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THE FACE OF INTERVENTION: MILITARY HUMANITARIANISM DURING THE  
1965 DOMINICAN CRISIS

by

Wesley Hazzard

A Dissertation  
Submitted to the Graduate School,  
the College of Arts and Sciences  
and the School of Humanities  
at The University of Southern Mississippi  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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## ABSTRACT

On April 28, 1965 the US military intervened in the Dominican Republic's civil war. This dissertation argues that the military did not deploy to fight a war but to create a favorable environment for the establishment of a pro-US government. The US military relied on humanitarian aid through civic action programs and civil affairs operations to diminish the Dominican populations' interest in leftist political organizations and platforms. The civil affairs and civic action programs served to both alleviate the hardships of the Dominican people, turn them away from leftist policies, and build support for a US friendly government. The US military's humanitarian aid through civic action and civil affairs included programs from entertainment to providing health care and demonstrates that the military during the Cold War functioned more as an occupation force rather than a fighting force. The 1965 Dominican intervention demonstrated that occupation and humanitarian policies continued throughout the Cold War and succeeded in developing stable pro-US governments. During the intervention the military functioned alongside humanitarian organizations, other US government entities, and the first and only western hemisphere military coalition created by the OAS. The use of military humanitarianism illustrates the neo-imperialist tactics of the US government during the Cold War.

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Last but certainly not least, thank you to all the staff and administrators at the University of Southern Mississippi. Your enthusiasm and dedication provided an atmosphere that made showing up to work easier. Thank you for your many explanations and guidance through the administrative technicalities of the process.

## DEDICATION

The many years this project required could not have been made possible without significant help and support along the way. It is never easy moving to a new town to start a new program. I am thankful for Sam Ward and Joel Bius for easing that transition. I also want to thank my fellow graduate colleagues for listening to me work through the various processes at the project played out. Thank you to Tyler, Becky, Hayden, Olivia, and Kevin for suggesting happy hour at the “Hog” to take the mind of school and reminding me that life existed outside of this project.

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## CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

On April 28, 1965 the United States intervened militarily in the Dominican Republic's civil war under the auspices of humanitarianism. During the year and a half occupation the US military relied on civil affairs and civil action programs, rather than combat actions, to ensure a stable environment in the Dominican Republic for the development of political negotiations leading to a permanent government. This dissertation will argue that the US Army and Marine Corps deployed to the Dominican Republic not to fight a war but to create favorable conditions to establish a pro-US government. The military used civil affairs and civic action programs to create the necessary conditions as humanitarian aid, from entertainment to medical care, made the Dominican population less likely to turn to leftist or radical political activism. When successful, civil affairs and civic action programs alleviated the Dominican peoples' hardships, turned them away from the promises of the radical left, and furthered the mission of establishing a stable pro-US government. The US military experienced minor, but intense fighting, during the initial months of the intervention, however most military action dealt with humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. The 1965 Dominican intervention serves as an example to demonstrate that during the Cold War the US military operated more as an occupation force rather than a fighting force. The US military's use of humanitarian aid in the Dominican Republic exemplified the United States' Cold War neo-imperialist strategy of using occupations and humanitarianism to build and support US friendly governments around the world.

The United States has a long history of military intervention in the Caribbean region, especially the Dominican Republic. Beginning in 1906, President Theodore

Roosevelt, having issued the Roosevelt Corollary two years earlier, took control of the Dominican Republic's customs house. Ten years later Woodrow Wilson ordered the occupation of the Dominican Republic due to civil unrest and increasing foreign controlled debt. This action, part of a larger overall policy to reinforce the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary, was included among a series of interventions across the Caribbean including Haiti, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Cuba. Under the guise of reforming the Dominican government's institutions a US military government controlled Dominican affairs from 1916 to 1924 and contributed to the future rise of Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo. The election of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt led to the enactment of the Good Neighbor Policy, which restrained US government interventions in Caribbean and Latin American nations' affairs; however, the policy did not stop U.S corporations from controlling and influencing the politics or economies of those nations. The Good Neighbor Policy ended in 1954 when President Dwight Eisenhower ordered the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to launch a covert coup to overthrow the elected government of Guatemala. The first overt military intervention in Latin America since the Good Neighbor Policy occurred with the 1965 Dominican intervention, and further reinforced the containment policy against left leaning and possibly soviet allied governments in the western hemisphere.

The assassination of Rafael Trujillo on May 30, 1961 pushed the Dominican Republic into civil unrest. Numerous factions attempted to take control of the government with the leading faction controlled by Trujillo's son Ramfis and Joaquin Balaguer. Considering the continuation of the Trujillo dynasty unacceptable the US government forced the younger Trujillo and Balaguer into exile. The decision stemmed

from the brutality inflicted over thirty years on the Dominican population by the Trujillo regime, but also due to the Kennedy administration viewing the Dominican Republic as a sample case for the Alliance for Progress projects to promote democracy. In 1963, the Dominican Republic created a new constitution, and held open elections resulting in the surprise victory of Juan Bosch, the leader of the left leaning Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). Months after the elections Bosch wanted to institute reforms altering the power structure within the Dominican military. High ranking Dominican commanders believed those reforms endangered their privileged position in Dominican society and in response launched a coup that overthrew Bosch, and established a triumvirate led by Donald Reid Cabral.<sup>1</sup>

In early 1965, the Dominican populations' anger at Cabral's leadership due to corruption and a failing economy reached a boiling point. On April 24, 1965 conspirators within the Dominican military, primarily junior or mid-level officers, arrested the Chief of Staff of the Dominican army, General Marcos A. Rivera. By the afternoon of April 24, those conspirators along with their civilian counterparts armed the civilian population. This faction, labeled the Constitutionals, called for the return to the 1963 constitution, and for Juan Bosch to finish his presidential term.<sup>2</sup> After political negotiations, Cabral stepped down, and Jose Molina Urena, a member of the PRD and an official from the Bosch administration, stepped in as the provisional president of the Constitutionalist

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<sup>1</sup> Piero Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis: the 1965 Constitutionalist revolt and American intervention* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

<sup>2</sup> The term constitutionalist is used to refer to the rebels acting against the Dominican Republic government. However, not all constitutionalists supported the same goal, which represents the complexity of the conflict.

government. While younger officers in the Dominican military tended to side with the Constitutionalist many of the enlisted held loyalty to the senior level commanders and opposed the Constitutionalist government immediately. Those who fought against the Constitutionalist, labeled the Loyalists, included the commander of the Dominican Military Training Center (CEFA) General Elias Wessin y Wessin, Juan De Los Santos, commander of the Air Force, and former Dominican general and Trujillo assassin Antonio Imbert.<sup>3</sup> In the afternoon of April 26, Loyalist planes attacked the presidential palace, the location of the Constitutionalist government, igniting a civil war which led to heavy urban fighting throughout Santo Domingo.

Reflecting the policy of containment and maintaining a reputation as an advocate against the spread of communism illustrated the importance of the Dominican Republic to US interests and led to the deployment of US combat troops to the Caribbean nation for the first time since 1924. The continuation of the Bosch administration and the Dominican Republic's civil war raised the possibility of a communist takeover of the Dominican Republic and increased the fear of a second Cuba in the Caribbean. The Johnson administration viewed Bosch and his reforms as weak on communism and believed communists already existed within the Constitutionalist leadership and controlled the policies of the faction. A communist Dominican Republic also brought the possibility of opening "Latin America to further Soviet-Cuban penetration, and diminish US credibility throughout the world as a faithful ally and a bulwark against Communist

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<sup>3</sup> The term loyalist is used to distinguish government officials from the constitutionalists but does not mean that these officials supported the government; instead, they supported their own interests and goals.

expansion.”<sup>4</sup> This credibility saw increased importance due to the US stance against communism around the world and the Johnson administration feared a possible decline of the US reputation without a strong show of force to protect the nation’s own sphere of influence.

Using humanitarian civic action programs and civil affairs operations the US military sought to turn the Dominican population away from the leftist political organizations instigating the rebellion. The military used humanitarianism compared to armed aggression to keep large amounts of the Dominican population from joining the Constitutionalist faction against a foreign invader. The distraction and control tactics attempted to depoliticize the environment and to divert peoples’ attention from the political maneuvering of both the Constitutionalist and Loyalist factions seeking support and control of the Dominican government. The US wanted to keep the United Nations (UN) from condemning the military action. While the US had the ability to veto any resolution to the security council the use of a veto presented a bad perception for the US and the Dominican intervention. Portrayal of the intervention in humanitarian terms gave the US traction when confronting accusations of violating a nation’s sovereignty.

On April 28, US Marines deployed to the capital city of Santo Domingo under the premise of protecting US citizens and property. The next day, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division landed at San Isidro airfield, preceding the rest of the 82<sup>nd</sup> along with the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Once established, the paratroopers and marines occupied strategic locations inside and outside the city, including the Duarte Bridge, the

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<sup>4</sup> Lawrence Yates, *Power Pack: US Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 34.

main connection between the city and San Isidro. The Marines established an International Security Zone (ISZ) around the US embassy, the Marine landing area, and the Hotel Embajador, which held a number of US and foreign citizens. A communication gap through the center of the city between the paratroopers and Marines concerned US military commanders. To close the gap the two forces established a Line of Communication (LOC) extending from San Isidro airfield to the ISZ, and also trapped a majority of the Constitutionalist forces in the southern section of the city called Ciudad Nueva, eliminating any chance of Constitutionalist victory, or the possibility to escape the city and start an armed insurgency in the countryside. Much like the Soviet Union erected the Berlin Wall in 1961 splitting the city, the US military split Santo Domingo.

Completion of the LOC brought the first prolonged violent engagements between US forces and the Constitutionlists. However, those engagements ended after the Constitutionalist offensive on June 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup>. After the offensive, seen as the last gasp of the Constitutionalist cause, the US expanded civil affairs operations and civil action programs around the Dominican Republic. US military personnel conducted all civil affairs in the Dominican Republic as the Latin American contingents of the Inter-American Peacekeeping Force (IAPF) provided only combat troops to operate in a police capacity throughout sections of Santo Domingo. The use of Latin American troops in a police capacity allowed the US to withdraw troops and allowed Latin American troops to engage with Dominican civilians to demonstrate multinational aspects of the coalition. The civil action programs remained aimed at manipulating Dominican civilians in and outside of the capital city through the duration of the occupation. While the US conducted those operations, the Latin American units remained in the capital city due to

the US military's desire for strict control of the message and programs conducted for Dominican civilians.

