu Guard diverged from the other successful case studies in that the British colonial government provided little oversight and material support, but demonstrated high degrees of membership for several other factors in the model and that the program was ultimately successful in defeating the Mau Mau insurgency.

The Kikuyu Guard were formed by the British colonial government around a nucleus of Kikuyu tribal leaders in 1952 in response to the Mau Mau Rebellion that had been building in Kenya in the period after World War II. The Mau Mau, a secret organization that broke from the Kenyan African Union party in the late 1940s, sought to eject the British from Kenya and regain lands lost by the Kikuyu tribe to European settlers. The Mau Mau targeted white settlers as well as tribal chiefs loyal to the British government and Kikuyu converts to Christianity. In self-defense the latter two groups...
formed community security organizations to repel Mau Mau. From these groups the British formed the nucleus of the Kikuyu Guard. At the height of the program the Kikuyu Guard numbered over 20,000 and secured the majority of the Kikuyu population in fortified villages. The program prevented the Mau Mau access to their support networks among the population and enabled the military and police forces to hunt the Mau Mau in their jungle hideouts. Although the British officially ended the state of emergency in response to the Mau Mau in 1960, the use of the Kikuyu Guard to secure the population effectively ended the rebellion by 1955.

As will be discussed in the following sections of this case study, the British consciously chose not to provide oversight and support to maintain the appearance of Kikuyu ownership of the program. The British were also required to conduct an economy of force effort in Kenya because they were simultaneously fighting insurgencies in Malaya and Cyprus during the height of the Mau Mau Rebellion. This meant that the British were not only fiscally constrained, but also constrained in manpower. This resulted in very little oversight and a high reliance on local leadership and local sustainability.

While the British did provide some arms and equipment to the Kikuyu Guard, the majority of the support they provided the members of the force were intangible goods such as promises for an increased role in post-conflict political system and access to education and business opportunities. The British colonial government was able to do this because the Mau Mau rebels did not have an external source of support, forcing them to arm themselves with whatever weapons they could make or steal. This meant that that
British did not have to provide many weapons to bring the Kikuyu Guard to a level of parity with the Mau Mau.

The Kikuyu Guard program partially adhered to other elements of the model such as incorporation of traditional justice systems. While the creation of tribal chiefs and local tribal councils did not have a direct connection with traditional justice systems, this case study will demonstrate that there were some parallels with the Kikuyu system of governance and the externally imposed colonial system. This created a system that was accepted by the population and placed the administration of governance and justice in the hands of local leaders.

In addition to incorporating local governance and justice systems, the British also used the Kikuyu Guard as a local security forces to secure the population and rarely used them outside their traditional tribal boundaries. Due to the conscious decision of the British to lightly arm the Kikuyu Guard, they were unable to conduct independent combat missions. This meant the main role of the Kikuyu Guard was to guard fortified consolidated villages and provide guides to the regular security forces, while the British Army and Tribal Police were charged with pursuing the Mau Mau into their forest hideouts.

Finally, the Kikuyu Guard relied heavily on local leadership and the cooption of local elites. The program arose from self-defense groups organized by tribal chiefs to defend themselves and their supporters. From these groups and similar groups formed by Christian Kikuyu opposed to the traditional religious practices of the Mau Mau, the British expanded the Kikuyu Guard by providing financial incentives such as waiving certain taxes and promising future political rewards to other local leaders and their
supporters. As this case study will show, while the lack of oversight and empowering local leaders led to numerous abuses by the Kikuyu Guard, the combination created a dynamic that meshed with the Kikuyu culturally accepted path to prosperity that propelled many Kikuyu to join the Kikuyu Guard against the Mau Mau.

As this case study will show and as the majority of the Mau Mau Rebellion and the major actors in the conflict agree, the Kikuyu Guard was the critical element responsible for the British defeat of the Mau Mau. While the Kikuyu Guard were responsible for numerous human rights violations during the rebellion, they were successful in preventing the Mau Mau access to the population and in turning the majority of the Kikuyu against the Mau Mau. These excesses, however caused the British to disband or absorb the Kikuyu Guard into the Tribal Police in 1955 to avoid negative publicity. The back of the Mau Mau insurgency had been broken by this point. In the following section this case study will provide an overview of the evolution of the Kikuyu Guard and the political and military factors that influenced the program.

Background

Prior to the arrival of the British in the late 19th century, the Kikuyu were a sedentary, agricultural people who lived in disbursed collections of family compounds to assist cattle grazing (Majdalany 1963, 137). The Kikuyu organized their society around the kehiomwere or age groups. Members of the Kikuyu progressed with their age group through riika or age-grades that divided life into stages from young adulthood to old age (Kenyatta 1962, xiv, 4).

Within the age group system, the most important was arguably the Mbari or senior age group comprised of land owning men who formed a senior council of elders
and legislative body usually comprised of the largest land owners (Kershaw 1997, 13, 177). The Kikuyu did not have tribal chiefs and positions of leadership were not inherited and could shift by consensus of the age group to different individuals as new age groups ascended to Mbari status and land ownership, the main determinant of wealth and self-worth, shifted among members of an extended family and clan (Kenyatta 1962, 22, 27 and Leakey 1953, 35-37).

The Kikuyu organized their political system through a system of hierarchical councils comprised of representatives from the Mbari. Individual villages formed their own councils and a number of villages formed a Mwaki or neighborhood administered by a kiama kia mwaki or regional council comprised of the most respected members of the Mwaki (Kenyatta 1962, 181). Above the regional council, the Rugongo or ridge council managed the relations of several Mwaki (Barnett and Njama. 1966, 44-45). Through this system the Kikuyu governed themselves up to the regional, but not national level.

Colonization of Kenya by the British did not start in earnest until the turn of the 20th century when British settlers occupied the land around Nairobi pushing the inhabitants, the Kikuyu, into less productive areas (Anderson 2005, 10, 22) Due to outbreaks of small pox and rinderpest outbreaks brought by the Europeans, the British found the area around Nairobi sparsely populated as the majority of the surviving Kikuyu moved out of the area and left caretakers on their land in expectation of returning after the diseases had run their course (Kitson 1960, 6 and Leakey 1953, 9).

The British rapidly occupied the most fertile lands and divided the Kikuyu lands into four districts: Kiambu, Fort Hall, Nyeri, and Embu (Kenyatta 1962, xv). Between 1902 and 1915, the British colonial government passed a series of ordinances allowing
white settlers to obtain leases for 99 and then 999 years, establishing the “White Highlands” area and tribal reserves (Maloba 1993, 26). This started friction with the Kikuyu who believed they still owned the land through traditional practices of inheritance. The British settlers also believed they owned the land because they bought the land from the caretakers left on the land whom the Kikuyu believed had no right to sell the land (Leakey 1953, 28-29). This dispute over land ownership formed the core grievance of the Mau Rebellion.

While Maloba (1993, 27) estimates the Kikuyu only lost about four percent of their land to British settlers, the land was the most productive in the traditional Kikuyu homeland. Adding to the economic hardships caused by losing their most productive land, the introduction of western medicine caused a population explosion among the Kikuyu (Leakey 1953, 21). The loss of land and the increase in population caused increasing conflict and competition among the Kikuyu as younger kehiomwere were unable to move to new lands and land holdings were divided into smaller and increasingly unsustainable plots.

The increasing pressures of population growth were exacerbated by changes to the Kikuyu political institutions. To ease the difficulties of governing Kenya with a small European colonial staff and not understanding or caring to understand the Kikuyu governance system, the British chose to implement a system that adhered to their notions of tribal political structures. The most important of these changes was the modification of the age-based leadership succession to make chieftainship hereditary. While kehiomwere continued to progress through levels of leadership as their cohort aged, leadership stayed within the same families and chiefs were granted powers formerly
exercised by *Mwaki* (Barnett and Njama. 1966, 50). This made the job of British
administrators easier as it reduced the number of Kikuyu they had to deal with and they
did not have to build consensus among the members of the Mwaki, but also
disenfranchised large portions of Kikuyu society.

In addition to population pressures and land alienation the British also created
further hardships for the Kikuyu to benefit white settlers. The most onerous was the
*Kipande* or pass card system. Under this system Kikuyu tenants on white lands were
required to provide free labor for white farmers as payment for the right to live on their
land. Each Kikuyu adult was required to wear a *Kipande* or pass around their neck and
could not move freely unless they had the permission of their white landlord. The British
continued this system until it was repealed in 1947 when mechanization of farms made
the system obsolete (Anderson 2005, 10 and Maloba 1993, 45).

Kikuyu political opposition to the colonial government formed within a few years
after the British appropriated the Kikuyu land and reorganized the tribal system. In 1919
the Kikuyu Association (KA), a reformist movement of tribal chiefs and landowners
formed to protest colonialist land seizures (Clough 1998, 27). Soon after the founding of
the organization, fissures within the KA formed between Kikuyu who wanted to protest
within the British system and those that sought more extreme measures to regain their
land, laying the foundation for the Mau.

In 1924, educated young radicals within the KA split off and formed the Kikuyu
Central Association (KCA) as a militant alternative to the KA. To seal their devotion to
the movement, KCA members took a secret oath, based on traditional Kikuyu religious
practices, promising to defend the Kikuyu lands on penalty of death (Clough 1998, 27).
This practice of the administering of oaths would become a key component of the Mau movement.

Resistance to British rule continued to grow from British land appropriation and political alienation of the native population. The Kikuyu also resisted attempts by British missionaries to ban the traditional practice of clitoridectomy that was a critical step in the process of Kikuyu girls proceeding into the first adult riika or age group (Branch, 2007; Anderson 2005, 18-20; and Leakey 1953, 88). These grievances continued to strengthen Kikuyu opposition groups. Although the British banned the KAU in 1940 as a wartime measure against subversion, the organization continued to operate underground and rapidly expanded its membership after World War II as Kikuyu who had served overseas with the British returned Kikuyu and expected expanded rights after their military service (Clough 1998, 28-29 and Branch 2007).

As Kenya transitioned from a colony to a self-ruling member of British Commonwealth after 1945, relations between the Kikuyu and British settlers continued to deteriorate due to several compounding factors. Following the examples of South Africa and Rhodesia, white settlers sought to manipulate the political system during the transition period to self-rule to restrict African political and economic power and entrench their own minority rule (Anderson 2005, 3).

In addition to this political grievance, the agricultural areas underwent a period of reorganization and turmoil in the post war period. Two trends made the economic situation of Kikuyu farmers increasingly tenuous. First, the population explosion that occurred in the 1920s and 1930s and displacement of the Kikuyu into less productive land caused widespread erosion and over farming. To counteract this and to make white
owned land more productive, the British government implemented soil conservation programs that prevented many Kikuyu from growing cash crops and further reduced the amount of land available for cattle grazing, the main source of Kikuyu wealth (Branch, 2007 and Maloba 1993, 31).

During the same period, Sir Phillip Mitchell, the governor of Kenya from 1944 to 1952, choose to focus on economic expansion of the agricultural sector at the expense of making land available to the growing Kikuyu population (Maloba 1993, 33). White owned farms underwent a period of mechanization and land consolidation to meet post war demand for agricultural goods and to capitalize on economies of scale. This made the need Kikuyu tenant farmers and the Kipande system unnecessary. This resulted in the large-scale ejection of Kikuyu tenant farmers from their lands and their movement to the urban areas of Nairobi in search of work (Branch 2009, 6).

All of these economic, political, and social crises caused infighting within the KCA, KAU, and the other major parties when it became apparent that peaceful political means to address Kikuyu grievances would be closed by the white minority and over five million African Kenyans would be ruled by approximately 29,000 whites (Anderson 2005, 9). The parties fractured in 1951 and radicals from the major parties coalesced into the Mau movement.

The Mau promised the Kikuyu *ithaka na withal* or “Land and Freedom,” using the existing KAU organization and communication networks to disseminate their message and recruit followers (Branch, 2007 and Kitson 1960, 14). Starting in 1950, the Mau Mau laid the groundwork for their violent struggle by recruiting a passive support wing
within in Kikuyu villages and the slums of Nairobi to support the armed wing organizing in the jungle on the borders of the Kikuyu lands (Kitson 1960, 15).

The Mau Mau movement was not a unified organization, but an umbrella organization of numerous independent groups controlled by their own leaders (Clough 1998, 20). The common and unifying feature of the Mau Mau was the administering of a tiered system of oaths. These oaths were tied to traditional Kikuyu religious and justice systems. These systems ensured adherence to agreements and settled disputes through a belief in spiritual impurity caused by breaking tribal rulings and social customs. Once an oath was broken, an individual could be cleansed only after expensive public ceremonies that brought their own amount of individual shame and social ostracism (Leakey 1953, 44-52).

The Mau Mau would force individuals to take different oaths depending on their role in the insurgency. Passive or active supporters of the movement took the Muma wa vigano oath that bound them to support of the movement. At a minimum, oath takers ensured that the members and activities of the Mau Mau would remain secret by swearing that, “If I do anything to give away this organization to the enemy, may I be killed by the oath” (Leakey 1953, 98). At the height of the insurgency in 1953, the British estimated 90 percent of the Kikuyu population had taken this oath. Active Mau Mau fighters took the second oath, the batuni or pledge to kill for the movement (Clough 1998, 109). Although the Mau Mau had no political ideology, the cultural power of oath taking and common grievances served as a potent unifying feature of the movement and allowed the
Mau Mau to develop the support networks of a classic insurgency and the silence of a majority of the population (Branch 2009, 38).79

As the Mau Mau Rebellion gained followers in 1951 and 1952 the Kikuyu experienced a rapid fracturing of their society. The independently organized Mau Mau groups attracted different mixtures of nationalists, opportunists, criminals, and those forced into the movement by circumstance (Maloba 1993, 66). The opposing group, the Loyalists or those loyal to the colonial government, divided into three groups. The first and most powerful group was the chiefs who benefited from their allegiance to the British. The other main groups were comprised of British educated moderate nationalists educated who wanted to work within the political system to gain independence and Kikuyu who converted to Christianity and were opposed to oath taking as blasphemous (Anderson 2005, 11-19).

The formation of the Mau Mau in 1950 to 1952 largely escaped the notice of British colonial officials and, as a result, the colonial government was unprepared for the rebellion. This was partly due to the process of becoming a Commonwealth member and the formation of an independent government that started in 1945 and was in an advanced stage by 1951. As a result, security operations were divided between the colonial African Affairs officer and local officials in the Law and Order office. This caused miscommunication and gaps in security efforts (Clayton 1984, 3).

Additionally, Sir Phillip Mitchell, The Governor of Kenya, sought to downplay the scope and threat of the Mau Mau movement in the first half of 1952 for internal

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[79] Kenyan National Archives, Syracuse University Library (hereafter referred to as KNAC,) Annual Report Rift Valley Province 1952, Film 2801, Reel 20, page 2.
political considerations (Clayton 1984, 4). Fearing that admitting there was a serious security problem would delay the transition to Commonwealth status and not wishing to upset the politically powerful white settlers, Mitchell sought to characterize the Mau Mau as criminals and to ignore the grievances causing the uprising. However, in the fall of 1952, an increasing series of attacks by the Mau Mau against African Loyalists and European farms along with increasing evidence of clandestine oath taking ceremonies raised concerns among colonial officials and white settlers about true strength of the Mau Mau (Clayton 1984, 3-5).

Two events caused the British to acknowledge the true scope of the Mau Mau movement and its threat to the state. First, Sir Evelyn Baring replaced Sir Phillip Mitchell as colonial governor. Baring was less sensitive to the influence of white settlers and more shocked by the violence he witnessed his first week in office (Elkins 2005, 32).

The second event that spurred an increased British response against the Mau Mau was the assassination of the influential Kikuyu chief, Waruhiu wa Kung’u. The assassination and a series of attacks on white settlers following it shocked Baring and led him to declare a state of emergency on October 9, 1952 (Clough 1998, 30).

The Declaration of a State of Emergency expanded government powers and suspended many civil rights for the duration of the emergency. This allowed the government the ability to arrest without charge and to forcibly relocate the population (Clayton 1984, 13). General George Erskine, the General in Chief of the British East Africa Command assessed that the Mau Mau were at most ten percent of the population and the majority of the population sympathized with their goals, but did not provide
material support to the movement (Clayton 1984, 7, 22). Based on this assessment and little intelligence, the British military and colonial police forces staged a series of large scale sweeps to arrest known radical KAU members and suspected Mau Mau members (Maloba 1993, 82-83).

The first and largest of these initial sweep operations was Operation “Jock Scott” conducted on 20-21 October 1952. During this operation the British detained moderate political leaders aligned with the Mau Mau, such as Jemo Kenyatta the future first President of Kenya (Clayton 1984, 21). Jock Scott not only arrested most of the known moderates who were still open to non-violent negotiation with the British, but it also pushed the Mau Mau out of the city of Nairobi and into rural areas the Kikuyu reserves, where the majority of the Kikuyu lived. This allowed the Mau Mau easy access to their support networks and the jungle areas around Mount Kenya that provided staging areas for offensive operations (Clayton 1984, 21).

Confronted with manpower shortages in the army and police forces and an inadequate knowledge of the extent of the Mau Mau movement, the British security forces continued to conduct large scale sweeps of Kikuyu and random detention and interrogation of suspected Mau Mau. These efforts failed to selectively target the Mau Mau leadership and failed to isolate the insurgents from the population, (Maloba 1993, 82). After Jock Scott the Mau Mau took the offensive and increased the number of attacks against unprotected European farms and African Loyalists. (Clayton 1984, 23). They did this because they lacked the arms and ammunition needed to attack the better equipped British Army and police forces. Also, attacking European settlers and Loyalist

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80 KNAC, Annual Report Rift Valley Province 1952, Film 2801, Reel 20, page 5.
chiefs caused uncommitted Kikuyu to feel the security forces could not protect them, forcing them into the Mau Mau movement for their own self-preservation (Edgerton 1989, 82-83). While the number and ferocity of attacks increased in early 1953, they remained uncoordinated due to the decentralized nature of the Mau Mau movement, further confusing British officials about the breadth and penetration of the Mau Mau in the Kikuyu population.  

Early in the Emergency, British officials realized the “impossibility of providing personal police protection to all informants” and sought alternate methods to protect loyalist (Branch 2009, 55). In October 1952, the District Commissioner of Kiambu province recommended to local chiefs that they form “self-protection” groups. The chiefs rejected the advice reasoning that forming armed groups would invite attacks from better armed Mau Mau forces.  

As the strength and membership base of the Mau Mau movement increased in early 1953, Mau Mau groups increased their attacks against groups and individuals they saw as representatives of the British system such as loyalist chiefs and Christian Kikuyu. During the largest of these attacks, the so called “Lari Massacre” on March 26, 1953, the Mau Mau killed the loyalist Chief Luka Mbugua Kahangara and his family and supporters. The colonial government publicized these murders to maximize the message of the brutality and savagery of the Mau Mau, accusing the Mau Mau of killing up to one hundred innocent men, women, and children (Barnett and Njama. 1966, 137). Mau Mau killings of loyalists in early 1953 such as the Lari massacre forced loyalists and those

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81 KNAC, Annual Report Central Province 1952, Film 2801, Reel 5, page 3
82 KNAC, Annual Report Central Province 1952, Film 2801, Reel 5, page 4

The first Kikuyu Guard self-defense forces, renamed the Kikuyu Guard in March 1953, were formed by churches and Christian chiefs. Their purpose was to protect their followers and to be a method to prevent forced oath administering by the Mau Mau (Maloba 1993, 89). By November 1952 these church groups had 580 members in Morang’s district and 817 in Nyeri district. (Anderson 2005, 240)

The Lari Massacre also persuaded General Hinde to issue the Kikuyu Guard firearms and to appoint a colonel, Colonel Philip Morcombe, to manage the program and special temporary district officers to train and oversee the Kikuyu Guard (Majdalany 1963, 151; Clayton 1984, 28; Bennett 2013, 247; and Elkins 2005, 71). After formal recognition by the British, the Kikuyu Guard more than quadrupled in number by April 1953, totaling approximately 7600 in the Central Provinces (Anderson 2005, 124-125) As will be discussed further in a following section, the British chose to limit the number and quality of arms provided to the Kikuyu, equipping only 20 percent of the Kikuyu Guard with shotguns while providing the entire force with uniforms or distinctive arm bands and rations to make up for income lost while on Kikuyu Guard duty (Elkins 2005, 70-71).

The Kikuyu Guard were loosely organized in groups of thirty to fifty men with the local chief as commander. Chiefs initially recruited members by requesting the local mbari to provide a number of men dependent on the mbari’s size. The initial purpose of these forces was to protect headmen or chiefs and their families from assassination by the

83 KNAC, Annual Report Central Province District 1954, Film 2801, Reel 5, page 5.
Mau Mau (Kershaw 1997, 327). A survey of Kikuyu Guard members found that most were between 26 and 40 and one third were illiterate. The majority were small land owners and members of a *mbari* (Maloba 1993, 88).

The colonial government response to the Mau Mau was uncoordinated and ineffective April 1953 when General George Erskine was appointed as commander of all military forces in Kenya with operational control of the police and police auxiliary (Clayton 1984, 6). The expansion of the Kikuyu Guard in 1953 to 15,000 and 25,000 in 1954 allowed Erskine to use the security forces to conduct large sweep operations and pursue the Mau Mau into their jungle bases (Clayton 1984, 29; Anderson 2005, 241; and Elkins 2005, 71).

With additional available security forces and a unified command, Erskine launched Operation Anvil, a massive sweep of the slums of Nairobi on April 24, 1954. The operation detained 75 percent (45,000) of the male population in Nairobi (Clough 1998, 162-163). Of the 45,000 detained, security forces moved more than 24,000 Kikuyu to detention and rehabilitation camps with the remaining detainees sent to the tribal reserves. According to Edgerton (1989, 91-92) this broke the Mau Mau urban support network, but did not destroy the rural support network that existed among the 2 million Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu living in the tribal reserves near the Mau Mau jungle hideouts.

Operation Anvil marked a shift in the purpose of the Kikuyu Guard. Instead of protecting chiefs and their followers, the Kikuyu Guard became the principle method used by the British to neutralize the support wing of the Mau Mau and isolate the Mau Mau fighters from the population. The centerpiece of this effort was the protected

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village. After sweeping an area to clear active Mau Mau fighters, the British moved the entire Kikuyu population from decentralized family compounds into consolidated, protected villages. The purpose of this plan was to sever the link between the Mau Mau fighters and their support network among the population. Each of the protected villages was centered on a Kikuyu Guard outpost that defended the population and monitored their movement. The villages were inexpensive, costing approximately 50 pounds each with the use of free local labor provided by the inhabitants (Majdalany 1963, 210). In a little over a year, the British were able to resettle over 1,000,000 Kikuyu in 800 villages by the end of 1954 (Clayton 1984, 93 and Maloba 1993, 90).

The expansion of the Kikuyu Guard and the concentration population forced the Mau Mau to consolidate into larger units in the Kikuyu Reserve to be able to attack the protected villages (Edgerton 1989, 123). General Erskine initiated two measures to separate these larger units from camps and to hinder their ability to move and supply themselves. Erskine declared the depopulated areas of the Kikuyu reserve to be free fire zones and off limits to the civilian population unless escorted by the Kikuyu Guard. He authorized security forces to fire on anyone in these areas without provocation and the death penalty was applied to anyone found to be illegally carrying firearms (Clayton 1984, 14-15).

