Europe Rising (Again): A Comparative Study of the Dynamics and Types of Modern European Nationalisms, 1989-2018

Timea Varga

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ABSTRACT

Nationalism is nothing new to Europe. While theoretical explanations of the catalysts of post-1989 European nationalist phenomena remain contested along material and non-material lines, this dissertation posits that it is the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears, and populism over time that have shaped the rise and types of post-1989 European nationalisms. Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) is combined with a collective case study design to examine: 1) how forces – political, economic, societal, or other – have dominated the formation and latest surge of European nationalisms since the end of European Communism in 1989; and 2) whether different, context-dependent types of European nationalisms exist as a result. The five cases examined – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden – extend the scope of earlier methodological efforts by: 1) recognizing the intersectionality of economic, societal, and political variables; and 2) are geographically, economically, culturally and politically representative of all Europe.

Findings indicate that while modest generalizations across the cases can be drawn, there is no universal trend or type of post-1989 European nationalism. This is because national identities and their expressions depend critically on the claims people attach to them in different economic, cultural, and political contexts and times. Thus, nationalism – its origins, dynamics, and types – are unique, evolutionary, and context-dependent. With some historic and symbolic features that are continuous, they adapt to transforming landscapes to guarantee a sense or perception of belonging, national self-determination, and economic, cultural, and political autonomy.
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This doctoral journey and dissertation would not have been possible without the love and support of several influential people. First and foremost, Dr. Joseph J. St. Marie – the Committee Chair Extraordinaire. Your wisdom, insight, guidance, and friendship along the way have been a true source of inspiration throughout this process, and will remain so long after. Your engagement with the topic and invaluable recommendations have made this journey truly enjoyable.

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My dearest friends and my former professors, colleagues, and friends at Lynn University: Thank you for your words of encouragement that served as much needed motivation at times. Thank you for continuing to impact my life in amazing ways.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my mom, dr. Vargané Csík Márta, who always believed in me and raised me with endless care and support so that I could pursue all my dreams since childhood; my dad, dr. Varga László, who gave me the gift of positivity to believe in myself and my abilities to accomplish anything I set my mind to. You both raised me with discipline to work hard, to always persevere, and to be kind - three of the most invaluable characteristics I have learnt from you. Thank you for exposing me to, and help appreciate a world that is greater than me. My brother, Varga Balázs, who remains an inspiration, and whose love and support is irreplaceable to me. Köszönök nektek mindent! Nagyon szeretlek benneteket!

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To Scott Carlee: Rest in peace and power, Scott. This dissertation is dedicated to your life and loving memory.
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<td>Alternative für Deutschland</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANI</td>
<td>Associazione Nazionalista Italiana</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
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<td>COMPASSS</td>
<td>COMParative Methods for Systematic cross-caSe analysis</td>
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<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union</td>
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<td>csQCA</td>
<td>Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
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<td>DEMIG</td>
<td>International Migration Institute Determinants of International Migration Policy Database</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EED</td>
<td>European Election Database</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>Economic Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUROPP</td>
<td>European Politics and Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Social Survey</td>
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<td>FI</td>
<td>Forza Italia</td>
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<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National</td>
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<td>fsQCA</td>
<td>Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>IRPP</td>
<td>Irish Refugee Programme</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISMU</td>
<td>Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDNP</td>
<td>Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt</td>
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<td>LN</td>
<td>Lega Nord</td>
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<td>MDP</td>
<td>Migration Data Portal</td>
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<td>MSI</td>
<td>Movimento Sociale Italiano</td>
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<td>MIÉP</td>
<td>Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja</td>
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<td>MSZP</td>
<td>Magyar Szocialista Párt</td>
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<td>M5S</td>
<td>Movimento Cinque Stelle</td>
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<td>mvQCA</td>
<td>Multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
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<td>PRR</td>
<td>Populist Radical Right</td>
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<td>QCA</td>
<td>Qualitative Comparative Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIRA</td>
<td>Real Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>SD</td>
<td>Sverigedemokraterna</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEK</td>
<td><em>Swedish krona</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWR</td>
<td>Südwestrundfunk</td>
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<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>The Treaty of the European Union</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN DESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPD</td>
<td>Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIID</td>
<td>World Income Inequality Database</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>ZDR</td>
<td>Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen</td>
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

“Our true nationality is mankind.”

– H.G. Wells (1897)

Nationalism as an ideology, sociopolitical platform, and economic, political, and social movement does not only rely on but often generates, reinvigorates, and guarantees a reason for desired self-determination and self-governance through emotional and psychological attachment to one’s nation and national identity. Though often interchangeably used with its ideological chauvinist, populist, and jingoist counterparts in scholarship and practice alike, nationalism in modern contexts is best understood as a collective celebration of the superiority of a national identity, with a focus on maintaining its economic, cultural, political independence, sovereignty, and autonomy.

Nationalism is nothing new to Europe in general and post-1989 Europe in particular. Neither a monolithic entity nor simply a collection of nation states, Europe remains a union of diverse individuals who differ from one another in a variety of ways, while sharing many characteristics associated with their ethnic, social, political, economic, religious, or national orientations (Breen 2017). Enduring efforts of economic and political unification and integration of its continental extremes through efforts of collective Europeanization, have pitted national identities as necessary ingredients of nationalisms against regional and global sentimental and cognitive affiliations. Whilst the 1992 Maastricht Treaty’s establishment of the European Union (EU) in 1993, envisioned and marked a definite path toward modern collective Europeanness, today, with a newly reinvigorated surge of nationalism sweeping through the continent – characterized by growing Euroscepticism, economic insecurities, societal fears, and radical right-wing
populist orientations, – such modern collective Europeanness, and what little has been achieved of it thus far, is an unlikely reality.

Contemporary scholars and practitioners across a variety of disciplines agree that in the past century alone, both World War I and World War II post-war periods, along with the Fall of European Communism, have prompted successive waves of European nationalisms (Özkirimli 2010; Hobsbawm 1990; 2012). Still, most recent events, including the political run-off between Emmanuel Macron of En Marche! and Marine Le Pen of the National Front (FN) in the 2017 French presidential elections, 81-year old media mogul Silvio Berlusconi’s sudden revival in an increasingly far-right extremist and ultra-nationalist Italy, and Central and Eastern European countries’ resistance to their Western EU partners’ policy recommendations as seen in the Czech Republic’s case, carry a combination of dimensions rarely or partially explored in existing nationalism scholarship.

Some experts have pointed to economic factors rooted in globalization and internal and external migration (Solt 2011; Aeharn 2006), while others have noted the primacy of ethnocultural configurations relating to regime legacy and party competition (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009); contending civic, ethnocultural and multinational visions (Brown 2003); increasing distrust in European institutions (Hooghe and Marks 2007); and a variety of societal fears (Delanty 2008) among others, as causes of newly

\[1\text{ The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) was signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992 and entered into force on November 1, 1993. It created the European Union and its three pillars: the European Communities, common foreign and security policy, and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The three European Communities (Euratom, Economic Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Economic Community (EEC) institutionalized cooperation in the realms of foreign policy, defense, police and justice. (Europa.eu).} \]
reinvigorating European nationalisms.

With hopes to enrich the modern nationalism literature’s understanding of the relationship between nations, national identities, and nationalism, the most significant contributions of this dissertation lie in its potency to add that single factors alone cannot explain transformations in national identities and nationalist tendencies over time on the continent. It advances the notion that one definition and single theoretical and/or analytical explanations of nationalisms as ideologies, economic, political, and cultural movements remain incomplete and insufficient because each nation, and with it, the phenomenon of nationalism – its origins, dynamics, and effects – are unique, evolutionary, and context-dependent. As such, this research puts forth a holistic approach to understanding and measuring nationalist phenomena, claiming that stand-alone explanations rooted economic, political, social, and other external and internal catalysts could constitute both a theoretical and methodological flaw as one size for nationalisms does not fit all in a complex world, where both national and international consciousness, and the human desire for belonging collide.

More specifically, this dissertation posits that it is the interaction of a multitude of political, economic, and societal catalysts over time – precisely, economic insecurities, societal fears and right-wing populism – that have shaped a newly rising post-1989 Europe and its types of nationalisms. Accordingly, this study is set out to bridge the theoretical and methodological gaps in nationalism studies with two principal objectives of inquiry: 1) it examines how forces – political, economic, societal, or other – have dominated the formation and latest surge of European nationalism since the end of European Communism in 1989; and 2) it explores whether different, context-dependent
types of European nationalisms exist as a result. More specifically, the research questions addressed in this dissertation are as follows:

RQ1: Has the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears and/or right-wing populism, since the end of European Communism in 1989, effected nationalism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden?

RQ2: Have particular economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism, since the end of European Communism in 1989, proven to be of dominance in their effects on nationalism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden?

RQ3: Have particular types of nationalisms, since the end of European Communism in 1989, been uniquely detectible in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden?

Existing scholarship rarely notes that European nationalisms tend to take a variety of forms, with one type of nationalism differently expressed and more salient in one particular setting than in another. In some cases, nationalisms may be economically dominant (Helleiner 2002; Chandra 2004), while in others, they may be prompted, nurtured, and expressed along ethnocultural lines as seen in the example of recurring Bosnian ethnonationalism traced to cost-benefit calculations of the nations’ fear of potential disintegration (Sarajlic 2010). Additionally, nationalisms can carry chauvinist undertones, with beliefs in national superiority to the extreme through prejudice and hostility toward an out-group considered weak and inferior.

Such a dimension of nationalism is slowly emerging across the European continent, exhibited in ideological campaigns against Muslim minorities, in-group communication, and legislation of a new fear against the Islamic faith (Werbner 2005; Sheehi 2011; Awan 2014). When triggered politically top-down, populist versions of nationalisms – visible through the Hungarian ‘Victator’s’ anti-migrant and anti-Soros propaganda – may additionally juxtapose the morality of ordinary citizens against the
establishment and elites accused of placing the interest of other groups such as foreign nationals and migrants above the interests of the nation and nation-state.

Despite their distinctiveness, all forms of nationalisms nonetheless require members of a group to collectivize in order to moderate, or entirely eliminate a feeling of individual or communal vulnerability (Baumeister and Leary 1995), and are linked with a sense of political independence and sovereignty. While some cultural and societal factors including religious antiquity, shared histories, linguistic, and ethnic kinship may be continuous and carried over from one from of nationalism to the next, nationalisms as ideologies, economic, political, and social movements cannot exist without the political component, and are far from being fixed. They are unique, constantly evolving, and context-specific, and should be theoretically conceptualized and analytically surveyed as such.

Although statistical methods have become increasingly popular in recent decades in a variety of fields including sociology, psychology, and comparative politics, the contribution of qualitative methods that survey historical determinants, collective memory, political discourse and mythology in the realms of nationalist sentiment and will-formation, cannot be discredited (Asal et al. 2010; Jaskulowski 2017). Qualitative approaches, compared to quantitative generalizations, are thus most beneficial in refining definitions and meanings of key concepts and providing a more nuanced analysis, and have a decisive role to play in the conceptual development of nations and nationalism in post-1989 Europe through detailed, case-centered evidence (Ragin 1987; Adock and Collier 2001; Mahoney 2007).
Consequently, this qualitative study adopts the often-critiqued Eurocentric methodological approach *not* as universally applicable to the study of nationalisms (as generally assumed by many post-1989 scholars of methodological nationalism) but as a strength of methodological nationalism in the post-1989 European context, *uniquely*. It does not take the applicability of this approach for granted beyond its focus, which is to examine the economic, societal, and political factors of modern post-1989 European nationalism *across and within* the five European nation-states – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden, where both stateless nationalist phenomena and European supranationalism are considered within the larger nation-state.

Accordingly, a combination of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) and a collective case study approaches have been employed. Due to its case-centered foci, the QCA technique can be combined with case studies to tackle the complexity of cases both logically and narratively, thus enhancing the quality and internal validity of any research study (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2008; Sehring et al. 2013). The researcher’s fluency in German, Italian, Hungarian, and English, and ability to read some Swedish, created an additional opportunity to examine conditions of post-1989 European nationalisms in five EU member states: Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden first-hand.

With little to no exploration of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) design in nationalism literature as it pertains to the casual mechanisms of rising nationalism, QCA and its three distinct techniques – crisp-set QCA (csQCA), fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) and multi-value QCA (mvQCA) – have advanced Mills’ Method of Agreement and Difference through the examination of both necessary and/or sufficient
conditions of particular phenomena of interest (Rihoux 2007). QCA does not
disaggregate cases into analytically separate variables as seen in most statistical research,
and assumes these as changing rather than constant (an often-cited limitation both
statistical methods and Mill’s Methods). Thus, QCA allows for a systematic cross-case
comparison of how configurations of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing
populism (specific combination of conditions as recipes and ingredients) have produced
post-1989 German, Italian, Hungarian, Irish and Swedish nationalisms as outcomes
(Ragin 2000).

The formulation of more coherent casual chains that summarize data and test
assumptions as they pertain to the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears, and
right-wing populism as ingredients (conditions/factors) in the recipe of post-1989
European nationalisms, is thus indispensable to adequately address research questions 1
and 2, and their respective hypotheses concerned with their interaction and dynamics.
Albeit, while fuzzy-set QCA permits the logical examination of the first principal
objective of inquiry, namely, how forces – political, economic, societal, or other – have
dominated the formation and latest surge of European nationalism since the end of
European Communism in 1989, fuzzy-set QCA cannot solely address the second
principle of inquiry in this research, which explores whether different, context-dependent
types of European nationalisms exist as a result.

While it is most appropriate to identify similar and contradictory (necessary
and/or sufficient) conditions within cases, and is beneficial for both theory building and
testing, the method alone cannot detail the context, in which economic insecurities,
societal fears, and right-wing populism as potential conditions of post-1989 European
nationalisms interact and/or dominate (Sehring et al. 2013). Although QCA treats phenomena under investigation as dynamic, it also cannot fully account for a temporal dimension, thus treating the combinations of conditions as they occur simultaneously, rather than over time (Caren and Panofsky 2005; Mannewitz 2011). Hence, it cannot account for the temporal and socio-constructivist determinants of post-1989 European nationalisms shaping such conditions, and thus, potentially the diversity in the similar outcome itself.

As this dissertation investigates the role of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism in the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms and their types, the qualitative case study design builds on the fuzzy-set QCA technique to examine nationalisms from a social-constructivist perspective, evoking the complexity of nationalisms as ideologies, sociopolitical platforms and/or economic, political, and social movements in their natural and human contexts. As Yin (2009) claims, case study research starts from the “desire to derive an up-close or otherwise in-depth understanding of a small number of ‘cases’ set in their real-world contexts” (13).

In sum, first the fuzzy-set QCA is employed to address research questions 1 and to test the hypotheses pertaining to the combination of dynamics conditions sufficient and necessary in the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms. Secondly, the observed thematic patterns of data are used to address research questions 2 and 3 – dimensions of post-1989 European nationalisms as it pertains to the domination of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism, and the types of post-1989 European nationalisms over time in their particular contexts.
The five carefully selected cases under consideration here extend the scope of earlier methodological efforts by: 1) recognizing the intersectionality of economic, societal, and political variables; and 2) providing evidence that is geographically, economically, culturally and politically representative of all Europe. They concentrate on exploring extremes in Eastern and Western, Northern and Southern nationalisms to exhaustively incorporate: differences in market structures; domestic and international political and institutional pressures; older and newer, and ethnically and religiously homogenous and heterogeneous EU member states; national identities coexisting alongside other national and international identities; and a diverse range of hybrid, regional, and cultural identities. All five nation-states are similar in so far that they all display a distinct longevity in their participation in Europe’s post-1989 development and most recent refugee and migrant crisis, also being among the extremes of the most (in some cases, imaginatively) affected by the 2015 influx of Muslim ethnic minorities, as specified below.

German nationalism prompts an exciting inquiry into the change and affiliation of national sentiments since European unification in 1989. Additionally, Germany’s open arms policies since the 1990s through the country’s Turkish Gastarbeiter program, topped by an unprecedented inflow of the largest number of asylum seekers during the recent events of the 2015 refugee and migrant crisis from Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan (and elsewhere in Africa and the Greater Middle East), with 860,000 granted applications in 2016 alone (European Commission 2018), have placed a strain on the country’s economic, political, and cultural landscapes. Contrasting political promises and rhetoric that only seem to exacerbate tensions between Muslim minorities and the German host
population despite decreasing levels of migration since 2017, raises questions about the possibility of a new, religiously outlined nationalism strengthening amidst economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populist tendencies.

In Italy, nationalism rooted in Roman antiquity has gradually morphed into a variety of modern nationalisms. Passionately competing regional identities and those of enduring familial kinship, Italy’s religious leadership in the European arena in the face of supranational institutional transformation and mass migration since the fall of European Communism in 1989, make the country an excellent fit for in-depth analysis to detangle political, economic, and societal catalysts, and mechanisms of rising nationalism. With at least 1.4 million Muslims living in Italy (European Commission 2018), Islam is de facto the second-largest religion but as far as Italian authorities are concerned, Islam does not exist as it was not formally recognized until 2017. With Italy having served, and currently acting as both a transit route and destination for African, and Middle Eastern refugee and migrant communities via the Mediterranean Sea, the case is ideal to examine the interaction of various forms of identities under international pressures, and the role of religious antiquity and continuity as an agent in the latest surge of an increasingly populist and hostile Italian nationalism.

Moreover, Hungary is an example of national identity expressed through extreme nationalist sentiments with a certain irrational and unapologetically distorted populist dimension. With only 3,397 asylum-seeking applicants in 2017 (Asylum Information Database 2018), Hungary’s 69.1 percent rejection rate is far below the EU-mandated quotas, Hungary, along Poland and the Czech Republic, is already in breach of European Court rulings after 2015 (Smyth 2018). Viktor Orbán, newly re-elected Hungarian prime
minister, recently echoed to the German *Bild*\(^2\) that the “EU’s migration policies threaten Hungarian national sovereignty and cultural identity” with Muslim refugees in particular seen as “Muslim invaders” of the Christian faith (The Irish Times 2018). Hungary’s continuity of statehood, its anti-Western attitudes represented in the perpetual disregard for EU institutional recommendations and policies, and civic religiosity embedded in its daily political, economic, and societal events, allow for the comparison of historical, economic, political, and societal variables, and their linkage to nationalism since 1989 to present.

Modern Irish nationalism began only in the late eighteenth century through the founding of the Society of the Irishmen, with goals to seek an independent Irish republic where discrimination against Catholics and Presbyterians would end. Since the 1990s through the most recent European migrant and refugee crisis, Ireland’s case is unique and therefore most appropriate for the study of: interaction between territorial claims, religious pasts, and ethnosymbolic complexes; political and cultural traditions as bases for sentimental attachments to the concept of a nation; the meaning of national identity; and nationalism’s origins and dynamics over time. The 1990s have brought about a significant shift in the ethno-religious composition of Ireland mostly through immigration, with 63,000 Muslims currently residing in the Republic (Central Statistics Office 2017). Similar to Italy’s case, Ireland’s enduring economically, politically, and religiously divided past, provides an insight as to why a country that has a history of grappling with economic, political, and social grievances, in the past decade would

\(^2\) The *Bild* (or *Bild-Zeitung*, literally: *Picture*) is a German tabloid published by Alex Springer AG, Mondays through Saturdays. It has the eight-largest worldwide circulation covering a range of topics including politics and gossip (World Association of Newspapers 2005).
increasingly gravitate toward right-wing populism and aggressive nationalist tendencies.

Lastly, while the Social Democratic Party remained predominant since WWI, Sweden’s political landscape has been historically divided between two major political blocks, the left (red) and the right (blue) with several parties, including The Green Party, The Left Party, and the Feminist Initiative, in-between remaining active. Despite the country’s booming economy and strong welfare safety net, shootings, grenade and arson attacks on cars, and over 60,000 asylum applications (primarily by Syrians) between 2015 and 2018 alone, have tapped into Swedish fears (Savage 2018). Sweden, a country once known for its moderation and balance through its centrist approach, has now shifted onto the opposite side of the pendulum as it has seen a rise in Swedish nationalism since 1989.

Dissertation Structure

In sum, Chapter I entitled “Introduction” focused on introducing the concept of nationalism, stated the research problem, detailed the research questions, presented a synopsis of the literature including its main theoretical and methodological limitations, and introduced the methodology along with the selected cases. The subsequent chapter, Chapter II entitled “Review of the Relevant Literature” comprises of classical explanations of the relationship between nations and nationalisms, definitions and types of nationalisms, explanations of the causes and dynamics of rising nationalisms over time in general, and post-1989 European nationalism in particular, on which this dissertation is based.

Chapter III, “Research Design, Methodology, and Data Compilation” details the rationale behind employing the Qualitative Comparative Analysis and collective case
study designs, reiterates research questions and hypotheses, discusses the data sources, data collection, and selected indicators of outcome and conditions of post-1989 European nationalism as they pertain to advancing both earlier and contemporary nationalism studies literature in the context of post-1989 European settings. This section further addresses challenges the researcher encountered during the data collection process and explains the rationale behind the selection of the five cases – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden – in detail.

Chapter IV, “Testing and Results”, then discusses the testing procedures and results of both the fsQCA and thematic analyses pertaining to H1 (the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism since the end of European Communism in 1989 as conditions for the rise of nationalism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland and Sweden), and H2 and H3 (the dominance of particular economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism; and types of post-1989 European nationalisms).

Chapter V, “The Cases”, surveys the evolution of European nationalism, with particular focus on nationalism as a site of symbolic struggle in every-day practice (Billig 1995; Bonikowski 2016), and discusses historic and thematic patterns emerging and recurring from archival and publically available national and international data sources since 1989 through Europe’s most recent migrant and refugee crisis since 2015 in the five examined countries.

Chapter VI, entitled “Analysis, Implications, and Conclusions” synthesizes findings from the QCA and collective case study designs to determine what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from the data collected. Lastly, it reviews the findings of the
dissertation to comprehensively address the causes and mechanisms of nationalisms as it pertains to the research questions and earlier theoretical and methodological contributions. Finally, findings are synthesized to recommend future directions in nationalism studies theory and analysis to facilitate a more holistic understanding of the unique, evolutionary, and context-dependent nature and types of nationalisms. The dissertation concludes with a reflection on the significance of economic, political, and societal implications of these findings in relation to the values and dangers embedded in national emotional and psychological affiliations in modern, exceedingly internationalized and institutionalized Europe, and beyond.
CHAPTER II - REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE

“A good nationalism has to depend on a principle of the common people, on myths of a struggling commonality.”
– Andrew O’Hagan (2010)

Because this dissertation focuses on the evolutionary dimension of nationalism over time in a variety of unique economic, political, and social contexts, the literature review is best presented in a historically grounded yet thematically consolidated manner. As such, it surveys, underscores, and adds to the significant contributions of four distinct stages of theoretical discourses and debates on nationalisms commonly acknowledged by most, if not all nationalisms scholars across a variety of disciplines ranging from psychology to political science. Appreciating the cross-disciplinary nature of nationalism scholarship as both a challenge and research opportunity in the social sciences, this chapter is divided into two key sections: nations and nationalism; and the rise of nationalisms in general, and in post-1989 Europe in particular.

Table 1

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>HISTORICAL STAGES IN LITERATURE</th>
<th>FOCUS OF INQUIRY</th>
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<tr>
<td>18th and 19th Centuries</td>
<td>• Ethical and philosophical discussions of nations and national attachments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1918 to 1945</td>
<td>• Nationalism and its types as the focus of academic inquiry.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945 to 1989</td>
<td>• Nationalism studies as interdisciplinary and specialized field; the role of socioeconomic, political, and sociocultural transformations, and nationalism as a form of politics and culture is explored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-1989</td>
<td>• The understanding of nationalism moves beyond the existence of nations and nation-states; theoretical and analytical considerations emerge on a range of subjects including banal nationalism, post-colonial nationalisms, and nationalism as discursive formation.</td>
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Embedded in these two sections, five detectable analytical paradigm shifts – primordialism, perennialism, modernism, ethno-symbolism, and an array of contemporary approaches to nationalism are discussed (Hobsbawm 1990; Brubaker 1996; Woolf 1999; Spencer and Wollman 2002; Özkirimli 2010; Smith 2010). Particular attention is given to the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears, and radical right-wing populism as catalysts of nationalisms in general, and European nationalisms in particular. Additionally, the role of religion as a tool for national collectivization of consciousness and social action is reviewed. The subsequent chapter, Chapter III entitled “Research Design, Methodology, and Data Compilation”, will delve into the mechanisms behind the rise of European nationalisms as well as present its working definition, characteristics, and indicators.

Table 2

Analytical paradigms of nations and nationalism

<table>
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<tr>
<th>PRIMORDIALISM</th>
<th>PERENNIALISM</th>
<th>MODERNISM</th>
<th>ETHNO-SYMBOLISM</th>
<th>CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalist Sociobiological Cultural</td>
<td>Continuous Recurrent</td>
<td>Socioeconomic Political Sociocultural Ideological Constructionist</td>
<td>Phenomenological Historical</td>
<td>Banal nationalism Feminism and politics of belonging Postcolonial theory Nationalism as discursive formation Ethnicity without groups Ethnic boundary making</td>
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Nations and Nationalism

The Nation

Neither A State Nor An Ethnic Community. What is nationalism, really? While the concept of nationalism has existed since the birth of ancient civilizations, the term
‘nationalism’ has not been used in the English language until 1844, acquiring increasingly negative connotations in the twentieth century (Sluga 2013). Nationalisms have been visible throughout history from the Jewish revolts in the 2nd century to the re-emergence of Latin culture in the Western Roman Empire in the 4th and 5th centuries, and from nationalisms of the French Revolution to the case of Russian exploitation of national sentiments behind Vladimir Putin’s consolidation of power in modern, twenty-first century contexts.

In both classic and modern nationalism studies literature, the notion of nationalism has been commonly examined alongside the concept of the nation. Though scholars often disagree on their relationship, nationalisms cannot be fully understood in contemporary global contexts without first understanding the concept of the nation and its characteristics as bases for national attachments. The concept of nations emerged long before the 1800s to refer to “inhabitants of a territory that could include shared history, law, language, political rights, religion and traditions, in a sense more akin to the modern conception” (Gat 2012, 214). Tilly (1975, 6) labelled the term as “one of the most puzzling and tendentious terms in the political lexicon”, which position, shared by many of his contemporaries, has led even contemporary scholars to erroneously equate the nation to the state, and subsequently, to the nation-state (Guibernau 2004a; Özkirimli 2010).

20th century scientists argued that the epoch of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries brought about two distinct types of nations: civic nations formed as an act of political affirmation (Brubaker 1992), of which post-French Revolution France was an example, and ethnic nations, rooted in ethnic affiliation. On one hand, Rousseau’s
idea of ‘self-determination’ and surrender to the “general will” (Rousseau [1762] 2001, 75) introduced the early case for nationalism as a ‘civic profession of faith’ (Qvortrup 2010).

As a critique of Kant’s position, according to which natural men live for themselves abiding by universal laws, Rousseau’s esprit de corps – consciousness of belonging together thus developed the early notions of nationalism through political association and adherence to civic duties and laws of a particular society, generally, the state (Barnard 1983, 239). On the other hand, for Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), this consolidation of national consciousness was embedded in language, as language expresses a nation’s traditions, history, religions and principles of life, with the nation viewed as an extended family with an ethnonational character not inescapably limited to territorial boundaries (Heater 2016).

As both strands of scholarship blended, distinctions between civic and ethnic nations became increasingly difficult. Nonetheless, in both, the tradition to associate modern societies with communities within boundaries of a national state was commonly embraced, overestimating the uniformity of nations (Burszta and Jaskulowski 2005). Through a socioeconomic lens, Iosif Vissarionovich Djugashvili, ordinarily known as Stalin (1973) explained that the “amalgamation of people into nations” (Heater 2016, 67) relies on rising capitalism as a modernizing process. He defined nations as “an historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (Stalin 1973, 61). Such ideological model created the foundation for the former Soviet Union, which, through socialism, would eliminate divergent nationalities by
bonding them internationally against Western capitalism. This ideal eventually failed in Soviet Socialism, and is currently being tested in complex, twenty-first century European contexts, where the peaceful coexistence and cooperation of national sentiments as supposed by Stalin, are all but ignited in an internationally pressured supranational economic, political, and social environment.

Weber (1948) also conceived the nation from a socioeconomic perspective, as an organizational form of economic solidarity. Unlike in Stalinist, Marxist, and Leninist approaches, where modern nations are claimed to eventually disappear in a cosmopolitan world order due to collective solidarity forming not on the bases of nationalities but from the struggles between workers and the capitalists, for Weber (1948), the unity in nations lied in their constant and continuous struggle for honor, power, and prestige against other nations in a Malthusian world (Norkus 2004). Later modernists would agree with such internationalist view on nations, but contrary to their Marxist and neo-Marxist counterparts, they would suggest that nations are historical novelty and the result of nationalisms not the other way around (Hobsbawm 1990; 2012). Nations, in the modernist view were thus products of modern processes including globalization, industrialization, and urbanization, and other rapid and unprecedented socioeconomic, political, and sociocultural transformations (Nairn 1977; Giddens 1985; Breuilly 1993; Mann 1995; Hobsbawm 1990; 2012).

Ethnosymbolist accounts later highlighted the role of ethnicity, and revived notions of ethnic nations that invent and reinvent themselves through symbolic processes and in-group communication. As such, Anderson (1991, 6) referred to the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”
with particular primacy given to the emergence of print capitalism, and the constructionist nature of mass media content through the use of language and symbolic imagery that resonates with kinship with community and ethnic consciousness.

Highlighting the importance of historic ties to the homeland, Miller (1995, 27) defined the nation as nationality, and as “a community (1) constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment, (2) extended in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a particular territory, and (5) marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture.” Miller’s (1995) approach thus focused primarily on the significance of historic continuity of nations, and respectively nationalisms, and neglected ethnicity as a key element of nations altogether. His ideas nonetheless laid the foundations for the blueprint of the form and content of nationalisms in ethnosymbolist accounts (Smith 2013).

With an attempt to further distinguish between civic and ethnic polities, Smith (2010) claimed that Miller’s definitions confounded nations with ethnic communities, calling for theoretical distinction between the two. Smith (1983) advanced the notion that the nation is neither a state nor is it an ethnic community. He defined the nation as “a named population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for its members,” and, in turn, referred to to *ethnies* as “named units of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among their elites” (57).

Thus, further blurring the lines between civic and ethnic nations, and the relationship between states and nations, he argued that nations and ethnies are similar in their construct as communities that function on the bases of shared beliefs and myths and
histories linked to particular territories or their histories, ethnies do not need to reside in such territory, and do not have distinct public cultures embedded in the voluntary adherence to laws and civic duties – both of which are imperative for nations in his views (Smith 2009; 2010). Citing the case of the Jurassiens aspired to independence from Berne, and limited by a Swiss national identity, Smith (2010; 2013) further attested that ethnies could live within a state, with its members claiming both a separate ethnic, and common national identities. With ethnic identities changing slower than generally assumed (Vaduchova et al. 1996; Verdery 1998), ethnies are believed to survive through times of invasions, migration, and intermarriages and political competition as seen in the examples of ancient dynastic Empires like China or Egypt, and in Scotland and Denmark since as early as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Eifert et al. 2010; Smith 2013).

(1) an historic territory or homeland, preferably one that was relatively compact;
(2) a territorially unified, and socially cohesive, if not homogenous, population;
(3) a single, shared and distinctive public culture, with preferably a single language;
(4) a set of distinctive myths and collective memories, with preferably a unified history; and
(5) common laws and customs for all members, together with participation as citizens in a largely autonomous, and preferably independent and sovereign, national community.

Figure 1. The ‘Blueprint’ Nationalisms in Ethnosymbolism.


Such theory of ethnies has made significant contributions to recent, social-constructivist nature of nations and nationalisms as it highlighted the potential for multiple identities coexisting alongside one another (Gellner [1983] 2006; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Anderson 1983). Additionally, the assumptions that identities as bases for commonality may exist outside territorial boundaries, have made valuable contributions to previous understanding of the nation and its elements, particularly to primordialist and perennialist theories through their emphasis of the potential longevity
and continuity of nations (Geertz 1973; van den Berghe 1978; Armstrong 1982), though not taking such continuity for granted as primoridalists and perennialists have done.

However, Smith too, failed to provide a clear distinction between the concept of nation and state, attributing some of the legal features of the state to the nation (Guibernau 2004b; Özkirimli 2010; Heater 2016). Further, he excluded the possibility of ethnic identities as national ones, and national identities existing beyond territorial boundaries of the state. Therefore, his arguments pertaining to the nation and its characteristics remain limited in today’s world, where both ethnic and diaspora identities are mobilized into national desires in both state and stateless settings.

Before nationalism and its dynamics can be thoroughly explored in contemporary global and supranational contexts like that of the EU and its member states, it is thus imperative to distinguish between nations, states, and nation-states as the relationship between them helps grasp the core purpose of nationalist claims. By Weber’s definition, the state is “a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory” ([1919] 1991, 78). While the state is thus conceived along the lines of a territory, population, self-governance, and sovereignty, nations are to be understood within the realms of common culture and consciousness that cannot exist without political connotations (Özkirimli 2010; Smith 2013).

Therefore, while the state is best conceived as a political organization, the nation, in contrast, is a socially, psychologically, and emotionally forged, maintained, and mobilized political unity. While territory is a tangible requirement for states, it is not a requirement for nations. Nevertheless, territory – historical, existent, or coveted – may serve as an aspiration and a desired prerogative for nations, with states preserving unity
through civic laws and practices, while nations sustaining themselves through historical symbols, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious ties, to name a few (Spencer and Wollmann 2002).

Hence for nations the love for a common motherland is the root of unity as seen in the example of the Jewish nation, whose state, Israel, was only established in 1948. Nations can thus be understood within the context of Smith’s original notion of ethnies, yet they do not have to rely on ethnonational elements as argued by Smith (2009; 2013) and Brubaker (1999; 2009). Nations can indeed function in states as well as in other nations, and nation-states. To draw a clear distinction between states and nations, Guibernau (1996) thus asserts that nations are “a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself (47).

Citing German post-1989 unification, Guibernau (1996; 2004a; Guibernau and Hutchinson (2004) further critiqued Smith’s (2010) conception of public culture and common economy as insufficient differentiators between states, nations, and ethnies. Nations may indeed survive for long periods of time despite lacking or losing its political institutions and public culture as seen in the examples of long durée Basque and Catalan heritage (Armstrong 1982). Nations also exist within other national boundaries including former Hungary in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or the French nation that extends to Belgium, Switzerland and Italy, and they can function in stateless nations such as in the case of quasi-states like Quebec and Scotland, or present-day Palestine or diaspora nationalisms around the globe (Bauböck and Faist 2010; Manning 2013; Skrbiš 2017).
Lastly, nations, even being occupied – with their economies, legal rights, and public culture in the hands of their occupier, can still be called nations (Guibernau 2004a; Nairn and James 2005; Özkirimli 2010; Smith 2013; Heater 2016). Renan (1882) would add national continuity, though it should not be taken for granted (Özkirimli 2010), is automatically embedded in both legacies of the past, and on the possession of a variety – socioeconomic, sociocultural, and political national associations in the present to drive desires to live together.

Although nations therefore are neither states nor simply ethnic communities, their destinies are often entangled in the nationalist quest for belonging. Because states often seek to base their legitimacy in nations to guarantee their survival and self-determination (Guibernau 2004a), most contemporary scholars agreed that nations and nationalisms must be examined alongside one another in the context of increasingly blending civic and ethnic nations. Consequently, advocates of contemporary methodological nationalism in particular, argued that nationalism – specifically on the European continent – functions within a larger society, that of the nation-state. This approach has indeed been widely adopted and rarely contested in modern nationalism scholarship (Wimmer and Schiller 2002; 2003).

Continuing his separation of civic loyalty and cultural collectivity, Smith (2010) offered a narrow definition of such national state as “a state legitimated by the principles of nationalism, whose members possess a measure of national unity (but not cultural homogeneity). In his critique of Smith, Guibernau (2004a) thus added that the nation-state rather is “a kind of state which has the monopoly of what is claims to be the
legitimate use of force within a demarcated territory and seeks to unite the people subject to its rule by means of cultural homogenization” (132).

Although views of the nation-state in methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Schiller 2002) should not be neglected, in the case of modern Europe that is neither a monolithic entity, nor a collection of nation-states, the notion that there is one nation for any given state is scarce (Connor 1972; 1994). With the complex case of Irish nationalism in mind, which exists at the interaction of nation-state, stateless (Northern Ireland), and diaspora nationalism alike, and subsequently operates in ethno-culturally diverse and institutionally complex supranational EU contexts, this dissertation suggests that modern nationalist phenomena must be studied by not taking nation-state as a unit of analysis for granted for all studies of nationalisms. While the nation-state may provide an ideal starting point in European settings, potential statelessness, along with global challenges and pressures must not be ignored as they may constitute the platform for a diverse array of national aspirations and desired prerogatives.

Nations are thus established, redefined, and reconfigured in global supranational arenas over time, where both territorial legacies and pursuits, historical legacies of transforming world economies (Rosser and Rosser 2004; Heater 2016; Lawrence 2016), cultural and political developments, and international organizational development all continue to reshape our understandings of nations (Lewis and Kanji 2009). Nations, while continuous, are therefore also evolving in nature. Accordingly, the former does not mean the exclusion of the latter as nationalism does not stop with the birth and death of states, or the creation of nations, nation-states, or stateless nations, among others (Binkowski
2016; Lawrence 2016) as so often implied by previous primoridalist, perennialist, and modernist approaches in particular (Penrose 2002; Kasier 2017).

In addition, with 90 percent of the world’s states being polyethnic, national identities understood as one’s sense of belonging to a nation (Ashmore et al. 2001) – “a feeling of recognition of ‘we’ and ‘they’ (So et al. 2012, 29) must also be examined along sociocultural and ethnic lines in the attempt to fully grasp the essence of nationalisms. While the continuity of ethnic identities may play a role in bolstering national identity (Ferdinand 2006; Leoussi 2006), these ethnic identities should however not be viewed as exclusive as claimed by prominent ethnosymbolists. Taiwan’s newly negotiated national identity as a response to Chinese and international economic and political pressures indeed displayed that national identities can mobilize along socioeconomic and political lines (Hughes 2013).

Most significantly, both old and new national identities as one of the main goals of nationalist movements (Edensor 2002; Smith 2013) can bring about new nations and nation-states, mobilize in stateless nations, and reinvigorate in pre-existing nation-states and beyond as most prominent in post-1989 Europe. Modernist assumptions, according to which nationalisms bring about nations, remain exclusionary in the face of enduring old nations like England, they point to the need to consider the role of unprecedented rapid change in Europe in the form of post-1989, and specifically, post-2015 socioeconomic, political, and sociocultural transformations on nations and respectively, nationalisms – a feature also often neglected by contemporary approaches.

Hence, national identities can converge along dimensions of cost-benefit calculations of economic, political, and social interests (Malešević 2006; 2018),
grievances pertaining thereto, and along frontiers for socially-constructed symbolic (Saxton and Bensen 2005; Aspinall 2007; Giugliano 2011) divisions that function to isolate national communities from other national, supranational, and even international peoples.

Nationalism

Ideaology, Political Project, Sociopolitical Movement, or Daily Practice? While nations constitute a necessary element in the life of nationalisms at some point in time, nationalism may precede the establishment of a nation or nation-state, and may evolve beyond its creation. Further, nationalism may emerge, continue, or periodically renew itself, with intentions to establish, re-establish, or further legitimize a state. Like that of nations, the meanings and definitions of nationalisms also remain highly debated and conflated in the social sciences. As such, over time, the concept of nationalism acquired a variety of socioeconomically, socioculturally, and politically defined meanings, of which the most used ones today include: “the process of formation, or growth, of nations; a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation; a language and symbolism of the nation; a social and political movement on behalf of the nation; and a doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular” (Smith 2010, 5).

Successively, Binkowski (2016) stated that nationalism scholarship has generally been defined along two specific domains:

1) ideology versus everyday practice, treating nationalism as a set of rules and principles as opposed to platforms of sociopolitical life; and
2) daily beliefs of the people versus elite political projects of parties.

Each of these presuppose emotional and psychological dimensions to nationalism and tie nationalism to its respective historical context, often with some degree of overlap.
in-between them. Before the dynamics and mechanisms of rising nationalism in general, and reinvigorating post-1989 European nationalism in specific can be addressed, commonly acknowledged definitions and socioeconomic, sociocultural, and political interpretations of the meanings nationalisms are discussed to help establish the grounds for the need of a more holistic, integrated approach to study the increase of nationalist phenomena in modern post-1989 Europe.

Considering nationalisms in the contexts of both pre-existing and new nations, Smith (2010) offered an ideological definition and viewed nationalism “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity, and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’”(9). Contrary to Smith who regarded nationalism rooted in pre-existing and pre-modern ethnic origins, Kohn’s (1965) claimed that nationalism is rather a state of mind binding individuals to the nation-state, embedded in supreme civic loyalty. Nonetheless, Kohn would have agreed with Smith on both ambitions for territorial attachments as elements of nationalism as well as on Smith’s differentiation of civic and ethnic nations and nationalisms. He classified Western European nationalisms within the realms of Renan’s (1882) and Rousseau’s (2001 [1762], 75) original concept of civic nations, and Eastern European nationalisms along ethnic lines.

Additionally, blurring the meanings of nationalism as a both a set of principles on one hand, and a diverse platform of sociopolitical life on the other, Kohn (1965) suggested that Western European nationalisms were based on political and civic communal relations held together by voluntary loyalty to democratic norms, while Eastern European nationalisms were organic communities united by culture and solidified
by language and descent (McGregor 2010). Auer (1997) warned that while Kohn’s contributions laid the foundations for different types of nationalisms, his exceedingly Eurocentric definition of nationalism remained too simplistic and biased, and his tendency to regard nationalism along Western and Eastern European dualistic lines attached a moralistic flaw to his contributions, though this tendency was later eagerly adopted in post-World War and post-communist nationalism literature (Calhoun 2005).

Hayes (1931), similar to Smith, also focused on nations as the origins of nationalisms. As a proponent of the ethnic tradition, he defined nationalism less ideologically along lines of ethnic kinship. Unlike Kohn (1965) who viewed loyalty as a civic duty in the legitimization of political relations, he asserted that “[l]oyalty and attachment to the interior of the group [namely land, language, and blood] are the basis of nationalism.” His ideas partially echoed earlier biological and sociobiological and culturalist primordialist views of the role of a ‘given’ national antiquity while also toying with the notion of nations and nationalisms as perennial-type continuities. Geertz (1973) suggested that

“[b]y primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’ – or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed ‘givens’ of social existence…the congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have ineffable, and at times, overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves (259).

Despite erroneously confining nations and nationalisms to a spatial and temporal dimension and territorial boundaries of the state, thus discrediting the potential of non-timeless national identities and nationalisms over time, these primoridalist and perennial approaches importantly underscored an important sociocultural feature of nationalism for modern times: that the belief in national superiority lies in national attachments as ‘given’
not because they are but because people see them as such. In his analysis of gender identities in nationalisms of former Yugoslavia, Mostov (1995) explained that due to such perceptions, nationalisms indeed often seek to “recover the unique character and purity of the nation and celebrate its ancient roots and historical continuity” (112).

It is this attachment to such historically grounded belief in nationality according to Hayes, in which individuals take pride and base social postures upon common shared paths and histories, not religion or faith. Classical theorists like Durkheim ([1897] 2018) would disagree, suggesting that religion functions as a foundation for the moral basis of civil society, with religion providing an avenue for nations to periodically renew and reinvent themselves through collective rites and ceremonies (Renan 1882). Mentioning English nationalisms as notable cases, Hastings (1997) would add that the continuity of culture, particularly Christianity, played an integral part of English nationalism guiding its daily functions throughout the nation’s history.

Kedourie (1962), along with contemporary ethnosymbolists, would further this argument stating that especially in the Middle East and Europe, nationalism has maintained a quasi-religious power in the daily beliefs of the people, with the power to break up existing nations and forming new ones, grounded in native ethnic and religious traditions (Kinvall 2004, 2007; Moaddel 2005). Through a series of in-depth case studies of Ireland, England, Poland, and Greece, Barker (2008) also asserted that in modern Europe, in particular, as states develop economically, religions can become useful in differentiating and mobilizing groups, especially when other religions represent a threat.

Having conceived nationalism within the realm of sociopolitical life, Greg Anderson (2003) further defined nationalism along historically felt and perceived ethnic
lines as “a new emerging nation [which] imagines itself to be antique” (4) in a political community. Although being among those who conflated the concept of nation, this time, with that of nationalism, he highlighted the role of print media at the time, and explained that national attachment is embedded in the usage of language which allows national comradeship to mature over time.

Language, in particular, pertinent both in popular culture and political discourse, marks national identity and cultural homogeneity, with language collectively expressing a nation’s traditions, history, religions, and principles of life (Blommaert and Verschueren 1992; Heater 2016; Berry et al. 2017). Though Anderson (1991) would disagree with Heater (2016) suggesting that nationalism is a sociopolitical platform first rather than a set of principles, along with his fellow ethnosymbolist scholars, he would not deny that nationalism indeed carries elements of historical continuity.

In addition, a common pattern in all approaches is that nationalism attempts to keep groups as homogenous as possible, for which process, intergroup communication is necessary (Hobsbawm 2012). During colonial times in the Hindi region, the colonial citizen, for instance, served as an educational ideal to absorb political ideas about equality and self-determination (Kumar 2005) through symbolic communication. Language, mass media, and the politics of education were essential to disseminate knowledge about shared histories and futures, and interest groups, with all three playing into the agenda of political elites who mobilized national sentiments into nationalist movements (Smith 2013) encouraging in-group association and outgroup rivalry (Kaufmann 1996; 2001; Hovil 2016).

Countering some of such symbolic accounts, Billig (1995) suggested that the
power of nationalism as an every-day ideological practice does not need to be extremely overt as discussed by proponents of symbolic and linguistic practices. Billig’s (1995) concept of banal nationalism discussed non-extreme form of symbolic representations of nations in every-day contexts that continue to build shared identity and desires for belonging. This rather dangerous form of nationalism (Wade 2014) is also continuous, and does not only operate in the present as critiqued by Smith (Van Ginderachter 2018). The Pledge of Allegiance in the United States, for example, displays that nationalism can be active in every-day contexts instituted by the state (Billig 1995) through the use of flags, national anthems played at in sporting events, or imagery on money (Penrose 2011).

Gellner (1983) agreed with such sociological and symbolic dimension of nationalism stating that nationalism has become a sociological necessity in the modern world. Yet, Gellner (1983) focused more on modernizing processes including industrialization and cultural modernization, and viewed nationalism primarily as a political force instead of a sociocultural one. Continuing the tradition of earlier approaches, conflating the state with the nation, Gellner (1983) insisted that nations must come before nationalisms, with congruency of the nation and politics being inalienable. Additionally, he believed that the mobilization of national identity occurs by cultural standardization, characterized by a centralized polity, both of which serve as avenues for political legitimacy and national identification with community (Eriksen 2007; May 2013).

Conceptualizing states within the division of labor, Gellner (1983) echoed a Durkheim’s classic conception of economic solidarity as an essential element of social
development. Accordingly, he defined nationalism as “a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983, 1). His approach was widely adopted by later scholarship, which has primarily focused on the formation and dispersion of nations and nation-states (Anderson 1983; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010), the creation of new states as modern establishments, or successors to preexisting ethnic groups (Calhoun 1997), and on efforts of secession to redefine their existing boundaries (Hechter 2000).

As such, Breuilly (2001) identified three main political functions of nationalisms – coordination to promote common interest between decision-making elites; mobilization to generate support for political parties and movements from groups otherwise excluded from the political decision-making process, and legitimacy to justify internal and external purposes and goals of political movements. He defined nationalism as “a political movement seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments” (32). Instrumentalist Brass (1979) would partially agree, equating nationalism to ethno-nationalisms functioning as tools for political mobilization assuming four potential forms in the elite-competition for control. Unlike sociocultural modernists and ethnosymbolists, Breuilly (2001) asserted that nationalism has little to do with historic shared pasts, cultural commonalities, ethnicity but everything to do with political motivation.

Political modernist like Gellner and Breuilly would therefore articulate the primacy of nationalism as a political event, with political motivation embedded in a set of political principles and elite political projects as opposed to ideology, a diverse platform of sociopolitical life, or daily beliefs of the people as often viewed by sociocultural
modernist and ethnosymbolist approaches, and in contemporary explanations of nationalism as a discursive formation. In his assessment of recent symbolic and political approaches, and of banal nationalism in specific, Skey (2009), however, explained that assuming the homogeneity of the public, approaching nationalist phenomenon solely from the top-down, or understanding nationalism exclusively as a historical outcome as viewed by modernists (Tambini 1996; Smith 2013), renders some of the uniquely socioeconomic, sociocultural, and political definitions and interpretations of nationalisms analytically flawed and incomplete.

This is because “[n]ational identities depend critically on the claims which people themselves make in different contexts and at different times” (Bechhofer et al. in Hester and Housley 2002, 3). Hence, in some cases, ancestry, ethnic and religious myths, symbolic politics, and elite political projects provide a way for national self-understanding and association as was seen in the various events of religious Zionism and Jewish shared past in the modern state of Israel (Gal 2007; 2010; Shelef 2010), in the case of holy nationalisms in Nigeria since the 1970s (Igwara 1995; 2001), and in the continuity and persistence of the Islamic faith in Middle Eastern nationalisms (Günther and Milich 2016). In all cases, however, they are not exclusionary, and carry some element of socioeconomic, cultural, and political grievance at different times and rates (McGarry, and O’leary 2013).

As such, Skey (2009; 2014) similar to Hroch (1995), encouraged a more holistic approach to view nationalisms as “a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships – economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographic, historical – and their subjective reflection in collective
consciousness” (Hroch 1995, 67). Reicher and Hopkins (2011) agreed, implying that understanding how, and why people choose their national identities, and how such identities shape their daily actions over time, is essential in the study of nationalism.

Subsequently, this dissertation considers meanings of nationalism within the realms of its last three earlier mentioned common usages: “the process of formation, or growth of nations; a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation; a language and symbolism of the nation; a social and political movement on behalf of the nation; and a doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular” (Smith 2010, 5). It neither restricts nationalism with the boundaries of a process only, which meanings naturally limit its scope to nations as objects of nationalisms, or nationalisms as the inherent products of nations, nor does it consider nationalism within a sentiment or consciousness uniquely, which conceptions of nationalism tend to examine nationalism the absence of symbolism, movement, or political ideology.

Indeed, linguistic and symbolic explanations, sociopolitical movements, and the ideological nature of nationalisms cannot be considered separately (Smith 2010; Özkirimli 2010). Language and symbolism do not only form intrinsic ties to culture and ethnicity encouraging a certain regularity in representation necessary within sociopolitical movements, but both underline the basic tenants of national ideology powering such movements to pursue rationally calculated or otherwise obtained national goals associated with the past, purpose, and concerns of nations and their self-proclaimed members.

Through the combination of rational and cultural, emotional and psychological,
individual and collectivist, and spatial and temporal considerations of nationalisms,

Kindermann (2006) hence defined nationalism as

> “an attitude of mind of persons and groups that attributes, among their values, the highest priority to the qualities, the well-being, success, power, and prestige of their nation and to its citizens’ loyalty to it. Particularly in a nation’s relations with other nations and states, nationalism assumes the function of social integration-ideology based on perceptions of a nation’s special identity and interests” (72).

Nationalism thus consists of emotional, cognitive, and discursive practices that extend, and institute common understandings of cultural similarities and differences of nations and nation-states as economic and political entities (Binkowski 2016) upon which individuals in a community act, with some national identities being more salient in some contexts than in others. Nationalisms indeed manifest self-proclaimed, self-conscious ideologies, which, through shared rituals and every-day practices, are separated from other ideologies (Billig 1995; Motyl 2002; Binkowski 2016) based on both material or non-material interests of the nation, nation-state, or stateless nation at a particular time, and within a particular space.

Furthermore, because linguistic and symbolic explanations, sociopolitical movements, and the ideological nature of nationalisms are closely interlinked, as Skey (2009; 2014), Guibernau (2013) and Bonkowski (2016) also claimed, nationalism cannot be merely viewed as a political domain for top-down stimulated efforts for elite-power accumulation seeking to legitimize rule over a territorially bounded body of people.

Instead, for a comprehensive understanding, nationalism as phenomena must encompass all four nationalist domains in modern global contexts – political ideology, day-to-day continuity of belief, everyday practice, and elite political projects (Binkowski 2016) – as
it requires coherence, expression, coordination, and mobilization at the level of individual membership – top-down to bottom-up, and in reverse (Reicher and Hopkins 2011; Binkowski 2016; Skey 2009).

In addition to interpretations of nationalisms as political elite projects, whilst some purely socioeconomic, sociocultural, and constructivist approaches often neglect the political connotations of nationalism in relation to territorial aspirations, and desires for political legitimacy and self-determination, explicitly rational definitions and interpretations of nationalism tend to disregard normative elements of nationalisms. The political in nationalism however cannot be ignored as it affects both the success and tenacity of nationalism, and the type of nationalisms that form in diverse contexts (Woolf 1996; Özkirimli 2010; Smith 2010; 2013).

Notably, it is the political in nationalism which differentiates it from familiar concepts often interchangeably and erroneously used with nationalism. Briefly, Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) indirectly equate nationalism with chauvinism as “a perception of national superiority and an orientation toward national dominance” (271), a definition, which due to its ambiguity, can also blur with the notion of patriotism as a deeply felt attachment to the nation. Though both of these introduce an emotionally stipulated societal dimension to understanding nationalisms, they are “fraught with analytical difficulty” (Binkowski 2016, 431).

Although nationalism, chauvinism, patriotism, and populism alike rely on attachment based on the combination of values relating to one’s homeland, including ethnic, cultural, or historical aspects (Arendt 1945), nationalism and chauvinism are exclusionary in terms of their conception of national membership and their tendency to
negatively express excessive national pride. While patriotism can be neutrally viewed in a positive sense (Poole 2007) as devotion to one’s native land, being temperate and composed (Arendt 1945), chauvinism exhibits itself in the irrational belief of national superiority and glory and acts as an extreme form of patriotism, which regards one’s outgroup as inferior and weak (Heywood 2015). Nationalism, on the other hand, is uniquely political in its connotations of self-determination and sovereignty over the homeland, oriented toward developing, maintaining, and reconfiguring national identities to create a politically independent, unified community (Nairn and Paul 2005).

Although nationalisms and its types may be characterized by chauvinism, extreme patriotism, and/or populism, the three concepts should neither be theoretically nor analytically equated to nationalism and its types. Nationalisms are therefore unique, evolutionary, and context-dependent, in some cases responding to unprecedented economic, political, and social challenges, and in others continuously developing not necessarily within particular geographic borders but rather within imagined (Anderson 1991) ones. Nationalisms are thus often unequal, multilayered, and multinational (Nimni 2010; May 2013; Wimmer 2013), and the diversity of their definitions and meanings cannot be explained with a single theory.