To aid the intervention's humanitarian perception the US advocated for the formation of the Inter-American Peacekeeping Force (IAPF), which formed on May 6, 1965 under control of the Organization of American States (OAS). Created in 1948, the OAS provides a place where the nations of the western hemisphere meet to discuss relations and policies. The OAS originally formed to promote the unity of the American nations and to defend their sovereignty and independence. The US military interventions of the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century heavily impacted the creation of the OAS and the language used in the founding charter sought to protect American nations from US intervention. Some Latin American nations, such as Mexico and Uruguay, still grew concerned that the US wanted to use the OAS as a western hemisphere North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that was created in 1947. That apprehension led member nations to use the OAS to speak out against US neo-imperialist interventionist policies. At present there are thirty-five nations within the OAS including the US and the Dominican Republic. After the initial intervention by the US military the OAS worked with the US in an attempt to take control of the situation. Member nations created humanitarian aid packages consisting of food and medical supplies, however, some member crafted resolutions that denounced the US intervention and called for an immediate withdrawal. In a second bid to control the situation the OAS worked with the US to deploy negotiators and to create the IAPF.

The idea for a joint American force originated with the creation of the OAS and received support from the US to deter "intrahemispheric conflicts, discourage pro-

Communist tendencies, promote security within Latin American countries, and, in the event of a hemispheric crisis, obviate unilateral US intervention.”<sup>5</sup> Essentially, the US wanted the creation of the coalition to avoid a situation like the Dominican intervention. However, the apprehension toward the creation of the OAS carried over to the joint American force as member nations grew concerned the US would use the force to promote US interventionist policies. The establishment of an inter-American force in 1965 did not originate without controversy. The initial unilateral US military intervention in the Dominican civil war angered many nations within the OAS with long histories of US political, economic, and military intervention such as Mexico, Uruguay, and Guatemala. The US campaigned hard for a joint American coalition to deploy to the Dominican Republic and pushed the humanitarian aspect of the mission. The OAS eventually approved the creation of the force but the initial unilateral intervention, along with other nation specific domestic reasons, led to Brazil, Honduras, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador as the only OAS member nations to join the US in creating the IAPF. While technically falling under the authority of the OAS, the United States remained the primary nation through providing the majority of troops and supplies for the duration of the intervention, allowing the US to maintain control over the perception of the military’s actions.

The establishment of the IAPF and turning over operational command to the OAS allowed the US, on the surface, to distance itself from having direct influence on the intervention. United States troops that served under Brazilian General Hugo Panasco

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<sup>5</sup> Yates, *Power Pack*, 146.

Alvim remained a controversial topic among US military commanders. General Bruce Palmer Jr., commander of US forces in the Dominican Republic and deputy commander of the IAPF, advocated that a US general should have maintained command over the unified force, and that “in the Dominican Republic, the United States for the ‘first time in its history,’ Palmer contended, had turned over field command of its combat forces to a foreign officer. That ‘serious error’ should never be repeated.”<sup>6</sup> Palmer’s concern stemmed from the possibility that the US units lost operational capability to act quickly under a foreign commander and joint hierarchy. US Government and military leaders assured Palmer that the US military commanders still had the ability to act when required to carry out the mission. On May 29, 1965 General Alvim assumed command of the international force and answered directly to the OAS Secretary General. While other international organizations, such as the United Nations, had advisors in the Dominican Republic, General Alvim and the OAS Secretary General “served notice that the OAS, not the UN, was going to call the shots in the Dominican crisis.”<sup>7</sup> While the IAPF provided the intervention with an international banner, the US remained in control of the intervention through the political negotiations, and by providing the international force with over half its personnel, and all logistical support. The US negotiators also circumvented General Alvim to seek advice from General Palmer, and to maintain US control of the operation.

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<sup>6</sup> Yates, *Power Pack*, 156; this was not the first time US combat troops turned over field command to a foreign officer. During World War I, US combat troops served under British and French officers, and during World War II some units served under British officers in Europe.

<sup>7</sup> Yates, *Power Pack*, 159.

The development of the LOC and the arrival of Latin American forces saw combat operations decline and the situation transitioned into a military occupation of Santo Domingo. Similar to the transition of Berlin at the end of World War II. The Marines withdrew fully by June 7, 1965 leaving the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne as the only US force in the city. As the situation transitioned to an occupation, relations between Dominican citizens and US troops resembled a roller coaster of emotions that depended on the reception of aid and the conduct of soldiers. Peacekeeping duty included strict rules of engagement for US forces and created situations where “combat operations would be defensive in nature and that soldiers would engage in a variety of activities normally performed by civilian agencies and officials.”<sup>8</sup> The Latin American troops under the IAPF had more lenient rules of engagement, compared to US soldiers, that led to more conflicts between those troops and Dominican civilians. Those conflicts caused problems for US troops attempting to forge relations with the Dominican population.

Like the Latin American troops, the US military experienced a variety of conflicts between soldiers and Dominican civilians. Many of the confrontations between Dominican citizens and US troops occurred at military check points, and depended on the neighborhood; middle and upper class neighborhoods tended to be friendlier to US forces, while poorer neighborhoods resented the US presence and manipulation of Dominican affairs as lower class neighborhoods tended to side with the Constitutionals

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<sup>8</sup> Yates, *Power Pack*, 119.

and the left leaning political parties in the Dominican Republic.<sup>9</sup> The Constitutionals resented the IAPF controlling movement, especially of weapons, throughout the city. They developed a number of tactics for moving weapons including the use of women, sniper diversions, funerals, and the city's sewer system. Many of these tactics generated contempt between the civilian population and US troops as US troops opened and searched coffins, and searched women. To prevent the use of sewers, US personnel rigged booby traps, and at times engaged in gunfights, or hand to hand combat beneath the city.<sup>10</sup>

The tactics employed by US military personnel required the development of more civil action programs throughout Santo Domingo to offset the impression of an aggressive foreign occupation. The development and use of civil action programs allowed US military personnel to minimize the impact of strong-arm tactics and make the case that the US military helped average Dominicans, many of whom had experienced extreme hardship during the civil war. While civic action programs helped the Dominican population directly through humanitarian aid programs, civil affairs worked with Dominican political structures and leaders to restart Dominican institutions which shut down due to the violence. The operation of government institutions gave Dominicans places to receive medical aid outside of US facilities and provided a foundation for Dominicans to find jobs or reopen places of business. The US military and government wanted life to return to normal as soon as possible for the Dominican people as US

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<sup>9</sup> Major Jack Ringler and Henry Shaw Jr, *US Marine Corps Operations in the Dominican Republic April-June 1965* (Washington D.C.: Historical Division Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1970), 38.

<sup>10</sup> Yates, *Power Pack*, 128.

personnel believed the return to normalcy ensured added stability while political negotiations took place. However, the return to normalcy allowed the US military to remove the population from the political environment through providing humanitarian aid and taking away peoples' interest in the leftist political promises through taking care of their needs.

The withdrawal of US troops from the Dominican Republic began with the withdrawal of the Marines in June and continued until total withdrawal in September 1966. The first stage of US troop withdrawals occurred when the Latin American units concluded US supervised training and deployed to occupy parts of the Line of Communication. After Joaquin Balaguer, the same individual who served alongside Ramfis Trujillo, won the presidency over the previously ousted president Juan Bosch on June 1, 1966, general stability continued throughout the city and the withdrawal of foreign troops increased. However, occasional violence still occurred, usually in the form of riots against the occupation, or isolated bombings and shootings. Overall, US forces suffered twenty-seven soldiers killed in action, and one-hundred seventy-two wounded, while the Dominican population suffered over three thousand casualties. While not as prolonged or violent as Vietnam the Dominican intervention represented the successful use of non-traditional military tactics. The use of civil affairs and civil action programs steeped in humanitarianism stabilized the Dominican political environment culminating in political elections that resulted in the establishment of a pro-US government. While the election of Joaquin Balaguer led to a US friendly government it also led to the return of authoritarianism to the Dominican Republic. Balaguer ruled the government for ten years with his own level of brutality. However, after the 1965 intervention the Dominican

Republic never faced another crisis like the civil war, or the possible creation of a communist government.

US Army historians have provided the most in-depth analysis of military actions during the Dominican intervention. Lawrence Yates' *Power Pack: US Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966*, is the first of these publications, and provides in depth detail of the military actions and maneuvers conducted over the course of the intervention.<sup>11</sup> Yates' book gives a blow by blow account of the combat and occupation activities undertaken by the army units deployed to the Dominican Republic. The second official history publication is Major Lawrence M. Greenberg's *United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations in the 1965 Dominican Intervention*, which supplies an analysis of the US Army operations within the IAPF during the course of the intervention.<sup>12</sup> Maj. Greenberg details the political and military contributions by the US and other Latin American nations as well as the main problems and benefits found within the IAPF. Major Jack Ringler and Henry Shaw Jr.'s *US Marine Corps Operations in the Dominican Republic, April-June 1965* provides a narrative of the US Marine Corps' actions in the Dominican Republic, and further discusses lessons learned from the operation.<sup>13</sup> These three publications are essential to understand the military's actions and perceptions during the intervention. However, they offer a primarily narrative based account with only analysis of upper level commanders and highlighting everyday

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<sup>11</sup> Yates, *Power Pack*, 1988.

<sup>12</sup> Major Lawrence M. Greenberg, *United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention* (Washington D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 1987).

<sup>13</sup> Ringler and Shaw, *US Marine Corps*, 1970.

routines, while not illustrating the variety of situations and circumstances. What this dissertation seeks to discuss is the conflict that occurred among the different levels of command within the military on how to handle humanitarian situations, and to add to the foundation by further analyzing the depth and complexity of those issues.

Furthering the discussion of the military's role, and seeking to determine whether the US military remained neutral, Herbert Schoonmaker argues that "one must study the entire 18 months of American participation in the Dominican intervention to answer such controversial questions as whether United States policy was truly neutral."<sup>14</sup> Classified military records limit Schoonmaker's analysis, which uses military periodicals, and accounts of military actions created by journalists, or non-military observers. Even with the limited sources Schoonmaker provides a detailed account of the overall military actions during the intervention, and a useful beginning to understanding the military's role within the political events. Bruce Palmer Jr.'s *Intervention in the Caribbean*, discusses the commanding general's experiences from a military and diplomatic point of view, and elaborates on the relationships and strategies incorporated by US forces and the IAPF.<sup>15</sup> These two works provide further in depth information on the military activities during the Dominican intervention outside of official government publications. However, the declassification of records allows for a further study and provides a clearer picture of military civil affairs policies and civil action programs, highlighting how the US military

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<sup>14</sup> Herbert Schoonmaker, "United States Military Forces in the Dominican Crisis of 1965" (PhD Dissertation, University of Georgia, 1977), 184.