The second project he authorized was the excavation of a “great ditch,” a ten-foot-deep and sixteen-foot-wide ditch that stretched for fifty miles and separated the tribal areas from the Mau Mau forests. The ditch was dug by local laborers who were organized by local chiefs and overseen by Kikuyu Guards (Edgerton 1989, 92). Securing the population with the Kikuyu Guard and containing the Mau Mau in a defined area with
the great ditch and free fire zones freed the security forces to go on the offensive in the forests in the summer of 1953 (Clough 1998, 154). By entering the jungle bases of the Mau Mau, the security forces could break the back of the Mau Mau by capturing or killing 4,064 fighters and detaining over 100,000 sympathizers between 1953 and 1955 (Edgerton 1989, 87). By the end of 1955, effective Mau Mau resistance was generally over and operations focused on eliminating isolated insurgent groups.85

Improved intelligence provided by the Kikuyu Guard had enabled the British to break the Mau Mau insurgency. Colonial officials could do this by creating the perception they were committed to winning the conflict and incentivizing loyalty to the government (Maloba 1993, 84, 89 and Elkins 2005, 68). The British provided non-monetary incentives to Kikuyu Guard members such as scholarships for their children and promises of a larger role in post-conflict politics (Anderson 2005, 271).

The British also provided material incentives to Kikuyu chiefs. For example, chiefs were granted the authority to implement land development programs in such a way that they were able to seize the property of suspected Mau Mau sympathizers and consolidate and redistribute the land among themselves and their followers (Branch 2009, 32). The loss of land, the main source of Kikuyu wealth, life in the protected villages, and the threat of indefinite detention if they were not definitely on the government side swayed the population to believe the Mau Mau cause was lost. As one Kikuyu remarked “If we are getting the opposite of what Mau Mau promised us when we were taking the oath, why then shouldn’t we do the contrary of what we promised?” (Branch, 2007). This feeling was echoed by Kalinga Wuchang, a Mau Mau leader, who felt the government

85 KNAC, Annual Report Central Province 1955 Film 2801, Reel 5, page 1-2
incentives and the feeling that the tide was turning against the Mau Mau were the main cause for the defeat of the movement (Clough 1998, 159).

In addition to the material and non-material incentives enticing uncommitted Kikuyu, retaliation against Mau Mau supporters or relatives of fighters by the Kikuyu Guard became a powerful disincentive to support the Mau Mau. Controlling the majority of the population in protected villages and possessing the ability to detain anyone suspected of Mau Mau support, tribal chiefs were able to exact swift revenge on those who were not seen as stalwart government supporters. As one Mau Mau leader remarked, “Whenever we kill or burn a Kikuyu Guard’s house, their revenge is between ten and twenty times. We should fight our enemies in the forests, in the Special Areas, in their camps and at any other place of contact, in order to safeguard the civilians.” (Clough 1998, 147-148).

By the end of 1956 the military phase of the emergency ended. Security forces and the Kikuyu Guard killed 10,527 Mau Mau fighters and captured 2,633. The Mau Mau killed 1,826 Kikuyu Guard and loyalists and wounded 918. In contrast, losses to the regular security forces were comparatively light. The British security forces suffered 63 killed and the Tribal Police lost 456 killed (Majdalany 1963, 221).

The Kikuyu Guard were a major contributing factor in the rapid and economical British defeat of the Mau Mau (Clough 1998, 31). The Kikuyu Guard did the majority of the fighting for the least amount of resources. According to the Meru District Commissioner, “Without belittling the service of the Regular Forces, it is true to say that the clear majority of the causalities inflicted on the Mau Mau during the year (1954) have been caused by the Tribal Police and the Kikuyu Guard forces operating under their own
This statement holds true throughout the areas affected by the Mau Mau Rebellion. During the emergency, which cost approximately $55 million, the Kikuyu Guard accounted for 42 percent or 4,686 of the Mau Mau killed (Majdalany 1963, 221 and Elkins 2005, 250).

Judging by the short duration of the emergency and the share of fighting undertaken by the Kikuyu Guard, the program was a successful use of community-based security forces in counterinsurgency. As will be discussed in the following sections, there were significant human rights abuses committed by the Kikuyu Guard that caused them to be disbanded or integrated into the Tribal Police in late 1955, but this occurred after the bulk of the fighting had already occurred and the momentum of the conflict had turned in the government’s favor (Anderson 2005, 271). Keeping the overall success and the flaws of the program, the following sections will analyze the Kikuyu Guard’s adherence to the factors of this dissertation’s model.

External Support and Oversight

The Kikuyu Guard in Kenya demonstrated a “mostly out” degree of membership with the factor of External Support and Oversight. By design and out of necessity the British consciously limited their external support and oversight of the Kikuyu Guards. Colonial officials did this to maintain popular perception that the Kikuyu Guard were an organic response to the Mau Mau and allowed them deniability of Kikuyu Guard wrongdoing to keep the Kikuyu Guard loyal to the government (Branch 2009, 68). While this allowed the Kikuyu Guards to commit serious human rights violations and the chiefs to

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86 KNAC, Annual Report Central Province 1954, Film 2801, Reel 5, page 3.
abuse their power for personal gain, it also fostered local ownership of the program as well as a certain amount of legitimacy for the program among the population.

At the outset of the emergency and government recognition of the Kikuyu Guard groups, the British colonial government was careful to support the Kikuyu Guard as little as possible in 1951-1952. The purpose of this according to the Kenya colonial governor Evelyn Baring was to keep the appearance that these groups were a response generated by the Kikuyu against the Mau Mau and not a “government-engineered organization” (Anderson 2005, 240-241). Accordingly, the office of the Officer of Director of Operations directed all district commissioners that the organization of all Kikuyu Guard units be “based on local customs and conditions and under local leadership” and not be subjected to too great a degree of central regimentation” (Branch 2009, 81).

The British focus on limiting oversight manifested itself in two main ways. First, the British assigned few personnel of European descent to oversee Kikuyu Guard daily operations. After a power struggle between the colonial office and the British Army after the declaration of emergency in 1952, the colonial office maintained control of the Kikuyu Guard as a means to maintain a stake in the security operations in areas affected by the emergency. Army personnel had no authority to discipline the Kikuyu Guard or direct their operations except through coordination with District Commissioners. Complete control of the Kikuyu guard rested with the District Officers. To alleviate the burden of managing the Kikuyu Guard, the colonial office authorized District Commissioners to hire temporary Assistant District Officers (ADO) (Elkins 2005, 71). According to Clayton (1984, 18, 46) the ADOs were recruited from local settlers who had no interest in the methods of the Kikuyu Guard.
While incoming ADOs were reminded to closely supervise Kikuyu Guard units and chiefs to prevent them from “chasing other lucrative ‘Loves’” or side vendettas not related to the Mau Mau, this was a secondary concern to rooting out Mau Mau sympathizers from the Kikuyu Guard and attacking Mau Mau fighters.\(^87\) In most cases ADOs were concerned with operations while the chiefs “shouldered administrative details” of disciplining their forces.\(^88\)

If excesses were committed by the Kikuyu Guard, this was a regrettable, but necessary risk involved in protecting European control of Kenya. As the Meru District Officer remarked in his annual official report that “The African is very easily provoked, at any rate, as Ibsen once said: - ‘Man does not put on his best trousers when he goes out to battle for freedom and for truth’.”\(^89\) J.A. Rutherford, a district officer supervising the Kikuyu Guard, echoes this sentiment in his assessment that the real role of district officers was to maintain the loyalty and morale of the Kikuyu Guard rather than concerning themselves with “paying off many old scores with the Mau Mau” (Elkins 2005, 71).

In addition to appointing British settlers who had little concern about Kikuyu Guard excesses and were more concerned with protecting their own farms, the British also assigned few Europeans to oversee the program. While the oversight provided by these officers was seen as “an essential factor in the struggle” they were too few to provide adequate oversight.\(^90\) In each district one ADO was assigned to oversee four to six Kikuyu Guard posts with informal assistance from local European farmers. In most

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\(^87\) KNAC, Handing over Report: Meru District April 21, 1953, Film 2803, page 1
\(^88\) KNAC, Annual Report Central Province 1955, Film 2801, Reel 5, page 17.
\(^89\) KNAC, Annual Report Central Province 1954, Film 2801, Reel 5, page 3
\(^90\) KNAC, Annual Report Fort Hall District 1952, Film 2801, Reel 13, page 3
cases the European farmers were of little help. As Captain Cooke, the Nakuru Assistant District Officer (Kikuyu Guard) found because “in all too many cases it was found that farmers knew little about their labor and even were unaware who was living on their farms.”

This resulted in each ADO supervising 200 to 300 Kikuyu Guard members dispersed over a large area with little help. In the most extreme cases of the Central Province and the Rift Valley Province each district had three to four temporary ADOs or other district officers, who took on as an extra duty, the supervision of 20 to 30 Kikuyu Guard posts. In several cases districts did not have ADOs in place to supervise all Kikuyu Guard units until 1955. While initiative were undertaken to assign tribal police to some Kikuyu Guard posts to train the Kikuyu Guard and provide them leadership, but this was not possible in all Kikuyu Guard posts due to manpower limitations.

The low priority for supervision set by the British was also demonstrated by the failure of British officials to investigate Kikuyu Guard abuses or punish those who committed the acts. Most colonial administrators ignored Kikuyu Guard excesses as long as they attacked the Mau Mau. This allowed the Kikuyu Guard to abuse their power by detaining anyone without evidence and coercing confessions as the sole evidence for prosecution (Edgerton 1989, 163). According to William W. Baldwin, an American serving in the General Service Unit, the paramilitary wing of the National Police, “We did not delve too deeply into some of the minor illegalities practiced by the Kikuyu

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91 KNAC, Annual Report Nakuru District 1954, Film 2801, Reel 18, page 6
93 KNAC, Annual Report Rift Valley Province 1955, Film 2801, Reel 21, page 9
94 KNAC, Annual Report Fort Hall District 1954, Film 2801, Reel 13, page 5-6
Guard. So long as we did not find one conniving with the Mau Mau, we left them pretty much alone. The indiscretions of the Kikuyu Guard were a small price to pay for their tremendous contribution toward quelling terrorism” (Maloba 1993, 94). This resulted in Kikuyu Guard posts turning into what Elkins (2005, 69, 244) termed “epicenters of torture” and allowed chiefs to use the screening and detention process as a means of settling personal grievances and enriching themselves with confiscated property (Clayton 1984, 29) (Edgerton 1989, 100).

As the power of the Kikuyu Guard grew, the number of abuses and massacres increased in 1954 and 1955 and the British made a concerted effort to overlook them (Elkins 2005, 76-81). In the most publicized of these cases, six Kikuyu Guard were tried for torture, forcing confessions, and murdering a Mau Mau suspect in Nyeri District. The Judge trying the case described the chief’s Kikuyu Guard post as a “stronghold of a robber baron,” and sentenced them to hard labor. In response, the Nyeri District Officer wrote a letter to the judge denouncing the conviction and commented that if news of the conviction spread, the Kikuyu Guard “may consider it better to join the Mau Mau and reactivate the fighting war than stay in a post and be liable to serious charge.” (Elkins 2005, 81-82).

In another case ADO Brian Hayward and twenty-one Kikuyu Guard were tried for systematically abusing prisoners. Governor Baring wrote to the judge trying to scuttle the case stating, “it would be politically most inexpedient to prosecute a loyal Chief who had taken a leading part in the fight against Mau Mau” (Branch 2009, 86). The judge remained undeterred and sentenced Hayward one hundred pounds and three months hard labor and the Kikuyu Guard members one hundred shillings and one day in prison.
While the judge condemned their actions he still tried to mitigate their severity saying, “It is easy to work oneself up into a state of pious horror over these offenses, but they must be considered against their background. All the accused were engaged in seeking out inhuman monsters and savages of the lowest order” (Elkins 2005, 82-83).

As the extent of the abuses committed by the Kikuyu Guard became known, the East African Court of Appeals found in 1954 that “There exists a system of guard posts manned by headmen and chiefs, and these are interrogation centers and prisons to which the Queen’s subjects, whether innocent or guilty, are led by armed men without warrant and detained – and as it seems tortured until they confess to alleged crimes and are then led forth to trial on the sole evidence of these confessions” (Clayton 1984, 46). British leaders believed that increased scrutiny of the program that might lead to the conviction of loyalist chiefs endangering the entire effort to defeat the Mau Mau.

General Erskine believed that the convictions had created a negative effect. He said, “Depression and despair are setting in and morale is dropping” among the Kikuyu Guard because of the convictions (Anderson 2005, 306). He believed that if the further convictions occurred “the Kikuyu Guard would have collapsed and with their collapse the whole structure of our fighting against the Mau Mau would have been undermined. Without them it would have been impossible to withdraw the Army and the Reserves such as those at Fort Hall which police and Kikuyu Guard are now taking over. Without them we would have had no support among any members of the Kikuyu tribe” (Edgerton 1989, 165). In early 1955 in response to increased unrest within the Kikuyu Guard over the convictions, General Erskine offered an amnesty to the Mau Mau with the ulterior motive of also granting the Kikuyu Guard amnesty for any abuses they committed,
staving off the potential “disaster” of a mass Kikuyu Guard (Clayton 1984, 28). Fearing a mass defection by the Kikuyu Guard with their weapons, Erskine offered amnesty to both sides to stave off the “disaster” of such a Kikuyu Guard defection (Edgerton 1989, 99).

By 1955 the extent of Kikuyu Guard abuses had increased to a point that it became apparent to British leaders that there could be severe public relations consequences if they became known, leading the Nairobi District Commissioner to comment that, “the prestige of Her Majesty’s Government is likely to be brought into disrepute” (Branch 2009, 107). In January 1955 with the emergency winding down, the colonial government responded with a plan to transfer 800 Kikuyu Guard into the Tribal Police and 6400 into the Tribal Reserve Police on reduced pay. The remaining 14,000 Kikuyu Guard were placed into other employment with the security forces (Anderson 2005, 271). The demobilization took the remainder of 1955, ending the Kikuyu Guard program and also ending the need to scrutinize the actions of the Kikuyu guard (Branch, 2007).

The officials in the colonial government also consciously provided few physical resources to Kikuyu guard units, preferring to provide indirect incentives or promises for future rewards. They did this for several reasons. As with the reasoning to limit oversight, the British desired to maintain the appearance that Kikuyu Guard units were a spontaneous, volunteer response by the Kikuy against the Mau Mau. The second reason was the British fear that weapons provided to the Kikuyu Guard would fall into the hands of the Mau Mau through corruption, defection or capture. As the Mau Mau lacked an

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95 KNAC, Annual Report Embu District 1955, Film 2801, Reel 15, page 5
external sponsor and could only make, capture or purchase weapons, it made sense to provide the Kikuyu Guard only enough weapons to defend themselves.

Throughout the Mau Mau Rebellion, the British paid the Kikuyu Guard as little as possible and offered other methods to incentivize membership. According to James Rutherford this, was done because “it was felt that (providing pay) would make them mercenaries whereas they were in fact engaged in eradicating a disease which afflicted the majority of their tribe” (Elkins 2005, 71). In the first two years of the emergency, only Kikuyu Guard chiefs were entitled to stipend of 15 schillings a month to defray the cost of leading their units (Anderson 2005, 240-241). The remainder of Kikuyu Guard members were unpaid. Reward for participation came in form of rations, exemption from taxes associated with the emergency, preferential treatment in business licensing, promise of land, and education opportunities for the children of loyalists. As Branch (2007) notes, “Loyalism was an investment in the future.”

The greatest incentive for Kikuyu Guard members, the chiefs in particular, was the promise of greater political power in the post-colonial government. At a public speech to a Kikuyu Guard unit in January 1955, Governor Baring told the gathering, “You have earned the right to lead your people and you will be given privileges before those who failed to take an active part in the fight” and that the loyalists would serve as “the foundation on which the government would seek to build during the reconstruction” (Branch, 2007).

In addition to promises of future political power, Kikuyu Guard members were given preferential treatment in business, employment, and educational opportunities. The colonial government provided Kikuyu Guard members exclusive rights to conduct
business, and employment in the Tribal Police and local government (Branch, 2007 and Kershaw 1997, 327). Additionally, Kikuyu Guard members were exempt from school fees for their children and scholarships were given to the children of Kikuyu Guard members to the top Kenyan boarding school, Alliance High School (Kershaw 1997, 327 and Anderson 2005, 271).

Finally, colonial officials provided Kikuyu Guard members the opportunity to improve their land holdings through land redistribution or reentry into the agricultural economy. The main mechanism used to implement land redistribution was the Swynnerton Plan, a program unveiled in 1954 designed to consolidate land into sustainable plots capable of subsistence and cash crop agriculture (Branch 2009, 122). In practice, according to Daniel Branch (2007), the program became the means Governor Baring could provide “a reward while the Emergency continues” to loyalists by redistributing lands confiscated from Mau Mau supporters to loyalists. The Swynnerton Plan became the most effective tool for promoting membership in the Kikuyu Guard and deterring support of the Mau Mau with its accompanying risk of the loss of land (Branch 2009, 119, 121). For those Kikuyu Guard members with lower economic or social status, colonial officials provided preferential treatment in access to employment as migrant farm workers through the establishment of vetting processes, labor exchanges, and passes to relocate to colonist’s farms (Branch, The Enemy Within: Loyalists and the War Against the Mau Mau in Kenya 2007).

Each of the incentives the British provided to Kikuyu Guard members provided a method for ensuring continued loyalty and a stake in the defeat of the Mau Mau. The incentives did not disrupt the local economy by introducing external funds or resources
and deferred most benefits until the successful conclusion of the conflict. Finally, the incentives cost the British little while targeting Kikuyu desire for land and improvement through education and self-actualization.

As mentioned in the introduction to this section, the British provided only enough weapons and equipment necessary to defend themselves and the fortified villages. This was due to budget constraints and the colonial government’s wariness about the loyalty of Kikuyu Guard members coupled with the inability to control weapons to a lack of oversight. During the initial months of the emergency the first Kikuyu Guard units were armed with machetes and spears they provided themselves and were unpaid (Branch 2007). After the Lari Massacre prompted the colonial government gave official recognition for the Kikuyu Guard in March 1953, the government provided the first Kikuyu Guard units with 50 rifles (Anderson 2005, 256). As the program matured in 1953 and 1953 the British reduced this number so that Kikuyu Guard units were given enough weapons to arm approximately a quarter of their force.96 In practice this meant that each Kikuyu Guard post was typically issued ten rifles. These would be given to the chief and his most trusted mean with the rest armed with locally procured machetes and spears (Bennett 2013, 16 and Branch 2009, 101). At the height of the emergency this translated into the British issuing 500 rifles and 2,170 shotguns to the force of approximately Kikuyu Guard 20,000 by December 1953 (Majdalany 1963, 188).97

As demonstrated by the evidence presented in this section, the Kikuyu Guard in Kenya demonstrated a “mostly out” degree of membership with the factor of External

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96 KNAC, Annual Report Nakuru District 1954, Film 2801, Reel 18, page 12
97 KNAC, Annual Report Fort Hall District 1952, Film 2801, Reel 13, page 3
Support and Oversight. The British consciously limited their external support and oversight of the Kikuyu Guards. Colonial officials did this to maintain popular perception that the Kikuyu Guard were an organic response to the Mau Mau and to provide incentives for continued loyalty to the government. A lack of oversight resulted in serious human rights abuses by the Kikuyu Guard, but the promise of material gain if the Mau Mau were defeated created strong incentives to join the Kikuyu Guard and remain loyal to the government.

Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction

The Kikuyu Guard program demonstrated a “fully in” degree of membership with the factor of Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction. By design the Kikuyu Guard were lightly armed and only capable of self-defense. Although they did occasionally act as guides for army and police units, their main purpose was to alert the security forces of Mau Mau operating in their local area, guard the protected villages and loyal chiefs and their families (Bennett 2013, 16). Legal restrictions and local recruiting were the factors that influenced the limitations on territorial jurisdiction placed on the Kikuyu.

For the first months of their existence, the Kikuyu Guard had no legal law enforcement authority other than the approval of the colonial government to defend themselves. While this was changed in February 1953 when the colonial government placed them under the Tribal Police as auxiliaries through the Tribal Police Ordinance of 1953, they could only operate outside their area of operations while augmenting the Tribal Police (Anderson 2005, 256). In practice this meant that the Kikuyu Guard were stationed in posts located within 500 yards of protected villages and each post guarded two to three villages (Branch 2009, 108).
The other limit placed on the Kikuyu Guard was local recruitment. As mentioned earlier, the Kikuyu Guard were unpaid and expected to continue their primary occupation while participating in the program. This meant that Kikuyu Guard units could not conduct sustained operations outside their Kikuyu areas without risking a reduction in the morale of their members. The British did start paying the Kikuyu Guard in 1955 when they transferred the Kikuyu Guard from the Tribal Police Auxiliary to Tribal Police Reserve but the “fortified posts remained their focus.”

The remainder of Kikuyu Guard were reintegrated into village life and formed into informal watch and ward committees.

The lack of pay and the necessity for Kikuyu Guard members to earn a living outside of the program required the British to raise units from local areas. To simplify and speed the process they allowed local chiefs to recruit and vet members and manage the employment of the Kikuyu Guard (Anderson 2005, 241). As Anderson (2005, 243) found, these restrictions to territorial jurisdiction improved the effectiveness of Kikuyu Guard units because they knew the population and terrain, but it also allowed them to settle old scores because the limited oversight provided by the British.

The Kikuyu Guard exhibited a “fully in” degree of membership with the factor of limits to territorial jurisdiction. Legal limits to their ability to operate away from their fortified posts coupled with their limited weaponry limited the Kikuyu Guard to operations to defensive operations around the fortified villages. The lack of pay for most members of the Kikuyu guard required its members to maintain a separate income, necessitating chiefs to recruit from the local area and limited the ability for the Kikuyu

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98 Annual Report Fort Hall District 1955, KNAC, Film 2801, Reel 13, page 24

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Guard to conduct operations far away from their villages without causing hardship to Kikuyu Guard members and endangering morale.

Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems

The Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a “more in than out” degree of membership with the factor of Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems. In addition to being modelled after 19th century Kikuyu self-defense groups formed to protect against Maasi raiding parties, the Kikuyu guard were also connected to traditional justice systems through their links to other organizations (Branch 2009, 67). During the colonization period in the first decades of the twentieth century, the British reorganized the Kikuyu consensus-based tribal governance system with one that was centered on a hereditary chieftainship system. However, the British did translate several of the Kikuyu justice systems into organizations based on western concepts and devolved power to these organizations as the Mau Mau Emergency progressed. Additionally, the British used traditional Kikuyu religious oath taking and de-oathing practices to undercut the Mau Mau base of support. While these organizations and practices were not a formal part of the Kikuyu Guard, they were linked to the program as part of the criminal justice process and the counterinsurgency program against the Mau Mau.

As described in the overview, the traditional Kikuyu governance and justice system was based on kiama ruling councils of Mbari age group leaders that controlled land ownership and politics (Presley 1992, 29). The authority of these councils was based on members’ progression through increasing levels of responsibility based on age-groups. The relative power of members was based on individual wealth and social standing within the community and not on inherited titles (Presley 1992, 25).
In 1908 the Kenyan Colonial Governor Sir Percy Girouard converted the kiama into Local Native Councils (LNC) and installed hereditary chiefs as the overall leaders of the councils (Presley 1992, 85). While the addition of hereditary chiefs was foreign to the Kikuyu, members of the LNCs were members of the *Mbari* and progression of age groups into leadership remained the same as the kiama system. The British withheld full sovereignty from the LNCs in the areas of intertribal relations and judicial matters, they granted the LNCs the authority for education, labor management, small public works projects, and tax collection (Presley 1992, 95-96, 181).