Types of Nationalisms. Classical nationalism sees the creation and maintenance of complete sovereignty of the state and the legitimacy of its majority ethnonational group. With a myriad of socioeconomic, sociocultural, and sociopolitical factors significant in the formation, maintenance, and reemergence – and thus salience – of national identities and respectively, nationalisms, the types of nationalisms as ideologies, sociopolitical platforms, and daily practices, should not be lumped together. In recent literature, types
of nationalisms have been expressed along civic, ethnic, ideological, and cultural lines, as well as based on scale and geographic markers (Özkirimli 2010; Smith 2010; 2013).

Post-World War I and World War II shifted academic inquiry toward nationalisms, distinguishing among a variety of types and qualities. Hayes (1931) highlighted five forms with a combination of ideological, geographic, moralistic specifiers: humanitarian, Jacobin, traditional, liberal, and integral nationalisms. He claimed that humanitarian nationalism arose from the Enlightenment period grounded in the belief of natural law as a necessity for human progress, with three varying subtypes: 1) aristocratic; 2) democratic; and 3) cultural nationalism. For Hayes (1931), democratic nationalism eventually transformed into Jacobin, aristocratic into traditional, and all other forms into liberal nationalism (Smith 2013).

Twentieth century humanitarian democratic nationalisms, including Mussolini’s Italian fascistismo or the German Nazionalsozialismus, for Hayes (1931) were characterized by: suspicion and intolerance of internal dissent; reliance on force and militarism to attain its ends; fanatic religiosity; and a missionary zeal (Hastings 2012). For him, this form of nationalism, accordingly transformed into Jacobinism, characterized by a strong central government powers and radical left-wing repressive, revolutionary politics as seen in former Soviet states. Traditional nationalism, in contrast, was aristocratic and evolutionary. Conversely, liberal nationalism originated in England, viewing nationality as a political unit to ensure citizens’ liberty. Also known as a form of civic nationalism, this type of nationalism was characterized by liberal values and a voluntary social allegiance to political procedures, later exemplified in post-World War II United States and France. Integral nationalism, in contrast, a highly illiberal and tyrannical form of
nationalism, became visible in Hungary, Poland, and former Yugoslavia at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Despite their contributions, these five forms remained too ambiguous and deeply overlapping, and consequently insufficient to differentiate among modern nationalisms critically. Fascismo under the Mussolini regime for example was highly illiberal and tyrannical and therefore some of its characteristics were that of integral nationalisms. Along the same lines, nationalisms in post-World War Poland and former Yugoslavia were characterized by suspicion and intolerance, which, according to Hayes’ own intersecting distinctions, could easily categorize these nationalisms as equally humanitarian democratic.

Wirth (1936) later highlighted four types of nationalisms referred to as hegemonic nationalism, particularistic nationalism, marginal nationalism, and the nationalism of minorities. Wirth (1936) would, for instance, argue that Hayes’ (1931) humanitarian democratic nationalism was a form of hegemonic nationalism. His notion of the four types of nationalisms created the foundations for later, more contemporary types of nationalisms including diaspora nationalisms or ‘long-distance nationalisms’ (Anderson 1991) present in the case of the Irish in the United States or the Lebanese in the Americas today.

Additionally, with the rise of nationalism attributed to political events in the West, and backwards socio-political development in Central and Eastern European nations, and in Asia, a dualistic tendency emerged in nationalism studies literature toward during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. These included contrasts between not only West and East (Björgo and Witte 1993; Gellner 1994; Billig 1995; Smith 2010) but
between the political and the cultural (Zetterholm 1994; Miller 1995; Mitchell and Russell 1996; Spencer and Wollman 2002), between the civic and the ethnic (Kellas 1991; 1998; Schwartzmantel 1991; Renan 1994; Jenkins and Sofos 1996; Weil 1996; Brubaker 1999; Spencer and Wollman 2002; Smith 2010), and between the liberal and illiberal, and voluntarist versus organic nationalisms (Spencer and Wollman 2002; Özkirimli 2010), among others.

In civic and ethnic nationalisms, as two of the most commonly distinguished types, the former relied on the active participation of the citizenry, which type of nationalism coincided with earlier notions of liberal nationalisms through the surrender of free will in exchange for political legitimacy. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, focuses on descent and some elements of historical continuity (Gladney 1996; Barbour and Carmicheal 2000). Today, nonetheless, the two types become blurred through state nationalism, recognized as a variant of civic nationalism, often consisting of ethnic elements.

Would then Basque and Corsican separatists refer to Spain and France as state nationalisms, while to their own as ethnonationalisms? Some scholars include Muro (2014) and Smith (2010) would most likely concur, while others including (Payne 2000; Núñez 2001; Keating 2001) would deviate, categorizing such nationalist focus on the maintenance of the strength of the state as either stateless nationalism instead in the cases like that of the Basques claims for independence in Spain, or Kurdish struggles for independence in Turkey.

The debates on the different types of nationalisms do not end here. Liberal nationalism has been bolstered by scholars with hopes for non-xenophobic nationalisms
that are compatible with values of freedom, tolerance, and equality (Tamir 1993; Miller 1995). This tradition often defends the value of national identity, though Patten (1999) and Abizadeh (2002; 2004) would argue otherwise, stating that nationalism as an exclusionary phenomenon, by nature, cannot be liberal. Romantic nationalism, in contrast, is considered a natural expression of the existence of historical ethnic culture, from which the state derives political legitimacy, whereas cultural nationalism is defined along the lines of a shared culture.

Moreover, nationalism can carry chauvinist undertones, with beliefs in national superiority to the extreme through prejudice and hostility toward an out-group considered weak and inferior. Such a dimension of nationalism is emerging across the EU’s supranational structure, exhibited in ideological campaigns against Muslim minorities, ingroup communication, and legislation of a new fear against the Islamic faith (Werbner 2005; Sheehi 2011; Awan 2014) amidst national political struggles for autonomy, self-determination, and sovereignty. When triggered politically top-down, populist versions of nationalisms – visible through the Hungarian ‘Victator’ s’ populist, anti-migrant, and anti-Soros propaganda – may additionally juxtapose the integrity of ordinary citizens against the establishment and elite accused of celebrating the interests of out-groups such as foreign nationals and migrants above the interests of the national population.

With conceptualizations of economic nationalisms (Baughn and Yaprak 1996; Helliener 2002; Chandra 2004) and religious nationalisms often explained as reactions to previous socioeconomic, sociocultural, and political systems, the list of scholarly distinctions between the various types of nationalisms is seemingly never-ending. The vast body of work in this realm, displays that nationalism is a complex phenomenon
globally. In the case of European nationalisms, each of these types of nationalisms merit attention, yet none can be employed universally.

Just as socioeconomic, sociocultural, and political definitions and explanations of the rise of European nationalisms, the several types of nationalisms cannot be quarantined. Scholarly attempts to categorize unique nationalisms into umbrella groupings, and mark them along merely ideological, geographic, economic, cultural, or moralistic outliners among others, could defeat the purpose of truly understanding the type of nationalism at hand. The following section of this literature review will address the multidimensionality of nationalism to demonstrate that similar to the definitions, meanings, and types of nationalisms, mechanisms of nationalisms, especially in modern Europe, should be approached with caution and respect for both top-down and bottom-up factors, and their close interplay within increasingly global yet all but uniform socioeconomic, sociocultural, and political contexts.

The Rise of Nationalism

*Filling the Void*

Why do nationalisms *rise* and *reinvigorate*? Nationalisms, though unique, evolutionary, and context-dependent, are historically grounded and often territorially imagined. In the case of new nations, nation-states, and stateless nationalisms alike, nationalisms become continuous once they emerge, although their forms and level of intensity may change to adjust to the specific economic, social, and political environments, in which they attempt to homogenize people into large group solidarity (Renan 1882) in some cases from the top-down, in others, from the bottom-up, or in others, mutually. Nevertheless, nationalisms – whether functioning as linguistic or
symbolic every-day struggles, sociopolitical platforms, or ideological or sociopolitical movements – rely on concrete, or emotionally and psychologically perceived voids that need to be eliminated or filled to ensure a sense of communal security and survival (Papic 1994; Eriksen 2007).

Such void – economic, ideological, political, or cultural, among others (Duany 2000; Gries 2004), carries political connotations of desires for territorial sovereignty, political legitimacy, and self-determination, on which the very tenants of nationalisms are based. Calhoun (2007) specifically stated that modern, twenty-first century “nationalism helps locate an experience of belonging in a world of global flows and fears” (6). As states and countries increasingly rely on global financial systems, governance structures, and legal systems, their autonomy is increasingly threatened by growing perceptions of nationalisms in global circles as illiberal preference for one’s own national culture (Calhoun 2007). Hence, nationalisms continuously endorse identity struggles within state borders and beyond against economic, political, and cultural voids of integration and changes in the global landscape, inevitably dichotomizing individual identities – national and other – into ‘us’ versus ‘them’ (Hervik 2004) internationally, regionally, and even nationally.

Economic Insecurities. Classical accounts of the economic and socioeconomic factors behind the rise of nationalism have been most prominent in the works of Durkheim, Weber, and Karl Marx. Their works did not only discuss the origin of nations from a socioeconomic perspective but influenced modern theories and explanations of the causes of nationalism. Like Marx, Durkheim ([1893] 1986) emphasized the division of labor necessary for the cohesion of societies, though Marx viewed the division of labor in
a negative light and as the cause for the disappearance of nationalisms in a cosmopolitan world order. In their analysis of African rubber workers on plantations in Putuyamo at the hands of European settlers, Luxembourg and Fernandez (2003) found that antagonistic class identities formed along socioeconomic lines rather than national and cultural ones. While their findings were limited within the context of specific socialist political circumstances (Löwy 1998; Özkirimli 2010), they highlighted communal will-formation as a response to socioeconomic alienation – a focal argument in Marxist claims.

Durkheim ([1893] 1986), on the other hand, suggested that with modernization and industrialization, labor became increasingly specialized in a state of ‘mechanical solidarity’, which created a platform for shared cohesion based on similarities and commonalities of workers. When replaced by ‘organic solidarity’, such social cohesion became impersonal based on individuals’ dependence on each other for survival in a more complex world, ultimately leading to sense of lost connection or void between them. Durkheim asserted that “two consciousness exist within us: the one that comprises only states that are personal to each one of us, characteristic of us as individuals, whilst the other comprises states that are common to the whole society” ([1893] 1986, 84). He thus introduced the notion of ‘collective effervescence’ to explain how communal sentiments intensify and amplify human experience, particularly in situations, in which “we become susceptible to feelings and actions of which we are incapable on our own (Durkheim [1912] 1965, 157). To him, such collective euphoria served to solidify social bonds in times of uncertainty or insecurity, with social mobilization as both a product and factor in collective effervescence and consciousness as a response to a sense of meaningfulness and injustice (anomie).
Due to his belief that social order has to be fairly stable and consistent, characterized by equal opportunity and an anticipated future (Durkheim [1897] 1951), a Durkheimian theory of nationalism today would likely stem from the combination of Marxist notions of economic alienation by both the elite and international institutions, with a Durkhemian collective effervescence and anomie relevant in times of economic uncertainty or insecurity in the face of global and European integration. Uniquely cosmopolitan Marxist theories of disappearing nationalisms rooted in class struggles and alienation would not withstand “universalist assaults on nationalisms” (Lind 1994, 88) because struggles of nationalisms in general, and post-1989 European nationalisms in specific, are also expressions of desires of sovereignty and territory, and thus increased political legitimacy rather than solely that of class.

Olson (1965), a rationalist, believed that all motivations are first individualistic and suggested that individuals, even in large-group solidarity, act based on rational cost-benefit calculations, rather than sentiment, loyalty, or a sense of belonging. Echoing portions of earlier sociobiological primordialist notions, according to which individuals are rational calculators to ensure their groups’ biological survival, Weber (1968) argued that groups therefore are ought to be viewed as collective associations to achieve one’s will and distinctive interests. For Weber (1965), differences in wages resulted in differing material conditions and therefore, social collective action.

His rather rational explanation was seconded by Appelrouth and Edles (2010) who stated that “antagonisms among property-less groups can be based on rational motives rather than false consciousness” (155). In the process of rationalization, according to Weber (1904; 1930), social institutions become increasingly governed by
methodical procedures and calculable rules, with ascetic ideals carried over into affairs of economic activity creating an ‘iron cage’ with little room for escape (Appelrouth and Edles 2010). In this iron cage, the combination of bureaucratic organization and the dominance of capitalism would lead to collective action, with status honor being a far more significant catalyst for social action than class distinctions or one’s relation to markets.

These classic theories vary in their relevancy to modern post-1989 European nationalisms and its types. Marx and Weber agreed that economic factors are integral to understanding social order, though Weber regarded Marx’s reductionist concept of a single economic cause, too simplistic. In the case of nationalism, Weber offers a more plausible explanation as nationalism is a product of several factors both within, and apart from the economic realm. The linkage between Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, as it pertains to the notion of alienation and anomie is focal to the discussion of nationalism in general, and European nationalism in particular, as it juxtaposes national identities with the confines of the European community in which, by Weber’s accounts in particular, many nations increasingly see themselves as economically, politically, and culturally imprisoned. As such, Thorlindsson and Bernburg (2004) claimed that these classical ideas of socioeconomically collectivized lives are not merely psychological but exist alongside structural properties with norms, values, and social relationships placing constraints on individuals in their economic environments.

Effects of Globalization

Neo-Marxist and socioeconomic modernists also stress economic factors, through from a slightly separate angle, including industrial capitalism, regional inequalities, and
class conflict as main causes behind rising and re-emerging nationalisms as forces, with which national communities are ill-prepared to cope. Nairn (1977), as a modernist, claimed that the rapid implementation of capitalism resulted in an anti-imperialist form of a morally justifiable nationalism across post-World War II Europe. The rise of nationalism, for Nairn, is also not entirely internal to society, and is embedded in the ‘uneven development of the world economy’ (Özkirimli 2010), particularly between Western states that were able to accumulate capital, while other non-Western states lagged behind (Kohli 2004; Rosser and Rosser 2004). Hechter (1975; 2000) would have agreed, and subsequently claimed that ‘internal colonialism’ – the result of unequal exchange within the territories of a given state, the free play of market forces, or unintended distributional consequences within regions – not historical cultural ties would lead to the rise of nationalism.

Özkirimli (2010) noted that neo-Marxist and socioeconomic modernist discussions were limited as they only explained the rise of nationalisms within the contexts of peripheral economies in the times of colonial dependence, which automatically weakened their explanatory power within pre-colonial and post-colonial, regionally complex settings. They do not universally apply over time given that Catalonia and the Basque country, for instance, have remained among the most prosperous regions of the world, they must consider economies in industrialized and post-industrialized modern 21st century contexts. Additionally, Scotland was also economically developed within the British context, serving as innovators in the realms of education, finance, technology, and the social sciences (Stone and Trencher 2001). In addition, the Magyars, whose nationalism developed as a response to oppressive rule by the Habsburgs, were not
backwards or an exploited group at the time (Breuilly 2001).

As their classical predecessors, modernist socioeconomic approaches in general thus cannot fully explain forces behind post-1989 and resurfacing European nationalisms, especially because they often postdate European nationalisms which preceded colonial rule (Breuilly 2001), and they limit their conceptions of nations as historical novelties brought about by nationalism and not the other way around. Nonetheless, Hechter’s (1975; 2000) modernist paradigms similar to classical socioeconomic approaches, underscored the significance of economic inequalities between individuals as patterns of collective oppression that carry a heavy societal element especially during periods of economic uncertainty.

Accordingly, in modern post-1989 European contexts, neo-Marxist and socioeconomic modernists would likely argue that when objective peripheral differences within a nation are superimposed on economic inequalities within them, they lead to ‘uneven development’ and cultural divisions of labor, which impedes the chances for successful regional economic integration foreseen by the European economic community. Although neo-Marxist and modernist explanations were made within anti-imperialist and anti-colonial historical contexts, their considerations of increasing nationalist responses to rapid or unprecedented socioeconomic transformations in the European arena, should not be ignored in modern settings. Regionally, the notion that socioeconomic livelihood of the individual can be calculated as a benefit to mitigate or entirely eliminate costs of communal vulnerability does apply to the economic grievances felt by Eastern countries versus Western ones throughout the process of European integration and in the face of international competition (Held et al. 2001; Sokol 2001), as well as by Southern countries
versus Northern countries in the aftermath of their post-2008 economic collapse (Kohli 2014).

Subsequently, Suriyadinata (2000) explained that challenges of globalization have intensified since the 1990s worldwide, with decreasing national boundaries and transforming ideologies having significant implications on national identities and nationalisms. The impact of globalization has not been identical in all nation-states over the years, leading to varying degrees of success and a wide range of economic systems ranging from highly developed social marker economies in countries like Germany, export-oriented mixed economies like Sweden’s, socialist market economies like China’s (Gregory and Stuart 2004; Rosser and Rosser 2004), and developing mixed-economies like that of India (Sumit 2011) to name a few.

Due to costs of the Cold War, in particular, Central European and Eastern European countries lagged behind. Economic transitions of former Soviet republics inevitably took divergent paths. For example, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Poland managed to adapt reasonably quickly post-1989, while Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine were struggling to catch up to Western European market capitalist systems (Rosser and Rosser 2004). Although in 2004, ten former communist countries joined the EU in its largest expansion with hopes to enjoy Eurozone benefits along with their Western members, the 2008 European sovereign debt crisis and its immediate aftermath has affected all European economies.

Roubini (2014) therefore stated that while historic differences matter, it is Europe’s latest economic recovery manifested by trade barriers, asset protection, and anti-immigration measures (Roubini 2014) that opened the door for recent resurges of
nationalisms. Lan and Li (2014) specifically found that a country’s openness to trade directly indicated its level of nationalism as lower levels of openness toward trade and greater levels of reactions against foreign direct investments implied greater lineage toward protectionism and preference of domestic material interests, thus economic nationalism. Alesina and Spolaore (2005) added that trade openness is in direct relationship with size of a country, with larger countries generally benefitting more from trade than smaller ones.

**National Unemployment and Income Inequality**

Roubini (2014) further claimed that such backlash against globalization is visible in both national governmental and public resistance against supranational governance institutions including The United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Union (EU), in the rise of populist parties, and even in restrictions to press and social media freedoms globally as seen in China or Russia. Roubini (2014) added that economic insecurity rooted in wealth and income inequalities for the working and middle class is the gravest in Europe though economic insecurities are also relevant in the United States, where the rising extreme right and Tea Party factions of the Republican Party are gaining strength due to threats by immigration and global trade felt

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3 The Eurozone is one of the largest economic regions of the world consisting of 19 European Union (EU) countries – Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain – that have fully adopted the euro as their national currency. The Maastricht Treaty aimed at creating a common economic and monetary union, with a central banking system (the European Central Bank (ECB)) and currency (euro). This economic policy is yet to be realized across all EU member states.

4 The European sovereign debt crisis began 2008 with the collapse of Iceland’s banking system, then spreading to Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain in 2009. The crisis led to the collapse of financial institutions, government debt, and increasing Euroscepticism and distrust in European institutions among members of the European Community.
by a vast portion of the population, especially in the country’s rural, and economically weakest regions (Castle 2009).

Similarly, Mughan et al. (2003) claimed that economic insecurities associated with job insecurity and low levels of employment attributed to deepening international economic integration, also expressed in the political discourse by populist party leaders, have resonated particularly well with the masses as bases for nationalist tendencies. In contrast, Solt (2011) suggested that states, in specific, often mobilize nationalisms with goals to divert public attention away from economic grievances. Kohl and Farthing (2012) nonetheless echoed a Durkheimian collective effervescence and anomie to conclude that the recognition of the gap between material and imagined benefits, particularly increases both the likelihood and intensity of sociopolitical, including nationalist movements.

Han (2013) further articulated that income inequality increases the national pride of individuals with low income, particularly in countries where the lower class consists of many immigrants. His findings suggested a link between income inequality, income levels, and nationalism, with the relevance of social catalysts such as levels of migration and imagined insecurities pertaining thereto. Contextualized discussions of European, North American, and Chinese deindustrialization further displayed mass migration (Winlow and Hall 2013), the depletion of resources, and systemic financial and monetary failures (Heinberg 2011) as economic factors that disrupt economic growth and thus, rearrange social orders and motivations within national boundaries due to rising inequalities (Dorling 2014; Therbon 2014).
The prominent argument that greater economic inequality and low levels of national unemployment rates prompt both Euroscepticism and, in turn, more nationalism therefore seems to hold true (Kuhn 2011; Hobolt and De Vries 2016), at least partially. In post-1989 European contexts, socioeconomic transformations have indeed superimposed national differences on economic inequalities, leading to not only a cultural but international divisions of labor, posing challenges to both economic as well as European political and social integration.

Rising post-1989 European nationalism as socioeconomic phenomena must therefore be examined due to economic insecurities triggered by the degree of globalization, income inequality, low levels of employment, particularly at times of mass migrations and other socioeconomic transformations including post-1989 economic integration or the 2008 European sovereign debt crisis. The notion that socioeconomic livelihood of the individual is calculated as a benefit to mitigate or entirely eliminate costs of communal vulnerability is indeed relevant globally, and thus inevitably on the European continent of “hollow freedoms, insecurity, and panoramic dissatisfaction” (Winlow et al. 2017, 2).

*Emigration, Immigration, and Euroscepticism*

These economic insecurities would hence imply that rational national actors would side with their national group despite economic insecurities plaguing it, responding to such grievances with increased nationalism. But do rational actors as selfish maximizers of interests decide to leave their ethnic or national groups to emigrate if it is more advantageous for them to do so? On one hand, Millennial European voters were known for their open-mindedness and highly globalist attitudes in the past decade,
in May of 2015 a shift occurred, with the youth having become key players in nationalist movements across the continent. Howe (2015) explains in *Forbes* that Le Pen “won votes of 25 percent of 18 to 24 year olds…and Eurosceptic parties were most popular among the under 30-year old crowd.” Already in the early 2000s, high youth unemployment rates resulted in high levels of student political activism and populist nationalist waves in most Southern Europe and across the Mediterranean (Vasagar 2013; de Caso Villar 2014).

Though specific measures of economic, social, and cultural deprivation remain contested by scholars in this arena (Kurt 1999), in their study of relative deprivation in Quebec’s quest for national independence, (Guimond and Dubé-Simard 1983) nonetheless underscored that economic, social, and cultural discontent regarding the gap between expectations and realities of what one believes they are entitled to, leads to intensified political activism (Kawakami and Dion 1995; Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013), often in the form of nationalisms. Student political activism as a catalyst of nationalism is seen in contemporary China’s intensified anti-imperialist nationalist youth movements (He 2007; Boren 2013).

Anti-EU sentiments, coupled with economic insecurities tied to job security, and youth unemployment specifically, have subsequently prompted negative net migration rates in 18 out of 40 countries, with 40 percent of Portuguese Millennials indicating that they would emigrate due to lack of employment in their homelands (United Nations Population Division 2016). The net emigration rates from OECD[^5] countries were countries during the 1990 and 2000 were greater among the university-educated than among the less-educated (Docquier et al. 2014; World Economic Forum 2014) segments.
of the population, a trend which continues in the EU today. Elsner (2013) claimed that with the EU enlargement in 2004, 1.2 million workers from Eastern European countries emigrated to the UK and Ireland in the pursuit of more income equality.

However, what emigration is to a sending country, means immigration to a receiving one. Because the European continent and its European citizens generally move West (Black et al. 2010), with recent influxes of migrant and refugee populations from beyond European borders having joined in with this trend, pressures of emigration and immigration on the rise of the recent European nationalist waves should be considered together as potential catalysts. The lack of empirical analysis on the effects of emigration on the increase of nationalisms are scarce compared to that of immigration. Nonetheless, while the level of student political activism indicates higher levels of nationalism rooted in economic grievances pertaining to income inequality and youth unemployment, the levels of emigration could have opposite effects in sending countries versus receiving ones (Thaut 2009; Black et al. 2010).

Thaut (2009) indeed found that higher levels of emigration could alleviate pressures of sending countries – in this case Central and Eastern European domestic economies – and consequent socioeconomic public demands. Still, the possibility of political pressures from above to divert attention from economic hardships as a top-down approach to bolster nationalism in these countries, should not be excluded as a possibility due to the rise of both radical right and left parties across the continent, with the latter

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5 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, established in 1961, is an intergovernmental organization that promotes economic development and world trade with 36 members committed to democracy and market capitalism. Its members include mostly European nation-states with the exception of the United States and Canada.
particularly opposing European integration on the bases of economic insecurities rooted in the neoliberal nature of the EU (DeVries and Edwards 2009).

Pogge’s (2003) diversionary theory suggesting a certain political elite diversion of the attention of the public away from economic inequalities through nationalism thus minimizes the likelihood of social protest against national economic circumstances. Hungarian ‘Victator’s’ unhinged populist, anti-migrant, and anti-Soros propaganda as mentioned earlier is a fitting example. Though Docquier and Marfuk (2006) and Borjas et al. (2012) counter such narratives and state that the arrival of migrant populations does not hurt wages and employment prospects, recent anti-migration policies have been carried out (Geiger and Pécoud 2010), along with post-2008 popular resentment against Syrian refugees and Middle Eastern, African, and even Eastern European migrants has been reiterated from the top-down and embraced by the bottom-up, stirring up both national sentiments and new flow of European emigration with Greeks and Italians with destinations to Germany and Australia, the Portuguese to Brazil, among others (Castles et al. 2009).

In addition to income inequality, unemployment, general Euroscepticism rooted in economic deprivation, mass migration and emigration thus both deserve scholarly attention in terms of their relation to nationalism (Özden and Parsons 2014). They both changed the face of the European continent (Castles et al. 2009; Collier 2013), in some cases, exacerbating nationalism directly, in others, playing a significant role in its rise and resurgence. Socioeconomic factors thus matter for post-1989 European nationalism, yet their salience differs based on the historical contexts in which they operate. Canada and its 1990s reconfiguration of a new Quebec nationalism emerged from newly-surfaced
economic parameters favoring the growth of the private sector and a greater North American economic integration at the time (Rocher 2002; Béland and Lecours 2006).

In contrast, although economic factors played a significant role in the migration process of rural Jewish populations to Israel, historical symbols of traditional Zionism also were substantial (Boum 2009) in the rise of both ethnonationalism and economic rationalism (Cohen 2009) in contemporary Israeli statehood. Lastly, while the rise of Kurdish nationalism was the result of lower levels of Kurdish economic integration in Turkey, it displayed that economic insecurities may emerge along various – including linguistic, cultural, and/or ethnic – dimensions, and could be both material and non-material in nature (Cagaptay 2006).

Thus, while nationalisms operate against global forces, globalization is an ongoing process that is multi-causal in nature, and is neither fixed within socioeconomic boundaries, nor within time and space (Kindermann 2006). Rational choice theories alone, however, have limited explanatory value on their own, given that economic insecurities extend beyond rationality into the emotional, psychological, and with it, into the socioeconomic and sociopolitical platforms of every-day life. Thus, while the socioeconomic dimension of nationalism may be taken out of the political, its political dimension cannot be taken out of neither the socioeconomic nor the sociocultural. Hix and Noury (2007) would have agreed, pointing for instance to left-right preference of EU legislators being stronger determinants of policy outcomes on migration issues than economic predictors including economic interests or political preferences of member states uniquely.

In sum, although earlier introduced umbrella concepts of uneven development
(Nairn 1979), cultural divisions of labor (Hechter 1985), and internal colonialism can be interpreted within modern-day economic environments, Özkirimli (2010) warned that merely material interest-based rationality is therefore insufficient to explain the rise of nationalisms, especially in economically, politically, and socially complex European settings. Indeed, non-material motivators of such as aspirations for national sovereignty or stronger feelings of self-determination, and the rise of racist, xenophobic, and extreme nationalistic practices in Europe (Guiraudon 1998; Ireland 1995; Hysmans 2000) therefore call for the reexamination of economic insecurities as both direct or indirect catalysts of increasing European nationalisms but not without caution. Individual and collective national interests are also dependent on the particular context, culture, social location, and historical period, with fluid yet continuous socially constructed ethnic and national identities (Stefanovic 2007). These, in some cases mobilize to mitigate economic woes, while in others, they exploit them in the pursuit of other national material or non-material gains.

While economic conditions are thus not the sole determinants of nationalisms, their goals (material and non-material alike) remain important (Lecours 2010). The degrees of globalization in terms of trade openness and immigration, along with income inequality and national unemployment, as well as emigration, Euroscepticism, and youth mobilization as responses to economic uncertainty, have been found particularly salient in the realm of economic insecurities. Their greater role as conditions for the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms, will be explored analytically in the subsequent chapter alongside societal and political determinants later discussed in this chapter.
Societal Fears. Nationalism – old or young, mobilized by a variety of criteria, is embedded in a sense of “choseness and mission” (Smith 2010, 125). The bases for such national uniqueness in sociocultural explanations lies the belief that linguistic, ethnic, religious ties bond individuals together by either congruities of blood, culture, or both. Primordialists pointed to historical antiquities, perennials to historical continuities, and ethnosymbolist and more contemporary approaches have generally explored the roles of ethnicity, race, gender, and nationalism as a discursive formation to explain the rise of nationalism as a socially constructed and practiced ideology, sociopolitical movement, and platform of every-day life (Woolf 1996; Spencer and Wollmann 2002; Özkirimli 2010; Smith 2010; 2013).

For primordialists, nations are fixed and exist independently of time and space, with the assumption that self-conscious human beings existed for over a thousand years. Modernists, on the other hand believed that before modernization and industrialization, mass shared consciousness was non-existent. Ethnosymbolists and contemporary approaches found both of these scholarly advances problematic (Cordell 2015), articulating not only a continuity between dynastic to nation-state transitions but that construction of modern national identities allowed for nationalisms to invent and reinvent themselves time and time again (Hobsbawm 1990; 2012) in Europe and elsewhere.

Drawing on the power of nationalisms as an action-driven phenomena, through a predominantly sociocultural lens, Hroch (1996) explained that its origins develop as linguistic and ethnic demands rather than socioeconomic ones, for social or political change in one of three ways:
“1) a social and/or political crisis of the old order, accompanied by new
tensions and horizons
2) the emergence of discontent among significant elements of the population;
3) the loss of faith in traditional moral systems, above all, a decline in
religious legitimacy, even if this affected only small numbers of
intellectuals” (Hroch 1993, 10).

This dissertation suggests that whilst not necessarily always as sociocultural, or
exclusively linguistic or ethnic demands, in post-1989 European environments at least
one of these ways is an identifiable sociocultural circumstance. As exemplary cases,
Holmes (1997) viewed post-Communist era for nationalist liberation struggles which
facilitated the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), former Yugoslavia, and
Czechoslovakia. Jajecznik (2015) added that conceptions of change, challenges to post-
1989 ruling parties and ideologies, and young leaders using social communication
channels led to the revival of different types of nationalisms in Poland, with the most
recent one characterized by anti-EU Polish sentiments toward member state
collaboration, and an overall negative party positioning toward the European Community
and Union.

Accordingly, Jajecznik (2015) warned that each case of nationalism is unique
with sociocultural elements often interacting with economic and political ones. As such,
resurging Hungary and Slovakia today differ from their Polish counterpart, as they
combine populism with extreme right features with anti-governmental attitudes and
promotions for authoritarian traditions from before 1945, all whilst campaigning on anti-
Roma sentiments (Kluknavská 2012; Varga 2014). Despite their uniqueness determined
by their own political systems and political and economic status in the EU, resurging
Central and Eastern European nationalisms all carry tones of animosity against the
establishment.
Markedly, post-1989 transformations and large-scale, migration flows in the past decades into Western European states, including the most recent European influx of migrants and refugees, and the sub-state reemergence of nationalisms like seen in the United Kingdom and Spain, continue to juxtapose moral goals of the state against economic, political, and sociocultural realities. Parallel to how in the 1990s, post-communist states had to abandon their prior national platforms, politically engaged citizens of Western Europe today are also forced to re-evaluate their norms, practices, and positions in regards to their nation-states and national identities within and beyond their borders (Jajecznik and Cordell 2015).

As a modernist, Gellner (1983) claimed that “high culture pervades the whole of society, defines it, and needs to be sustained by the polity” (18). His approach, echoing classical messages by Durkheim and Weber, underlined that culture thus exists in order to provide structure, and determining the role and legitimacy of political units. For Gellner (1983), socioeconomic and cultural factors thus interacted, with industrialization as a circumstantial necessity for the rise nationalisms. His critiques maintained that Gellner’s account remains vastly material in nature and is limited beyond contexts of industrialization, where nationalism rose in German-speaking lands with hardly any industrialization (Kedourie 1994), in the British Isles preceding industrialization by 150 to 200 years (Kedrourie 1985), and in the nineteenth-century Balkans, specifically in Greece, where industrialization was not yet making its mark (Mouzelis 2007; Minogue 2001).

As such, Gellner’s critiques consequently argued that industrialization could be one of the preconditions of nationalisms not their starting point (Hroch 2006). They
added that Gellner thus remained reductionist in his accounts of the political motivations producing nationalism, and most importantly, neglected the power of identities in his conceptualizations of high culture (Minogue 1996; O’Leary 1996). In socioeconomic, sociocultural, and political settings alike the ‘sense of identity’ (Smith 2010), or ‘sense of national identity’ (Anderson 1991) as one of the main goals of nationalist movements, along with national autonomy and unity – which individuals seek to create, preserve, or willing to die for (Smith 2009; 2010), is therefore essential to understand both material and non-material motivators behind the continuous creation, reproduction, and reinterpretations of members of a national community.

Hence, nationalisms emerge, re-emerge, and intensify over time over the continent, providing a platform for new identities that evolve in response to a loss of previous economic, political, or societal references (Hall 1995), and thus a cultural landscape for economic and political power interactions. Although this thought rings bells of earlier modernist theses of rising nationalism, in contrast to modernist assumptions, it views national consciousness as existent before significant periods of historic change in the case of older nationalities, and persistent, though such national consciousness may be dormant or even banal (Billig 1995) at times when its extreme expression is not indispensable.

Arguably, the power of nationalism hence, at least to some extent, lies in its adaptability to changing times through the reliance and reinvigoration of individual and collective consciousness through historic, linguistic, and other sociocultural bonds as needed. Presently, in Canada, Belgium, Britain, Spain, and Italy, subnational bodies are seeking autonomy, while in other cases, regional economies and languages are seeking
independence. Quebec, Flemish Belgium, Scotland, and Norther Ireland seek to claim special status as well, with some of the countries citizens favoring complete secession, while Mexico struggles with insurgency in Chiapas. These examples display that

“demand for national self-determination is usually represented as one for liberty. Nevertheless, national self-determination is by no means identical with political liberty. It does not necessarily imply a democratic regime, but merely a freedom from foreign interference” (Herz 1951, 240).

Despite of his reductionist modernist approach to the rise of nationalism, Gellner’s (1983) notion of the conflictual nature of nation-states as both historically and economically bonded group of people to a modern polity, and populations spanning borders while retaining allegiances and attachments to their nations (Özkirimli 2010), deserves credit in contemporary global, and European settings. Its political nature, is indeed unalienable from nationalist phenomena as it continues to tie sociocultural demands to economic and political ones, having tormented efforts of eighteenth and nineteenth century European unification, post-World War economic, political, and cultural developments, and today, post-1989 European integration.

In such process, through a top-down approach, Guibernau (2004) thus pointed to national identities as pursued strategies by states to homogenize members of national communities through: the portrayal of a common image of the common history, culture, and demarcated territory of the dominant national or ethnic group; creation and dissemination of symbols reinforcing a sense of community; the enactment of civil, legal, and socioeconomic rights and rules favoring one group while excluding another; creation of common enemies – present, potential, or invented; and progressive consolidation of educational and media systems. Accordingly, the European continent, where both right –
and left-wing political elites are currently pursuing such strategies of cultural homogenization and standardization (Kraus 2000), serves as a battleground for identities, with competing national, regional, identity-related challenges posed by globalization, identity mixes, and hybrid identities due to border populations and migrants (Kolhi 2000).

*Fear of the Loss of National Identity*

The construction of social identities and realities is therefore relevant in discussions of nationalisms as the bases for nationalist mobilization. The criminalization of migrant, ethnic, and minority communities in popular political and media discourse as seen throughout history, and presently in the case of racial, ethnic, or religious criminalization of migrants across Europe (Melossi 2003; 2012; Palidda et al. 2009; Palidda 2017), the dehumanization of migrants and refugees (Esses et al. 2013), categorizations of the ‘deserving’ refugee and ‘undeserving’ migrant (Holmes and Castañeda 2016), and categorizations of the ‘criminal Gypsy’ in several Eastern European countries (Smuk 2015), are just a few examples to display not only the ongoing struggle of national identities against collective European ones but also the role of sentimental, exclusionary associations as the bases for nationalist phenomena, not explicable in merely material terms.

Skey (2009), as a prominent critique of Billig’s (1995) banal nationalism thesis, would likely suggest that these extreme discursive and symbolic expressions underlining the formation of nationalities and nationalisms are certainly not hidden, and deserve attention within contexts of changing economic, political, and cultural landscapes and in people’s every-day practices. Especially, as globalization in general, and European
integration efforts in particular intensify, identities become hybrid, multiple, and multilayered (Kohli 2000; Straubhaar 2008; Vandenbroeck et al. 2009), hybrid collective (Eder 2009), and increasingly symbolic and optional (Hall 1993; Eriksen 1993). As such, national identities expand and evolve, providing cultural platforms for domestication and clasping into popular and daily national cultures (Edensor 2002).

Scholars have repeatedly found that for successful nationalisms and homogenization of identities, intergroup communication is necessary, which is usually achieved through mass education and communication (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; 2012; Anderson 1991; 2006; Smith 2013). Post-War Bosnia-Herzegovina’s decentralized education system, in many ways, further segregated competing visions of Bosnian identity. Its educational practices constituted a societal security dilemma stipulated by a mono-ethnic curriculum and linguistic symbolism, continues to threatens Bosnian Muslim, Croat, and Serb identities within an already ethno-religiously and ethno-linguistically fractionalized state (Swimelar 2013).

The Bosnian national example demonstrates the complicated nature of identity-based competition in the larger twenty-first century European arena, where exclusionary practices against states, national groups, ethnic and linguistic minorities continue to occur in complex, economically and socio-politically unequal environments (Fligstein et al. 2012; Wedel 2015). National identities and their forms – linguistic, religious, ethnic, or other – and any sense of the loss thereof (Johnston et al. 1994), as was seen in the constructed identities in ethnic nationalisms in Russia’s republics (Giuliano 2011) and collective German identity mobilization post-1989 (Pfaff 1996), are therefore key in the
creation and maintenance of constructed and embraced grievances that prompt individual attachments and loyalty to national communities.

Through the examples of territorial minority languages in Great Britain and Ireland and dominant languages spoken in mainland Greece in the 1820s, Barbour and Carmichael (2000) specified linguistic differences as catalysts behind the rise of nationalisms. Further, Conversi (2000) cited the example of Basque and Catalan nationalisms to argue that the inclusive character of language (Irvine and Gal 2009), ethnic languages in particular, rather than other values provide better indicators of national mobilization in democratic states, especially when the particular language is spoken, or understood by the majority of the population.

In addition, Hilton and Liu (2017) established that socially shared symbols of history have been particularly significant in the in creating, maintaining, and changing national, including ethnic identities, social comparisons between them, and thus in maintaining the stability of the social order. Echoing an Andersonian message of the significance of print media, the presence of media acts as a social crystallizer for national group association and expression (Mabry 2015; Hajj 2017).

Press and Civil Freedoms

In their studies of nationalist and ethnic conflicts, Snyder and Ballentine (1996) underscored that the manipulation of such media messages in the marketplace of ideas, is highly significant. Although during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries nationalism as phenomena proved adaptable to liberalism, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, its evolution resulted in it growing increasingly mass-oriented, ideological, and doctrinal (Donskis 2003). Accordingly, the success of national agitation of the local press as both a
symbolic and sociopolitical platform for nationalism, is in direct relation with the laws imposed on it (Twumasi 1974; Fischer-Tiné 2007). Further, free association and the freedom of the press function as direct effects of state nationalisms (Kymlicka and Straehle 1999), as was relevant post-1990 Romania, where Nicolae Ceaușescu manipulated classic national symbols of the right, a trend that continues in present-day Romania as a power-driven legitimacy-seeking technique to entice nationalism by politicians who are hesitant to share sovereignty with transnational organizations and institutions (Gallagher 2001; Lewis and Kanji 2009).

Critiques nonetheless warned that the nature of multinational pressures, like the ones emerging due to European economic and political complexity, must be considered as intervening challenges in process of national rights manipulation (Grégoire 2018). Still, events such as the denial of the rights of the Oromo minority during Ethiopian colonialism, several efforts of attacks to the free press (World Press Freedom Index 2018), and increasing number of migration control policies, and alleged human rights violations in Catalonia excused by Amnesty International suggest that the decrease in press freedoms and an increase in policies limiting civil freedoms correlates with the rise in levels of nationalism.

*Fear of Migration and Terrorism*

The loss of national sovereignty to larger international and supernatural entities like the EU and the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) regionally, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) among others globally, has thus prompted disillusionment with foreign interference across contemporary Europe (Roubini 2014) both for the political elite and the European public.
As a result, waves of societal fears of foreign ownership (Kim 2007) fears of migration in the form of refugee flows, asylum seekers, and internal displacement, which have consequently raised fears of loss of state control, especially in the contexts of migration (Castles 2003) emerged since the Cold War. Liang (2016) added that societal fears of uncontrolled migration, terrorism, costs of globalization, and less tangible threats of non-state actors including the EU as a supernatural governing and economic body itself, have specifically contributed to the rise of right-wing populist parties and orientations, and in turn, resurging nationalisms on the continent.

Delanty (2008) subsequently claimed that the recent resurge of European nationalisms is result of the emergence of the European community, which has linked social fears and anxieties with migration via popular and political discourse, producing xenophobia and nationalism. In contrast, Rydgren (2008) asserted that immigration skepticism should not be confused with xenophobic attitudes, as socially-constructed frames of migration linked to criminality and social unrests, are more significant in generating voter support for the radical right than xenophobic attitudes or ethnicity. Nevertheless, the central tendency is that immigration carries ethnic, linguistic, and even racial diversity, potentially disrupting homogenous national identity.

*Ethnic Homogeneity*

Ethnicity as potential factor in the rise of right-wing populism in contemporary contexts, and as potential catalysts of the latest wave of European nationalisms therefore merits attention. With at least eighty-seven distinct peoples of Europe, with fifty-four constituting ethnic minorities, the total number of ethnic and linguistic minority populations, is continuously on the rise (Pan and Pfeil 2002). Historic examples of ethnic
conflicts, as provoked by ruling elites to create “a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only relevant political identity” (Gagnon 1995, 132), were for instance relevant measures in the cases of Serbian nationalism. Gagnon (1995; 2010) argued that the former Yugoslavian conflict was neither a result of culturally-transmitted myths of ethnic competition (Denich 1993), nor of externally-triggered material insecurities (Posen 1993) but that of elite-driven nationalist claims to legitimize the Slobodan Milosevic regime.

Gagnon (1995; 2010) nonetheless claimed that the success of nationalist mobilization from the top-down depends on a variety factors including the history of relevance of political ethnicity, the type of ethnic interests, and the amount of elite-control over mass media as tools for symbolic politics, among others. After 1989 the Romanian former-Communist elites also used moderate Romanian nationalism in order to preserve their power against anti-Communist reformers (Verdery 1993) but after the escalation of ethnic tensions between Romanians and Hungarian minority, ethnicity waned once the former Communists lost power to pro-Western opposition in 1996.

Within most EU-member states, new ethnic diasporas have emerged in light of migration, with the onset of the 2015 refugee and migrant crisis marking a definite path toward additional fears of cultural, ethnic, and religious mixing (Van Hear 2005; Holmes and Castañeda 2016). The refugee label, in specific, became highly politicized in wider political discourse of resistance to migrants and refugees since (Zetter 2007). In addition to references to their ethnic, linguistic, and cultural ‘otherness’, European rhetoric and images of refugees and migrants are indeed located on the nexus economic threats to the welfare state and associations with them as threats to national security (Karyotis 2007;
Nail 2016). Bommes and Geddes (2000) stated that the argument that migration is a threat to welfare is too simplistic. While scholarly opinions thus remain highly contested (some concurring and some scrutinizing such two common positions), the fact that socioeconomic insecurities remain closely tied to sociocultural fears, remains important, though uniquely due to differences in national histories, and national and supranational institutional interactions (Bommes and Geddes 2000).

With more than 350,000 migrants moving through Hungarian territory, a combination of such depoliticizing narratives and ethnographic mobilization attempted to immobilize, while some state institutions and humanitarian volunteering groups tried to aid the mobility of the primarily Middle Eastern migrant and refugee groups. Despite their relatively abrupt presence within the countries territorial borders, new forms of political solidarity emerged with heavy influences on the country’s both elite-driven and publically embraced nationalist tendencies.

Religious Grievances

This raises the unescapable question whether religion, so often and increasingly neglected by most recent nationalism scholarship, has regained its significance in modern nation-states as the main or side ingredient in the recipe for nationalisms? The Muslim population in Europe has expanded from 29.6 million in 1990 to 44.1 million in 2010, with a projected increase to exceed 58 million by 2030. Muslims, from both Middle Eastern and African nations today consist 6 percent of Europe’s population. Interestingly, although it is projected that Europe’s total Muslim population is likely to remain small (Pew Research Center 2018), islamophobia as a societal fear, is on the rise (Bunzl 2005; Fekete 2008), in many cases with the right manufacturing such fear against religion and
ethnicity (Esposito and Kalin 2011; Lean and Esposito 2012; Ogan et al. 2014) as a common ground to build pan-European right-wing unity (Hafez 2014; Gardell 2014).

The social democrat Czech president Milos Zeman, for instance, claimed that the influx of refugees and migrants was a mastermind by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a rhetoric of ‘Muslim invasion’ and ‘gradually controlled Europe’ that resonates well with the Islam-migration-terrorism nexus across Europe, especially in countries where the Muslim presence is relatively low (Bayraklı and Hafez 2016). Shyrock (2010) and Taras (2013) suggested that religion nonetheless must be decoupled from ethnicity as religions are increasingly disconnected from the cultures in which they have been embedded, despite politicized frames connecting them. In addition, cultural, religious, and ethnic Muslims must be distinguished (Sander 2016; in Peach and Vertovec 2016).

Subsequently, Rieffer (2003) would thus attack material explanations posed by Roubini (2014) and others, who posed that rising right-wing populism and nationalism in Europe is a consequence of economic insecurities primarily. He attributed religious grievances as a potential cause for newly rising nationalism in contemporary European countries. Rieffer (2003) found that the stronger the religious influence on the national movement, the greater the likelihood that discrimination and human rights violations will occur between groups. Echoing a Huntington’s (1993) classic notion of the ‘clash of civilizations’, Barker (2008) asserted that religion is indeed an effective tool for mobilization of national identities particularly when these represent a threat, though suggested that as states develop economically and politically, religion plays a lesser role in people’s individual lives and identities.

Although religion may not be the primary cause of conflicts, religion could take
precedence over language, culture, or other elements of nationalism because it holds the power to easily distinguish between large groups in times of mobilization (Barker 2008). Bormann et al. (2015) concurred, though suggested instead that linguistic differences matter more than religious ones, though underscored that Muslim populations are generally more conflict-prone. In an environment, where economic insecurities persisted and varied drastically locally and nationally, and in-between Southern and Northern, and Eastern and Western European nation-states for centuries, yet the latest surge of right-wing populism and nationalisms across the continent, remain fairly recent phenomena, the continental longing for the restoration of the colossal religious voids (Anderson 1991; Hroch 1996), which post-War nation-building and globalization at one point in time replaced (Greenfeld 2012), thus should not be further overlooked in nationalism scholarship. On one hand, religion, therefore may be regarded as a driving force behind nationalisms, in which case religious nationalism could arise, with religion inseparable from nationalism, while in other instances, religion may assist other elements of nationalism including but not limited to socioeconomic insecurities and ethnicity in the process of its formation and rebirth.

As such, Anderson (1991) and Hroch (1996) may be partially correct in their assumptions according to which that nationality and nationalisms are therefore parts of larger cultural systems that preceded them, with the modern nation as a historically grounded ‘sociological organism’. Their claims that the result of capitalist, communicative, and cultural interactions entirely replaced a vacuum left by colossal religions of previous times must however be revisited within the context of contemporary reinvigorating European nationalisms to explore whether religious woes, along with
ethnic – and religious fractionalization, have recently regained their relevance.

In sum, much scholarly work has been performed pertaining to socioeconomic insecurities and sociocultural fears across disciplines pertaining to studies of globalization, migration, and transnational migration. Their relationship and interaction, however has mostly been explored within contexts of civil wars and ethnic conflicts only. Works exploring the role ethnicity in nationalist insurgencies (Cederman and Girardin 2007; Cederman et al. 2010); greed and grievance in civil wars (Ballentine and Nietzschke 2003; Keen 2012); nationalism as a cause of war (Posen 1993; Snyder 1993; Van Evera 1994; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Hall and Malešević 2013; Hutchinson 2017); the implications of migration and nationalism (i Berdún et al. 2010; Wimmer and Schiller 2002; de Genova 2013); and globalization and nationalism (Hall 2000; Kindermann 2006; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015) are a few examples.

Albeit, the abundance of exclusionary theoretical offerings on one hand, and the lack of comprehensive empirical investigation on the origins of nationalism in contextually unique environments over time on the other, is striking. Schiller (2009) claimed that merely material explanations tend to disregard the social and cultural divisions and potential similarities within nation-states that exist both within and across state borders, simultaneously inferring that cultural causes cannot be isolated either. Analysis of the combination of material and non-material dynamics of nationalism over time and in a variety of contexts has therefore been rare, if not entirely untouched.

As a result, ample room is left for further investigation of the origins of nationalism in general, its most recent re-birth in Europe in particular, and the catalysts behind its rise altogether. Fear of loss of national identity, the degree of press and civil
freedoms, fear of migration and terrorism, as well as ethnic homogeneity and religious grievances proved particularly salient in the realm of societal fears. Their greater role as conditions for the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms, will be explored methodologically in the subsequent chapter alongside economic factors mentioned earlier, and political determinants to be discussed next.

Political Motivations and Sociopolitical Cleavages. Despite carrying both socioeconomic and sociocultural characteristics, nationalism is embedded in the desire for national legitimacy, sovereignty, and self-determination generally tied to a once historically demarcated, or newly ‘imagined’ territory, and although such self-determination not being identical to political liberty (Herz 1951), nationalism as an ideology, sociopolitical platform, and movement, remains highly political in nature. While scholars continue to debate the emergence of nationalisms in relation to the nation in a ‘chicken versus the egg’-like debate, what all theoretical approaches imply is that nationalism cannot be detached from its political connotations (Smith 2010; 2013).

In his infamous Hypotheses on Nationalism and War, Van Evera (1994) partially agreed with previous classical and more contemporary tendencies (Mill 1951; Brass 1979; Gellner 1983; Breuilly 2001), viewing nationalism entirely as a political movement. Linking civic and ethnic elements of nationalisms embedded in political structure, Van Evera (1994) would have concurred with Rousseau (2001 [1762]) that nationalism thus functions as a ‘civic profession of faith’ (75) that requires the surrender of ‘general will’ first to one’s national community, which loyalty supersedes any other forms of loyalty to other groups based on kinship or political ideology. In the context of war, he further stated that ethnic and national communities’ nationalisms arise and rise relative to the
levels of these groups’ desires of own independent state.

While Van Evera, along with Smith (2010; 2013) and others, preferred to remove ethnicity from the context of the bureaucratic and legal functions of the state, recent examples from ethnonationalist movements in Sri Lanka, or that of political tribalism, and consequential uncivil nationalisms in African states (Berman 1998; Laremont 2005) demonstrates that politics is often deeply cultural, with such cultural politics playing a significant role in emotional responses to social realities by capitalizing on the likelihood of pain, the politicizing of fear, organization of hatred, and representation of disgust (Ahmed 2013), among others. Indeed, a country’s ethnic composition and civic loyalty has become increasingly entangled, often independent from geography but dependent on the history of nationhood and its domestic governance structure (Kuzio 2002).

The question then becomes not whether politics and national governance plays a role in the rise of nationalisms in nationalism in Europe or beyond but rather, what role does it assume in contexts where historically and naturally bonded group of people live in a modern polity, which polity functions within, and consciously faces economic and societal pressures within both domestic and supranational governance. Caramani’s (2004) concept of the ‘nationalization of politics’ assumed that local politics transforms into national politics to align electoral systems and parties with national identities, in which process, “sectional cleavages – [state – church; center-periphery; rural-urban; and class] – transform into nationwide functional alignments” (1). Such top-down, and inversely bottom-up functions of nationalism, reinforce the essence of the ‘in-group’ in nationalist movements and ideologies through pitting national identities against all that is the ‘other’ as earlier discussed. In the realm of nationalized politics,
“[s]uch others threaten to take away from what ‘you’ have, as the legitimate subject of the nation, as the one who is the true recipient of national benefits. The narrative invites the reader to adopt the ‘you’ through working on emotions: becoming this ‘you’ would mean developing a certain rage against these illegitimate others, who are represented as ‘swarms’ in the nation” (Ahmed 2013, 2).

The politicized notion of ‘otherness’, and the attempts for cultural and territorial homogenization in contemporary Europe presents an “intricate web of sociopolitical cleavages” (Caramani 2004, 3), which are no longer utterly territorial. Post-1914 post-War Eastern Europe historical nightmares ushered in aggressive forms of nationalism, which were believed to die down after the fall of European Communism in 1989. Ancient roots and modern dilemmas of the new European era (Roshwald et al. 2006) – with changing borders, transforming economic systems, and underlining political ideologies, have however furthered perceptions of ‘otherness’ between Western, Eastern, Northern and Southern European nations in recent decades, and between ethnic and minority groups nationally and domestically (the former within imagined territories, while the latter within politically legitimate ones).

Additionally, with the EU and its supranational governing bodies increasingly failing to integrate political and financial elites of Europe at the expense of ordinary citizens, not one but many competing political cultures, and consequently cultural politics have emerged nationally and within the supranational structure itself (Shore 2013). As a result, right and left national party dimensions have been significant in the party positioning on European integration; the more to the right the party dimension, the more anti-EU the party’s positioning (Hooghe et al. 2002). While older right-wing extreme parties have carried fascist imprints, newer right-wing parties tend to be characterized by
anti-EU and anti-establishment salience (Ignazi 2003; Beyme 2007).

Neither right-wing extremist, nor right-wing populist parties have been continually successful but it became clear after the European Parliamentary Elections of May 25th 2014 that on a European level, they are on the rise (Wodak et al. 2013; Wodak 2015). Arzheimer and Carter (2006) attributed the variation in the right-wing party vote to a variety of socioeconomic and demographic variables. Right-wing parties in general tend to appeal to the masses and their Durkheimian anomies through the politicization of fear and subsequent organization of hatred (Ahmed 2013). Communicating frames of ‘sense of belonging’, ‘paternal protection’, ‘the myth of values’, and the ‘significant other’ (Van Noije and Hijmans 2005) have particularly resonated well with the public.

Rydgren (2003) added that previously mentioned anti-migrant and refugee arguments are often coupled with so called ‘welfare chauvinism’ which depicts foreigners, particularly migrants and refugees, as threats to the generous welfare programs of Western societies. Rydgren (2003) further stated that one thing that connects radical European right-wing parties in specific, including the Danish Fremskridspartiet (Progress Party) founded in 1972 or the Swedish Ny Demokratie (New Democracy), is their resentment against immigrants – right-wing parties may thus not necessarily be extreme, or populist (Mény and Surel 2000; Mudde 2007).