<sup>15</sup> General Bruce Palmer Jr, *Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965* (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1987).

attempted turned the Dominican population away from leftist political groups during the political negotiations.

Foreign policy perspectives dominate the analysis of the 1965 Dominican intervention, with specific focus on the reason for intervening, and how President Johnson's policy fits within the 1960s and the Cold War. Abraham Lowenthal's *The Dominican Intervention* searches "for other explanations of the US government's response to the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic...to help account for one particular set of occurrences, comprising the massive US armed intervention in Santo Domingo."<sup>16</sup> Lowenthal agreed that containment and the prevention of a second Cuba acted as the catalysts for intervention, however he believes those reasons do not account for the massive US response of over 20,000 soldiers and Marines. Piero Gleijeses provides some informative clues in *The Dominican Crisis*, which provides a fully covered background of events in the Dominican Republic leading up to the intervention. Gleijeses paints a picture of the Dominican Republic searching for a political identity after Trujillo's assassination while carefully navigating the elements of US influence and control but stops short of providing a full account and analysis of the intervention. The US government never ceased attempting to control the political activities within the Dominican Republic. A thorough analysis of the US military and government actions in the Dominican intervention illustrates the neo-imperialist policies of humanitarianism and occupation demonstrated in the political negotiations overseen by US diplomats and the tactics of the civil affairs and civil action programs. While differences exist regarding

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<sup>16</sup> Abraham Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 5.

the cause, political scientists and historians agree on the complex nature of the intervention. Yale Ferguson describes this “bewildering complexity” of the intervention and how “the Johnson Administration’s lack of candor in explaining US actions...that many aspects of the crisis still remain highly controversial.”<sup>17</sup> Much of the literature during the 1960s and early 1970s provided an analysis on how the intervention impacted foreign policy, domestic policy, and the carrying out of military interventions.

Ferguson elaborates on the complexity by comparing the Dominican intervention to the Soviet Union’s intervention in Czechoslovakia. Viewing the US influence in the Caribbean reflecting the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe political scientists see the US remaining more democratic in its actions rather than relying on military violence. These political scientists, such as Jerome Slater, further emphasized that both nations had options to settle the crisis peacefully through negotiation, but the Soviets chose to use military force. However, Ferguson explains that “Washington did ultimately opt for a negotiated settlement, but the United States also initially gave serious thought to a military ‘solution,’ and went so far in this regard as to allow the Imbert junta to massacre the constitutionalists’ northern sector.”<sup>18</sup> Ferguson goes further in his comparison by explaining that “if one believes that the totalitarian potential in the constitutionalist movement was minimal, or even virtually nonexistent, it hardly matters whether the state

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<sup>17</sup> Yale Ferguson, “The Dominican Intervention of 1965: Recent Interpretations,” *International Organization* 27, no. 4 (Autumn 1973): 518.

<sup>18</sup> Ferguson, “The Dominican Intervention,” 539; Jerome Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution*, (New York: Harper Row, 1970).

crushing a democratic revolution was itself democratic or dictatorial.”<sup>19</sup> The comparative aspects in the literature of the 1960s and 1970s leads to further research in the 1980s on military interventions and foreign policy implications. Analyzing the US military’s use of civil affairs and civil action programs allows for further building on Ferguson’s comments on democratic and dictatorial actions. During the Cold War both the Soviet Union and the United States demonstrated control of their respective spheres of influence. Whereas the Soviet Union opted for military tactics heavy on violence and suppression. The Dominican intervention illustrates how the US opted for occupation and humanitarian aid in situations of instability or crisis and relied on those strategies to forge pro-US governments. The US government may have sought for the Dominican people to control their government democratically, but the US military’s actions attempted to control the Dominican peoples’ options.

Historians and political scientists studying interventions have found it useful to compare the 1965 Dominican intervention to US interventions before and during the Cold War rather than to make comparisons to Vietnam. Walter Soderlund analyzed the 1916 and 1965 US occupations of the Dominican Republic to “highlight linkages between international and domestic politics in the Caribbean area” and to “point out the manner in which this relationship has changed over time as well.”<sup>20</sup> Each intervention, as well as other interventions in the Caribbean region developed from security, humanitarian, and economic interests, and all played a role in the 1965 Dominican intervention.<sup>21</sup> H.W.

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<sup>19</sup> Ferguson, “The Dominican Intervention,” 539.

<sup>20</sup> Walter Soderlund. “United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic 1916 and 1965: A Comparative Case Study.” *NS, Northsouth* 2, no. 3/4 (1977): 87.

<sup>21</sup> Soderlund, “A Comparative Case Study,” 88.

Brands demonstrates that “in each of the three interventions [Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada], the decision to send in troops was made against a background of instability. This instability was both regional and local; in each case local turmoil was a reflection, and in some ways a distillation, of regional troubles.”<sup>22</sup> The Dominican Republic illustrates this case, especially as a reflection of US policy and reputation not only in the region but around the world. The multiple factors included anti-American riots in Latin America and the Caribbean that began in the late 1950s, the instability caused by the assassination of Trujillo, and the Cuban Revolution. International aspects such as the situation in Vietnam and the occupation of Berlin influenced the reaction to the Dominican civil war. For the Johnson administration the crisis in the Dominican Republic represented the US government’s struggle to intervene without obvious pursuit of foreign policy goals.<sup>23</sup> The US saw the IAPF coalition as an effective tool to solve this problem, as well as reducing US military presence in the Dominican Republic.

Comparisons between the 1965 Dominican intervention and other interventions of the Cold War illustrate how the US sought the continuation of stability around the world and how the fear of instability motivated the US to act militarily. In 1965, instability and a humanitarian crisis prompted US neo-imperialist action in the Dominican Republic using historically tested justifications such as defending US citizens, US property and humanitarianism.

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<sup>22</sup> H.W. Brands. “Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada,” *Political Science Quarterly* 102, no. 4 (Winter 1987-1988): 608.

<sup>23</sup> Brands, “Decisions,” 614.

The Dominican intervention also carries similarities to the US occupation of Berlin after World War II. Ernest May describes how after the war the US developed itself as the city's protector meaning the US "committed to economic recovery and political rehabilitation of both Berlin and Germany."<sup>24</sup> This same situation played out in the Dominican Republic where the US saw itself as the protector of not only Santo Domingo but the entire nation and provided humanitarian aid while rebuilding the political institutions of the nation. The comparison between the Dominican Republic and Berlin continue when in 1966 President Johnson advocated that peace and stability remained the primary goals in Berlin, but that those goals "did not imply abandonment of the ideals of national self-determination and individual freedom of choice."<sup>25</sup> Again this is similar to the situation that occurred in the Dominican Republic as the Johnson administration wanted stability but believed that the Dominican Republic had the ability to choose its own political future. In this way Santo Domingo and the Dominican Republic act as a parallel situation playing out in the occupation of Germany. The situation where the capital city of both nations experienced the US facing communist adversaries through a wall or barricade that divided the opposing factions.

Researching the diplomatic practices and implications of the Dominican intervention evolved throughout the 1980s and 1990s as declassified political documents allowed historians to provide an in-depth analysis of the strategies and issues regarding the negotiating process. The first of these contributions is from Quinten Kelso, who

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<sup>24</sup> Ernest R. May, "America's Berlin: Heart of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 4 (Jul.-Aug., 1998): 149.

<sup>25</sup> May, "America's Berlin," 158.

analyzed declassified material with “the purpose of evaluating these materials in order that a more comprehensive judgement could be offered which would better document the ramifications of the United States’ involvement in the Dominican crisis.”<sup>26</sup> The recently declassified material allows for a more complete discussion of US policy and perceptions during the Dominican intervention. However, the materials brings Kelso to the unsurprising conclusion that the US diplomatic representatives did not act in a fully neutral manner, and fell far short of the expectations of the US government, and Dominican people.<sup>27</sup> Peter Felten argues “the dynamics of US-Dominican relations thus should not be viewed simplistically or statically as a superpower exercising authority over its helpless neighbor. Rather, Washington generally held the preponderance of power, but Dominicans used their leverage to direct the course of events... Washington sketched the outlines; Dominicans filled in the details.”<sup>28</sup> Felten’s contribution of including the Dominicans into the story is crucial to understanding the political nature of the intervention, and that it took a number of attempts before the US understood the role the Dominican population played in the politics of their own country. The works of Kelso and Felten complement each other as they further the discussion of US intervention diplomacy by offering new methods and perceptions. Looking at how the US military used humanitarianism to diminish the Dominican populations’ interest in a leftist government provides insight into the military’s political role in the intervention. Both

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<sup>26</sup> Quinten Allen Kelso, “The Dominican Crisis: a new appraisal” (PhD Dissertation, University of Colorado, 1982), iii.

<sup>27</sup> Kelso, “The Dominican Crisis,” iv.

<sup>28</sup> Peter Felten, “The 1965-1966 United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic” (PhD Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1995), iv.

Kelso and Felten primarily analyze the diplomatic elements of the intervention by focusing on the OAS negotiations while only adding limited supplemental information regarding the US military. While Felten points out that Dominicans participated politically, this dissertation seeks to discuss how the civil affairs and civil action programs conducted by the US military turned the Dominican population from supporting leftist policies to supporting a pro-US government.

Kelso's work also points out that information regarding the intervention is still going through the declassification process. This causes an issue within the historiography illustrated by Felten's critique of Jerome Slater, explaining how Slater's "privileged access to classified US records means that he does not cite specific evidence to support many of his conclusions. Readers...are left to trust Slater's interpretations on blind faith."<sup>29</sup> In 2003, the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library declassified presidential telephone conversations regarding the Dominican intervention. These tapes "reveal that Johnson was more responsible than previously thought for the intelligence failures and hasty decision-making that marked the intervention," where previously much of the blame fell on the ambassador and intelligence agencies.<sup>30</sup> The continuing declassification of diplomatic and military sources facilitates new observations, and declassified military documents provide further insight into the military operations in the Dominican Republic. Further showcasing how civil affairs and civil action programs-built relationships with the Dominican people, and how the military operated alongside

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<sup>29</sup> Felten, "United States Intervention," vi.