In addition to the LNCs, the British also instituted Native Tribunals in 1944, comprised of *Mbari* members selected by the British with jurisdiction over land ownership and civil disputes. While the traditional *Mbari* system combined governance and the judiciary in a single body, the combination of the LNCs and Native Tribunals exercised most of the functions of the *Mbari*. The authority of the Native Courts continued to expand after their creation and in 1950, they were given jurisdiction over non-capital criminal cases in 1950. As the Mau Mau uprising escalated, the British further empowered the tribal courts in 1953, not only to enforce customary law and minor criminal offenses, but also to convict any person local courts found to have Mau Mau affiliation and had committed an act “which in the opinion of the Chief might cause a riot or a disturbance or breach of the peace.” Through the LNCs, headed by chiefs who were also the leader of the Kikuyu Guard, and the Native Courts that tried

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99 KNAC, Annual Report Nyeri District 1946, Film 2801, Reel 14, page
100 KNAC, Annual Report Fort Hall District 1950, Film 2801, Reel 13, page 7 Annual Report Fort Hall District 1951, Film 2801, Reel 18, page 6 and Annual Report Central Province 1951, Film 2801, Reel 5, page 10 and Handing Over Report Naivasha District, January 1953, Film 2803, Reel 9, page 3
suspected Mau Mau detained by the Kikuyu Guard; the Kikuyu Guard maintained a connection with traditional justice systems.

The incorporation of Kikuyu oathing ceremonies, used traditionally to ensure adherence to judicial rulings and negotiated settlements, provided the Kikuyu Guard another connection to traditional justice systems. Starting in late 1952, the British became aware of the scope of the Mau Mau use of oath taking to coerce support from the population. As a counter to the cultural power of these oaths, loyalist chiefs recommended to British officials the use of cleansing ceremonies to negate the power of the oaths and counter-oathing to cement loyalty to the colonial governments (Luongo 2006). This led to the creation of “Her Majesties Witchdoctors” or “White Witchdoctors” who would administer mass cleansings and counter-oaths to entire villages (Clayton 1984, 16). While these cleansing ceremonies were often conducted by force, they proved effective in countering the mystical power of the Mau Mau (Kershaw 1997, 250-251).

To ensure the loyalty and added commitment of the Kikuyu Guard, chiefs administered a kahungwa mahuri, or “lung cleaning” ritual. Administering this ritual further ensured that they had no connection to the Mau Mau and held members of the Kikuyu Guard to the same level of commitment as active Mau Mau fighters (Elkins 2005, 70). Through these rituals, the Kikuyu Guard incorporated traditional justice mechanisms designed to ensure compliance and loyalty to the colonial government.

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102 KNAC, Annual Report Central Province 1952, Film 2801, Reel 5, page 3
103 KNAC, Annual Report Kiambu District, 1952, Film 2801, Reel 11, page 5
While the modification of the traditional justice organizations by the British prevents full membership with the factor of incorporation of traditional justice systems, the links between the Kikuyu Guard and the tribal governance and justice organizations provided a connection to traditional justice systems. Additionally, the incorporation of cleansing rituals and counter-oaths negated the spiritual power of the Mau Mau and provided a culturally acceptable mechanism for individuals to join the Kikuyu Guard. Through the inclusion of these organizations and rituals, the Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a “more in than out” degree of membership with traditional justice systems.

Local Sustainability and Accountability

The Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a “more out than in” degree of membership with the factor of local sustainability and accountability. As discussed in the external oversight and support section of this case study, the colonial government provided the Kikuyu Guard with few resources and its members sustained themselves with monetary rewards or preying on the population. Due to the limited external support, the Kikuyu Guard had to be sustained by the local community; causing hardship among the population that found it hard to maintain a living in the resettlement camps. Due to the power entrusted to local chiefs and Local Native Councils (LNC) over the population that the British distrusted, there were few mechanisms to promote local accountability and abuses by local chiefs and Kikuyu Guard were frequent.

During the period between late 1952 and 1955, the British did not pay the Kikuyu Guard salaries in order to keep the appearance they were spontaneous and local reactions to the Mau Mau. However the British did provide the Kikuyu Guard members with food
and clothing allowances and rewards in the form of cash or food. While this did change in 1955, when the colonial government transitioned some the Kikuyu Guard into the Tribal Police Reserves and placed them and chiefs and village headmen on salary in 1955, for the majority of the program’s existence most material and financial support came from local sources. The main source of financial support came in the form of monetary rewards given to the Kikuyu Guard members who captured or killed Mau Mau members, but these funds were drawn from fines levied against local Mau Mau supporters (Branch, The Enemy Within: Loyalists and the War Against the Mau Mau in Kenya 2007).

The lack of pay for the Kikuyu Guard led to many abuses of power by guard members in the pursuit of material gain. The main source of abuse and corruption stemmed from the identification and detention of suspected Mau Mau members that was left up to the discretion of chiefs and headmen. Kershaw (1997, 250) found that in many cases Kikuyu were forced to appear before a screening committee by Kikuyu Guards and selected for detention based on testimony from the screening committee who were also members of the Kikuyu Guard. Because the Kikuyu Guard and their leaders were both accusers and judges of guilt, this left the accused no recourse but to offer bribes in return for their freedom. In the aftermath of the detentions resulting from Operation Anvil in 1954, Anderson uncovered numerous cases of individuals offering bribes of over 600 pounds to get out of detention and cases of the Kikuyu conducting nightly patrols to collect a tax ensuring freedom from detention (Anderson 2005, 210). While these abuses

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104 KNAC, Handing Over Report Githunguri District, January 1955, Film 2801, Reel 15, page 29
105 KNAC, Annual Report Fort Hall District 1955, Film 2801, Reel 13, page 24 and Annual Report Rift Valley Province 1955, Film 2801, Reel 21, page 12
106 KNAC, Annual Report Nakuru District 1954, Film 2801, Reel 18, page 5
are lamentable, it also formed a method of local sustainment of the program in lieu of external support.

Another area where the sustainability of the Kikuyu Guard played an important part was the creation in 1954 of the fortified villages that the guard used to secure the population. The villages each cost approximately 50 pounds due to their method of construction (Majdalany 1963, 210). Instead of using mechanized construction methods and outside materials, colonial officials tasked the chiefs to build the villages using communal labor under Kikuyu Guard supervision and utilizing as many local materials as possible (Branch 2009, 69). This not only allowed the British to move 1,000,000 kikuyu into villages in less than a year, but also for the cost of approximately 40,000 British Pounds (Clayton 1984, 93 and Maloba 1993, 90). This sped the separation of the Mau Mau from the population, but also created villages that could be easily maintained by the local population.

While the Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a high degree of sustainability, the program possessed few mechanisms for accountability. This was due to the authority granted to the chiefs by the British to manage the Kikuyu Guard as well as most aspects of village activities. Chiefs were responsible for the recruitment of members, enabling the chiefs recruit from within their supporters (Anderson 2005, 241). Thus, a system was created where Kikuyu Guard members were loyal to the chiefs and not the community.

While chiefs wielded power over most village activities and their rule was based more on the power of the Kikuyu Guard than legitimacy, there were two governing bodies that gained the community some measure of accountability over the Kikuyu Guard
The first of these organizations were the LNCs that were chaired by chiefs, but were comprised of other *Mbari* members who derived their legitimacy from their membership in their age group. These councils were charged with formulating and implementing local policy and possessed the ability to seek recourse from colonial district officials to override the actions of chiefs (Branch 2009, 109).

In addition to LNCs, the British also formed village tribunals and councils comprised of individuals selected by villagers (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, 213). The tribal tribunal judges or * athamaki* were selected in a process similar to the traditional tribal council system, providing a legislative and judicial body that was accountable to the populace (Leakey 1953, 37, 80 and Kenyatta 1962, 211). These groups concerned themselves mainly with providing recommendations for public works projects and the allocation of resources, but could also regulate local religious, social, and trade matters. These councils provided an avenue for villagers to address grievances against the Kikuyu Guard and chiefs as they had some power to sanction malfeasance committed by them (Luongo 2006).

The Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a “mostly in” degree of membership with the factor of local sustainability and accountability. The colonial government designed the program to be low cost by limiting Kikuyu Guard compensation and offering rewards drawn from assets confiscated from the property of convicted Mau Mau members. Due to the limited external support, the Kikuyu Guard had to be sustainable by the local
community. However, due to the power entrusted to local chiefs and Local Native Councils (LNC) over the population whom the British distrusted, there were few mechanisms except for village councils to promote local accountability and abuses by local chiefs and Kikuyu Guard were frequent.

Voluntary Participation by Local Elites

The Kikuyu Guard program demonstrated a “fully in” degree of membership with the voluntary participation by local elites. As this section will show, the British drew existing leaders into the Kikuyu Guard by leveraging existing grievances and using incentives that appealed to the Kikuyu’s concepts of self-improvement. Once existing leaders predisposed to opposing the Mau Mau were inducted into the program with the promise of immediate and future rewards, the colonial government devolved power to these individuals and allowed them high levels of discretion in the exercise of that power to engender ownership in the success of the fight against the Mau Mau.

The initial leaders of the Kikuyu Guard were drawn from groups that had been attacked by the Mau Mau because of their real or perceived ties to the colonial government and western culture. One of the main groups targeted by the Mau Mau were the Kikuyu elite that consisted of chiefs who derived their power from the colonial government, landowners and moderate political leaders who advocated using peaceful means to gain political power (Clayton 1984, 19) (Anderson 2005, 242). Individually in this category had either been attacked by the Mau Mau or disapproved of their methods. The indiscriminate savagery of the Mau Mau repelled many with one Kikuyu Guard leader saying he rejected the Mau Mau because, “they killed innocent women and

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110 KNAC, Annual Report Central Province 1954, Film 2801, Reel 5, page 3
children, sometimes pregnant women” (Branch 2009, 59). Branch (2009, 100) found that the largest predictor of loyalism and membership in the Kikuyu Guards among this group was being a victim of the Mau Mau.

Another group that joined the Kikuyu Guard in opposition to the Mau Mau were traditionalists who felt the Mau Mau were upstarts who violated the traditional norms and values of the Kikuyu (Maloba 1993, 88-89). These individuals saw the Mau Mau as “greedy eaters” or those that wanted to gain land and political power without the hard work the Kikuyu regarded as necessary to honestly achieving social status and wealth (Branch 2009, 22). These individuals found that Loyalism was the most certain path, especially as the tide began to turn against the Mau Mau, to what Branch (2007) calls “the practice of self-mastery” and legitimate leadership in the Kikuyu.

Christian communities provided some of the first pockets of resistance against the Mau Mau and like the traditionalists rejected the Mau Mau on cultural and religious grounds. Having rejected the traditional Kikuyu religion, the Christian Kikuyu opposed the “witchcraft” of the Mau Mau oaths (Branch 2007). Refusing to take the Mau Mau oaths, Christians were punished and sometimes executed by the Mau Mau (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, 295). Colonial administrators found the Christians to be the most reliable opposition to the Mau Mau and authorized them to form the earliest self-defense groups in 1952 such as the “Torchbearers” group in the Rift Valley Province with the encouragement of local church leaders.111

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111 KNAC, Annual Report Embu District 1953, Film 2801, Reel 15, page 2 and Annual Report Rift Valley Province 1953, Film 2801, Reel 20, page 5
While these groups also wanted self-rule, as did the Mau Mau, British officials found a core of leaders with whom they could start the “reconstruction of the Kikuyu people” and a core of support to combat the Mau Mau (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, 295). To cement their loyalty, the British promised their greatest rewards would come after the crisis ended with the Nyeri District Commissioner promising the Kikuyu Guard in 1954 “after this, you will continue to work together as local committees, to assist the government and to advise yourselves how best law and order can be maintained in your areas, and farming and other progress restored and furthered” (Branch 2009, 69). In addition to political power, economic rewards would also be bestowed upon the Kikuyu Guard with its members receiving “preference in every possible way and be considered before the masses who, by their oathing and obedience to Mau Mau ways would have to work their passage back to recognition” (Elkins 2005, 71).

To fulfill this promise, the colonial government began enacting land reforms designed in 1954, according to M. P. K. Sorrenson (1967, 217) to make the Kikuyu Guard “the rich, the powerful, and the loyal.” The main mechanism used to benefit the leaders of the Kikuyu Guard was the Swynnerton Plan, discussed earlier in this case study. While the plan addressed the legitimate problem of unsustainable farms caused by overcrowding and fragmentation of land through subdividing inherited plots, only loyalists were eligible for the newly consolidated plots of land that were confiscated from convicted Mau Mau members or sympathizers. Through land redistribution, the colonial authorities created with little cost, tangible incentives for Kikuyu Guard membership and penalties for Mau Mau membership.
In addition to providing loyalists with financial rewards, the British also expanded the power of the chiefs and established local councils in 1954 to tie local leaders to the colonial government. With this new power loyalists were able to direct villager labor, gain access to resources and external markets, and seek retribution against rivals (Branch 2009, 29-30 and Elkins 2005, 241-242). To ensure their loyalty by making local leaders feel secure in their positions, the British provided few checks to their power. In general District Officers let the chiefs “do as they please” (Clough 1998, 158). For example, the District Commissioner of Nyeri instructed his subordinates that “nothing should be said or done to take the authority of the administration over the Kikuyu Guard away from us and the Chiefs” (Branch 2009, 71). This allowed the chiefs to “seize real control” of their communities according to the Fort Hall District Officer. Through this bargain of giving chiefs almost unlimited control over their communities, the British were able to gain undivided loyalty of local leaders and impose severe costs on anyone with suspected Mau Mau sympathies (Branch 2009, 61).

This led to the next major group of Kikuyu leaders, opportunists, to switch sides to the Kikuyu Guard (Clough 1998, 66). The defection of this group was rapid and may have been the change that turned the tide of the Mau Mau Rebellion. For example, in Nyeri District, one of the areas of intense Mau Mau activity, local support shifted to the government in the early part of 1955 with the District Officers estimating that at the beginning of the year the majority of the population supported the Mau Mau and by the end of the year over 90% supported the government. While not all those who joined

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112 KNAC, Annual Report Embu District 1954, Film 2801, Reel 15, page 8
113 KNAC, Annual Report Fort Hall District 1952, Film 2801, Reel 113, page 2
114 KNAC, Annual Report Nyeri District 1955, Film 2801, Reel 14, page 1
the Kikuyu Guard were willing volunteers, membership became a necessity for their current financial security and for future survival (Branch 2009, 76; Barnett and Njama. 1966, 139, 154; and Kershaw 1997, 250). Branch argues that the resistance of the first three groups against Mau Mau played a part in the early struggle, but the dramatic loss of support the Mau Mau experienced in 1954 was due to the perception of leaders and their followers that the loyalists were on the winning side and their failure to join would preclude them from future power sharing in post-conflict Kenya (Branch 2009, 11).

As demonstrated in this section, the Kikuyu Guard program demonstrated a “fully in” degree of membership with the voluntary participation by local elites. The British drew existing leaders into the Kikuyu Guard by leveraging existing grievances and using incentives that appealed to the Kikuyu’s concepts of self-improvement. Once existing leaders who were predisposed to oppose the Mau Mau were inducted into the program with the promise of immediate and future rewards, the colonial government devolved power to these individuals and allowed them high levels of discretion in the exercise of that power to engender ownership in the success of the fight against the Mau Mau.

Conclusion

The Kikuyu Guard program was overall a successful program. Through its use the British defeated the power of the Mau Mau in under three years with relatively low costs. The program evolved from a spontaneous response to the Mau Mau into a program that provided security for two-thirds of the Kikuyu population in less than a year. As shown below (Table 9), the Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a “mostly out” degree of membership with the external support and oversight factor. This was because the British consciously chose not to provide oversight and support to maintain the appearance of
Kikuyu ownership of the program. Also, the British were also forced to limit their assets in Kenya because they were simultaneously fighting insurgencies in Malaya and Cyprus during the height of the Mau Mau Rebellion. This resulted in very little oversight and a high reliance on local leadership and local sustainability.

The Kikuyu Guard partially adhered to the incorporation of traditional justice systems and demonstrated a “more in than out” degree of membership (Table 9). While the creation of tribal chiefs, Local Native Councils, and local tribal councils did not strictly adhere to the Kikuyu system of kiama ruling councils led by the *Mbari* or senior age group, they did maintain some aspects of the age group system. This created a system that was accepted by the population and placed the administration of limited governance and justice in the hands of local leaders.

Due to the British use of the Kikuyu Guard as a local security forces to secure the population and rarely used them outside their traditional tribal boundaries this led to a “fully in” degree of membership with the factor of limits to territorial jurisdiction (Table 8). The Kikuyu Guard were also limited in their ability to conduct sustained operations outside their villages because the British required guard members to maintain their primary occupations due to their decision to limit payments and compensation to keep costs low and maintain the perception of Kikuyu Guard autonomy.

Finally, the Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a “fully in” degree of membership with the factor of voluntary participation of local elites (Table 9). The British formed the Kikuyu Guard around a nucleus of groups who opposed the Mau Mau on personal, political, cultural or religious grounds. To expand membership and maintain loyalty, the British provided financial incentives such as increased political power,
waiving certain taxes, and promising future political rewards to other local leaders and their supporters. While the lack of oversight and empowering local leaders led to numerous abuses by the Kikuyu Guard, the combination created a dynamic that meshed with the Kikuyu culturally accepted path to prosperity that propelled many Kikuyu to join the Kikuyu Guard against the Mau Mau.

As this case study has shown and as most experts in this Mau Mau Rebellion agree, the Kikuyu Guard was the critical element responsible for the defeat of the Mau Mau. The Kikuyu Guard were responsible for numerous human rights violations during the rebellion due to limited oversight. However, the program was successful in preventing the Mau Mau access to the population and turning the majority of the Kikuyu against the Mau Mau.

Table 9. Membership of the Kikuyu Guard with Community-Based Security Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/Membership</th>
<th>Fully In</th>
<th>Mostly In</th>
<th>More In Than Out</th>
<th>More Out Than In</th>
<th>Mostly Out</th>
<th>Fully Out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Support and Oversight</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Limits to territorial jurisdiction</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local sustainability and accountability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary participation by local elites</td>
<td>X</td>
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CHAPTER XI - “FREEDOM FROM FEAR”

The Home Guard in the Malayan Emergency

Introduction

This case study explores the use of the community-based security force, the Home Guard, by the British during the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 and its adherence to the model presented in this dissertation. The case study’s overview includes a discussion of the organization of the Home Guard and the internal and external factors that influenced the program’s development. Next, after the history of the Home Guard has been presented, this case study presents a detailed discussion of the degree of membership the case demonstrates for each factor presented in this dissertation’s model. Finally, this case study concludes with a summation of the findings and an application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix. Most significantly, this case study demonstrates that the successful case of the Malayan Home Guard possessed a high degree of membership in the factor of external oversight and material support, as well as several other factors in the model and that the program was ultimately a critical factor in the defeat of the communist insurgency.

The Home Guard, which eventually grew to number over 240,000, was formed by the British from several spontaneously generated self-defense programs that emerged in response to the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) insurgency that erupted in the years immediately following World War II. The MCP, predominately comprised of ethnic Chinese and with connections to the Chinese Communist Party, sought to eject the British from Malaya and establish a communist government. The MCP started its plan to take over Malaya with a coordinated nation-wide attack by its armed wing, the Malayan Races
Liberation Army (MRLA) against British rubber plantation and tin mine owners in an attempt to disrupt the economy. The British responded with by declaring a state of emergency and giving the security forces the ability to institute a national identification system, control population movement, arrest without warrant, and deport any non-Malayan citizen. Over 90 percent of MCP members were Chinese and most Chinese in Malaya were not citizens according to Malayan law. Therefore, in the first two years of the Emergency, the British sought to defeat the insurgency by destroying MRLA formations and base camps with large Army units and to identify, detain, and deport non-combatant MCP members operating among the population. The initial British response was uncoordinated, heavy handed, and largely unsuccessful at separating the MCP from its base of support among the Chinese population.

While the initial British response foundered, ethnic Malayans and plantation and mine owners formed several self-defense groups to defend their villages and property. Two events highlighted the potential of these self-defense groups as a potential tool to defeat the communists. The first was the victory of the Chinese Communists in mainland China that precluded the deportation of Chinese Malayans to China. The second event was the appointment of Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs as the Director of Operations for the British counterinsurgency effort in March 1950. Briggs realized the key to defeating the communists was to separate them from their base of support, the ethnic Chinese squatters who lived on the fringes of the Malayan jungles. Briggs instituted a plan that bore his name and sought to relocate the majority of the Chinese squatters into protected camps or New Villages, thereby denying the MRLA access to food and driving them into the jungle where the Army could destroy them.
Briggs was faced with the problem of securing over a million squatters and Chinese workers on tin mines and rubber plantations. To do this he turned to the self-defense groups, renamed the Home Guard in 1950 to provide security within the New Villages and existing settlements. The program quickly expanded to over 240,000 members by 1951, providing security for over 400 New Villages and numerous existing towns. The Home Guard not only provided security within settlements and denied the MCP free access to the population, but also freed Army and police units to conduct operations outside population centers and to conduct intelligence operations against the MRLA and its support network the Min Yuen.

While the Briggs plan began to turn the tide against the communist insurgency, this was not apparent as the MRLA increased its attacks against civilians and security forces and succeeded in assassinating the British High Commissioner for Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney in October 1951. Also during this period, Lt. Gen Briggs’ health began to fail. He retired in December 1950 and died shortly after. The new conservative government under Winston Churchill realized that a drastic change was needed to reinvigorate the counterinsurgency effort. They appointed General Sir Gerald Templer, “the Tiger of Malaya” as the replacement for both Gurney and Briggs, creating a unified command of both the military and civilian elements of government. Templer expanded the Home Guard into Chinese New Villages and made the controversial decision to arm the Chinese Home Guard units. In conjunction with pressuring the Malayan Federation parliament to extend citizenship to the Chinese in Malaya and granting former squatters title to their land around New Villages, Templer also motivated Chinese leaders to support the New Villages through the Malayan Chinese Association. While the
Emergency continued for another eight years, Templers actions with the Home Guard and reinvigorating the counterinsurgency effort in 1952 continued and expanded the progress gained in the 1951 and for all intents and purposes ended the threat of the communist insurgency by 1953.

As will be discussed in the following sections of this case study, the British provided a high degree of supervision and support to the Home Guard. Unlike Kenya, Malaya provided a large source of revenue for the United Kingdom and after the communist takeover of China, Malaya was seen as a next step in the communist takeover of Asia. These considerations resulted in the British providing close oversight of the Home Guard and focusing resources on the Home Guard and the New Villages they guarded. While the British provided training and resources to the Home Guard, they did not have to provide many weapons to the Home Guard. This was partly due to the training program that did not give the Home Guard access to the weapons until they had proven trustworthy and partly because the MRLA did not have an external source of support to provide them with overwhelming firepower, relying on weapons left over from their fight against the Japanese and weapons captured from the British.