*Rise of the Populist Radical Right Wing (PRR)*

The rise of European right-wing populism, in specific, have paved the path for European conservatism (Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2016), which uniquely serves existential and ideological needs driven by fears and uncertainties. Right-wing populist parties rely on support from like-minded communities (Beauzamy 2013; Schmuck et al.
2016; Muis and Immerzeel 2016). According to Harrison and Bruter (2011), right-wing populism takes two dimensions: authoritarianism and a negative identity dimension, with four distinguishable groups of right-wing populist parties – xenophobic repressive (i.e. The British National Party (BNP)); repressive (i.e. Front national (FN) in Belgium); reactionary (i.e. United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)); and xenophobic reactionary (i.e. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) of Austria). While the reactionary form favors the return to traditional ways of life, usually Christian values, the repressive form advocates for law and order ideologies and thus usually, an authoritarian-type leadership (Wodak 2015).

Although populism and nationalism therefore often become entangled in scholarship, they are not the same as the former carries an anti-establishment tone, while the latter is associated with the exclusionary primacy of all that is national – politics, economics, and identities. It is the rise of the reactionary type populist radical right wing (PRR) parties that rely on nationalist rhetoric to entice ‘otherness’, usually embedded in the form of ethnic-cultural nationalism (Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2005; 2007; Wodak 2015; De Cleen 2017). Because not all right-wing politics is populist or nationalist, European PRR politics in specific, is likely to increase nationalism through pitting “people-as-underdog” (De Cleen 2017), legitimizing nationalist demands as the will of the silent majority against the rights of people of foreign descent and the multiculturalist elite (Mudde and Katlwasser 2012) who impose threats on national sovereignty.

**Historical and Symbolic Reliance on Ethnic Identity**

What unites radical right-wing populism is its close reliance on ethnocultural nationalism as seen in the example of contemporary Italy’s leadership under Matteo
Salvini, PODEMOS in Spain, or the Belgian Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest). Latin American radical populist parties similar to the Greek Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás (SIRYZA; Coalition of the Radical Left), in contrast, lean to the left, and are mostly inclusionary focusing on economic equality of the lower classes and that of excluded groups like the poor and indigenous populations as seen in the case of Bolivian populism. Although both radical traditions motivate anti-EU orientations and attitudes, the link between the right Euroscepticism and nationalism is embedded in the politics of fear based on both economic and ethnocultural elements, whereas radical left Euroscepticism tends to exclusively attack the neoliberal character of the EU (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2012).

Although Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2012) argued that the centrality of nationalism cuts across party lines, radical right wing party parties differ from their leftist counterparts as they are inward-looking, thus often characterized by nationalism and chauvinism advocating nativist politics, while left-wing populism tends to lack such nativist tendency orientating toward internationalism and post-nationalism uniquely (Wodak 2015). The rise of radical right-wing populist articulations against supranational and international bodies entrenched in economic measures and social change in the wake of economic insecurities and ethnocultural transformations (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014; Stavrakakis 2015), is a better predictor of the rise of European nationalism.

Ethnic diversity, as it pertains to the radical right and its popularity, thus plays a significant role in social cohesion (Putnam 2007) in the formation and bottom-up support of the European right-wing in general. Van Assche et al. (2018) found that both objective and perceived diversity was correlated with more right-wing political contempt and
popular party support. Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009) also claimed that the ethnic composition of the country plays an important role in radical right mobilization, especially when a supposed majority faces a small ethno-cultural minority in times in economic inequality. In contrast, Tavits (2005) argued that not the ethnic composition but rather social cleavages affect electoral stability of right-wing populist parties, and only during economic downturns.

Whether rooted in ethnocultural or societal cleavages, resentment toward elites, immigrants, ethnic, racial, and religious minorities have nonetheless been prominent in radical right-wing political discursive strategies across the board, resonating with the attitudes of the majority public. Binkowski (2017) added that the threat among national ethnocultural majorities, in particular, do not only threaten democratic institutions but increase the likelihood of the rise of future populist, nationalist, and even authoritarian politics. Using data from the World Values Survey, Varney (2013) added that higher levels of ethno-religious hostility against minority groups were correlated with lower levels of trust in the EU, while higher levels of ethnic fractionalization led to higher levels of confidence in EU institutional practices.

Consequently, in post-1989 European contexts, such notions would suggest that the rise of radical right-wing populist party support encourages the rise of nationalism due to rapid change that triggers perceived threats and social discontent rooted in economic insecurities, including the levels of migration (Lubberts et al. 2000; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000), ethnic homogeneity, and levels of confidence in the EU. Blokker (2005) viewed the rise of populist nationalism in post-Communist Eastern Europe as a political movement, which, through the reinvigoration of nationalism, attempts to revive
quality of life rooted in social dislocation as a result of post-Communist uneven developments. Knigge (1998) further asserted that high levels of migration had a particular effect on the increase in the support for anti-migrant parties, while Lubbers and Scheepers (2000) found the opposite in Germany.

As anti-immigrant attitudes and Eurosceptic parties emerged in Britain, the Netherlands, and Austria among others, xenophobic parties became prominent in Central Europe and the East have strengthened at the expense of domestic economies. Bulgaria’s Ataka party and the Greece Golden Dawn regularly used racist rhetoric in the electoral campaigns, which trend has been adopted by many radical right-wing parties across Europe recently beginning to target Muslims. The Slovak National Party (SNS), though not holding seats in the local parliament has infiltrated the political system slurring against the Hungarian ethnic minority, the Roma and the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ) community, while Hungary’s Jobbik has attacked Romas, Jews, and Muslims alike (House 2014).

Therefore, findings on migration and political attitudes, along with ethnocultural factors as catalysts for rising nationalism remain inconclusive (House 2014; Binkowski 2017). Still, the relationship between objective and perceived effects of dismantled social cohesion in times of economic insecurities and rapid social change as triggers for radical right-wing parties, and respectively, for nationalist tendencies, in the contexts of the fall of European Communism, efforts of European integration, and the latest European refugee and migrant influx, should not be ignored.

The role of ethnic religious homogeneity in symbolic politics, the demand for popular sovereignty, and anti-establishment attitudes have been particularly salient in the
rise of the European right-wing, and radical right-wing populism. Their greater role as conditions and indicators of the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms, will be explored methodologically in the subsequent chapter alongside earlier discussed economic and societal determinants. As such, mechanisms of rising nationalism across whole Europe are to be examined in this dissertation given that socioeconomic, sociocultural, and political explanations and findings alike remain debated and most often, indirectly, or impartially explored.

Contributions to the Literature

This dissertation contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it revisits the blurred lines pertaining to the relationship between nations and nationalisms in international and supranational contexts. Secondly, it offers a unique, holistic approach to understanding the socioeconomic, sociocultural, and political dynamics behind the rise of nationalism in historically defined, yet constantly evolving context-dependent settings. Third, through the use of a qualitative comparative approach, this study builds on existing data to expand the lack of empirical explanations of the rise nationalisms in general, and post-1989 European nationalisms in particular. Fourth, it examines the types of post-1989 European nationalisms to establish what types of national identities, if any, have emerged since the Fall of European Communism, and whether a uniquely originated and expressed, yet generally recognizable new type of European religious chauvinist nationalism is on the horizon on the continent. Overall, while employing a contextual lens to the study of nationalism, this dissertation examines nationalism across its spatial and temporal dimension – an undertaking rarely attempted, or entirely left untouched in recent nationalism scholarship.
Chapter I entitled “Introduction” thus focused on introducing the concept of nationalism, stated the research problem, detailed the research questions, presented a synopsis of the literature including its main theoretical and methodological limitations, and introduced the methodology along with the selected cases. The present chapter, Chapter II entitled “Review of the Relevant Review” comprised of classical explanations of the relationship between nations and nationalisms, definitions and types of nationalisms, explanations of the causes and dynamics of rising nationalisms over time in general, and post-1989 European nationalism in particular, on which this dissertation is based.

More specifically, it introduced the main factors, measures, and indicators of nationalisms in general, and post-1989 European nationalisms in particular that will serve as the bases for analysis subsequent chapter, Chapter III, “Research Design, Methodology, and Data Compilation”. The following chapter details the rationale behind employing a qualitative research design, reiterates research questions and hypotheses, discusses the data sources, data collection. Lastly, it elaborates on the indicators of outcome and conditions of post-1989 European nationalism introduced in this chapter as they pertain to advancing both earlier and contemporary nationalism studies literature in the context of post-1989 European settings.
CHAPTER III - RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND DATA

COMPLICATION

“National identity is the last bastion of the dispossessed. But the meaning of identity is now based on hatred, on hatred for those who are not the same.”

– Umberto Eco (2011)

Rather than providing large amounts of quantitative data that can become the bases of generalizations, this dissertation employs a qualitative approach to focus on European nationalisms as unique, context-dependent, and evolutionary phenomena. It combines Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and collective case study designs to examine the complexity of economic, social, and political conditions pertaining to the rise and types of post-1989 European nationalisms. With their case-centered foci, these approaches complement each other as they allow for a contextual and holistic view of the dynamic character of post-1989 European nationalisms in five European Union countries – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden.

Accordingly, this chapter consists of four core sections that explore post-1989 European nationalisms as ideologies, sociopolitical platforms and/or economic, political, and social movements. The first section reiterates the research questions and hypotheses and justifies nation-states as the primary unit of analysis. The second section elaborates on the rationale behind the combination of a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and collective case study designs and details the specific methods employed: fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) and thematic analysis, respectively. Lastly, it justifies the selection of the five Next, the third section of the chapter clarifies and specifies indicators of the outcome (dependent variable) – the rise of post-1989 European Nationalism, along with the
conditions/factors (independent variables) – economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism, and their respective indicators introduced in Chapter II, with particular attention paid to their functions in historically unique post-Communist European supranational contexts. Lastly, the fourth section details the study’s data collection and coding process before a detailed discussion of the results follows in Chapter IV, with further elaboration on the rise \textit{and} types of nationalism in the five selected EU countries in Chapter V, “The Cases”.

Section I: Research Questions and Hypotheses, and Unit of Analysis

\textit{Research Questions and Hypotheses}

This research is set out to bridge the theoretical and methodological gaps in nationalism studies with two principal objectives of inquiry: 1) it examines how forces – political, economic, societal, or other – have dominated the formation and latest surge of European nationalism since the end of European Communism in 1989; and 2) it explores whether different, context-dependent types of European nationalisms exist as a result. More accurately, the research questions addressed in this dissertation are as follows:

RQ1: Has the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears and/or right-wing populism, since the end of European Communism in 1989, effected nationalism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden?

RQ2: Have particular economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism, since the end of European Communism in 1989, proven to be of dominance in their effects on nationalism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden?

RQ3: Have particular types of nationalisms, since the end of European Communism in 1989, been uniquely detectible in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden?

Based on existing research and available survey and narrative data sources consulted, this study hypothesizes that it is a multitude of political, economic, and societal
catalysts – precisely, economic insecurities, societal fears and radical right-wing populism – that are shapers of a newly rising post-1989 Europe and its types of nationalisms. As such, the following three hypotheses were formulated:

H1: The interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism since the end of European Communism in 1989 has led to an increase in nationalism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland and Sweden.

H2: Particular economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism, since the end of European Communism in 1989, have proven to be of dominance in their effects on nationalism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland and Sweden, with their dominance dependent on the economic, social, and political contexts in which they exist and operate.

H3: Particular types of nationalisms, since the end of European Communism in 1989, have been uniquely detectible in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden.

The Primary Unit of Analysis

The European Nation-State in Context. Because nations and nationalisms are unique and their context matters, so does their concept and operationalization in the context, in which they are studied. Methodological nationalism and its primary unit of analysis – the nation-state – “a kind of state which has the monopoly of what is claims to be the legitimate use of force within a demarcated territory and seeks to unite the people subject to its rule by means of cultural homogenization” (Guibernau (2004a), 132) – is therefore not exclusive for studies of all nationalisms.

Nevertheless, because this study focuses on the rise of post-1989 nationalism in five European Union member countries that are nation-states, nation-states as the primary unit of analysis is appropriate in this dissertation. To effectively address its research questions and test the hypotheses, this study thus adopts the Eurocentric methodological nationalist research approach not as universally applicable to study all nationalisms (as generally assumed by many post-1989 scholars of methodological nationalism) but to
capitalize on the strengths of methodological nationalism in the post-1989 European context, uniquely. It does not take the applicability of this approach for granted beyond its focus, which is to examine the economic, societal, and political factors of modern post-1989 European nationalism across and within the five European nation-states – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden.

Section II: Research Design and Methodology

A Qualitative Approach

Scholars of comparative politics frequently turn to qualitative methods instead of solely quantitative or mixed-method approaches as qualitative methods are essential to address central questions regarding human behavior in the field. Works on democracy and authoritarianism (Collier 1999; Haggard and Kaufman 1995), economic growth (Kohli 2004; Amsden 2003); social movements (Golstone 2003; McAdam 2003), and nationalism and ethnicity (Brubaker 1992; Yashar 2005) are just a few examples of the vast body of such literature and methodological applications (Mahoney 2007).

Specifically, in nationalism and ethnicity research, qualitative methods range from historical narratives to event data analysis. In his study of ethnic and cultural nationalism in Japan, Yoshino (2005) explained that both ‘produced and consumed’ national distinctiveness by Japanese society, has been unique to Japanese national identity and historical legacy. With most, if not only all nationalism scholars having recognized the role of collective identities on bases of territorial prerogatives or aspirations, historical legacies, a common past, a shared culture, identity, or some combination of these, it is therefore not surprising that many have increasingly employed qualitative approaches to examine both characteristics and dynamics and nationalism.
existent in unique socioeconomic, political, and cultural arenas. Scholars including
Breuilly (1993) and Turino (2003) among others, have grown a particular interest in the
role of collective sentimental and psychological associations.

With an originally mixed-method design, this work has recognized that statistical
methods have become increasingly popular in the recent decade but views that the
contribution of qualitative methods that survey historical determinants, collective
memory, political discourse and mythology in the realms of nationalist sentiment and
will-formation, cannot be discredited (Lemieux and Asal 2010; Jaskulowski 2017).
Qualitative approaches, compared to quantitative generalizations, are thus most beneficial
in refining definitions and meanings of key concepts and have a decisive role to play in
the conceptual development of nations and nationalism through detailed case-centered
evidence (Ragin 1987; Mahoney 2007).

Comparative Research Methods

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Multiple qualitative approaches have
been developed including ethnography, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), and
case study research. With little to no exploration of the QCA design in nationalism
literature as it pertains to the casual mechanisms of rising nationalism, its combination
with a collective case study approach is most appropriate to identify more complex
causation of case-specific conditions of post-1989 European nationalisms through
systematic analysis (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009; Sehring et al. 2013).

With its foundation built by American social scientist Charles Ragin in 1987,
QCA and its three distinct techniques – crisp-set QCA (csQCA), fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA)
and multi-value QCA (mvQCA) – have advanced Mills’ Method of Agreement and
Difference through the examination of both necessary and/or sufficient conditions of particular phenomena of interest. QCA does not disaggregate cases into analytically separate variables as seen in most statistical research, and assumes these as changing and context-specific rather than constant (an often-cited limitation both statistical methods and Mill’s Methods). Thus, it allows for a systematic cross-case comparison of how configurations of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism (specific combination of conditions as recipes and ingredients) produce post-1989 German, Italian, Hungarian, Irish, and Swedish nationalisms as outcomes (Ragin 2000).

While in statistical methods with the exception of multiple regressions, variables are often treated as a competitive, QCA’s conjunctural causation logic assumes that these conditions are often complementary and/or interdependent. Through its binary approach, the crisp-set QCA would not be effective as it limits to the researcher to assess the hypothesized interaction gradually, while the fuzzy-set QCA permits such assessment through more precise description and differentiation among proposed conditions relying on existing literature to identify and categorize thresholds for the conditions of post-1989 European nationalisms – in this case economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism. Although multi-value QCA expands fuzzy-set analysis to examine remote and proximate factors and conditions, its scope extends beyond the focus of this dissertation research (Caren and Panofsky 2005; Schneider and Wagemann 2006).

Fuzzy-set QCA thus makes it possible to evaluate partial fulfillment of conditions and calibrate data accordingly for a more precise evaluation, with values of conditions measured based on the extent to which they are present in each configuration. Through the quasi-quantitative employment of Boolean algebra and minimization rules
implemented, fuzzy-set QCA allows gradual assessment of whether conditions of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism are necessary and/or sufficient for the emergence of post-1989 European nationalism in each of the five selected cases, while also allowing to identify similarities and differences in the configurations of conditions among these various cases.

Accordingly, Rihoux and Ragin (2009) present six stages in a QCA: 1) building the data table; 2) constructing a ‘truth table’; 3) identifying contradictory configurations; 4) minimization through Boolean algebra; 5) consideration of the logical set-up of cases; and 6) interpretation. Through a non-linear, non-additive, and non-probabilistic approach that rejects permanent causality and stresses equiprimality – the idea that different paths may lead to the same outcome, fuzzy-set QCA can help effectively identify complex combinations of conditions. Several software tools have been developed by engineers since the 1950s, including QCA-DOS (for crisp-set QCA), FSQCA (for fuzzy-set QCA), and TOSMANA (for crisp-set and multi-value QCA) to help the researcher better grasp casual relationships through simple configurations and data visualization (Fiss 2011).

By requiring the researcher to make clear justifications of coding along the way, fuzzy-set QCA method employed in this study examines the proposed conditions of rising post-1989 European nationalisms logically beyond the simple binary identification of clusters, patterns, and differences among cases obtained through the crisp-set QCA technique or Mill’s Method of Agreement or Difference (Pennings 2009; Longest and Vaisey 2008). The formulation of more coherent casual chains that summarize data and test assumptions as they pertain to the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism as ingredients (conditions /factors) in the recipe of post-1989
European nationalisms, is thus indispensable to adequately address research questions and its respective hypothesis concerned with their combination and dynamics.

Albeit, while fuzzy-set QCA permits the logical examination of the first principal objective of inquiry, namely, how forces – political, economic, societal, or other – have dominated the formation and latest surge of European nationalism since the end of European Communism in 1989, fuzzy-set QCA cannot solely address the second principle of inquiry in this research, which explores whether different, context-dependent types of European nationalisms exist as a result. While it is most appropriate to identify similar and contradictory configurations of necessary and/or sufficient conditions within cases, and is beneficial for both theory building and testing, the method alone cannot detail the context, in which economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism as potential conditions of post-1989 European nationalisms interact and/or dominate (Sehring et al. 2013).

Fuzzy-set QCA, in particular, should generally be combined with other data analysis techniques, especially in larger research studies where the aim is to draw casual inferences. Its combination with comparative case study designs is particularly beneficial (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). In this case, although QCA treats phenomena under investigation as dynamic, it cannot fully account for a temporal dimension, thus treating the combinations of conditions as they occur simultaneously, rather than over time (Caren and Panofsky 2005; Mannewitz 2011).

Hence, whilst Boolean logic and its atemporal nature can effectively test what interactions of conditions have been sufficient and/or necessary for the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms (H1), it does not fully account for the context of post-1989
European nationalisms shaping such conditions, and thus, potentially the diversity in the similar outcome itself (H2 and H3). As such, the combination of the fuzzy-set QCA technique and the collective case study approach are combined to effectively address all research questions, and to test their related hypotheses for a more holistic understanding of the dynamics and types of nationalisms over time in the five selected countries.

**Collective Case Study.** Case studies in general, and qualitative case studies in particular, have been developed in the social sciences to capture the complexity of a single, or small number of cases (Zainal 2007). With its two distinguishable paradigms – social constructivist (Stake 1995; Merriam 2009) and post-positivist models (Yin 2012), social-constructivists emphasize the object of the study – the case(s), while post-positivists define case studies along the lines of the techniques of analysis employed. Despite such variations, case study designs have been deemed adequate in both the examination of micro and macro-level phenomena, with various units of analysis ranging from single individuals to large corporations to world-changing events (Gray et al. 2009).

As this dissertation investigates the role of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism in the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms and their types, the qualitative case study design builds on the fuzzy-set QCA technique to examine nationalisms from a social-constructivist perspective, evoking the complexity of nationalisms as ideologies, sociopolitical platforms and/or economic, political, and social movements in their natural and human contexts. As Yin (2009) claimed, case study research starts from the “desire to derive an up-close or otherwise in-depth understanding of a small number of ‘cases’ set in their real-world contexts” (13).

Because effective case study methodology is quite complex, unlike many of their
quantitative methodological rivals, it goes “beyond the study of isolated variables, with relevant case study data often coming from multiple and not singular sources of evidence” (Yin 2006, 43). Systematic gathering of data through a variety of sources, including the use of descriptive statistics from reliable data sources such as the Standard Eurobarometer, European Social Survey, and the KOF Globalization Index as well as national archives, government documents, and online media material, thus permits the researcher to understand the complexity of post-1989 nationalisms as a socially constructed (both top-down and bottom-up) phenomena.

In his comparative analysis of nationalist politics in Singapore, Ghana, Spain and Australia, with tensions in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, and Rwanda also analyzed, Brown (2003), along with many of his fellow scholars, utilized a collective case study approach to explore competing civic, ethnic, and multinational characteristics of nationalism from a socio-constructivist angle. This dissertation employs a similar collective case study design (multiple-case or comparative study design), and systematically gathers and codes data from a variety of sources to highlight similarities and differences as they pertain to the role of economic insecurities, societal fears in the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms and their types across five selected cases – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden.

Collective case studies have been particularly popular in larger, more comprehensive research projects like this dissertation. Comparative case studies are indeed viewed as the most compelling and credible case study design, and although they are more time-consuming to implement than a single case study or many quantitative
designs, due to their reliance on multiple methods, they ensure greater construct and internal validity (Gomm et al. 2000; Johansson 2002; Rowley 2002).

Thematic Analysis

Although various data gathering and analysis methods, including process-tracing and casual process-observations have been utilized by scholars of nationalism studies to gain “an insight or piece of data that provides information about contexts and mechanisms” (Collier at al. 2004, 231), these approaches are most effective in within-case analysis in single cases (George and Bennett 2005). Due to their complexity, collective case study designs such as the one in this dissertation, relies on cross-case analysis. In-depth qualitative case study evidence gathered from descriptive and narrative data has the potential to reveal similarities and differences thematically, while taking both the temporal and contextual characteristics of German, Italian, Hungarian, Irish, and Swedish nationalism into account.

In an effort to codify and measure such thematic patterns, which help identify common themes between economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism as conditions in the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms, a thematic analysis (in contrast to a content analysis) was performed. Despite their similarities including the search for patterns and themes, content analysis codes and categorizes the frequency of words and thematic patterns used, their relationships, directly focusing on discourses of communication (Mayring 2000; Pope et al. 2006). Thematic analysis, on the other hand, identifies, analyzes, and reports patterns within data, not only document content (Braun and Clarke 2006) that carries the danger of potentially missing the context. Thematic
analysis allows the examination of patterns by attaching meaning to them within particular contexts (Krippendorff 2004; Maguire and Delahunt 2017).

Hence, first the fuzzy-set QCA is employed to address research question 1 and to test the hypothesis pertaining to the combination of dynamics necessary and/or sufficient in the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms. Secondly, the observed thematic patterns of data are used to address research questions 2 and 3, dimensions of post-1989 European nationalisms as it pertains to the domination of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism, and the types of post-1989 European nationalisms over time.

*The Five Cases: Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden*

The five carefully selected cases extend the scope of earlier methodological efforts by: 1) recognizing the intersectionality of economic, societal, and political variables; and 2) are geographically, economically, culturally and politically representative of all Europe. They concentrate on exploring extremes in Eastern and Western, Northern and Southern nationalisms to exhaustively incorporate: differences in market structures; domestic and international political and institutional pressures; older and newer, and ethnically and religiously homogenous and heterogeneous EU member states; national identities coexisting alongside other national and international identities; and a diverse range of hybrid, regional, and cultural identities. All five nations are similar in so far that they all display a distinct longevity in their participation in Europe’s post-1989 development and most recent refugee and migrant crisis, also being among the extremes of the most (in some cases, imaginatively) affected by the 2015 influx of Muslim ethnic minorities.
German nationalism prompts an exciting inquiry into the change and affiliation of national sentiments since European unification in 1989. Additionally, Germany’s open arms policies since the 1990s through the country’s Turkish *Gastarbeiter* program, topped by an unprecedented inflow of the greatest number of asylum seekers during the recent events of the 2015 refugee and migrant crisis from Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, with 860,000 granted applications in 2016 alone (European Commission 2018), have placed a strain on the country’s economic, political, and cultural landscapes. Contrasting political promises and rhetoric that only seem to exacerbate tensions between Muslim minorities and the German host population despite decreasing levels of migration since 2017, raises questions about the possibility of a new, religiously outlined nationalism strengthening amidst economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populist tendencies.

In Italy, nationalism rooted in Roman antiquity has gradually morphed into a variety of modern nationalisms. With at least 1.4 million Muslims living in Italy (European Commission 2018), Islam is de facto the second-largest religion but as far as Italian authorities are concerned, Islam does not exist as it has not formally been recognized until 2017. With Italy having served, and currently acting as both a transit route and destination for African, and Middle Eastern refugee and migrant communities via the Mediterranean Sea, tensions continue to grow between Islamic minorities and Italians, with Islamic weddings having no legal value, and Muslim workers not entitled to take days off for religious holidays.

With 69 per cent of Italians reporting negative opinions about Muslims – highest among European countries polled (Momigliano 2017), the case is ideal to examine the
interaction of various forms of identities under international pressures, and the role of religious antiquity and continuity as an agent in the latest surge of an increasingly populist and hostile Italian nationalism. Passionately competing regional identities and those of enduring familial kinship, Italy’s religious leadership in the European arena in the face of supranational institutional transformation and mass migration since the fall of European Communism in 1989, thus make the country an excellent fit for in-depth analysis to detangle political, economic, and societal catalysts, and mechanisms of rising nationalism.

Hungary is an example of national identity expressed through extreme nationalist sentiments with a distorted populist dimension. With only 3,397 asylum-seeking applicants in 2017 (Asylum Information Database 2018), Hungary’s 69.1 percent rejection rate is far below the EU-mandated quotas, Hungary, along Poland and the Czech Republic, is already in breach of European Court rulings after 2015 (Smyth 2018). Victor Orbán, newly re-elected Hungarian prime minister recently echoed to the German Bild that the “EU’s migration policies threaten Hungarian national sovereignty and cultural identity” with Muslim refugees in particular seen as “Muslim invaders” of the Christian faith (The Irish Times 2018). Hungary’s continuity of statehood, its anti-Western attitudes represented in the perpetual disregard for EU institutional recommendations and policies, and civic religiosity embedded in its daily political, economic, and societal events, allow for the comparison of historical, economic, political, and societal variables, and their linkage to nationalism since 1989 to present.

Modern Irish nationalism began only in the late eighteenth century through the founding of the Society of the Irishmen, with goals to seek an independent Irish republic
where discrimination against Catholics and Presbyterians would end. The 1990s have brought about a significant shift in the ethno-religious composition of Ireland mostly through immigration, with 63,000 Muslim residents currently residing in the Republic (Central Statistics Office 2017). Similar to Italy’s case, Ireland’s enduring economically, politically, and religiously divided past, provides an insight as to why a country that has a history of grappling with economic, political, and social grievances, in the past decade would increasingly gravitate toward right-wing populism and aggressive nationalist tendencies. Since the 1990s through the most recent European migrant and refugee crisis, Ireland’s case is unique and therefore most appropriate for the study of: interaction between territorial claims, religious pasts, and ethnosymbolic complexes; political and cultural traditions as bases for sentimental attachments to the concept of a nation; the meaning of national identity; and nationalism’s origins and dynamics over time.

Lastly, while the Social Democratic Party remained predominant since WWI, Sweden’s political landscape has been historically divided between two major political blocks, the left (red) and the right (blue) with several parties, including The Green Party, The Left Party, and the Feminist Initiative, in-between remaining active. Despite the country’s booming economy and strong welfare safety net, shootings, grenade and arson attacks on cars, and over 60,000 asylum applications (primarily by Syrians) between 2015 and 2018 alone, have tapped into Swedish fears (Savage 2018). Swedish Democrats associated with neo-Nazi and far-right radical politics are among the three most popular political parties in Sweden today, and subsequently have entered the Swedish Parliament in 2010. Thus, Sweden’s rapidly transforming economic, political, and social landscape, in which populism is on the rise despite steady employment and economic growth rates,
adds a fitting case to an examination of the dynamics of European nationalism as a once economically, politically, and culturally homogenous Nordic welfare state.

Addressing Potential Limitations of a Eurocentric Qualitative Comparative Analysis

In sum, the combination of the fuzzy-set QCA and collective case study approaches have been strategically employed. Due to its case-centered foci, the QCA technique can be combined with case studies to tackle the complexity of cases both logically and narratively, thus enhancing the construct and internal validity and quality of this research study (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2008; Sehring et al. 2013). Moreover, the consultation of a multiplicity of data sources – descriptive and narrative alike, and the combination of their data collection and analysis techniques, in particular logical minimization through Boolean algebra and thematic analysis, allows the researcher to consider modest generalizations (Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Sehring et al. 2013) and thus, to counter a general critique of qualitative designs. In any QCA and/or multiple-case study design that is undertaken systematically, ‘naturalistic generalizations’ are indeed possible (Stake 1978; 1995; Rowley 2002; Yin 2014).

It is nonetheless worth noting that despite earlier critiques of the Eurocentric tendency in nationalism research, the applicability of this Eurocentric qualitative analysis was never intended to explain nationalist phenomena globally. As such, its qualitative Eurocentric nature should not be regarded as its demise but rather as its vigor. Indeed, this study is conducted not to force large-scale generalizability or replicability that generally characterizes quantitative research but to explain specific, case-centered post-1989 European nationalist phenomena thoroughly through a rarely seen methodological lens in nationalism studies.
Section III: Definitions and Indicators of Outcome and Conditions

Before detailed within-case and cross-case comparisons can be formalized through fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) and collective case study designs, definition of the outcome (dependent variable: post-1989 European nationalism) and its proposed conditions (independent variables: economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism) and sub-conditions must be defined and operationalized. Indicators for both have been selected and defined based on theoretical and empirical evidence as discussed earlier in Chapter II, “Review of the Relevant Literature”.

‘Outcome’ and ‘conditions’ as termed in the fsQCA have been employed for clarity and uniformity in the place of ‘dependent’ and ‘independent variables throughout the chapter, and were employed in the calibration of data for the fsQCA analysis as well as in the thematic coding process (both detailed later in section four of this chapter).

*The Outcome*

*Post-1989 European Nationalism.* Nationalism is best understood as a collective celebration of the superiority of a nation, with a focus on maintaining that nation’s political independence and sovereignty. In this dissertation, it is viewed both as a top-down and bottom-up phenomena – and as ideology, sociopolitical platform, and/or sociopolitical movement, and every-day practice, respectively. Based on earlier definitions in the literature discussed in the previous chapter, Chapter II, this study conceptualizes and operationalizes post-1989 European nationalism and defines nationalism not on the basis of *nations* but rather on a *national identity* as an ideology, sociopolitical platform, and/or sociopolitical movement rooted in individuals’ exalting association with a *collective national identity* above all others that emphasizes its history, political ideology, economic development,
culture, and interests as opposed to those of other national or supranational identities as a guarantee for desired self-determination and self-governance.

**Indicators of Outcome**

Far-right party vote shares: increase in vote shares as proportion of the total vote.

Anti-migrant policies: increase of restrictive national – economic, social, political or other – policies in place targeting irregular migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and other vulnerable people as percentage of the total of national migration policies.

Euroscepticism: decrease in support and trust of the process of European integration, austerity programs, or the EU and its European initiatives by the politicians and/or the national public.

Restrictions of civil freedoms: decrease in the level of social globalization – personal guarantees and freedoms that the government cannot reduce, either legally or by judicial interpretation without due process (i.e. freedom of press, freedom of religion, equal treatment under the law).

**The Conditions**

**Economic Insecurities, Societal Fears, and Right-Wing Populism.** Economic insecurities are defined, conceptualized, and operationalized in this study as the subjective risk of any economic loss faced by individuals in EU member countries in regards to institutional (welfare efforts), socioeconomic factors (GDP), and/or degree of internationalization (EU integration, economic globalization and migration) (Western 2012; European Social Survey 2008/2009).

Second, societal fears are defined, conceptualized, and operationalized on the bases of the notion of societal security coined by the Copenhagen school. Societal fears are defined here as public fears of the “[i]nability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (Waever 1993, 23).
While state security is rooted in sovereignty, societal security is rooted in the sense of belonging and identity (Waever 1995).

Lastly, advancing with caution that not all right-wing politics is populist and/or nationalist, right-wing populism is defined, conceptualized, and operationalized in the European context as a political ideology that speaks for the common people and combines right-wing politics and populist rhetoric that include but are not limited to themes of anti-immigration, anti-globalization, Euroscepticism, and anti-establishment (Bruter and Harrison 2011; Wodak 2015).

**Indicators of Conditions**

A. Economic Insecurities

Degree of globalization: increase in economic, social, and political dimensions of global openness.

National unemployment: increase in rates of unemployment rate as proportion of the national population.

Emigration: increase of rates of emigration as proportion of the national population.

Income inequality: increase in income inequalities measured by the total income earned by cumulative percentage of the national population.

B. Societal Fears

Fear of migration: increase in negative public sentiments pertaining to migration (from outside the EU including economic, irregular, welfare-migration) as a percentage of the national population.

Fears of terrorism: increase in public ranking of terrorism as a national and European issue priority.

Fear of loss of national identity: increase in societal fears and insecurities associated with actual or potential risks of losing linguistic and/or cultural identity measured as an attachment to national identity above all else.
Religious grievances: increase the number of hate crimes by bias motivation (specifically racism and xenophobia, bias against Muslims, anti-Semitism, and bias against members of other religions and beliefs)

C. Right-wing Populism

Anti-elite and establishment attitudes: increase in right-wing populist party vote shares as a measure of public attitudes.

Demand for popular sovereignty: decrease in the percentages in public opinion about the level of democracy nationally and in the European Union.

Ethnic homogeneity: decrease in ethnic homogeneity in overall international migrant stock as the percentage of the total national population.

Section IV: The Data, Data Collection, and Coding Procedures

The Data and Data Collection

The data corpus – all data collected – for calibration for the fuzzy-set QCA and thematic coding were collected from a variety of sources including the Standard Eurobarometer, the KOF Globalization Index, national archival, governmental documents, and online media material. Data collection span over a total of six months (from November 2018 to April 2018), during which time the researcher has consulted and evaluated both descriptive and narrative data sources in preparation for an originally mixed-method-intended design. Additional narrative data was periodically consulted thereafter up until March 2019 for the discussion of the cases. The design was later finalized as a solely qualitative design with both logical and narrative components with the recognition that the qualitative approach’s flexibility is most appropriate to best address the research questions and test the hypotheses outlined above.
Sources consulted for the outcome, conditions, and respective indicators for the fuzzy-set QCA addressing research question 1 and its respective hypothesis are displayed in Table 3 below with assigned names entered into the fsQCA software shown in parentheses. The researcher’s choice to rely on these sources was grounded in their scholarly reputation and reliability to display cross-national data objectively, with missing values already accounted for.

Table 3

Data sets consulted for the outcome and conditions in each case examined, 1989 to 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome: Post-1989 European Nationalism (Nationali)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Far-right party vote shares: European Election Database (EED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anti-migrant policies: International Migration Institute Determinants of International Migration Policy Database (DEMIG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Euroscepticism: Standard Eurobarometer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Restrictions of civil freedoms: KOF Index of Globalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition A: Economic Insecurities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Degree of globalization (EiGlobal): KOF Index of Globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National unemployment (EiUnemploy): Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Labour Force Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Emigration rates (EiEmig): United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs (UN DESA); World Bank Population Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Income inequality (EiInequal): World Income Inequality Database (WIID) (1989 to 2015) and Eurostat EU-SILC Survey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition B: Societal Fears</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Fear of migration (SfMigra): Standard Eurobarometer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fears of terrorism (SfTerror): Standard Eurobarometer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Religious grievances (SfReligion): Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE ODIHR) Hate Crime Reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fear of loss of national identity (SfNident): Standard Eurobarometer; European Social Survey (ESS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition C: Right-wing Populism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Anti-elite attitudes (RwpAntiE): European Election Database (EED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Demand for popular sovereignty (RwpPopSov): Standard Eurobarometer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ethnic homogeneity (RwpEHomog): Migration Data Portal (MDP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, in preparation for the thematic analysis, the researcher has cataloged, reviewed, and coded a total of 136 publically available archival, governmental and institutional documents and reports from Germany’s, Italy’s, Hungary’s, Ireland’s and Sweden’s government websites as well as archived and recent online media material available detailing policies, events, and the general political, societal, and political environment of each country. With most scholarly findings having underscored three
notable historical periods in the rise of European nationalisms since 1989, the narrative data has been compiled with special attention paid to three consecutive, partially overlapping historical periods post-1989: 1989 to 2007 (between the Fall of European Communism and the European debt crisis); 2008 to 2014 (recovery period from the European debt crisis); and 2015 until present times (between the onset of the EU’s most recent refugee and migrant crisis until 2018).

Data sources for the first historical period primarily included national archival as well as EU institutional research data available online including data from the European Social Surveys, Standard and Special Eurobarometers, and on national governmental websites including the Governo Italiano (specifically Ministero dell’Interno), Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistics Office of Germany), and the Hungarian Kormany.hu. Data for the second and third periods, for the decade between 2008 until 2018, also relied on both national and EU-level descriptive and narrative data, and added narrative data gathered from the five country’s most used online news websites including Germany’s Spiegel online, the Italian Repubblica della Sera online, and the Swedish Aftonbladet online. These articles, in particular, have been collected, reviewed, and later coded at the country-level.

Figure 2. Types of Data Sources: The Outcome and Conditions, 1989 to 2017.
Table 4

*Top five online news sources and their weekly usage in each case, 2018*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>ONLINE NEWS SOURCE</th>
<th>AVERAGE WEEKLY USAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Spiegel online&lt;br&gt;t-online news&lt;br&gt;ARD News online&lt;br&gt;(Tageschau.de, etc.)&lt;br&gt;Web.de&lt;br&gt;Focus online</td>
<td>15&lt;br&gt;14&lt;br&gt;13&lt;br&gt;13&lt;br&gt;13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>La Repubblica online&lt;br&gt;TgCom24 online&lt;br&gt;SkyTg24 online&lt;br&gt;ANSA online&lt;br&gt;Il Corriere della Sera online</td>
<td>28&lt;br&gt;27&lt;br&gt;26&lt;br&gt;21&lt;br&gt;20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Origo.hu&lt;br&gt;Index.hu&lt;br&gt;24.hu&lt;br&gt;HVG online&lt;br&gt;444.hu</td>
<td>42&lt;br&gt;41&lt;br&gt;33&lt;br&gt;31&lt;br&gt;26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Journal.ie&lt;br&gt;RTE News online&lt;br&gt;Irish Independent online&lt;br&gt;Irish Times online&lt;br&gt;Breaking News.ie</td>
<td>32&lt;br&gt;31&lt;br&gt;30&lt;br&gt;23&lt;br&gt;19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Aftonbladet online&lt;br&gt;SVT News online&lt;br&gt;Expressen online&lt;br&gt;Dagens Nyheter online&lt;br&gt;TV4 News online</td>
<td>48&lt;br&gt;37&lt;br&gt;31&lt;br&gt;20&lt;br&gt;18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (as percentage of the total national population); Source: Reuters Institute Digital News Report, 2017.

*Calibration for the Fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA).* With fuzzy-set QCA, the process of calibration must be clear and transparent. Precision comes from the combination of the reliance on literature and quantitative assessments of degree of set membership ranging from 0.0 (full exclusion from a set) to 1.0 (full inclusion) (Ragin 2000; Smithson and Verkuilen 2006). In this study, this membership scores were thus not to be seen as *probabilities*, but rather as *truth values* of the target sets (the conditions) – economic insecurities, societal fears, or right-wing populism (Ragin 2000). The indicators of presence for the outcome and conditions were calibrated based on the combination of substantive theoretical knowledge and country-level empirical data to determine the
consistency thresholds for both the outcome and conditions (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2010).

Employing a six-value fuzzy-set: 1.0 = fully in; 0.9 = mostly but not fully in; 0.7 = more in than out, 0.3 = more out than in, 0.1 = mostly but not fully out; and 0 = fully out with $2^k$ logically possible configurations $= 2^3 = 8$ (Ragin 2008), degree of membership in the target sets for each country has been calibrated based on the consistency thresholds discussed next.

Membership in Outcome (Post-1989 European Nationalism)

Scores for membership in outcome for the fsQCA for each country has been determined through the careful evaluation of the presence of indicators of post-1989 European nationalism generally agreed upon by nationalism scholars. Although far-right parties are not exclusively nationalist, far-right parties often capitalize on nationalism to obtain votes (Ellinas 2010). In particular, nationalist climates tend to reinforce state-controlled media and government policy, with anti-migrant policies and often societal restrictions, playing a major role (Schenk 2010).

In addition, Euroscepticism has been established as a common denominator for both radical right and left-wing parties promoting nationalist sentiments (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2012; Gifford 2017). Total scores for membership for each country in the outcome were based on the level of presence of each indicator since 1989 in preparation for the fsQCA presented in Table 5 below.
Table 5

Score thresholds and assigned membership scores (Post-1989 Nationalism)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Six-value Fuzzy-set Scores</th>
<th>Post-1989 European Nationalism (Nationalism)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0 = fully in</td>
<td>All four indicators have been present at least once since 1989 (0.7 to 1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9 = mostly but not fully in</td>
<td>Three indicators have been present at least once since 1989 (0.7 to 1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7 = more in than out</td>
<td>Two indicators have been present at least once in 1989 (0.7 to 1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3 = more out than in</td>
<td>One indicator has been present at least once since 1989 (0.7 to 1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1 = mostly but not fully out</td>
<td>At least one indicator has been somewhat present at least once since 1989 (0.1 to 0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = fully out</td>
<td>No indicators have been present at least once since 1989 (all indicators 0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Germany

Far-right party vote shares. With far-right parties banned in the early 1990s, not until 2004 did a far-right party, the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NDP) gain 1.6% percent of the federal vote. By 2017, although the NDP lost popularity with vote shares falling to 0.4%, the relatively new Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) founded in 2013 secured 12.6 percent of the federal vote shares approaching 14 percent (German Parliamentary Election Database 2018) \( 13\% = 0.7 = \text{more in than out} \).

Anti-migrant policies. Between 1989 and 2017, Germany had transitioned from a country of prevention to integration. From a total of 96 migration policies targeting all foreign nationals between, only 2 have been recorded (in 2010 and 2012) as more restrictive targeting irregular migrants only (DEMIG 2015). \( 2\% = 0.1= \text{mostly but not fully out} \).

Table 6

Germany’s main political parties, descriptions and election results, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VOTES %</th>
<th>SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU)</td>
<td>Christian Democrat</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)</td>
<td>Social Democrat</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Democrats (FDP)</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Left (Linke/PDS)</td>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance ’90/The Greens (B90/GRÜ)</td>
<td>Ecologist</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3. German Parliamentary Elections, 1990 to 2009.

Figure 4. NPD and AfD Vote Shares in State, National, and EU Elections.\(^6\)


**Euroscepticism.** With East Germans included, in 1989/1990, German support for the former European Community (EC) was at 73 percent indicating German public opinion that the EC was a ‘good thing’ for the country. Such support for the then

\(^6\) Each state election is indicated with the abbreviation of the state’s name; EU2014 refers to the 2014 European Parliament elections; and Bundestag 2017 refers to the 2017 federal elections (Nociar and Thomeczek 2018).
European Union (EU) declined to 44 percent by 1995, to only 39 percent of Germans trusting the EU in 2015, and rose to 47 percent in 2017 (Standard Eurobarometer 34, 1990; Standard Eurobarometer 71, 1995; Standard Eurobarometer 83.3, 2015; Standard Eurobarometer 88, 2017). \(\Rightarrow 25\% = 1.0 = \text{fully in.}\)

**Restrictions on civil freedoms.** Germany’s cultural globalization index indicated an increase in press freedoms and personal freedoms rising from a score of 71.87 in 1989 to 86.83 by the end of 2016 (KOF Globalization Index 2018). Economic, social, and political globalization has been on a general rise in Germany since unification with its press deemed *free* with a score of 20/100 (0 being most free; 100 being least free) in 2017 (Freedom House 2017). \(\Rightarrow 0 = \text{fully out. TOTAL: } 0.7 = \text{more in than out}\) (Two indicators have been present at least once in 1989).

**Italy**

**Far-right party vote shares.** Italian far-right parties had a 5.5 percent vote share during national general elections in 1989 (EC 1989; Jacobs and Corbett 1990). These vote shares in totality rose to 22.43 percent – Fratelli d’Italia (4.35 percent), Lega Nord (LN) (17.69 percent), Forza Nuova (New Force, 0.39 percent) – if the neo-fascist parties Tricolor Flame (0.39 percent) and Casapound (0.95 percent) are not included (European Election Database 2018). \(\Rightarrow 16.93\% = 0.9 = \text{mostly but not fully in.}\)

**Anti-migrant policies.** Of a total of 78 national policies targeting all migrants, irregular migrants, their families, and refugees, asylum-seekers and other vulnerable peoples between the period of 1989 and 2018, 39 anti-migrant policies emerged as more restrictive (DEMIG 2015; Migration Policy Institute 2018). \(\Rightarrow 50\% = 1.0 = \text{fully in.}\)
**Euroscepticism.** In 1990, 77 percent of Italians viewed EC membership to be a ‘good thing’, beneficial to the country. By 1996, 52 percent of Italians viewed EU membership as a benefit to the country. By 2017, this percentage represented Italian’s distrust of the EU and its institutions with 52 percent of Italians among the EU nations that distrust the EU the most against 22 percent of Italians who ‘trust’ and ‘support’ the European Community, its programs and institutions (Standard Eurobarometer 34, 1990; Standard Eurobarometer 44, 1996; Standard Eurobarometer 88, 2017). \[ 55\% = 1.0 = \] fully in.

![Graph showing measures of Italian Globalization since 1989.](image)

**Figure 5. Measures of Italian Globalization**\(^7\) since 1989.

*Note:* Measures of overall globalization (blue) and measures of cultural globalization (green).

**Restrictions on civil freedoms.** Italy’s social globalization index indicated an increase in press freedoms and personal freedoms rising from a score of 65.11 in 1989 to 83.22 in 2016 (KOF Globalization Index 2018). Economic, social, and political globalization has been on a general rise in Italy since unification. Economic, social, and

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\(^7\) Measures of overall globalization include *de jure* and *de facto* measures of economic, social, and political globalization. The KOF Index of Globalization database includes panel normalized data that measures information freedoms and civil freedoms in the category of social globalization *de jure*. Weights were calculated by using the entire sample with time-varying weights for the variables (KOF Index of Globalization 2018).
political globalization has been on a general rise in Italy since unification with its press
deemed *partially free* with a score of 31/100 (0 being most free; 100 being least free) in
2017 (House 2017). \( \Rightarrow 0.1 = \text{mostly but not fully out. TOTAL: } 0.9 = \text{mostly but not}
\text{fully in} \) (Three indicators have been present at least once since 1989).

*Hungary*

**Far-right party vote shares.** In 1989/1990, no radical far-right parties were in
the vicinity of capturing vote shares in the national elections. Fidesz, the right-wing
populist party obtained 13.8 percent of the total vote shares and slowly advanced to being
the second largest party by 1998. Jobbik, the radical right-wing party formed in 2002 won
its first votes in 2006 (2.2 percent). By the 2010 national elections, they won 14.9
percent, by 2014, 20.22 percent, maintaining 19.6 percent of votes in the 2018 national
elections (European Elections Database 2018). \( \Rightarrow 19.6\% = 0.9 = \text{mostly but not fully in.} \)

**Anti-migrant policies.** Of a total of 59 national policies targeting all migrants,
irregular migrants, their families, and refugees, asylum-seekers and other vulnerable
peoples between the period of 1989 and 2018, 16 ‘more restrictive’ anti-migrant policies
were enacted (primarily between 2004 and 2018), the latest being a series of bills in the
‘STOP Soros law’ (DEMIG 2015; Kormány 2018). \( \Rightarrow 27\% = 1.0 = \text{fully in}. \)

**Euroscepticism.** Although 83 percent of Hungarians favored EU membership in
2003, since 1990, support for political parties promoting integration has declined
(Ungváry 2014). Based on archived national reports between 1989 and Hungary’s
membership in the EU in 2004 on May 1, 2004 Eurobarometer data and other country-
level data about ‘trust’ of the EU in Hungary, a gradual decline was observed. In 2005,
40 percent of Hungarians ‘trusted’ the EU, with 49 percent viewing that Hungarians had
no voice in the EU. In 2017, 43 percent of surveyed Hungarians did not trust the EU while 49 percent of them did (Standard Eurobarometer 63.4, 2005; Standard Eurobarometer 83.3, 2015; Standard Eurobarometer 88, 2017). \( \Rightarrow 34\% = 1.0 = \text{fully in.} \)

**Restrictions on civil freedoms.** Hungary’s social globalization index indicated an increase in press freedoms and personal freedoms rising from a score of 49.58 in 1989 to 82.79 in 2016 (KOF Globalization Index 2018). Economic, social, and political globalization has been on a general rise in Hungary since unification with its press deemed partially free with a score of 44/100 (0 being most free; 100 being least free) in 2017 (House 2017). \( \Rightarrow 0.1 = \text{mostly but not fully out. TOTAL: } 0.9 = \text{mostly but not fully in} \) (Three indicators have been present at least once since 1989.

*Ireland*

**Far-right party vote shares.** The 1989 Irish general elections yielded no radical right-wing support, only 29.3 percent of support for the center-right Fine Gael behind the conservative Fianna Fáil. Renua, a new registered right-wing party captured 2.2 percent of votes in 2016, while the rest of the parties remained center-right, left and left-wing throughout the years, with Fine Gael retaining leadership with 25.5 percent of the votes in 2016 (European Elections Database 2018). Far-right parties such as the far-right nationalist An Páirtí Náisiúnta (National Party) founded in 2016 remain unregistered. \( \Rightarrow 0 = \text{fully out.} \)

**Anti-migrant policies.** Between 1989 and 2018, Ireland has legislated 36 migration-related national policies in total with the target groups including all migrants, irregular migrants, their families, and refugees and asylum-seekers as well as other vulnerable people with fine-tuning changes to major changes. 22 of these national
policies became more restricted during this time-period (DEMIG 2018). $\Rightarrow 5\% = 1.0 = \text{fully in.}$

**Euroscepticism.** In 1989, 84 percent of the Irish felt that they benefitted from the EC, with 80 percent trusting the EU and its institutions in 1995. While in recent years, such trust index remained stable, in fall of 2017, only 50 percent of Irish respondents indicated their trust in the EU. From early 1990s, survey results indicated a decline in Irish trust of the EU. (Standard Eurobarometer 44, 1996; Standard Eurobarometer 88, 2017). $\Rightarrow 34\% = 1.0 = \text{fully in.}$

**Restrictions on civil freedoms.** Ireland’s social globalization index indicated an increase in press freedoms and personal freedoms rising from a score of 73.89 in 1989 (with a minor decline to 73.37 increased to 89.97 by 2016 (KOF Globalization Index 2018). Economic, social, and political globalization has been on a general rise in Ireland since unification with its press deemed *free* with a score of 18/100 (0 being most free; 100 being least free) in 2017 (House 2017). $\Rightarrow 0 = \text{fully out. TOTAL: } 0.7 = \text{more in than out}$ (Two indicators have been present at least once since 1989).

![Figure 6. Trust in the European Union and Its Institutions By Country, 2017.](image)

Sweden

**Far-right party vote shares.** Between 1988 and 1998, Sweden’s political parties were primarily center-left, liberal, and socialist, with the Swedish Social Democratic Party capturing the majority of votes. In 1998, the right-wing populist, described many as far-right nationalist party, the Swedish Democrats captured 0.4 percent of votes and representation in the Riksdag for the first time since 1988, with Ny Framtid (New Future) a Eurosceptic party also having captured 0.1 percent of the votes. By 2010, the popularity of the Sweden Democrats was at 5.7 percent, advancing the party to third most popular party of Sweden by 2014 with 6.8, and by 2018 with 12.6 percent of vote shares (Government Offices of Sweden 2018).  

\[ \text{12.6\%} = 0.7 = \text{more in than out}. \]

**Anti-migrant policies.** Once a migration country, Sweden has ratified a total of 48 migration-related policies targeting all migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, and other vulnerable peoples. Out of these, 12 migration policies became more restrictive ranging from fine-tuning to major changes in areas such as the permanent residency requirements, refugee smuggling, and re-entry bans (DEMIG 2015; Government Offices of Sweden 2018).  

\[ \text{25\%} = 1.0 = \text{fully in}. \]

**Euroscepticism.** With no data available until 1995, as a new member country, in 1995 54 percent of Swedes did not see their membership in the EU as beneficial. Swedish trust in the EU has remained relatively the same, with only a minor increase over the years, with only 48 percent distrusting the EU overall in 2017.  

\[ \text{7\%} = 0.3 = \text{more out than in}. \]

**Restrictions on civil freedoms.** Sweden’s social globalization index indicated an increase in press freedoms and personal freedoms rising from a score of 81.25 in 1989
(with its peak of 92.76 in 2013) to 92.26 by 2016 (KOF Globalization Index 2018).

Economic, social, and political globalization has been on a general rise in Sweden since unification with its press deemed \textit{free} with a score of 11/100 (0 being most free; 100 being least free) in 2017 (House 2017). → 0 = \textbf{fully out}. TOTAL: 0.7 = \textbf{more in than out} (Two indicators have been present at least once since 1989).

\textit{Membership in Conditions (Economic Insecurities, Societal Fears, and Right-Wing Populism)}

A. Economic Insecurities

As discussed in Chapter II, ‘Review of the Relevant Literature’, scholars have generally agreed that degree of globalization along with income inequality, national unemployment, and emigration rates serve as effective indicators of economic uncertainty and insecurities that open doors for nationalisms (Mudde et al 2003; Roubini 2014).

\textbf{Degree of globalization} (EiGlobal). Scholars have found that degrees of globalization indicated a country’s level of nationalism as lower levels of openness implied greater lineage toward protectionism and preference of domestic material interests and Euroscepticism (Lan and Li 2014; Roubini 2014). Data for degree of globalization was calibrated from the KOF Index of Globalization (Overall – economic, social, and political – globalization). Scores were assigned based on the differences in total scores in countries’ levels of globalization between 1989 and 2017 as measured by the KOF Globalization Index.

\textbf{National unemployment} (EiUnemploy). Economic insecurities associated with job insecurity and low levels of employment attributed to deepening international
economic integration, also expressed in the political discourse by populist party leaders, have resonated particularly well with the masses as bases for nationalist tendencies (Mughan et al 2003). With natural unemployment rates for a country being considered ‘normal’ around 5.5 percent, European unemployment must be treated context-specifically and with specific attention paid to its duration (Blanchard 2004). Data for the total national unemployment (frictional, structural, and surplus) was calibrated based on available statistical data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Figure 7. Unemployment Rates as Percentage of Total Labor Force, 1989-2017.