<sup>30</sup> Alan McPherson, "Mislead by Himself: What the Johnson Tapes Reveal About the Dominican Intervention of 1965," *Latin American Research Review* 38, no. 2 (2003): 129.

the ongoing political negotiations. Continuing to use declassified information in 2006, Stephen Rabe's article argues that while "Johnson emphasized the multilateral nature of the concern about communism in the Dominican Republic, the invasion was a unilateral action...The military intervention violated Article 15 of the charter of the OAS," which prohibits states from intervening in the affairs of other states illustrating US thinking towards preserving its reputation of supporting allies, acting unilaterally, and dedication to containment.<sup>31</sup> The continuing release of documents, and the growing information on the Dominican intervention gained from the declassified material may not change the argument related to the cause or reasoning behind the intervention. However, the materials allow for a further understanding of military policies during humanitarian endeavors, and how the development of civil affairs and civil action programs impacted perceptions among the international world of the Cold War.

The Dominican intervention has a role in expanding the international perspective of US history and US military history. Mary Dudziak's *Cold War Civil Rights* illustrates how "American history plays out in a transnational frame. The international context structures relationships between 'domestic' actors...This suggests that an international perspective does not simply 'fill in' the story of American history, but changes its terms."<sup>32</sup> The Vietnam War provides an example of how international history can impact events within domestic US history illustrated in the anti-war movement. However, while

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<sup>31</sup> Stephen Rabe, "The Johnson Doctrine," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1, Presidential Doctrines (Mar., 2006): 57.

<sup>32</sup> Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: race and the image of American democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 17.

the Vietnam War carried the most influential impact on domestic affairs, highlighting the Dominican intervention details how other events outside of Vietnam impacted affairs within the United States. The military's mission in the Dominican Republic appeared in national headlines over Vietnam in the early phase of the intervention, Phil Ochs sang about the intervention, and the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) formed as a direct response to the Dominican intervention.<sup>33</sup> Elements of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne also demonstrated the international impacts on domestic affairs, as the unit served in a peace keeping capacity in the Dominican Republic, and later deployed to Detroit during the 1968 race riot. The peace keeping mission in the Dominican Republic provided the paratroopers that deployed to Detroit with experience in peace keeping and operating under strict rules of engagement. The Dominican intervention serves as an example of how US military functioned as an occupation force that carried out the humanitarian policies to support the goals of the US government.

Smaller military actions, such as the Dominican intervention, also provide perspectives and opinions overlooked when analyzing a larger military operation, such as Vietnam. Mary Renda's *Taking Haiti* discusses how World War One concerned the US much more than the 1915 to 1932 occupation of Haiti. Renda further describes events occurring in the US as "over 4 million US workers went on strike, race riots racked the nation, and the US Senate finally approved woman suffrage," and asks the question "How, then, should the first occupation of Haiti by the United States figure in the larger

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<sup>33</sup> The Phil Ochs song "The Shores of Santo Domingo" is about the military intervention, and calls attention to the history of the US military invading the Dominican Republic.

picture of US history?”<sup>34</sup> Large scale protracted conflicts carried enormous influence on the military and society, but small conflicts provided just as much influence, especially when the US military operates in a humanitarian, or non-war like, capacity. Mentioned throughout the historiography of US interventions

the rhetoric of paternalism had its roots in the changing social organization of gender and race in the United States. It appealed to deeply ingrained sets of beliefs about righteous masculinity, feminine domesticity, and white race privilege precisely at a time when the racial dimension of the US American gender ideologies was coming to the surface and when racial and gender hierarchies were being challenged in multiple ways.<sup>35</sup>

The situation in 1965 reflected many of these same characteristics; the Civil Rights Act passed in 1964, the Voting Rights Act in 1965, followed by the Immigration and Nationality Act, and a few months later the Watts Riot erupted in Los Angeles, followed by race riots throughout the country.

Paternalism’s relevance during the Cold War took center stage during the military’s humanitarian intervention in the Dominican Republic. Paternalism in the Dominican Republic was displayed when Ambassador Tapley Bennett described that his primary problem “was keeping the little president from coming over and sitting in my lap everyday” when referring to Donald Reid Cabral’s attempt to maintain power before the civil war.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore Colonel Muller, Deputy Chief of Staff of the IAPF, illustrated paternalism during a fourth of July speech at IAPF Headquarters that stated “we may be confident that the concept that has brought us here, the belief that good neighbors have

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<sup>34</sup> Mary Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of US Imperialism, 1915-1940* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 30.

<sup>35</sup> Renda, *Taking Haiti*, 321.

<sup>36</sup> Yates, *Power Pack*, 21.

the right and the duty to help another in times of great trouble is also a just and enduring concept that in time will come to be accepted by all in the family of American nations.”<sup>37</sup> Analyzing the paternalism prevalent within the US military and within the humanitarian aid provided during the intervention illustrates the use of this ideology as a justification of the intervention as well as the relationship between the US military and the Dominican population.

There has also been an increase in scholarly activity regarding the role of armed interventions and armed humanitarianism, especially with the increasing humanitarian roles performed by militaries throughout the world. However, these histories have primarily analyzed the foreign policy perspective of the humanitarian actions rather than analyzing how militaries conducted humanitarian operations. Joe Bryan discusses military humanitarianism by analyzing the 2008 humanitarian mission conducted by the *USS Kearsarge* to Nicaragua. Bryan points out that “US military involvement in humanitarianism is often rationalized in terms of universal moral duty to preserve life and prevent suffering.”<sup>38</sup> Similar sentiments occurred during the military intervention in the Dominican Republic as the military viewed its mission as protecting the Dominican population from the violence of the civil war. However, when the military acts within a humanitarian environment those actions may always be viewed skeptically as Michael

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<sup>37</sup> IAPF Bulletin No. 1, August 4, 1965; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 23 May 1965-20 September 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>38</sup> Joe Bryan, “War Without End? Military Humanitarianism and the Limits of Biopolitical Approaches to Security in Central America and the Caribbean,” *Political Geography* 47 (2015) 33.

Pugh points out that even though “military forces might aspire to...principles of impartiality and neutrality...as agents of government or inter-government policy” their actions will always be viewed in terms of impacting the political situation.<sup>39</sup> Military involvement in humanitarian endeavors has increased since the end of the Cold War. Analyzing military humanitarianism during the Cold War demonstrates the military’s tactics during humanitarian endeavors to support US foreign policy goals.

Interactions between Dominican civilians and US military personnel were vital to the creation of civil affairs programs. The US military supported a variety of humanitarian aid missions including medical and infrastructure operations in order to promote good relations. During the Dominican intervention the US primarily provided medical equipment, food and water, while taking on the role of medical professionals due to the high numbers that left the city during fighting. Military personnel also sought to rebuild Dominican health institutions and provided assistance to the average Dominican citizen. Describing humanitarian assistance in Vietnam, Heather Stur’s *Beyond Combat* discusses how the need to reinforce “paternalistic images of the Vietnamese as victims in need of the gunslinger’s protection, numerous stories highlighted soldiers’ work with Vietnamese children and families” in newspapers and other public periodicals.<sup>40</sup> Reflecting the situation in Vietnam and the occupation in Berlin, US troops occupied the Dominican Republic for the humanitarian reason of protecting Dominican civilians from the violence perpetrated by the Constitutionlists. Fulfilling the mission of containing the

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<sup>39</sup> Michael Pugh, “Military Intervention and Humanitarian Action: Trends and Issues,” *Disasters* 22, 4 (1998) 341.

<sup>40</sup> Heather Stur, *Beyond Combat: women and gender in the Vietnam War era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Nook Edition, 183.

spread of Communism and providing the conditions necessary to form a stable government illustrated the influence of paternalism on the intervention. A military occupation is the ultimate act of paternalism even when the occupation includes humanitarian aid. This is partially due to US influence but the OAS wanted “to show the world that the American states can and should find a solution to their difficult problems.”<sup>41</sup> However, this statement refers to the OAS as an organization, not to individual nations controlling their own affairs.

The relationship between Dominican citizens and the US military changed as the military intervention transitioned into a military occupation. The occupation operated as an “encounter and a process” as “two cultures within one geographical space” interacted with each other in multiple situations with multiple outcomes.<sup>42</sup> This is highlighted during the Dominican intervention as there included not only militaries from a variety of nations but also humanitarian organizations, and other non-military government agencies. The development of pieced together US bases, or US controlled zones, aided in the interaction of these cultures. The operations the US military conducted to benefit its own personnel did not only impact the military members but also the surrounding community. Cynthia Enloe describes how “each of the men and women—civilian and military—deployed to each base has relationships that extend beyond that base...which affect how that man or woman thinks about what he or she is doing there.”<sup>43</sup> This is fully illustrated

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<sup>41</sup> IAPF Bulletin No. 1, August 4, 1965; NACP.

<sup>42</sup> Renda, *Taking Haiti*, 39.

<sup>43</sup> Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: making feminist sense of international politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) Nook edition, 115.

in the Dominican Republic due to the different number of organizations present all with different ideas of their roles and responsibilities. The variety of organizations included the Peace Corps, the OAS, the United Nations, private organizations, and other non-governmental actors. The Peace Corps, especially, operated a number of clinics and schools within the poorer neighborhoods and the rural towns of the Dominican Republic. The Peace Corps volunteers, and US military personnel operated parallel programs with the same goals of improving the US image and providing humanitarian aid to turn the population away from leftist political organizations.

The Dominican intervention created a situation where the US military conducted humanitarian operations to stabilize the Dominican political environment leading to the creation of a pro-US government. The situation required adaptation to navigate the humanitarian requirements, but the US military also found itself constricted in the humanitarian endeavors due to military regulations. Military culture focuses “not on ideology but on military practices and the basic assumptions behind them. These habitual practices, default programs, hidden assumptions, and unreflected cognitive frames” produce reactions when in a military situation.<sup>44</sup> An analysis on the practices of civil affairs and civil action programs rather than the ideology behind them allows researchers to see the changes and adaptations within the military when confronted with situations that lay outside the military’s realm, such as humanitarian activities.