The Home Guard program “more in than out” or partly adhered to incorporation of traditional justice systems. The British maintained customary Malay court in parallel to formal government courts, but did not allow them to try serious security cases involving the communists. The British also informally relied on the Malayan Chinese Association and other Chinese pseudo-secret societies to organize and discipline Chinese in New Villages and to raise and vet Home Guard units. While the British allowed the Malays and Chinese some freedom to enforce their own traditional justice systems, the
British did not give complete control to them by interposing British civil servants and security service personnel into the system to ensure British policies were enforced, especially until local leaders had proven their loyalty. This created a system that was accepted by the population and placed progressively more administration of governance and justice in the hands of local leaders.

In addition to incorporating local governance and justice systems, the British adhered mostly to limitations to territorial jurisdiction by keeping the Home Guard in a defensive posture, providing security only within their own village perimeters. While the British did create “operational” Home Guard units 1953 that would operate outside away from their villages for up to 48 hours at a time and for no more than seven says total in a thirty-day period. This limited the ability of these forces to operate more than a few miles away from their villages and usually in support of security forces, effectively placing limits on their territorial jurisdiction.

Operating under fiscal constraints in the immediate post-World War II period, the British were also forced to mostly adhere to local sustainability and accountability. Except for the three years of budget surpluses due to the increased demand for rubber and tin during the Korean War, the British were forced to keep the Home Guard and the New Villages they guarded as locally or regionally sustainable as possible. New Villages were situated in economically viable locations and their inhabitants were required to provide for themselves in a short period of time. In rubber or tin producing areas, the owners of those plantations and mines were responsible for the funds necessary to raise and support a Home Guard unit. This created a system that was highly sustainable as demonstrated
by the fact that over 90 percent of New Villages continue to be vibrant communities today.

Finally, the Home Guard demonstrated a high degree of membership with the factor of voluntary participation of local elites. The British fostered the formation of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in 1948 by influential Chinese businessmen. The MCA served as a political party, mutual aid society and quasi-secret society. This meshed with existing Chinese social norms and allowed the British a means to organize the Chinese squatter population, integrate them into the Malayan political system, and select leadership and members of the Home Guard. In addition to the MCA, the British encouraged the formation of local councils that had oversight of the Home Guard, starting in 1952 and selected existing local leaders to lead the Home Guard.

As this case study shows and most of the literature on the subject agrees, the Home Guard was the critical element responsible for the British defeat of the communists in Malaya. While the Home Guard killed the fewest number of communists compared to the Army and Police, the Home Guard allowed the British security forces to go on the offensive starting in 1952 by freeing them from static defense of the population. The Home Guard also made possible the Briggs Plan’s strategy of separating the MRLA from the population and denying the communists food by controlling food distribution and preventing smuggling out of the New Villages. In the following section, this case study will provide an overview of the Malayan Emergency, the evolution of the Home Guard and the political and military factors that influenced the program.
Background

The British involvement in Malaya began in the period between 1771 and 1800, during which the British negotiated with the Sultans of the nine Malayan states first to establish trading posts and then to incorporate them into the Commonwealth as semi-autonomous protectorates. The British allowed the Sultans to remain in power and provided them an annual income in return for British occupation and indirect rule (Brooke 2004, 17-18). From 1874 to 1888, as rubber became more important to the British economy, the British increased their control of Malaya through a series of treaties with the Sultans that established a British High Commissioner overseeing national affairs of the Malayan Federation and British Residents in each state with the power to formulate policy and manage state affairs, while maintaining the veneer of the Sultans’ sovereignty (Jackson 2011, 3; Sunderland, Organizing Counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1948-1960 1964, 4 and Barber 1981, 13).

In addition to the ethnic Malayans, the other major ethnic group and the one most important during the Malayan Emergency were Chinese. The Chinese presence in Malaya dates to 1349 when the first Chinese merchant settlements were established in Singapore (Purcell 1956, 2). The major migration of Chinese occurred during the beginning of the 20th century as the rubber and tin trade increased. The British, needing additional labor and seeing the Chinese as harder workers than Malayans brought tens of thousands of Chinese from the Chinese mainland (Peoples 2001, 2). While the Chinese prospered in Malaya, they did not integrate into Malayan society and were not granted citizenship so they were excluded from the political system (Bartlett 1954, 47 and Barber 1981, 15). The Chinese chose instead to rely on secret societies and mutual aid groups to
meet their needs and organize their communities. This created parallel systems with Malayans living in hamlets or “kampongs” linked together in mukims or village complexes and the Chinese villages typically had a population of 1,000 clustered around rubber plantations or tin mines or areas conducive to cultivating cash crops (Thompson 1966, 121).

The seeds of Malayan Emergency first appeared during the 1930s. The global economic depression of the put thousands of Chinese out of work. This coincided with the formation and expansion of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) that was formed in 1929, after six years of preparation by Chinese Communist Party agents from mainland China (Postgate 1992, 1). As most Chinese in Malaya had not integrated into Malayan culture and maintained strong times to mainland China, they became increasingly radicalized due to the political struggles occurring in China. Both the Kuomintang (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) expanded their respective memberships in Malaya as the decade progressed (Brooke 2004, 18-19).

When the Japanese invaded Malaya in 1941, the bulk of ethnic Malayans were able to retreat to their rural farming and fishing villages and in many cases, did not strongly object to the Japanese occupation. The Chinese, on the other hand, being concentrated in business and trade, were unable to avoid contact with the Japanese (Purcell 1956, 8). The Japanese saw the Chinese as potential agents of their foes on mainland China and mercilessly persecuted them (Purcell 1956, 32). The Japanese also used the Malayan Police force, dominated by ethnic Malayans to control the Chinese population, further creating enmity between the two groups (Purcell 1956, 37).
This left the Chinese in Malaya two options, flee or fight. Many chose to retreat to the uninhabited edges of the Malayan jungles. The Chinese found uncultivated lands, suitable for farming, and in most cases owned by the Sultans. In these areas, the Chinese squatted on unclaimed land and began subsistence farming for the duration of World War II. (Purcell 1956, 8 and Henniker 1955, 5). Along with the remnants of the British military that retreated into the jungles after their defeat by the Japanese, other Chinese chose to fight the Japanese occupation. The only group that possessed the organization and support network capable of carrying out an insurgency against the Japanese was the MCP. In 1942, approximately 200 members of the MCP retreated to the jungle with members of Task Force 136 of the British Special Operations Executive to raise a resistance force (Postgate 1992, 1). With British training and weapons, the MCP was able to exploit the Malayan Chinese anger for the Japanese atrocities in mainland China to form the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) in early 1942, a force that expanded to over 7,000 by 1945. In addition, the MCP was also an underground support network comprised of several thousand members (Jackson 2011, 8, 11).

At the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, 380 British personnel remained in Malaya compared to the MPAJA’s 7,000 (Shennan 2000, 294). The British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir George Henry Hall realized that after four years of Japanese occupation, the British pre-war administrative infrastructure was dismantled and they would have to “make an entirely new start” (Stockwell 1995, 243). In August and September of 1945, the British did not have the forces available to reinstate their control over Malaya.
The MCP and MPAJA stepped into the vacuum created by the Japanese surrender and, using the narrative that they had defeated the 130,000 Japanese in Malaya as the liberators of Malaya, established local governments in the areas they controlled for the month it took the British to move in troops from India to reassert control (Shennan 2000, 298). As sufficient British forces became available in October 1945, the British Military Administration started demobilizing the MPAJA, recovering their weapons, and banned the MCP under the reoccupation plan, Operation ZIPPER (Jackson 2011, 10 and Shennan 2000, 297) Unknown to the British, the MPAJA communist leaders cached hundreds of tons of arms and ammunition they had been given by the British and captured from the Japanese for a “rainy day” (Henniker 1955, 6).

Once the British believed the MPAJA had been demobilized, they sought to reestablish the pre-war political and economic system. However, they did not address systemic issues that created a divided society. The Malayan population in 1945 was 4.9 million, comprised of 2.1 million ethnic Malays, 1.8 million ethnic Chinese and the remaining population comprised of Indians, Europeans and other ethnic minorities (Clutterbuck 1973, 33 and Great Britain Colonial Office 1949, 1). In reestablishing the federal system under the Sultans, approximately 40 percent of the population lacked citizenship and access to the political system.

The Chinese prospered economically during the years immediately following war. The Chinese reentered their traditional occupations in mining, rubber production, and trade; earning on average three times the median income of Malays. The approximately 500,000 Chinese squatters also prospered growing cash crops and did not return to their lives before the Japanese occupation. Although they did not own the land they
cultivated, they prospered due to high food prices caused by war time disruptions in food distribution networks in Malaya (Miller 1954, 142; McCuen 2005, 91 and Purcell 1954, 73). While the Chinese prospered in Malaya, they did not integrate into Malayan society and were seen by the British as “independent and not as amenable to discipline as those who live in accommodation supplied by estates” (Great Britain Colonial Office 1949, 7 and Clutterbuck 1973, 35). According to T.F.P McNeice, the Secretary for Social Welfare, most Chinese had no desire to have a connection with the government, considering it “something inevitable functioning on high without reference to their well-being.” Instead, secret societies, “the real movers of history” filled the void for the Chinese (Stockwell 1995, 85).

As the dominant Chinese political party, the MCP hoped to influence the political system by peaceful infiltration of trade unions and political agitation (Jackson 2011, 12). MCP leaders were encouraged in October 1945, when the British announced that in 1946 Singapore would become its own colonial state and the remainder of the nine Malayan states would form under the unitary government of the Malayan Union, with all ethnic groups granted citizenship and political representation. This move outraged the Sultans and ethnic Malayans who saw this move as a diminution of their political power (Shennan 2000, 304).

Under pressure from the Sultans and their constituents, the Malayan Union lasted until February 1, 1948 when the British replaced it with the Malayan Federation. It retained the strong federal government under the British High Commissioner, but returned the sovereignty of the state sultans (Hack 2015, 612) Under the Federation all ethnic Malays were granted citizenship, but it only gave citizenship to Chinese
individuals who had both parents born in Malaya. Only 375,000 of the 1.9 million Chinese in Malaya gained citizenship under this system (Purcell 1956, 41). The MCP leaders realized under this new system the 95 percent Chinese MCP had no hope of taking power peacefully (Sunderland, Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya 1964, 5).

The formation of the Malayan Union coincided with orders from the Soviet Union at the February 1948 Communist Youth Conference in Calcutta. The Soviets were planning to a political offensive in Europe and wanted communist parties in colonial states to divert the attention of European colonial powers (Jackson 2011, 12). Therefore, in June 1948, the MCP unleashed a series of violent strikes and terrorist acts.

As part of their plan to seize control, the MCP sought to wreck the Malayan economy and eject British business owners and civil servants from areas they sought as staging bases (Peoples 2001, 9). The MCP launched its campaign on June 16, 1948 with the murder of rubber planters Arthur Walker, John Allison, and Ian Christian in the northern Malayan town of Sungei Siput in the State of Perak (Barber 1981, 17). The murders shocked the British government, which, consequently, declared the MCP an illegal organization and arrested more than a thousand suspected members (Deery 2007, 29). The MCP and the former members of the MPAJA who had not been arrested retreated to the jungles to wage a Maoist guerrilla war (Henniker 1955, 7).

Under the leadership of Chin Peng, whom the British had awarded the Order of the British Empire for his service in the MPAJA, reactivated the MPAJA units and renamed the force the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-British Army (MPABA), later renamed the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) in February 1949 (Jackson 2011, 13-14).
also reactivated the several thousand members of the wartime clandestine support network, the Min Yuen or “Masses Movement” (Barber 1981, 29).

Chen Peng organized the MLRA into nine regiments, one for each state, and each with 200 to 500 members. These regiments were further divided into companies and platoons with regional responsibilities. In addition, each regiment was assigned a hunter-killer platoon of 60-70 personnel to spearhead attacks (Postgate 1992, 30) The MLRA found ready recruits among the disaffected Chinese squatter population by 1951 after a series of battlefield successes the MLRA organization expanded to its height of 12,500 members (Jackson 2011, 14). Additionally, the Min Yuen rapidly increased. Researchers Vernon Bartlett (1954, 41) and O’Ballance (1966, 92) placed the number of Min Yuen at four times the number of active MRLA fighters or somewhere between thirty and forty thousand members. This growth of support for the MCP was assisted by conflict between the ethnic Malaya dominated government and the Chinese squatters in December 1948 due to economic and political issues when the state governments attempted to reclaim the land used by squatters. The sultans chafed at ceding their “Malaya reservations.” To the Chinese and the Chinese objected to being resettled and losing their livelihoods (Miller 1954, 143).

Using the MRLA and Min Yuen, Chen Peng conducted a traditional Maoist insurgency. First, the MLRA killed or displaced the British administrators, miners and planters from the countryside (Henniker 1955, 7). Then the MCP established communist controlled “liberated areas,” to be used as base areas and expanded until the MCP controlled the entire country (Jackson 2011, 13). In the months leading up to the Emergency, the British leadership in Malaya did not understand the full depth and scope
of Chinese resentment of their treatment by the Federation government and their support of the MCP. Two weeks before the communist attacks that started the Emergency, Assistant Secretary of State for the Colonies J.B. Williams downplayed the impending crisis by stating the growing number of communist attacks “gives an impression of drama; almost melodrama. It conjures up pictures of hordes of people burrowing mole-like in the interstices of Malayan society… I do not think that any information has reached the Eastern Department during the last month would lead us to suppose that any serious trouble is brewing in Malaya (Stockwell 1995, 15-16). Even as communist attacks mounted, the British were unaware of the danger. In a telegram from M.J. MacDonald, the High Commissioner for Malaya to Creech Jones, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated, “We hope the worst of the Emergency can be behind us by the end of September” (Stockwell 1995, 70). Instead the Emergency continued for twelve more years.

This complacency meant the British were caught unprepared for the communist insurgency. In 1948 there were 12,000 British citizens in Malaya, comprised of civil servants, police, mine and rubber plantation owners and other businessmen (Barber 1981, 16). The British security forces at the start of the Emergency were woefully understrength, consisting of 9,000 poorly trained Malay Police and ten infantry battalions (Jackson 2011, 17)

In response to the MRLA assassinations and acts of terrorism, the British declared a state of emergency in the State of Perak on June 16, 1948 and in the rest of the Malay on June 18. The State of Emergency allowed the imposition of the death penalty for carrying weapons, extended detention without charge, search and seizure without warrant
and the ability to restrict the movements of entire communities (Stockwell 1995, 40). As part of the declaration, the British enacted the Emergency Regulations. These measures allowed the government to raise special security forces, register the population, and to secretly try all crimes except capital crimes (Stubbs 2004, 70). Of importance for the New Village program and the Home Guard were Special Regulations 17D, 17E, and 17F allowed the government to control the movement of individuals and communities, evict squatters and relocate them to “resettlement camps” (Tan 2009, 217). These regulations would form the legal basis for the mass resettlement of almost a million people.

Initially, the British believed the insurgency was limited to a small population and they could kill or capture the members of the MRLA and deport any communist sympathizers so they enacted additional laws to facilitate this strategy. First, the British implemented the National Registration and Identity Card program in July 1948. This program required all persons over 12 years old to register with the government and carry an identity card at all times. The purpose of this program was to identify outside MCP organizers and was completed in March 1949, but was not effective due to a concerted MRLA campaign to sabotage the program (Brooke 2004, 57).

The second part of the initial British strategy in 1948 and 1949 was the detention and deportation of suspected MCP members. Article 18B authorized indefinite detention and in the first two years of the emergency, allowing the British to detain as many as 11,000 people at any one time. (Bartlett 1954, 48) Additionally the Federation parliament passed the Banishment Act that allowed the government to deport any non-Federation citizen who was implicated in violent acts (Stockwell 1995, 17). The British used this

The initial British response did disrupt MRLA operations forcing the MCP to reorganize after the flurry of attacks in the summer and fall of 1948. In 1948 618 MRLA were killed and 337 captured along with 3,020 weapons making it impossible for the MRLA to continue the sustained attacks (Colonial Office 1950, 138). Additionally, the MCP miscalculated their level of support among the non-Chinese Malayans. In response to the lack of a general uprising against the British, the MCP central committee issued a directive in December 1948 that recognized that a popular uprising would not occur in the near future. The MCP renamed its military arm the “Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) to bring in more non-Chinese supporters and directed that a decentralized protracted war starting from secure jungle bases be conducted (Brooke 2004, 68). After this directive, the MLRA renewed their campaign of terrorism and sabotage. They damaged tin mines and the rubber trees on plantations or stole products to sell through coopted Chinese business owners to generate revenue. As much as twenty percent of the rubber produced in the period between 1948 and 1950 was diverted to fund the MRLA (Bartlett 1954, 41).

Outraged by the government’s inability to protect their property European businessmen and administrators lost confidence in the High Commissioner to Malaya, Sir Gerald Gent and called for his replacement in June 1948. Gent recalled to London for consultations and was killed in a plane crash on July 2, 1948 when he was recalled to Britain for consultations. He was replaced by Sir Henry Gurney on October 6, 1948. Gurney had served as Chief Secretary in Palestine from 1946 to 1948 and was familiar
with counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations (Jackson 2011, 22 and Stockwell 1995, 36). This four-month gap in leadership caused a pause in operations that gave the MRLA a chance to reorganize after the initial British response inflicted significant damage on it (O’Ballance 1966, 86).

In addition to a change in leadership, the British responded to mounting MLRA attacks in 1948 and 1949 by expanding the police from 9,000 to 20,000 to conduct routine police duties in villages. Most of the new police officers were ethnic Malayans and had little training before entering active service. These forces were led by equally untrained Police Lieutenants drawn from England who M.C.A Henniker (1955, 32) charitably said of their leadership ability that the lacked “the ‘touch’ with the soldiery. In addition to the 20,000 regular police, the British fielded 30,000 Special Constables formed into Jungle Companies. These paramilitary forces trained counterinsurgency and infantry tasks to conduct offensive operations in the jungles bordering populated areas (Corum 2006, 5). The British authorities also allowed planters and mine owners to raise and equip Auxiliary Police, a force of Malays, Chinese and Indians; who were paid to guard their land (Henniker 1955, 31 and Corum 2006, 6).

In addition to lacking adequate training, the police forces lacked ethnic Chinese recruits or Chinese speakers. This exacerbated a general lack of understanding of the motivations of the Chinese population. According to a memorandum dated December 8, 1948 by T.F.P. McNeice, the Secretary for Social Welfare commented, “there was no doubt about the difficulty of knowing what the ordinary Chinese man or woman is thinking. This is due to in very large measure to the fact that there is an insufficient number of Chinese speaking officers in the administration. Out of 83 MCS (Malaya
Civil Service (MCS) officers at present learning a first language, only 17 are learning Chinese. 100% of all other officers engaged in administrative work speak no Chinese at all” (Stockwell 1995, 85). The lack of Chinese speaking officers was a problem that plagued the British throughout the Emergency.

In addition to a poorly trained police force and a lack of Chinese speakers, the British also suffered from an uncoordinated war effort. According to Miller (1954, 137) authority in large scale operations were divided with Army officers chaffing at the slow and careful pace of police operations and police commanders resenting the heavy handed and indiscriminate methods of the army. This allowed the MRLA to operate in the seams between the security forces and benefit from a lack of information sharing between the security services.

The British continued their strategy of mass deportation of Chinese until other events in Asia made that impossible. The victory of the Chinese communists over the Kuomintang in mainland China at the close of 1949 made deportation to China impossible. If the Chinese could not be removed from Malaya, the only option left was to control them. The first step the Federation Government took was to pass Emergency Regulation 17D (Miller, The Communist Menace in Malaya 1954, 133). The regulation gave security forces the authority to relocate and detain entire populations if evidence existed they had supported the communists. This move laid the legal ground work for the New Village program and the Home Guard.

In 1950 the situation for the British continued to worsen. Not only were they unable to deport suspected Chinese communists, the communist victory in mainland China emboldened the MRLA. Miller (1954, 135) cites the takeover of mainland China
by the communists and the British Labor Government’s recognition of the Chinese Communist government as a turning point in the attitudes of the Malayan Chinese. The MRLA increased its attacks 80 percent, to 221 in February 1950. The attacks continued to increase to a high of 534 in May 1950 and the monthly average number of attacks increased over 80 percent from 1949 (Miller 1954, 136) (McGrath 2006, 35). As the tide seemed to be turning in favor of the communists in the region one government report remarked the Malay Chinese in the first months of 1950 were “more disposed to insure themselves with the other side, for they feared that if they openly sided with the government in Malaya their relatives or their property, or both, in China, would suffer at the hands of the Communist Government (Miller 1954, 135).

Sensing victory, the MRLA also increased its campaign of intimidation against the Chinese squatters. By June 1950 the MLRA was killing on average over 100 mostly Chinese civilians each month, five times the level in 1949 (Clutterbuck 1973, 175). Thus, the Chinese squatters were forced to become the main source of support for the MRLA and provided over 90 percent of its fighters and members of the Min Yuen, allowing the MRLA to expand to almost 12,000 in 1950 (McCuen 2005, 92).

After Labor Government of Clement Atlee was replaced by the Conservative Government under Winston Churchill, the British Government undertook a review of its operations in Malaya. One of the major problems the review identified was the lack of unity of effort among the security forces. In March 1950, the British Government addressed this issue by appointing Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs as the Director of Operations “to plan, co-ordinate, and direct the anti-bandit operations of the police and fighting forces” (Miller 1954, 138 and Stockwell 1995, 194).
Briggs assumed his position in April 1950 and made a rapid assessment of the situation. He found that the insurgency could not be solved by killing or deporting the communists since new replacements would be available from the disaffected Chinese squatter population. Briggs determined that the only way to defeat the communists was by destroying their morale and removing their source of supply of both personnel and material. The solution lay in the Chinese squatter population (Purcell 1954, 76). Briggs believed that “the whole key to the war lies in getting control of the squatter areas. The people matter, they are vital, but you can’t expect any support from people you can’t protect” (Barber 1981, 88-89). This was not a new concept. In December 1948, High Commissioner Gurney had formed a committee to explore the issue of the Chinese squatters that found the long-term problem was land reform and the short-term problem was providing security from the communists (Purcell 1954, 75). The difference in 1950 was Briggs was able to unify the efforts of the security forces towards this goal under a single plan.

The plan, titled the “Federation plan for the elimination of the communist organization and armed forces in Malaya,” but popularly known as “The Briggs Plan” was presented by Briggs to the Cabinet Malaya Committee on May 24, 1950 and enacted on June 1, 1950 (Director of Operations, Malaya 1958, 5). The Briggs plan established a committee command structure with executive committees comprised of commanders from each branch of the security services and the civil government, forcing leaders to share information and agree on operations. Each committee was headed by the senior civil service representative who had veto authority over all operations (Director of Operations, Malaya 1958, 4 and McCuen 2005, 184). The plan recognized that the
communist MRLA relied on the Min Yuen support network for material support and propaganda in areas predominately comprised of ethnic Chinese. Briggs proposed that to defeat the communists, British civil and military authorities would have to work together to not only destroy the communist forces, but also restore the peoples’ faith in the government to protect them against “gangster Communist extortion and terrorism” (Stockwell 1995, 217).

To accomplish these goals, the Briggs Plan directed that the government must “demonstrate Britain’s firm intention to fulfill her obligations in defense of Malaya against both external attack and internal disorder” and “extend effective administration and control of all populated areas” (Stockwell 1995, 216). To accomplish this involved:

1. A large measure of squatter resettlement into compact groups.
2. A strengthening of local administration.
3. Provisioning of road communication in isolated populated areas.
4. Setting up of Police Posts in these areas.