Figure 8. Trends in Income Inequality in the Five Examined Cases, 1989 to 2015.
Source: The World Income Inequality Database 2018; Eurostat 2018.
Scores for the national unemployment were calibrated based on the total national unemployment rates in relation to their ‘normal’ and their duration. Both the degree of globalization and national unemployment were again based on the six-value fuzzy set with a scoring system for the period between 1989 and 2017 displayed in Tables 7 and 8 below.

Table 7

*Degree of globalization and national unemployment score thresholds (Economic Insecurities)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Six-value Fuzzy-set Scores</th>
<th>Degree of Globalization (EiGlobal)</th>
<th>National Unemployment (EiUnemploy)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0 = fully in</td>
<td>Maximal change (10 or more scores) change in overall degree of globalization</td>
<td>Total national unemployment rates above 10% for at least 5, or for more than 5 consecutive years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9 = mostly but not fully in</td>
<td>Major (8 to 9 scores) change in overall degree of globalization</td>
<td>Total national unemployment rates between 8.50% and 9.99% for at least 5, or for more than 5 consecutive years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7 = more in than out</td>
<td>Mid-level (6 to 7 scores) change in overall degree of globalization</td>
<td>Total national unemployment rates between 7.50% and 8.49% for at least 5, or for more than 5 consecutive years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3 = more out than in</td>
<td>Low-level (4 to 5 scores) change in overall degree of globalization</td>
<td>Total national unemployment rates between 6.50% and 7.49% for at least 5, or for more than 5 consecutive years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1 = mostly but not fully out</td>
<td>Minimal (1 to 3 scores) change in overall degree of globalization</td>
<td>Total national unemployment rates between 5.51% and 6.49% for at least 5, or for more than 5 consecutive years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = fully out</td>
<td>No change in overall degree of globalization</td>
<td>Total national unemployment rates at 5.50% or below 5.50% for at least 5, or for more than 5 consecutive years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8

*Degree of globalization and national unemployment calibration and assigned scores*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Degree of Globalization (EiGlobal)</th>
<th>Assigned Score</th>
<th>National Unemployment (EiUnemploy)</th>
<th>Assigned Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>73.37 (\rightarrow) 88.77 = 15.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 (2012-2017)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>68.06 (\rightarrow) 82.59 = 14.53</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (2012-2017)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>58.37 (\rightarrow) 85.13 = 26.76</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1 (1999-2004); 1 (2008-2013)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>73.16 (\rightarrow) 84.64 = 11.48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 (2000-2007); 1 (2009-2014)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>77.9 (\rightarrow) 89.88 = 11.98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3 (2003-2008)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Emigration (EiEmig).** Although rarely explored in nationalism studies literature, the level of emigration may be cause of increased nationalism. Scholarly findings suggest that homeland politics and symbolic politics to reinforce national identity may be in direct relation with a country’s emigration trends (Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Padilla and Ortiz 2012). Emigration has found to significantly change the wage distribution in the sending countries in the EU (Elsner 2013), thus giving way to economic insecurities as bases for nationalist politics. As such, 88 percent of Hungarians, 33 percent of Germans, and 18 percent of Swedes have recently viewed emigration as a national problem (Connor and Krogstad 2018). Data for calibration was based on theory and descriptive statistics from the United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs (UN DESA) and World Bank Data between 1989 and 2017. Scores were assigned based on the increase/decrease in the rates of emigration and in national population.

**Income inequality (EiInequal).** Scholars have suggested a link between income inequality, income levels, and nationalism (Dorling 2014; Therbon 2014; Winlow and Hall 2013; 2017). Greater economic inequality is believed to prompt both Euroscepticism and, in turn, more nationalism (Kuhn 2011; Hobolt and De Vries 2016). Data was calibrated based on data from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) (1989 to 2015) and Eurostat EU-SILC Survey (2015 to 2017) based on the level of change in Gini coefficient values since 1989 (the smaller the Gini coefficient, the more equal the distribution of income – scale of 0 to 100). Scores for both emigration rates and income inequality were again based on the six-value fuzzy set with a scoring system for the period between 1989 and 2017 displayed in Tables 9 and 10 below.
Table 9

*Emigration and income inequality score thresholds (Economic Insecurities)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Six-value Fuzzy-set Scores</th>
<th>Emigration (EiEmig)</th>
<th>Income Inequality (in Gini coefficient values) (EiInequal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0 = fully in</td>
<td>Rates of emigration increased while the total population mostly shrunk since 1989</td>
<td>Income inequality is much higher than it was in 1989 (at least 5 values higher)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9 = mostly but not fully in</td>
<td>Rates of emigration have increased while the total national population mostly grew since 1989</td>
<td>Income inequality is higher than it was in 1989 (at least 3 to 4 values higher)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7 = more in than out</td>
<td>Rates of emigration have increased more than decreased while the total population grew since 1989</td>
<td>Income inequality is somewhat higher than it was in 1989 (at least 1 to 2 values higher)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3 = more out than in</td>
<td>Rates of emigration have decreased more than increased while the total population grew since 1989</td>
<td>Income inequality is somewhat lower than it was in 1989 (at least 1 to 2 values lower)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1 = mostly but not fully out</td>
<td>Rates of emigration have mostly decreased while the total national population grew since 1989</td>
<td>Income inequality is lower than it was in 1989 (at least 3 to 4 values lower)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = fully out</td>
<td>Rates of emigration have steadily decreased while the total national population grew since 1989</td>
<td>Income inequality is much lower than it was in 1989 (at least 5 or more values lower)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10

*Emigration and income inequality calibration and assigned scores*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Emigration (in Millions/ Total Population) (EiEmig)</th>
<th>Assigned Score</th>
<th>Income Inequality (EiInequal)</th>
<th>Assigned Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>3.3/79,433,029 (1990); 3.3/81,678,051 (1995); 3.4/82,211,508 (2000); 3.6/82,469,422 (2005); 3.9/81,776,930 (2010); 4.2/82,695,000 (2017)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7 values higher</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>3.4/56,719,240 (1990); 3.3/56,847,303 (1995); 3.1/56,942,108 (2000); 2.7/57,969,484 (2005); 2.6/59,277,417 (2010); 3.0/60,551,416 (2017)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.4 values higher</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>386.9 thous/10,373,988 (1990); 404 thous/10,328,965 (1995); 420.2 thous/10,210,971 (2000); 466.4 thous/10,087,065 (2005); 527.8 thous/10,000,023 (2010); 636.8 thous/9,781,127 (2017)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.7 values higher</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>917.6 thous/3,513,974 (1990); 864.2 thous/3,608,847 (1995); 821.4 thous/3,805,174 (2000); 771.1 thous/4,159,914 (2005); 780.8 thous/4,560,155 (2010); 802.1 thous/4,813,608 (2017)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.2 values lower</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>207/8,558,835 (1990); 227.2/8,826,939 (1995); 258.3/8,872,109 (2000); 270.5/9,029,572 (2005); 300.1/9,378,126 (2010); 348/10,067,744 (2017)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.2 values higher</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Societal Fears

As discussed in Chapter II, “Review of the Relevant Literature”, scholars have noted fear fears of migration, terrorism, of the loss of national identity, and religious
grievances as particularly salient potential societal conditions for the rise of post-1989 nationalism.

**Fears of migration** (SfMigra). Huysmans (2006) and Balzacq and Carrera (2005) found that, in the EU, European integration and the insecurities pertaining thereto take place within a larger political game as it is often the politicization of such fear, which fuels national political and security policy. Increasing public fears of migration were found to be linked with the deterioration of the economic opportunities such as access to welfare and social security (Delanty 2008; Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2016). In 2017, over half of Europeans surveyed had negative attitudes toward migrants, while Europeans tend to prefer migrants from the same race or ethnic group (Eurobarometer 88, 2017; Transatlantic Trends Survey 2014, European Social Survey Round 7, 2014). Data from the Standard Eurobarometer (various years between 1989 and 2018) were examined and combined to calibrate scores based on the highest percentage responses to whether immigration (from outside the EU) has “evoked positive or negative feelings” in the citizens questioned. The 6-value scores were based on the Eurobarometer’s general response options ranging from ‘very positive’ to ‘don’t know.’

**Fears of terrorism** (SfTerror). In 2017, a Special Eurobarometer indicated that 95 percent of respondents across Europe viewed terrorism as a critical issue, with respondents regarding it as a trend that has increased in the EU in recent years. A decreasing number of Europeans believe that terrorism is being dealt with adequately throughout the EU (Special Eurobarometer 464b, 2017). Liang (2016) indeed found empirical linkage between societal fears of uncontrolled migration, terrorism, costs of globalization, and less tangible threats of non-state actors including the EU as a
supernatural governing and economic body, particularly since the 2001 global terrorist attacks against the United States. The fear of ‘terrorism’ in the EU spiked in 2002, with over 90 percent of Europeans regarding it as the second top priority.

Figure 9. Most Important Issues of Concern Facing the EU, 2011 to 2017.
Source: Eurobarometer 79, 2013; Eurobarometer 83; 2017; Retrieved directly from “10 Trends Shaping Migration.” 2017. European Political Strategy Centre. European Commission. Note: Survey responders were allowed to name up to two priorities.

By 2009, this concern diminished, with Germany attributing 0 percent and Ireland 1 percent to it nationally, indicating the two issues prioritized being economic in nature. With ‘terrorism’ as a top priority reaching a peak of a 39 percent EU-level increase between 2016 to 2017, by 2018, it slid to the second place after ‘immigration’ (Eurobarometer 57, 2002; Eurobarometer 71, 2009; Eurobarometer 88, 2018).

Membership scores for the fsQCA were calibrated based on mean scores from the Standard Eurobarometer (various years between 1989 and 2018) on citizens ranking of terrorism as a top priority facing the European Union and their nation.

**Fear of loss of national identity** (SfNident). Westle and Segatti (2016) and Westle and Buchheim (2016), established that in most European countries, attachment to one’s home country is much stronger than one’s attachment to the EU. They also
explained that while dual national and hybrid European identities are encouraged in times of European integration and globalization, exclusive national attachment exists, while exclusive European attachment is rare. European identity and other foreign identities are indeed often perceived as threats despite being mutually compatible with national identity (Wintle 2005; Stokes-DuPass 2017).

Membership scores for the fsQCA were calibrated based on whether attachment to nationality or attachment to European identity has been generally more pronounced as shown in Eurobarometer responses (various years from 1989 to 2018) to the question: “Do you see yourself as… (NATIONALITY) only; (NATIONALITY) and European; European and Nationality; European Only; None; and Refuse to Respond? Scores for fear of migration and terrorism were based on the six-value fuzzy set with a scoring system for the period between 1989 and 2017 displayed in Tables 11 and 12 below.

Table 11

*Fears of migration and terrorism score thresholds (Societal Fears)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Six-value Fuzzy-set Scores</th>
<th>Fears of Migration (SfMigra)</th>
<th>Fears of Terrorism (SfTerror)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0 = fully in</td>
<td>Extremely negative (over 50 percent or over on average)</td>
<td>Terrorism has remained among the top two priorities for at least ten, or over ten consecutive years since 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9 = mostly but not fully in</td>
<td>Very negative</td>
<td>Terrorism has remained among the top three priorities for at least ten, or over ten consecutive years since 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7 = more in than out</td>
<td>Fairly negative</td>
<td>Terrorism has remained among the top five priorities for at least ten, or over ten consecutive years since 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3 = more out than in</td>
<td>Fairly positive</td>
<td>Terrorism has remained among the top ten priorities for at least ten, or over ten consecutive years since 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1 = mostly but not fully out</td>
<td>Very positive</td>
<td>Terrorism has been among the top priorities at least once since 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = fully out</td>
<td>Very positive (at least 50 percent or over on average)</td>
<td>Terrorism has not been among the top ten priorities for the country since 1989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12

Fears of migration and terrorism calibration and assigned scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fears of Migration (SfMigra)</th>
<th>Assigned Score</th>
<th>Fears of Terrorism (SfTerror)</th>
<th>Assigned Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>Fairly positive (36 percent)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Terrorism has remained among the top five priorities for at least ten, or over ten consecutive years</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>Fairly negative (42 percent)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Terrorism has remained among the top ten priorities for at least ten, or over ten consecutive years</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>Fairly negative (34 percent)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Terrorism has remained among the top five priorities for at least ten, or over ten consecutive years</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>Fairly positive (30 percent)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Terrorism has remained among the top five priorities for at least ten, or over ten consecutive years</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>Fairly positive (44 percent)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Terrorism has remained among the top ten priorities for at least ten, or over ten consecutive years</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Religious grievances (SfReligion). In the EU, islamophobia as a societal fear, is on the rise (Bunzl 2005; Fekete 2008). With a linkage to migration, Muslim migrants, for instance, have been regarded as less deserving of welfare assistance in comparison to other migrant groups, with religious grievances thus spanning across the migrant-terrorism nexus (European Social Survey Round 7, 2017). The Pew Research Center found empirical evidence that many Central and Eastern European countries ‘prefer’ one religion over another, and see national identity linked with a religious one (Kishi and Starr 2017).

Scholars have thus linked hate crimes to economic cycles, immigration, and political agendas. Hate crimes against migrants, refugees, and other vulnerable peoples include but are not limited to harassment, violence, ethnic agitation, and assault (Bunar 2007). Membership scores were calibrated based on the level of decrease/increase in the number of hate crimes by bias motivation (specifically racism and xenophobia, bias against Muslims, anti-Semitism, and bias against members of other religions and beliefs).
in each country since 1989 obtained from national police reports and data compiled by the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, available since 2009. Scores for fear of loss of national identity and religious grievances, based on the six-value fuzzy set, are displayed in Tables 13 and 14 below.

Table 13

*Fears of loss of national identity and religious grievances score thresholds*

*(Societal Fears)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Six-value Fuzzy-set Scores</th>
<th>Fears of Loss of National Identity (SFNident)</th>
<th>Religious Grievances (SFReligion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0 = fully in</td>
<td>Majority of respondents see themselves as NATIONALITY only since 1989</td>
<td>Maximal increase in the number of hate crimes (more than 1000 incidences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9 = mostly but not fully in</td>
<td>Majority of respondents see themselves as NATIONALITY and European since 1989</td>
<td>Major increase in the number of hate crimes (between 700 and 999 incidences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7 = more in than out</td>
<td>Majority of respondents see themselves as European and NATIONALITY since 1989</td>
<td>Mid-level increase in the number of hate crimes (between 400 and 699 incidences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3 = more out than in</td>
<td>Majority of respondents see themselves as European and NATIONALITY since 1989</td>
<td>Low-level increase in the number of hate crimes (between 100 and 399 incidences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1 = mostly but not fully out</td>
<td>Majority of respondents see themselves as only European since 1989</td>
<td>Minimal increase in the number of hate crimes (between 1 and 99 incidences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = fully out</td>
<td>Majority of respondents see themselves as NONE since 1989</td>
<td>Decrease or no change in the number of hate crime-related incidences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14

*Fears of loss of national identity and religious grievances calibration and assigned scores*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fears of Loss of National Identity (SFNident)</th>
<th>Assigned Score</th>
<th>Religious Grievances (SFReligion)</th>
<th>Assigned Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>Majority of respondents see themselves as NATIONALITY and European since 1989 (61 percent)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3,266+ (racism and xenophobia; anti-Semitism; bias against Muslims most prominent in 2017)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>Majority of respondents see themselves as NATIONALITY and European since 1989 (53 percent)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>576+ (racism and xenophobia; anti-Semitism most prominent in 2017)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>Majority of respondents see themselves as NATIONALITY and European since 1989 (49 percent)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>298+ (racism and xenophobia; bias against members of other religions and beliefs most prominent in 2017)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>Majority of respondents see themselves as NATIONALITY and European since 1989 (51 percent)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Less than 200 (racism and xenophobia; anti-Semitism most prominent in 2017)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>Majority of respondents see themselves as NATIONALITY and European since 1989 (57 percent)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>920+ (racism and xenophobia; bias against Muslims most prominent in 2017)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C. Right-wing Populism

As discussed in Chapter II, “Review of the Relevant Literature”, scholars have noted that right-wing populism often relies on anti-EU and anti-elite attitudes, the notion of sovereignty, and xenophobic extremism to promote a sense of national belonging through attachment based on the combination of values relating to one’s homeland, including ethnic, cultural, or historical aspects (Arendt 1945).

**Anti-elite attitudes** (RwpAntiE). Raadt et al. (2004) noted that populists often critique the intermediary organizations that stand in the way of an ideal democracy. Ivarsflaten (2007) found that what united the success of European populist right wing parties specifically since 2002, was their effective mobilization of national grievances against immigration. Arter (2013) however warned that not all right-wing populist parties rely on xenophobia, including the True Finn Party (PS) which relies solely on national identity and Finnishness as its key driver of nationalist vote (Arter 2013).

Membership scores for the fsQCA were thus calibrated based on the level of right-wing populism through the examination of right-wing party vote shares obtained from the European Election Database since 1990. Employing a six-value fuzzy-set: 1.0 = fully in (≥ 25%); 0.9 = mostly but not fully in (15-25%); 0.7 = more in than out (9-14%), 0.3 = more out than in (4-8%), 0.1 = mostly but not fully out (1-3%); and 0 = fully out (0%), degree of membership in right-wing populism for each country has been calibrated.

**Demand for popular sovereignty** (RwpPopSov). Nationalism and the sense of national belonging is grounded in the notion of self-determination and sovereignty a notion often capitalized upon by right-wing party-rhetoric. Yack (2001) found empirical evidence that the quest for popular sovereignty and nationalism are indeed correlated as
popular sovereignty leads to the affirmation of national interest and the populous being in charge of their national economic, political, and social destinies. To calibrate membership scores for the demand for popular sovereignty, mean percentages of the Standard Eurobarometer surveys have been consulted (various years). Scores for popular sovereignty were assigned based on the level of increase/decrease in the mean scores in public perceptions about their satisfaction with ‘democracy working in their own country and in the European Union’ as measured by the Standard Eurobarometer since 1989.

Figure 10. Average European Right-Wing Populist Electoral Support, 1980 to 2017.

**Ethnic homogeneity** (RwpEHomog). Scholars have concluded that ethnic diversity decreases social trust (Gereke 2018). Changes in ethnic composition have been associated with globalization, migration, and demands for national boundaries. Populist nationalist parties and right-wing populists have often played the nationalist card, with extreme right-wing popularity generally increasing with ethnic heterogeneity (Ellinas 2010; Lucassen and Lubbers 2011). Interestingly, neither Germany, Hungary, nor Sweden keeps national census statistics on ethnic and/or racial diversity before the early 2000s.

For consistency, scores for membership have thus been calibrated based the
empirical linkage identified by scholars between international migration and ethnic diversity. Data from the Migration Data Portal was used to measure increases/decreases in overall international migrant stock as the percentage of the total national population for each country between 1990 and 2017. Scores for anti-elite attitudes, demand for popular sovereignty, and ethnic homogeneity with their respective scoring systems for the period between 1989 and 2017 are displayed in Tables 15 and 16 below.

Table 15

Anti-elite attitudes, demand for popular sovereignty, and ethnic homogeneity score thresholds (Right-wing Populism)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Six-value Fuzzy-set Scores</th>
<th>Anti-elite Attitudes (RwpAntiE)</th>
<th>Demand for Popular Sovereignty (RwpPopSov)</th>
<th>Ethnic Homogeneity (RwpEHomog)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0 = fully in</td>
<td>Above 25 percent increase in combined right-wing party vote shares since 1990</td>
<td>Very dissatisfied with the way democracy works nationally and in the EU (20 or less percent)</td>
<td>Above 25 percent increase in international migrant stock since 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9 = mostly but not fully in</td>
<td>15 to 25 percent increase in right-wing party vote shares since 1990</td>
<td>Fairly dissatisfied with the way democracy works nationally and in the EU (21 to 40 percent)</td>
<td>15 to 25 percent increase in international migrant stock since 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7 = more in than out</td>
<td>9 to 14 percent increase in right-wing party vote shares since 1990</td>
<td>Somewhat dissatisfied with the way democracy works nationally and in the EU (41 to 50 percent)</td>
<td>9 to 14 percent increase in international migrant stock since 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3 = more out than in</td>
<td>4 to 8 percent increase in right-wing party vote shares since 1990</td>
<td>Somewhat satisfied with the way democracy works nationally and in the EU (51 to 60 percent)</td>
<td>4 to 8 percent increase in international migrant stock since 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1 = mostly but not fully out</td>
<td>1 to 3 percent increase in right-wing party vote shares since 1990</td>
<td>Fairly satisfied with the way democracy works nationally and in the EU (61 to 80 percent)</td>
<td>1 to 3 percent increase in international migrant stock since 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 = fully out</td>
<td>Less than 1 percent increase in right-wing party vote shares since 1990</td>
<td>Very satisfied with the way democracy works nationally and in the EU (81 to 100 percent)</td>
<td>Less than 1 percent increase in international migrant stock since 1990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accordingly, in preparation for testing H1 detailed later in this chapter, the following truth table, essentially a data spreadsheet, was constructed with assigned scores for the ‘outcome’ and the ‘conditions’ entered into the fsQCA software. As such, Figure 3.9 displays the data entered into fsQCA. The testing procedures for H1 and results (regarding the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing
populism since the end of European Communism in 1989 as conditions for the rise of nationalism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland and Sweden) will be discussed in Chapter IV, “Testing and Results” following the discussion of the thematic coding.

Table 16

Anti-elite attitudes, demand for popular sovereignty, and ethnic homogeneity calibration and assigned scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Anti-elite Attitudes (RwpAntiE)</th>
<th>Assigned Score</th>
<th>Demand for popular Sovereignty (RwpPopSov)</th>
<th>Assigned Score</th>
<th>Ethnic Homogeneity (RwpEHomog)</th>
<th>Assigned Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>9 to 14 percent increase</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Somewhat dissatisfied (51 percent)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>7.3 percent increase in international migrant stock since 1990</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>15 to 25 percent increase in right-wing party vote shares since 1990</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Somewhat dissatisfied (49 percent)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>8 percent increase in international migrant stock since 1990</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>Above 25 percent increase</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fairly dissatisfied (39 percent)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.1 percent increase in international migrant stock since 1990</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>Less than 1 percent increase in right-wing party vote shares since 1990</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Fairly satisfied (66 percent)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>10.5 percent increase in international migrant stock since 1990</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>9 to 14 percent increase in right-wing party vote shares since 1990</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Somewhat satisfied (58 percent)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>8.4 increase in international migrant stock since 1990</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Thematic Coding.* In preparation for the thematic analysis, the researcher has carefully reviewed the data corpus. A total of 136 archival, governmental and institutional documents and reports from Germany’s, Italy’s, Hungary’s, Ireland’s and Sweden’s government websites as well as archived and recent online media material were reviewed, detailing policies, events, and the general political, societal, and political environment. Obtaining these documents proved to be time and cost-efficient, with
background information, broad coverage of data, and contextualization of the research (Bowen 2009).

The narrative sources were accessed in their native language based on public availability of data, in proportion for each case. Special attention was paid to three partially overlapping historical periods post-1989: 1989 to 2007 (between the Fall of European Communism and the European debt crisis); 2008 to 2014 (recovery period from the European debt crisis); and 2015 until present times (between the onset of the EU’s most recent refugee and migrant crisis until 2018) previously identified by scholars both during the selection coding of data.

The first step to analyze the data corpus required the researcher to determine the unit of analysis for the study – the subjects of the study, and the type of thematic analysis (Trochim 2006). With EU member nation-states as the unit of analysis, theoretical thematic coding and analysis was conducted as opposed to an inductive approach to address specific research questions, specifically RQ2 pertaining to particularities of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism and RQ3 pertaining to the potential diversity in the types of the outcome (post-1989 European nationalism). While theoretical thematic analysis works with a pre-existing theoretical frame deductively, inductive thematic analysis is generally employed to generate research questions and respective hypotheses. Deductive thematic analysis, such as the one employed in this dissertation thus used a pre-determined framework to analyze the data in contrast to inductive approaches (Maguire and Delahunt 2017).

A code is best described as a word or short phrase that characterizes textual or visual data that does not reduce it but rather condenses and summarizes it (Saldaña 2009).
Lofland et al. (2006) explained that the researcher should record all social aspects such as behaviors, perceptions, beliefs, rules, values that emerge repeatedly to categorize data into patterns. Codes and the number of themes vary based on discipline, project scope, size, and contextual factors (Saldaña 2009). Thus, pre-set coding procedures were implemented based on the research questions to help identify main themes to group data to then compare similarities between patterns among the five selected cases – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden.

The researcher began pre-coding by combing through both hard and online copies of reports, documents, and, articles manually. Although qualitative data analytic software such as ATLAS and Nvivo may be utilized, thematic analysis experts recommend to first ‘touch’ the data, and if the researcher prefers, data can be stored electronically later (Bazeley 2009). Microsoft EXCEL spreadsheets proved to be useful tools to code and identify themes after manual coding (Bree and Gallagher 2016). Armed with colored highlighters and pens, the researcher began by annotated the hard and online copies of narrative documents, reports, and media material. Initial or preliminary codes to record data “into smaller chunks of meaning” (Maguire and Delahunt 2017, 5) were initially based on indicators of both the outcome and conditions but not without the option of open coding of any additional themes that may have emerged to help avoid confirmation bias, or the researcher’s tendency to favor or interpret information that confirms pre-existing hypotheses due to poor or sentimental information-processing. Thorough evaluation and clarity of the process of classification can indeed help preserve the credibility of the study (Bowen 2009; Maguire and Delahunt 2017).

Due to its deductive nature, thematic coding in this dissertation thus first relied on
pre-set codes based on the indicators of the ‘outcome’ (post-1989 European nationalism) and its potential ‘conditions’ (economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism) to allow for later comparison and similarities and differences among patterns of the data (Maguire and Delahunt 2017). Initial code names were nonetheless simplified and broadened to capture the data corpus broadly first. For instance, *Loss of National identity* was coded as *National identity* and *Ethnic homogeneity* was coded as *Ethnicity* to allow coding of all aspects of the data, and to help further reduce confirmation bias. *Anti-migrant policies, Fears of migration, and Emigration* were combined and coded under the broader code of *Migration*. Moreover, additional codes were generated to code potential diversities in types of post-1989 European nationalism based on their primary characteristics discussed in Chapter II, ‘Review of the Relevant Literature’, including *Ethnic, Cultural, Romantic, and Religious nationalism*.

Table 17

*Initial codes generated and their classification for coding*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INITIAL CODES</th>
<th>CLASSIFICATION FOR CODING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-elitism</td>
<td>Negative public attitudes against elites and establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic nationalism</td>
<td>Ideas, rhetoric, and/or policies that promote the primacy of legitimacy of the nation-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil freedoms</td>
<td>Perceptions, attitudes and/or policies that concern rights, freedom of ideas, expression, and religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic nationalism</td>
<td>Ideas, rhetoric, and/or policies that promote the primacy of the national economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic nationalism</td>
<td>Ideas, rhetoric, and/or policies that promote the primacy of the national economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Perceptions, attitudes and/or policies that concern rights, freedom of ideas, expression, and religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroscepticism</td>
<td>Negative perceptions, attitudes and/or policies against EU membership and institutional legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far-right</td>
<td>Perceptions, attitudes and/or policies that promote far-right (fascist, racist, xenophobic, and/or reactionary) ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>Perceptions, attitudes and/or policies that concern global economic, social, and/or political openness or the lack thereof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality</td>
<td>Perceptions, attitudes and/or policies that concern economic, social, and political equality or the lack thereof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal nationalism</td>
<td>Ideas, rhetoric, and/or policies that promote the primacy of national identity in a free, tolerant, and non-xenophobic community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Perceptions, attitudes and/or policies that concern international migration and emigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National identity</td>
<td>Perceptions, attitudes and/or policies that concern the maintenance and continuity of national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular sovereignty</td>
<td>Perceptions, attitudes and/or policies that concern the maintenance and continuity of popular sovereignty in the nation-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist nationalism</td>
<td>Ideas, rhetoric, and/or policies that promote the primacy of an anti-elite and anti-establishment national community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Perceptions, attitudes and/or policies that concern religion, religious practices, national religion, religious identity, foreign religions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romantic nationalism</td>
<td>Ideas, rhetoric, and/or policies that promote the primacy of the legitimacy of the nation-state as a natural consequence of a historical ethnic culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State nationalism</td>
<td>Ideas, rhetoric, and/or policies that promote the primacy of a national community that contribute to the strength of a nation-state or a desired state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Perceptions, attitudes and/or policies that concern international terrorism in the nation-state and in the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Perceptions, attitudes and/or policies that concern national unemployment and related issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobic nationalism</td>
<td>Ideas, rhetoric, and/or policies that promote the primacy of an in-group national identity through the promotion of fear of an out-group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Following the initial annotation of the narrative raw data for each country, the researcher saw the need to elaborate on, and finalize the coding scheme by featuring particularities noted in addition to the preliminary codes to ensure detail and accuracy of the annotations. Initial or preliminary codes previously limited to ‘umbrella’ words only at the start of the coding process have thus been expanded to short phrases for all initial codes and were noted in the data. Final codes were expanded to capture further detail in the narrative data and final codes were noted alongside initial codes to allow for clarity and organization. Overlaps in final codes for initial codes were not excluded to allow for the recognition of potential pattern overlaps among initially discovered commonalities in the data. Final codes were then organized visibly for each nation-state, within the three partially overlapping post-1989 historical periods – 1989 to 2007; 2008 to 2014; and 2015 until present times previously identified by scholars to examine in patterns historically, economically, socially, and/or politically diverse settings.

Final codes were then organized and collated into major and sub-themes based on the overlapping patterns noted by the researcher in each case. Themes are generally defined by their significance in relation to the research questions and may be collated into central and sub-themes accordingly (Braun and Clarke 2006). Themes may considerably overlap with codes and they must be detailed enough to describe patterns of data relevant to the research questions. Themes in this dissertation are thus primarily descriptive in nature. Most codes are associated with one theme but some may be associated with more than one. This, as the number of themes, similarly to that of codes, depends on the type and focus of the study. Albeit, the number of central themes is advised to be kept to a minimum (Maguire and Delahunt 2017).
Some scholars recommend the selection of three major themes, while others have expanded their selection to five to six main themes (Wolcott 1994; Creswell 2007). Sub-themes, as used in this dissertation, are beneficial to provide additional detail about the data as well as the similarities and differences among major themes the studied cases (Saldaña 2009). Because this dissertation surveys a large body of data, with multiple final codes relevant to other central themes and sub-themes, the researcher allowed for greater detail and opted for six central themes, with no limitation posed on the amount of potential sub-themes by the researcher to help further avoid researcher’s bias. As such, six major themes were recognized capturing coherent data patterns: 1) *legacies and continuity*; 2) *national identities in context*; 3) *varying attitudes toward globalization*; 4) *inequalities and unemployment as drivers of economic insecurities*; 5) *social fears and public reservations*; and 6) *varying expressions of nationalist sentiments in contexts*, with 14 distinguishable sub-themes.

*Legacies and continuity* as a major theme encompassed data patterns in regards to top-down emphasis on historical and symbolic legacies in political discourse, including the celebration of legacy of ethnicity and national identity in national governmental and media reports, and the endurance of national identity, primarily ethnic, religious, and linguistic national identity. Accordingly, two sub-themes for this theme were defined as *emphasis on historical and symbolic legacies and continuity of national identity*.

Secondly, the major theme *national identities in context* included two sub-themes, *national identity as legitimacy of the nation-state in political rhetoric* and *public identification with national identities*. This category captured significant data patterns relating to the various roles of national identities in various contexts over time. In some
cases, national identities emerged as political tools to unify the nation-state and its citizenry, while in others, their salience in context was embraced by the citizenry. In some settings, national identities were strategically capitalized upon as both.

Third, *varying attitudes toward globalization* has emerged as a major theme, denoting both top-down and bottom-up sentiments toward complex economic, societal, and political transformations since 1989. One sub-theme, focusing on the several hopes and concerns associated with European integration and Euroscepticism, became particularly visible in relation to Europeanization, and was thus categorized under the sub-theme of *varying attitudes toward EU integration and Euroscepticism*.

*Inequalities and unemployment as drivers of economic insecurities* was identified as the fourth overarching theme, which denoted historical and geographic inequalities in the economy, income inequalities as well as migration, welfare, and unemployment-related grievances as reoccurring topics in both political and societal settings. *Inequalities along geographic lines* as one of the sub-themes, summarized narrative data patterns ranging from the evolution of European economic zones, Western-Eastern and Northern-Southern dualities, and expectations pertaining thereto in the realms of welfare and democracy. The second sub-theme, *unemployment and anti-migrant sentiments* captured data patterns associated with demographic characteristics of unemployment and the relationship between unemployment and job security, welfare benefits, job polarization, and migration.

The fifth major theme, *societal fears and public reservations* was collated capturing data patterns related to all recognizable forms of societal fears and public reservations held by both national leaders and the public. Three sub-themes were
recognized: *fears of foreign domination, fears of violence and terrorism, and xenophobic discrimination against other ethnicities*. Fears of foreign domination as a sub-theme emerged from a variety of concerns expressed over time pertaining to the legitimacy of the nation-state being undermined by other states, supranational entities like the former Soviet Union or the European Union, or other foreign communities. In addition, fears of violence and terrorism, as a sub-theme, denoted concerns pertaining to physical safety along with national and supranational security. Lastly, xenophobic discrimination against outgroups captured patterns of data pertaining to the ideological, legal, political, and public discrimination of the ‘other’ based on ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexual orientation.

Table 18

**Central themes and sub-themes and respective final codes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEME: Legacies and continuity</th>
<th>SUB-THEME: Emphasis on historical and symbolic legacies Codes:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Historical legacy of ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Historical legacy of national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Historical legacy of ethnic identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Symbolic legacy of ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legacy of foreign domination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB-THEME: Continuity of national identity Codes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic identity continuity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious identity continuity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linguistic identity continuity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panes of loss of national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Far-right party discourse in context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Fears of foreign domination</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fears of foreign domination as a sub-theme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emerging from a variety of concerns expressed over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pertaining to the legitimacy of the nation-state being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undermined by other states, supranational entities like the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former Soviet Union or the European Union, or other foreign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fears of foreign domination as a sub-theme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>As a sub-theme, denoted concerns pertaining to physical safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Along with national and supranational security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lastly, xenophobic discrimination against outgroups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captured patterns of data pertaining to the ideological, legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political, and public discrimination of the ‘other’ based on</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexual orientation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Table 18</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Central themes and sub-themes and respective final codes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SUB-THEME: Emphasis on historical and symbolic legacies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Codes:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Historical legacy of ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Historical legacy of national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Historical legacy of ethnic identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Symbolic legacy of ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legacy of foreign domination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sub-theme: Continuity of national identity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Codes:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic identity continuity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexual orientation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THEME: National identities in context**

**SUB-THEME: National identity as legitimacy of the nation-state in political rhetoric**

**Codes:**

- Promotion of anti-communism, pro-independence, pro-democracy, collective political identity
- Promotion of a liberal civic nationalism
- Promotion of a liberal civic individuality
- Political discourse of national identity as legitimacy of the nation-state
- Political discourse of ethnic unity as legitimacy of the nation-state
- Political discourse of cultural unity as legitimacy of the nation-state
- Fears of loss of national identity
- Varying levels of commitment to democracy
- Far-right party discourse in context

**SUB-THEME: Public identification with national identities**

**Codes:**

- National identity as EU identity
- Loss of sovereignty of overlapping citizenship
- Citizenship legislation and redefinitions of citizenship
- Public preference for a coherent, non-xenophobic national identity
- National identities juxtaposed against EU identities
- National identity as ethnic identity
- National identity as religious identity
- National identity as linguistic identity
- Fears of loss of national identity

**THEME: Varying attitudes toward globalization**

**Codes:**

- Globalization as economically beneficial
- Globalization as socially beneficial
- Increase in civil broadband
- Globalization squared to Europeanization
- Legacy of foreign domination
- Iphological attitudes toward larger integration
- Integration perceived as foreign dominance
- Negative views toward migration
- Positive views toward migration and integration
- Pains of migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers
- Preference for migrants from EU
- Concerns of law enforcement and criminalization
- Protecstive policies
- Pride to being an expert nation
- Pride in being migration nation
- Weak EU identity result of internal or process

**THEME: Varying attitudes toward EU integration and Euro scepticism**

**Codes:**

- Globalization squared to Europeanization
- Skeptical attitudes toward larger integration
- Historical relevance of economic zones to EEC
- EEC economic policy seen as a form of imperialist domination
- Integration perceived as foreign dominance
- Increase in integration policies
- Ineffective integration policies and programs
- Cultural, social, and political diversity as the only commonality of EU
- Struggle of EU to safeguard democratic values
- EU democratic deficit
- National identity as EU identity
- Losses in the right-wing vote shares in national and EU elections
- Far-right as a threat to EU
- Far-right anti-migrant discourse
- National identities juxtaposed against EU identities
- EU anti-terrorism security agenda
- Terrorism as primary EU issue
- Events of terrorism
- EU Islamophobia
- Preference for migrants from EU
- Concerns of law enforcement and criminalization
The sixth major theme, *varying expressions of nationalist sentiments in context*, summarized data patterns of a variety of nationalist associations discovered. Related sub-themes were defined and named after the main characteristics of types of nationalism generally agreed upon by most if not all scholars. The sub-theme of *liberal civic nationalisms* thus denoted patterns of pride in national associations characterized by non-xenophobic, tolerant, and equal participation of the citizenry, while that of *economic nationalisms* captured data patterns that both positively and negatively associated national pride with the national economy. Further, the sub-theme of *ethnonationalisms* was identified to denote data patterns that both positively and negatively associated national pride with ethnic continuity. At last, the sub-theme of *xenophobic nationalisms* recognized collated data patterns ranging from populist and far-right nationalist...
sentimental expressions to xenophobic national sentiments juxtaposed against foreign ethnicities and religions, including Roma minorities and Muslims completing the thematic coding process.

Results of the fsQCA analysis addressing H1 (the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism since the end of European Communism in 1989 as conditions for the rise of nationalism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland and Sweden), and results of the thematic analysis pertaining to H2 and H3 (regarding the dominance of particular economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism; and types of post-1989 European nationalisms) are explored in the subsequent chapter, Chapter IV “Testing and Results.”
CHAPTER IV – TESTING AND RESULTS

“Nationalism: a state of mind in which you do not love your own country as much as you hate somebody else’s.”

– Friedrich Reck-Malleczewen ([1947] 2013)

This chapter utilized the data collected in Chapter III to test what conditions, if any have been necessary or sufficient for the rise of post-1989 European nationalism, and examined the greater context to determine whether specific economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populist tendencies have been of dominance over time, and whether distinct types of post-1989 European nationalisms emerged as a result. For the fuzzy-set QCA testing, the FSQCA software was downloaded and employed, using degree of membership scores calibrated based on the six-value fuzzy-set detailed in the previous chapter. For the thematic analysis, results were summarized thematically and chronologically. Testing procedures as well as the discussion of the results in this chapter continued to employ QCA terminology for clarity and consistency including ‘outcome’ and ‘conditions’ as opposed to ‘dependent’ and ‘independent variables’.

The present chapter, Chapter IV, “Testing and Results” thus details the testing procedures and results for both the fsQCA and thematic analyses, while the subsequent chapter, Chapter V, “The Cases” explores the relationship between the conditions (economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism) and the outcome (post-1989 European nationalism) based on descriptive and narrative data consulted, and elaborates on the results of the fuzzy-set QCA and thematic analyses to highlight unique attributes of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism as conditions in each case. Chapter VI, “Analysis, Implications, And Conclusions” then serves as a
forum for discussion and analysis of the results and concludes this research, underscoring its main contributions to, and implications for nationalism studies scholarship and practice.

Testing and Results of the fsQCA and Thematic Analyses

*Testing H1 with fsQCA*

*Preparation of Data for Testing*. H1 proposed that the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism since the end of European Communism in 1989 has led to an increase in nationalism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland and Sweden. In fsQCA, relationships among sets rather than correlations were examined through possible configurations. Unlike in statistical analysis, where the combination of conditions may result in collinearity (linear relationship of variables), in fsQCA, conditions are expected to relate and/or be interdependent as part of the Boolean set logic (intersection) (Thomas et al. 2014). The study considered the five main goals of any QCA as testing procedures were completed and results were reported. As such, the researcher’s goal was to: 1) represent data in a truth table; 2) review consistency of the data; 3) testing of the hypothesis; 4) discuss basic assumptions of the analysis; and 5) develop casual hypotheses based on the patterns observed in the data (Ragin and Rihoux 2004).

To best interpret the results of the fuzzy-set QCA analysis, it was important to understand its elements. First, in fuzzy-set QCA, consistency is a measure of the extent of membership strength of a casual configuration regularly producing the outcome, while coverage “determines empirical relevance of a solution and quantifies the variation in casual pathways of an outcome” (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 34).
equifinality in QCA analysis (the idea that there is more than one combination of conditions associated with the same outcome), truth table results report various potential paths to the outcome. When casual pathway coverage is high, the more the outcome is accounted for by that pathway (Kane et al. 2014). The lower the consistency, the higher the coverage. These two, however, need to remain in balance and must remain in ranges that validate the solution. For instance, if consistency is extremely low and coverage is extremely high or vice versa, the solution will be both empirically and theoretically uncompelling (Elliott 2013). Therefore, consistency scores greater than 0.9 (90 percent) with coverage scores greater than 0.5 (50 percent) generally are the thresholds to indicate necessary and/or sufficient conditions in QCA solution formulas (Ragin 2000; Schneider and Wagemann 2010).

“By definition, an intermediate solution must be a superset of the complex solution (no simplifying assumptions used) and a parsimonious solution (all possible simplifying assumptions used, regardless of their plausibility)” (Kenworthy and Hicks 2008, 78). Unique coverage then measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained solely by each individual solution term” (Ragin 2008, 86), while raw coverage suggests which portion of the outcome, in this case post-1989 European nationalism, is explained by an alternative path (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). Necessary conditions thus represent a superset of the outcome, and sufficient conditions are representative of a subset (Ragin 2000).

Testing procedures for H1, concerned with the necessary and sufficient conditions for the rise of post-1989 European nationalism(s) began with the construction of an EXCEL data table considering three primary conditions: economic insecurities, societal
fears, and right-wing populism as previously discussed in Chapter III, “Research design, Methodology, and Data Complication.” With intentions to provide a more comprehensive analysis and complement later testing procedures for the thematic analysis addressing H2 and H3 (features of primary conditions and potential types of the outcome), membership scores for each of condition also included the calibrated membership scores for their respective indicators highlighted by nationalism scholars in earlier thematic and empirical and elaborated upon in the previous chapter. They will be referred to in later chapters as conditions for simplicity, with their economic, societal, and political connotations kept in mind.

Accordingly, for the fsQCA analysis, the outcome condition, post-1989 European nationalism (Nationali), three main conditions – economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism, and eleven respective sub-conditions – degree of globalization (EiGlobal), national unemployment (EiUnemploy), emigration (EiEmig), income inequality (EiInequal), fears of migration (SfMigra), fears of terrorism (SfTerror), fear of loss of national identity (SfNident), religious grievances (SfReligion), anti-elite and establishment attitudes (RwpAntiE), demand for popular sovereignty (RwpPopSov), and ethnic homogeneity (RwpEHomog) were entered into the fsQCA software.

Figure 11. Membership Scores for Outcome and Sub-conditions as Calibrated for Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden According to fsQCA Requirements.
The fsQCA software was freely available and downloaded from the website of the COMPARative Methods for Systematic cross-case analySis (COMPASSS), a worldwide network for comparative case study scholars and practitioners. FsQCA provided the following descriptive statistics for the study’s casual conditions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>N Cases</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationali</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.09797954</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ElGlobal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ElUnemploy</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3847077</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ElInequal</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.2939388</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ElExg</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.3762977</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFxifgra</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.1955592</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFterror</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.1955592</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFReligion</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.2939388</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFIntent</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>nan</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RespAntiE</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.2496571</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RespEpopGov</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.2935387</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RespEhomog</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.1955592</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12. Descriptive Statistics for Each Sub-condition in the fsQCA.

Before the actual analysis began and a truth table was constructed, subset/superset analysis was completed to offer preliminary insights into potentially casual relationships and conditions of interest through the examination of all variables and the display of coverage and consistency scores, which were considered initial parameters of fitness. Consistency scores below 0.75 (75 percent) indicated substantial consistency, and scores greater than 0.9 (90 percent) indicated conditions as potentially necessary conditions. As mentioned above, consistency is a measure of the “degree to which membership in each solution term is a subset of the outcome”, while “raw coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained by each term of the solution” (Ragin 2008, 46).

Proposed conditions (pertaining to economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism) were all identified by the subset/superset analysis as potentially necessary conditions thus indicating that they are unlikely bring about the outcome (Nationali) alone. Demand for popular sovereignty (right-wing populism), ethnic homogeneity (right-wing populism), fear of terrorism (societal fear), and fears of
migration (societal fears) were identified as having highest consistency, and as such potentially necessary and/or sufficient conditions, with consistency scores of 1.0 (100 percent), although national unemployment (economic insecurities), anti-elite and establishment attitudes did not stay far behind with consistency scores above 0.9 (90 percent). The fear of loss of national identity (societal fears) resulted in the highest combined score with 0.96 (96 percent).

Figure 13. Subset/Superset Analysis with Consistency and Coverage Scores.

*Truth Table Analysis.* Truth table analysis followed, beginning with the creation of the truth table, after which evaluation and deletion/recording, casual condition selection, and at last, analysis was performed known as Boolean minimization. Evaluation of potentially necessary conditions as well as graphic representations of the relationship between conditions (their respective sub-conditions) and the outcome were also included. Truth tables had “$2^k$” rows (where $k$ represented the number of casual conditions), and reflected all possible configurations of casual conditions. The 1 (100 percent) and 0 (0 percent) represented full membership and zero membership conditions, respectively with ‘1’ indicating fuzzy-set membership scores of 0.5 or above and ‘0’ indicating a fuzzy-set membership score of 0.5 or below as the cut-off point (Ragin 2008, 46). The number columns displayed the number of cases exhibiting the specific
configuration listed. As such, before the truth table analysis, the researcher needed to determine the frequency and consistency thresholds by developing a rule for classifying combinations (rows) as relevant and others as irrelevant, based on their frequency. With a small number of cases, frequency thresholds should be 1 or 2 (Ragin 2008).

Given that the number of cases in this study was relatively small (5), the researcher selected the frequency threshold as ‘1’. Once the frequency threshold was determined, all rows below the threshold were deleted and were excluded from the minimization process. For configurations that exceeded the threshold, ‘1’ was entered in the truth table, while for configurations that did not meet the consistency threshold, ‘0’ was entered. The next step was for the researcher to identify configurations as subsets of the outcome, and separate them from other configurations that were not. Values below 0.75 (75 percent) indicated substantial consistency, while a threshold of 0.8 (80 percent) was regarded as the standard threshold (Ragin 2009).

![Figure 14. Truth Table before Evaluation.](image)

*Note: Segment of the Truth Table before Evaluation shown here due to original size exceeding possibility of display.*
After the sorting and deletion of irrelevant configurations, the first five rows displayed configurations with consistency scores ‘1’, thus indicating sufficiency for the rise of Nationali. As such, ‘1’ was entered for the first five rows in preparation for the fsQCA process referred to as ‘standard analyses’.

![Figure 15. Truth Table after Evaluation.](image)

![Figure 16. Data Run With Casual Conditions Both Present and Absent.](image)

This research relied on standard fsQCA analysis as the recommended procedure to derive three distinct results in truth table analysis, namely complex, intermediate, and parsimonious, with intermediate solutions being the most reliable consisting of counterfactual analysis of the casual conditions (Ragin 2008). “Complex solution makes no assumptions, the parsimonious solution uses both easy and difficult assumptions to simply, and the intermediate only uses easy assumptions (Elliot 2013, 9). Figures 4.5 and 4.6 above display the necessary steps undertaken before ‘standard analyses’ could be performed. The output from the ‘standard analyses’ displayed measures of coverage and consistency for each solution term and for the solution as a whole. These measures were
computed by the fsQCA software based on the original fuzzy-set data prepared by the researcher (Ragin 2000).

Truth Table Results. After Boolean minimization described above, data was run through the software multiple times. First, the relationships among the sub-conditions of economic insecurities and post-1989 European nationalism were examined, then the relationships between the sub-conditions of societal fears, and right-wing populism and the outcome Nationali were tested. Lastly, all sub-conditions were evaluated alongside one another to evaluate potentially necessary and sufficient combinations of all conditions for the rise of post-1989 European nationalism (Nationali). Each time, data was run through the software with proposed conditions both present and absent to provide a more comprehensive insight into potential causal pathways.

Results of the first run with sub-conditions of economic insecurities yielded a complex solution only. The results displayed that no sub-condition of economic insecurities was alone necessary and/or sufficient for the rise of post-1989 European nationalism. Results indicated four potential combinations of pathways to post-1989 European nationalism with only economic insecurities as primary conditions examined: 1) absence of national unemployment and absence national inequality \((-EiUnemploy*\neg EiInequal)\) (Ireland); 2) presence of national unemployment and income inequality \((EiUnemploy*EiInequal)\) (Italy and Hungary); 3) absence of national unemployment and presence of emigration \((-EiUnemploy*EiEmig)\) (Sweden); and 4) presence of both emigration and income inequality \((EiEmig*EiInequal)\) (Hungary and Sweden). The overall solution coverage for this run indicated that 0.95 (95 percent) was the proportion of memberships in the outcome was explained by the complete solution,
while 0.92 (92 percent) indicated the degree to which membership in the solution (the set of solution terms) was a subset of the membership in the outcome.

Figure 17. Truth Table Analysis (Complex Solutions: Economic Insecurities).

Although consistency scores were greater than 90 percent, coverage scores were greater than 50 percent only in the case of emigration and income inequality, which indicated that the combination of an increase in the level of emigration and an increase in national income inequality ($EiEmig \times EiInequal$) may be necessary and/or sufficient conditions with the most strength to explain the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms. Conditions in fsQCA are potentially sufficient for an outcome typically when their consistencies are greater than 0.8 (80 percent) (Ragin 2000; Tomasino 2015).

Next, the relationship between societal fears and post-1989 European nationalism was similarly examined. After Boolean minimization as required by fsQCA, the data was run to examine complex solutions. Again, intermediate and/or parsimonious solutions were not yielded due to only ‘positive cases’ of societal fears (cases with 0.5 or higher fuzzy-set scores) having been identified for this run. Results indicated four potential casual pathways contributing to the rise of Nationali with societal fears as potential conditions: 1) fears of terrorism and the fear of loss of national identity when religious
grievances are absent ($SfTerror*~SfReligion*SfNident$) (Germany, Hungary, and Ireland); 2) religious grievances and fear of the loss of national identity when fears of terrorism are absent ($~SfTerror*SfReligion*SfNident$) (Italy and Sweden); 3) fear of terrorism and the fear of the loss of national identity while fear of migration is absent ($~SfMigra*SfTerror*SfNident$) (Germany and Ireland); and 4) religious grievances and the fear of the loss of national identity when fear of migration is absent ($~SfMigra*SfReligion*SfNident$) (Germany and Sweden).

Figure 18. Truth Table Analysis (Complex Solutions: Societal Fears).

While consistency scores of ‘1’ indicated that these configurations were supported by the empirical evidence, raw coverage scores for the latter three of 0.59 (59 percent) indicated that these configurations covered close to 60 percent of the instances of post-1989 European nationalism. The path of $~SfMigra*SfReligion*SfNident$ alone could have accounted for 10 percent of post-1989 European nationalist phenomena. The fear of loss of national identity emerged as both a necessary and sufficient condition in this finding as it could produce Nationali on its own. The overall solution coverage of .89 indicated that the proportion of memberships in the outcome Nationali could be explained by the complete solution, while the solution consistency score of 1 indicated that membership in the solution was a subset of membership in the outcome.
In terms of the relationship between right-wing populism and post-1989 European nationalism, results indicated two potentially necessary and/or sufficient casual pathways: 1) the presence of anti-elite and establishment attitudes and absence of the decrease in ethnic homogeneity \( (RwpAntiE \ast \sim RwpEHomog) \) (Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Sweden); and 2) the absence of anti-elite and establishment attitudes combined with the absence of the demand for popular sovereignty and the presence of a decrease in ethnic homogeneity \( (\sim RwpPAntiE \ast \sim RwpPopSov \ast RwpEHomog) \) (Ireland). Results suggested that the presence of the combination of anti-elite and establishment attitudes and the absence of ethnic homogeneity \( (RwpAntiE \ast \sim RwpEHomog) \) led to \textit{Nationali} 77 percent of the time. These results yield no necessary and/or sufficient conditions in the complex solution formula.

For the cohesive ‘standard analyses’, both the complex and intermediate solutions yielded five possible configurations (paths) to \textit{Nationali} as an outcome. There was no parsimonious solution and the “ERROR (Quine-McCluskey): The 1 Matrix Contains All Configurations” message indicates that all cases met the consistency threshold and thus, there were no cases coded ‘0’. The truth table analysis displayed coverage and consistency scores for the potential combination of sub-conditions of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism suggesting that all five potentially necessary combinations of pathways leading to \textit{Nationali}. The overall solution coverage
score over 0.89 (89 percent) suggested that close to 90 percent of the proportion of Nationali could be explained by the complete solution. The consistency score of 1.0 indicated that 100 percent of this configuration was supported by empirical evidence, or that this causal combination will lead to the outcome in almost all cases.

Raw coverage of the individual configurations indicated that several pathways combining the presence and absence of specific economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populist factors may have indeed contributed to the outcome of Nationali, with each configuration accounting for approximately 20 percent of the outcome individually in almost all cases. Economic insecurities pertaining to degree of globalization (EiGlobal) and societal fears pertaining to the fear of loss of national identity (SfNident) emerged as potentially necessary but not sufficient conditions in this finding, suggesting that their presence was necessary for the outcome to occur but it was not sufficient as neither condition produced the outcome by itself. “A necessary condition occurs when the outcome is present and a condition is also present, when the membership in the input (X_i) is greater than membership in the outcome (Y_i) (Tomasino 2015, 5).

**Analysis of Necessary Conditions.** With consistency scores greater than 90 percent and coverage scores greater than 50 percent indicating potential necessary and/or sufficient conditions, analysis of necessary conditions was performed to re-examine previous findings of the fsQCA analysis to determine the likelihood of potentially necessary conditions and combinations of conditions (and thus respective sub-conditions).

“Condition A is necessary for outcome Y if the occurrence of Y is not possible without the presence of A, but A alone is not enough to produce Y. In such cases, all cases with in which Y occurs share the presence of condition A. In fuzzy-set
terms, a necessary relation exists if outcome Y is a subset of casual condition; that is in each case the degree of membership in Y is less than or equal to the degree of membership in A (Y < A)” (Legewie 2013, 3).

Figure 20. Truth Table Analysis (Complex, Intermediate, and Parsimonious Solutions).