In the Dominican Republic, the military required many investigations and debates relating to the carrying out of civil affairs and civil action programs in a humanitarian

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<sup>44</sup> Isabel Hull, *Absolute Destruction: military culture and the practices of war in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 2.

capacity. While at the same time trying to decide what actions did not endanger the humanitarian perception of the intervention but also led to the completion of the stability mission. Wayne Lee describes how a “cultural analysis in military history should connect that ‘idea template’ to wartime behavior, while recognizing that there may be different templates at different levels within the military and the political leadership.”<sup>45</sup> This aspect is illuminated through analyzing how the different levels of command and the different military offices viewed the role of the military in humanitarian activities. Some levels of the command believed the military should be able to render aid regardless of responsibility. While other levels and offices believed that rendering aid in certain circumstances, humanitarian or not, led to legal culpability or a taking on of too many endeavors. Civil affairs and civil action programs in the Dominican Republic showcased the complexity of the military’s situation and demonstrated that what commanders wanted to do remained different from what they actually did or were able to accomplish. Those actions also provide issues for comparison of how the US military acted during occupations around the world during the Cold War.

Chapter one examines civil affairs and civil action projects while also demonstrating the variety of roles civil affairs played in the Dominican Republic during the intervention. Since traditional military operations, including combat actions, made up a small part of the intervention civil affairs took on a different and more primary role. This chapter describes the influence civil affairs units carried on the Johnson

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<sup>45</sup> Wayne Lee, “Mind and Matter—Cultural Analysis in American Military History: a look at the state of the field,” *The Journal of American History* 93, no. 4 (Mar. 2007): 1119.

administration's attempts to stabilize the Dominican Republic outside of the political negotiations and how those units demonstrated humanitarian actions. The administration funneled money into the Dominican Republic and the role of civil affairs remained to ensure that Dominican institutions operated in a capacity that the money benefitted the nation. Civil affairs operators also conducted counter terrorism assignments in the capital city. After the signing of the ceasefire in September 1965, many left and right-wing political groups conducted terrorism and assassinations of political opponents. US troops did not escape the attacks, as political groups attacked American soldiers in restaurants, cafes, and on the streets throughout the city. The civil affairs units attempted to turn the Dominican population away from radical groups and worked with Dominican institutions and the IAPF to stop the attacks. Those descriptions illustrate the large tasks under the umbrella of civil affairs throughout the Dominican intervention, but also illuminates the military's success in removing the Dominican population from the unstable political environment.

Chapter two analyzes the US military's claims services during the intervention. The claims services of the US military are placed under the civil affairs in this dissertation due to the attempted use of claims as part of humanitarian aid. Claims services existed alongside other civil affairs and civil action programs to provide financial aid to the Dominican people. The claims services sought to distance US military responsibility regarding destruction of homes or injuries suffered by Dominican citizens. However, while the role of claims services was supposed to help Dominicans in their plight, army regulations made that job difficult as claims resulting from combat injuries experienced rejection, and the military passed claims over to the OAS and IAPF, or

settled for a lesser amount of money. There also existed instances where the claims services and the US military sought to control how Dominicans used the claims money by making sure it was spent on the damage leading to the claim rather than on how Dominicans wanted to spend it, such as improvement of their homes. This chapter seeks to portray the different sides of the claims process and the difficulty in adjudicating claims where the military wished to provide aid but remained unable to do so due to the regulations and possible liability.

Chapter three discusses the medical aid mission undertaken in the Dominican Republic, which served to alleviate the public health humanitarian crisis. The medical aid missions were the first priority of the US military when the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne first landed in the Dominican Republic and saw the military make medical deployments top priority over combat deployment, angering senior level military officers. After the initial stage of fighting the US military conducted medical programs throughout the neighborhoods of Santo Domingo providing free medical care to all Dominican civilians. As the intervention grew in duration, however, the US military started to scale back the medical missions and started to use civil affairs units to restart the Dominican medical institutions. The military's use of humanitarianism sought to diminish the populations' interest in a leftist government and to bolster support for the pro-US government. The military further pushed this by turning down Dominican requests for medical treatment at US facilities outside of the Dominican Republic. However, the military did treat high ranking Dominican officers and government officials at US facilities in Puerto Rico demonstrating a discrepancy in how the military treated people deemed essential and non-essential to the mission. The medical humanitarian aid provided by the US military

provides an analysis into how the military used medical aid and controlled who received the aid.

Chapter Four examines the use of recreation and entertainment activities such as baseball and band concerts as part of the civil action programs conducted by the US military. Baseball has a long history as the most popular sport in the Dominican Republic, and the US military sought to use that history to their advantage while creating youth baseball leagues to keep Dominican youth away from radical political groups. US Army band concerts also served as a vital component of the civil action programs as the concerts sought to improve the relationship between the Dominican population and the US military and to decrease interest in leftist political activities. The US military successfully used baseball and music to connect with the Dominican people and created a favorable environment for the establishment of a pro-US government.

Chapter five analyzes the relationship between the Peace Corps and the US military during the intervention. The Peace Corps first sent volunteers to the Dominican Republic in 1963. Many of the volunteers served in poor neighborhoods in Santo Domingo that became Constitutionalist strong holds during the civil war. Some volunteers served in hospitals behind Constitutionalist lines, drove ambulances that came under fire from Loyalist soldiers, and provided medical treatment to Constitutionlists wounded fighting against US soldiers. The Peace Corps, as an independent government organization, conducted parallel programs alongside the military to improve the US image and to turn the population away from leftist organizations. The Johnson Administration also pondered the idea of sending hundreds of Peace Corps volunteers to the Dominican Republic to replace US military personnel to offset the perception of an

aggressive military intervention. The Peace Corps for their part fought back against that type of use and many volunteers wondered whether the Peace Corps managed to maintain their independence. The Dominican intervention represented the first time the Peace Corps and the US military operated in the same nation and carried a lasting impact on the two organizations.

The 1965 Dominican intervention has largely been left out of the debate regarding military actions during the Cold War or left as a footnote. However, the Dominican intervention provides an interesting case of a situation where the US military relied on civil affairs and civil action programs more than combat efficiency. It was also a situation that saw the military adopt humanitarianism to turn the population away from a leftist style government, and to establish the environment for a permanent pro-US government. The Dominican intervention may have only lasted a year and half but the invaluable insight into how the military operated in a humanitarian capacity during an occupation offers a number of new perspectives. Especially into military humanitarian endeavors and occupations during the Cold War.

## CHAPTER II – CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

In the afternoon of July 17, 1966, a group of enlisted IAPF soldiers, believed to be American due to use of the word “Yankee” in the watchman’s report, boarded the Norwegian cargo ship “Gimlekollem,” an oil tanker docked in Santo Domingo.<sup>46</sup> A Dominican watchman on duty attempted to stop the group, but the soldiers, not permitted on the ship in the first place, threatened to throw the watchmen overboard. Wanting to prevent a serious confrontation a crewman of the “Gimlekollem” asked the watchman to allow the soldiers to board. Once on the ship the soldiers started to drink and smoke, which the watchman believed dangerous due to the ship transporting fuel. Also seeing this behavior, the ship’s crewman, who originally allowed the soldiers to board, urged the soldiers to leave. At this point the soldiers continued their hostility, and again threatened to throw both men overboard. Finally, a US officer intervened and ordered the men off the ship. However, the watchman later reported that another group of US soldiers, attempted to board the ship while hurling threats, but eventually left the area on their own.

This event illustrates the public relations task of the US civil affairs officer and the bureaucratic difficulties of conducting civil affairs as the complaint had to work through the multiple levels of command before reaching the civil affairs officer’s desk. The complaint moved through various levels of hierarchy from the Watchmens’ Group, a

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<sup>46</sup> Letter from Santiago Espinal Rincon to Watchmans’ Group, July 18, 1966; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Civil Action Reference Papers, 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

local workers union, to the Customs Collector's Office, to the General Ports Director, to the Finance Minister, to the IAPF Commander, and finally landing on the desk of the Civil Affairs officer. The civil affairs office (J-5) of the US Forces Dominican Republic (USFORDOMREP) received the complaint on August 2, 1966, which then forwarded the complaint to the Provost Marshall's Office for further investigation. The investigation eventually ended on August 31, 1966 "due to the fact that the incident took place some six weeks ago, further investigation at this time is not recommended, unless more specific information can be provided by persons directly involved in the incident."<sup>47</sup> The event, the following complaint and investigation represented various interactions civil affairs officers had to navigate between US soldiers with Dominican civilians and how those interactions impacted the image of the US military.

Handling the "Gimlekollem" incident and serving as a liaison between the US military and elements of the Dominican government represented only one among many responsibilities the civil affairs office held throughout the intervention. Civil affairs' main priority remained restarting the Dominican institutions that provided services, such as electricity, medical services, and garbage collection. However, during the intervention civil affairs experienced a broadening of responsibilities. In a message to US forces regarding the creation of the Inter-American Peacekeeping Force (IAPF) Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer Jr, outlining the mission of ensuring a stable, pro-American Dominican government, said "the mission outlined is a difficult, complex and

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<sup>47</sup> Letter from General Robert Linvill to CG IAPF, date; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Civil Action Reference Papers, 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

sensitive...each of us holds the reputation of our country in his hands” and to “present your best in appearance, conduct and performance of duty.”<sup>48</sup> The responsibilities of the civil affairs office required every point outlined by General Palmer during the intervention, from humanitarian aid, to public relations, to community liaison. Those responsibilities fall into line with historical duties of civil affairs within the military, which started as its own separate unit during World War II when US commanders needed to deal with the liberated populations in the formerly occupied towns and cities. With the onset of the Cold War civil affairs joined the Special Forces branches as the military along with the US government realized the military had to portray a softer side under certain circumstances to win the support of the local population. The job of civil affairs in the Dominican Republic remained throughout the intervention to manipulate the population through a winning the hearts and minds strategy.

This chapter argues that US Army conducted a wide variety of humanitarian civic action programs and civil affairs projects across all aspects of the intervention to create the environment necessary to establish a pro-US government. This relates to the overall argument illustrating the elaborate programs the US military developed successfully used to diminish Dominican population interest in a leftist government and that those programs developed support for a pro-US government. Those diverse programs included providing food and water to the local population, conducting psychological operations,

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<sup>48</sup> Palmer Letter on creation of IAPF, May 29, 1965; 205-02 United States Army Element, Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Publication Record Set, General Orders, 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

and participating in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency whenever necessary. This chapter also discusses the Civil Affairs branch of the IAPF. While US army officers commanded the IAPF Civil Affairs branch and closely cooperated with the USFORDOMREP Civil Affairs the branch engaged in operations as a separate entity under a separate chain of command. Operating under a separate chain of command allowed the IAPF Civil Affairs branch to coordinate civil affairs and civil action programs across the IAPF with those conducted by US forces. However, IAPF civil affairs and civic action programs almost always operated with US personnel and with US supplies allowing the US to maintain control over the branch.