The plan directed the police to continue normal police functions and collect intelligence and directed the army to act as a striking force in areas adjacent to populated areas suspected to be MLRA support areas (Stockwell 1995, 218).

The central pillar of the Briggs plan was resettlement. The resettlement plan sought to separate the communists from their base of support, the Chinese squatters. To do this, approximately 500,000 would be moved from the outskirts of the jungle to defensible communal compounds, called “New Villages” (McCuen 2005, 156). By the end of 1952, the New Village program relocated approximately 430,000 Chinese squatters into 410 settlements and “regrouped” between 630,000 and 740,000 Chinese
mine and rubber plantation workers into guarded compounds near their place of employment. This was approximately half of the Chinese population (French 2011, 120; Clutterbuck 1973, 176; and Jackson 2011, 20).

Even though the British Army had increased Army forces from nine battalions in 1948 to 21 or approximately 50,000 soldiers in 1950 and the police from 20,000 in to 40,000 in 1950, Briggs realized they were inadequate to secure a population of over 4 million (Deery 2007, 31; Ucko 2010, 21 and Stockwell 1995, 232). Briggs sought to address this deficiency in two ways. First, the Briggs Plan called for the clearing of each state in sequence from the south to the north with cleared areas declared “white areas” in the control of local forces (McGrath 2006, 36). This would allow for the concentration of security forces, achieving local numerical superiority over the communists.

This required the ability of the security forces to turn over white areas to local security forces. This formed the second element of his plan, the formation of a Home Guard. Ethnic Malayan Home Guard and Auxiliary Police units defending mines and plantations had been formed as early as 1949 and number over 47,000 by December 1950, but in an uneven manner and typically did not include Chinese squatters (Barber 1981, 80; Postgate 1992, 5 and Jackson 2011, 18). The weak Chinese squatters’ response was mainly because they were not given weapons to defend themselves, unlike the Malayans. According to a statement from the Chinese Chung Shing Jit Pao Party, the early Chinese Home Guard units were “but passive measures” and once there were adequate security forces to clear the jungles of communists, the Chinese Malayans would “no longer hesitate to come forward and join” (Stockwell 1995, 74).
Briggs addressed this by successfully pressuring the Federation government to pass the 1950 Home Guard Regulations and by combining all existing Home Guard and auxiliary police into one organization with a strength of 300,000 by July 1951 (Postgate 1992, 5 and Jackson 2011, 18). These regulations allowed the Chief Minister and state Resident Commissioners to raised Home Guard forces and made all men between 18 and 55 liable for service. The regulations also gave Home Guard members the authority to carry weapons and the powers of arrest and detention. These regulations were later amended in 1951 to allow Home Guard units in New Villages (Yaacob 2011, 26).

Starting in the fall of 1950, the British started to relocate the Chinese squatters into 550 New Villages, completing the relocations by the end of 1952 for a cost of 11 million pounds (Bartlett 1954, 50). The overall cost of the program between 1950 and 1958 was approximately $41 million (Clutterbuck 1973, 175 and Jackson 2011, 20). The British conducted the establishment of a New Village in phases. In the first phase, the Army would converge on the selected population, conduct a sweep of the area to push out communist forces and then provided the logistical support necessary to move villages to the site selected for the New Village. While the regular police would provide security as the New Villagers constructed their new homes and planted crops, the Army and Special Police would conduct small unit, “distributed operations” in the areas within five hours march around the village to prevent communist forces from approaching the village (French 2011, 118 and Miller 1954, 140).

Once the village had proven that is was willing to cooperate in its defense, a contingent of Special Police would begin the second phase by recruiting and training a Home Guard (O'Ballance 1966, 109). The size of the Home Guard depended on the size
of the population in the New Village. Their unpaid duties were limited to a rotating
guard duty at night within the perimeter of the New Village (McCuen 2005, 159). As the
Home Guard became more proficient and demonstrated loyalty to the government, the
police presence in the village would be reduced and then removed to another area to
repeat the process.\footnote{Extract from Malayan Federal Executive Committee Minutes, August 8, 1952, Reference CO 1022/35,
Record Group 1243765, UK National Archives}

Chinese leaders informed Briggs that the squatters would not participate in the
Home Guard willingly because they feared communist reprisals. To remove the
responsibility from them, he sought to make it look like they were forced to participate.
On September 8, 1950, he ordered every village to form a Home Guard (Sunderland
1964, 51).

As the bulk of the squatters were moved into New Villages during 1951, Briggs
moved on to the second part of the Briggs plan, Operation Starvation in June 1951 (Hack
1999, 105). This operation sought to deprive the MRLA access to food and medicine. In
“food restricted areas” all food had to be consumed at home and shop keepers had to
record all food sales. Food was cooked in communal kitchens and cans were opened at
the time of sale. In the tropical Malayan climate, this ensured all food had to be
consumed quickly to avoid spoilage (O’Ballance 1966, 122)

To increase the effectiveness of the operation, Briggs pushed for an expansion of
the Home Guard to force the population to assist in the effort. He pressured local
plantation and mine owners to assume some of the cost to field these new forces (Miller
1954, 188). In addition to the benefit of forcing Home Guard members to publicly
support the government, the Home Guard were critical in screening inhabitants in New Villages as they entered and exited the perimeter and identifying individuals who were Min Yuen members or vulnerable to MCP intimidation and possibly smuggling food (Yaacob 2011, 30).

Operation Starvation, in conjunction with the operations of the Army, newly freed from static defensive duties, forced the MRLA into the defensive. Being cut off from their food supplies provided by the Chinese squatters forced the MRLA commanders to divert approximately 25 percent of their force into food cultivation in the deep jungles and security forces to guard the crops (Hack 1999, 108). Tan Guat, the MRLA commander in Johore province, admitted during interrogation after surrendering that after the establishment of the New Villages operating in large units became “extremely difficult because of the problem of feeding a large gang. Before resettlement, bandits could visit relatives and close friends at any time of the day and night to get information” (Miller 1954, 152). The increased hardships of food scarcity lowered the morale of the common MRLA fighter. Through an increase in fighters killed by the Army and surrenders due to the hardships of the jungle, the MRLA force strength dropped from 12,000 in 1950 to approximately 7,200 by the end of 1951 (Sunderland 1964, 16).

Chin Peng, the leader of the MCP and MRLA, recognized the threat posed by the New Villages and Operation Starvation. He also realized the MCP had not won the popular support of the Chinese squatters through their campaign of terrorism and intimidation, only their compliance built on fear (Ramakrishna 2001, 80). In October 1951, the MRLA Central Committee issued the “October Directives” that ordered MRLA forces to conduct “seven urgent tasks” to build popular support (Hack 1999, 104). British
intelligence succinctly summarized the directives as, “Don’t be beastly to the masses, lets woo them instead” (Henniker 1955, 163-164).

While the directives ordered MRLA forces to “Stop destroying property and harassing the population and to limit civilian casualties to win popular support, the directives also indicated how effective the Home Guard and food control had been” (Purcell 1956, 47 and Miller 1954, 213). Included in those tasks, the directives ordered Min Yuen cells to infiltrate Home Guard units and Village Councils to undermine food control measures and that, “food collection was to be the primary task of the self-protection branches of the Min Yuen rather than sabotage and intimidation” (Miller 1954, 213 and Stubbs 2004, 192).

The MRLA was in its death throes by the end of 1952 because of the Briggs Plan, but no one knew it. To disrupt the New Villages and stop food control, attacks rose from 380 in April 1950 to 571 in October of the same year (Miller 1954, 166). Attacks continued to increase in 1951 until they were a third higher than 1950 at 6,100 total attacks, but as Harry Miller, a veteran of Malaya and an expert on the Emergency, noted, “Looking back, it seems to me that their vicious attacks and their atrocities (in 1951) were also born of desperation” (Barber 1981, 103).

However, it felt to the British and Malayans that they were losing because of two events. The first and most psychologically jarring to the British was the death of the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, who was killed in a random MRLA ambush on October 6, 1951 (Jackson 2011, 23). Along with the increase in overall increase in attacks, the death of Gurney seemed to be a symbolic death of the British effort in Malaya. Gurney’s death was the event that spurred the British government to increase its
effort and to appoint one man or “Supremo” that would have overall command responsible for the military and civil elements of the counterinsurgency effort (Barber 1981, 122).

The second event was the sudden resignation of Harold Briggs in November 1951. Briggs left Malaya on December 1, 1951 after his health had been wrecked by years of tropical service. He died a month later in his retirement home in Cyprus (Coates 1992, 99). In the space of two months, both the top civilian and military positions, were vacant during increasing communist violence.

While their deaths were unfortunate, the timing was propitious for the British war effort. Sir Oliver Lyttelton, the Undersecretary of State for Colonies who had been named to the post in October 1951, had been formulating a new plan the Emergency. He wanted to put the civil and military war efforts in the hands of one man, retrain the police, and educate the Malaya population and the war effort (Barber 1981, 129). His report on the Emergency, submitted to the Prime Minister on December 21, 1951, also recommended an increased effort to create Chinese Home Guard units to offset the predominance of Malays in the Special Constables as only 1860 of the 38,466 the force were Chinese in 1951 (Nagl 2002, 77).

On January 4, 1952 Secretary of the Colonies Oliver Lyttelton endorsed General Sir Gerald Templar as the Director of Operations to Winston Churchill and again proposed a plan to expand the Home Guard by integrating more Chinese into the organization (Stockwell 1995, 356). The British high command, including Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, agreed that “they had the plan, and the man” with Templer (Jackson 2011, 24). Templar assumed the role
of “Supremo,” in command of the entire British counterinsurgency effort on February 5, 1952, assuming both the role of High Commissioner and Director of Operations (Jackson 2011, 24).

Templer, a man a great energy, quickly took charge. One of his first acts was to issue a memorandum to all government officers to strip away any complacency and highlight the requirement for all members of the government to assist in the effort to defeat the communists. In the circular he said, “Any idea that the business of normal civil Government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all. The two activities are completely and utterly interrelated. There is not one person who has not a personal responsibility for contributing something to its suppression” (Miller 1954, 204). Not only realized the civil and military forces needed renewed vigor and to understand they all had a part in the struggle, he also reminded his subordinates that, “the answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people,” especially the Chinese squatters (Clutterbuck 1973, 30). Templer stated “no victory would be permanent unless the government won over many of the Chinese” and “to gain their confidence, the government had to free them from the fear of Communist violence” (Ramakrishna 2001, 86).

In the two years Templer was Supremo, two-thirds of the MRLA were killed or surrendered, attacks fell from 500 to less than 100 a month, and civilian and security force casualties fell from 200 to less than 40 and the key was the Chinese Guard (Ramakrishna 2001, 79). According to Clutterbuck (1966, 87) 1952 was the decisive year, “though this was not to become apparent until the middle of the following year (1953).”
Until Templer became Supremo, British officials had fought arming the Chinese Home Guard adequately because they felt they could not be trusted (Ramakrishna 2001, 82). This left Tan Cheng Lock, the head of the Malayan Chinese Association to comment that the Home Guard was a “half-hearted measure and a farce. Templer took several measures to address this criticism.

First, he appointed a single entity to oversee the program by appointing Major General E. B. de Fonblanque, as the Home Guard Inspector General in April 1952 (Stubbs 2004, 162). Fonblanque would oversee the recruitment, training and sustainment of the Home Guard, while the operational control of the Home Guard lay with the civilian District Officers (Brooke 2004, 111). He would also have a position on the National War Council to address any systemic issues affecting the Home Guard.

The second measure Templer took in the spring was the risk of arming the Chinese Home Guard (Stubbs 2004, 162). He felt that the Chinese Home Guard was the key to defeating the communists on the “second front,” or the “Hearts and Minds” in the battle between government forces and the Min Yuen. (Miller 1954, 220). He took this gamble after the successful experiment in the fall of 1951 with the Kinta Valley Home Guard, a Chinese full-time security force paid by the mine owners of the Chinese Perak Ti Mining Association (Clutterbuck 1966, 85 and Comber 2011, 45).116 The force that expanded by mid-1952 to 30,000 and guarded 323 tin mines did not suffer from the conflicted loyalties the British feared they would have and were not just a source of

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116 UK National Archives, “Templer to Re-form His Home Guard, Daily Mail, March 31, 1952, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765
weapons for the communists to take. In fact, between 1952 and 1954, the Kinta Valley
Home Guard lost nine weapons (Stubbs 2004, 162).

Templer moved to improve the quality of the Home Guard and increase the
proportion of Chinese participation in the program. In March 1952, the first full month
of Templer’s command, there were 278,787 Home Guards with 71,041 Chinese. By
September 1952, Templer had reduced the Home Guards to 253,401 to fit the
available budget, but the number of Chinese in the program increased to 87,032.
Templer would continue to push for more Chinese participation in the program and
Chinese Home Guard units eventually reached 93,854 members in December 1953.

Through General Fonblanque, Templer continued to improve the weaponry of the
Home Guard with the goal that the first Home Guard units would be operating
independently by June 1, 1952. He convinced the British government to purchase an
initial 10,000 shotguns, 2,000 semi-automatic carbines with the goal of eventually
providing one gun for every three men, roughly the proportion of Home Guard members
on duty at any given time. While the Templer was unable to achieve this ratio, he was
able to provide approximately one weapon for every five Home Guard members by
December 1953.

By the summer of 1952 all the elements of the Briggs plan were in place and the
New Village program had relocated most of the Chinese squatters. The concentration of

117 UK National Archives, Extract from Foreign Ministry Briefing, December 8, 1952, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765
118 UK National Archives, Extract from Foreign Ministry Briefing, November 11, 1952, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765, UK National Archives
119 UK National Archives, Extract from Foreign Ministry Briefing, December 12, 1953, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765
120 UK National Archives Extract from Foreign Ministry Briefing, May 27, 1952, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765
121 UK National Archives Extract from Foreign Ministry Briefing, December 12, 1953, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765

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the population in New Villages and the relief the Home Guard provided the regular security forces from static defensive duties was a key to the defeat of the MRLA. As the British implemented the New Village program and the Home Guard increased in size and competence civilian casualties decreased from a high of 100 a month in the summer of 1950 to under 20 by the start of 1953. Attacks initiated by the MLRA also decreased from a peak of over 500 per month in 1950 and 1951 to 428 in June 1952 and under 80 in January 1953. Finally, the number of MLRA fighters killed or surrendered peaked at 140 a month in December 1952 and then precipitously declined as the MLRA lost strength and effectiveness (Barber 1981, 168 and Clutterbuck 1973, 185). During the period from the summer of 1952 to June 1954 when Templer stepped down as Supremo, the British estimated the MLRA lost two-thirds of its fighting force (Barber 1981, 187 and Clutterbuck 1973, 186). The reduction of MRLA activity in 1953 allowed the Army to hand over all static security responsibilities to the police, allowing them the start a country-wide sweep (Postgate 1992, 20). The Army expanded out from secure areas into central Malaya where the MRLA was weakest, driving a wedge between the two wings of the communist force (Jackson 2011, 47).

The British war effort suffered a budget shortfall starting in the summer of 1953 as economic recession caused by the collapse of the rubber and tin markets after Korean War cease fire. This caused the British to reduce the Home Guard was reduced to and end strength of 210,000 by the close of 1953, but the main strength of the MRLA had been broken by this point. By 1955 the security situation had improved to the point that national elections could be held with 85 percent of the electorate voting; electing

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122 UK National Archives, Home Guard Report, September 1953, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765

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Tunku Abdul Rahman of United Malays National Organization party as the first Chief
Minister of a multiethnic unity government. During the same year, Chen Peng put out his
first peace feelers, hoping to end the conflict while his organization still existed (Barber

For all practical purposes, the Emergency ended on August 31, 1957 with the
British granting full Malayan independence (Hack 2012, 672). The MCP had been
pushed to the largely uninhabited border with Thailand and was comprised of fewer than
two thousand active members and less than 200 fighters (Markel 2006, 40). After
independence, the security plan remained the same with the British Army patrolling the
areas between villages and the jungle and the constables and Home Guard providing
security within the villages (Clutterbuck 1966, 147-148). While the MLRA continued to
operate on the Thailand border in limited numbers into the 1960s, the conflict officially
ended on July 30, 1960 when Malayan Federation President Tunku Abdul Rahman
signed an official declaration ending the Emergency (Miller 1972, 198).

The Home Guard program can be seen as an overall success and is generally
regarded as the most effective use of a community-based security force in modern
counterinsurgency history. While the Home Guard were the lease effective element of
the security forces in terms of killing MRLA fighter, their real value according to
Scheipers (2017, 20) and Markel (2006, 39) was their bolstering effect on the population
and their ability to force the Chinese to side with the government. In addition, the Home
Guard units were critical in defending the New Villages, freeing the army and police to
conduct offensive operations and implementing food control (Corum 2006, 23 and
McCuen 2005, 319). The burden of all the security measures to implement the Briggs

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Plan would have been too great for the Police and Army to carry out (Townshend 1986, 162).

The Home Guard also had a direct negative effect on the MRLA and the Min Yuen. The Home Guard increased the precision of reward and punishment and decreased MRLA morale because of the suspicion the Home Guard might be providing information to the security forces and focused searches of all individuals entering and exiting the New Villages (Hack 2012, 688 and Ucko 2010, 26). Although not present in much greater numbers than in 1951, the security forces, freed from static security duties also caused the majority of their damage on the MRLA after the creation of the Home Guard, inflicting over 6500 casualties between 1948 and 1952 with the majority incurred in 1952 (Barber 1981, 172). Additionally, Sunderland (1964,56) notes, the ability of the MRLA to conduct offensive operations drastically decreased after the expansion of the Home Guard, peaking at 550 attacks in August 1951 and falling to just over 100 in July 1952.

The New Villages were the key to the successful British strategy and the Home Guard was critical to the success of the New Villages. The New Villages were not the concentration camps portrayed by the MCP, but lasting settlements that achieved lasting integration of the Chinese into the Malayan national system (Hack 2012, 690). The New Villages also provided the Chinese squatters with a better life. The improvement and quality of life across the New Villages was not even or immediate, but according to Frakking (2014, 395) New Villages and Home Guard programs provided a “credible promise for a modern and better future” and an avenue for local agency separate from the insurgents. King (1954, 36) found in a national survey that New Villages experienced a lower rate of disease than Malayan urban areas and previous squatter settlements. The
New Villages were so well planned and situated that 480 New Villages still existed in 2009 and more than 82 percent of the inhabitants were descendants of the original Chinese squatters (Tan 2009, 216).

In addition to the resources supplied by the British, the Home Guard was a critical element in the initial success of the New Villages. According to Herbert Andrew, a Malayan Emergency veteran and researcher,

The first major breakthrough probably came when the size of the Home Guard was increased and everyone who joined was issued a single barrel shotgun. The Chinese joined in large numbers for at last they could protect themselves and their families against any acts of vengeance by the communists (Andrew 1995, 31).

Not only was the success of the New Villages, but the feasibility of the entire Briggs Plan was only possible given the use of the Home Guard. Having established the key elements and events in the history and the overall success of the Home Guard program, the following sections will evaluate and measure the degree of membership with the model that the Home Guard exhibited.

External Support and Oversight

The Home Guard program exhibited a “fully in” degree of membership with external support and oversight with high levels of material support to and intensive supervision by security force members. The British ensured that Home Guard units underwent initial and periodic refresher training and were given responsibility to guard their villages only after progressing through a three-phase process that tested their competence and loyalty to the central government. The British also adequately armed and equipped the Home Guard as part of a comprehensive program to make the New Villages an attractive place to live and worth fighting for.
As British security forces grew in size, the British provided the Home Guard with increasing direct supervision before Home Guard units were given the responsibility of defending their villages. This came most directly in the form of the police. At the end of 1947, there were approximately 11,500 personnel in the police force, with 9,422 serving as uniformed police officers (Great Britain Colonial Office 1949, 93). This was a shortage of over 2,000 officers compared to their authorized strength and was identified by British officials as a major weakness in their counterinsurgency effort (McCuen 2005, 88). The British focused their efforts in the first four years of the Emergency in expanding the police and by the end of 1952 the police had expanded to 26,154 regular police officers, 99,000 auxiliaries, and 39,870 special constables (Coates 1992, 123). Most of the auxiliary police and special constables were assigned to training and supervising the Home Guard and securing New Villages until the Home Guard could defend the village themselves.

While the British sought to recruit “suitably qualified members of the public” for the special police, they often sacrificed quality for quantity and British efforts were often according to Secretary for the Colonies Oliver Lyttelton described as “haphazard,” sometimes bordering on “utter disorder;” the expansion gave the British the ability to provide high levels of supervision to the Home Guard (Stockwell 1995, 140, 327 and Miller 1954, 220). By 1952 when police expansion was complete, Home Guard units, each with approximately 35 men in each New Village were supervised by a police post with ten to twelve constables. The constables were supported by an undercover Chinese Special Branch detective to collect intelligence. This allowed a ratio of one police officer for seven Home Guards with the rest available as reinforcements as needed (Clutterbuck
A typical duty rotation had the bulk of the police conducting the majority of security duties during the day and rotating two to three officers at night to supervise the five Home Guard members on night duty (Clutterbuck 1966, 114). This level of direct supervision is provided to a community-based security program. The only other case with a comparable level of external supervision is the U.S. Marine Combined Action Program in Vietnam.

In addition to the direct supervision of the special police in the New Villages, the British fielded 42,000 Special Constables trained in infantry tactics and organized into Area Security Units (ASU) (Bartlett 1954, 77). These paramilitary units were formed by in December 1952 by Colonel Arthur Young, the Malaya Commissioner of Police, on loan from the London City Police initiated Operation Service. This units were designed to patrol areas in the immediate vicinity around New Villages and existing villages to provide a buffer between the communists and the population and to provide a quick reaction force for the Home Guard (Bartlett 1954, 81). The ASUs provided the lightly armed Home Guard and their Special Constable supervisors the confidence that assistance would be provided if the communists attacked with a force too large for the Home Guard to handle.

The British also provided a high degree of direct supervision in the areas of logistics and training. As mentioned earlier the British organized the sub-national level into states administered by Malay rules under the supervision of British advisors. Below the states, the British assigned District Officers (DO) with administrative staffs to govern the sub-state districts. Districts were further divided into sub-districts and administered by Assistant District Officers (ADO) who also supervised five to ten villages or
kampongs that were led by headmen selected by the ADOs and after 1951 elected councils (McCuen 2005, 88). Under the Briggs Plan, the British tripled the number of ADOs in 1950 and 1951 so they would be responsible for no more than five villages (Miller, The Communist Menace in Malaya 1954, 140). These administrators were ultimately responsible for the fielding, equipping, and training of the Home Guard.

In October 1951, to assist the DOs and ADOs, Gen. Briggs issued Directive No. 17 that established the organization of the Home Guard program and the phased process to establish, arm, and eventually turn over security duties to Home Guard units (Short 1975, 293). As part of this directive, the British added a Home Guard Officer to the national War Executive Committee and each DO and ADO staff (Director of Operations, Malaya 1958, 16). While the Special Constables commanded the Home Guard, responsible for raising, training and equipping the Home Guard units (Clutterbuck 1966, 59). To improve the effectiveness of the Home Guard Officers in June 1, 1952, Gen. Templer increased the Home Guard administrative staff was increased to an Inspector General at the national level, 14 State Home Guard Inspectors, 49 District Home Guard Officers, and 200 Home Guard Inspectors. To acquire the necessary personnel, Briggs closed the Ministries of Forestry, Game, Mines, and Surveys and reassigned all their personnel to the Home Guard and New Village programs. Additionally, every Chinese speaking administrator was assigned to the New Village program to assist in making inroads into the Chinese population (McCuen 2005, 156).