Single sub-conditions were tested, along with pairs of sub-conditions and interaction of sub-conditions (moving forward referred to as conditions for simplicity) were tested to re-examine earlier findings from the truth table analyses displayed in this chapter. Results for testing single sub-conditions confirmed earlier findings in this research, which indicated that the economic insecurity, degree of globalization (EiGlobal) (measured in terms of an increase in the level of economic, social, and political dimensions of global openness) and the societal fear, fear of loss of national identity (SfNIdent) (operationalized as increase in societal fears and insecurities associated with actual or potential risks of losing linguistic and/or cultural identity measured as an attachment to national identity above all else), met the threshold for being
potentially necessary conditions by themselves, or in combination with other conditions for the rise of post-1989 European nationalism (Nationali).

Results for the testing of pairs of conditions indicated that these two condition variables may have also been sufficient as their combination with other conditions has resulted in very high consistency scores of 1.0, not only having met the threshold but having indicated that they could explain 78 (in the case of EiGlobal) and 85 percent (in the case of SfNident) of the outcome almost 100 percent of the time, regardless of the combination of conditions.

Additionally, the analysis of necessary conditions of pairs of conditions displayed that the combination of degree of globalization (EiGlobal) and societal fears of migration (SfMigra), thus EiGlobal+SfMigra (Italy and Hungary) alone, had the potential to explain the outcome in all cases examined. Fear of migration was operationalized here as the increase in negative public sentiments pertaining to migration (from outside the EU including economic, irregular, welfare-migration) as a percentage of the national population. Moreover, the right-wing populist tendency of anti-elite and establishment attitudes (RwpAntiE) when combined with ethnic homogeneity, a decrease in ethnic homogeneity in overall international migrant stock as the percentage of the total national population, may represent a superset of the outcome, potentially explaining 75 percent of the outcome in almost all cases. This was interesting since EiEmig*EiInequal was determined to be a necessary combination of conditions in the truth table analysis, inconsistent with the truth table findings pertaining to economic insecurities and the rise of Nationali.
Moreover, analysis of necessary conditions testing multiple combinations of conditions resulted in five potential casual paths of necessity with sub-conditions from the primary economic, societal, and political conditions examined:

\[ \text{RwpAntiE} + \text{RwpEHomog} + \text{SfNident}; \text{ RwpAntiE} + \text{SfMigra} + \text{SfNident} \text{ (Italy)}; \]

\[ \text{SfReligion} + \text{RwpAntiE} + \text{RwpEHomog}; \text{ EiGlobal} + \text{SfNident} + \text{RwpEHomog} + \text{EiInequal}; \text{ and} \]

Note: Yellow highlighting indicated likelihood of necessity.

Figure 21. Analysis of Necessary Conditions (Single and Pairs of Conditions).

Figure 22. Analysis of Necessary Conditions (Multiple Combinations of Conditions).
EiInequal+SfMigra+RwpAntiE+SfTerror. These combinations of conditions, in addition to the complex and intermediate solution formulas from the earlier truth tables, displayed the multiplicity of combinations of conditions potentially necessary for the rise of post-1989 European Nationalism (Nationali). This finding did not display any sufficient combinations of conditions, in other words, combinations of conditions that could bring about the outcome Nationali uniquely.

Extending the Analysis: Bivariate Relationships Per Case. XY fuzzy-set plots provide visual insights into the relationship between condition variables. Plots displaying cases above the diagonal line in a plot indicated the X-axis variable was a subset of Y, therefore supporting the notion that X was sufficient for Y to occur. Cases on, or below the diagonal, on the other hand, could be considered a superset, thus necessary conditions for the Y, or the outcome (Ragin 2008). Fuzzy-set XY plots, therefore, examined bivariate relationships among conditions as well as the conditions against the outcome, Nationali.

Based on the results returned by the fsQCA analysis above, to reexamine their role in the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms, the researcher has tested degree of globalization as an economic insecurity (EiGlobal) and fear of loss of national identity (SfNident) as a societal fear first as these single sub-conditions emerged as necessary and potentially sufficient conditions for the rise of post-1989 European nationalism (Nationali).

As shown in figures 4.12 below, the fuzzy-set plots indicated that in all cases, EiGlobal was a necessary but not sufficient condition for Nationali. In the cases of Italy and Hungary, consistency of EiGlobal being a superset of Nationali was higher (1; 0.9)
than in the cases of Germany, Ireland, and Sweden (1; 07). Secondly, SfNident resulted in being on the diagonal line, thus both a potentially necessary and sufficient condition for the rise of nationalism in post-1989 Italy’s and Hungary’s case (0.9; 0.9), while it was indicated to be a solely necessary condition solely in the remaining cases (0.9; 0.7).

Figure 23. EiGlobal Leading to Nationali and SfNident Leading to Nationali.

Hence, fuzzy-set plots were useful in gaining further insight into bivariate relationships between the various types of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism on a case-by-case basis. After all bivariate relationships were examined through the plots, additional sufficient and necessary conditions were identified, this time, helping the researcher visualize the distinct sub-conditions of economic insecurities as supporting the contentions of X being either necessary or sufficient for Y to occur in each case. The lower box showed the degree to which data plotted were consistent with Y≤X (Y being a subset of X) and the upper box showed the extent to which data plotted were consistent with X≤Y (X being a subset of Y). “If one of these numbers [indicated] high consistency, the other could be interpreted as a coverage score” (Ragin 2008, 31).

The plots depicted unique results that met the threshold of consistency scores

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greater than 90 percent and coverage scores greater than 50 percent, therefore supporting the contention of necessity and/or sufficiency in regards to the conditions of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism alike. Particularly, in regards to economic insecurities pertaining to the rise of national unemployment ($E_{i\text{Unemploy}}$), the plot suggested that in the cases of Ireland and Sweden, economic insecurities associated with the rise in national unemployment may be sufficient (0.3; 0.7), in the case of Hungary, it may be both sufficient and necessary, and in the case Italy (0.9; 0.9), it may be necessary (1; 0.9) accounting for at least 60 percent of the conditions leading to $Nationali$ approximately 96 percent of the time in these cases. National unemployment did not appear to be either sufficient or necessary in post-1989 Germany.

Next, economic insecurities associated with the rate of emigration ($E_{i\text{Emig}}$) met the threshold of consistency and coverage as potential conditions for $Nationali$, indicating 90 percent consistency and 74 percent coverage. Potential sufficiency was displayed in the cases of Ireland (0.3; 0.7) and Italy (0.3; 0.9), while both sufficiency and necessity was suggested in the case of Sweden. Necessity was indicated in the cases of Germany (0.9; 0.7) and Hungary (1; 0.9). As such, $E_{i\text{Emig}}$ resulted in being either a potential superset and/or subset in all five examined cases.

Societal fears of migration ($S_{f\text{Migra}}$) were also relevant in all five cases, with the fuzzy-set plot having indicated potential sufficiency in Germany, Ireland, and Sweden (0.3; 0.7), with higher likelihood of sufficiency in the cases of Italy and Hungary (0.7; 0.9). In addition, the presence of anti-elite and establishment attitudes ($Rwp_{AntiE}$) resulted in being a potentially sufficient and necessary condition in post-1989 Germany, Sweden (0.7; 0.7) and Italy (0.9; 0.9), and necessary in Hungary (1; 0.9), with high
consistency and coverage scores of .97 and .82, respectively. This finding indicates that anti-elite and establishment attitudes could potentially account for the presence of post-1989 European nationalism (*Nationali*) accounting for 82 percent in almost all cases but that of Ireland.

Lastly, the relevance of the demand for popular sovereignty (*RwpPopSov*) as a condition within the realms of right-wing populism, conceptualized and operationalized in this dissertation as the decrease in the percentages in public opinion about the level of democracy nationally and in the European Union, was displayed in all five cases. Namely, in Italy (0.7; 0.9), Ireland (0.1; 0.7), and Sweden (0.3; 0.7), it was indicated as a potentially sufficient condition, while in Germany (0.7; 0.7) and Hungary (0.9; 0.9) it was shown as a potentially sufficient and necessary condition for the outcome of *Nationali* covering 69 percent of the phenomenon in almost all instances.

**Summary of fsQCA Results**

RQ1 asked whether the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears and/or right-wing populism, since the end of European Communism in 1989, effected nationalism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden. Accordingly, the researcher hypothesized that the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism since the end of European Communism in 1989 has indeed led to the rise in nationalism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland and Sweden.

The initial subset/superset analyses implied that fears of loss of national identity (*SfNident*), degree of globalization (*EiGlobal*), demand for popular sovereignty (*RwpPopSov*), fears of migration (*SfMigra*), ethnic homogeneity (*RwpEHomog*), fears of terrorism (*SfTerror*), fears of loss of national identity (*SfNident*), anti-elite and
establishment attitudes (RwpAntiE), and national unemployment (EiUnemploy), in this particular order, may have been necessary and/or sufficient conditions as elements of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism for the rise of post-1989 European nationalism(s). Case by case bivariate analyses exploring the relationships between these condition variables and Nationali through XY fuzzy-set plots confirmed that economic insecurities pertaining to degree of nationalism, national unemployment and emigration, societal fears of loss of national identity and migration, and anti-elite and establishment attitudes as well as demand for popular sovereignty as tools of right-wing populism may indeed be regarded as potentially sufficient and/or necessary conditions, though their sufficiency and/or necessity has been shown to vary in each case.

Thus, when testing H1 in regards to the effects of the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears and/or right-wing populism since the end of European Communism in 1989 in the five examined European countries, sufficiency suggested that post-1989 European nationalism(s) as the outcome could potentially be explained by single conditions, while necessity implied that their interaction with other conditions would be necessary as they could not bring about the outcome on their own. As such, the fuzzy-set plot results confirmed H1 partially, and suggested that single conditions alone were unlikely to explain the outcome, at least not universally across the five cases. They implied the need to further examine the role of specific economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism in their contexts – phenomena later addressed by the thematic analysis in this chapter and detailed case studies in the subsequent Chapter V, “The Cases”.

Results of the truth table analysis initially confirmed H1 through equifinality (the
idea that there is more than one combination of conditions associated with the same outcome). The truth table analysis of the conditions of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism and post-1989 European nationalism separately as well as combined, yielded high consistency and coverage scores that met the required thresholds of the fuzzy-set QCA technique. As such, these results indicated the potential presence of specific casual pathways and interactions among sub-conditions within specific primary conditions as well as combinations of the three primary conditions, all of which could likely have contributed to the rise of post-1989 European nationalism across the five cases—Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden.

In addition to the combination of four potentially necessary and/or sufficient casual pathways, the truth table analysis of economic insecurities and post-1989 European nationalism revealed one pathway, which alone may have been necessary and/or sufficient, namely the interaction of emigration and income inequality ($EiEmig+EiInequal$) across the cases. This result however was later contradicted by findings of the analysis of necessary conditions and combinations of conditions.

Furthermore, the truth table of societal fears and post-1989 European nationalism yielded four casual combinations of pathways of interactions with thresholds suggesting that these combinations had the potential to explain post-1989 European nationalist phenomena. No individual pathway pertaining to societal fears was however indicated as necessary and/or sufficient, though the fear of loss of national identity ($SfNident$) was indicated to have been a potentially sufficient societal fear to trigger the outcome in all cases. This finding was later partially confirmed in the cases of Italy and Hungary, while $SfNident$ was shown as a necessary condition in the remaining cases.
When (sub-)conditions within the realm of right-wing populism were examined, two potentially necessary and/or sufficient casual pathways to *Nationali* were found, although neither one of these pathways could account for the rise of post-1989 European nationalism uniquely. Truth table results of the relationships between primary condition variables of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism and the outcome variable separately called for further testing to determine necessity and sufficiency of their suggested casual pathways.

Lastly, analysis of necessary conditions testing multiple combinations of economic, societal, and political conditions contradicted initial implications of potentially necessary and/or sufficient casual pathways unique to economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism as conditions of *Nationali*. Instead, these results confirmed five potential casual paths of necessity having met the threshold: 1) anti-elitist and establishment attitudes with the decrease in the level of ethnic homogeneity and the public’s fear of the loss of national identity (*RwpAntiE+RwpEHomog+SfNident*); 2) anti-elitist and establishment attitudes combined with the public’s fears of migration and loss of national identity (*RwpAntiE+SfMigra+SfNident*); 3) religious grievances combined with anti-elitist and establishment attitudes and fears of the loss of national identity (*SfReligion+RwpAntiE+RwpEHomog*); 4) degree of globalization combined with public fears of the loss of national identity, decrease in ethnic homogeneity, and increase in national income inequality *EiGlobal+SfNident+RwpEHomog+EiInequal*; and 5) the presence of national income inequality combined with fears of migration, anti-elitist and establishment attitudes, and fears of terrorism (*EiInequal+SfMigra+RwpAntiE+SfTerror*).
In sum, while the complex and intermediate solution formulas from the earlier truth tables revealed multiple potentially possible combinations of conditions, the analysis of necessary conditions confirmed five interactive combinations among economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism and their respective sub-conditions as having been necessary for the rise of Nationali. As such, fsQCA analysis partially confirmed H1 of the researcher that in some cases it was the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism since the end of European Communism in 1989 that has likely contributed to the rise of post-1989 European nationalism. However, the bivariate fuzzy-set plots showed that some sub-conditions were identified as potentially sufficient, and some both sufficient and necessary for the rise of Nationali thus suggesting that while in some cases it is the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism, in others, specific economic insecurities, societal fears and/or right-wing populist tendencies could have guaranteed the rise of Nationali when present.

*Findings of the Thematic Analysis Addressing H2 and H3*

While the results of the fsQCA, referred to as ‘solution formulas’, have indicated the conditions and combinations of conditions potentially necessary and sufficient for the rise of post-1989 European nationalism, the thematic analysis paid attention to the three previously identified, distinct post-1989 historical periods – 1989 to 2007; 2008 to 2014; and 2015 until 2018 to examine patterns of post-1989 European nationalist phenomena in historically, economically, socially, and/or politically diverse settings.

Results of the thematic analysis addressed H2 to determine whether unique economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or elements of right-wing populism have indeed
proven to be of dominance in their effects on nationalism in the five cases. In addition, the analysis addressed H3, interested in potential diversities in the outcome, namely the types of post-1989 European nationalisms. To examine the strength of these hypotheses, and thus to respond to research questions 2 and 3, themes and subthemes identified during the coding procedures were organized to display similarities and divergences among the five cases – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden. The following section along with Table 4.1 below summarizes the most relevant central themes and sub-themes for each case in the three overlapping historical periods. The chapter ends with the researcher’s discussion of the value of the findings for H2 and H3.

Results of the Thematic Analysis. The remainder of this chapter reviewed the main characteristics of themes and sub-themes identified among the five cases as they pertain to economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism as potential conditions of post-1989 European nationalism and its potentially distinct types. In this chapter, most commonly noted similarities and differences among the cases have been summarized as the next chapter, Chapter V, “The Cases” details case-specific examples pertaining to the themes and sub-themes. Chapter VI, “Analysis, Implications and Conclusions”, then synthesizes the results and findings from both the fuzzy-set QCA and thematic analyses before this dissertation concludes with a discussion of their implications for nationalism studies theory and practice.

1. Legacies and continuity

All five cases – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden displayed that historical legacies and continuity of national identities – primarily cultural, religious, and linguistic national identities were a reoccurring societal distress, particularly resonant
with the national public in each European nation-state since 1989. National identity, though differently expressed in each case, has contributed to a sense of community interminably cherished by the public, symbolically capitalized upon by political leaders, and repeatedly reinforced by national media narratives over time.

Various types of national identities – ethnic, cultural, religious, economic, and linguistic among others - also varied over time as narrative conceptualizations of, as well as sentimental and cognitive associations with national identities evolved in each country and in the larger EU space, with some identities periodically more active and/or salient than others across the examined time periods. Nonetheless, always salient within nationally distinct economic, societal, and political environments in all five cases, in all instances, diverse and often hybrid forms of national identities have either simultaneously functioned within, and/or increasingly balanced against broader regional and supranational European identities constituting the heart of country’s national legacy.

1.1 Emphasis on historical and symbolic legacies

This first sub-theme revealed that Italian, Hungarian, and Irish political rhetoric emphasized historical legacies of national identities in all three historical periods from 1989 until 2018. On one hand, they instilled pride in national belonging, while on the other, they built on fear of erosion of national identity to promote survival of the nation in times of hardship, foreign domination, and transformation on the other. Banal nationalism, embedded in varying expressions of nationalist sentiments (a theme later discussed in more detail) in these three cases over time, continued to celebrate historical legacy through a retrospective lens that did not only help locate national commonalities rooted in a common past but also provided a basis for political rhetoric and policy
discourse to progressively build on such shared sentiments and associations to paint a picture of declining national sovereign decision-making and independence.

Generally characterized by higher expectations for progress, democracy, and integration and greater trust in the European Union (EU) during the first historical period (1989 to 2007), historical legacies in the years after the 2008 European financial crisis, and then again following the onset of the 2015 European refugee and migrant crisis, seemed to have been particularly exploited to by domestic political parties to secure their popularity in rapidly transforming economic, societal and political environments. As public expectations in these three countries were observed to have gradually declined since 1989, the quest for greater economic and political independence rooted in sour memories and experiences of the past became an evident pattern throughout the narratives examined in Italy, Hungary, and Ireland alike.

Although emphasis on historical and symbolic legacies was not to be disregarded in Germany and Sweden, such emphasis in these two cases has remained generally more prospective, progressive, and optimistic in nature. This sub-theme, when examined in Germany, and Sweden indicated that historical legacy as it pertained to the past, was not of utmost importance at the societal level, at least not between 1989 and 2014. Rather than re-living the past, Germans and Swedes alike were generally less concerned with the erosion of historical and symbolic legacies as necessities for continuity in the shape of survival. Albeit, after the onset of the 2015 European refugee and migrant crisis, memories of the past in national narratives have been repeatedly rekindled in all five cases, especially in the political rhetoric of the right that reminded citizens of the old days in the face of modern-day challenges.
Table 19

Prominent themes and sub-themes by case, 1989 to 2007, 2008 to 2014, and 2015 to 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Sub-themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989-2007</td>
<td>Theme 1</td>
<td>Sub-theme 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2014</td>
<td>Theme 2</td>
<td>Sub-theme 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015-2018</td>
<td>Theme 3</td>
<td>Sub-theme 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...
1.2 Continuity of national identity

In some cases, national identities were noted as prospective, progressive, and thus, more inclusive in nature, in others, national identities remained more retrospective and exclusive. In the cases of Italy and Hungary, sentimental and cognitive associations with national identities were generally accompanied by fear of loss of national identity in the face of economic, societal, and political transformations since 1989. Nevertheless, several types of identities appeared in both countries, having made it a challenge to collectively mobilize a common national identity in all five cases. For example, in Italy, regions like Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, and Veneto have repeatedly contested collectivization of ‘Italianness’. As both Italy and Hungary transitioned from one historical period to the next, right-wing and far-right political parties tapping into common societal fears as well as economic insecurities on the national level have been partially successful in collectivizing national sentiments more and more since the 2008 financial crisis.

The continuity of national identities, was closely related to historical legacies in Ireland’s case, where, Irish national identity has remained at the cross-roads of Irish and Northern Irish national identity first. Existing and functioning as a sovereign state along a complex economic, societal, and political system of the United Kingdom, a much-contested player within the EU, Ireland’s national identity has been ever-present. Catholicism and Protestantism both underline distinct forms of Irish national identity, which, amid institutional and political change has remained among, if not the strongest sources of political identity in the country.
The continuity of national identities in Germany and Sweden has also prevailed through its various forms over time. Shared national belonging, compared to the cases of Italy, Hungary, and Ireland, has become visibly more integrated broader European identities, though has not assimilated with them. Unlike in the cases of Italy and Hungary, in Ireland, Germany, and Italy, national identity continuum has thus been largely characterized by adaptation to change rather than by political and public resistance to it. The continuity of distinct, coexisting, and/or competing regional identities in Germany, Italy, and Ireland was an additional commonality.

2. National identities in context

This central theme captured the roles of national identities in various contexts over time. Continuous in all five cases, national identities have periodically emerged as political tools to unify the nation-state and its citizenry in unique economic, societal, and/or political contexts, in which these various national identities have interacted.

2.1 National identity as legitimacy of the nation-state in political rhetoric

A common pattern among the cases surrounded the role of symbolic politics equating national belonging as a source of political legitimacy of the nation-state. Although this research did not directly study the direction of the relationship among political discourse, national media content, and public opinion, their reliance on one another became visible across all five cases, serving as a platform for national collectivization. The push toward collectivization of certain types of national identities varied across the cases and has also evolved over time.

For instance, in the years after German unification, German narratives have generally encouraged a collective German identity committed to democratic values
through cultural West-East unity as a source of nation-state legitimacy. In the period between 1989 and 2007, West and East German national identities, nonetheless, remained distinct. While in the West, a civic form of national identity was encouraged by political leaders of a unified Germany, in the Eastern states, similarly to Hungary’s case, political legitimacy was first embedded in the promotion of an anti-communist, pro-independence, and pro-democratic collective political identity. The former phenomena were also noted in Sweden at the time, where hybridity of Swedish-EU identities and overlapping citizenry were encouraged alongside Swedish collectiveness.

Additionally, all five cases displayed that national identity as a source of political legitimacy became mobilized by political discourse differently in particular contexts, particularly in circumstances when either the legacy of the nation-state and/or the continuity of its national identities were perceived to be threatened. Such threats were rearticulated by national media sources as EU democratic deficit, ethnic heterogeneity, and emigration, among others. Interestingly, while in Germany’s and Sweden’s case political legitimacy was symbolically embedded in tolerant and non-xenophobic civic national identities, the post-2008 era marked the arrival of an era that awakened potentially dormant or new forms of national identities that shared many similarities with discourses of ethnic and cultural unity as legitimacy of the nation-state, and fears of loss of national identity historically more dominant in the cases of Italy and Hungary. Since 2015, findings suggested that all five countries have refocused their attention to the need for national unity in times of challenges facing the EU.
2.2 Public identification with national identities

The public, in all five cases, has associated with their national identity first before other identities such as that of a broader European identity, though results varied per case, and again, over time. Between 1989 and 2007, although much more visibly in Germany’s, Ireland’s, and Sweden’s case, the public seemed to have embraced the notion of a national identity alongside an EU identity with hopes tied to democratic commitment and EU institutional stability. In Germany and Sweden, findings indicated that national identity has almost been viewed by the public as EU identity, with press coverage of overlapping citizenry, and legislation that redefined citizenry and with it, the notion of national belonging. In Italy and Hungary, national identities remained somewhat juxtaposed with EU identities since 1989, partially explaining the varying levels of commitment to the EU’s democratic values.

Thus, public identification with national identities were observed, yet with time, the salience of the type of national identity the public in each country associated with, became dependent on the public’s specific national interests – economic, societal, political, or other. As an example, when economic interests such as the distribution of welfare have become societal concerns, interestingly, expressions of national identities became closely tied to ethnic ones as was seen in all cases, particularly Germany’s and Sweden’s in the latest historical period surveyed. In the aftermath of the refugee and migrant crisis, all five cases have seen an increase in associations with national identity as ethnic identity, with such identities set against primarily Muslim minority identities by far-right party discourse.
Nonetheless, throughout all three overlapping periods since 1989, national identities as religious identities as seen in the cases of Ireland and Italy, national identities as linguistic identities as seen in the cases of Italy, and national identities as economic identities as seen in the case of Germany have been continuously embodied. Some of these various forms of identities functioned as synonymous with, or alongside a collective European character, while others remained more regionally salient, challenging the possibility of one sole collective national identity. Findings also suggested that political discourse and media content have been most resonant in times of economic, societal, and political events permeating public insecurities and fears. Examples of these across the cases included but were not limited to concerns regarding national and/or EU political effectiveness, socio-economic problems (primarily in the realms of inequalities and unemployment), and personal safety and security.

3. Varying attitudes toward globalization

In all five cases, globalization and related economic, societal, and political transformations have emerged as unescapable, having brought about a natural increase in overall civil freedoms and openness. While in Ireland, Germany, and Sweden alike globalization has generally been deemed economically and socially beneficial since the 1990s, in Hungary globalization was often equated with Europeanization, associated with legacies of foreign domination and skeptical attitudes toward larger integration from the start – tendencies especially apparent from the early 2000s. Italy exhibited some similarly skeptical attitudes from the 1990s despite becoming a major economic player globally and in the EU. Consequently, diverse top-down and bottom-up orientations toward globalization ranged from integration perceived as foreign dominance in Hungary to
generally positive views of migration in Germany, Ireland, and Sweden, and from pride in being a migration nation in Sweden, export nation in Germany to fears of migrants and asylum-seekers in all cases by the turn of the century. Such attitudes became more synchronous among the cases between 2008 and 2014, with preference for migrants from the EU, concerns for outmigration and low birthrates, and persisting regional inequalities reoccurring patterns, though not equally applicable in each case.

3.1 Varying attitudes toward EU integration and Euroscepticism

While high hopes for European integration through an increase in integration policies generally characterized all five cases immediately after the Fall of European Communism, historical reliance on the economic zones of the former EEC has shown signs of divergence among the cases in relation to their progress in adapting to and embracing EU standards in economic, societal, and political realms. Reservations toward the EU as a supranational entity have been continuous and prominent in Italy and Hungary. With globalization equated to Europeanization, in Hungary’s case as an example, EU economic policy has been viewed as a form ‘imperialist’ domination, while Italy has shown its dissatisfaction with EU policies and European collectivization through the criticism of EU integrative policies as ineffective.

The public, in all cases, has historically identified with their respective nationality first, with Euroscepticism having become a common thread among the cases at different times. Nevertheless, Euroscepticism has gradually increased in all cases since the mid 2000s. Although each case has demonstrated varying attitudes toward the EU along with various levels of Euroscepticism, ineffective EU policies and programs, their EU democratic deficit, the EU’s struggle to safeguard democratic values, and cultural, social,
and political diversities as the only commonality in the EU have become shared criticisms, especially since 2008. Meanwhile, an increase in far-right party vote shares in national and European elections was evident in all cases, with German and Swedish narratives having signaled that that the far-right would constitute a prominent threat to the EU and its institutions.

As such, in each case, national identities have been increasingly juxtaposed with EU identities, and increasingly so over time. While in Germany and Sweden public narratives indicated a greater level of acceptance of a European identity, the two more recent historical periods examined, between 2008 to 2014 and 2015 to 2018, suggested a turn toward public perceptions split down the middle in regards to the benefits of EU membership. Post-2015, data further indicated the rise in the level of fear of terrorism and Islamophobia as a shared pattern, with preference for migrants from the EU first in each case.

4. Inequalities and unemployment as drivers of economic insecurities

In the realms of economic insecurities, inequalities and national unemployment emerged as reoccurring themes, though again, quite differently in each of the three historical periods studied. Inequalities extended beyond the notion of income inequality alone, and were most often underscored along geographic lines within countries, and within the EU in economic and political terms primarily. Moreover, experiences of national unemployment were closely tied with topics of low birth rates in Germany and Italy, emigration in Italy and Hungary, and migration overall, with some level of anti-migrant sentiments having lasted in each case since 1989 thus connecting the economic, societal, and political spheres.
4.1 Inequalities along geographic lines

First, inequalities – primarily economic and political along geographic lines have remained prominent not only each case but across the EU as alluded to by national narratives since 1989. Major economic divides between the East and West in Germany, between the North and South in Italy, and regional divides in all five countries have persisted, threatening both social cohesion and the legitimacy of national institutions in each case. The research has found that these regional inequalities have particularly intensified since the 1980s across the cases, with historical processes of the past, ineffectiveness of both national and EU governing bodies, policies, and programs, globalization and Europeanization, and an EU democratic deficit in regards to power imbalances of economic and political decision-making among member countries repeatedly mentioned as perceived catalysts behind such inequalities lasting, and in almost all cases intensifying over time.

Findings suggested some divergence among the cases, with narratives from Germany, Sweden, Italy, and Ireland highlighting regional inequalities nationally first, while Hungary’s case focused on grievances pertaining to continental inequalities instead. Divergences among cases in regards to broader context of both factual and perceived inequalities, have revealed potential explanations for dissimilarities in country’s level of commitment to democracy and EU institutional values as country’s including Germany and Sweden with less reliance on EU support emerged as more trusting, while particularly in Italy’s and Hungary’s greater levels of Euroscepticism was noted. While tax and benefit system reforms in some cases like Germany’s aided the reduction of socio-economic gaps, changing unemployment patterns, working conditions,
and labor market structures have contributed to increased job polarization, inequality and high levels of concentration of wealth in three of the five cases examined – in Germany, Italy, Sweden.

4.2 Unemployment and anti-migrant sentiments

Results of the thematic analysis indicated that experiences of national unemployment emerged periodically in all five cases, and have effected national policy as well public opinion distinctly in each case. While unemployment in Germany was pertinent in the East and similarly to Sweden’s unemployment, plunged in the early 1990s, but remained relatively low from the mid-2000s. In Ireland, national unemployment rates skyrocketed following the European sovereign debt crisis but have decreased gradually since. In Italy’s case, unemployment rates remained relatively high since 1989, while Hungary’s case was noted to be like Ireland’s with the financial crisis having taken a toll on national unemployment rates. National government documents and media reports have indicated that the financial crisis of 2008 nonetheless had negative effects on all five national economies, contributing to rising youth unemployment (of ages 15 to 24) and thus national migration among regions as well as emigration.

Most notably, national unemployment gained a symbolic role, with experiences of unemployment having been tied to negative attitudes toward minority groups in national narratives as well as European reports on the performance of the EU labor force. Findings suggested that low coverage of unemployment benefits and perceived threats to welfare allowances have consistently resonated with both populist and right-wing party rhetoric, and triggered negative attitudes toward migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers as threats to job security – a phenomena apparent and capitalized upon in far-right party discourse
shown by national media reports.

Interestingly, the level of these anti-migrant sentiments emerged and varied based on the specific outgroups historically present in each country. For instance, anti-migrant sentiments between 1989 and 2007 in Germany have gradually shifted from Polish to Turkish migrants during the late 2000s. Preference for migrants from the EU has significantly increased in each case, with Muslim migrants perceived by the public generally less deserving of welfare assistance than other groups across all the cases – a tendency visible in some cases since the early 2000s.

5. Societal fears and public reservations

The theme of societal fears and public reservations recorded patterns of fear expressed or insinuated by political leaders and the public in governmental and media narratives and reports. Fears of foreign domination captured societal fears closely related to perceptions of threats to national identity as well as national policy, and became similarly exhibited among cases only after the mid-2000s. Fears of violence and terrorism, though in a variety ways also connected the five cases over time, and has visibly gained a primarily anti-Muslim character across all cases since the early 2000s. Fears against outgroups since 1989 has emerged through various indications of xenophobic discrimination against outgroups, though targeted outgroups also were first unique to each country, then became somewhat uniform against Muslim minorities by the early 2000s. Interestingly, societal fears and reservations most often overlapped with economic insecurities in the realms of European integration, migration, and unemployment as they appeared to have triggered national collectivization.
5.1 Fears of foreign domination

Between 1989 and 2007, societal fears were most prominent and similar in the cases of Hungary and Italy connected by skeptical attitudes toward European integration, with integration perceived as a form of foreign dominance in Hungary specifically. With state capture and corruption as most dominant public concerns in the post-Soviet country, fears of loss of political autonomy in a supranational structure has shown to awaken legacies of threats to national sovereignty in Hungary. While Italians have placed more trust in the EU superstructure than their Central-Eastern neighbors, reservations toward the EU have persisted, though perceptions toward the EU as threat to Italian decision-making processes have not become deeply articulated until the European financial crisis. Fears of foreign domination, associated with perceived threats to political autonomy and national sovereignty, were virtually non-existent in Germany, Ireland, or Sweden nationally, although regional public skepticism toward greater European integration have been apparent in all five countries.

Between 2008 and 2014, in the cases of Germany, Ireland, and Sweden views toward the EU as a potentially threatening entity were lacking, yet frequently emerged in Hungarian and Italian narratives, with some of these exploring perceptions of an EU democratic deficit. In addition, by 2015 to 2018, fears of foreign domination emerged through public perceptions of a ‘foreign invasion’ by non-EU peoples emerged in all five cases, although such perceptions were much more dominant in collectivizing the national public in Hungary, Italy, and Ireland than in Germany’s and Sweden’s case.

Right-wing and populist political rhetoric of Muslim migrants and refugees depicted as invaders in political discourse has resonated much more with societal fears of
the public in Hungary and Italy overall than in Germany’s and Sweden’s case, where such far-right tendencies have been embraced but have also been simultaneously disputed as threats to both EU and national economic, cultural, and political stability. Interestingly, while Ireland has remained relatively distant from such far-right and populist waves, findings showed that a portion of its public has shared some societal reservations toward Muslim minorities.

5.2 Fears of violence and terrorism

Fears of violence and terrorism have been found as a reoccurring pattern across the cases yet quite distinctively so up until the early 2000s. For instance, public fears of violence and terrorism have been present in Germany post-unification due to recognition of regional inequalities and grievances. In Hungary, such fears, at the time, were largely embedded in fears of post-Soviet violence, while in Ireland’s case, anti-terrorism efforts and policies and public fears pertaining thereto, were primarily observed domestically often citing republican terrorist organizations of the Real Irish Republican Army (IRA) as well as Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), the latter specifically aiming to bring about a united Ireland.

Over time, however, fears of violence and terrorism, have been observed to shift toward international terrorism and violent crime brought about by migration, respectively. Post the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11th, all five European countries began to prioritize international terrorism as an EU priority, although not seeing eye-to-eye on the effectiveness implementation policy. Findings indicated that fears of terrorism have been expressed through national anti-terrorism policy – a similarity among the cases transcending into the economic and cultural realms.
in the form of public reservations against migrants and refugees from Islamic countries. These gradually grew after the onset of the financial crisis and then again, following the onset of the latest refugee and migrant crisis. Although the level of migration from primarily Muslim countries to each country has gradually declined in all five countries since 2017, in almost all cases, right-wing, far-right radical, populist, and/or far-right populist political discourse has connected the topics of Islamic terrorism with anti-globalization and migration sentiments of the national public.

5.3 Xenophobic discrimination against outgroups

Societal fears and public reservations have been most prominent across the cases toward the EU as a supranational entity on one hand, and toward a variety of outgroups perceived as having distinctive identities from that of the commonly accepted national citizenry. Notably, in-groups and outgroups have been explored and discussed both domestically due to the several national identities persistent in each country as well as globally, when national collectiveness was juxtaposed against regional identities, a collective European identity – economic, cultural, and political alike, and non-EU migrant and refugee identities. Despite outgroups having differed across the cases and over time, results of the analysis have revealed that in almost every case, outgroups have been targeted by political leaders and national policy as well as the public. For example, in Hungary primary targeted outgroups in the early 1990s included the Roma and Sinti. With time, some of the discrimination expanded to members of the LGBTQ community.

While these ethnic minorities remained a perceived outgroup since, political, media, and public attention alike has shifted to the ethnic and cultural composition of the migrant and refugee communities arriving to Hungary. Germany’s and Sweden’s
example further illustrated that xenophobic attitudes similarly collectivized German nationality to some extent, first weighing national characteristics against Eastern identities, then Turkish, and most recently against African and Middle Eastern ethnic, religious, and linguistic identities.

While the nature of the relationship among political discourse, media narratives, and public resonance with related issues was beyond the focus of this study, it appeared that there may have been a cyclical relationship among the depiction of outgroups as threats to particularly cherished national identities in political and media narratives and the overall perception of their members by the national public. Furthermore, as findings from the 2008 to 2014 and 2015 to 2018 historical periods have displayed an increase in the public’s frustration with national government and ineffective EU policies and programs to integrate outgroups into their respective socioeconomic lives.

Findings showed that right-wing populist and far-right party discourse, in specific, has capitalized on such lack of action as a campaign strategy in all cases but Ireland’s. Notably, by the late 2000s, xenophobic societal fears and public reservations have gained an international, predominantly anti-non-EU dimension, with EU concerns expressed in regards to decreases in the lack of commitment to democracy in the Hungarian and Italian case. Increases in discriminatory national anti-migrant policies and deliberate attacks targeting ethnic and religious minorities, specifically Muslims attributed to public frustrations, were common across all cases but Ireland’s since. Xenophobic attitudes have been observed differently in Hungary and Italy, where their dominance in collectivizing national identities since 1989 was observed continuously, compared to Germany’s and Sweden’s cases, where xenophobia toward non-EU citizens and nationals, specifically
against Muslim ethno-religious minorities have amplified in the 2000s, splitting public national sentiments and attitudes toward outgroups.

6. Varying expressions of nationalist sentiments in contexts

The thematic analysis revealed four main distinct types of nationalisms in the five cases, though these types were not identical when present. In addition, they have often overlapped with one another, with some characteristics changing over time dependent on the context, in which they operated. Moreover, in some contexts and situations, their presence was pertinent in national political rhetoric but has not been fully embraced by the national public, and in others, these types of nationalisms appeared as already resonant with the national public and then became apparent in political discourse and online media coverage.

6.1 Liberal civic nationalisms

Liberal civic nationalism, though somewhat distinctly, has been a common pattern in Germany, Sweden, and Ireland. Through the promotion of a civic commitment to the unification of German collective identities in economic, social, and political realms, post-1989 German nationalism has been generally characterized first by the promotion of an anti-communist, pro-democratic stance in the years immediately after the Fall of European Communism. In the early 2000s, political leaders began to promote a tolerant, non-xenophobic nationalism, tying civic identities to pride of being a migration. Such type of liberal civic nationalism promoting a civic collective political national identity as a cornerstone of state legitimacy was also observed in Sweden since the 1990s, though Sweden’s case pride in being a migration nation appeared to be supported by a certain welfare nationalism at the same time.
Findings of the study indicated that a greater openness to globalization, Europeanization, and European integration were associated with the emergence of liberal civic nationalisms in Germany and Sweden, interdependent with characteristics of economic nationalisms – a tendency observed throughout all three examined historical time periods in the two countries. It was also noted that liberal civic nationalisms gradually became less embraced by the national public over time, providing a vacuum for not only criticism by right-wing populists and radicals but for more aggressive types of nationalisms. While liberal civic nationalism was witnessed in Italy’s case as well post-1989, its relevance was overshadowed by other types of nationalisms including ethnonationalisms and economic nationalisms. Liberal civic nationalism was virtually non-existent in the case of Hungary.

6.2 Economic nationalisms

Economic nationalisms with various dimensions of national attachment to national economy have been evident across the five examined cases. Some characteristics of economic nationalisms over time included but were not limited to high-expectations of welfare and democracy in Hungary, and former Eastern German states, pride in being an export nation in unified Germany (mostly embraced by the public in the West), a welfare nation in Sweden and Ireland, and migration nation in Germany, Italy, and Sweden. These, similarly to the types of liberal civic nationalisms observed principally in Germany’s and Sweden’s case, have evolved over time, often overlapping with other nationalist phenomena including ethnonationalisms and xenophobic nationalisms.

Economic nationalisms, like liberal civic nationalisms, also periodically appeared as promoted goals of political leaders mirrored in media narratives rather than
as sentimental or cognitive associations of the public with pride in their respective economies. In some cases, media coverage highlighted such political attempts of national collectivization along economic lines as efforts for masking persisting inequalities and rising unemployment, while in others economic nationalisms appeared as a tool to ignite political unity relying on the public’s economic insecurities pertaining to the protection of economic national interests.

The European sovereign debt crisis and its aftermath post-2008 showed a re-emergence of collective national sentiments tied to the domestic economies. Because each country was affected differently, findings indicated that in nation-states with good overall performance of the national economy globally and in the EU, as in Germany, Ireland, Sweden, such nationalist sentiments and associations were more inclusive than exclusive of ethnic minority interests and EU economic interests. The opposite was observed in Hungary and Italy, where economic decision-making at the governmental level as well as public perceptions of the domestic economy appeared rather in-ward oriented, more exclusive of minority and EU interests, and protectionist in nature. Post-2008, each country nonetheless saw a rise in the overall promotion of national economic interests, with shared patterns such as the preference for migrants from the EU, greater economic Euroscepticism, and public perceptions of Muslim migrants as less deserving of national economic benefits than others.

Markedly, while economic nationalisms could be observed on a nation-state level across the cases, the multiplicity and hybridity of several economic national identities pointed to distinct regional economic identities balancing against a greater national economic identity. The Northern Italian region, Sweden, where regional mobilization
from stemmed from urban economic modernization, and the German state of Bavaria, are among the examples.

6.3 Ethnonationalisms

The promotion of ethnic identity as a legitimate source of the nation-state surfaced in all five cases. Reliance on ethnic continuity was found to connect all cases, with legacies of ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic identities cherished by the public, especially in times of economic, societal, and political transformations. For instance, a push for a collective German and simultaneously European civic identity by the leadership in the early 2000s celebrated ethnic diversity and the integration of Turks and other ethnic minorities including Sorbs, Danes, Frisians, the Roma and the Sinti. Ethnic nationalism triggered from the top-down was embedded in political attempt to redefine nationality by birthright rather than ethnic heredity. Nonetheless, the debate of what constituted ‘Germanness’ had the national consensus split down the middle with two distinct types of ethnonationalisms emerging.

Additionally, Italian regional, specifically ethnolinguistic identities, appeared to limbo at the intersection of demands for sovereign independence through secession (as in the cases of Trentino Alto-Adige or the invented nation of Padania), and the respective fears of losing such sovereign independence of the greater Italian nation. Although findings indicated that Italy has not managed to achieve a collective national identity, ethnonationalism in Italy has been partially collectivized over time. Characterized by both cultural and linguistic dimensions since the Fall of European Communism, where pride in a non-uniform ethnocultural and ethnolinguistic ‘Italianess’ superseded all other
forms of belonging, and has frequently served as a tool for collectivization in national political discourse.

Findings further exposed that Ireland’s national identity, like all the cases, has been frequently collectivized and mobilized on ethnic grounds. Its ethnic exclusive has been historically embedded in a religious divide between Catholic and Protestants. As Protestants aligned with the British and Catholics with the Ireland, Irish nationalism has been split and discussed as so in national narratives along ethnoreligious lines. Pride in ethnic national identity in the country has been deeply engraved in birthplace, residence on Irish soil, and most often religion. Results of the analysis nonetheless displayed that modern, post-1989 Irish nationalism has not been exclusively ethnic as Irish pride has also been characterized by inclusiveness and civic-mindedness.

Accordingly, the thematic analysis uncovered that various forms of ethnonationalisms appeared in the five cases, characterized by cultural, linguistic, religious, and even populist features. In addition, these types of nationalisms also appeared to have overlapped, in some cases having adopted unique features of several other types of nationalisms not shared with other cases, including those of state nationalism and romantic nationalism. The former was noted uniquely in Germany and Italy, while the latter was evident in both Italy and Hungary. Lastly, most ethnonationalisms were characterized by pride in preserving national economic interests of an ethnic group, particularly in the contexts of globalization, migration, and welfare distribution, the latter most evident in the past decade in the cases of Ireland and Sweden.
6.4 Xenophobic nationalisms

Although most notable in Germany’s and Hungary’s case during the first historical period between 1989 and 2007, xenophobic forms of European nationalisms across all the cases were not a clear commonality until the mid-2000s. In each case, a relationship among the level of perceived threat to national identities and political autonomy was thus observed. It was further recognized that more economically and politically independent nation-states were within their respective EU structure, the more they have exhibited split public attitudes toward outgroups including ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other cultural minorities. In contrast, the less economically and politically autonomous nation-states perceived themselves to be within the EU, as was the case in Italy and Hungary, public attitudes toward outgroups were more pessimistic and exclusive overall.

In specific, though at a different pace, Islamophobia began to collectivize national identities, and to some extent European identities since the early 2000s. Increases in targeted welfare policies aimed at minorities, reported increases in the level of violence against ethnic, above all, Muslim minorities, varying levels of support for wealth distribution for migrant and refugee families, and right-wing ideology combined with anti-migrant and nationalist discourse were among the few features associated with societal fears and public uncertainties.

Right-wing party support, populist orientations, and far-right political discourse associated with xenophobic attitudes in one form or in another were observed in four of the five cases, virtually non-existent in the case of Ireland. Hence, the analysis revealed that xenophobic expressions of national identities became particularly apparent across the
cases since the early 2000s, with right-wing political discourse periodically capitalizing on specific societal fears and/or economic insecurities relevant in each case to help trigger, re-awaken, or mobilize them.

As such, in Sweden’s and Ireland’s case, since 1989, xenophobic national expressions have primarily grown alongside concerns felt and associated with transformations to the country’s welfare system, though since the early 2000s, these concerns also assumed a cultural dimension. In Italy’s case, xenophobic national expressions were primarily observed along cultural lines first, though economic interests gained an increasingly important role in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis. Nevertheless, xenophobic national sentiments and associations have been expressed along ethnic lines, suggesting the presence of xenophobic ethnonationalisms in each case since 1989, characterized by a gradual shift toward Islamophobia in all five cases since the early 2000s.

Chapter Summary

The thematic analysis confirmed H2, and suggested that unique economic, social, and political contexts have indeed defined the types of economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism in their effects on nationalism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden. The six major themes – legacies and continuity, national identities in context, varying attitudes toward globalization, inequalities and unemployment as drivers of economic insecurities, societal fears and public reservations, and varying expressions of nationalist sentiments in context – and their subsequent sub-themes revealed that some economic insecurities and societal fears were indeed more
dominant than others across the cases over time, yet seemingly never truly independent from political environments.

In almost all the cases, when more closely examined, the observed patterns differed periodically in their relevance over time, often interdependent, and related with additional factors such as economic, social, and/or political regionalism as unique determinants of the level of national collectivization in each case. Findings indicated that legacies and continuity were key to the existence each nation-state, with a variety of national identities expressed over time and often, simultaneously. As such, while patterns associated with fear of loss of national identities were noted in all cases, the researcher could not capture a single collective national identity in neither of the cases, although some level of identity continuity was ever-present. In some cases, national identities were more continuous, rigid, and exclusive, in some, more flexible, evolving, and inclusive. National identities were therefore neither universally expressed nor collectivized, and shifted among economic, cultural, political, regional, European, or a combination thereof in nature.

Varying attitudes toward globalization and European integration were common across the five cases, though their relevance changed in each case. Interestingly, during the early 2000s with heightened levels of immigration in all cases, this theme and sub-themes revealed growing Euroscepticism among the cases – a pattern noted up until 2018. Such Euroscepticism, however, in each case emerged distinctively, though national dissatisfaction in regards to the lack of ineffective EU policies and programs appeared as a shared criticism among the cases, which notably intensified during the aftermath of Europe’s financial crisis.
Additionally, inequalities along geographic lines and in terms of national income were persistently present regionally among all cases since 1989, while economic uncertainties and related societal fears were noted periodically. Nonetheless, experiences of unemployment appeared in relation to anti-migrant attitudes, targeted primarily toward Muslim inhabitants of the nation-state in all cases since the mid-2000s. Societal fears and public reservations also differed among the cases but emerged as a commonality closely tied with fears of foreign domination, terrorism, and xenophobia as main patterns in the past two decades.

Hence, the thematic analysis partially confirmed H2 that the economic, social, and political circumstances of each nation-state, at least to some extent, shaped the primacy of specific economic insecurities and societal fears in their effects on post-1989 European nationalism in the five EU countries generally, and in each nation-state, uniquely. Generally, transformations to the European landscape, including the onset of the 2008 financial and the 2015 refugee and migrant crises, have left their mark on the five EU member states but did so distinctively. Testing resulted in no clear evidence that either right-wing populism or its elements have enjoyed dominance in their effects on post-1989 nationalism across the cases. The analysis revealed that in the recent decade particularly, both right and left-wing political rhetoric and discourse, have depended on economic insecurities and/or societal fears, to collectivize national belonging. Albeit, economic insecurities and societal fears have rarely existed without a political context in neither top-down or bottom-up processes of collectivization.

The findings also confirmed H3, given that specific types of nationalisms since the end of European Communism have been uniquely detectible in Germany, Italy,
Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden. Four main types of post-1989 European nationalisms as conceptualized by nationalism studies research emerged – liberal civic nationalisms, economic nationalisms, ethnonationalisms, and xenophobic nationalisms. Results revealed that despite some similarities in expressions among the cases, the types of nationalisms were unique to each case, and extended beyond their simplified thematic codes as they coexisted, competed with, or supplemented other nationalist tendencies.

In sum, the present chapter, Chapter IV detailed the testing procedures and results from both the fsQCA and thematic analyses. The next chapter, Chapter V titled “The Cases” elaborates on unique attributes of each case by expanding on these results. Similarities and differences among the five cases – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden identified through thematic analysis are synthesized with results from the fuzzy-set QCA in the final chapter, Chapter VI, “Analysis, Implications, and Conclusions”, which also summarizes the main contributions of this dissertation to nationalism studies literature along with its cross-disciplinary implications for this complex and evolving field.
CHAPTER V – THE CASES

“In its haste to bolster nationalism, in its obsession with security, Europe is losing its soul.”

– Tariq Ramadan (2009)

Nationalism as a symbolic, sociopolitical, and ideological impetus, is nothing new to Europe, and it has been transforming a historically cultivated, yet economically, culturally, and politically evolving continent. Historically harnessed grievances, memories of war, and enduring battles for independence have not disappeared, with deepening regionalization and globalization fueling anti-establishment, anti-European integration, and anti-migrant attitudes. This chapter details the most prominent patterns noted pertaining to economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism as potential conditions of post-1989 European nationalisms in the five European nation-states – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden.

Case 1: Post-1989 German Nationalism

Legacies and Continuity

Post-1989 expressions of German nationalist sentiments varied over time, the continuity of national identities has been deeply rooted in the complexity of historical events leading up to the post-Cold War reunification of the German people. The German nation has been divided between Catholic and Lutheran religious identities since the sixteenth century. Bavarian nationalists have indeed viewed the German government and 1871 German Unification particularly controversial and invasive of Bavarian domestic affairs and sovereignty – a pattern that persisted in the post-1989 era until 2018. Nonetheless, at the time of the Enlightenment, the German ‘Volk’ was generally viewed either as a ‘Sprachnation’ – a community united by a shared language, a ‘Kulturation’ –
a people defined by a shared culture, or ‘Erinnerungs-gemeinschaft’ – a community bonded by remembrance of a shared history (Jansen 2011).

A collective German nationalism in the form of a political Pan-Germanism to unite German-speaking people in a single nation-state Groß-Deutschland (Great Germany) emerged, first, in response to Napoleonic Wars. Such German pan-nationalism as a socially divisive political project supported the German Empire, and later, provided a sociopolitical platform for German expansionism during both World Wars.

In the shadows of economic and political transformations of a new world order in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the pursuit of political self-determination rooted in desires of a unified German national identity, have remained outliners of subsequent German nationalisms, with national identity as a legitimizer of the nation-state and cultural standardization. Xenophobic nationalisms for instance, became repeatedly embedded in moral superiority against such ‘other’– a pattern that reemerged in the mid-2000s. Examples of such oppressive nationalisms included those against Jews and other untermenschen (subhumans) including ethnic Poles and Romani minorities during World War II, East German communists during times of the Cold War, and migrants and refugees, particularly Muslims, since the mid-2000s. Accordingly, histories and myths of various German national identities in context remained in the collective consciousness both as memories of fascism, and as European, and cosmopolitan memories of the Holocaust (Fukuyama 1989; Levy and Sznaider 2002).

With the formation of the EEC and respectively, the EU in the early 1990s, domestic and external forces became increasingly entangled as they shaped German identity and a more distinct European identity, with national attachments now aligning
and re-aligning on the bases of domestic geographical boundaries, competing political, and ethno-cultural ideologies, and economic systems, and a simultaneously expanding European union. Eastern Germany, officially the German Democratic Republic (GDR) operated under Soviet control, and tried to establish its separate identity (Priestand 2009), with its own Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) distinct from its Western neighbors in the Allied Zone. Major linguistic differences, separated families, restrictive civic freedoms, and preventive in-group communication and accessibility to the West, have exacerbated Eastern and Western dualities between 1949 and 1989. Laissez-faire type of West German nationalism has been generally attributed to political and economic transformations in the West including globalization, while Central and Eastern European nationalisms, including that of the GDR, were the result of backwards socio-political development of the times (Özkirimli 2010; Smith 2013).

With the West German motto of ‘Unity, Justice, and Freedom’ and a national anthem titled ‘Song of the Germans’ on one hand, and ‘Workers of the World, Unite!’ and the national song titled ‘Risen from Ruins’ on other, ideological differences and symbolic meanings underlining Western and Eastern German national ways of thinking and acting were, and remain evident. The former progressive and inclusive, the latter retrospective and exclusive. Thus, West German Cold-War nationalisms have generally been more liberal civic in nature, driven by the aim to reduce the socioeconomic, sociocultural, and political gaps, and to celebrate a collective German national identity in two German states but one German nation (Brandt 1970).

Post-1989 Western German national identities thus continue to differ in their origins on the bases of receptiveness of international influences and the ability to come to
terms with its Nazi past, breaking away from German superiority through commitment to the European Union (EU), democracy, and a tolerant, non-xenophobic German identities, at least up until the early 2000s. In contrast, in the former Eastern bloc, Marxist internationalism did not erase feelings of German supremacy (Jarausch and Welsh 2006). While Brandt’s initial efforts to establish a united Germany as a Kulturnation (culture nation) later earned him a Nobel Prize, close to four decades post-reunification, fundamental economic, cultural, and political poles of Eastern and Western national identities remain (Merkel 2017).

*Post-1989 German Economic Insecurities*

In May 1990, the two regions agreed on the establishment of a monetary, economic, and social union, with the GDR transferring financial sovereignty to the West, and the West reciprocally granting subsidies to the GDR for budgeting and social security systems. In the early days of reunification, a “D-mark nationalism” symbolized collective national pride associated with unified German economic power. Germany – its German political elite, public, and the mass media – took considerable pride in German product quality. However, with shock-therapy style privatization, artificially high rates of exchange for the Ostmark, and the rapidity of the economic merger between distinct capitalist and socialist market structures have not occurred without challenges as hopes of prosperity tied to the D-mark began to fade in the East.

In 1991, the year post-reunification, unemployment in the East rose to 3 million, with an only 8 percent of Eastern German production contributing to the whole of German output. Steady growth rate in the West, coupled with high demands for money supply and high levels of government expenditures in the East, the much slower overall
German growth rate than initially anticipated pushed Germany into a recession in the in the early 1990s (Solsten 1999). Differences in education, income levels, and religious denomination remained significant, in addition to dissimilarities in perceptions of work-life balance, and work-family centrality (Torgler 2011, World Bank Group 2011) between former Eastern and Western Germans.

Pressured by declines to its workforce due to emigration to other EU nations, and the country’s declining birthrate (especially in the East,) to stabilize its united ‘economic miracle’, Germany began importing workers since the post-war period. As part of its Gastarbeiter (Guestworker) program, the country receiving an average 300,000 immigrants, primarily from Turkish origins annually since the 1960s (Berdahl 2005; Hübschmann 2015; German Historical Institute n.d.). By 2016, at least 4 million people of ethnic Turkish origin lived in Germany, constituting approximately 5 percent of the total German population of over 82 million (Rizwi 2015; Adreutsch 2016). As the German Spiegel reported in 2010, although many integrating Turks taught their children “…wherever you make your living, that’s your home”, the pursuit of economic opportunities did not automatically facilitate Turkish assimilation.