The first month of the intervention, from April 28 until May 31, involved most combat actions and the pinnacle of the humanitarian crisis regarding the availability of food, water, and medical aid. The primary task of civil affairs involved the humanitarian mission of food and water distribution to the population of Santo Domingo. In the Dominican Republic's humanitarian crisis the lack of food and water due to the closure of stores and distribution centers, and the shutting down of water treatment facilities, illustrated how "hunger remained an irrational element, turning citizens into mobs and giving demagogues license."<sup>49</sup> The situation in Santo Domingo, and the growing instability provided a humanitarian excuse for the US to intervene militarily.

The Organization of American States (OAS) meeting of foreign ministers passed a declaration on May 2, 1965 recognizing the humanitarian crisis and allowing OAS member nations to send food and other humanitarian aid supplies to the strife ridden

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<sup>49</sup> Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 7.

country. The US government understood the importance of the OAS declaration to provide a humanitarian perspective in a city wrecked by conflict, and in a region with a long contentious history of US intervention. With no centralized government existing in the Dominican Republic the US military started food and water distribution programs to stabilize the situation and turn down the political passions of the population. The programs also attempted to isolate the small percentage of political radicals by providing aid to their potential followers. The emphasis on food and water programs throughout the intervention and subsequent occupation illustrated that “hunger and poverty were no longer seen as the universal human condition but as a danger to international stability.”<sup>50</sup> Understanding this factor, from April 28, 1965 to June 31, 1966 the US military conducted an operation with parallels to the Berlin Airlift that delivered “1,451 tons of food supplies...this includes over 663 tons of rice, 155 tons of powdered milk, 147 tons of beans, 108 tons of cooking oil, 96 tons of flour, 76 tons of wheat, 195 tons of corn meal, and 7 tons of baby food.”<sup>51</sup> 2nd Battalion, 325th Infantry Regiment assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division handled a food distribution program from May 31 to September 25, 1965 and described the process as:

An orderly procedure was developed to distribute this food once a week. The was broken down into small bags and placed on trucks the night prior to the distribution. Concertina wire was placed in the distribution area in such a manner as to force the civilians to form orderly lines. Dominican National Police assisted

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<sup>50</sup> Cullather, *Hungry World*, 8.

<sup>51</sup> Military Civic Action and Community Relations Projects Performed by the United States Forces, Dominican Republic, 28 April 1965-21 June 1966; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Military Civic Action and Community Relations Projects, 1966; Unit Records During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

in controlling the crowd which numbered 700-1000. Hand megaphones were also utilized to give instructions to the crowd. Approximately 20 soldiers and 12 Dominican policemen were needed to effectively control the crowd, check the food cards, and distribute.<sup>52</sup>

While the conflict remained largely isolated to the capital city food distribution to rural areas maintained the humanitarian aid operations and ensured the population in those areas did not revolt or join the political conflict raging in the capital. Even in the city, the food distribution programs targeted not only people but also animals, as seen with a food program aimed towards abandoned animals at the Santo Domingo Zoo, further illustrating the humanitarian aspects of the military operation. By the end of the intervention the US military distributed over 30 million pounds of food throughout the Dominican Republic.<sup>53</sup>

United States' use of humanitarianism in the Dominican Republic to prevent a communist friendly government continued the use of occupation forces and humanitarian aid during the Cold War that originated with the occupation of Berlin and the Berlin Airlift. As a part of that policy the Dominican military intervention remained a major issue among Latin American representatives in the OAS due to concerns the US returned to the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century military interventionist policy. In an attempt to gain support, the US termed the intervention in a humanitarian perspective at the OAS for a higher probability to create an Inter-American force, or at least to receive Latin American

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<sup>52</sup> After Action Report 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 325<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment; 206-05 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion (Airborne), 325<sup>th</sup> Infantry, 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade, 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, Command Reports, After Action Reports, 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 26; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>53</sup> Andrew Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 209.

contingents to carry out roles “in addition, policing cease fire and handling refugees such contingents could also be helpful in humanitarian work, distribution of food and medical supplies in Santo Domingo and throughout the country.”<sup>54</sup> The US government also attempted to differentiate this military action from past interventions, and to “make it clear that our [US] soldiers do other things besides fire weapons at Dominicans.”<sup>55</sup> For this instance the provision humanitarian aid drew on added importance to show not just the region, but the world the US intervened to prevent a humanitarian disaster, not just for political reasons. However, the humanitarian aid provided during the initial months was always a tactic to control the Dominican population and to stop the formation of a communist government.

Economic aid to the Dominican government to restart the economy operated as another control tactic by US government. While distribution of food and water served as one tactic to bring stability back to Santo Domingo and avert a communist takeover. The other primary tactic rested in getting the nation’s economy up and running again and to fund civil affairs and community projects. The situation remained bleak into the first month of the intervention as the Constitutionals, under the command of Colonel Francisco Caamano, a former officer in the Dominican military, held the Ciudad Nueva district of downtown Santo Domingo, the primary financial district for the city. Both the Loyalist and Constitutionalist factions refused to negotiate with the other, and residents

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<sup>54</sup> Outgoing Telegram 2101, May 2, 1965; POL 23-9 Rebellion, Coups, Dominican Republic; Classified Central Subject Files, 1963-1975; Record Group 84; Box 44; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>55</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964-1968, Vol. XXXII: Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, Guyana, eds. Daniel Lawler and Carolyn Yee (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2005), Document 51.

of Santo Domingo lived in a state of occupation by two opposing forces. During this period the US conducted negotiations to end the conflict and set up a government with the goal of holding official elections after the situation stabilized. However, both factions did not agree on the individuals nominated for government positions as each side wanted their own personnel and feared retaliation without the realization of their conditions.

Due to the state of political negotiations to create a permanent government, jumpstarting the economy remained an important factor in returning the capital city to a period of normalcy. In response the US government sent a team of economists led by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony Solomon. Solomon pointed out that “the major offices downtown” controlled by the Constitutionals “contain the books and records, and when a business does not have books and records, it is going to do less business,” such as receiving loans from banks and providing work for the unemployed.<sup>56</sup> One tactic around this problem suggested by the US Embassy was to provide capital to Dominican businesses in the form of a loan, but this option aided money leaving the Dominican Republic when the population desperately needed money to stay in the country.<sup>57</sup> The solution called for the US to provide credit to Dominican banks, which can then be urged to extend credit to Dominican businesses.<sup>58</sup> Getting the economy up and running presented a huge humanitarian issue for the US government. While the military did not carry a strong hand in the economic revitalization efforts the

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<sup>56</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, Guyana*, eds. Daniel Lawler and Carolyn Yee (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), Document 104.

<sup>57</sup> FRUS, Document 104.

<sup>58</sup> FRUS, Document 104.

success of those efforts impacted the military civil affairs programs by diminishing interest in leftist political programs. The economic revitalization helped the military by stabilizing the political and financial environment and eased the military's job of lessening interest in leftists' political proposals.

On November 17, 1965 President Johnson approved a large aid package for further economic recovery of the Dominican Republic. The package called for fifty million dollars covering fiscal year 1965 and 1966 "of assistance to reduce political and economic pressures" in order to move forward with government elections and the withdrawal of IAPF forces in 1966.<sup>59</sup> The aid package provided the Dominican government the opportunity to create for itself a level of stability that provided employment within the Dominican government. The package also contributed to the financing of civil affairs and community projects operated by the US military alongside Dominican government personnel. Ten million of the initial fifty million provided went to community projects in early 1966 such as refurbishing ports, building irrigation, road maintenance, and other projects that provided employment, which aided "more importantly to siphon off potential dissidents from political activity."<sup>60</sup> The US government believed that providing employment for Dominican citizens took them away from political groups through giving them a job funded by the Dominican government also making them dependent on the government, thereby bringing a level of stability by removing the incentive to rebel against the government. Providing economic aid on top of

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<sup>59</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, Guyana*, eds. Daniel Lawler and Carolyn Yee (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), Document 143.

<sup>60</sup> FRUS, Document 143.

military civil affairs operations allowed for a two-pronged attack on the primary issues preventing stability such as politicization of the population and the humanitarian crisis. Those humanitarian aid initiatives allowed the US to provide a humanitarian face to the intervention that covered the use of military force and for US and OAS negotiators to end the conflict between the Loyalist and Constitutionalist factions.

Psychological warfare operations during the intervention assisted humanitarian aid through providing information to the Dominican population on where to find aid but also through countering Constitutionalist propaganda against the US military. Throughout the intervention the civil affairs office monitored radio stations to gather information related to the propaganda of the Loyalists and Constitutionlists. Working alongside the US Army's Intelligence branch (J2) the Civil Affairs branch provided reports to the US Forces, Dominican Republic (USFORDOMREP) commanding general on the daily reporting from radio stations and newspapers in the country. Keeping tabs on the media and running propaganda fell under the 1<sup>st</sup> Psychological Warfare Battalion, which operated under the J5 (Civil Affairs) branch and went against normal procedure as the unit usually operated under J3 (Operations).<sup>61</sup> Along with being placed under the J5 command, the psychological operations unit worked closely with the US Information Agency (USIA) to disseminate information regarding the purpose and mission of the intervention in the Dominican Republic. The USIA created the information and the battalion distributed the information to the Dominican population. The primary reason for this was "during the rapid developments at the height of the [Dominican Republic] crisis,

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<sup>61</sup> United States Department of the Army, *Stability Operations: Dominican Republic*, Volume II, Psychological Warfare, 4.

it was necessary to achieve instant reactions in consonance with the immediate situation. The USIA had the current knowledge and understanding of the target audience to fulfill this essential requirement” of immediately stating the reason for the US intervention and portrayed the US military in a positive and humanitarian light to stabilize the situation.<sup>62</sup>

The USIA worked with the J5 to present reports to the USFORDOMREP commanding general that regarded the variety of radio stations and provided information about the stations’ primary listeners. In a report dated November 15, 1965 from the USFORDOMREP J5 to the Chief of Staff, the J5 provided news summaries from Radio Commercial, Radio Universal, and Radio Military.<sup>63</sup> Radio Commercial, one of the left leaning stations in Santo Domingo, reported that the “Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) has appealed to all political, labor, professional and student associations to continue the struggle for the achievement of sovereignty and the withdrawal of the occupation troops from the country.”<sup>64</sup> This was one of the standard Constitutionalist messages played over the radio and demonstrated the need for expanded humanitarian operations through civil affairs and civic action programs to diminish the Dominican peoples’ interest in leftist policies and into supporting the presence of the US military in the nation.