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124 UK National Archives, Extract from Executive Committee Meeting, April 17, 1952, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765
This system installed one individual who was responsible for the logistical support for the Home Guard, but also provided a direct line of communication from the New Village to the National level to address equipment deficiencies and a centralized system to train Home Guard units (Director of Operations, Malaya 1958, 15 and Corum 2006, 22). By the end of 1952 all Home Guard units received two weeks of initial training in firearms use and infantry squad tactics and existing units received annual refresher training at a district training facility (Clutterbuck 1966, 71).

In spite of the extensive oversight instituted by the British, the Home Guard remained controversial in late 1951 as Gen. Briggs’ tour in Malaya drew to a close. The British were initially reluctant to arm the Chinese Home guard due to questions concerning their loyalty. According to a Cabinet Malaya Meeting dated 17 June 1950, senior army commanders felt, “the Malays are about 99% on our side” and “we could arm the Malays pretty well indiscriminately,” but Chinese support for the government depended on the area and in areas of communist support arms would “go straight through to the bandits (communists)” (Stockwell 1995, 237). This led the British to arm the initial Chinese Home Guard units with batons and arm bands and use them as a neighborhood watch (Coates 1992, 120). In return the Chinese squatters also feared the British security forces would not support them with the MRLA attacked in force (Henniker 1955, 174).

Gen. Briggs realized the only way to allay the fears of both sides while achieving the goal of turning over local security duties to the Home Guard was to institute a system that progressively tested the loyalty and capability of the Home Guard while providing the Chinese with examples of the security forces ability and willingness to support the
Home Guard. As a solution, Briggs instituted a three-phased process to build the capacity of the Home Guard and ultimately turn over security responsibility to them. In Phase I, the British Army would concentrate forces in the area surrounding a proposed New Village and clear the area to gain the space and time necessary to establish a New Village (Clutterbuck 1966, 113). New Villages were not established until District Officers determined enough police officers were available to provide 24-hour supervision of the village Home Guard unit (Clutterbuck 1973, 274).

After the New Village was formed, the Home Guard were recruited and trained, but had no security duties. An augmented police force was used to secure a New Village during this phase (Henniker 1955, 241). In Phase II, the police were responsible for security, but used the Home Guard as supplementary manpower. During this phase a Home Guard squad would draw their weapons from the armory at dusk and patrol within the New Village with one or two constables until dawn.

As the police gained trust in the Home Guard members, they transitioned to Phase III. Weapons were not issued to the Home Guard until the District Officer certified their loyalty. Until that time, the police would provide most of security in the village (Coates 1992, 95). During this phase, the Home Guard were responsible for village security and the police gradually reduced oversight and then moved to another area to repeat the process (Clutterbuck 1966, 120).

When Gen. Templer took command in February of 1952, he identified the benefit of the phased approach and expanded the plan to turn over more security duties to the Home Guard. After proving themselves trustworthy, Home Guard units would not only take over static defense within the New Villages, but also all volunteer units of
“Operational Home Guard” would receive additional training and take over security of the areas immediately outside the New villages from the Area Security Units. These operational Home Guard were divided into twelve-man patrols that would conduct offensive operations for no more than 48 hours outside of their villages. (Coates 1992, 121 and Pauker 1962, 8).

The phased approach of giving intensive oversight to individual Home Guard units and then moving on to new areas proved to be highly successful. By July 1953 the first Chinese Home Guard units entered phase three (Brooke 2004, 111). The first “white” or areas cleared of all communist influence and under the control of the Home Guard declared in the southern state of Johore in September 1953 (McGrath 2006, 38). By 1954, 150 New Villages had progressed to Phase III and had total responsibility for their security (Coates 1992, 121). This process continued until August 1957 when the security forces final states in Northern Malaya to the Home Guard (McGrath 2006, 38). During this time, no Chinese Home Guard unit in Phase III surrendered to the MPRA or turned over their weapons and the only losses of weapons or surrenders in Phase II was largely due to police inattention (Henniker 1955, 242).

While the British were able to provide extensive oversight to the Home Guard program by reallocating personnel from other government agencies and recruiting new personnel from around the Empire, they were continually challenged to provide material support due to limited post World War II national budgets. For example, in what Coates (1992, 99) described as Britain’s “halfcocked war in Malaya,” less than half of the 2,156 tons of barbed wire ordered in the summer of 1951 to defend the New Villages had been delivered by December 1951 when Briggs left Malaya. Fiscal constraints through 1951
meant that the British issued only enough weapons to arm the Home Guard on duty or approximately a quarter of the force and limited the expansion of the program (McCuen 2005, 160).

This changed with the installation of Gen. Templer as Supremo and the sweeping powers afforded to him to reallocate funds and pressure the British government to provide more supplies. After taking command in February 1952, Templer charged Major General E.B. Fonblanque, his newly appointed Home Guard Inspector General to find the weapons necessary arm the Home Guard. In an initial acquisition in June 1952 Fonblanque ordered 10,000 semi-automatic shotguns and 2,000 carbines from the United States (Comber 2011, 52). The project was completed in 1953, when the Federation Government spent one million pounds to arm one third of the Home Guard and in a few cases armored cars for perimeter patrolling (Miller, The Communist Menace in Malaya 1954, 220). Within one year of Templer taking command, the British reached the goal of providing weapons to over 45 percent of the Home Guard.\textsuperscript{125} While the British did not lavish military supplies on the Home Guard, the evidence indicates that supplying the Home Guard was a priority for the British and they received priority for arms and equipment to bring units up to a common standard as they progressed through the phases of their development.

In addition to the military aid provided by the British, they also expended a good deal of resources to provide the New Villages the Home Guard with a standard of living the Chinese squatters had not previously experienced. This meant the Home Guard not

\textsuperscript{125} UK National Archives, while the Home Guard was reduced from 259,000 to 197,173 with 63,731 Chinese members, the British continued to add weapons to the program with 89,941 weapons issued in September 1953. Extract from Foreign Ministry Briefing, September 1953, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765
only had the tools to defend their villages, but also the motivation to protect the gains they had made. As one district officer commented “The degree of co-operation we get in the New Villages is in almost exact proportion to what we have put into it. In short, where the amenities are good the people are good” (Miller, The Communist Menace in Malaya 1954, 218). While the resources provided by the British were uneven to do constrained budgets and the rapid execution of the program that resettled over 600,000 Chinese squatters in under two years, they made a concerted effort to improve the quality of life in each New Village (Tan 2012, 85).

The efforts started in February 1951 when Gen. Briggs issued Directive No. 13. This directive ordered District Officers to form Home Guard units when a New Village population demonstrated loyalty. In addition, the directive ordered District Officers to provide New Villages with Chinese language schools, medical facilities, and social services such as community centers with communal radios and workshops (Short 1975, 293).

More critical to the success of the New Villages was the British focus on addressing the core grievance of the Chinese squatters, ownership of profitable land. Both Generals Briggs and Templer fought with the Sultans of the individual states and the Malayan Federation parliament to provide the Chinese with permanent ownership of land near economic centers. After 1950, the Malayan Federation government bought land for $200 to $330 an acre and sold the land to squatters for $4-5 an acre, giving them permanent title to an amount of land sustainable for the type of agriculture practiced in the area (Sunderland, Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya 1964, 45 and McCuen
In all, from 1950 to 1954 the government spent $3.4 million to buy land for the new villages (Stubbs 2004, 179).

To ease the trauma of moving to a new area, the British provided generous initial assistance to the Chinese squatters. To build their new houses, the British gave approximately $100 in cash and building supplies provided (McCuen 2005, 157). To ensure all New Villagers had equitable access to building materials the resettlement officers supervised the allocation of building materials for the New Villages and provided a £40 for between two weeks and six months depending on if the New Villagers had to access to their old land or needed to plant new crops (Miller 1954, 146, 152 and Barber 1981, 97).

In addition to providing money and material to ease the transition to their new homes, Gen. Templer also sought to bring medical and educational services up to a functioning level as quickly as possible to show the Chinese immediate and tangible benefits to moving to a New Village. To do this he petitioned Christian organizations to send Chinese speaking missionaries displaced by the Chinese Revolution to Malaya to provide social services to the New Villages. Templer convinced the organizations to send the missionaries, not to proselytize, but to act as agents in the fight against communism and he convinced the Malayan Federation to pay the missionaries half the equivalent of a comparable civil servant. In total over 400 Chinese speaking missionaries served 333 New Villages, providing education, medical, and other social service programs between 1952 and 1954 (Lee 2013, 177-178). These efforts raised the percentage of Chinese squatter children in New Villages receiving public education from zero in 1951 to 39 percent in 1952 and 60 percent in 1954 (Stubbs 2004, 175). As Lee
(2013) notes, Chinese language education was highly prized by the Malayan Chinese, providing them a tangible benefit to fighting on the government side.

The Home Guard program demonstrated the highest level of membership with the factor of External Support and Oversight of all the cases examined in this study. Government police and civil servants provided constant oversight of the Home Guard. Their phased system to develop the Home Guard provided checks to ensure the competence and loyalty of the Home Guard while providing the Chinese squatters with tangible evidence of government support. In addition to the military aid provided to the Home Guard, the material support provided to the New Villages gave the squatters tangible reasons to side with the government and defend their new homes.

Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction

The Home Guard program demonstrated a “Fully In” degree of membership with the factor of Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction. During the height of the communist insurgency Home Guards were limited to providing security within the barbwire perimeter of their villages, while the police and Army provided concentric rings of security outside the village limits. This is the most restrictive limit placed on a security force demonstrated by any of the cases examined in this study. While after 1954 the British formed “Operational Sections” of Home Guard volunteers who were allowed to conduct security operations outside of village perimeters, Operational sections comprised a fraction of the Home Guard forces and were used after the back of the insurgency had been broken and only in areas cleared of communist forces. Therefore, they formed the exception to the norm and the bulk of the Home Guard demonstrated a high degree of membership to this factor of the model.
From the earliest plans to form a Home Guard, the British saw it as a purely defensive force whose only mission was to protect New Villages from communist incursions. Soon after assuming office in October 1951, Secretary for the Colonies Oliver Lyttelton supported the expansion of the Chinese home Guard as a means to attract Chinese support for the government. He expressed that Chinese support would come not from using them in an offensive role, but using them for “the protection of Chinese lives and property in the towns and of the Resettlement Areas (New Villages) into which their countrymen have been concentrated outside the towns.” (Stockwell 1995, 328). This feeling was echoed by Gen. Templer before he took command in a report to the Whitehall cabinet on December 21, where he expressed a desire to expand Chinese participation in the Home Guard and felt they would if they were limited to protecting Chinese property.126 Partly from the desire to win the support of the Chinese by using them only to defend their own families and property and the early distrust of Chinese loyalty, the use of the Home Guard to only defend within New Villages served a guiding principle of the program.

Upon joining the Home Guards, new members were promised that their duties would end at the village gates. In a welcome letter to new members of the Home Guard, Home Guard Inspector General E.B. de Fonblanque stated that “Home Guard units were responsible only for their own village and the approaches to the village” and “Home

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126 UK National Archives, Extract from Memorandum on Cabinet Paper C (51) 59, December 21, 1951, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765
Guard members would never be sent away from their villages without their permission.\footnote{UK National Archives, Major General E.B de Fonblanque Welcome Letter, April 23, 1952, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765}

After 1954 and the first states in Malaya were declared “White” or cleared of communist forces, the British began moving the bulk of Army and police forces in white areas to other states where communist forces remained. In these areas, the British formed “Operational Sections” of Home Guards. These operational sections were formed from paid volunteers from Existing Home Guard units.

Operational Sections operated in twelve-man sections and could conduct operations for two days (McCuen 2005, 160). While the Operational Sections could operate outside of village perimeters, they were always paired with an Army or police unit to provide supervision. In addition to external supervision while operating on extended patrols, the British strictly limited the employment of Operational Sections (Corum 2006, 22-23). Operational Section members were expected to maintain primary employment outside the Home Guard and could only be used for 48 hours at a time and for a maximum of 72 days a year (Coates 1992, 121).

While the formation of Operational Sections would seem to be a departure from the adherence to the factor of Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction, the small size of the force as well as the tight controls placed on their employment limited their impact on the overall program. McCuen (2005, 161) reports that there were approximately 400 Operational Sections formed in by 1957 and Postgate (1992, 5) estimates their total membership at 8,500. Given that at the height of the program there were over 240,000
Home Guard members, Operational Sections comprised less than four percent of overall membership in the program.¹²⁸

Given the small portion of the Home Guard that participated in Operational Sections, the Home Guard program is the most restrictive of all the case studies presented in this research. Regular Home Guard members were not allowed to operate outside the perimeter of their village. The small portion of Home Guard members that did operate with expanded territorial jurisdiction did so with strict limitations on their employment and only with close supervision by regular security forces.

Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems

The Home Guard program demonstrated a “More in than Out” degree of membership with the factor of Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems. The elements of the program that facilitated this adherence were the continuation of existing non-criminal judicial systems during the emergency and the control mechanisms that the British instituted to link the Home Guard to these existing systems through local governing councils. The determination to place the Home Guard is “More in than Out” was made because while the British allowed customary law to continue, they retained ultimate authority to try cases connected to the insurgency in British courts.

The British incorporation of traditional justice systems in Malaya started with unique position Malaya experienced as a protectorate and not a colony of the British Empire. While the British kept the Sultans in power at the state level and chiefs and headmen or penghulus at the local level, they exercised real governance at the national level.¹²⁸

¹²⁸ UK National Archives, Extract from Foreign Ministry Briefing, November 11, 1952, Reference CO 1022/55, Record Group 1243765
and state levels through a parallel government of “advisors” (Sunderland, Organizing Counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1948-1960 1964, 12). Additionally, the British created a parallel judicial system of Malay customary law or *adat* and formal British model judicial system (McCuen 2005, 87). The British allowed the Malays to exercise authority over non-criminal offenses and lesser criminal cases involving Malayan citizens, while trying more serious criminal cases and those cases involving non-Malays, including Chinese Malays in British courts.

At the start of the Emergency, the British were determined to maintain the existing civil governance and judicial systems. On May 30, 1949 the High Commissioner for Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney directed that

In the case of application of marital law to a part of a territory, there will be courts which will remain open and will have such jurisdiction, e.g., to hear habeas corpus applications. The closing of all civil courts is a serious step that only arises for consideration if and when their continued operation is obstructive (Stockwell 1995, 135).

This practice remained in place throughout the Emergency because the British believed that instituting martial law would undercut the government’s legitimacy and give combatant status to the insurgents (Stockwell 1995, 136).

As the New Village program developed the British transferred their dual judicial system to the Chinese population. To keep existing social governance structures intact the British moved entire communities to New Villages (Markel 2006, 38). Once in place, the British maintained village headmen if they proved loyal and allowed them to rule and administer justice as long as they collected taxes and followed British dictates. The Chinese communities were ruled by “captains” who administered and enforced Chinese customary laws with the oversight British courts and police (Purcell 1956, 10). Once a
community had proven its loyalty the British allowed elections to appoint “town boards” or village councils that had the same powers as the captains and were adapted from a system of sanitary boards that the British had instituted in the 1920s (Hawkins 1953, 156).

The British recognized that the village councils had to have tangible authority in governance and judicial matters. Sir Roger Thompson, a key member of the British staff under Briggs and Templer stated, “It was no good electing village counselors without real power. Otherwise the whole experiment would sooner or later slide into oblivion” (Barber 1981, 100). Therefore, the British placed the Home Guard under the supervision of the Village Councils, allowing them to discipline the force as well as adjudicate minor infractions committed by the populace (Short 1975, 414 and Postgate 1992, 161).

While the Headmen or Village Councils did exercise some control over the Home Guard and were allowed try less serious offenses, the real power in the lay with the British civil servants. The Village Councils reported to Advanced Committees comprised of British civil servants who in turn reported to District Officers or Assistant District Officer who possessed the power to veto council decisions. It is also unclear how much real power the councils possessed because in British organizational diagrams, the village councils were depicted as having advisory or consultative authority over the Home Guard, but not command authority.129

The British attempted to incorporate traditional justice systems or adapt existing conflict resolution practices into the Home Guard. In theory, the Village Councils were

129 UK National Archives, Briggs, Progress Report on Situation in Malaya by Director of Operations, 15 February 1951, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765
given authority over the Home Guard and to adjudicate lesser offenses committed in the New Villages. However, the Home Guard demonstrated a “Mostly In” degree of membership with the factor of Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems because in practice the British parallel system retained the real power to try cases in the British judicial system.

Local Sustainability and Accountability

Faced with constrained debt and global commitments after World War II, the British were challenged throughout the Malayan Emergency with constrained by limited fiscal resources. Therefore, they had to design the Home Guard to be dependent on external funding as possible. Additionally, both Generals Briggs and Templer determined Chinese loyalty to the government was the key to defeating the MLRA and the only way to win that loyalty was to provide them with a system that was accountable to them. Due to these challenges, the Home Guard demonstrated a “Fully In” degree of membership with the factor of Local Sustainability and Accountability. At both the national and local level, the Home Guard program used existing resources to fund the majority of the program and included systems for Chinese input into the system.

At the national level the Home Guard program was the most cost-effective element of the British security strategy. Postgate (1992, 27) estimates the Emergency cost approximately 700 million pounds from 1948 to 1961. The British bore approximately two-thirds of this cost and funded the rest through direct taxation in Malaya (Stockwell 1995, 253). Most of these funds were used to support security force operations and expand the civil service. In contrast the New Village program cost the nearly 4.8 million pounds to move approximately 600,000 Chinese squatters and one to
million pounds a year to support (Peoples 2001, 14). The majority of the cost incurred by
the New Village and Home Guard program was paid not by the British, but by the group
most affected by the insurgency, the Chinese business class.

The Chinese business class owned a majority of the rubber and tin concerns in
Malaya and had been targeted by the communists to disrupt the economy of Malaya. Due
to the raw material demand caused by the Korean War, the Malayan tin and rubber
exports boomed (Miller 1954, 149). As part of the Kinta Valley Home Guard (KVHG)
experiment in 1950 and 1951, Chinese tin mine owners funded the KVGH by agreeing to
pay an 8$ per picul levy on all tin produced by their mines (Comber 2011, 57) (Director
of Operations, Malaya 1958, 16). After the success of the KVGH program, this method
of funding the New Villages and Home Guard was expanded nationally (Brooke 2004,
75).

In addition, General Templar also pressured the Malayan Chinese Association
(MCA), the main Chinese political party, to help fund the New Village program.
Templer secured low cost contracts with Chinese contractors to provide the infrastructure
construction for the New Villages and local Chinese business leaders would provide an
initial job stipend and job placement to New Village settlers (Peoples 2001, 16 and Tan
2012, 102, 104). He also allowed the MCA to run lotteries to fund welfare programs and
raise Home Guard units in the New Villages. To gain support in the New Villages, MCA
members on town and district councils “adopted” New Villages and assisted the villagers
in development projects using proceeds from the lotteries. In 1952, the MCA spent $4
million in development projects, including raising Home Guard units (Stubbs 2004, 217
and Purcell 1954, 107).
Two events in 1953 diminished support from the Chinese business class, but the initial support during the critical period between was crucial in establishing the New Villages and Home Guard as viable programs. The first event in early 1953 was the passage of law by the Malay dominated federal parliament banning political parties from running lotteries. This was designed to diminish the growing influence of the MCA (Purcell 1954, 108). The second event was the end of the Korean War 1953. This caused a slump in tin and rubber prices and plunged Malaya into recession, causing a cutback in funding to the Home Guard program (Stubbs 2004, 168). Despite these setbacks, the tide had turned against the communists by 1953 and the British were able to reallocate existing funds away from secured areas to those with worse security conditions.

At the local level the British also strove to make the Home Guard as sustainable as possible. As a 1953 Malayan Christian Council study found, the key to making a New Village and Home Guard unit stable and sustainable was the availability of regular employment (Stubbs 2004, 181). To facilitate employment, the British located New Villages in economically viable areas close to rubber plantations and agricultural areas. The New Villages were also located near one of Malaya’s 6000 miles of roads to connect them to markets (Miller 1954, 145). In areas near rubber plantations and tin mine, owners paid for their workers to relocate to “dormitory” New Villages, but the most critical element for most Chinese to earn a living was land (Barber 1981, 93).

British administrators starting in 1948 with Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner for Malaya accepted the wisdom of a Chinese proverb that stated, “a land title is the hoop that holds the barrel together” and strove to gain land ownership for the Chinese squatters (Barber 1981, 97). At the end of 1951, after 18 months of negotiations
with the sultans, Gurney convinced them to provide Chinese squatters relocated to New Villages with titles to agricultural land around the New Villages (Barber 1981, 92). Squatters were given two acres of land per family within two miles of the village for household consumption and an additional five or more acres for raising cash crops (Miller 1954, 151). Once the New Villagers had their land, they were expected to earn a living from it.

Although Home Guard members could receive compensation for performing duties for 10 hours or more in a 24-hour period, they did not receive a salary from the Home Guard (Director of Operations, Malaya 1958, 15). Since the Home Guard members had to support themselves with employment outside the Home Guard, the British designed the program to make the burden on the community and individuals as little as possible, ensuring the long-term sustainability of the program. While all men between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five could be conscripted into the Home Guard, unit size was based on the ability of a community to sustain guard duties and all members were volunteers capable of carrying out night time security duties (Short 1975, 412 and O'Ballance 1966, 125) In most cases Home Guard members were only required to stand duty one or two nights a week depending on the strength of the unit so they could continue their daytime occupation (McCuen 2005, 160) Police officers supervising the Home Guard would adjust the number of individuals on duty depending on the security situation to balance security requirements with sustainability. In high threat areas as many as a third of Home Guard members would be on duty at any one time, while in low

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130 UK National Archives, “Help for Volunteer Organizations,” Foreign Ministry Weekly News Summary, April 24, 1951, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765
threat areas as few as one in seven would be on duty (Miller 1954, 25). Even the Home Guard Operational Sections, the units that were allowed to operate outside the New Villages were designed to be sustainable. Operational Sections were organized into platoons of three sections to facilitate the rotation of duties between the sections allowing members adequate time to carry on their regular employment (Director of Operations, Malaya 1958, 15). The Home Guard system proved to be highly sustainable and allowed the economic foundations of the New Villages by giving villagers the time to reestablish their employment. This is evidenced by the fact that of the 480 New Villages established between 1950 and 1960, 474 were still inhabited in 2001 (Brooke 2004, 75).

The British also designed the Home Guard program to incorporate increasing accountability to the populace of the New Villages until as the population and Home Guard demonstrated loyalty to the government. In the first phase of Home Guard development, the British maintained total control over the Home Guard and there was little direct accountability. Accountability was provided through the District War Advisory Committees, comprised of important local political and economic leaders. Home Guard officers were members of each of these committees and complaints could be addressed at these meetings (McCuen 2005, 186).