Such ‘Turkish question’ has indeed has been an issue still at the forefront of both German and European policy agenda (Paul and Schmidt 2017; European Policy Centre 2017). In addition, frequently masked by German leadership throughout the 1990s into the early 2000s, a new coalition led by the Social Democratic Party of Germany changed the laws in 2005 with goals to promote the integration process of Turks and other national minorities including Sorbs, Danes, Frisians, the Roma and the Sinti. The definition of German nationality became *jus soli* rather than *jus sanguinis* (Berdahl 2005)
by birthright within a particular territory rather than by ethnic or cultural heredity.

This did not occur without a nationalist backlash. On one hand, extreme far-right nationalists gained support through parties like the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) founded in 1964, whose attempts in the 2000s were to reinvigorate hereditary pan-German national identity through the bolstering of anti-migrant sentiments. On the other, the rest of the country was trying to accustom to a culturally diverse, economically, politically, and culturally integrated civic German Gesinnung (spirit). Today, Turks remain the least integrated national minority in Germany, with data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study indicating that they use welfare benefits much more frequently than native Germans (Elger et al. 2009; Focus Online 2017; Riphahn et al. 2010).

With 43 percent of Turks not officially employed (Eurostat 2017), Turks are also the least successful national minority group in the labor market, with only a third of Turkish women employed, about half the employment rate of the total female population in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2018). A 2009 study by the annual micro-census of Berliner citizens in regards to their accommodations, employment, education, income, and nationality, relieved that the alarming lack of Turkish integration has plagued the German public since the arrival of the first Gastarbeiter in the 1960s (Birdal 2012).

Access to welfare benefits as part of the Germany’s migrant integration program launched in 2005 coupled with Germany’s “economic record budget surplus, consumer-led upswing fueled by falling unemployment, inflation-beating pay rises, and low-borrowing costs” (Thomson Reuters Foundation News 2018). Germany’s economy did not only become the largest in Europe and fourth largest in the world by nominal GDP
but also the number one migration destination on the continent. The most recent European migrant and refugee crisis brought an unprecedented influx of over 890,000 asylum-seekers in December of 2015 alone. Although the number of arrivals has substantially decreased in 2017, more than 1.6 million asylum-seekers from Middle Eastern and African countries have entered Germany since 2014 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2018).

Home to the highest foreign population among its 27 EU member states, a record figure of 10.6 million foreign citizens live in Germany today – more than ever before (Statistisches Bundesamt 2018). As it transformed from the “sick man of Europe” in the late 1990s and early 2000s into an “economic superstar” (Dustmann et al. 2014, 166) by 2017, Germany did not experience a significant rise in unemployment since 2005, not even during the great recession, despite a sharp decline in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2008 and 2009. Whilst the highest levels of unemployment regionally have generally been visible in the former Eastern German regions, the lowest levels of unemployment in the economies of the Bavarian, North-Rhine Westphalian, and Baden-Württemberg states (Gürtler 2010; Eurostat 2017).

Nevertheless, the 2008 economic recession, has negatively affected Western European, including German satisfaction with the national economy and the level of political solidarity between 2006 and 2008 (Hochschild 2010; European Social Survey 2010). Many young people in rural Eastern Germany have been forced to relocate to the West or larger Eastern cities due to the lack of competitive wages and employment opportunities. The gap between the highly educated (graduates) and the less educated (individuals with lower secondary education or below), and significant experiences of
unemployment among natives in general and among youth in specific, have led to higher levels of negative attitudes toward minority groups in addition to higher levels of right-wing electoral support, with polarized extremes between 2002 and 2014 (Offenes Datenportal der EU, 2000; European Social Survey 2016; Eurostat 2017).

Based on a survey conducted with 200,000 participants from 11 EU countries, German broadcasters Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDR), Südwestrundfunk (SWR), and the Bayerisches Rundfunk in 2009 reported that 80 percent of German youth supported migration as a path toward an enriched German cultural identity, with only 24 percent of youth advocating the prioritization of native citizens for low-level employment in times of economic crises. Since, having grown up with the historical recollections of a Turkish ‘parallel’ society, an increasing number of young Germans has embraced right-wing populist anti-migrant orientations (Braunthal 2009; European Social Survey 2017).

Additionally, inequalities in Germany remain at an all-time high since the 1990s. Between 2000 and 2006, the country has experienced an unprecedented time of income inequality and poverty (Biewen and Juhasz 2010). While tax and benefit system reforms aided the reduction of economic gaps, changing unemployment patterns, working conditions, and labor market structures have contributed to increased job polarization and inequality and high levels of concentration of wealth (Deutsche Welle 2016; OECD 2017).

Varying expressions of national sentiments since 1989 thus remained salient with pride in German human capital, products, and exports. In the 2000s, “Germany’s world-beating exports […] had seemed to replace the Deutsche Mark as the symbol of German economic success” (Kundnani 2015, 86) as Germany transitioned to a migration, welfare,
and ‘Exportnation’, the latter in the words of Chancellor Angela Merkel (Polikiikasta 2015). Protectionist government measures such as the Nord Stream I and II pipeline projects pushing deficit economies toward greater austerity, and surrendering Ukrainian, Belarussian, Polish, and European interests to German-Russian cooperation, have notably prompted European criticisms of ‘German economic narcissism’ (Feldstein 2012; Kundnani 2012; 2013).

Figure 24. Flows of Non-Germans8 by 2015.


**Post-1989 German Societal Fears**

Though Berlin served as two “cultural metropoles” (Merkel 2016, 8), eastern cultural institutions lagged behind the ‘capitalist island’, where attractive modern consumerism – telephones, color television sets, rock and roll music and Hollywood movies – have contributed to a globalized education and rising prosperity since the 1960s (Glaser 2004; Jarausch 2006). Nevertheless, the East-West integration fueled a new wave of temporary German optimism and cultural nationalism, with a collectivized German national identity legitimizing the nation-state as global ‘Kulturnation’, historic pieces of

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8 The Statistisches Bundesamt or Germany’s Federal Statistical office provide high-quality statistical data on Germany in a variety of areas including migration, globalization, society, and state. Non-Germans are defined by the office as all immigrants, Germans with migrant background, and foreign nationals born in Germany.
the fallen Berlin Wall left behind, embodied people’s hopes and fears, and bonded the national community by remembrance of a shared history (Ladd 2008).

Despite the initial optimism, hopes for prosperity, and high expectations for welfare and democracy, cultural and related policies regarding the construction of a united German national identity soon turned sour. Post-Cold War reunification in the East became synonymous with fears of foreign domination and a sense of “colonization by Western bureaucrats and elites” (Bernt et al. 2013, 15), leaving a void, an “emptiness that asked for a definition and identity” (Cupers and Miessen 2002, 64). People in the East gradually became more disillusioned with Western capitalism due to the economic downturn and the subsequent gap between expectations and realities, though not disillusioned enough to return to Communism. While 75 percent of contemporary Eastern Germans viewed reunification a success, only half of Western Germans shared the same views (Abendzeiting 2014). More than half of all Germans today believe that differences between the Ossis and Wessies continue to outweigh their commonalities (Rennefanz 2010; Jenkins 2011).

Despite enduring inequalities and identities split along geographic lines, public reservations gradually became united by fears of the influx of cheap labor. Already in the 1990s, the defeated Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (the Christian Democratic Union of Germany) in the 1998 elections began to appeal to populist anti-migrant sentiments with a controversial campaign known as ‘Kinder statt Inder’ (Children instead of Indians). In response to growing societal dissatisfaction, the federal government (then lead by an SPD-Green coalition) established the Süßmuth
Commission in 2000, an Independent Commission on Immigration to mitigate consequences of Germany having been framed as a *Einwanderungsland* (immigration nation) (Schneider and Scholten 2015). The lack of effective integration strategies at the time did not prove clear until 2006, when it was noted that only 14 percent of the foreign students reached the Gymnasium (specialized high school) or university level. Moreover, only 41 percent of migrants between the ages of 20 and 29 having had vocational qualifications and training compared with 12 percent only of Germans (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2006).

With migrants in Germany twice as likely to be unemployed as members of the host population (Reimann 2010), the Commission released a report admitting the need for integration. In addition to requiring migrants to participate in the integration program, incentives such as Integration Course Certificates as pathways to German citizenship in seven years instead of eight were introduced by the government along with punishment for noncompliance. Consequently, the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees) became the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) in 2005 to collaborate with the Goethe Institut, and design integration courses. With linguistic ability, familiarity with the legal system, the culture and history of Germany seen as the key aspect of integration, newly re-defined Germanness included requirements of German language application without third-party assistance requiring a B1 intermediate level of German (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2008).

What constitutes Germanness and whether a *Leitkultur* (a leading culture) exists, since the early 2000s indeed had the national consensus split ‘right down the middle’
between proponents of German identity inherited by blood and ethnicity on one hand, and Germanness acquired through socialization and integration on the other (Hawley 2006; Hübschmann 2015). With the concept of Leitkultur frequently adopted by both political and public discourse, chauvinistic nationalist implications of the term have emerged since the inception of the 2005 Immigration Law, pointing to forced German cultural standardization through inherited German values embedded into BAMF tests of integration across the country (Hübschmann 2015).

Further, EU failure to cope with the 2015 refugee and migrant crisis has led to varying attitudes of European integration and Euroscepticism enabling far-right parties to fill the void once again; this time, habitually creating and perpetuating Muslim folk devils (Dittfield 2016; Humanity in Action 2016). German core values of tolerance, democracy, and enlightenment on one hand, have been contrasted with foreigners’ tardiness, laziness, and ambitiousness, among others (Malik 2009; Holert and Terkessidis 2009). With German values came social fears and public reservations in the realms of globalization, migration, crime, and terrorism. These, especially in the period following the 2008 European debt-crisis, have been salient with Germans’ – particularly with the youth’s – need for a sense of security in the labor market and in their larger society (Shell Youth Study 2015; European Social Survey 2017).

With ten percent of the German population being non-ethnic, one in every five foreigners living in Germany is a non-native, and only one-third of Turkish, Italian, and Greek citizens living in Germany were born in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017). German politics and discourse have ignored these implications of the nation’s changing population over time, failing to reconcile German national identity with changing
sociodemographic dynamics. Muslims, in specific, have become the target of public hostility in the early 2000s, with German public opinion containing some of the strongest anti-Muslim sentiments and an entirely new politics of fear of Turkey when compared to other Western EU nation-states (Zick et al. 2011; Altun 2017). For instance, targeted welfare policy at ethnic minorities have outlined poor Muslim families as less deserving than other ethnically targeted groups including the Sinti and Roma (European Social Survey 2017). The level of disapproval against Turkish families in 2015 was 30 percent among youth in the former East, while 18 percent by youth in the West (Youth Shell Study 2015).

Chancellor Angela Merkel’s declaration that “Wir haben so vieles geschafft – wir schaffen das!” (We have managed so many things – we will manage this too!) (Stark 2018) enhanced the moral panic, which she tried to mitigate in the aftermath of her open-door policy during the crisis against publically embraced imagery of an ‘Islamic mass invasion’ in the wake of dramatized migrant crime. Attacks by immigrants, the children of immigrants, and right-wing extremists including the 2016 Munich shootings, the 2016 machete attack and Ansbach bombing, and the Würzburg train attack were just too fresh in German memory. The Social Democratic Party affiliated Friedrich Elbert Foundation (2010) found that anti-Muslim attitudes between 2015 and 2018 became most widespread in Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Poland, with France, Britain, and the Netherlands closely behind. 62.2 percent of Germans living in former East German and 57.7 percent in former West German states expressed ‘negative’ to ‘extremely’ negative attitudes toward Islam (Foroutan 2013). The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported
“Some say, foreigners, especially Muslims, cannot be integrated into German society for religious, cultural and genetic reasons. However, you do not have to be a fanatic to realize, that you need to restrict the quantitative amount of migrants to integrate them” (January 10, 2016).

When referring to positive attributions, only 6.6 percent in former East German states and 8.1 percent in former West German states demonstrated any form of solidarity with Islam (Zick et al. 2011). Resonant with public opinion, Germany’s 

*Die Welt* stated that

“It was a mistake to bring uneducated workers from culturally backwards areas around the Mediterranean Sea to Europe...What is left, is a poorly educated proletariat depending on social welfare and passing on their lack of education to the second and third generation” (September 5, 2015).

Xenophobic discrimination against outgroups in the form of attacks on mosques and people perceived Muslim, hate mail to Muslim organizations, and anti-Muslim internet blogs and social media posts became common (Jung 2010; Petzinger 2011). Within the week of summer of 2016, religious and cultural racism characterized by heightened xenophobia became visible and a racial paranoia has been rationalized, with representations of Muslims “as terrorists, archaic warriors, and anachronistic religious believers trickled into the German national *Diskursraum* (public dialogue)” (Hübschmann 2015, 5; Dittfield 2016). With more than 50 percent of Muslims being members of a German association and eighty percent of Muslim immigrants making a living from income as employees or are self-employed, economic, cultural, and social integration of Muslims in Germany has been far better than assumed (BAMF 2009; Bundesamt für Verfassungs-schutz 2011).
Albeit, nationalist youth movements, including Generation Identity, have emerged, and have blamed the EU and the German center-left for the disruption of German cultural unity stating that “[y]ou populate our homeland with foreigners which we do not understand”, “you support the foreign and hate and fight what is our own” (Identitarian Movement Video Manifesto 2018). Notably, an increasing number of young Germans take pride in their national values of family and gender roles and in their country and hometowns (70 percent among native Germans and 54 percent among youth with at least one German parent) demanding the pursuit of national interests in place of political correctness (Youth Shell Study 2015).

In addition, German Jews battle fears of Muslim and right-wing anti-Semitism (The Local.de 2017), and Germans fear crimes of fraud and robbery as well as sexual violence perpetuated by refugees, migrants, and other ethnic minorities, and migrants from other Eastern and Central EU member states. Whilst the number of crimes committed by refugees did not rise in proportion to the number of refugees between 2014 and 2015, more than one-third of the total German population (30.8 percent) agree that “people who have always lived here should have more rights than those who have moved here later”, and that “there are too many foreigners in Germany” (47.1 percent) (Heitmeyer 2011; Bundeskriminalamt 2016; Deutsche Welle 2016).

As a distinct German national identity thus exists in theory only (Make Me a German 2013), the pervasiveness of blood-and-soil-nature-based identification with the German nation-state as an ‘Erinnerungs-gemeinschaft’ – a community
bonded by remembrance of a shared history has enjoyed its recent revival amid liberal civic, ethnic, xenophobic, and economic expressions of nationalist sentiments. Echoing common sentiments of many Germans, in *Der Spiegel Online*, German playwright and novelist, Botho Strauß stated “I would rather live in a society that is dying than in one that, out of economic and demographic speculation, is being mixed together with foreign peoples and made young again”. To Strauß, Germans “have been robbed the sovereignty of being in opposition.” (Karnitschnig 2015).

*Post-1989 German Right-wing Populism*

German right-wing populism has been characterized by three main recurring themes that distinguishes it from traditional populism: demand for stricter to combat rising crime, the return to traditional, historically inherited moral values, and the protection of national and cultural identity threatened by foreign nationals including migrants and refugees (Greven 2016; Lohocki 2018). Notably, the East-West national divide has resulted in the heightened splintering of the left (Kurbjuweit 2014: Deutsche Welle 2018). The left was similarly fractured in the Weimar Republic with a split between the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the weakening Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD), and the German Communist Parties, with centrist grand coalitions as measures to mitigate the rise of right-wing populism. Dormant since the fall of the Weimar Republic, such political dimensions have recently resurfaced in Germany.

Already pre-reunification in 1989, the West German *Republikaner*
(Republicans) gained attention as a national-conservative or right-conservative party with 7.5 percent of total vote in the federal elections and 7.1 percent of the popular vote in the European Parliament, weakening the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister’s party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). From the 1990s into the mid-2000s, the rise of the German right-wing has significantly weakened both the center-left and the left in Germany. While Germany’s National Democratic Party (NPD) founded in 1964, as a traditional extreme right party promoted a neo-Nazi, fascist anti-migrant ideology in favor of a homogenous German ‘Volk’ in place of multiculturalism, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) founded only in 2013, represented a rising ‘new’ radical right in Germany. This newer version does not rely on fascism and extremism exclusively but rather, has been made ‘friendly’ to the public through populist political discourse that capitalizes on fear, anger, and hatred (Spiegel Online 2015; Nociar and Thomeczek 2018).

In September of 2017, appealing to inequalities and unemployment as drivers of economic insecurities and societal fears and public reservations of the public pertaining to globalization, European integration, migration, and terrorism, the AfD won 12.6 percent of the federal vote and gained 94 seats. Further disrupting Germany’s multicultural order, this was a significant jump compared to 4.7 percent and zero seats in 2013 (Spiegel Online 2015; Greven 2016). Directly behind the center-right CDU and the center-left SPD, in only five years, the AfD advanced to be among the top three most popular parties in contemporary Germany ahead of the FDP, The Left, and The Greens. An EU-wide survey
eupinions\(^9\) (2016), 78 percent of AfD supporters, like 76 percent of French Front National supporters consider globalization a threat (Hoffmann 2018).

![Figure 25. German Parliamentary Elections, 1990 to 2009.](image)

The party’s radical stance embedded in nationalistic political discourse directly attacks Chancellor Merkel and her politics, along with liberal and pluralist German and

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\(^9\) ‘eupinions’ is poll tool developed by Bertelsmann Stiftung and Dalia Research. It surveys citizens from 28 EU member states on European matters. Results referenced come from 14,936 participants from the nine largest EU states: Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. Measures display Seats in Parliament; Votes Percentage; and Number of Votes. European Election Database. (2015).

\(^{10}\) Each state election is indicated with the abbreviation of the state’s name; EU2014 refers to the 2014 European Parliament elections; and Bundestag 2017 refers to the 2017 federal elections (Nociar and Thomeczek 2018). Source: Nociar, Tomas, and Jan Philipp Thomeczek. "Far right politics in Germany: from fascism to populism?" LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog (2018).
EU institutions, as the betrayers of the ‘people’ (Speit 2016). The mobilization of young voters through populist and xenophobic resentments, has become a signature of the AfD, “transferring anti-Muslim, anti-refugee, and anti-establishments” directly into votes. Both the AfD and its sub-organizations as well as other radical right-wing parties such as the Patrotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West), and the Bürger in Wut (Citizens in Rage) represented in state parliament, have appealed to anti-semitism and Islamophobia (Häusler and Roeser 2015; Minkenberg 2018; German Election Database 2018).

Case 2: Post-1989 Italian Nationalism

Legacies and Continuity

With its origins tracing back to the Renaissance era, Italian nationalism has been first recognized under the leadership of Giuseppe Manzini in the 1830s. Italian national belonging served as a cause for the Risorgimento (struggle for Italian unification in the 1860s to the 1870s) as well as a tool for irredentist efforts during World War I. The epoch of colonization then brought a fresh wave of Italian national obsession with unity under then prime minister, Francesco Crispi’s leadership, whose patriotic quest to defend Italy against all hostile and foreign powers led to the creation of the Associazione Nazionalista Italiana (ANI – Italian National Association) in 1910. Further, the World War II era gave rise to a fascist form of Italian nationalism. By the 1960s, a patriotic Italian nationalism, rooted in Roman antiquity, regained its momentum (Spencer and Wollman 2002).

With the fall of Italian fascism and the establishment of the Italian Republic as a sovereign state in 1946, Italian nationalism did not disappear. Rather, many Italians, especially those who did not struggle with negative memories of WWII fascism,
embraced a neo-fascist dimension advocated for by the fourth largest Italian party by the 1960s, the Movimento Sociale Italiana (MSI – Italian Social Movement) (Atkins 2004). Italian national identities thus embraced a neo-patriotist dimension. The Italian landscape, architecture, and national symbols, including the flag and Italy’s national anthem became strategically highlighted during national events such as Festa della Repubblica (Republic Day) on June 2, and the Italian Liberation Day celebrated annually on April 25. Constant historical references to, and reminders of ancient Roman heritage along with Italian values and unity from the epochs of the Risorgimento and Resistenza\textsuperscript{11} have also been repeated in political and media messages, and gained moderate support. Post-2000s, much of the strength of such patriotic Italian nationalism was re-embraced politically and publically, with nationalist waves especially heightened following the 150\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Italian unification. While, on one hand, the anniversary celebrations reinvigorated collective Italian national identities and attachments to the patria (homeland), on the other, they highlighted regional divisions and tensions among Italian provinces. Alto Adige (South Tyrol) did not participate in, and renounced the national festivities due to cultural grievances tied to its separation from its motherland, Austria on March 17, 1861. Notably, in this region distinctly German in culture, temperament and symbolism, many German-speaking locals choose to use English as a second language instead of Italian.

Regions like Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, and Veneto have also

\textsuperscript{11} The Italian Resistenza symbolizes the era during World War II, when multiple resistance group refused to become “the puppet state” of the occupying German Nazi ideology and Italian fascism and engaged in protests and demonstrations through the appeal to Italian national identities demanding national sovereignty.
repeatedly contested collectivization of ‘Italianness’. A North and South-divide has particularly strained a collective Italian national identity, partially due to economic differences between a highly developed and industrialized North and a highly agricultural South (Tambini 2001). As such, in the 1990s, campaigns for the independent state of Padania began through proposed secession of the industrialized Lombardia region and its financial capital, Milan. Although the Lega Nord currently no longer plans to secede from the rest of Italy, tensions remain palpable as the party continues to demand more autonomy from the Italian government, and holds referendums regularly to achieve it.

Post-2000 Italian nationalisms have also been expressed along socioeconomic lines, exhibited through anti-globalization protests, mainly supported by right-wing political parties including Brothers of Italy-National Alliance – a party that gained nine seats in the European parliament. Minor far-right parties like The Right, Tricolour Flame, or Forza Nuova also capitalized on Italian fears of globalization to rally collective support. In recent years, Italy’s banal and economic nationalistic tendencies have both been spread and celebrated by liberal parties including Forza Italia, and centrists like the Union of the Centre (Agnew 2002; Boyer et al. 2011) alike.

Lastly, Italy’s experience with mass migration since the early 1980s led to a flow of migrants from former Eastern bloc countries including Romania and Albania, and North African countries, including Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, as consequence of the Arab Spring and the most recent European refugee and migrant crisis. As the sociodemographic landscape changed, pressures were placed on a previously largely linguistically and culturally homogenous Italy. With at least one million Romanians, 10 percent of the ethnic Romani background and at least 1.4 million Muslims living in Italy,
Italy’s historical, linguistic, and cultural heritage as themes have seen a revival particularly in post-Cold War right-wing political discourse (European Commission 2011; 2018).

Home to 54 World Heritage sites – the most in the world (UNESCO 2018), and center Roman Catholic life, the founding and leading member of the EU and member of multiple international institutions including the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), Italy continues to struggle to establish its true national identity. On one hand, post-1990s Italian nationalism has been triggered by the exaggeration of the Italian people as conquerors, descendants of their Roman and religious pasts and ancestors including Galileo and Garibaldi. On the other, it has been fueled by pessimism discourse, which has not ceased to capitalize on a wide array of national grievances in the economy, society, and culture – all that threatens Italian greatness (Sassi 2011).

Post-1989 Italian Economic Insecurities

In the years after WWII, the Italian economy was booming due to initial U.S. assistance and the Marshall Plan aid, which helped revive the countries food, oil, and steel industry. Until 1964, Italy expanded its internal market and restructured its labor market to enjoy an ‘economic miracle’ of its own, with its clothing industry, stylish electronic products, and inexpensive as well as luxury motorbike and auto brands like Vespa, Maserati, and Lamborghini, thus gaining momentum in the global economy in the post-war era. The northwestern industrial triangle became the country’s most economically empowered regions, having transformed Italy from a heavily agricultural economy into a dynamic industrial one, representing over 75 percent of the Italian
economy, with an Italian middle class that has been growing significantly faster in the North (OECD 2015; Futuro Europa 2018).

However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and European unification, a constant economic decline befell Italy, through a decline of aggregate demand and labor productivity. Since the 1990s, the average annual growth rate between 1995 and 2007 was a mere 1 percent, with gradually lower rates after 2001. The growth rate of labor productivity, particularly, was close to 0 percent between 2001 and 2010, while other EU countries held a 2 percent growth rate on average (OECD 2015; Brian 2015). Reforms to the labor market and the pension system in the 1990s, and structural changes to the economy brought about considerable challenges for all Italians, especially for the middle class, the Italian youth, and women. Scala mobile, the abolition of wage indexation and reforms to the collective bargaining system introduced in 1992 and 1993, led to both wage moderation (Brandolini et al. 2007) as well as new temporary labor contracts that allowed firms to adjust labor input in the face of international competition and demand uncertainty (Cipollone and Guelfi 2006).

Increasing job insecurity, temporary labor contracts, and declining earnings have characterized the Italian economy over the 1986 and 2004 period (Rosolia 2009), with significant reductions in entry-level wages (Rosolia and Torrini 2007). Consequently, the segmentation of the labor market became more pronounced, with income inequality, differences in levels of job security, and better opportunities for promotions (Cipollone 2001; Brandolini et al. 2007) among older workers born in the 1950s and 1960s versus laborers in younger generations born after (Barbieri and Lucchini 2007; Barbieri and Scherer 2009). As older workers could maintain their rights to generous pension benefits
and early retirement, younger generations were required to retire at an older age, with lesser social security entitlements that required them to save a larger portion of their income (Berloffa and Villa 2007).

Italy’s employment protection index indeed fell from 3.57 at the beginning of the mid-1990s to 1.5 in 2014 (Forges Davanzati 2016), while the number of poor Italian households gradually increased (Banca d’Italia Eurosistema 2009) – a trend that continues to characterize Italy’s economy presently in the late 2000s. Those living in ‘absolute poverty’ – “the condition of those who cannot buy goods and services ‘essential to avoid grace forms of social exclusion’” – rose to 5.1 million in 2017, constituting 8.4 percent of the total population (ISTAT 2018). As such, post-1989 Italy has seen a gradual decline in legalized marriages and fertility rates, with negative effects on Italy’s overall economic (Modena 2010) and social well-being. Italy, thus, is aging, with death rates outweighing birthrates at least until 2026 (Reynaud and Miccoli 2016). In 2014, 22 percent of Italy’s total population was 65 or older, with only 13.5 percent of Italian citizens under the age of 15 (Eurostat 2017).

As post-1989 internal migration intensified from Southern agricultural regions toward the more industrialized North, internal migration also increased toward the capital city, Rome. Over 3 million Italian nationals also returned ‘home’ from other European countries since 1946 including the UK and France, where they emigrated to during the second World War to escape the swindling economy, political instability, and corruption (Bonifazi and Heins 2000; Bonifazi et al. 2009; Scotto 2017; Migration Policy Institute 2017) – the very situation they found starting in post-1989 Italy upon their return. In
hopes to counterbalance its constant economic decline, post-1989 Italy followed the Western trend set forth by Germany as it pertains to guest worker integration programs.

Under global and Western EU pressures to show international solidarity, Italy opened its doors to international migration flows. While in the 1970s through the 1980s, African and Filipino migrants made up the largest national groups arriving to Italy from abroad, by the 1990s, Central and Eastern European migrants were dominant, replaced by Moroccans, Filipinos and Tunisians as the most frequently present group of nationals in the Italian labor force. Italy’s demand for cheap labor drastically shifted Italian demographics in the mid-2000s too, making Italy a primary asylum destination in the EU by the late 2000s. By the end of 2010, Italy had 4,570,000 foreign residents, comprising 7.5 percent of the total population with a 5 percent increase since 2006. As Romanians joined the EU in 2006, with 969,000 Romanian nationals legally residing in Italy, Romanians became the largest foreign national group. Additionally, the 2015 EU migrant and refugee crisis brought over 335,000 irregular arrivals via the Mediterranean Sea, with the influx outpacing in the first half of 2017 alone the total flow of the year earlier (Scotto 2017; Migration Policy Institute 2017).

As international migration continued into the country of steady economic decline, the 2008 European debt crisis hit the stagnating Italy considerably hard (Orsi 2013; Samuelson 2016). In 2009, Italy’s GDP fell by 5 percent since 2008, with unemployment further rising from 7.8 percent in 2009 to 8.5 percent by February of 2010 (Eurofound 2010). Italy’s North, specifically, the Lombardia and Veneto regions, recorded the greatest amount of bankruptcies at 1,963 and 880 bankruptcies respectively. With small companies suffering the most, the gap between the public and private sector increased
between not only the Northern and Southern Italian regions but between larger and smaller firms. In 2009 alone, 14 small business owners committed suicide due to economic uncertainties brought about by the recession in the region.

Poor regulation, an ageing population, weak investment, and more borrowing has only placed Italy under even more EU pressure as it recorded a government debt equivalent to 131.8 percent of its GDP in 2017, reaching an all-time high of 132 percent in 2016 (Orsi 2013; Trading Economics 2018). In 2012 and 2013, the economy recorded additional contractions of 2.4 percent and 1.8 percent respectively (FocusEconomics 2014). As the second largest debtor in the Eurozone, and fifth largest worldwide, the country, therefore, continues to battle stagflation, weak economic growth and labor market, and extremely high unemployment rates that reached their record peak at 12.5% in 2013.

Varying attitudes toward globalization, and inequalities and unemployment have been powerful drivers of the right-wing populist vote in Italy in the past decade, with unemployment and fears of globalization linked with the decline in trust of national and European political institutions (Standard Eurobarometer 81, 2015; European Social Survey 2017). For instance, right-wing populist party supporters of Forza Italia, have associated ‘globalization’ with the large movement of people unlike liberal party supporters like voters of Ciudadanos in Spain, who tend to view globalization in terms of trade, as the movement of ideas, products and technology respectively. Amid economic grievances, the level of education proved to be a decisive factor. (European Social Survey 2016; Eurostat 2017).

In March of 2014, then Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, promised a national
economic revival by proposing further income tax cuts, labor reform to tackle loopholes of the unemployment and welfare schemes, and redefined job contracts. His failure to succeed in protecting Italian citizens from economic insecurity however gave way to Italy’s newly elected populist Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte to capture the country’s most powerful position, sworn into office in June of 2018 after an aggressive campaign run on anti-migrant and Eurosceptic sentiments. Many of his colleagues in the parliament, including Matteo Salvini or il Capitano (the Captain) as referred to by his followers, have exhibited neonationalist, anti-globalization and Eurosceptic stances (La Reppublica.it 2018; Mattioli 2018) too as they proposed protectionist and anti-migrant measures to ‘defend’ the Italian economy. Italy thus remains most economically detached from the EU (EU Cohesion Monitor 2018), and the country could be next after Brexit on the journey toward more economic nationalism.

Post-1989 Italian Societal Fears

In its twenty regions, most Italians identify with their regional identity above their European, and even national Italian identity. With variations in linguistic attributes such as accents and dialects, and traditions, foods, and architecture, regional Italian identities are thus uniquely cherished. To some extent, Italy’s twenty regions thus function as twenty small countries of their own, with histories of distinct tribal, cultural, and political forces, which, over the centuries, have left their mark on the language, culture, architecture, food, and mentality, among others in the country’s regions (Bellini 2018). Having total of just a little over 1 million inhabitants, the example of the Northern Italian Trentino Alto-Adige (Südtirol) region – annexed to Italy in 1919 from the Austria-Hungarian Empire and its predecessors, to which it belonged since the 9th century –
demonstrates the complexity of both personal and group belonging in Italy.

Self-governed by two autonomous provinces, that of Trentino and Bolzano (known as South Tyrol), despite the region’s role as one of the wealthiest and most developed in Italy and the EU, significant ethnolinguistic differences remain not only among inhabitants residing in the two provinces, but among those who feel German and Italian within them (Eurostat 2017). While 69 percent in the Bolzano province speak German, in its capital, Bolzano, 73 percent of the population uses Italian as their primary language (SPA, Südtiroler Informatik AG 2017). Small minorities across both regions also speak Bavarian dialects of Ladin, Cimbrian, and Mòcheno (Rowley 2000). Thus, many in South Tyrol, including Eva Lotz, the co-founder of the separatist party Südtiroler Freiheit (South Tyrolean Freedom) are Italian citizens but do not consider themselves Italian. Accordingly, she voiced growing social concern in regards to public job quota systems, a linguistically separated school system, and outdated integration policies, which all have contributed to the lack of cultural awareness, and mounting societal anxieties tied to a persisting identity crisis of ethnic and linguistic belonging in the region (Marchetti 2014):

“[m]y dream is to reunite with Austria. I’m an Italian citizen but don’t belong to the Italian culture, state nor language. I have a Tyrolese identity. In my cultural backpack there’s Schiller” (Marchetti 2014).

In addition to inequalities along geographical lines, in the 1990s, Italy’s foreign population increased significantly, with more than 5.1 million registered individuals, the Romanians with (1,190,100), Albanians (440,500), Moroccans (416,500), Ukrainians (237,000), Chinese (290,700), Philippines (167,900) and Indians (151,800) remaining the
most traditionally present ethnic minorities in the country (Minority Rights Group International 2018). 2017 marked the fourth straight year of migrant arrivals to Europe by sea, with the majority of migrants arriving from Nigeria (17,100) and from Guinea (9,217), with only 1 registered migrant from Libya (IOM 2017; Statista 2017).

Additionally, between 120,000 to 180,000 Roma and Sinti ethnic minorities resided in the country but only a small proportion having Italian citizenship (ECRI 2016).

Figure 27. 21st Century Italian Regions and Their Respective Dialects.

While migration flows saw the return of emigrants in the 1970s and 1980s, the 1990s marked the start of a distinct period in Italy’s societal transformation that led to around 80 percent of the total migrant population now consisting of foreign nationals by the mid-2000s. Law 222/2002, for instance, declared the regularization of domestic workers and personal assistants along with a payment of 700 euros to cover welfare and administrative costs for three months before the amnesty (Arango et al. 2009). This law has introduced a welfare allowance to all residing in the country, awaiting asylum. While presently asylum-seekers are not allowed to work until their asylum is granted, or during
the first six months (whichever enjoys priority), the state pays 35 euros per day to Italian citizens who decide to temporarily house asylum-seekers, with asylum-seekers also entitled to 2.50 euros per day pocket money (Hodali and Prange 2018). The average living wage in Italy for a typical family with two parents and 2 children with at least one adult working, ranges between 965 euros to 1400 euros, while that of a single adult with no children is between 620 and 875 euros (WageIndicator 2018). As housing and rental costs gradually rose, welfare policies toward refugees and migrants have caused increased public distress among native Italians.

Figure 28. Refugees and Migrants\textsuperscript{12} Arriving to Italy by Sea, 1997 and 2016.

In 2017, roughly half of respondents to a public opinion survey between the ages of 45 and 54 of shared such belief, supported by 38 percent of younger interviewees between the ages of 18 and 29 years. By education level, such anti-migrant perception was shared by 66 percent of Italians with lower education level (some secondary education or below) and 40 percent of Italians with high education levels (some

\textsuperscript{12} Graph based on findings of “Sbarchi e richieste di asilo, 1997-2014 by Fondazione Ismu and the Italian Ministry Interior. The Italian foundation, Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità (ISMU – today known as the Cariplo Foundation for Initiatives and Studies on Multi-ethnicity) is located in Milan, Italy. ISMU has studied migration flows since 1993 with aims to disseminate results of independent scientific research studies, and thus educate and train in the realms of international migration and multiethnic social phenomena (ISMU 2018).
Despite the intensifying sociodemographic divisions between older and younger generations, teachers and university students have remained the most open and receptive groups, whereas generally older, less educated, the unemployed, along with housewives and retirees have been the least welcoming toward ethnic minorities to Italy, and EU integration (Bonifazi 2006; European Social Survey 2017; Special Eurobarometer 469, 2018).

While attitudes toward migrants and refugees remained split in the middle since the 1990s, anti-migrant hostility and violence has substantially increased over the years (Panichella 2018). In the first half of 2017 alone, Italian civilian patrol, vigilante groups have emerged, led by angry and disappointed locals who feel that law enforcement action has been insufficient to protect them from migrants. The example of 1,000 African farm workers evacuated in Southern Italy in 2010 due to a wave of violence against them. In 2017, immediately behind Hungarians and the Greeks, Italians were the most convinced that the wave of refugees and migrants would mean more terrorism and fewer jobs. Specifically, 60 percent of Italians feared that refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism, 65 percent expressed concern that refugees would take land and jobs away from Italians, and 47 percent that refugees are more to blame for crime than other groups (Wike et al. 2016).

Moreover, the otherwise picturesque Sicily, Puglia, and Campania among others, “choked by corruption, its economy in recession and its communities corroded by unemployment”, suffered from historically low regional birth rates, and an intensifying youth emigration epidemic to Western EU cities, London and Berlin primarily (Day 2015). With social welfare programs benefitting Southern regions less than their more
industrialized counterparts, internal social stratification has thus become clearly visible along linguistic, with other boundary-makers including dress style, choice of food, and leisure activities. A split between the political class and civil society has become increasingly intertwined with others at stake in Italian social life, especially between Italians in the North and in the Mezzogiorno (South). Awareness of, and individual connections with social class status therefore remain pertinent among Italians, with 54 percent of 1,327 Italian respondents having indicated a perception that their family belonged to the lower social strata (Statista 2016).

Figure 29. Migrant Arrivals Versus Perceived Threat\textsuperscript{13}, 2000 to 2017.

Source: Sources for the figure include the Italian Ministry of Interior and Demos & Pi research institute’s study conducted for the Italian national newspaper, La Repubblica.

Italian national identity has shown significant collectivism through care for the self and family. With Italian culture rooted in family and gender roles, kin-group associations, and marital relationships, by 2017, 58.4 percent of Italians have been worried for their own and their families’ safety along with at least half of those surveyed concerned for the future of their nature and environment (Banfield 1958; Viazzo 2010;)

\textsuperscript{13} The illustration above has been directly imported from a figure titled “Arrival of Migrants vs. Perceived Threat” displayed in the article Pastore, Ferruccio. “The Election of Fear”. \textit{POLITICO}, (February 7, 2018).
European Social Survey 2017). Even before the 1990s, the sense that such ‘familism’ and family values should be protected, has been employed as a political tool by Italian leaders to reduce the split between the political class and Italian civil society.

With political elites emphasizing the vision of the family in general, and that of the Italian woman, domestic and familial units have also repeatedly been defended and legitimized by religious authorities (Saraceno 2003). While attempting to promote the social inclusion and integration of the “nuovi arrivati” (new arrivals), in contemporary contexts, Pope Francis himself declared that the societal fears of the Italian populous are “comprensibili” (understandable) given the common Italian perception that new arrivals often disturb the social order, ‘stealing’ something that has been tirelessly built (la Repubblica 2018).

Indeed, the country remains predominantly Catholic, and although it is often difficult to estimate the number of Italians practicing Catholicism given the lack of questions on the national census on religious affiliation, according to a recent study by the Pew Research Center, 80 percent of Italians identified as Catholic. Despite widespread European secularization, in May 2018, 71 percent of those surveyed in 15 Western European countries including Italy, has identified Christian, with 22 percent indicating that they regularly attend Church and religious services (Heneghan 2018).

Historical bonds between the Italian state and the Catholic Church, have had significant influence on individual religious freedoms and perceptions of pertinent threats associated with them. The Article Nineteen of the Italian Constitution for instance guarantees religious freedom for ‘everyone’ of religion and from religion. Yet, both the presence of Catholic politicians, and their relationships with Catholic organizations have
increased across the political spectrum. Hence, ambiguous and often controversial categorizations of denominations into four controversial tiers have further exacerbated tensions between religious expression and public order. With Law Nr. 1129 of 1929 placing Islam within the lowest tier of denominations, doctrines and practices that exclude many non-Catholic religions from some important privileges with respect to financing and religious education, among others have historically prevailed in Italy (Ferrari and Pastorelli 2016; Ferrari 2016). Furthermore, although the usage of Catholic symbolism, including crucifixes in courts and schools have been contested by minority groups as violations of religious freedoms outlined by the Constitution, such symbols have been legitimized as cultural rather than religious by the Italian Supreme Court (Barnett 2011).

As cultural expression constitutes the heart of Italian nationality, cultural artifacts and architecture have been among the most feared potential national losses. In 1990, unified Europe meant a direct threat to Italian treasures, in the aftermath of 244,403 paintings, statues, frescoes, coins and other items stolen from 1970 and 1989 (Haberman 1990). In Italy’s post-1990 declining economy, such smuggling trend persists. Although its perpetrators have rarely been identified as those of refugee or migrant backgrounds, public perceptions of cultural losses tied to migration have resonated in public discourse, aggravated by the lack of adequate financial support for restoration of Italy’s heritage sites as threats to the country’s cultural symbolism and longevity (Scammel 2015).

Post-1989 Italian Right-wing Populism

In the aftermath of Soviet Collapse, political bipolarity has filled a vacuum in the already fragmented, regionally “complex and often confusing” multi-party system where
aging senior male leaders have been generally viewed as the status quo (The Local.it 2017). Former Prime Minister Mario Monti was 70, Silvio Berlusconi was 75, and Romano Prodi was 70 when resigned, while former Presidents of the Republic, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi and Giorgio Napolitano were 86 and 88, respectively (Senato della Repubblica 2013), with modern Italian politics “increasingly dominated by large figures, or figures striving to be large” (Lloyd 2018).

The period between 1992 and 1997 has marked the times of significant political transformations, during which time, the left-leaning Christian Democratic Party dissolved and larger coalitions gained primacy – a trend that continued into the late 2000s. Italians were increasingly disappointed with the Tangentopoli in Italy – a combination of massive government debt, extreme corruption and fears of organized crime – exposed by the mani pulite (clean hands) investigation a year after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Parker 2002). Demands for political, economic, and societal reforms and electoral system the whirlwind of scandals (Parker 2002).

In the broader Italian national political landscape, regional governments continue to represent ethnic, linguistic, and cultural minorities. Five Italian regions – Aosta, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily and Trentino Alto-Adige – enjoy varying degrees of autonomy of their own, while all Italian regions simultaneously function within their national political system, and balance against one another on a spectrum of center-right (13 regions) and center-left coalitions (7 regions) as of 2018, respectively. A sense of Italian “democratic dysfunction” has been traced by many to the “impossibility of Italian
politics” and the country’s deep-rooted “ungovernability”, creating an ideal vacuum over the years for anti-EU populism (Lloyd 2018).

Accordingly, Italy has had the highest percentage followed by France, the UK, Austria and Germany among Western European countries, with 80 percent of the total population having indicated that they do not trust the national government (Chassany and Chazan 2017). Italy has regularly had the lowest trust in the EU among fellow EU members, with 41 percent in 2017 indicating voicing their views that they have not benefitted from EU membership (Chassany and Chazan 2017; European Social Survey 2017). A sharp decline in such EU support has surfaced post-Brexit in 2016, with over half of Italian citizens holding negative attitudes toward immigration, with fear of Islam and ethnic diversification (European Social Survey 2017).

Mudde (2018) further noted that the EU itself helped create Italy’s ‘crisis’, its newest radical right-wing awakening due to the lack of effective European policy in response to the world’s financial crises as well as the continent’s most recent refugee and migrant influx. In an increasing volatile global and Eurozone economy, Italy has thus functioned both as a hotbed and a “strong and enduring market for populism” throughout the past three decades. First, it saw the rise of Forza Italia and the Lega Nord in the early1990s, and then the ascendance of Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S – Five-Star

14 In the early 1990s, in Italy’s political landscape, as many as thousands of public figures were questioned and at one point, nearly half of the Italian Parliament was indicted under corruption charges. More than 400 city councils were dissolved as a result, with investigations uncovering that approximately 6.5 trillion lire ($4 billion dollars) were paid in bribes annually during the 1980s for bids of large government contracts (Koff 2002).

15 “Clean hands” was the official nationwide judicial investigation into the political corruption in Italy, resulting in the dissolution of Italy’s ‘First Republic’ between 1946 and 1994, countless suicides of exposed Italian figures, and the disappearance of both smaller and larger political parties.
Movement) shortly after the 2008 European financial crisis. A combined vote for populist parties exceeding the 50 percent mark for the first time in the 2013 general elections has shown a steady increase in populist party votes from 26.3 percent in 2006 and a high of 45.7 percent in 2008 (Bobba and McDonnell 2016).

In May 2001 Berlusconi’s victory as Prime Minister, and his leadership of The House of Freedoms coalition united his own Forza Italia, the radical right-wing Lega Nord, along with the Christian Democratic Center, and the United Christian Democrats. While Italy’s news sources remain rather fragmented, Italian parties including Berlusconi’s FI in the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, similar to Matteo Salvini’s LN, populist right-wing parties and leaders, have successfully utilized the most consulted news sources – Rai News, Mediaset, and La Repubblica – to disseminate anti-left, Eurosceptic anti-migrant and anti-establishment ideals to the Italian public. Berlusconi’s anti-establishment rhetoric, for instance, took a drastic turn after the 2001 terrorists attacks in New York City, after which his anti-establishment propaganda shared in his regular newsletters to his Club Forza Silvio members built on Italy’s ethnonational and religious superiority – the role of Dio (God) and il popolo (the populous). At a G8 summit it Genoa, he stated that

“[w]e should be conscious of the superiority of our civilization, which consists of a value system that has given people widespread prosperity in those countries that embrace it, and guarantees respect for human rights and religion…this respect does not exist in the Islamic countries” (Hooper and Connolly 2001).

Salvini and Lombardy’s LN has adapted such Berlusconism over time, and adjusted the party discourse to incorporate powerful symbolism – visual and verbal alike – to cater to traditional family values and gender roles, and religious and cultural antiquity to fight against Italy becoming “Europe’s refugee camp” (Krause 2001; Canoles
While the LN follows an anti-elite, party-dominated form of Berlusconian populism, Pepe Grillo’s M5S that arrived on the political scene just before 2013, in contrast, relies on social media to promote a less anti-elite and party-dominated, rather opportunist form of democratic representation. It has managed to obtain votes across all Italian regions, having become the “true one national party” in the country against LN and Berlusconi’s FI, both of which suffered a mild voter share decline (Diamanti 2014; Woods 2014).

![Figure 30. Total Populist Vote in Italian General Elections, 1994 to 2013](image)

Source: The Electoral Archive of the Italian Ministry Interior, Italy.

M5S has won the hearts and votes of the Italian youth, especially those unemployed, having won the support of 31 percent of Italians aged 18 to 22 and 35 percent of those aged 23 to 28, while the center-left gained 20 percent and 17 percent of the votes of the youth in the same categories respectively (Quorum 2018). Young Italians also joined the LN and its respective organizations in numbers after the victory of Salvini, many seeing their economic distress in the mirror of economic competition due to migration (Schultheis 2018). Reliance on national economic insecurities as bases for populist

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16 General elections refer to the elections for the Camera dei Deputati (Chamber of Deputies) in the lower house of the parliament. For elections between 1994 and 2006, the sum of FI and LN; for 2008, the sum of the PDL and LN; and for 2013, the sum of PDL, LN, and M5S vote shares have been used.
mobilization, and strange echo of Berlusconi’s link between Islamic terrorism and the anti-globalization movement, have contributed to an increasingly xenophobic Italian political and reality (Anelli et al. 2018; Robertson 2018b).

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Figure 31. Election Results of Radical Right-wing Parties.


Salvini has been gearing up to spread his domestic success regionally by creating an EU-wide Eurosceptic nationalist bloc ahead of the 2019 EU Parliament elections, as he admired the political models of Poland and Hungary, and repeatedly emphasized that “Brexit is an EXAMPLE to follow” in his promise to fight the EU (Heath 2018; Scotto di Santolo 2018). With volatile intermediary institutions between Italian citizens and their state since the 1990s, Italian populism with all its faces, has therefore relied on its rhetoric of crisis and Catholic value systems, and Roman antiquity to create platforms for political power games by capitalizing on economic and social cleavages of the Italian popolo (Pappas 2012; Kriesi 2014).

Case 3: Post-1989 Hungarian Nationalism

*Legacies and Continuity*

Due to the country’s long history of occupations, Hungarian identity has been repeatedly compromised over the years. In the 17th century, the conflicts of Imre
Thököly, Ferenc Rákóczi, and the era of Protestant movements gave rise to first historically recorded waves of Hungarian nationalism. As the French Revolution swept through the continent, it triggered *Magyar* (Hungarian) self-consciousness. However, not until the *Ausgleich* (compromise) of 1867, when Austrian emperor Franz Joseph and Hungarian delegations agreed to give Hungarians the decision-making power to legislate over ethnic Croat, Slav, and Romanian minorities, did Hungarian national attachment truly thrive (Kontler 2003). Aside from a single decade after 1849 since the country’s establishment in the year 1000 A.D., Hungary has been a functioning state. Hungarian pride engraved into a rigid social, economic, and political hierarchy, has remained intact from the Middle Ages all the way through 1848, the country’s revolution (Széky 2014).

Ethnocentric national biases have often dominated over economic and social interests, and even diplomatic ones, particularly since the 19th century. In fact, a strong sense of national survival instinct has become a unique attribute of Hungarian identity and national culture along with another Hungarian distinctiveness: the continuity of the country’s statehood and national identity (Kontler 2003; Cartledge 2011). As ethnic and racial problems persisted, Hungary’s loss in WWI, and Budapest’s loss of economic dynamism has reinvigorated the need for national collectivity and association among Hungarians. Anti-Semitic notions of cultural and national purity, the need to resist the pull of the West, and the criminalization of Jewishness through special legislations passed in the late 1930s and early 1940s dominated the Hungarian, largely ethnonationalist landscape. Economic and social deprivation as a result of WWII added fuel to the national fire in an era where societal fears became deeply rotted in suspicion. Assimilation to Hungarian identity was perceived a necessity, resulting in 37 percent
(close 200 percent increase) in intermarriages between Jews and Hungarians, and 50 percent of Jews changing their legal name to Magyar-sounding names (Patai 2015).

The fall of European Communism in 1989 and the early years of the 1990s resulted in political, economic, and social transformations under Soviet occupation, with Hungarian once again placed at the cross-roads of continuity and survival. Soviet occupation, and ethnic wars in former Yugoslavia had quickly reinvigorate Hungarian nationalism in the shadows of endangering nationality politics sweeping across the Southern portion of the European continent (Csepeli et al. 2000). Parallel to Hungarian majority grievances, ethnic minority grievances have emerged among Slovakian, Romanian, and Serbian Hungarians, whilst Gypsies became the Roma, with extended national rights granted as a minority nationality. As grave economic disparities remained, after-war Western influence also transformed the global economy, with “the invisible Jew becoming visible, often to himself/herself for the first time” (Freifeld 2011).

Hungarian public opinion has nonetheless been salient with economic nationalism closely related to the expression of one-sided national interests, while political and cultural nationalism continue to divide Hungarians (Örkény 2005; Hungarian Spectrum 2015). The emergence of the right-wing Fidesz party led Orbán Viktor – often referred to today as ‘Victator’ by European leaders – has reintroduced Hungarian ethnocentrism, with conscious efforts to reignite public memories of a glorious and Hungarian past of pre-1944 ideology. Orbán’s first government between 1998 and 2002 ran an aggressive emotionally-powerful, historically-based propaganda campaign to commemorate the

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17 Note: In Hungary last names enjoy legal primacy before first names. Middle names are rarely used and are generally are not displayed in writing. This dissertation will honor Hungarian legal and cultural customs, and will refer to, and display all Hungarian names in their original format where relevant.
formation of the Hungarian state, simultaneously reinvigorating Catholic religious ties to national identity to further instill supreme values continuity of the state and self-determination over pluralistic liberal democracy (Széky 2014).

In modern Hungary, national unity is a main principle now encoded in the new Fundamental Law of the land, and was incorporated into the Hungarian Constitution in 2011, with global criticisms of disrupting its democratic institutions in exchange for another form of rigid national cohesion (European Union Cohesion Policy 2007-13). The onset of the 2015 European refugee and migrant crisis exposed the EU’s inability to formulate a coherent and coordinated response, provided an ideal void for Orbán’s anti-EU and anti-establishment propaganda, further reinvigorating aggressive types of Hungarian nationalism similar to that of the post-1848, post-World War, and post-Communist eras that promoted the resistance against Western pull, while celebrating ethnic, and Catholic Hungarianness. Furthermore, the lack of sovereignty and democratic deficit in the EU has facilitated the rise of Hungarian populism and “feelings of historic victimization that demand a strong stand against the decadent [George Soros] and Western powers who are inviting dangerous racial mixing” (Pack 2015).

Hungary’s case and dense platform of post-1989 nationalist phenomena have remained an extreme example of Central and Eastern European national identity. The country’s continuity of statehood and identity, its anti-establishment and anti-EU attitudes represented by public discourse, and the perpetual disregard for international and supranational institutional recommendations and policies are just a few examples that characterize a stronghold of national primacy. A civic religious dimension embedded in
political, economic, and societal events, has also drawn increasing attention to Hungary in Europe and beyond.

*Post-1989 Hungarian Economic Insecurities*

Post-1989 Hungary was faithful of European economic integration, with high hopes for welfare and democracy. In many ways, during the initial years of economic, political, and cultural restructuring, the country acted as the most ideal pupil for integration among its former Eastern bloc neighbors, attracting the highest level of per capita foreign direct investment, preceded only by Poland, a country three-times its size. Though varying attitudes toward globalization lingered among the public, with memories of a turbulent past of foreign occupation and dependence, with majority of Hungarians (83 percent in 2003) viewing both membership in the EU and larger integration as beneficial up until the early 2000s (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal 2010).

Hungarian agriculture and food industry, both of which were thriving between 1867 and 1990, slowly started losing their momentum. Hungary eventually spiraled into a recession as it experienced a significant loss of export markets. To mitigate the fading economic conditions, improve the country’s fiscal state, and integrate with the global economy, Hungary’s government under the leadership of Antall József implemented price and trade liberation measures among other economic policies. Double-digit inflation and a contraction of the economy was nevertheless apparent since the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1992, inflation rose to 160 percent, and with close to one-third of the jobs disappearing between 1990 and 1995. Unemployment rose to over 12 percent by 1992 and social welfare programs suffered a severe setback as spending cuts were instituted (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal 2010).
Although Hungary was one of the most economically advanced nation-states that joined the EU in 2004, it remained highly volatile in the world economy since the early 1990s. Although the economy remains the 64th freest economy in the world, with the combined value of exports and imports equaling to 172.6 percent of GDP, excessive spending, ambitious road construction projects, and wage hikes by over 50 percent in the public sector have contributed to public debt and financial deficit, with government spending as a percentage of the GDP rising from 52 percent in 2001, to 73 percent in 2008, and 78.3 percent in 2009 – one of the highest in the EU (2019 Economic Freedom Index; Thomas White International 2019).

In 2008, the global economic stagnation and European financial crisis took a toll on the country’s economy, with investors exiting, and Hungarian Forint plunging. Hungary’s economy was indeed hit the hardest among the former Soviet bloc economies launching Hungary into its worst recession since 1991. The rise in national unemployment has become a key concern particularly since 2008, with unemployment rates exceeding 11 percent in 2010. Insecurities in the domestic economy were mirrored through volatility in GDP, prices, productivity levels, and unemployment leading to increasing public disillusionment with the national government as well as the EU superstructure (Ungváry 2014; Deutsche Welle 2018). Moreover, frequent cuts to social security contributions and risks associated with homeownership have been two commonly noted economic insecurities on post-Communist Hungary. Until 2002, risk of homeownership was for instance related to housing and utility costs, with 8 to 10 percent of households experiencing payment problems (Hegedüs and Teller 2005).