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<sup>62</sup> United States Department of the Army, *Stability Operations: Dominican Republic*, Volume II, Psychological Warfare, 4.

<sup>63</sup> Early Morning News Summary, November 15, 1965; 501-01 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-2, Intelligence Administration Files, 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 3; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>64</sup> Early Morning News Summary, November 15, 1965; NACP.

From the beginning of the intervention and into the subsequent occupation psychological operations and propaganda efforts took a position of immense importance within the USFORDOMREP and later the IAPF. In the first month of the intervention the US sent out one million six hundred and forty one copies of propaganda sheets that varied in content from a “List of Communists” (accounting for twenty-five thousand copies), to “Why Americans are Here” (accounting for a hundred thousand copies), to “Baseball Scores” (accounting for twenty-thousand copies).<sup>65</sup> Those statistics illustrated that the US understood the importance of the informational campaign against the Constitutionalist faction in the Dominican Republic. A campaign not only waged for the pacification and support of the Dominican population but also for the support of the world.

Not all pro-US propaganda received approval by the US government or support the US’s mission. In one instance a Department of State telegram stated that “we have report that Wessin y Wessin [commander of the Loyalist faction] is doing all he can to promote idea that US Government is supporting him to associate himself with US operation in Dominican Republic. In your discretion you should do what you can to convince Wessin y Wessin that it is neither in his interest nor ours for him to become over-identified with US at this point” the telegram concluded with words of advice regarding the General that said “it would be particularly helpful if he could be persuaded

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<sup>65</sup> United States Department of the Army, *Stability Operations: Dominican Republic*, Volume II, Psychological Warfare, Inclosure 3.

to stop playing the ‘Star Spangled Banner’ over San Isidro Radio Station.”<sup>66</sup> Wessin y Wessin’s propaganda decisions endangered the US image of remaining neutral, at least publicly, not to mention that a majority of the Dominican population saw Wessin y Wessin as everything wrong with the Dominican military. He was a leftover from the Trujillo government and had been one of the 1963 coup’s leaders that ousted Juan Bosch, the democratically elected president of the Dominican Republic for eight months before the coup.

The Constitutionalist did not back down from the battle over the image of the intervention and the US psychological operations unit had to stand ready to counter any information put out by the Constitutionalist that damaged the US mission. On one occasion in a Department of State telegram, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the US forces to “employ all available resources to jam rebel radio broadcasts in the DOMREP to the maximum extent consistent with maintaining essential SIGINT [Signal Intelligence] collection capabilities” with the next point directly underneath stating “queries and/or accusations regarding US radio jamming are to be flatly denied.”<sup>67</sup> For the first month of the occupation two themes dominated the Constitutionalist propaganda messages: pro-Constitution and Anti-US sentiment. Along the pro-constitution line Constitutionalist stated that “The citizens of the Dominican Republic

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<sup>66</sup> Outgoing Telegram 753, May 2, 1965; POL 23-9 Rebellion, Coups, Dominican Republic; Classified Central Subject Files, 1963-1975; Record Group 84; Box 44; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>67</sup> Incoming Telegram, May 2, 1965; POL 23-9 Rebellion, Coups, Dominican Republic; Classified Central Subject Files, 1963-1975; Record Group 84; Box 44; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

are fighting to eliminate dictatorship, drive out the Yankee invaders, and re-establish the Constitutional Democracy of 1963.”<sup>68</sup>This statement illustrated Constitutionalist attempts to push their ideology by giving the Dominican population a reason for the violence, the ultimate goal of the fighting, and stated that a victory was taken away by the interference of the United States military. In the anti-US message, the Constitutionlists stated that “Ambassador Bennett and VOA [Voice of America] have lied to the President and the American people. In response to these lies, President Johnson sent troops to halt a democratic revolution. The US troops, in support of the tyranny of San Isidro, have committed atrocities against the Dominican people, especially the women. These troops must withdraw.”<sup>69</sup>The message focused on the actions of the US troops and as psychological operations personnel commented “a clever distinction is made between the American who are maintaining the peace and those who will continue to send food, financial supplies, and medical aid to the Dominican Republic. Ambassador Bennett and US troops in-country are attacked but the US homeland receives gentler treatment.”<sup>70</sup> The mention of San Isidro, the base of Loyalist forces, further illustrated why US personnel wanted Wessin y Wessin to stop playing the “Star Spangled Banner” over the radio. Much of the propaganda created by the psychological operations unit dealt with those two themes pushed by the Constitutionlists through informing the population of the

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<sup>68</sup> United States Department of the Army, *Stability Operations: Dominican Republic*, Volume II, Psychological Warfare, Inclosure 6.

<sup>69</sup> United States Department of the Army, *Stability Operations: Dominican Republic*, Volume II, Psychological Warfare, Inclosure 6.

<sup>70</sup> United States Department of the Army, *Stability Operations: Dominican Republic*, Volume II, Psychological Warfare, Inclosure 6.

humanitarian operations of the intervention and relayed messages that the Constitutionlists answered to foreign communist influencers rather than popular Dominican leaders. By the end of the first month the 1st Psychological Operations Battalion disseminated over two million copies of printed material, spent almost seven hundred hours on radio propaganda, and conducted close to two hundred air and ground loudspeaker missions demonstrating the importance of the media and propaganda to turn the Dominican population away from support leftist political organizations.<sup>71</sup>

The signing of the Act of Reconciliation on August 30, 1965 created the Provisional Government headed by Hector Garcia-Godoy, a Dominican politician approved by both the Constitutionalist and Loyalist factions and called for national elections the following year. The IAPF, including US forces, supported the Provisional Government and considered combat actions over due to the end of Constitutionalist legitimacy. The declaration ended the civil war, reunified Santo Domingo, and allowed the re-establishment of the Dominican police force. However, severe schisms still lingered on both sides, and both Loyalists and Constitutionlists commenced a campaign of terrorism throughout Santo Domingo in order to continue the conflict and influence the upcoming elections. In response to the increased terrorist activity the US forces increased the amount of humanitarian aid projects to further restrict the spread of radical political ideologies.

To highlight the increased terrorist actions occurring in the Dominican Republic by both left- and right-wing groups the Intelligence Chief of Staff of US Forces (J2)

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<sup>71</sup> United States Department of the Army, *Stability Operations: Dominican Republic*, Volume II, Psychological Warfare, Inclosure 8.

produced a report on November 16, 1965 that detailed the many different forms of terrorist actions. This report provided the best insight into how the US military viewed and investigated the actions of terrorism after the signing of the Act of Reconciliation.<sup>72</sup> The report illustrated how “predictions about the occurrence of terrorism are risky simply because terrorism is not a mass movement, but carried out by a very small group of people...conditions certainly deserve to be investigated, but accident undoubtedly plays a great role.”<sup>73</sup> It is also difficult to name the groups behind a terrorist attack, especially with the many different factions that existed in the Dominican Republic, but the report does provide details from witness statements. The report is broken up into three sub-categories: the first is “terrorist activities,” followed by “activities of sabotage,” and “law and order incidents.”<sup>74</sup> The multiple categories allowed the report to include incidents that cannot be confirmed as terrorist actions and some of those incidents may have occurred due to grudges between individuals for non-political reasons, or due to frustration with a business. Of the forty-four incidents listed in the report seventeen, or thirty-five percent, of them are listed as acts of terrorism, and six of those incidents occurred against US military personnel. One such event occurred on October 3, 1965 when a bomb exploded in a bar used by men from the 504<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment as an enlisted men’s club wounding ten people, six of them US military personnel. While an

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<sup>72</sup> Acts of Terrorism, November 16, 1965; 501-01 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-2, Intelligence Administration Files, 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 3; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>73</sup> Walter Laqueur, “Forward,” in Robert Kupperman and Darrell Trent, *Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response* (Hoover Institute Press: Stanford, 1979), ix.

<sup>74</sup> Acts of Terrorism, November 16, 1965; NACP.

investigation of the incident did not find an individual responsible leftist and communist groups received blame for the attack.<sup>75</sup>

While left-wing terrorist activities took the primary focus, right-wing terrorism also concerned the US military as a continuing threat to stability throughout the Dominican Republic. The US military already had a difficult task in controlling the Loyalist faction of the Dominican armed forces led by General Elias Wessin y Wessin. This task grew more difficult due to the relationships between fervent anti-Communist commanders within the US military and the IAPF. An example involved the relationship between Brazilian General Hugo Panasco Alvim, the commanding general of the IAPF, and General Robert York, commanding general of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division who bonded over their disdain for the left particularly communism. According to General Bruce Palmer, York “was conservative in his views, and to compromise with the left was not in his nature;” Alvim was also a “rightist and viewed everyone on the rebel side as a card-carrying Communist,” and had a great admiration of the paratroopers.<sup>76</sup> The relationship between the two generals created friction with the Dominican population and made it difficult the IAPF and US forces to maintain the perception of neutrality during the first four months of the intervention.<sup>77</sup> With Alvim and York holding close relations with Loyalist commanders the Constitutionlists did not believe the US or IAPF acted in good faith during the negotiations making progress difficult. However, the issue was soon

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<sup>75</sup> Acts of Terrorism, November 16, 1965; NACP.

<sup>76</sup> Bruce Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky) 80.

<sup>77</sup> Palmer, *Intervention in the Caribbean*, 80.

relieved when General York left the Dominican Republic and the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne to command the Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia.<sup>78</sup> Cutoff from his most ardent supporter General Alvim became easier for General Palmer and the OAS Ad Hoc Committee to control.

After combat activities ceased, Loyalist soldiers continued targeting Constitutionalists thereby ignoring orders from the Provisional Government and allowed for the continued instability of the nation. An intelligence report dated November 13, 1965 titled “Possible Rightwing CEFA Group at San Isidro” illustrated the concern US military commanders had about the formation of right-wing terrorist groups.<sup>79</sup> The report, distributed three days before the “Acts of Terrorism” report described a possible rightwing terrorist group under the leadership of an individual named “El Rubio.”<sup>80</sup> The report defined the goal of this group as to “kill military personnel who were Constitutionalists,” and that the “group dresses in civilian clothing and are armed with pistols” in order to carry out their actions in the city.<sup>81</sup> While maintaining a deep level of concern the J2 also stressed that caution needed to be taken while investigating the claim as “the actual existence of these groups has not been confirmed. It would appear that the San Isidro element may be organized as the name “El Rubio” has been referred to, in the

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<sup>78</sup> In his book General Palmer states that he was not involved with the transfer of General York, but that it certainly made dealing with Alvim and the Loyalist faction easier.