Additionally, some accountability was possible because the Home Guard commander was nominated by local leaders with the approval of the DO. This provided some accountability in that the commander and members of the Home Guard had to live among the people they protected (Coates 1992, 95). The level of accountability increased in the second and third phases of development as the Home Guard demonstrated loyalty and proficiency.
In the second phase of development, the British added Village Councils whose members were nominated by local leaders and appointed by the District Officers. As mentioned earlier, Village Councils were expanded in May 1952 when the Federation Government passed the Local Council Ordinance under pressure from Templar. This ordinance directed that when District Officers felt an area had met required security and development standards, Village Councils would by elected through a popular vote. Village Councils were given control of village finances and statutory control over education, medical facilities, community development and oversight in security operations. Templar also instituted a civics course for Village Council members to develop a grass roots ownership in the political process and security (Coates 1992, 120). This provided a conduit for popular grievances about Home Guard members to reach the District Officers and by May 1954, 209 of the 410 Chinese New Villages had Village Councils (Clutterbuck 1973, 187 and Coates 1992, 120).

When a Home Guard unit graduated to Phase III, the Home Guard commander was popularly elected and given complete responsibility for local security (Short 1975, 413). Usually in conjunction with a Home Guard unit transitioning to Phase III, the area around the New Village would then be declared “White” or sufficiently clear of communist activity. Security forces would be withdrawn to other areas, with the Home Guards assuming all security duties and Village Councils assuming governance duties, including control of the Home Guard (Miller 1954, 223). By the end of the phased development of the Home Guard, the population had several avenues to hold the Home Guard accountable. The head of the Home Guard and the Village Council members were all popularly elected and could be voted out if they did not execute their duties.
adequately. Additionally, as members of the New Village community, these elected leaders had to live with the people they were protecting and risked social ostracism if they abused their power.

As demonstrated in the preceding section, the Home Guard demonstrated a “Fully In” degree of membership with the factor of Local Sustainability and Accountability. Faced with constrained budgets, the British were forced to design the Home Guard to be low cost and sustainable at the regional and local level. When possible, they found local funding sources and minimized the effects of supporting a Home Guard by communities and individuals. Additionally, the British designed the Home Guard program to give New Villagers increasing control over the Home Guard, increasing avenues for accountability.

Voluntary Participation by Local Elites

The Home Guard program demonstrated a “Mostly In” degree of membership with the factor of Voluntary Participation by Local Elites. While participation in the Home Guards was mandatory, this measure was more to give New Villagers an excuse to give to communist infiltrators. Most Home Guard members were volunteers and the British relied heavily on local leadership to recruit Home Guard members.

When Gen. Briggs launched the Home Guard program in September 1950, Chinese participation was low. He realized that until the security situation improved the Chinese squatters were concerned about large MRLA units entering villages and killing anyone who volunteered to support the government. He believed the Chinese would join the Home Guard if they could rationalize it as mandatory service. (Sunderland, Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya 1964, 36, 39). This belief was confirmed by
one New Village leader who told Briggs, “If the communists come in with a gun and demand food, we are killed if we refuse to help. Do something by law which the communists know makes it impossible for us to help them” (Barber 1981, 101). While all males between 18 and 55 were liable for mandatory service, the British made considerable effort to attract volunteers and sought the support of national and local Chinese leaders to create support for the Home Guard (Sunderland, Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya 1964, 40).

At the national level, the British realized that they had to bring the Chinese into the political process and coopt existing Chinese leaders to remove the grievances the communists used to gain support among the Chinese population. In 1948, High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney persuaded the Malay states to expand citizenship and enfranchise the Chinese, threatening that Malaya would turn into “another Palestine” if they failed (Miller 1954, 143). Once the Malay Federation expanded citizenship, Gurney sought to make inroads with the Chinese population. To coopt existing Chinese leaders, he created Chinese Advisory Boards comprised of Chinese businessmen aligned with the mainland Chinese anti-communist Kuomintang (KMT) party to coordinate all functions of government that interacted with the Chinese (Stubbs 2004, 207-209 and Gullick 2014, 70).

Through the national Chinese Advisory Board, Gurney pushed Tan Cheng Lock, a prominent Chinese businessman, to form a political party to bring the Chinese into the political process. After months of negotiation among members of the Chinese Advisory Board, Tan Cheng Lock formed the Malayan Chinese Association in February 1949 and served as its first president (Purcell 1954, 67 and Postgate 1992, 12 and Stockwell 1995,
The MCA was part political party and part mutual aid society with the goals of safeguarding Chinese interests and providing an alternative to the Malayan Communist Party (Ismail 2004). The MCA proved popular and by the close of 1949 there were over 100,000 members, but mostly in urban areas (Colonial Office 1950, 212).

To increase its membership prior to the December 1951 municipal elections, the MCA assisted the British to form Community Liaison Committees in New Villages in conjunction with membership drives (Colonial Office 1950, 212, King 1954, 36 and Stubbs 2004, 214). This allowed the MCA to recruit members on the predecessors of the Village Councils. It also gave the British a way to select local leaders who were deemed loyal to the government by the MCA.

According to the private papers of Gurney found in the days after his death, he believed the MCA provided an “alternative standard to which loyal Chinese could rally” and the MCA was critical in “the whole vast scheme of resettlement” (Stockwell 1995, 300). He was correct in this assessment because by 1953, three quarters of MCA members lived in rural areas and local leaders were typically middleclass shopkeepers and school teachers (Brooke 2004, 62). In most cases Chinese squatters elected these business or social leaders to serve on village councils (H. Miller 1954, 169).

By 1952, MCA branches were set up in almost every New Village (Tan 2009, 226). The Chinese valued education and the government made a priority establishing Chinese language schools in the New Villages. The signature program of the MCA was the donation of funds to build and run the schools and the government provided $1,400 to build each school and $1,500 for each teacher’s house as well as $10 per student for
books and equipment (Stubbs 2004, 174). This helped build support for the local MCA leadership and increased the motivation of the Home Guard to defend New Villages.

Most experts agree that the MCA was a critical element in linking the New Villages to the government, improving living conditions, providing an avenue for legitimate political activity and providing a link with traditional communal organizations (McCuen 2005, 161; Hack 1999, 121-124; Hack 2012, 679 and Purcell 1954, 81).

Additionally, and more important for this study, the British allowed the MCA to select the first Chinese Home Guard and Yaacob (2011, 33) found that MCA Home Guard recruiting drives were crucial in boosting Chinese joining the Home Guard (Barber 1981, 140). According to Karl Hack (1999, 118-119), the shift in Chinese allegiance from the communists to the government was part the ability of the Chinese to defend themselves against the communists with the Home Guard and in part a shift in the Chinese community’s view of the insurgency as a struggle of Malay versus Chinese to an intra-communal conflict within the Chinese community between the MCP and MCA. Therefore, the cooption of Chinese leaders at the local and national level was a critical factor in the success of the Home Guard and the overall British counterinsurgency effort.

The British also turned to the MCA to recruit former KMT officers to join the Special Constables in support of the Home Guard after they had performed successfully in the Kinta Valley Home Guard experiment.131 These officers had been displaced from mainland China due to the communist revolution, had military training, and were deeply anti-communist. In 1951, 2,300 auxiliary police who supported the Home Guard had KMT connections (Comber 2011, 53, 55).

131 UK National Archives, Extract from Review of Chinese Affairs, September 1952, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765
In addition to the Special Constables in each New Village, the British also assigned a British Resident Officer (RO) and Resident Assistant (RA) to each village to assist in establishing a New Village and Home Guard. The RAs were typically educated young Chinese men from the village and usually members of the MCA and therefore strongly anti-communist (Sunderland, Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya 1964, 47-48). The ethnic Chinese assistant would act in that capacity until he was proficient in RO duties. When that occurred, he would take over administration duties and the British civil servant would move on to the next village to restart the process (Miller 1954, 146). This allowed another avenue for a local leader to assume a position of authority in the New Village and influence over the Home Guard.

While the MCA assisted in increasing Chinese participation in the Home Guard, Chinese membership lagged behind that of ethnic Malays in 1951. The British struggled with how to get the Chinese leaders to “come off the fence” (Stockwell 1995, 310). According to a Cabinet Office memorandum dated 20 November 1951, the Malay Chinese accounted for 1,200 of the total 1,700 civilians killed since the start of the Emergency, causing a shift in support from Chinese leaders. The report indicated that “certain Chinese leaders have also set on foot an organization working within the Chinese community itself, whose object would be to stimulate a more positive reaction against communism, and which will work in ways best suited to the Chinese mentality” (Stockwell 1995, 312). This organization was the MCA that already existed, but still struggled to appeal to the New Village Chinese because many were still disfranchised from the political process because they weren’t citizens of Malaya.
Gen. Templer realized this was the key problem that needed to be solved in order to win over the Chinese. Templer’s first directive as High Commissioner in February 1952 proclaimed that “Malaya should in due course become a fully self-governing nation” and “to achieve a united Malayan nation there must be a common form of citizenship for all” and “truly local government.” (Purcell 1954, 86 and Townshend 1986, 160). Templer’s efforts came to fruition in September 1952, when the Federation Agreement forming the Federation Government was amended to expand citizenship to 1,157,000 or approximately 60 percent of the estimated 2,155,000 Chinese in Malaya (Barber 1981, 162). Any individual born in Malaya automatically became a citizen and could now vote (Bartlett 1954, 98; Purcell 1954, 196; and Brooke 2004, 115). Both the mounting violence caused by the communists against their constituents and the potential for increased political power energized Chinese leaders, resulting in their success in recruiting an additional 100,000 Chinese into the Home Guard between 1952 and 1954 (Bartlett 1954, 53).

At the local level, the British also sought to incorporate existing local leaders into the Home Guard. When possible, the local headmen served as the leader of the Home Guard. If one was not present, local leaders nominated someone among themselves to serve as the Home Guard leader. This leader was responsible for recruiting his force and conducting sustainment training.132 Below the Home Guard Commander, Home Guard platoons were divided into sections, each with a sector of the village to defend. Each section operated under the command of a headman (Sunderland, Organizing

132 UK National Archives, Major General E.B de Fonblanche Welcome Letter, April 23, 1952, Reference CO 1022/35, Record Group 1243765
Counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1948-1960 1964, 58). Under the sections, the head of each household was designated the “tenant-in-chief” who was responsible for monitoring the movements all individuals in his portion of the village (Coates 1992, 95).

Under Gen. Templer the British focused on increasing not only security, but also quality of life to increase support for the government and build the ownership of local leaders in the New Village and Home Guard programs. As a government white paper stated, the purpose was not only “freedom from fear,” but also “the growth of civic sensibility and pride in communal and well as individual achievements” (Miller 1954, 218). To facilitate this, Templer convinced the Federation parliament to pass Local Councils Ordinance 1952, designed to foster “self-government from the ground up.” This ordinance allowed village councils to pass local ordinances, collect taxes and fees, and manage the security forces when the Home Guard had reached stage III (Stubbs 2004, 219). Additionally, Templer sought to empower local leaders whenever possible through frequent visits to New Villages. As one Malayan leader recalled, “I know this for a fact, that leaders in the New Villages…would look forward to visits from the Templer for they knew very well that if they asked for something valid, Templer would not turn them down” (Ramakrishna 2001, 91). Templer not only sought to incorporate existing leaders into the Home Guard program, but also worked to empower them and make them want to participate in the program.

The Home Guard program demonstrated a “Mostly In” degree of membership with the factor of Voluntary Participation by Local Elites. While participation in the program was ostensibly mandatory, the British did this more to give individuals worried about reprisals in the early stages an excuse to give communist agents to avoid reprisals.
In fact, the British leveraged existing Chinese leadership through the MCA to boost support for the Home Guard in New Villages. The British also used existing leadership at the local level to fill leadership roles within the Home Guard and incentivized participation by making life in New Villages an improvement over the Chinese squatters’ previous lives.

Conclusion

The Home Guard program was possibly the most successful community-based security program examined in this research. As an integral part of the Briggs Plan, the Home Guard was a key element in the precipitous reduction of communist attacks in 1952 and the effective end of the insurgency by 1954 (Miller 1972, 107). The Home Guard program enabled the British to cut off the communists from their sources of supply and freed the regular security forces from static defensive duties, allowing them to hunt the MRLA in the jungle. Although the Home Guard inflicted the lowest number of casualties on the communist forces, that was not the Guard’s point. The Home Guard protected the New Villages allowed the other security forces to keep the MRLA away from the population, resulting in a drop in monthly attacks from a monthly average of 507 attacks in 1951 to an average of under 10 by the close of 1952 (Miller 1972, 104).

As shown below (Table 10), the Home Guard demonstrated a “Fully In” degree of membership with the external support and oversight factor. Malaya was a key source of revenue in the years following World War II, making the defeat of the communists a critical national security issue for the British. The victory of the communists in mainland China meant that the British had to abandon their original strategy of deporting suspected communists. This led the British to adopt the Briggs plan and expend considerable
manpower and resources to ensure the New Village and Home Guard programs succeeded.

The Home Guard somewhat adhered to the incorporation of traditional justice systems and demonstrated a “More in than Out” degree of membership (Table 10). The British allowed Malay and Chinese customary law to regulate non-criminal crimes and disputes, but retained authority over serious criminal offenses and activities relating to the insurgency. Additionally, the British created village councils that had links to British efforts to foster local governance, but these councils were not linked to Malay or Chinese traditions.

Due to the British use of the Home Guard solely as a means to secure the population within New Villages, the program demonstrated a “fully in” degree of membership with the factor of limits to territorial jurisdiction (Table 10). The Home Guard was not allowed to patrol outside the perimeter of their villages, except for Operational Sections that comprised approximately eight percent of the total force of a quarter million. Even the Operational Sections were highly restricted in the length of time they could spend away from their villages and, even then, only under direct supervision of the Army or police.

Due to budget constraints, the British were forced to design the Home Guard as cost effective force, giving it a “Fully In” membership with the factor of Local Sustainability and Accountability (Table 10). The British sought local funding to construct and maintain the New Villages and to fund the Home Guard. At the national level they used to MCA to reach out to wealthy Chinese businessmen to fund individual Home Guard units. At the local level, the British designed the Home Guard so the
members of force had to maintain outside employment and divided security duties among the force to the extent that the burden on individuals was light. The continued existence of the majority of New Villages today is evidence on the sustainability the program. Additionally, the British gradually increased accountability of the Home Guard as the force and the population demonstrated loyalty to the government. Elected headmen and then Village Councils provided oversight and eventually controlled the Home Guard, providing accountability of the Home Guard through elected officials.

Finally, the Home Guard demonstrated a “fully in” degree of membership with the factor of Voluntary Participation of Local Elites (Table 10). The British formed coopted the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) to form a core of support among existing Chinese squatter leadership and to raise Home Guard forces. When possible the British used existing leaders within the community to lead the Home Guard and required heads of households to participate as section leaders.

The Home Guard did not win the Malayan Emergency, but the majority of experts agree it was a critical success in the British victory. As part of the Briggs plan, the Home Guard contributed to the end of organized fighting in about two years after the implementation of the plan, although the Emergency continued until 1960. The Malayan Home Guard is held up as the prime example of a successful community-based security forces, so it is not surprising that it demonstrated a high degree of adherence to the factors of the model.
Table 10.
Membership of the Malayan Home Guard with Community-Based Security Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/Membership</th>
<th>Fully In</th>
<th>Mostly In Than Out</th>
<th>More In Than Out</th>
<th>Mostly Out</th>
<th>Fully Out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Support and Oversight</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits to territorial jurisdiction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local sustainability and accountability</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary participation by local elites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER XII – CONCLUSION

Introduction

This research sought to develop a model for the successful application of bottom-up, community-based security programs advocated by prominent Counterinsurgency (COIN) theorists (Jones 2010 and Kilcullen 2013). The model for community-based security forces tested in this dissertation was based on prevailing bottom-up COIN theory and community-based policing theory originally used in Africa. This research addresses one of the gaps in existing COIN theory and doctrine advocated by bottom-up COIN advocates. While the use of community-based security forces is touted as a component of bottom-up COIN, in numerous cases the use of these irregular forces has led to human rights abuses and other counterproductive effects. The model proposed in this dissertation presents variables believed to influence the success or failure of community-based security programs and mitigate the abuses committed by irregular security forces.

This research addressed the research question, “How do the variables associated with the relevant literature on community-based policing influence the outcome of bottom-up COIN operations using non-state local security forces?” From a review of the relevant literature in the COIN, political science, and post-conflict community-based policing fields, the following model was produced: security \( s \) = amount of sustained external oversight and support \( os \) + limits to territorial jurisdiction \( t \) + level of traditional justice systems incorporation \( tj \) + degree of local sustainability and accountability \( sa \) + level of voluntary participation by local political local leaders \( vp \) or \( s = os + t + tj + sa + vp \). In addition to the hypothesis that these factors influenced the
outcome of a community-based security program, it was further proposed that external support and oversight would have the most influence on an outcome.

The method selected to test this hypothesis was a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of eleven case studies. During the data collection and writing of the case studies, it became apparent that three of the case studies were not viable or suitable for the purposes of this research. The most important thing to note is the exclusion of these did not unduly influence the results of this research. More cases than needed were included in the case study sample to mitigate the risk that some of the case studies would prove to be unsuitable. The remaining cases were sufficient to meet the requirements of fuzzy set QCA outlined in the methodology section and strong examples of successful and failed cases of community-based security programs.

As stated in the methodology section, fuzzy set QCA is applicable in this research because the sample size is small- to medium-sized (over 6 cases and under 50 cases) and the purpose of this dissertation is to test a modified existing theory rather than generate a new theory (Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Sets and Beyond 2008). In review of the fuzzy set QCA method, the method melds the intensive and integrative benefits of historical context-based qualitative research with the logical and empirical rigor of larger sample size, variable-based quantitative research. Through Boolean methods of logical comparison each case is depicted as a combination of causal and outcome conditions. The combination of conditions can be compared with other cases to produce causal combinations.

The overrepresentation of successful cases due to the rejection of three failed cases does not change the nature of the research or the importance of its findings. The
research question guiding this dissertation ask, “How do the variables associated with the relevant literature on community-based policing influence the outcome of bottom-up COIN operations using non-state local security forces?” The findings of this research indicate the combination of factors that produce a successful outcome. This is the more important question for practitioners and researchers of COIN.

The cases dropped from the original sample were removed for the following reasons. In the case of the Second District, Department of Southern Luzon, during the Philippine Insurrection, a sufficient number of primary and secondary sources were not available to adequately examine the case. In the case of the Cyprus Emergency, in depth examination of the case revealed that the British used an indigenous uniformed police force and not a community-based security forces. Therefore, the case did not meet the case selection criteria. Finally, in the case of the French use of the Harkis militias in Algeria, adequate primary and secondary sources are not available. The case is an interesting comparison to the American and British cases that have a prodigious amount of material available for researchers. In the case of the Harkis, the majority of researchers have focused on the plight of the Harkis after the conflict and not their use during the Algerian conflict. While it the inclusion of these cases would have increased the sample size, the number and variety of cases that remained in the sample were more than adequate to test the model.

Consideration of adding additional cases was given when the cases in question were rejected. As mentioned in the introduction, several similar cases such as the Rondas in during the Shining Path insurgency in Peru and the Maquis guerrillas in Indochina during the French Indochina war were rejected because they did not fit the case selection criteria.
criteria. In the two cases mentioned, the programs were instituted by a domestic government or were designed as counter-guerrillas and not self-defense forces respectively. This selection criteria strengthen the external validity of the research (Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki 2008). Other recent cases of community-based security programs such as the Sons of Iraq and the Afghan Public Protection Program were also considered but as discussed in the introduction, available archival records and scholarly research is not available. The availability of scholarly research is important for the fuzzy set QCA method to mitigate researcher bias during the determination of the degree of membership of cases with the factors of the model by relying on the consensus of other researchers (Ragin, 2008).

The examination of the remaining case studies explored the adherence of eight community-based security programs during major counterinsurgency operations to the model presented in this dissertation. Table 11 presents the findings for the eight case studies. This table allows for the comparison of the relationships among of all the cases to the factors of the model and their respective outcomes. An initial visual observation also allows for a determination of obvious trends among the sample set. It also provides an initial analysis of the combinations of factors that may produce a similar outcome and an opportunity to determine factors that are overrepresented across the cases and may require “context-setting” calibration required for fuzzy set analysis.
Table 11.
Summary of Adherence to Factors of Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region and Group</th>
<th>External Oversight and Support</th>
<th>Limits to territorial jurisdiction</th>
<th>Traditional Justice System</th>
<th>Local sustainability and accountability</th>
<th>Local Elites</th>
<th>Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st District, Department of Northern Luzon</td>
<td>Mostly In</td>
<td>Mostly In</td>
<td>More In than Out</td>
<td>Mostly In</td>
<td>Mostly In</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th District, Department of Northern Luzon</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
<td>Mostly Out</td>
<td>More In than Out</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
<td>Mostly In</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd District, Department of Southern Luzon</td>
<td>More In Than Out</td>
<td>Mostly In</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
<td>Mostly In</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Action Program</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
<td>Mostly In</td>
<td>Mostly In</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
<td>Mostly In</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu Guard</td>
<td>More Out Than In</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
<td>More In Than Out</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
<td>More In Than Out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malayan Home Guard</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
<td>More In than Out</td>
<td>Fully In</td>
<td>More In Than Out</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Forces Vietnam</td>
<td>Mostly Out</td>
<td>Mostly Out</td>
<td>Fully Out</td>
<td>Mostly Out</td>
<td>Fully Out</td>
<td>Mostly Out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Irregular Defense Group</td>
<td>Mostly Out</td>
<td>Fully Out</td>
<td>Mostly Out</td>
<td>Fully Out</td>
<td>Fully Out</td>
<td>Fully Out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Successful Community-based Security Programs

Most successful programs demonstrate a general adherence to the factors of the model and indicate the validity of the model. The exceptions to this observation indicate a potential relationship between the factors of the model and combinations of factors and a successful outcome. All of the successful cases except for the Third District, DSL and the Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a Fully In or Mostly In degree of membership with the factor of External Oversight and Support as predicted by the hypothesis. In the successful cases that did not display a strong display of membership with this factor, they
did appear to display a strong adherence to limits to territorial jurisdiction and voluntary participation by local leaders. In addition to indicating that successful cases do not necessarily adhere to all the principles of the model, these cases point to a relationship between external oversight and voluntary participation by local leaders. Specifically, in cases where external oversight and support is not as strong, committed participation by local leaders can provide the oversight needed to make a program successful.

The other general observation from this initial review of the data is the importance of external oversight and support to mitigate a low adherence to other factors of the model. In the successful cases that did not adhere strongly to individual factors such as the case of the First District DNL and Fourth District, DNL, early extensive oversight and support, possibly coupled with the short duration of the conflicts, counteracted the weak degree of membership with other factors. This result indicates the reasonable assumption that early pervasive and sustained oversight and support is the most critical factor in the model.

Among the successful programs, the cases demonstrated the weakest adherence to the factor of Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems with one case of fully out adherence, one of mostly out adherence, and two cases of more in than out adherence. Is unclear if this factor is unimportant or in cases with strong adherence to Voluntary Participation of Local Leadership, the populace have informal connections with leadership that function as an undocumented justice system.

In addition to External Oversight and Support, most of the successful cases exhibited a strong adherence to Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction. The one case of low adherence to this factor, the 4th District, Department of Northern Luzon, exhibited a high
degree of external oversight and support. The high degree of supervision provided by US forces may have mitigated any issues experienced with employing a local force outside of its home territory. The fuzzy set analysis later in this chapter should identify individual factors and combinations of factors that offset low adherence in other factors and still produce a successful result.