As such, many native Hungarians have left the country primarily for financial
reasons, while others emigrate due to the lack of opportunities and what they refer to as an “uneven playing field” (Hungarian Spectrum 2018, para. 5). In 2013, 370,000 Hungarian natives between the ages of 18 to 40 planned to emigrate, while in 2015 17 percent of the total national population indicated their intention to temporarily work in a foreign country or to emigrate entirely, with the Hungarian youth leading the way. Since 1989, an estimated 350,000 Hungarians moved abroad, with 7.4 percent of Hungarian nationals lived abroad in 2013. Primary destinations include Germany (124,000), the United Kingdom (74,500), and Austria (36,000) (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal 2017).

Foreign-born first-generation Hungarians were estimated to exceed half a million, with the emigration trend steadily on the increase since 2008 (Rigó 2015). To mitigate the effects of emigration, the government’s “Gyere haza fiatal” (Come home, youth) was launched to encourage young Hungarians to return from the UK in exchange for housing assistance, higher education degree opportunities, upward mobility, and travel cost coverage. Thus, the country has transformed into emigration-nation, currently experiencing its second largest emigration wave in history after its mass exodus last recorded in 1956 (Hungarian Spectrum 2018). While, Hungarians reportedly continue to experience exploitation and unfair treatment in other European nation-states (IOM 2019), they tend to stay abroad.

While emigration has been on the increase, Hungary has also been both a transit and destination country for international migration due to its geographic location within the EU as a main entry point toward the Western EU member states. As emigration increased, the nation-state at the heart of Europe, Hungarian firms have experienced challenges when trying to fill jobs especially in the fields of information technology (IT)
and health care. The number of manual laborers has also gradually declined since the 1990s, acknowledging the necessity of labor migration, the Hungarian government targeted Ukraine as a country of origin for skilled labor to balance its labor shortage (Hungarian Migration Strategy 2013; IOM 2019). Romanian, German and Chinese nationals are the most represented in the labor force, with the total population of migrants — approximately 66 percent — consisting of Europeans (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal 2017). In 2015, during the EU refugee and migrant crisis, Hungary also apprehended 411,515 irregular migrants at its borders with primarily Afghan, Iraqi, and Syrian backgrounds.

Despite economic grievances, Hungarians’ economic pride remains visible in the industrial and services sectors including the automotive, biotech, IT, and renewable energy sectors. For instance, the Hungarian Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector expanded an exponential 50 percent between 2002 and 2007 alone. Moreover, the national pharmaceutical industry is one of the largest and most developed in Eastern-Central Europe. Notably, regional inequalities have increased between the Eastern and Western Hungarian regions between 1990 and 2007. Közép-Magyarország (Central Hungary) significantly outperformed other regions including Dél-Dunántúl (South of the Danube) and Észak-Magyarország (Northern Hungary), and recorded the fastest growth in GDP per capita at 5.6% between 1995 and 2005 as it contributed to over 56 percent of the total GDP growth between 2000 and 2010 (OECD 2011).

Despite such Hungarians national pride in being export leaders as well as a destination of foreign direct investment, and considerable efforts to open the economy
since the 1990s, public support for parties who supported a market economy gradually declined. By 2010, such parties were no longer present in parliament. Widespread public disenchanted toward the ruling socialist party due to tax hikes, salary, and pension cuts paved the way for Hungary’s conservative, center-right populist party Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance) under the leadership of Orbán Viktor, in power since with its continued promise to restore the national economy.

As systemic economic challenges, including pervasive corruption, labor shortages, geographic inequalities, volatility in demand to exports, and development gaps compared to EU economic averages persist, trust in the EU has declined among Hungarians who increasingly equate globalization to Europeanization (Eurobarometer 86 2016). The Fidesz and the radical right-wing Jobbik have relied on the public’s anti-establishment, Eurosceptic, and anti-migrant sentiments to justify their quest toward more economic nationalism, and thus a decline in monetary and labor market freedoms, raising the retirement age to 74, and increasing fiscal health and government spending (2019 Index of Economic Freedom; Ákos 2018).

Post-1989 Hungarian Societal Fears

Hungary has pioneered the transition from the post-Soviet system. With a turbulent past and foreign occupation and oppression engraved into its common national memory, by 1990 the country was yet again exposed to a rapidly transforming political, economic, and cultural landscape. With free market economy and a liberal democratic civil society emphasized, a multi-party system was established led by the center-right Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), though the socialists regained power in 1994 to them lose dominance again in 2010 due to the economic recession post the 2008 European
financial crisis.

Economics, culture, and politics in the relatively small country at the heart of Europe has been woven into an ethnic fabric, with primarily Magyars (Hungarians) constituting much of the total national population, followed by the Roma, ethnic Germans, Romanians, and Serbs. While the predominance of ethnic identity groups in the nation-state changed little since after World War II, based on national census data, the number of Magyars has declined from 97.8 percent in 1990 to 85.6 percent between 2001 and 2011, and then grew to 98.3 percent in 2016. The country is also home to the largest Jewish populous in Central and Eastern Europe, though over half of the population identifies with the Roman Catholic religion and Calvinism (Középonti Statisztikai Hivatal 2017). Rich folk art and music traditions and literary heritage have been cherished by most in addition to globally renowned cuisine, with world-famous gulyás and desserts like the Dobos Cake. Hungarian cultural national identity is also strongly embedded in a 200-year old spa culture blending Roman, Greek, and Turkish influences.

With high expectation for welfare and democracy, post-Soviet Hungary has always been underlined by a sense of pessimistic orientation and fear of uncertainty. Post-1989, memories of Nazism to Sovietization through mass illegalities have not disappeared and remained present in both political and public discourse with emphasis on historical and symbolic legacies and a quest for a Hungarian identity tied to national political autonomy that in some ways, has never been truly realized (Bottoni 2009). Hence, forces favoring a Hungarian nation-state system have been evident since before the Fall of Communism, embedded in many aspects of every-day life since on the bases of historical victimhood and ethnic Magyar survival. This national characteristic is often
not appreciated enough by many Western EU member states, and regularly taken advantage of by domestic parties to generate voter support (Ungváry 2014; 24.hu 2018).

The 2008 financial crisis and the onset of the continent’s most recent refugee and migrant crisis have visibly concentrated Hungarian societal fears and public reservations toward the disadvantages of globalization and larger European integration (Eurostat 2017; European Social Survey 2017). In 2014, Hungary received 41,215 first-time asylum applications from peoples arriving from outside the EU, while in 2015 this number rose to 65,000, the second highest number after Germany. In 2014, the top three nationalities requesting asylum included Kosovo (21,455), Afghanistan (8,795), and Syria (6,855) (UNHCR 2018), with irregular entries following from Serbia and Croatia in 2015 with final destinations including Germany, Belgium, and The Netherlands. The number of asylum applications significantly dropped to 3,397 in 2017, a total decrease of 88 percent. Along with Estonia and Bulgaria, Hungary recorded the greatest decreases with more than 70 percent each, respectively (IOM 2018).

A wire fence along the 175-kilometer border with Serbia and fence-building plans along the Croatian and Romanian border, incidences of Hungarian police using tear-gas against migrants as well as new amendments passed to the national Asylum Act in 2016 (that denies assistance to asylum-seekers, deports them, and allows their prolonged detention), and infringement of the EU quota system, all raised eye-brows across the EU and among many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Although the European Court of Human Rights in the Ilias and Ahmed vs. Hungary case in March of 2017 ruled that the detention of migrants in transit zones qualified as a violation of civil liberties, Hungary’s leadership generally dismissed these charges casting blame on the
need to protect national – primarily religious and family – values given that ineffective EU policies have been failing to do so.

Articulating that Europe needs to return to a ‘Europe of nations’, Vice Prime Minister Semjén Zsolt stated:

“Magyarország megvédéséhez meg kell állítani a migrációt, meg kell erősíteni a magyar családokat és meg kell erősíteni a keresztény identitást. „Akármilyen kerítést építünk, akárhogy harcolunk, amíg nem születik eléggé gyerek, nem tudjuk megvédeni a hazánkat” (Semjei 2017).

Particularly proud of his party’s family politics, in which traditional gender roles are celebrated, his statement above expressed the need to stop migration, strengthen Hungarian families and Christian identities to protect Hungary. Further, he suggested that no matter what fences are built, until Hungary experiences a shortage in children born, the Hungarian homeland cannot be protected. Indeed, the government’s latest policy to trigger a baby boom in exchange for tax cuts and loan forgiveness is rooted in the notion that ‘for married women giving birth is an obligation, for the unmarried youth, it is an honor’ (Farkas 2016).

Though the development of recent anti-liberal government policies deemed by many civil society organizations, volunteers in Hungary as a ‘national insult’ per international media reports, despite the decrease in the number of asylum-seekers, anti-migrant views and xenophobia have been on the rise (Eurobarometer 86, 2016; IOM 2018). In 2015, along with the issue of international terrorism, 13 percent of Hungarians saw immigration as a security priority, a 10 percent increase since the fall of 2014 – a trend that persisted through 2017 (Eurobarometer 83, 2015). Despite many Hungarian intellectuals having called for the need to embrace European solidarity, pro-Orbán media giants have gained ‘national strategic importance’ also fueling fears for press freedom in
Hungary as reported by both national and international online media (444.hu 2017; 2017; Origo.hu 2018). Anita Kőműves, an investigative journalist and proponent of media freedom explained to the *Irish Times* that “the biggest advertiser in Hungary is the state. It can channel a lot of money to outlets it likes and make sure the ones it doesn’t like don’t get money” (McLaughlin 2018).

Redefining true ‘Hungarianness’ as a matter of ethnic and cultural heredity, the current government in 2018 and its supporting media sources indeed pressed the notion that ‘a true Hungarian is one, whose grandchildren will also be Hungarian’ (Herczeg 2018). In addition to hereditary claims surrounding Hungarian national identity, Hungarian national belonging has visibly shifted toward exclusivity rooted in fears of uncertainty and the other. With an overwhelming public support in the most recent elections in April of 2018, Orbán has continued his populist, anti-migration, and Eurosceptic agenda campaigning on the premise of “Nekunk Magyarorszag az első” (To us, Hungary comes first), which most recently triggered the move of the U.S. – accredited Central European University from Budapest to Vienna due to restrictions on academic freedoms and institutional autonomy. Seldom separate from historical and symbolic legacies, Hungary’s nationalism in its various forms over time, has been markedly defensive and inward-oriented, and notably linked to societal fears of the unknown.

*Post-1989 Hungarian Right-wing Populism*

After the Fall of European Communism, Hungary’s shift toward the center and extreme right gradually ensued as the Hungarian Communist ‘elite’ became increasingly scrutinized by center-right and right-wing parties over time. Several characteristics of right-wing populism have emerged since, characterized by: anti-establishment and anti-
elite orientations; juxtaposition of the national, rural, and ethnic civil society in economic, political, and cultural contexts against ‘the other’; blaming of electoral and international institutions of distorting the popular will; and the need for citizen communities on the bases of religion and national symbolic heritage (Szabó 2003).

Figure 32. Latest Vote Share for Radical Populist Parties in Europe.

With attacks on post-communist elites, heirs of the communist party, and the greater EU institutional structure, Hungarian civil society has been slowly (in some ways, unvoluntarily) surrendered to a Fidesz’s political force, with checks and balances, parliamentary representation, and independent institutions increasingly disappearing in exchange for sworn policies by right-wing politicians. Since the early 2000s, Hungarian narratives pointed to shared political and public opinion of viewing the turn of the century as a distinct momentum for Hungarian right-wing populism. Despite of Hungary’s accession to the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), amid years of recession, parties who governed since 1998, including the Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP) and the Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Free Democrats or SZDSZ) who led the country between 2002 and 2010 lost popularity over time to Orbán’s right-wing party, Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Alliance and the new anti-
establishment parties like the radical right-wing party, Jobbik. Jobbik indeed has won about 17 percent of the vote in 2010 and 20 percent in 2014, while the Fidesz won 52 percent of the votes and more than two-third of the seats in the Parliament, since having made multiple modifications to the national constitution in the name of ‘the people’ (Csigó and Merkovity 2016). Popular support for these two parties in Hungary has been regularly higher in regions with lower socio-economic development, including Dél-Dunántúl (South of the Danube) and Észak-Magyarország (Northern Hungary), and among religious Hungarians (Ádám and Bozóki 2011; Eurobarometer 83, 2015).

Since 1989, references to Christianity in political debate and national media – not in the context of religion and universalized religious identity itself but rather in a broader ideological context of social conservatism and traditional nationalism – became dominant. Since the early 2000s, the Hungarian right has combined religious symbolism with the ethnic idea of national belonging and territorial and historical legacy. Populist rhetoric has thus managed to frame religion not as a biblical source of a collective Hungarian identity but instead, as an ideological and cultural reference point for a Hungarian ethnonationalism and civic national identity.

Although only a small portion of Hungarians identifies as church-goers and devoted followers, a Pew Research Center survey in 2018 found that 75 percent of Hungarians were raised Christian, while 76 percent declared themselves as Christians (Pew Research Center 2018). Hungarian voters have gradually gravitated toward right-wing extremism between 2002 and 2009 (European Social Survey 2017). To link religious values to every-day Hungarianness, right-wing populist parties reemphasized religious symbols already embedded in the minds of the ‘people’, whose national anthem
begins with the phrase ‘God bless the Hungarian’, and where one of the most renowned poems learned in schools, the *National song* (1848) by Petőfi Sándor, poet and liberal revolutionary of his time, repeats ‘[w]e swear on the God of Hungarians that we won’t stay slaves anymore” at the end of each verse.

Although heavily critiqued by a portion of the public and both domestic liberal and international media sources, right-wing populist political narratives of the Fidesz since the early 2000s have been officiated through the Fundamental Law in 2011 (referred to as the Fidesz Constitution), which articulates that national values and communal duties as well as the legitimacy of nationhood derive from Christian values. Orbán himself has stated that “[t]he Christian culture is the unifying force of the nation […] and the inner essence of the state […] and that’s why we declare that Hungary will either be Christian or not at all” (Dull 2015; Semsei 2017). Subsequently, since 2013, the government increased financial support for the Catholic and Calvinist churches, and has compensated by church-run schools, hospitals, and a religious elementary school curriculum generously (Ádám and Bozóki 2011).

The onset of the European refugee and migrant crisis in 2015 provided a unique opportunity for Christianity as a symbol of cultural and ethnic identity to regain its role in Hungarian identity politics and right-wing political discourse. In May 2015, in his address to the European Parliament, Orbán further claimed that “Hungarians would like to keep Europe for the Europeans and Hungary for the Hungarians” (Kormány.hu 2015). While the Fidesz has adopted symbols of Christianity within its greater framework for a collective Hungarian ethnic nationalism tied to the Hungarian homeland, the Jobbik has interpreted Christianity to promote its own form of anti-Roma and anti-Semitic
ethnonationalism.

Indeed, it continues to frame the refugee and migrant crisis as a biological and ethnic problem that has brought “hoards of Muslims” and different languages and skin colors to Hungary only to exacerbate the existing Gypsy-problem (Budapest Sentinel 2015). Increasing nationalist, authoritarian, and anti-establishment attitudes have existed for a time, with the Jobbik having appealed to the Hungarian youth harboring such sentiments the most. Until 2005, the Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party or MIÉP) gained about 5 percent of votes on average, known as the most extreme right-wing party of the early 2000s and in 2005, it joined forces with the Jobbik with an emphasis to combat Roma and migrant crime, and to bolster a Christian nation after years of foreign domination.

The Jobbik has been mostly pro-Christian, with some members having exhibited blatant anti-Semitism, anti-Roma, and pro-Arab stances, while the Fidesz remains openly Islamophobic but seems to reject anti-Semitism (Csigó and Merkovity 2016; Karácsony and Róna, 2011). Whilst in 2012, only 22 percent of supporters of the Fidesz-KDNP alliance and 6 percent of supporters of the Jobbik having identified as ‘religious following the guidance of the Church’ (Political Capital 2012), the overwhelming victory of the Fidesz in the 2018 national elections has highlighted the role of ‘the God of Hungarians’ in shaping national identity.

After 2008, right-wing populist narratives of economic and social security and wealth generation have been resonant with a generally state-dependent Hungarian public, whose welfare in terms of pensions, loans, healthcare, and employment remains in the state’s hands. national principles and interests and thus ‘the people’. As such, they
created a cycle of populist supply and demand where welfare populism – one that repeatedly capitalizes upon distrust in, and failures of the global market and the EU, also incites fear of foreign threats and losses (of population, ethnic identity, political autonomy, and economic benefits, and more), encourages protectionism, and legitimizes illiberal civic policies.

Case 4: Post-1989 Irish Nationalism

*Legacies and Continuity*

The Republic of Ireland is home to thousands of years of historic, ethnic, and religious legacy and complex, hybrid forms of national identities that are closely tied to notion of both state legitimacy and Irish cultural independence. With the Old English and native Gaelic Irish identities blending together, Irish national sentiments and belonging strengthened in the 16th century under the umbrella and Catholicism and an Irish civic yet communal identity that relied on faith and homeland. Efforts to establish a sectarian Ireland without religious divisions however did not emerge until the late 17th century when the Society of the Irishmen as a political organization sought to implement parliamentary reforms to end discrimination against Catholics to found an independent Irish republic (Garvin [1981] 2005).

The two types of distinct Irish nationalisms that emerged – one, a radical Irish Republicanism that justified violent means to a secular and egalitarian Irish end, and a more peaceful, primarily Catholic nationalism. While Irish national identities over time became many, expressed in a variety ways depending on context, religious identity has remained a marker of not only Irish identity but political decision-making. Gaelic linguistic revivals, economic grievances, and national collectiveness among the Catholic
Irish in specific have characterized Irish nationalism as it continued into the 20th century, after the Great Famine of 1845 to 1851, in which Ireland lost one-third of its total population to starvation and disease, with an additional two million Irish having emigrated abroad to Canada and the United States. Ireland’s population has not recorded a rise in its population since this time until 2006 (Garvin [1981] 2005; Quinn 2007).

In 1921, Ireland gained complete independence although its statehood has not been declared until 1949, with Northern-Ireland remaining in the United Kingdom (UK). During this time, religious Irish identity has yet again prevailed, with Roman Catholic majority comprising the seceded territory, while a Protestant majority remained alongside Great Britain. The Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland have remained politically divided since, with many modern Irish having diverging on whether foreign rule has been beneficial or detrimental to Irish national interests. With memories of the secession and a subsequent Irish Civil War between 1922 and 1924, the Republic of Ireland, post-1989 Irish nationalism has seemingly adopted the former stance on foreign domination viewing it as detrimental to Irish national belonging, with a small national minority from Northern Ireland also having favored unification.

While militant nationalism was initially exhibited by the left-wing Irish Republican party Sinn Féin with the slogan ‘We Ourselves’, as political narratives indicated, over time the party has become more constitutionally committed and peaceful. Nevertheless, given a long history of conflicts (most recently a wave of civil unrests between 1960 and 1990), while these distinct Irish nationalisms are celebratory of their ancient Celtic legacies and belonging to the national land, they have also been largely embedded in fears of terrorism and persisting socio-economic and political divides.
The emergence of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as an aggressive militant nationalist group before the 1990s, and later the Ograigh na hEireann or Real IRA (RIRA), for instance managed reignite escalating fears of terrorism and secular unrests in Northern Ireland, with the RIRA particularly feared since 2008.

Although a peace settlement was reached in 1998 through the Good Friday Agreement, in which issues relating to sovereignty, civil and cultural rights, and justice were clearly outlined, due to the United Kingdom’s Brexit deal, Northern Irish concerns regarding fears of a strong border between the two Irelands have recently re-emerged. To calm Northern Irish societal fears given that more than half (56 percent) of Northern Irish voters voting for the UK to remain in the EU in 2016, the UK government declared that its “clearly-stated preference is to retain Northern Ireland’s current constitutional position: as part of the UK, but with strong links to Ireland” (Her Majesty’s Government 2017).

True Irish identity thus has remained at the cross-roads since 1989, with 79 percent of having identified as British, while over 60 percent of Catholics viewed themselves as Irish, with 13 percent identifying with Britishness (Breen et al. 1996). By 1999, 78 percent of Protestants felt ‘strongly British’, while 78 percent of Catholics responded ‘strongly Irish’ and 62 percent Catholics and 28 percent all respondents ‘not at all British’ (Northern Ireland LIFE and TIMES 1999). Despite such division and multiple forms of true ‘Irishness’, the republic has increasingly focused its rhetoric on Irish unity embedded in a Celtic revival, in which national myths make sense of the present. Histories of Viking, Norman, Welsh, Scottish, and African populations settling in Ireland over the last 1200 years have shaped Irish culture as that of one of the Celtic nations
along with Scotland and Wales (Counihan 2012). With a 50 percent increase Muslim community in the republic between 2006 and 2011, the Irish state has relied on the use of national colors, emblems, and the already present architecture and designs including the shamrock, Celtic crosses, and towers to reinstall such Celtic belonging.

As a former colony, the Irish Republic and with it, its own form of Irish identity remains embedded in historical legacies where continuity of statehood as national identity has become synchronous with a sense of independence and sovereignty. The Irish nation-state since its inception thus functions alongside its former hegemon and the goal of an all-island republic continues to inspire many political parties both in the Republic and in Northern Ireland. Albeit, in chorus with a persisting pagan Celtic Irish nationalism, in the Republic of Ireland, various other forms of national sentiments and associations with Irish belonging, ‘Britishness’, and EU identities collide.

Post-1989 Irish Economic Insecurities

After the fall of Communism in Europe, as a member of the European community since 1973, the Irish economy has experienced exponential growth. The Irish economy of the 1990s, referred to as the Celtic Tiger\(^ {18} \), which growth wave was eventually disrupted by a property bubble and a subsequent economic slowdown. While the country was relatively poor compared to its European neighbors, suffering from high poverty rates, unemployment, and inflation, between 1995 and 2000, the Irish GDP recorded a growth rate between 7.8 an 11.5 percent and unemployment reduced to under 4 percent between

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\(^ {18} \) Celtic Tiger was a term often employed to describe the Irish economy between the mid-1990s and the late 2000s. The boom, as a result of rapid real economic growth and foreign direct investment was shortcut by a property bubble leading to an economic slowdown. The term’s first recorded use was in Morgan Stanley report by Kevin Gardiner in 1994 to compare Ireland to the East Asian Tigers including South Korea and Singapore (Kirby et al. 2002).
the 1980s and 2007. Low-taxation policies and corporate taxation rates were mentioned as contributive elements of Ireland’s post-1990 economic boom (Bromund and Foster 2011). Exports of zinc and lead concentrates from Irish mines, pharmaceuticals, software products, and natural gas have also added to the boom and made Ireland the largest producer of zinc and second larger producer of lead in Europe. Despite an economic slowdown between 2008 and 2014, exports remained a success to the present day.

Having become the richest country in Europe in a matter of only a few years, with the growth of the economy, free higher education now offered to EU citizens, and new job opportunities led to an employment rate from 1.1 million to 1.9 million between 1990 and 2005 (Dorgan 2005). In addition, the government’s appreciation for immigration as a potential contributor to further economic growth, Ireland expanded its economic policies to EU nationals, who could work in a variety of industries. With a peak of the recruitment of international labor force in 2003, 47,707 Irish work permits were issued and subsequently in 2004, Ireland became one of the few EU nation-states that did not impose any entry-restrictions on migration, encouraging international migration and thus the entry of primarily Polish migrant workers as well as the return of emigrants who left Ireland for a better life abroad (Moylan 2006; Glynn et al. 2013).

Known as the most affected country in terms of emigration in Europe for the last two centuries, the early 1990s to 2007 have reversed Ireland’s emigration trend and economic pride soared in Ireland having become a migration nation. With further goals to expand the Celtic Tiger, the Irish government turned to its banks for lending and embarked on a journey to invest in housing developments for its increasing population.
In Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern’s words at the time, “[t]he boom [was] getting boomier”, while the national debt has also mounted (Roberts 2010). Despite Ireland’s economic progress until 2007, the 2008 financial crisis hit the country hard after two decades of unceasing growth the property bubble pushed the Republic into a recession, the highest level of household debt relative to disposable income in the developed world at 190 percent, slowdowns in private consumption, and new waves of emigration. The bailout of Ireland’s financial system by the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2010 required austerity cuts, which did not leave much hope for recovery. Irish indebtedness has continued into the years beyond the recession with Ireland having the highest levels of both public and private sector debts in 2017 as reported by the Irish Times and Irish Independent (White 2016; Burke-Kennedy 2017).

While challenges due to a new wave of economic recession caused by the European sovereign debt crisis reached Ireland in 2012, economic growth resumed in 2013 with 1.1 percent and by 2014, with 4.8 percent. Nevertheless, tax inversion practices by large multinational corporations like Apple contributed to the inflation of the Irish economy, which required its restructuring. For instance, in 2010, the Irish government published its National Recovery Plan, according to which, public finances would be restored and Ireland’s deficit would be in line with the EU target of 3 percent by 2015. As such a property tax was reintroduced in 2015, domestic water charges in 2015 along with public sector wages, unemployment, reduced social welfare payments, and health care spending. The Irish national debt decreased from 32.5 percent to 5.7 percent of the national GDP and the national unemployment rate fell from its all-time
highest of 15.1 percent in 2012 to 10.6 percent in 2014 (Government Finance Statistics 2014).

The Irish economy, and with it, the Irish thus began to experience the first recoveries in 2014, though the national unemployment remained constant at 10 percent, with youth unemployment at over 20 percent – much higher than the EU average. With memories of multinational tax schemes in the Irish economy, the European Commission and Irish media outlets in 2017 indeed continued to warn about both the potential inaccuracy of Irish economic indicators of GDP and GNP alike and as such, about the dangers that economic growth may mask the true Irish economy, in which unemployment and inequalities persist.

Although emigration rates also began to fall again in 2014, the Irish have experienced another wave of rising housing costs due to the recovery of the construction sector and demand for housing, particularly in Dublin and Limerick. In 2015, over 20,000 people applied for social housing (Kenny 2014). As the state introduced further tax cuts, the 2016 announcement of Brexit brought about economic insecurities in the realms of trade with the UK. Mirrored in Irish media narratives, the public quickly became concerned about potential effects of the UK leaving the EU. Despite being among the wealthiest countries in terms of GDP per capita and successful years of the national economy, Ireland’s population is at risk of poverty more than the EU-15 average and 6.8 percent of the Irish continue to experience ‘consistent poverty’ (National Competitiveness Council 2008).

Economic inequality has been a pertinent issue in Ireland since 2008, with children and women being most affected. Both Irish political leaders and national media
sources have agreed that regional solidarity to less wealthy regions in the country must be accompanied by funding to aid national cohesiveness in the process of Irish recovery (FitzGerald 2017). Although it has been ranked eighth out of 29 advanced economies for inclusiveness, while Irish economic growth in GDP per capita soars, high levels of wealth and income inequality have resulted from decades of surrendering economic growth to social equity (Donnelly 2018).

As such, a new wave of Irish nationalism has emerged, in which a new political party, Irexit Freedom to Prosper launched on September 8, 2018 campaigns on the back of growing Irish Euroscepticism and fears of the outcomes of Brexit for the Republic. Referring to itself as a political party and national movement, Irexit’s discourse relies on the promise of maximum economic autonomy and pursues Irish patriotist support to re-establish national independence, democratic ideals, and effective sovereignty of Ireland through leaving the EU by putting “the Irish people of Ireland first.” Targeting the workers class and rural voters first, with its left-wing rather than right-wing populist ideology, founder Herman Kelly openly stated that growing asymmetries of power in the EU and growing inequalities provide a “compelling case for an Irish exit” (Holland 2018).

With promises to preserve Ireland for the Irish citizen, while reiterating the restitution of Irish cultural and linguistic legacies to the people, along with other Irish political parties, Irexit, so far, has remained immune to anti-migrant right-wing rhetoric and populism. Nonetheless, public myths of welfare-migrants as recipients of disproportional welfare distributions (repeatedly debunked by politicians), national reports and media narratives and heightened racism continue to linger in Irish economic,
political, and societal spheres – phenomena that Ireland, per its own national media commentators, should not be complacent about (Journal.ie 2013; 2018; Fanning and Farrell 2018).

Post-1989 Irish Societal Fears

Post-1989 Irish society and culture has been shaped by several economic reforms, tax cuts, welfare reforms and a demographically transforming European and global landscape. Cultural symbols including the Celtic knots and the clover have become synonymous with ancient Celtic ancestry and despite being primarily Anglophone, ‘Irishness’ appears to be traced to a Celtic past. In the Republic of Ireland, a common racial and ethnic identity (embedded in such Celtic identity) has been shared with the Welsh and Scots for centuries, which resulted in racial identification with the ‘Celtic brothers’ as originally termed by the Irish Republican Army (1972). Today, the exploitation of the Celtic heritage as a symbol of white nationalism across Europe and even the United States (De Barra 2018).

Such commitment to Irish nationalism and its celebration of a Celtic revival has been a reoccurring theme in Irish political and public discourse alike, carrying national meanings, sentiments and associations with a unique type of pan-European identity. In this meaning in general, modern Irish nationalism today has been visible in bolstering societal fears of loss of political autonomy and independence, and acting as a political platform that supports the unification of Northern Ireland with the Republic. While generally, the Irish people in the Republic have seen themselves as Irish yet increasingly European, these identities have been subject to negations over time, with secular and religious identities being two most infused within.
Due to the complexity of the multiple representations of ‘Irishness’ and the political and economic closeness of Ireland to its former imperial hegemon, the UK, a collective Irish identity remains an aspiration only. Nevertheless, Irish identity, in broader terms, has become visibly less religious and more ethnically and racially inclusive since the 1990s. Ethnic and racial minorities have grown to make up approximately 12 percent of the majority (84.5 percent) ethnically Irish population, with most common foreign nationalities including Polish, British, Latvian and Nigerian in addition to Indian, Chinese, and Pakistani minority groups. Figures of ethnic and cultural background by nationality have indicated that the number of dual Irish nationals doubled to 104,784 in the 2016 census from 55,905 in the 2011 census, with citizenship held (Central Statistics Office 2018). Moreover, by 2016 the number of individuals who identified as Irish Catholics decreased to 78.2 percent compared to 84.2 percent in 2011. Indeed, the annualized growth rates of religions for Roman Catholicism remained the same in Ireland between 1991 and 2016 remained the same, while they increased for other religions including Hindu (by 11.5 percent), Muslim (11.8 percent), and Orthodox (22.9 percent),
respectively.

Although Ireland had varying attitudes toward globalization and migration, until the economic downturn in 2007, attitudes toward globalization and migration remained more positive than negative since 1989 (European Social Survey 2017). Despite having been spared from xenophobic political discourse, the Irish National Election Study indicated that societal fears pertaining to migrants directly correlated with the economic threat they were assumed to represent already between 2002 and 2007. In addition, individuals with higher education attainment were more pro-migrant (Denny and Ó Gráda 2013). Irish attitudes toward both migration and the EU have worsened with the economic downturn.

International migrant stock having risen pointed to a migration problem in Ireland, particularly after the onset of Europe’s latest refugee and migrant crisis. Having established the Irish Refugee Programme (IRPP) in September 2015, Ireland’s government pledged to accept 4,000 displaced persons in total and have lived up to a record of maintaining EU democratic principles. Since 2011, over 10,000 asylum-seekers arrived from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Sudan and Ireland’s immigration policy has remained on providing community safety and security with a primary focus on children.

Nonetheless, despite its open-door policy Ireland’s civic policies, security agenda, and public perceptions have also hardened over time as automatic citizenship rights extended to anyone born in Ireland were a concern in 2004. Moreover, between 1989 and 2018, Ireland has legislated 36 migration-related national policies in total with the target groups including all migrants, irregular migrants, their families, and refugees and asylum-seekers as well as other vulnerable people with fine-tuning changes to major changes. 22
of these national policies became more restricted during this time-period (DEMIG 2018). In 2018, Irish support for Muslims and the Roma are lower than the European average, and the attitudes of Irish-born immigrants to migration also varies over time depending on ethnicity. 58 percent of Irish supported immigrants from the same ethnic group, while 41 percent supported Muslim and 25 percent supported the Roma minority. An Attitudes to Diversity by the European Social Survey demonstrated that negative attitudes toward migration reached their peak in 2010 and became more inclusive as the economy improved (Economic Social Research Institute 2018; thejournal.ie 2018).

Even so, racist incidents increased steadily since 2013, by a third between January and June of 2018, with 245 incidences more compared to the same period during the previous year (The Irish Examiner 2018; Hilliard 2018). Preoccupation with rising right-wing extremism in Europe and internationally has shined through in Irish political discourse and media narratives, and while the Republic has remained relatively immune to xenophobia, signs of ethnonationalism in its xenophobic have been present particularly since 2008. A moderate rise in the number of hate crimes by bias motivation (less than 200 since 2009), name calling, and physical altercations on trains are among the few of such concerns articulated (OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2018). Indeed, Ireland is home to the highest number of hate crimes against people with African background and transgender individuals (thejournal.ie 2018). Government policy that has focused on economic objectives has lacked a coherent social policy to help reduce inequities and discrimination further exacerbated both economic and societal grievances particularly since the 2008 European financial crisis.
Economic performance and rural and urban inequalities, in specific, have marked Irish social life, with an increasing amount of youth being driven into homelessness. In 2009, 40 percent of people between the ages 18 to 25 had difficulty paying bills. In recent years, social-welfare payments have been reduced by the government has indeed created ‘hidden homelessness’ with “inequitable and age discriminatory rates. Ireland’s Jobseeker Allowance for 18 to 25 year olds remains 102.70 Euros, and the rate for 25 year olds remains 147.80 Euros – both considerably lower than the standard welfare payment of 193 Euros a week for all other age-groups (The National Youth Council of Ireland 2009; McDonagh 2017).

While the Department of Social Welfare justified the lower payments as a prevention mechanism to provide financial incentive for the young Irish to pursue employment, reminiscent of the 1980s, the Irish public continue to fear emigration. Furthermore, the cost and availability of housing – a pertinent issue in Ireland for decades – has been noted as a source of societal insecurity. Fears of extremism and terrorism have also returned since the 9/11 attacks on US soil in 2001, and awakened memories of violence and conflict. Per Irish media reports, the 2004 amendment to citizenship rights was rooted in fears of terrorism and radicalization, while most recent fears of violence have surfaced after 2016 in relation to potentially damaging effects of Brexit to the border control between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

Post-1989 Irish Right-wing Populism

With economic and social divisions, Ireland’s political parties in power have remained relatively unchanged since 1989, with the conservative nationalist Fianna Fáil (meaning Soldiers of Destiny) and center-right Fine Gael (best translated as Tribe of the
Irish) having dominated the political scene in the Republic until 2011. After a major political shift, Ireland’s political landscape has led to a Fine Gael becoming the leading party, the Labour party and Fianna Fáil following thereafter. With its slogan ‘Building an Ireland for Equals’ and alleged past links to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the left-wing Irish republican nationalist Sinn Féin (a party active in both the Republic and in Northern Ireland) has gained increased support. Irexit Freedom to Prosper launched on September 8, 2018 is a new left-wing populist party that campaigns on the back of growing Irish Euroscepticism and fears of the outcomes of Brexit for the Republic. Referring to itself as a political party and national movement, Irexit’s discourse relies on the promise of maximum economic autonomy and pursues Irish patriotist support to re-establish national independence, democratic ideals, and effective sovereignty of Ireland through leaving the EU by putting ‘the Irish people of Ireland first.’

Notably, the 1989 Irish general elections yielded no radical right-wing support, only 29.3 percent of support for the center-right Fine Gael behind the conservative Fianna Fáil. Renua, a new registered right-wing party captured only 2.2 percent of votes in 2016, while the rest of the parties remained center-right, left and left-wing throughout the years, with Fine Gael retaining leadership with 25.5 percent of the votes in 2016 (European Elections Database 2018). Far-right parties such as the far-right nationalist An Páirtí Náisiúnta (National Party) founded in 2016 remain unregistered. Therefore, right-wing and radical right-wing populism as a political ideology, movement, and platform has remained virtually non-existent in the Republic. In contrast to the German AfD and the Hungarian Jobbik and the rest of right-wing parties that have relied on in-ward looking
nationalist sentiments and associations, Irish parties have generally supported internationalism and the EU institutional superstructure.

As a conservative nationalist party, over the years, Fianna Fáil have remained stable in support levels among the Irish from all social strata as it successfully adjusted its ideology to appeal to a variety of expressions of nationalist traditions including that of a Gaelic nationalism. With its populist rhetoric, it has appealed to seekers of Irish unity and repeatedly voiced its commitment to the promotion of the Irish culture and language but not without the respect for European democratic values rooted in liberty and equality to promote legitimacy of the Irish nation-state. Referring to itself not as a party but rather as a national movement, Fianna Fáil has also vowed to uphold liberal civic national values to promote social responsibility and justice in the interest of welfare and safety of the public, and to maintain Ireland as a sovereign state and member of the EU (Banchoff 1999; FIANNA FÁIL The Republican Party 2018).

Fine Gael, has lost its leadership to Fianna Fáil in 2018. As a center-right liberal party, it has also adjusted its discourse and appeal to the Irish landscapes since 1989, and while heavily influenced by Christian values, has supported Irish LGBT rights, most recently through the 2015 Marriage Equality Referendum and abortion rights through the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act, 2013. As the most pro-European integration parties in the country, even after the announcement of Brexit, with no apparent populist agenda, the party has maintained its pro-EU stance with plans to nurture global alliances and relationships with neighboring European countries (Government of Ireland 2018).

With repeated historical references to former occupation and conflicts, both Irish party and media discourse have underscored enduring fears of foreign occupation in the
sovereign nation-state, with the closeness of the former imperialist British economy, politics, and culture repeatedly emphasized. Nevertheless, Irish nation-statehood and national self-determination, at least up until most recently in 2017 and 2018, were rarely seen as separate from European integration and membership. Efforts to compromise agreement processes with Northern Ireland, while legitimizing European integration has underlined bottom-up nationalist ideals and pursuits, making the legitimacy of the nation-state and EU institutions appear as complementary in Irish political discourse.

Although on one hand, historical and ethnic homogeneity continued to connect the Irish people through constant reminders of a Celtic ancestry, Irish national belonging clinging to its pan-European past, cultural heritage, and linguistic origins have recently seen a revival in political anti-establishment and Eurosceptic ideology. Public’s disillusionment with the lack of effective national and European economic and social policies in the aftermath of both the Irish recessions post-2008 and in 2011, the European refugee and migrant crises, and a multitude of public reservations associated with the Brexit deal, have triggered a gradual rise in Euroscepticism despite the repeated efforts of the government to shift blame away from the EU. In 1989, 84 percent of the Irish felt that they benefitted from membership in the former EC, with 80 percent trusting the young EU and its institutions in 1995. While in recent years, such trust index remained relatively stable, in fall of 2017, only 50 percent of Irish respondents indicated their trust in the EU. From early 1990s, survey results thus showed a steep decline in Irish public trust of the EU and its ability to safeguard Irish national interests. (Standard Eurobarometer 44, 1996; Standard Eurobarometer 88, 2017).

As Eurosceptic populism surges across Europe in 2018, Ireland’s left-wing
populist Irexit now rides the way against the monopoly of republican nationalism, and
attacks the EU on the bases of the lack of freedom, independence, national sovereignty,
and ability to ensure maximum economic autonomy. Although post-1989 Irish politics
has been immune to right-wing and radical right-wing populist ideology, Ireland has been
home to center-right and left-wing populist ideals. As modern Irish identity and culture
remains divided between rural and urban populations, Catholics and Protestants, Gaelic
and English and other identities, political rhetoric relied on a sense of ancient paganism
to collectivize ‘Irishness’ – in some cases along with pro-European civic liberal
nationalist sentiments (Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael), in others based on Eurosceptic
economic national attachments (Irexit Freedom to Prosper). Given the rise in xenophobia
and Euroscepticism, it is yet to be seen whether Ireland will manage to escape the right-
wing European political and social wave entirely.

Case 5: Post-1989 Swedish Nationalism

Legacies and Continuity

Swedish historic legacies date back to prehistoric times when the land of
contemporary Sweden was inhabited by Germanic people generally categorized into two
groups of sea peoples: the Gaets and the Swedes. Known for its Viking age between the
8th and 11th centuries, its kingdoms and 17th century Swedish Empire, growing
commitment to democracy in the 19th century, and humanitarian efforts during both
World Wars as a neutral nation, Sweden today functions as a constitutional monarchy and
parliamentary democracy like its Scandinavian neighbor, Norway. While, following the
Protestant reformation in the 1530s adopted Lutheranism, and later Judaism and Roman
Catholicism, the country has silently cherished a pagan historical legacy and a pre-
historic ethnic and racial Swedish identity that dates to the Norse and Viking times.

The Swedish have indeed historically conceived their national identity in the context of historic, ethnic, and linguistic homogeneity guided by the same values in both spiritual and political life (Gardell 2011; Forsell 2017). Roots of Swedish national identity in thousands of years of historical evolution of the land and its people, gave rise to a sense of Swedish collectiveness in the 19th century, which, has generally been characterized by the collective acceptance of economic, political, and social change, globalization, and ability to compromise. More specifically, Swedish national identity until the turn of the 20th century remained relatively unchanging, and over time, became the foundation of an unspoken Swedish nationalism taken for granted that no longer needed to recast Swedish historical identity to explain the past.

The value of history, though ever-present through banal nationalism, has significantly diminished as a social necessity diminished by 1989 and remained so up until the late 1990s – a phenomenon visible for instance through the Swedish government’s decision to remove history as a compulsory school subject within Swedish secondary education in 1991 (Emilsson 2009). While originally rooted in historical legacies that simultaneously instilled Swedish national pride in the nation-states accomplishments over time, has remained rather forward-oriented since 1989 despite emerging economic and societal challenges.

With a historic form of Swedish nationalism thus taken for granted in the realms of education, economic performance, political stability, and quality of life, several other meanings of Swedish national belonging, including an individualist and state-dependent welfare nationalism emerged in a variety of contexts that concentrated on making sense
of the present and the future instead (Emilsson 2009). The *Nationalencyklopedin* (National Encyclopedia of Sweden) for instance claims that the country has been an ‘immigration country’ since 1919, while other national sentiments and associations with Swedish superiority have been tied to the nation-state’s leading role in the world economy and soft power in global culture.

In the context of a fiscal crisis in the early 1990s and increasing globalization, national ideals remained embedded in civic self-understanding and democratic participation functioned as a source of national legacy and state legitimacy. By the end of 1999, Sweden has restructured its economy, shifting more economic responsibility to its provinces and to individuals. With national pride in being an immigration, export, and welfare state, the Swedish retained their own currency, the krona (SEK) despite having agreed to eventually adopt the Euro and become members of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) after Sweden’s Treaty of Accession in 1994.

With birth-place, daily customs and traditions of little importance to the Swedish when it comes to defining true ‘Swedishness’, Swedish national identity and nationalism has shown flexibility and a highly secular nature (Roden 2017). While Sweden does not keep official statistics on ethnicity, an estimated 3,193,089 Swedish inhabitants were foreign nationals in 2016 (foreign nationals defined as born abroad or with at least one parent born abroad) (Statistics Sweden 2016). Nevertheless, the Swedish take pride in their language and regard it a necessary element of Swedish national identity although Swedish has not been declared as the official language until July 1, 2009 (Sweden.se 2018; Government Offices of Sweden 2018).

Further, while most Swedes have remained more attached to their own country
than to the EU and its institutions, Swedish nationalism has remained civic and liberal, in many ways harmonizing with efforts of Europeanization while simultaneously guarding national interests particularly in the economic arena (Wemer 2016; Eurobarometer 57, 2002; Eurobarometer 71, 2009; Eurobarometer 79, 2013; Eurobarometer 83; 2017). The website of the Government Offices of Sweden thus state that “[i]n a time of insecurity and conflict, the EU and Sweden must be strong voice for peace, security, development, democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (2018).

Despite Sweden’s repeated economic successes, in the socio-political realms, one unique collective ‘Swedishness’ has been all but a reality. In a land shared with the semi-nomadic Sami who deeply cherish their historical and linguistic national heritage and struggled for greater autonomy, an increasingly multinational Sweden began to see the first waves of criticism and the resurgence of a historically Swedish-first mentality in the early 1990s. Growing concerns about the government’s ability to honor its social welfare programs after the European financial crisis and Swedish insecurities prompted by multiculturalism have allowed the right-wing populist Sverigedemokraterna (Swedish Democrats, SD) to capitalize upon immigration fears through nationalist rhetoric since 2010 primarily. With histories of fascist and white nationalist orientations in the early 1990s, today the party rejects Nazism and fascism (Rydgren 2006; Wallis Simmons 2014). Albeit, the heavily anti-migrant, specifically anti-Muslim political discourse in the contexts of migration, healthcare, justice and pensions has resonated with the Swedish public who increased their vote of 5.7 percent in 2010 to 12.6 percent for the party in the 2018 national elections (The Irish Times 2018). Although the party did not gain enough votes to become part of the Swedish government formally, the increase in its voter
support implies the continuity of a historically ethnic and racial Swedish nationalism posed against a once distinctively collective characterized by a united liberal consensus and tolerance.

Post-1989 Swedish Economic Insecurities

Having evolved from a primarily agricultural economy, Sweden’s economic stability was shaken by a financial crisis in the early 1990s. After a real estate bubble burst, Sweden’s GDP decreased by 5 percent and unemployment fell by close to 10 percent between 1990 and 1993. Investment levels have also decreased, and Sweden saw its worse crisis since the 1930s. With the government, unable to sustain its social welfare structure, government debt exceeded 15 percent of the GDP having constrained Sweden to institute austerity measures and reforms. Per the Swedish government, given Sweden’s been historical challenges pertaining to high inflation and low growth, “the path to stability was not easy for Sweden. But pursuing inventive and courageous reforms – and sticking to them – Sweden has transformed its economy, paving way to robust growth in the face of global economic uncertainty” (The Government of Sweden 2018).

Since the 1990s, the Swedish government had effectively regulated public spending and did so despite financial challenges to its banking sector during the 2008 European sovereign debt crisis. As such, in 1996, the utgifstak, a ceiling for public spending was introduced, followed by setting a surplus goal referred to as överskottsmålet for government spending to help balance national debt. Having learnt its lessons from the 1990s’ crisis, Sweden’s Finanspolitiska rådet (Swedish Fiscal Policy Council) has invested fiscal responsibility in ensuring growth, unemployment and sustainability. With long-awaited reforms regarding pensions introduced in 1999, public
uncertainties rooted in economic struggles have also been substantially mitigated, at least until the period between 2008 and 2010. As a leader in privatized pensions, grievances pertaining to these remain unnoticeable compared to other EU nation-states.

Since the 1990’s recession, the Swedish have indeed embraced the strength of their national economy, particularly the export sector, with global companies like Volvo, Ericsson, and Sony Mobile Communications. Additionally, the Swedes have embraced deregulation, globalization, and their competitive technology industry as drivers of national economic security and dominance (OECD Economic Surveys 2005). Swedish confidence in maintaining the country’s own currency, the Swedish krona (SEK) have helped balance inflation levels and price stability and against international market shocks. In their national referendum in 2003, 56 percent of Swedes rejected the Euro, while 42 percent favored the common currency (Scarsi 2018).

In addition, at various points in time, the pursuit of full employment was a source of national Swedish pride, with employment seen as a civic social responsibility. National unemployment rates have averaged 5.95 percent from 1980 to 2018, with a record low 1.30 percent in 1989 and an all-time high of 10.50 in 1997. Despite is generally strong performance since 1993, the Swedish economy experienced a slowdown because of the 2008 financial crisis, when the country’s trade fell. Although Sweden’s national unemployment rates were maintained around 2 to 3 percent, in both the 1990s and then again in 2008, the national unemployment rate rose to 8 percent (CEIC Data 2018). Unemployment in June 2003 was 9.1 percent and 29 percent among 15 to 25 year olds. As the country’s labor force participation rate dropped to 72.92 percent in September of 2018, the unemployment rate in September 2018 was 6.47 percent (Statistics Sweden
With 70 percent of Swedish labor force unionized, while there are no minimal wage requirements by Swedish legislation, 90 percent and 85 percent of workers have been covered by collective agreements in the public and private sectors respectively (DN.se 2009; Kjellberg 2018).

Figure 34. Sweden’s Monthly Unemployment Rates (in percentages) since 1984.
Source: CEIC Data.

Although still considered one of the most egalitarian nation-states, the Swedish has experienced an increase in income inequality since the 1990s – the largest among OECD countries between 1985 and 2012. As a social democratic state, some living in the folkhemmet (the people’s home), however, were left behind. In 2012, the top 10 percent of Sweden has earned 6.3 times higher than the bottom 10 percent, a gradual increase from the 4 to 1 ratio in the early 1990s and 5.75 to 1 ratio in 2007 (OECD 2015). As a highly taxed economy, some of the redistributive effects of income have made up for such divergence.

Nevertheless, such effects have considerably worsened over time in Sweden, and while the country remains above the OECD averages, taxation legislation that has benefitted wealthier households. Such inequalities transcended into the realms of social benefits in the areas of education and care, with the poor and the youth, and ethnic
minorities most affected (OECD 2014). Inequalities in healthcare and mental health care have been particularly troubling to the Swedish (Fors et al. 2007; Amroussia et al. 2017).

Sweden’s rapid population growth and its prosperous economy that shifted the nation-state from one of emigration to that of migration, has been experiencing a public uproar in regards to income inequalities. These inequalities have been located along geographic lines not only between rural and urban Sweden but within Swedish cities where migrant and refugee-populated districts are the most impoverished. Immigration reached its peak in Sweden in 2009 with 102,280 people having emigrated to Sweden. Moving into urban areas mostly, including Svealand and Götaland, since the 1970s many Middle Eastern and African migrants and refugees alike arrived to the Nordic welfare state, resulting in a 67 percent increase in asylum applications between 2012 and 2013 alone (Statistics Sweden 2013; Swedish Migration Agency 2014). The onset of the 2015 European refugee and migrant crisis only added to the flames, although most Swedes continue to view migration, globalization, and membership in the EU as beneficial despite increasing uncertainties.

An increase in the number of krona billionaires (an increase of 22 since 2015), who collectively own more than twice the annual budget of the entire Swedish state and the rise in the number of dollar millionaires have visibly preoccupied the public since 2006. Several policy reforms between 2006 and 2011 and the 2008 financial crisis have widened the disposably income gap, and created a split between economic losers and winners. In the light of recent protests, though government officials have acknowledged the gap between Sweden’s wealthiest and the rest of the population, political discourse from the left and center-left has rarely (if at all), addressed such public concerns. Instead,
it continued to highlight the Swedish economy’s strengths as opposed to its Economic vulnerabilities have thus divided the Swedish public in recent years, in which economic insecurities have rendered electoral votes for the Sweden Democrats – the party that has capitalized on both these economic and social conditions.

Post-1989 Swedish Societal Fears

Since 1989, Sweden has solidified its self-image as open and liberal nation-state. Like many other populations in EU nation-states, the Swedish have embraced Swedish national identity rooted in linguistic homogeneity and a historic Nordic pagan identity. With histories of emigration and migration embedded in Swedish national identities, national sentiments and associations with a sense of ‘Swedishness’ have become multifold over time. Having assumed an unspoken Swedish collective identity, Swedish politicians and the public alike has generally embraced a national superiority distinct in its ability to remain national while embracing changing economic, political, and societal landscapes globally. As result up until the late 1990s, historic Swedishness remained a given without much need for reemphasis in daily Swedish life in addition to cultural traditions and symbols already present (Emilsson 2009).

With legacies of Sweden as a place for social revolutions pertaining to gender equality and increasingly liberal views of sexuality, a Swedish national identity became partially collectivized through progress up until the 2000s when critiques of the direction of such progress began to surface in government and among the public alike. After the 1980s, in the aftermath of the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, Sweden began to receive asylum-seekers from the two countries in addition to applicants from Lebanon, Turkey, Eritrea, and Syria as well as from Somalia and some Southern American countries. The 1990s,
during Sweden’s financial crisis, also triggered massive population flows from the former Yugoslavia. Most common countries of origin throughout years have included Poland, Syria, Finland, and Iraq (Statistics Sweden 2017; Government Offices of Sweden 2018).

With Sweden’s joining the Schengen Agreement in 2001, migration from and to Sweden grew exponentially with five of the main reasons identified by the Swedish government being: to join and be close to family; seek asylum; pursue job opportunities; studies; or for love. Consequently, small towns like Södertälje accepted 1,268 Iraquis in 2007 (5 percent of all Iraquis arriving in Europe that year) and over 40,000 people of Syrian, Somali and stateless nationals were granted permits to stay with family in Sweden. The number of refugees between 2010 and 2014 triples in Sweden, and increased from 12,130 to 35,642 peoples. Although in 2017, a significant drop in the number of arrivals was recorded, Syrians remain the largest group of arrivals, with Syria having become the most-common country of birth among foreign-born Swedes (Statistics Sweden 2017; Government Offices of Sweden 2018).

For the Swedes, nationality in such multinational Sweden where, in 2017, 31.5 percent of the population was foreign-born, Swedishness is not understood based on birthplace but rather one’s willingness to learn the language and adopt to Swedish life. For older generations, Christianity in Sweden has also been a prerequisite for true Swedish national identity (Standard Eurobarometer 81, 2015; Roden 2017; European Social Survey 2017). Interestingly, Swedish only became the official language in 2009 in the country, where in addition to Finnish Sami, Romani, Yiddish, and Meänkieli are also officially recognized.
In an increasingly multicultural Sweden since 1989, the government’s narratives along with media narratives in general have depicted immigration as beneficial and a pillar of the Swedish economy. Highlighted success stories of integration like that of Vildana Aganović a war refugee from former Yugoslavia who now works as a freelance journalist, and Mouhanad Sharabati, a 30-year lawyer from Syria underscore the Swedish government’s tendency to depict Sweden as a migration nation, in Sharabati’s testimonial displayed on the Swedish government’s website as “a place where [he] can start over an live a respectable life and think of having a job, family and children” (Government Offices of Sweden 2018).

While the Social Democrats since 1989 thus pushed forth the rhetoric of a historically rooted, distinctly moral and politically open Swedishness as a path to continued nation-state legitimacy within a cosmopolitan world order, on the public front the realities often differed from such Andersonian imagined Swedish community. Sweden’s entry to the EU in 1995, in some ways, have led to the end of an era of such Swedish exceptionalism as anti-migration stances and Euroscepticism began to conquer the Swedish public. Despite Sweden’s economic recovery after 1993, economic insecurities tied to unemployment and concerns regarding the government’s ability to tackle integration issues and maintain their social welfare structure remained in the forefront of public consciousness.

Additionally, the large influx of immigration has been viewed by many as a cause of Swedish schools having dropped in the Programme for International Student Assessment Rankings (PISA) study by the OECD over time. Moreover, protests ensued in 2013 over immigration and multiculturalism tied to resentments over competition for...
employment and Islamist terrorism. Indeed, integration has not been easy in Sweden, leading to stark inequalities among natives, older and younger Swedes, and foreigners as well as Romani and Sami minorities in Sweden (Minde 2008). For instance, the unemployment rate among migrants with lower levels of education in 2018 is over 20 percent higher than for Swedes with the equivalent education levels. In addition, collective union bargaining has made it challenging for qualified migrants to have their qualifications recognized (Robinson and Käppeli 2018).

In addition to apologizing to the Sami for years of discrimination and giving the Sametingent (the Sami parliament) greater autonomy in Swedish affairs along with financial resources to help preserve Sami heritage and identity, the Swedish leadership took measures to control migration flows post-2015. Compared to 67,000 asylum grants in 2016, only 41 percent of applicants were granted asylum (approximately 27,000) in 2017 (Swedish Migration Agency 2017). Subsequently, in 2016, Sweden’s Minister for Employment Ylva Johansson stated that

“[t]his unprecedented population increase has resulted in a lack of practical resources from housing to school to healthcare. And that’s why we can’t continue having such a large number of people coming here year after year – it’s stretching our system” (Governmental Offices of Sweden 2016).

Once a migration country, Sweden has ratified a total of 48 migration-related policies targeting all migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, and other vulnerable peoples. Out of these, 12 migration policies became more restrictive ranging from fine-tuning to major changes in areas such as the permanent residency requirements, refugee smuggling, and re-entry bans (DEMIG 2015; Government Offices of Sweden 2018). Its Lag om eget boende (EBO) (Own Living) act enacted in 1994 for instance, grant asylum-
seekers the option to live where they choose, including with family members, friends or fellow country-men. As the Dagens Nyheter (2019) reported “Ebo-lagen leder inte bara till socialt utanförskap och segregation” (The Ebo Law does not only lead to social exclusion and segregation) given that arriving foreigners tend to group with peers already living in impoverished conditions thus self-marginalizing.

Despite the April 7, 2017 attack that killed individuals when a truck ran down pedestrians in Stockholm, most Swedes have remained ‘fairly positive’, with 64 percent of Swedes favoring immigration of people from outside the EU compared to an EU average of 37 percent (European Social Survey 2017; Special Eurobarometer 469, 2018). Most Swedes indeed continue to identify both as Swedish nationals and European citizens. Those, who support the politics of Europeanization and transnationalism, have thus feared that in the wake of Brexit in 2016, the EU may lose the fight to populism, chauvinism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism (Wemer 2016). With an increase in gang-related violence, shootings deaths, and media coverage of xenophobic hate crimes (Swedish Crime Survey 2016), societal fears of crime and violence have also been on the rise among Swedes, attributed by some to failures of integration of foreigners already in Sweden, and by others as an immigration problem entirely.

Post-1989 Swedish Right-wing Populism

Between 1988 and 1998, Sweden’s political parties were primarily center-left, liberal, and socialist, with the Swedish Social Democratic Party capturing the majority of votes. In the early days, as a result if their inability to tackle Sweden’s financial crisis, the Social Democrat’s political monopoly, however, was briefly interrupted in 1991, when moderate party-leader Carl Bildt formed a non-socialist coalition with the aim to move
Sweden’s economy toward market capitalism. The Social Democrats eventually were reelected to office in 1994, and as Sweden’s reforms continued, the country’s political forces continued to balance between the center-left and center-right parties.

In their shadows, as a response to Sweden’s open-door immigration policies dating back to the 1950s and 1960s, new political forces began to emerge gaining seats in the Swedish parliament – forces that did not share previously promoted liberal conceptualizations of ‘Swedishness’. With migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers arriving from mostly former Yugoslavia, Africa, the Middle East and South-America, already in the 1980s, right-wing populist, anti-migrant parties like Ny Demokrati emerged having gained 6.7 percent of the total votes in the Swedish general elections. In 1998, the right-wing populist, described many as far-right nationalist party, the Swedish Democrats captured 0.4 percent of votes and representation in the Riksdag for the first time since 1988, with Ny Framtid (New Future) a Eurosceptic party also having captured 0.1 percent of the votes (Government Offices of Sweden 2018).

By 2004, with focus on lowering unemployment and taxes the center-right Allians för Sverige (Alliance for Sweden) managed to stabilize the economy and maneuvered it through the 2008 European debt crisis. Capitalizing on Swedish exceptionalism in economic and societal life, focus remained on globalization, exports, immigration, social welfare and benefit policies to promote economic growth and Swedish development. In 2010, while the first non-socialist coalition under Fredrik Reinfeldt was reelected for the first time in Swedish history, the radical right Swedish Democrats began to gain traction and captured 20 seats in the parliament. By 2010, the popularity of the Swedish Democrats was at 5.7 percent, advancing the party to third
most popular party of Sweden by 2014 with 6.8, and by 2018 with 12.6 percent of vote shares (Government Offices of Sweden 2018). While some reforms of the Reinfeldt government were exceptionally well-received, others like the ending of the mandatory military service in 2009, increased the socioeconomic gaps between Swedes in rural Sweden, where, as military installations disappeared, so did economic opportunities. In addition, the government’s failure to reduce unemployment to the pre-crisis levels and to reinvent the Swedish welfare amid increasing immigration paved the way for the right-wing populist Swedish Democrats.

Strategically, by having distanced itself from fascist and Nazi ideologies during the 1990s and early 2000s, the Swedish Democrats have reinvented themselves as a right-wing party, having successfully built on its Social Democratic opponent’s earlier efforts to unify a Swedish identity through welfare nationalism. In fact, the Social Democrats have been laying the foundations for Swedish national pride in a strong welfare state since the 1930s to promote Swedish collectivism in a utopian Folkhemmet (the People’s Home) (Lönnaeus 2009). Sweden Democrats have ‘borrowed’ such nationalist symbolism and twisted it to appeal to societal fears and public reservations of post-1989 Sweden to promote an anti-migrant and anti-elitist Swedish utopia of their own.

Thus, while on one hand center-left and center-right parties have primarily appealed to Swedish belonging to a Sweden with strong moral values, the resurgent right has highlighted the troubles associated with migration, including a rise in crime and pressures on the welfare state. Their ability to effectively distance themselves from fascist and Nazi ideology, instead of only depicting migrants as a cultural threat, the party has employed welfare chauvinism to distinguish between the different social groups in
Sweden. With the ability to utilize Swedish symbolism to mobilize electoral support, the Swedish Democrats have partially achieved the reestablishment of an ethnic Swedish identity by combining traditional right-wing rhetoric while defending the existing Swedish economic model – a right-wing populist tactic unique to the party among other anti-migrant right-wing populist parties in the EU (Ekman 2015).

With unemployment, housing, and schooling being among the major policy challenges in Sweden, the Swedish Democrats have fed societal fears, especially of a lower-educated Swedish society. By highlighting incidents like the 2010 Stockholm bombings¹⁹ and violent gang-activity in Malmö’s Rosengård street, Swedeish Democrats cast blame on Sweden’s contemporary challenges as they advocate for the repatriation of refugees, firmer law and order, and a ‘Swexit’ as means to greater independence, political autonomy, and national self-preservation. Although international media coverage has repeatedly shown the rise of the radical right in Sweden along with the rise in xenophobia and racist incidents, Swedish officials have claimed that the situation is better than it seems. While Sweden’s National Crime Prevention (Brå) has reported an average of 228 anti-Semitic hate crimes per year showing neither an increase nor a decrease compared to previous years, racism and xenophobia and bias against Muslims have nonetheless been pertinent in 2017 (OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2018).

Many therefore believe that party leader Jimmie Åkesson’s declarations in the Swedish Aftonbladet, according to which “Muslims are our biggest foreign threat since the second World War” (Åkesson 2009) have been socio-culturally salient in the context

¹⁹ On December 11, 2010 two bombs exploded in central Stockholm killing two people. The suspected bomber was Swedish-Iraqi national Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly. Had it succeeded, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the bomb had the capacity to kill up to 40 individuals (Hanson and Homström 2011).
of politicization of immigration among Swedes, who consider Muslims as threats to Swedish national ideals and “an anti-thesis to collectively acknowledged Swedish-ness” (Gardell 2011, 9). In early 2018, 73 percent of Swedes indeed thought that integration has been unsuccessful, and immigration has led to crime, with 58 percent viewing migrants as a burden on Sweden’s welfare nation. Nevertheless, Swedes remain supportive of immigration and European integration, with 76 percent holding positive attitudes toward migrants (Special Eurobarometer 469, 2018). It will be curious to observe whether far-right success in advocating a historically Nordic, predominantly ethnic Swedish identity could prevail over national sentiments and associations of Swedish national homogeneity rooted in a utopian civic and liberal exceptionalism amid Europe’s nationalist wave.

Chapter Summary

Unique economic, social, and political contexts have defined the types of economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism in their effects on nationalism in all five EU member states. In almost all the cases, when more closely examined, the observed patterns differed periodically in their relevance over time, often interdependent, and related with additional factors such as economic, social, and/or political regionalism as unique determinants of the level of national collectivization in each case.

Economic insecurities and societal fears since 1989 have indeed been many, some more apparent in some contexts than in others. Including but not limited to rising housing costs and fears of international terrorism in all nations (particularly since the early 2000s), these economic insecurities and societal fears (as displayed by both the fsQCA
and thematic analyses), were rarely unrelated. They functioned closely alongside forces of globalization, Europeanization, as tools for political collectivization and public identification with national material and non-material interests. Throughout the three-overlapping time-periods since 1989 to 2018, vacuums created by these subjective risks of economic loss and public fears concerning societal security, were repeatedly filled and given meaning to time and time again by political parties, many of which became progressively more populist – on the right and left alike.

Despite the case-by-case diversity in the outcome, specific economic insecurities, societal fears, and political determinants and their combinations were more dominant in their effects on the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms among and internal to the five cases since the fall of European Communism. Experiences with national unemployment, regional inequalities, migration, terrorism, and Eurosceptic anti-elitist and establishment attitudes appeared as most densely embedded with both effects of global openness and the quest for preservation of national identities.

Legacies and continuity were key to the existence each European nation-state, with a variety of national identities expressed since 1989. Nonetheless, in some cases, national identities were more continuous, rigid, and exclusive, in some, more flexible, evolving, and inclusive. National identities were therefore neither universally expressed, nor collectivized. As such, multiple types of civic liberal nationalisms, economic nationalisms, ethnonationalisms, and xenophobic nationalisms were noted across and within between 1989 and 2018, acting interdependently and/or simultaneously, with post-1989 European nationalism observed as both top-down and bottom-up phenomena, and as ideology, political platform, and socio-political movement.
Since the early 2000s, the emphasis on historic and symbolic legacies embedded in ethnic, religious, and cultural national identities and subsequent types of nationalisms among and internal to each of the five cases began to converge as waves of Eurosceptic populist parties gained momentum. As trust in EU institutions and Euroscepticism grew, Eurosceptic chauvinist and populist economic, ethnonationalisms, and xenophobic expressions of exceptionalist national sentiments and associations have accelerated in all five countries by the year of the European sovereign debt and financial crisis. As such shifts in the economy occurred, events of the 2015 European refugee and migrant crisis further exacerbated national vulnerabilities that piled on top of the multitude of actual and perceived economic insecurities and societal fears of the previous periods as voids of economic, cultural, and political autonomy and self-determination.

In sum, this chapter detailed the most prominent patterns noted pertaining to economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism as potential conditions of the various types of post-1989 European nationalisms in the five European nation-states – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden. The next chapter, Chapter VI, “Analysis, Implications, and Conclusions” synthesizes these findings from the fuzzy-set QCA to detail modest generalizations possible pertaining to casual pathways and types of post-1989 European nationalisms across cases, while simultaneously highlighting the contextual nature of specific pathways as well as unique attributes of the types of nationalisms within them. The subsequent chapter thus serves as a forum for discussion and analysis of the results and concludes this dissertation, emphasizing its main contributions to, and implications for twenty-first nationalism studies scholarship and practice.
CHAPTER VI - ANALYSIS, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

“Nationalism is tool increasingly used by leaders to bolster their authority, especially amid difficult economic and political conditions.”


So far, this dissertation has introduced the concept of nations and nationalism, presented a synopsis of the relevant literature in nationalism studies, and detailed the methodology and findings as they pertain to the five selected cases – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden. More specifically, its earlier chapters elaborated on the results of the fsQCA and thematic analyses pertaining to H1 (the interaction of economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism since the end of European Communism in 1989 as conditions for the rise of nationalism in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland and Sweden), and H2 and H3 (the dominance of economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism; and types of post-1989 European nationalisms). Lastly, the study elaborated on these conditions in each of the selected cases, with special attention given to three overlapping historical periods: 1989 to 2007 (between the Fall of European Communism and the European debt crisis); 2008 to 2014 (recovery period from the European debt crisis); and 2015 until present times (between the onset of the EU’s most recent refugee and migrant crisis until 2018).

This final chapter, “Analysis, Implications, and Conclusions”, synthesizes findings from the fuzzy-set QCA and collective case study designs to comprehensively address the causes and mechanisms of post-1989 European nationalisms as they pertain to the research questions and earlier theoretical and methodological contributions. Furthermore, findings are integrated to reiterate this dissertation’s contributions to 21st
century nationalism studies literature and practice, and to recommend future directions in nationalism studies theory and analysis to facilitate a more holistic understanding of the unique, evolutionary, and context-dependent nature and types of nationalisms. The present chapter concludes with a reflection on the significance of economic, political, and societal implications of these findings in relation to the values and dangers embedded in national emotional and psychological affiliations in modern, exceedingly internationalized and institutionalized Europe, and beyond.

Analysis and Discussion of Findings

*Multidimensional Post-1989 Identities and Nationalisms*

Findings from the fuzzy-set QCA and collective case study designs both pointed to the complexity of post-1989 European nationalism since the fall of European Communism. First, both designs yielded confirmation that, though nothing new to the European continent, European nationalism (in general) has increased since 1989. Such increase was observed in all five examined cases, with deeper levels of nationalism suggested in the cases of Italy and Hungary by the fsQCA and thematic analyses. In addition, as indicated later by the study’s case studies, while some similarities pertaining to characteristics of post-1989 nationalisms were similar among the cases, features of nationalism, its types as well as functions, varied over time and across the cases.

Subsequently, despite its atemporal character as a frequently cited methodological weakness, the fsQCA analysis provided valuable insights into the many ways, in which these conditions and their configurations could account for the rise of post-1989 European nationalism and its manifold types. The multiplicity of sufficient and necessary conditions *across* and *within* cases pointed to the potential existence of some similarities
in regards to the potential casual mechanisms of post-1989 European nationalisms, while the divergences encouraged the examination of these on a case-specific bases.

As displayed by the fsQCA results, several single sub-conditions and configurations of casual pathways of economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism have emerged as either necessary or sufficient for the rise of nationalism in the five cases – most if not all, consistent with previous empirical findings as indicated by the consistency scores during testing. The coverage scores in the analysis revealed that none of these – either solely or combined – were sufficient to explain the rise of post-European nationalism in all cases equally, thus challenging earlier generalizations of quantitative research, in which single variables – economic, cultural, political, or other – singlehandedly accounted for nationalism as an outcome. This confirmed H1 of the study per which, intersectionality of economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or right-wing populism since the end of European Communism in 1989 triggered an increase of nationalist phenomena in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland and Sweden instead rather than a single cause.

While the study yielded no single causes for post-1989 European nationalism across the cases, both the fsQCA and thematic analyses implied that some material as well as non-material conditions could explain the emergence and re-emergence of specific types of nationalist phenomena in some cases contextually. These results confirmed not only H2, which suggested that specific economic insecurities, societal fears, and/or elements of right-wing populism have dominated in their effects on the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms but also implied the likelihood of distinct types of
nationalisms in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden, thus, also addressing H3 of this dissertation.

The early 1990s brought about increasing economic, cultural, and political openness in the five examined nation-states and in all Europe. With heavily dissimilar economic, social, and political landscapes before and after the fall of European Communism and roles in the greater European superstructure, each country entered an already uneven playing field and gained distinct experiences in both the greater post-1989 European and global systems. Although the years following the fall of European Communism, all five nation-states initially remained optimistic, some with particularly high expectations for economic prosperity and democracy (Italy and Hungary in specific), national economies and political systems handled the global shifts uniquely.

Economic insecurities and societal fears since 1989 have indeed been many, some more apparent in some contexts than in others. Including but not limited to rising housing costs (i.e. in Ireland post-2014); high inflation and low growth (in early-1990s Sweden); high levels of emigration (post-2008 Hungary); and fears of international terrorism in all nations (particularly since the early 2000s), these economic insecurities and societal fears (as displayed by both the fsQCA and thematic analyses) were rarely unrelated. Per the thematic analysis, throughout the three-overlapping time-periods since 1989 to 2018, vacuums created by these subjective risks of economic loss and public fears concerning societal security, were repeatedly filled and given meaning to time and time again by political parties, many of which became progressively more populist.

Within the greater systemic dynamics of EU institutionalization, national satisfaction with the performance of the domestic economy and perceptions of governing
elites’ ability to protect national interests – material and non-material alike – have been unalienable. Satisfaction with the domestic economy and leadership were tied to the formation, reinvigoration, and maintenance of exalting national attachments and its various types with nationalisms functioning cementing the space between complex national economic, cultural, and political desires and realities. As displayed in the case studies specifically, national desires and exalting associations with a collective national identity above all other national and/or hybrid forms of identities have differed periodically, and when expressed from the top-down (by those in the political sphere) and the bottom-up (by the national public).

In some instances, political discourse promoting a distinct form of national identity emerged more prominent, while at other times, public fears and reservations guided national political behavior and discourse as a response to public disillusionments. Although the casual directionality of political, media discourse, and public opinion was beyond the focus of this dissertation, findings of the case study analysis suggested that collective national identities indeed were multiple and collectivized both top-down and bottom-up manners. With one single collective identity as an aspiration only in all five cases since 1989, expressions of nationalist sentiments thus were found to vary over time depending on: 1) the type of national interests these identities meant to represent in their immediate economic, cultural, and political environments; and 2) the group whose national interest they embodied.

Thus, not only did different types of nationalism function alongside each other over time but the four major types of nationalisms identified by the thematic analysis – civic liberal nationalism, economic nationalism, ethnonationalism, and xenophobic
nationalism – were expressed uniquely in the cases depending on who expressed them (top-down, bottom-up or both) and in what greater context they have operated. As confirmed by the thematic analysis, these four main types of nationalism, in some cases similar and in others vastly distinct, functioned interchangeably as ideologies, political projects, sociopolitical movements, and every-day phenomena over time. In each case, they have adapted to the changing domestic and international circumstances with both their types, characteristics, and interactions thus continuously evolving since 1989 to mitigate, or eliminate communal vulnerabilities tied to potential economic or societal threats.

Figure 35. Types of Post-1989 Nationalisms.

As such, multiple types of civic liberal nationalisms, economic nationalisms, ethnonationalisms, and xenophobic nationalisms were noted across and within between 1989 and 2018, acting interdependently and/or simultaneously, with post-1989 European nationalism observed as both top-down and bottom-up phenomena, and as ideology, political platform, and socio-political movement. For instance, less concerned with the continuity of national identity in a historic sense by the political leadership, during the
first two historical periods (between 1989 to 2007) examined in the thematic analysis, in Germany’s and Sweden’s case, a type of nationalism rooted in civic liberal ideology emerged, embraced by both political leadership and the greater public. Early 1990s’ German and Swedish nationalist ideology was characterized by global openness, greater European integration, and progressive worldview, complementing efforts by liberal governments to push forth morally democratic and economic exceptionalism as symbols of nation-state legitimacy in the EU.

Nationalism as a civic liberal ideology and political platform, however, was not welcomed by the public identically over time. First, in former East Germany, memories of the socialist past partially hindered a progressively civic nationalism of the West, at least in the early days after transition. The Swedish example also demonstrated that during the recession period in the early 1990s, and again in 2008, despite political narratives promoting a civic liberal collective national identity and ideology and thus, economic solidarity, national pride of the public became collectivized through civic engagement in the labor force with nationalist sentiments and associations now less focused on pride in being a migration-nation.

In contrast, Hungarian and Italian ideological nationalism in the early 1990s became embedded in both historic and symbolic ethnic legacies between 1989 and the early 1990s as high hopes of the native populations became nationally more invested in desires for economic prosperity and democratic values of the political elite and public alike. In these two cases, however, post-1989 nationalisms between the early 1990s and 2000s have operated first and foremost as top-down political platforms with attempts for the ruling parties to justify policies and principles and thus collectivize national identities
as bases for nation-state legitimacy in increasingly global and Europeanizing landscapes. Thus, post-1989 European nationalisms appeared as flexible, context-dependent, and some types even evolving since 1989.

Analysis of the Conditions and Types of Post-1989 European Nationalisms

Comparing Conditions and Types of Nationalisms Across and Within Cases

What triggered such diversity in the mechanisms and types of post-1989 European nationalisms since 1989? The fsQCA and thematic analyses indicated that despite the case-by-case diversity in the outcome, certain economic insecurities, societal fears, and political determinants and their combinations were more dominant in their effects on the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms across and/or within the five cases since the fall of European Communism. The degree of globalization (as it pertains to economic, cultural, and political openness) and the fear of loss of national identity (as an actual or potential risk of diminishing significance of cultural autonomy) emerged as having the most potential to lead to post-1989 European nationalisms across the five cases, though with more potency to explain the outcome in Italy’s and Hungary’s case when present alongside other influences than in the other three cases. Though neither powerful enough to produce post-1989 European nationalisms on their own, remerged time and time-again in the complex interplay of post-1989 European nationalist phenomena.

The fsQCA analysis yielded pairs of these conditions to suggest that the most likely combinations to contribute to increased nationalisms across the cases when present. Nevertheless, both the fsQCA results of potentially necessary and sufficient conditions and combinations of conditions and the thematic analysis implied that the
greater effects of globalization and insecurities pertaining to national identity continuity and legacy were not only related but needed evaluation in the context of post-1989 Europeanization to explain both similarities and variations in the outcome and its types within cases.

Potential necessity for the rise of post-1989 nationalisms was thus indicated by the fsQCA for the combination of global openness and threat to cultural autonomy embodied by a sense of belonging and identity. Consistent with some earlier scholarly findings, the thematic analysis indeed noted that historical legacies and the continuity of national identities – ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic primarily (thus never truly expressed collectively) – were deeply cherished by the public in all five EU member states, with national identities embraced first above all other forms even in the cases of Germany and Sweden, where national identities have merged more alongside broader European identities than in the other cases.

Globalization in Italy and Hungary, since the 1990s, has been increasingly equated to Europeanization and European integration. As all five cases gradually became more open toward global influences, varying attitudes toward globalization emerged with greater levels of global openness in Germany, Sweden, and Ireland tied to greater trust in EU institutions and civic liberal nationalisms that permeated and encouraged economic, cultural, and political realms inclusive of ethnic minorities. On one hand, inclusive pro-globalization economic and ethnonationalisms (i.e. characterized by export and accepting of ethnic diversity) were noted between 1989 and the early 2000s, in sharp contrast with pro-globalization but increasingly xenophobic ethnonationalist phenomena in Hungary and Italy.
In Hungary, rooted in ethnic continuity, economic nationalisms in general became more skeptical of processes of globalization and European integration by the late 1990s, embedded in memories and fears of histories foreign occupation and domination and the gap between economic expectations and realities at the time. As such, although economic nationalisms were observed in all five of the cases during this time-period, in Germany’s, Ireland’s, and Sweden’s case, they functioned simultaneously alongside liberal civic political ideals whereas in Italy’s and Hungary’s case, national pride in the economy (increasingly more exclusive of minority and EU interests) enjoyed primacy, and was associated with the government’s ability to restore and defend their stagnating economies for their ethnic majority populations.

The case studies thus implied that issue-areas spanning economic, cultural, and political horizons alike – including immigration, welfare distribution, anti-elite and establishment attitudes, and economic and societal insecurities remained inseparable from satisfactions with the domestic economy and governance in a rapidly changing socio-economic, socio-cultural, and socio-political scene of the global and the complex EU superstructure since 1989. More specifically, experiences with unemployment, emigration, immigration, and societal fears as threats to both economic and cultural identities, and terrorism have emerged as commonalities, increasingly interdependent with a sense of personal security, belonging, national self-determination, and political and economic autonomy.

With the highest consistency and coverage scores, the combination of global openness and fears of migration yielded by the fsQCA analyses indicated the highest potential among the pairs of conditions to explain the rise of post-1989 European
nationalisms across the cases. With generous open-door migration policies in four of the five countries (except Hungary), the experiences of these nation-states began long before 1989. The recognition for the need of effective integration policies until decades later, the early 2000s marked an interesting shift in anti-migrant attitudes and related national sentiments and associations.

Since the early 2000s and increasingly so post-2008, the public in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden alike have expressed their preference for the prioritization of ethnic majority nationals for employment above migrants and refugees (especially of non-EU origin) – a tendency that persisted until 2018 also in the aftermath of the continent’s most recent refugee and migrant crisis. The gradual rise in more restrictive anti-migrant policies and increasingly negative attitudes toward non-EU and particularly Muslim migrants were a commonality among the cases, displaying a partial but gradual shift from morally justifiable civic liberal nationalisms and their economic and ethnically diverse counterparts in Germany, Ireland, and Sweden toward more exclusive forms of expressions of nationalist sentiments observed since 1989 in Italy and Hungary.

Namely, although xenophobic discrimination against perceived outgroups, including Eastern European migrants and Turks in Germany, the Roma in Italy and Hungary were observed since 1989, the early 2000s and increasing international migration flows from non-EU countries have potentially contributed to the increasing perception of both material and non-material national interests being threatened. With the lack of effective EU and national integration policies, global threats of violence and terrorism after the September 11 attacks in 2001 and subsequent concerns pertaining to
the war on terror in the Middle East, fears of migrants, particularly Muslims has gradually intensified since the early 2000s.

Consequently, since the early 2000s, ethnic, religious, and cultural national identities regained their momentum as trust in EU institutions and Euroscepticism rose, and anti-migrant economic, ethnonationalisms, and xenophobic nationalisms have regained their momentum in all five countries by 2008 – in some cases strictly as political platforms, in others as sociopolitical movements, or both. For example, while in Italy and Hungary, xenophobic nationalisms remained primarily xenophobic reactionary as political platforms and sociopolitical movements (favoring the return to traditional ways of life and symbolic Christian values), in Ireland, Germany, and Sweden non-xenophobic liberal and tolerant and xenophobic repressive forms of nationalisms have split political and public collective sentiment and opinion.

Notably, fears of migration, terrorism, and anti-elite and establishment attitudes appeared as densely interlinked with both effects of global openness and the preservation of national identities yet they did so differently, dependent on the domestic economic and political circumstances in each case over time. These did not only help determine the direction (bottom-up or top-down) of expressions of nationalist sentiments and associations but further confirmed the multidimensionality of post-1989 European nationalist phenomena, per which several paths toward its formation and re-emergence are likely. Therefore, both economic, cultural, and political openness and a desire for national identity continuity have appeared as the most likely to lead to an increase in post-1989 nationalist top-down or bottom-up behavior when present alongside, or
combined with economic insecurities, societal fears, or political catalysts. Their sufficiency, while appreciated, was however neither assumed nor guaranteed.

Subsequently, the fsQCA results have noted eight pairs of potentially necessary combinations, and five combinations of multiple economic, societal, and political sub-conditions that could explain the rise of post-1989 nationalism. The analysis of the pairs of conditions pertaining to economic insecurities, societal fears, and right-wing populism underscored the potential dominance of increased globalization and fears related to national identity in the increase in post-1989 nationalist phenomena as ideology, political platform or sociopolitical movement. The analysis of the combinations of multiple conditions nonetheless showed that sometimes, both may be absent and instead operate indirectly and/or symbolically through, or alongside right-wing, far-right, or populist nationalist political projects.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Necessary and/or Sufficient Conditions</th>
<th>Necessary and/or Sufficient Pairs of Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Degree of globalization</td>
<td>1) Degree of globalization + Fears of loss of national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Fears of loss of national identity</td>
<td>2) Degree of globalization + Fears of migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Degree of globalization + Fears of terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Degree of globalization + Anti-elite and establishment attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Religious grievances + Fears of loss of national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) Fears of loss of national identity + Anti-elite and establishment attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7) Fears of loss of national identity + Fears of terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8) Anti-elite and establishment attitudes + Ethnic Homogeneity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The combination of pairs of conditions with the most explanatory power were identified by the fsQCA as: 1) in global economic, cultural, and political openness and in
fears pertaining to the potential risk of loss of cultural identity (ethnic, linguistic, religious, and/or other); 2) increase in globalization and sentimental grievances and fears pertaining to migration; 3) increase in global openness and fears of terrorism; 4) increase in globalization and anti-elite and establishment sentiments; 5) increase in religious grievances and fears of loss of national identity; 6) increase in fears of terrorism and perceived threats to the continuity of national identity; 7) increase in fears of the loss of a sense of communal belonging through national identity and anti-elite and establishment attitudes; and 8) increase in anti-elite and establishment attitudes and decrease in ethnic homogeneity. With the highest consistency and coverage scores, the combination of global openness and fears of migration yielded by the fsQCA analyses indicated the highest potential among the pairs of conditions to explain the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms across the cases.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Necessary and/or Sufficient Combinations of Conditions for the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms across the cases (fsQCA analysis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Anti-elite and establishment attitudes + Ethnic homogeneity + Fears of loss of national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Anti-elite and establishment attitudes + Fears of migration + Fears of loss of national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Religious grievances + Anti-elite and establishment attitudes + Ethnic homogeneity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Degree of globalization + Fears of loss of national identity + Ethnic homogeneity + Income inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Income inequality + Fears of migration + Anti-elite and establishment attitudes + Fears of terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, the five multiple combinations of conditions with a likelihood to explain substantial portions of post-1989 European nationalisms were noted as: 1) increase in anti-elite and establishment attitudes, decrease in ethnic homogeneity, and increase in the fear of loss of national identity; 2) increase in anti-elite and establishment
attitudes, fears of migration, and perceived threats to national identity; 3) increase in religious grievances pertaining to non-traditional religions, anti-elite and establishment attitudes, and decrease in ethnic homogeneity; 4) increase in global economic, cultural, and political openness, the fear of loss of national identity; decrease in ethnic homogeneity; and increase in income inequalities; and 5) increase in income inequalities, fears of migration, anti-elite and establishment attitudes, and fears of terrorism. The latter combination of multiple casual conditions indicated to have the highest potential among the pairs of conditions to explain the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms across the cases.

These findings and potential pathways to post-1989 European nationalisms along with findings of the thematic patterns discovered were critical because they showed that while increasing global openness and societal fears associated with national identity continuity could explain most of the post-1989 nationalist collectivization, they may neither explain nor produce its rise of it universally. The thematic analysis thus supported this notion and highlighted that as these cases continue to operate domestically and institutionally complex settings, various types of post-1989 nationalisms may be facilitated or be simultaneously produced context-specifically by other mechanisms than increasing globalization and the continuity of national identity.

Accordingly, in addition to the degree of globalization and societal fears pertaining to the loss of national identity, the fsQCA analysis returned economic securities pertaining to unemployment, emigration, fears of migration, anti-elite and establishment attitudes, and the demand for popular sovereignty (decrease in satisfaction with the level of democracy domestically and in the EU) as potentially necessary.
conditions, and in other cases sufficient to bring about nationalism within cases. In regards to economic insecurities pertaining to job security and employment, potential sufficiency was indicated in the cases of Ireland and Sweden, necessity in the cases of Italy and Hungary. Emigration, appeared as a potentially sufficient condition for the rise of nationalist phenomena in the cases of Ireland and Italy, with necessity indicated in the cases of Germany and Hungary, and both potential sufficiency and necessity in the case of Sweden.

Table 22

*Summary of necessary pairs and multiple combinations of conditions for the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms across the cases (fsQCA analysis)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pairs of Necessary Conditions</th>
<th>Combinations of Multiple Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Increase in global economic, cultural, and political openness and in fears pertaining to the potential risk of loss of cultural identity (ethnic, linguistic, religious, and/or other);</td>
<td>1) Increase anti-elitist and establishment attitudes, decrease in ethnic homogeneity, and increase in the fear of loss of national identity;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Increase in globalization and sentimental grievances and fears pertaining to migration;</td>
<td>2) Increase in anti-elitist and establishment attitudes, fears of migration, and perceived threats to national identity;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Increase in global openness and fears of terrorism;</td>
<td>3) Increase in religious grievances, anti-elitist and establishment attitudes, and decrease in ethnic homogeneity;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Increase in globalization and anti-elitist and establishment sentiments;</td>
<td>4) Increase in global economic, cultural, and political openness, the fear of loss of national identity, decrease in ethnic homogeneity; and increase in income inequalities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Increase in religious grievances and fears of loss of national identity;</td>
<td>5) Increase in income inequalities, fears of migration, anti-elitist and establishment attitudes, and fears of terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Increase in fears of terrorism and perceived threats to the continuity of national identity;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Increase in fears of the loss of a sense of communal belonging through national identity and anti-elitist and establishment attitudes;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Increase in anti-elitist and establishment attitudes and decrease in ethnic homogeneity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The lists are displayed in no special order.

Moreover, a potentially sufficient condition in Germany, Ireland, and Sweden, and necessary in the cases of Italy and Hungary, fears of migration were observed next.
Lastly, while demand for popular sovereignty was shown as a potentially sufficient condition in Sweden, Ireland, and Italy, in Germany and Hungary, the fsQCA findings indicated potential necessity and sufficiency. Potential necessity and sufficiency was also suggested for post-1989 Germany, Sweden, and Italy, and necessity for Hungary in the realms of anti-elite and establishment sentiments. To concur, the thematic analysis explored these contextually, further noting that their effects on the rise of nationalist phenomena did not necessarily occur at the same time in these cases, nor was their relevance noted in every case.

In harmony with findings of the fsQCA analysis, the thematic analysis inferred that when present either solely, or in combination with other factors, experiences with national unemployment, regional inequalities, emigration, migration, and anti-elite and establishment attitudes relevant to right-wing populism had the potential to contribute to the rise in post-1989 European nationalism, though their salience remained highly temporal and context-specific, thus somewhat unique in each case. Notably, the fsQCA results pointed to income inequalities being most salient alongside increased global openness, fears of loss of national identity, and the decrease of ethnic homogeneity on one hand, and in combination with fears of migration, anti-elite and establishment attitudes, and fears of terrorism.

The thematic analysis expanded these results and found that inequalities extend far beyond income inequalities in the EU. It found evidence of it being on a steady rise in all five examined nation-states along regional lines – both domestically between rural and urban environments, and within an uneven EU superstructure. These inequalities have
functioned as drivers of economic grievances largely affecting satisfaction with the
domestic economy and the level of economic autonomy.

Table 23

*Necessary and/or sufficient conditions and pairs of conditions for the rise of post-1989*

*European nationalisms within the cases (fsQCA analysis)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONDITIONS</th>
<th>GERMANY</th>
<th>ITALY</th>
<th>HUNGARY</th>
<th>IRELAND</th>
<th>SWEDEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of globalization</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fears of loss of national identity</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N+S</td>
<td>N+S</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National unemployment</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N+S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>N+S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fears of migration</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-elite and establishment attitudes</td>
<td>N+S</td>
<td>N+S</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N+S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Potential necessity and/or sufficiency is indicated by N and S respectively. N/A = Non-applicable.

In Ireland, the thematic analysis confirmed the presence of left-wing populism instead of right-wing measured by the fsQCA.

Experiences with unemployment, for instance, did not only vary among the cases over time, but they have appeared in relation to various types of post-1989 European nationalisms. High levels of unemployment have plagued the Italian economy, society, and politics since before 1989, while were relatively irrelevant in Germany since 1989, and became more economically and culturally salient in Ireland, Hungary, Sweden (in the latter case prominently until 2014) following the 2008 financial crisis. Like in post-2008 Ireland’s case and then again after its recession in 2012, in Sweden (just as in the early 1990s), national pride in the economy from the bottom-up became collectivized by a sense of security through employment as opposed to a more tolerant and inclusive welfare and migration nationalism continuously put forth on the grounds of political legitimacy of the nation-state since the early 1990s.
Youth unemployment was also noted as a distinctive concern in all five cases post-2008, and in the weaker performance economies like that of Hungary and Italy, they were linked to increasing emigration, related fears, and societal insecurities in regards to both the national labor force and preservation of nationality and cultural heritage. While in Germany’s case, the fsQCA did not indicate the relevance of national unemployment to the increase in post-1989 nationalist sentiments and associations, the thematic analysis found that since the early 2000s, welfare and social benefit policies became more discriminatory of ethnic minorities, with Muslims increasingly viewed as less-deserving when compared to other ethnic and non-EU populations. In addition to such welfare chauvinism increasingly apparent in all five cases, ethnic majorities with lower education levels (secondary schooling or below) – old or young – have expressed more negative attitudes against minority groups since 1989.

**Right-wing Populism, Radical Right-wing Populism, or Merely Populism?**

Thematic patterns implied that challenges felt and perceived in economic and cultural realms have been tied to a sense of Durkheimian ‘anomie’, in which globalization as well as legacies and continuity help locate national experiences and identities in their present economic, political, and societal contexts. In these national vacuums, countless shapes of national identities (some more collectivized than others) – including Italian linguistic regional identities in Trento, German ethnoreligious identities in Bolzano, or Irish-British hybrid identities – therefore continuously search for a meaning and a sense of belonging and security (economic and societal like).

In some of the cases (i.e. Italy and Hungary), earlier than in the rest of the cases, populist ideology and political platforms have appeared to the ordinary people to with
attempts to give these identities a meaning through symbolic politics, with attempts to mitigate or altogether eliminate some form of actual or imagined communal vulnerability while also generating voter support. In four of the five cases with Ireland’s exception, while right-wing and populist parties have emerged in the 1990s, their support did not noticeably increase until the years immediately after Europe’s sovereign debt crisis, and then again with a wave of populism – left and right-wing – characterized by Euroscepticism intensifying on the continent in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee and migrant crisis.

Ireland, interestingly did not befall the right-wing nationalist wave, with its right-wing party, Renua having captured only a few (2.2 percent) of votes in 2016. The republics center-right conservative nationalist party Fianna Fáil, just like right-wing populist parties, placed national identities in context but remained supportive of the EU. With some populism, it refrained from adopting populist ideology until 2013 as it promoted civic liberal national identities, social responsibility, and justice, and a republican nationalism as bases for the legitimacy of the nation-state. Nonetheless, Ireland gained its left-wing populist Irexit Freedom to Prosper party in 2018, which campaigns on the back of Irish Euroscepticism, national independence, democratic ideals, and effective sovereignty.

The fsQCA analysis and thematic analyses alike suggested that anti-elite and establishment attitudes therefore could have contributed to the latest types of nationalisms since 2008, and increasingly so in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee and migrant crisis, specifically when combined with increased globalization, societal fears of the loss of national identity continuity, fears of migration, religious grievances decrease
in ethnic homogeneity, and rising inequality. Thus, fitting with findings of the fsQCA, the thematic analysis found that similarly to economic insecurities and societal fears as conditions for the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms anti-elite and establishment attitudes could have contributed to the outcome and some of its types in some cases but they did not do so equally across the cases.

Table 2

*Populist parties, types of post-1989 populisms, and post-1989 populist party appeals in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parties and Foundation Year</th>
<th>Type of Populism and Appeals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td><em>Alternative für Deutschland, AfD (2013)</em></td>
<td>Radical right (Euroscepticism; Inequalities; anti-globalization; anti-immigrant sentiment; national and youth unemployment; and terrorism; welfare chauvinism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>Forza Italia, FI (1994)</td>
<td>Right (Euroscepticism; ethnonational and religious superiority; anti-globalization; terrorism; Islamophobia; welfare chauvinism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lega Nord, LN (1982)</td>
<td>Right (Euroscepticism; ethnonational and religious superiority; anti-globalization; terrorism; Islamophobia; welfare chauvinism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S (2018)</td>
<td>Radical right (Euroscepticism; anti-immigrant xenophobia; Islamophobia; welfare chauvinism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>Fidesz (1988)</td>
<td>Right (Euroscepticism; ethnonational and religious superiority; Islamophobia; welfare chauvinism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jobbik (1999)</td>
<td>Radical right (Euroscepticism; ethnonational and religious superiority; anti-Roma sentiments and anti-Semitism; welfare chauvinism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>Irexit for Freedom (2018)</td>
<td>Left (Euroscepticism, national independence, democratic ideals, and effective sovereignty; welfare chauvinism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>Swedish Democrats (1988)</td>
<td>Radical right (Euroscepticism; anti-immigrant xenophobia; Islamophobia; welfare chauvinism)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Experiences with unemployment, emigration, migration, religious grievances as well as satisfaction with the domestic economies and governments and trust in the EU to protect material and non-material national interests, have been repeatedly recycled by populist parties, as some of these parties, including the Sweden Democrats, the Italian Lega Nord, or the Jobbik in Hungary, reinvented themselves to ensure their public appeal to prioritized national interests over time. As such, on one hand, growing Eurosceptic
populism pulled to the far right, and on the other, Eurosceptic populism emerged on the left. In Germany, the AfD has appealed to public reservations pertaining to inequalities, globalization, national and youth unemployment, European integration, and terrorism, consistent with a potentially necessary path identified by the fsQCA analysis.

Moreover, in Italy, Matteo Salvini’s Lega Nord disseminate anti-migrant, while Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia became gradually characterized by the promotion of ethnonational and religious superiority, these findings also resonant with potentially necessary pathways suggested by the fsQCA analysis, such as political rhetoric of anti-globalization and Islamic terrorism as well as anti-elite and establishment sentiments combined with religious grievances and a decrease in ethnic homogeneity. In Hungary’s case, the right-wing populist Fidesz has managed to frame religion as an ideological and cultural reference point for Hungarian ethnic collectivism and superiority, while the Jobbik, also pro-Christian, have promoted anti-Roma and anti-Semitic ethnonationalisms instead. Lastly, the Swedish Democrats have returned to Swedish a non-traditional right-wing populist tactic that capitalizes on Swedish exceptionalism and welfare chauvinism to distance itself from its xenophobic nationalist past, yet with enough success to have reignited anti-migrant sentiments and a historically Swedish national identity.

Synchronous with the findings of the fsQCA, details of the thematic analysis implied that it may be populisms in general, and Eurosceptic populisms more precisely, not right-wing populism that explain the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms in these five countries and types of populist nationalisms as ideologies and political platforms, and sociopolitical movements (when embraced from the bottom-up). While this dissertation originally hypothesized that it is always the interaction of economic
insecurities, societal fears, and elements of right-wing populisms that contribute to the rise of post-1989, the researcher now recognizes that material or non-material explanations may explain nationalist phenomena in specific contexts in time. As indicated by the findings, populism, in general, therefore may indeed do the job in the case of some post-1989 nationalisms as right-wing, radical right-wing, and left-wing populism alike rely on economic insecurities and societal fears to succeed in their efforts to collectivize selected types of national sentiments and associations in exchange for votes and a promise of increased economic, cultural, or political autonomy and a related sense of self-determination.

Generally, the thematic analysis discovered that nationalisms as bottom-up expressions of social collectivization embraced civic liberal ideological nationalism and nationalism as political projects pertaining thereto until the 2000s in Germany, Ireland, and Sweden primarily. The cohesion of such nationalisms in these three EU member states however began to deteriorate in the early 2000s, and even more visibly so following the 2008 European financial and economic meltdown when right-wing populism from the top-down began to feed nationalist aspirations from the bottom-up. The more inclusive, progressive, and pro-globalization and pro-Europeanization national collectiveness was promoted from the top-down became, the more polarized top-down and bottom-up expressions of nationalist sentiments became over time until 2018.

As such, although nationalisms including civic liberal nationalisms rooted in democratic values, economic nationalisms rooted in pride in the economy as an export, migration, and welfare-nation, and non-xenophobic ethnonationalisms as ideologies and political platforms alike persisted until 2018 on one hand, competing types of post-1989
European nationalisms became embraced as both political platforms pursuing voter support and sociopolitical movements embraced by the national public to resist both elites and the establishment, with increasingly split attitudes toward globalization, European integration, and ethnic minority groups on the other.

In contrast, the more exclusive and in-ward oriented top-down nationalist ideologies or political platforms appeared in post-1989 European settings (i.e. in Italy and Hungary), the more synchronous they remained with bottom-down nationalist expressions since 1989. In fact, the national policy-public opinion and thus, top-down and bottom-up circle of nationalist sentiments and associations with national identities at play was observed in relation to performance of the domestic economy and the government’s ability to maintain political and economic autonomy in the complex EU superstructure and to preserve historically cherished cultural identities.

Additional Observations

The time-periods of the early 1990s, 2000s, and the years immediately after the European financial and sovereign debt crisis in 2008 left their unique marks on each nation-state. Despite the unique pathways and combinations of pathways identified in this research as potential producers of the rise of post-1989 European nationalisms, some noteworthy similarities appeared across the five cases particularly since the early 2000s. By the early 2000s, earlier nationalisms embedded in ideological value frames and political platforms have increasingly diverged from publically-embraced nationalisms, especially in Germany, Ireland, and Sweden. In these cases, challenges of integration specifically were not faced through policies and programs and the lack thereof has not
been recognized until after decades of increased migration that began long before the
1990s.

As public dissatisfaction with the domestic economy and national government
performance grew, vacuums created by economic insecurities and societal fears have
been filled by populist parties – some of which were not originally populist but adopted
populist ideology and rhetoric – in all five countries, widely supported by the lower-
educated and paid. Some right-wing, some left-wing but all Eurosceptic, these political
parties have symbolically relied upon the unique attributes of economic and societal
grievances in each country. Indeed, features of the four distinctly observed post-1989
European nationalist phenomena – civic liberal, economic, ethnonationalisms, and
xenophobic nationalisms began to converge after the early 2000s, with non-inclusive
anti-minority nationalisms operating from the top-down and bottom-up in all five EU
member states examined in this dissertation.

Top-down and bottom-up nationalisms in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and
Sweden alike remain more polarized with competing national identities and their
immediate material and non-material interests shaping types of nationalist sentiments and
associations. Nevertheless, whether through reminders of Celtic or Nordic ancestry (in
Ireland and Sweden), remembrance of shared history (in Germany), and religious values
not in the biblical sense but as ideological and cultural reference points for Hungarian and
Italian collectivism, populists have partially succeeded in all five nation-states to promote
some sense of a shared belonging through ethnic superiority and exceptionalism.

Since the early 2000s, ethnonationalisms and xenophobic nationalisms have
increasingly targeted Muslims and other non-EU groups, though anti-Roma and anti-
Semitic sentiments have also intensified across the five cases. Embedded in political and media discourse interchangeably depicting migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers, a strategic reliance on every-day symbolic representations of a shared historical ethnic identities (banal nationalism) to underscore ‘otherness’ has characterized recent Euro-populism in all five countries. It is yet to be seen how such chauvinistic forms of many Eurosceptic economic, ethnonationalisms, and xenophobic nationalisms will shape the future of these multifarious nation-states and their even more complex EU superstructure.

Contributions to Nationalism Studies Literature

This dissertation contributes to the increasingly interdisciplinary literature on nationalism in ways more than one. First, its findings build on all previous theoretical stages of debates and discourses on nationalisms and methodological paradigms generally recognized by most, if not all scholars (Özkirimli 2010; Smith 2010). Adding the most value to nationalism studies’ latest, post-1989 stage, the most critical contribution of this research is that it offers a holistic approach to the study of modern nationalism. Its findings imply that one-size-fits-all theoretical and methodological approaches do not effectively capture neither complex dynamics nor characteristics of modern, twenty-first nationalist sentiments and associations in general, and those of post-1989 European nationalisms in specific.

Secondly, the research found that this is because economic, societal, and political determinants interact in their effects in shaping distinct types of post-1989 European nationalisms. Although single material and non-material conditions may explain the rise of nationalist phenomena in some contexts in distinct cases, they cannot fully account for the rise of all post-1989 European nationalist sentimental and cognitive associations in all
cases, and not over time. With civic liberal nationalisms, economic nationalisms, ethnonationalisms, and xenophobic nationalisms having appeared as the most common (each gradually more embedded in ever-present banal nationalism) over time among the five cases, their features evolved between 1989 and 2018. In each case, they have adapted to the changing domestic and international circumstances with their types, characteristics, and interactions thus also continuously evolving since 1989 to mitigate, or eliminate communal vulnerabilities tied to potential economic insecurities and/or societal fears in particular contexts, particularly at times of uncertainty.

Third, these voids – economic, ideological, political, or cultural, among others, carried desires for territorial sovereignty, political and economic legitimacy and autonomy, and self-determination, on which the very tenants of nationalisms are based and individuals and communities act. Hence, with nationalisms continuously endorse identity struggles within state borders and beyond against economic, political, and cultural voids of integration and changes in the global landscape, inevitably dichotomizing individual identities – national and other – into ‘us’ versus ‘them’ (Hervik 2004) internationally, regionally, and even nationally.

Fourth, with nationalisms therefore nothing new to the European continent, national identities allowed for nationalisms to invent and reinvent themselves time and time again as national identities expanded and evolved post-1989. In some cases, similar and in others vastly distinct, these nationalisms function interchangeably as ideologies, political projects, and socio-political movements. With one single collective identity as an aspiration only in all five cases since 1989, expressions of nationalist sentiments thus varied over time depending on: 1) the type of national interests these identities meant to
represent in their immediate economic, cultural, and political environments; and 2) the
group whose national interest they embodied.

This is because national identities and their expressions depend critically on the
claims people attach to them in different contexts and times. Consequently, as also
claimed by Guibernau (2013) and Binkowski (2016), nationalist phenomena thus cannot
be merely viewed as a political domain for top-down stimulated efforts of elite-power
accumulation seeking to legitimize rule over a body of people, instead it must encompass
nationalism as ideologies, political projects, and sociopolitical movements alike within
historically grounded yet symbolically redefined environments.

Next, with little to no exploration of the QCA design in nationalism literature as
it pertains to the casual mechanisms of rising nationalism, the fifth major contribution of
this dissertation lies in its methodological approach, which, combined with a collective
case study design, identified more complex causation of case-specific conditions of post-
1989 European nationalisms through systematic analysis, while allowing modest
generalization of post-1989 European nationalist phenomena in five cases representative
of all Europe. Methodological nationalism and its primary unit of analysis however was
not taken as granted as so often advocated by post-1989 methodological scholarship.

To effectively address its research questions and test the hypotheses, this study
adopted the Eurocentric methodological nationalist research approach not as universally
applicable to study all nationalisms (as generally assumed by many post-1989 scholars of
methodological nationalism) but to capitalize on the strengths of methodological
nationalism in the post-1989 European contexts at the nation-state level, uniquely. It did
not take the applicability of this approach for granted beyond its focus, which was to
examine the economic, societal, and political factors of modern post-1989 European nationalism across and within the five European nation-states – Germany, Italy, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden.

Therefore, at last, the five carefully selected cases extended the scope of earlier methodological efforts by: 1) recognizing the intersectionality of economic, societal, and political variables; and 2) are geographically, economically, culturally and politically representative of all Europe. They concentrated on exploring extremes in Eastern and Western, Northern and Southern nationalisms to exhaustively incorporate: differences in market structures; domestic and international political and institutional pressures; older and newer, and ethnically and religiously homogenous and heterogeneous EU member states; national identities coexisting alongside other national and international identities; and a diverse range of hybrid, regional, and cultural identities. All five nations are similar in so far that they all display a distinct longevity in their participation in Europe’s post-1989 development and most recent refugee and migrant crisis, also being among the extremes of the most (in some cases, imaginatively) affected by the 2015 influx of Muslim ethnic minorities.

Overall, while employing a unique, contextual, evolutionary yet continuous lens to the study of nationalism, this dissertation examined nationalism across its spatial and temporal dimensions – an undertaking rarely attempted, or entirely left untouched even in recent nationalism scholarship.

Implications and Conclusions

Many attributed the most recent waves of European nationalisms to the continent’s most recent refugee and migrant crisis and its aftermath since 2015.
Nationalism however, is nothing new to Europe and has connected and re-connected sentimental and cognitive attachments to a sense of belonging, political, economic, and cultural autonomy, and self-determination long before 1989. As a major force in ancient and modern Europe alike, nationalisms as both rational and sentimental associations have taken multiple shapes as they expressed a sense of superiority and exceptionalism in varying economic, societal, and political contexts.

In a world of rapid and uncertain economic, cultural, and political change and interdependence, in post-1989 European nationalisms, national identities have however increasingly blended between civic and ethnic meanings, with their destinies often entangled. As such, former political and civic communal relations held together by voluntary loyalty to democratic norms in Western countries and organic communities united by culture and solidified by language and descent in the East have been reimagined and adopted chauvinist, populist, and extreme patriotist undertones in the West and East, and North and South alike.

Therefore, nationalisms are unique, context-dependent, and evolutionary, though the relevance of historic and symbolic meanings should not be neglected in any of study of nationalisms. As theoretical and methodological debates continue in regards to definitions and dynamics of nationalisms, this dissertation cautions about the evaluation of nationalist phenomena alongside concepts of a nation and the nation-state and recommends to define and examine nationalisms alongside national identities.

National identities – their coherence, expression, collectivization, and mobilization – have been essential for the formation, continuity, and reemergence context-specific nationalist phenomena in post-1989 European settings, and could
provide a more effective approach to understand and measure nationalist phenomena in increasingly global contexts. National identities have thus provided bases for belonging over time through emotional and cognitive attachments to symbols, rituals, and myth on one hand, and through territorial political, economic, and cultural legitimization against other identities on the other.

Therefore, scholars of nationalism studies should not neglect definitions of nationalisms on the bases of national identities, as nationalisms can locate and explain expressions and types of nationalisms within carefully selected units of analysis. While in this particular dissertation, the focus of the research was to examine post-1989 European nationalist collectivization at the nation-state level, it is important to note that nationalisms may form, exist, and evolve within, and beyond the nation-state. A Eurocentric and methodological nationalism may not be the most appropriate to examine all forms of nationalisms such as diaspora nationalisms and stateless nationalisms.

Moreover, although statistical methods have become increasingly popular in nationalism scholarship, contribution of the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) technique should not be ignored as it allows for modest generalizations while also addressing the multidimensionality of nationalisms. Accordingly, whilst case study designs have been popular and widely employed by scholars, the fsQCA can complement contextual evaluations of material and non-material determinants of complex nationalisms. While the researcher still agrees that a qualitative design was the most appropriate for this study, she cautions about the importance of careful selection of case study design, methods, and cases to avoid researcher bias.
Notably, in recent years, contemporary nationalisms have enjoyed increasing research and media fever from the election of Donald Trump in the United States to Eurosceptic populist waves across Europe. While media reports repeatedly indicate that the world therefore has engulfed in waves of nationalism, as shown in this dissertation, nationalisms have historically existed, and it is their manifestations and magnitudes that have changed over time. As its various types repeatedly rise due to a combination of economic, cultural, and political conditions, some of their features remain engrained and salvaged, they also evolve and adapt to rapidly changing landscapes to address sentiments and perceptions of disadvantage and loss of security in specific contexts.

There is indeed no universal trend or type of nationalism, nor is there a single cause to explain it. Attempts to indicate otherwise can be misleading and elusive. While beyond the scope of this research, it is recommended that future studies hence explore particular features of types of nationalist sentiments and associations in more detail. Albeit, one thing has become clear: because expressions of nationalisms in general, and post-1989 European nationalisms in particular are manifold, in addition to their theoretical and methodological considerations, responses to mitigate their long-term dangers, including further polarization, instability, marginalization, and potential violence, must also be.
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