Failed Community-based Security Programs

The failed cases provide a stark contrast to the successful cases. Neither of the cases demonstrated a strong adherence to any of the factors of the model. An interesting note with these cases is they demonstrated strong adherence to different principles during different periods of their existence, but still resulted in overall failure. In the case of the CIDG, the program started with strong adherence to the model with great success and abruptly demonstrated low adherence to all of the factors after a change in the agency in charge of the program and the change of the mission of the CIDG during Operation Switchback in 1963. The Territorial Forces demonstrated the opposite behavior and demonstrated low adherence to all the factors early in the program and in spite of the efforts of the U.S. that adhered to the model after 1968, the program could not overcome the failures early in the program.

As with the successful cases, the lack of adherence to the factors of the model does not imply causation. However, the failed cases do suggest a correlation between the factors and the outcome of a community-based security program. As mentioned above, the failed cases also suggest that community-based security programs should demonstrate an early and consistent adherence to the factors of the model to be successful.
Crisp Set

In the next step of analysis, the findings depicted in Table 11 were used to create a crisp set (Table 12). As depicted in Table 10, the adherence of each principle was assessed on a six-point Likert Scale of 0 to 1.0, with 0 representing a fully out degree of adherence and 1.0 representing fully in degree of adherence to the individual factors with four points in between depicting partial adherence. This allows for a crisp set and fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the data.

Table 12. Crisp Set Adherence to Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>External Oversight and Support</th>
<th>Limits to territorial jurisdiction</th>
<th>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System</th>
<th>Local sustainability and accountability</th>
<th>Local Elites</th>
<th>Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st District, Department of Northern Luzon</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th District, Department of Northern Luzon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd District, Department of Southern Luzon</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Action Program</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu Guard</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malayan Home Guard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Forces Vietnam</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Irregular Defense Group</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Initial Model

Through a review of the relevant doctrine in the literature review, the author predicted that the External Oversight and Support would be the most influential factor in the model and did not propose a hierarchy for the other factors. While the author did not predict a full hierarchy of factors, the examination of the case studies gives the impression that Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction and Local Leadership are the next two most influential factors in that order and the other factors appeared to be less important.

This placed the factors of the model into two categories. External Support, Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction, and Voluntary Participation of Local Leadership form a group of essential factors and Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems and Local Accountability and Sustainability form a second less important group of factors. This second group of factors was determined to be less important because all the successful cases had some combination of the essential factors, but the results did not indicate that a lack of these factors and some combination including the lesser factors determined success.

The argument for the importance of External Support and Oversight is intuitive. Effective support and oversight by the counterinsurgent force in successful cases gives the community-based security force the tools necessary to fight against insurgents and the leadership necessary to build the professionalism necessary to beat an insurgent force while preventing abuses committed by the local security force and clandestine coercion by the insurgents. Until this initial shield of security and framework for training a local
security force is in place, little else can be accomplished. This is why External Oversight and Support was determined to be the most important factor.

The connection between External Support and Oversight and Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction and Local Leadership is also understandable. Limiting the ability of local security forces to operate outside of their communities makes supervision easier if conventional security force manpower is limited. Local leadership can also assist in providing oversight by providing a trusted agent in communities who know the population and potentially members of the insurgency. In cases where External Support and Oversight is limited, Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction can also provide a check on the temptation of local leadership to use a community-based security force to coerce or settle scores with other communities.

Due to the long-term nature of counterinsurgency and the necessity to gain public support for the government cause, Local Sustainability and Accountability is possibly the most important of the second-tier factors. Drawing on local resources can alleviate budgetary pressures on the counterinsurgent force national budget and build ownership among the population for the population. Accountability increases the legitimacy of the program by providing a method to prevent abuse of the population at the hands of local security forces. Increasing the legitimacy of a program and public ownership in a program is one potential path to create support for a program that creates the momentum Seth Jones (2010, ix) contends is necessary for a COIN operation that makes insurgent victory is impossible. In the cases where Local Sustainability and Accountability was less present such as the First District of the Department of Northern Luzon, the rapid defeat of insurgency forces or extensive and pervasive oversight by external security
forces may have reduced the need to build sustainable local ownership of the program. Local Leadership may also provide a proxy for accountability by providing leadership that the population is familiar with and may have established informal accountability mechanisms.

Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems is also an important secondary factor in fostering legitimacy and local ownership. Maintaining traditional justice systems provide the population with a form of self-regulation, such that they know the rules and penalties and meld community-based security forces into the existing social fabric. In the cases of the 4th District of the Department of Northern Luzon, Kenya and Malaya, a marginal or lack of adherence to this factor may have been mitigated by other factors in the model and the duration of the conflict. The population may be willing to endure the suspension of traditional justice systems for a short time. Also, as with the case of the 4th District of the Department of Northern Luzon, full adherence to incorporating local leadership into the program may have mitigated the lack of adherence by providing informal mechanisms to achieve justice.

Subset/Superset Analysis

To determine the coverage, consistency, and combined score of coverage and consistency, the next step was to analyze the crisp set in Table 12 using the superset/subset function of the fuzzy set QCA program. This procedure analyzes how well the outcome or dependent variable “success” rate fits with the necessary conditions, in this case the factors of the model that produced that outcome. As a necessary condition should be a part of the superset of the outcome, consistency measures the “degree to which the cases sharing a given combination of conditions [factors of the
model] agree in displaying the outcome in question” or “how closely a perfect subset relation is approximated” (Ragin 2008, 44). Meanwhile, coverage measures how much of the outcome is explained by a necessary condition or put in another way, coverage “assesses the relevance of the necessary condition – the degree to which instances of the condition are paired with the instances of the outcome” (Ragin 2008, 44-45). A high consistency score, but a low coverage result could be an outcome of the factor being “a necessary, but not sufficient condition” to cause the specified result (Ragin 2008, 72).

The overall subset/superset analysis shown in Figure 13 supports the validity of the model as a planning and evaluation tool for community-based security programs. One particularly revealing outcome of the subset/superset analysis is the fact that several combinations of factors such as external support and oversight, along with local sustainability and accountability, produced higher combined consistency/coverage scores than all the factors collectively. This suggests that different factor “recipes” can produce successful results even if several of the factors are absent. It also suggests that several of the factors may be necessary, but not sufficient to produce an outcome, a potentiality to be addressed in subsequent sections.

Table 13.
Subset/Superset Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Oversight and Support (extovspt)</td>
<td>0.931393</td>
<td>0.817518</td>
<td>0.895080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction (juris)</td>
<td>0.929314</td>
<td>0.815693</td>
<td>0.889507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System (tradjus)</td>
<td>0.920097</td>
<td>0.693431</td>
<td>0.820139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local accountability and Sustainability (lclsusact)</td>
<td>0.963362</td>
<td>0.815693</td>
<td>0.898630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Elites (leader)</td>
<td>0.867961</td>
<td>0.815694</td>
<td>0.866278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The subset/superset analysis of individual factors in Table 13 produces a slightly different hierarchy of factors than the model, based on combined consistency and coverage calculations. The hierarchy produced is external oversight and support, followed by local accountability and sustainability, limits to territorial jurisdiction, local leadership, and, last, incorporation of traditional justice systems. This confirms the importance of external support and oversight and limits to territorial jurisdiction and their ranking as top tier factors. The second rank of local accountability and sustainability was unexpected. The factor did not exhibit a coverage score markedly higher than the other factors and its consistency score was the highest of all the factors. This raises the possibility of Ragin’s concept of “context-setting” (Ragin, 2008). This is a phenomenon of a factor being influenced by other factors or other factors common to all cases with a similar outcome. In this case all the counterinsurgent forces in all the successful cases experienced constrained budgets and manpower. This may mean that local accountability and sustainability was a logical result of these constraints. The potential for this problem will be addressed in fuzzy set calibration.

Analysis of Necessary Conditions

An analysis of necessary conditions allows researchers with another tool to measure consistency and coverage. In this case, “consistency assesses the degree to which instances of the outcome agree in displaying the causal condition thought to be necessary, while coverage assesses the relevance of the necessary condition – the degree to which instances of the condition are paired with instances of the outcome” (Ragin 2008, 44-45). This analysis provides insight into potential interactions among factors in the model and the influence of adherence to one factor on adherence to others.
The analysis of necessary conditions among successful cases provided some validation of the model and some differences. If the model is correct, external oversight and support, limits to territorial jurisdiction, and voluntary participation of local leadership should have the highest consistency scores. As shown in Table 14 this is the case, but local leadership has the highest consistency score, followed by external oversight, then a tie between limits to territorial jurisdiction and local accountability and sustainability. Interestingly, local leadership has the lowest coverage score indicating that it is a necessary condition, but not sufficient to produce a successful outcome on its own.

The necessary condition analysis also produced other interesting coverage results. The ranking among the factors was external oversight and support, local accountability and sustainability, traditional justice systems, territorial jurisdiction, and voluntary participation by local leaders. External oversight and support and local accountability and sustainability scored almost identical coverage scores, 0.962138 and 0.962054 respectively. As predicted external support and oversight was the most important factor in producing a successful outcome, but the other results require further analysis. The high score of for local accountability and sustainability is possibly because the factor is inherent to counterinsurgency operations due to the political-social element and long duration of most counterinsurgency that requires buy in from the population. It is also possible that this factor is dependent on the context of the majority of cases examined in this study as mentioned earlier. All of the successful cases were conducted in situations of constrained budgets and manpower, so by necessity all of the programs had to be designed to be as self-sufficient as possible.

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Table 14. Analysis of Necessary Conditions among Successful Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Oversight and Support (extovspt)</td>
<td>0.812030</td>
<td>0.962138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction (jurs)</td>
<td>0.810150</td>
<td>0.926882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System (tradjus)</td>
<td>0.714286</td>
<td>0.957179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local accountability and Sustainability (lclsusact)</td>
<td>0.810150</td>
<td>0.962054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Elites (elite)</td>
<td>0.840226</td>
<td>0.867961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15 contains the results of the necessary condition analysis for the failed cases in this study. As expected, their low or non-existent levels of adherence to the factors of the model produced low levels of success. External oversight and support proved to be the most critical factor in producing failure. The other finding of note was the lack of adherence to local leadership. This result again suggests that this factor is necessary, but not sufficient condition.

Table 15. Analysis of Necessary Conditions among Failed Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Oversight and Support (extovspt)</td>
<td>.173913</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction (jurs)</td>
<td>.086957</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System (tradjus)</td>
<td>.086957</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local accountability and Sustainability (lclsusact)</td>
<td>.086957</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Elites (elites)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fuzzy Set Calibration

As identified in the previous section, local accountability and sustainability scored higher than predicted in consistency and coverage. As mentioned earlier, this could possibly be caused by the influence of other factors in the model or other environmental factors common to all the cases. Fuzzy Set QCA allows for this phenomenon through a process of “calibration” (Ragin 2008, 16-17 and 85-96). Informed by the available literature and familiarity with the sample of cases, calibration allows for individual factors to be weighted to account for their overall importance and influence on the other factors and to mitigate overrepresented factors. In the calibration process, to structure the fuzzy set each factor is assigned three qualitative breakpoints, full membership, cross-over point, and threshold for non-membership. As shown in Table 16, each factor in the model was assigned these values in accordance to the predicted hierarchical importance of each factor.

Table 16. Fuzzy Set Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Calibration Full membership/Cross-over/Non-membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Oversight and Support (extovspt)</td>
<td>.9/.7/.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction (juris)</td>
<td>.8/.6/.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System (tradjus)</td>
<td>.5/.3/.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local accountability and Sustainability (lclsusact)</td>
<td>.6/.4/.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Elites (elite)</td>
<td>.7/.5/.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fuzzy Set Analysis

Using the calibrated values, a fuzzy set analysis of necessary conditions was conducted. The results shown in Table 17 supported the model’s prediction that external oversight and support and limits to territorial jurisdiction are the two of the most necessary and sufficient factors in determining a successful outcome. Interestingly, incorporation of traditional justice systems ranked the third highest in coverage. This could be because adherence to this factor in the cases was usually a conscious choice by commanders and is less influenced by other factors in the model. The results also indicate that local accountability and sustainability, along with local leadership are influenced by the other factors and environmental conditions common to all the cases.

Table 17. Fuzzy Set Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Oversight and Support (extovspt)</td>
<td>0.761278</td>
<td>0.959716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction (juris)</td>
<td>0.868421</td>
<td>0.900585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System (tradjus)</td>
<td>0.855263</td>
<td>0.899210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local accountability and Sustainability (lclsusact)</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
<td>0.886667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Elites (elite)</td>
<td>1.000000</td>
<td>0.886667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis and Comparison of Results

As shown in Table 18, the hierarchy predicted by the model and the crisp and fuzzy set analyses were consistent in the finding that oversight and support by a counterinsurgent force is the most critical factor in determining a successful outcome. This finding is intuitive, but also informative for practitioners looking for an inexpensive method to defeat an insurgency. While less costly than fielding large conventional...
military forces, community-based security programs are not inexpensive in manpower or material. The other critical factors identified by the model, limits to territorial jurisdiction and voluntary participation did not fare as well in crisp set analysis. Interestingly, after calibration the scores for local accountability and sustainability and voluntary participation by local leaders both experienced lower scores as it became apparent that they were highly influenced by other factors in the model. This is not surprising as most of the cases demonstrated that local accountability and sustainability was influenced by resource constraints experienced by the counterinsurgent force. Also, in the majority of cases, the “voluntary” participation by local elites was usually a pragmatic decision taken when it became apparent that the counterinsurgent force was committed to victory and there were negative consequences associated with participating in the insurgency. The importance of the incorporation of traditional justice systems is an interesting, but not unexpected outcome. In several of the cases, placing limited justice systems that were familiar to the population proved to be an effective method to gain popular support for the government and undercut the nativist claims of the insurgents.
Table 18.
Comparison of Hierarchy of Factors from Model and Analysis Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Subset/Superset</th>
<th>Necessary Conditions</th>
<th>Fuzzy Set Necessary Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Oversight and Support</td>
<td>External Oversight and Support</td>
<td>External Oversight and Support</td>
<td>External Oversight and Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Leadership</td>
<td>Local accountability and Sustainability</td>
<td>Local accountability and Sustainability</td>
<td>Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction</td>
<td>Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction</td>
<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System</td>
<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local accountability and Sustainability</td>
<td>Local Leadership</td>
<td>Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction</td>
<td>Local accountability and Sustainability - Tie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System</td>
<td>Incorporation of Traditional Justice System</td>
<td>Local Leadership</td>
<td>Local Leadership - Tie</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fuzzy Set Truth Table Analysis

The final analysis conducted was the fuzzy set truth table analysis. The function of this analysis is to determine the connections between combinations of causal conditions and an outcome (Ragin 2008, 109). The standard analysis provides three sets of solutions; complex, parsimonious, and intermediate. The complex case provides a solution that avoids counterfactual cases. The parsimonious case provides the simplest case with the fewest casual conditions through the use of counterfactual cases. The intermediate case allows for inclusion of the most reasonable counterfactual cases. The strength of this analytical method is it determines multiple pathways to a similar outcome.

The complex case solution provides two causal pathways: 1) limits to territorial jurisdiction, incorporation of traditional justice systems, local sustainability and voluntary...
participation and 2) external support and oversight, low adherence to limited jurisdiction and traditional justice, local sustainability and accountability, and voluntary participation. The overall coverage of these two combinations as 0.976277 and a consistency of 0.894649. See Annex two for a full presentation of the results. For the purposes of this study, the complex solution is less informative because it takes into consideration counterfactuals, making determine a make a positive statement on the optimal mix of factors and making it harder to recommend to practitioners which causal factors should be focused on to achieve a given result.

The parsimonious solution includes two causal pathways, local sustainability and accountability and voluntary participation by local leaders. The overall solution was calculated to have a coverage of 0.998175 and a consistency of 0.868254. In this solution, each term is measured by their degree membership in each possible solution for the outcome and the proportion each factor contributes to the explanatory value in each potential solution. The importance of this finding to practitioners is that gaining local support, either in the form of coopting local leadership or building popular ownership in a program through accountability measures is an important consideration in designing a community-based security program.

The intermediate solution provided to causal pathways leading to a successful outcome. The first is voluntary participation, local sustainability and external support. The second is voluntary participation, local sustainability and accountability, incorporation of traditional justice systems, and limits to territorial jurisdiction. These pathways provide an overall consistency of 0.875614 and an overall coverage of 0.976277. These two pathways are instructive in that they indicate two realistic sets of
conditions that can produce a successful outcome. In cases where sufficient external support and oversight is available, local ownership of the program by local leaders and acceptance by the population is sufficient to produce a successful outcome. In cases where external support and oversight is lacking, strong adherence to the other factors in the model is necessary to achieve success. This again highlights the importance of external oversight and support as well as another combination of factors that could mitigate its absence.

Recommendations and Limitations

This study proposed a model for designing and evaluating community-based security programs as part of COIN operations based on a synthesis of counterinsurgency and community-based policing theory. The model correctly hypothesized that the most important factor influencing the success of a program was the level of external oversight and support provided by the counterinsurgent force. The model also shows that a balanced adherence to the factors of the model correlates to a successful outcome.

The small-n nature of this research requires that additional investigation be conducted. As three of the failed case studies were dropped because of a lack of evidence or a failure to fit the case study selection criteria, more research needs to be conducted on failed cases to confirm the findings of the two failed case studies examined in this study. Specifically, it is important to confirm that a general lack of adherence to the factors of this model consistently produce failure. Additional research could expand the data set or focus on a new set of cases as data from more recent counterinsurgency operations becomes available.
The U.S. COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will provide fertile ground for future research as records are declassified and the passage of time allows for a more settled perspective on the cases. Both Iraq and Afghanistan can provide several successful and failed cases to examine. Additional research could also be conducted on the use of community-based security forces by domestic governments combating local insurgencies and not those fought by external intervening forces. If the results continue to confirm the findings of this study, the U.S. military should consider adopting the factors of this model as part of their counterinsurgency doctrine.

Another avenue for research lies in a more granular examination of the individual cases examined in this research. The more recent cases of community-based security programs in the post-World War II cases provide a wealth of reporting data that can be used for within-case analysis. The archival date on the monthly reporting for the Territorial Forces and Combined Action Program in Vietnam provide cases in point. Advisors to each RF/PF and CAP unit provided detailed monthly assessments to higher headquarters that could be used to compare the development and effectiveness of individual units to others in the same or across districts and provinces. While the data provided by the Hamlet Evaluation System was prone to inflation and manipulation by American and Vietnamese officials, controls may be possible that would mitigate such misreporting. The result of this more granular examination within cases could reveal a better understanding of how local conditions influenced the effectiveness of community-based security programs.

A final area of future research is in the area of heterogeneous or displaced communities where the bonds of community are weaker or disrupted. The majority of
the case examined in this research were homogeneous societies and if they were relocated, they were moved as community units to secure locations. To further test the generalizability of this model, examination of mixed ethnic or religion communities or refugee communities needs to be conducted.

Potentially the most rewarding, but risk-prone potential use for the findings of the research would be to “travel” the theory. The model could be applied as the guiding principles in the formation of community-based security programs in the ungoverned spaces of fragile states. The danger of creating militias and warlords is real, but the potential reward for the bottom-up creation of order and improving the lives of the people living in these conflict-prone areas is great.

Another area outside of counterinsurgent field that this theory might be applied is in the response to natural disasters that stress or cause the breakdown of existing security systems. Given prior assessments of communities using this model, it might be possible to establish stopgap community-based security forces after a hurricane, earthquake or other natural disaster. In conditions where no armed threats occur, an armed security force would not be needed, lessening the need for external support, but the other factors of the model should maintain their importance.

The findings of this research concerning external support should also provide a warning to counterinsurgency planners who often turn to the use of paramilitary forces as a quick and inexpensive means to combat an insurgency. This research shows that to work properly, community-based security forces must be supervised and equipped adequately. The successful case of the Kikuyu Guard in Kenya demonstrate that an
insurgency can be defeated with minimal oversight and support, but at the risk of the lasting effects of human rights abuses and alienation of segments of the population.

The findings also indicate the importance of local ownership in these types of programs. As the failed cases of Vietnam indicate, if the participants feel no ownership in the program and do not feel they are protecting their communities, the program may fail. Anecdotal evidence from the numerous failed community-based security programs mentioned in the introduction indicate a lack of local support may have been a cause for several of the programs, but further research is needed to support this assertion.

The most important implication for this research is as a planning tool for planners and military and political leaders faced with conducting COIN operations with limited resources. At the most basic level, the decision to initiate a community-based security program should be informed by the presence or absence of the factors or conditions presented in this model. If they are not present or cannot be created, the creation of a community-based security program should be rejected. If they are present, planners can use this model as a set of guiding principles when deciding on the organization of a program and as a selection criterion to choose which areas provide a more fertile ground to start and hopefully expand the program.

This study also shows that political leaders must make the hard decision to provide early support the program with sufficient resources and oversight and to sustain that commitment over a long period. The cases that occurred during the Philippine Insurrection, Malaya, and Kenya show that an early adoption of a community-based security program can significantly shorten the duration of an insurgency. On the inverse, the failed cases in Vietnam demonstrate that an early failure to support a program of a
deviation from early adherence to the model can lead to ultimate failure even with the infusion of support and oversight later.

This dissertation research is not without its limitations, which must be considered with interpreting and applying the findings of this research. One the most significant limitations of this research is the geographic weighting of the sample cases toward Southeast Asia. This may bias the findings due to cultural similarities between the majorities of cases. While this is mitigated by the wide temporal and geographic dispersal of the cases, this shortcoming must be noted. As mentioned earlier in the dissertation, a promising avenue of research would be to test this model using a sample including cases drawn from Africa, the Middle East, and South America. Current cases in Iraq and Afghanistan will provide fertile ground for future testing of this model, as more of their associated data, particularly presently classified material, becomes available. Similar findings from such research would support the findings of this study and indicate a lack of geographic or cultural bias.

Another limitation of this research is the potentially subjective measurement of degrees of membership of the cases for the factors of the model. While this study attempted to mitigate this by using guiding questions to frame the examination of the cases and qualitative descriptions to demonstrate degrees of membership, it is possible that the researcher made incorrect assessments. Two avenues of follow-on research could be used to validate the findings of this study. First, another researcher or group of researchers could use the same data and method to replicate the study. If the assessments made in the subsequent study conform to the findings of the original study, this would support the claim that there was little or no researcher bias.
The second method to validate the findings of this study would be to conduct research using a different methodology. As mentioned earlier, it may be possible to use quantitative methods to exam programs such as the Territorial Forces in South Vietnam. Although quantitative research methods serve different purposes than the qualitative methods used in this research, statistical analysis could determine if the presence of the factors in this model correlate to successful outcomes. This would lend strength to the findings of this research that contend that the factors of this model are causative factors in producing successful outcomes.

At the most basic level, this research has contributed to the understanding of an understudied element of counterinsurgency operations. As mentioned in the introduction, most foreign powers conducting counterinsurgency operations conduct or at least experiment with community-based security programs during some phase of a counterinsurgency. This research provided an examination of this phenomenon in several counterinsurgencies over a seventy-year period. This examination and analysis supported the model presented in this research and a qualitative examination of how local factors during several periods and in diverse locations influenced the outcome of similar programs. The results of this research confirm the assertion presented in the introduction that the factors contained in this model should be included in current COIN doctrine and added as an element to COIN theory.
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