<sup>79</sup> Possible Rightwing CEFA Group at San Isidro, November 13, 1965; 501-01 United States Force, Dominican Republic, J-2, Intelligence Administration Files, 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 3; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>80</sup> Possible Rightwing CEFA Group at San Isidro, November 13, 1965; NACP.

<sup>81</sup> Possible Rightwing CEFA Group at San Isidro, November 13, 1965, NACP.

past, as a source employed by the 82<sup>nd</sup> Abn. Div.,” the same unit commanded by General York who General Palmer grew concerned about due to the close relationships with the Loyalist faction and CEFA commanders.<sup>82</sup> The existence of this group and other right wing terrorist groups threatened the image of the US military and the US military’s control over the population. The continued activities of those groups were counterproductive to the US military mission of turning people away from leftist organizations rather people listened to the leftist messages of a violent occupation. The right-wing terrorists attempts at destabilizing the nation are demonstrated in a kidnapping and murder that occurred in November 1965.

The case involved the targeting of a former Constitutionalist officer by individuals suspected by the US military of belonging to the right-wing terrorist group based at San Isidro and threatened the work toward stability. Details of the case involved the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Luis Arias Collado who was kidnapped by armed civilians on November 1, 1965 and found dead from multiple gunshots on November 3, 1965. A file from the US forces intelligence officer contained a statement from Collado’s wife who said the kidnapers “forced him into their automobile at gunpoint and drove eastward from Duarte Bridge.”<sup>83</sup> It is important to note that CEFA headquarters, the force primarily making up the Loyalist faction, is located at San Isidro, east of Santo Domingo and the Duarte Bridge. Furthermore, the car used in the

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<sup>82</sup> Possible Rightwing CEFA Group at San Isidro, November 13, 1965, NACP.

<sup>83</sup> Kidnapping and Murder of Lewis Arias Collado, November 16, 1965; 501-01 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-2, Intelligence Administration Files, 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 3; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

kidnapping was said to have Dominican Air Force license plates, described as being white numerals with blue background, “which is not only the color scheme of Dominican Air Force vehicles, but also of all DOMREP official vehicles.”<sup>84</sup> The file continued to offer some hypotheses about the individuals behind the abduction which all point to it being a political targeting. Collado was named on a list of deserters from the Dominican army and was also on the list of Constitutionalist soldiers to be placed back into the Dominican military.

The J2 file concluded that while the kidnapping and murder “appears on the surface to be the work of extremist rightists, conceivably involving DOMREP military personnel, the identification of the kidnapers-murderers remains anonymous, and further speculation that the crime was committed by Caamano forces is dangerous in the absence of any proof.”<sup>85</sup> The “further speculation” regarding Caamano forces is in regard to left-wing radical groups that targeted former Constitutionlists for deserting the cause and many of those radicals viewed those men as traitors to the country. This case illustrates the difficulty the US forces and the IAPF faced in attempting to stabilize the situation in Santo Domingo. The evidence demonstrates that this case was not carried out by left-wing but right-wing extremists within the Dominican military. The IAPF and US forces worked closely with the Dominican military and the situation provided increased difficulty for the Army’s Civil Affairs branch to portray the US and IAPF in a positive light, pacify the population, and limit the populations’ exposure to violent political

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<sup>84</sup> Kidnapping and Murder of Lewis Arias Collado, November 16, 1965; NACP.

<sup>85</sup> Kidnapping and Murder of Lewis Arias Collado, November 16, 1965; NACP.

groups. Due to the terrorist activities humanitarian operations to manipulate the Dominican people grew in importance throughout the occupation.

To counter terrorist activities and to stem the growth of extremist groups the Civil Affairs branch reached out to the population through civil affairs projects and community relations projects. While not holding a large role in an investigating capacity the Civil Affairs branch had the ability to make the most impact distancing the US military from the right-wing terrorist actions and continuing to use humanitarian operations to turn the population away from leftist groups. The primary concern remained a stable environment to form a temporary government and to hold national elections leading to a pro-US government. The easiest way to complete this goal was through humanitarian projects meeting the populations' needs such as food and water which diminished the peoples' interest in a leftist government.

The goal of civil affairs in preventing terrorist activities was not through discouraging people from holding political demonstrations but to keep the population from joining the violent extremist groups on the left and right. Providing humanitarian aid or alternative non-political events remained the surest tactic to control the population and the one reason why US personnel conducted civic action programs and performed civil affairs operations.<sup>86</sup> By the early months of 1966, through humanitarian operations the US and IAPF succeeded in limiting terrorist activities and managed a level of

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<sup>86</sup> Compilation of Information of Status of Military Counterinsurgency Programs, July 27, 1966; 501-01 United States Force, Dominican Republic, J-2, Intelligence Administration Files, Periodic Intelligence Reports, 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 3; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

stability. Terrorist actions transitioned to the exception rather than the rule and brought “a cautious optimism with respect to the chances of holding elections on June 1” leading to the formation of a permanent government.<sup>87</sup>

To combat both left- and right-wing terrorism the US military trained elements of the Dominican military in counterinsurgency with a heavy emphasis on civic action programs. In July 1966, the US military conducted counterinsurgency training for the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Dominican Army and two squadrons of the Dominican Air Force emphasizing civil disturbance and riot control. While the “counterinsurgency program conducted by United States Forces was limited to environmental improvement...the actions were highly successful from the point of view of favorable publicity and good will created for the United States Forces.”<sup>88</sup> The civil affairs programs, referred to in the report as counterinsurgency, fell under six categories: construction activities, professional training, medical care, athletics, air freight, and other. In every category the care of children, religious institutions, and road construction accounted for the most projects conducted from July 1965 through June 1966 with many of the projects ongoing at the time of the report. However, working on projects “limited to environmental improvement” does not allow for a deep reconstruction of society or government institutions, instead those projects focused on fixing existing problems of a much smaller capacity. For example,

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<sup>87</sup> “Memorandum From the Representative to the Organization of American States (Bunker) to President Johnson,” March 26, 1966, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, Guyana (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 382.

<sup>88</sup> Compilation of Information of Status of Military Counterinsurgency Programs, July 27, 1966; NACP.

the sub-heading “construction activities” included projects such as repairing a monastery, repairing park benches, road repairs, and multiple pier leveling projects.<sup>89</sup> Those projects did not mean to drastically change the lifestyle of the population but existed as primarily cosmetic changes to aid the everyday issues facing the population and to fix lingering infrastructure problems.<sup>90</sup> Those projects kept the spirit of a humanitarian intervention and US forces relied on civil affairs and community projects to build support among the population for a pro-US government. The projects improved the image of the United States through providing Dominican citizens basic necessities and community improvement. Many of those projects only provided short term stability and satisfaction leaving other long term, more important, projects and reforms to be addressed in the future by the newly elected Dominican government.

The Inter-American Peacekeeping Force (IAPF) activated on May 23, 1965 under a multinational command structure with Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer in temporary command.<sup>91</sup> Six days later Brazilian General Hugo Panasco Alvim took permanent command of the IAPF from General Palmer and organized the unified command staff so

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<sup>89</sup> Compilation of Information of Status of Military Counterinsurgency Programs, July 27, 1966; NACP.

<sup>90</sup> Compilation of Information of Status of Military Counterinsurgency Programs, July 27, 1966; NACP.

<sup>91</sup> IAPF General Orders #1 and General Orders #2, May 29, 1965; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 23 May-30 June 1965; Unit Records Created During Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland. General Palmer only received temporary command of the IAPF while Brazilian General Alvim traveled to the Dominican Republic. The IAPF started as the Inter-American Force, and would undergo a number of name changes until officially receiving the name Inter-American Peacekeeping Force (IAPF).

each of the participating nations obtained a position.<sup>92</sup>The US held the Logistics (C4) and Communications (C6) Chiefs of Staff positions, while Personnel (C1) belonged to Honduras, Intelligence (C2) to Costa Rica, and Operations (C3) to Nicaragua.<sup>93</sup> Nations primarily held onto their respective staff commands and the only change occurred when Paraguay received command of the intelligence office due to having more troops in the Dominican Republic than Costa Rica. A Civil Affairs branch (C5) had not been created at the time of activation but when created the position belonged to a Latin American officer, however, the C5 ended up commanded by an officer from the United States. The US wanted to maintain control of the occupation's civic action programs and civil affairs operations to ease the coordination between the IAPF and US forces during projects.

The primary duty of the IAPF Civil Affairs office was to handle personal claims against the force. IAPF regulations under chapter five, "Rights and Duties of Members of the Force," paragraph thirty contains a detailed description of how the civil affairs office dealt with claims resulting from property damage or personal injury and stated "claims against the Force and its members shall be settled in accordance with procedures provided by the laws and regulations of the participating state or states concerned. But if the claims were as a result of the accomplishment of the mission, such claims should be

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<sup>92</sup> Unit Records, IAPF General Orders #3, May 30, 1965; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 23 May-30 June 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>93</sup> IAPF General Orders #4, May 30, 1965; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 23 May-30 June 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

directed to the OAS.”<sup>94</sup> Reporting claims to the OAS fell under the accomplishment of the mission due to the OAS legal protection provided to members of the IAPF as OAS agents. Each of the participating nations handled claims differently under different laws. The goal of the regulation, and the IAPF in general, was to offset the cost of settling these claims. The wording “result in the accomplishment of the mission” meant that all claims fell under OAS jurisdiction, however, the US did handle claims against the USFORDOMREP, but many claims filed against the US fell to the IAPF and OAS. How the US handled claims will be discussed in a later chapter.

For the first three months after the IAPF’s creation civil affairs issues mainly fell to the Office of the Secretary of the Combined Staff (SCS) and experienced a number of growing pains in the initial months. Confusion reigned the first few months of the IAPF’s existence as personnel shuffled from job to job with orders requiring translation between Spanish, English, and Portuguese.<sup>95</sup> Many rivalries also existed between the participating nations such as Paraguay and Brazil, and especially regarding the contentious history with the United States. As a response to those issues the IAPF-SCS conducted an internal civil affairs campaign. The campaign functioned as propaganda and built good relations between IAPF members to promote the unified mission. One example was the parties or commemorations centered on holidays, especially patriotic holidays, of the different

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<sup>94</sup> IAPF Regulations chapter 5, paragraph 30; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 1 October-31 December 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>95</sup> Later the IAPF Combined Command only used English and Spanish as Portuguese was deemed too difficult to translate, and a majority of the command’s population spoke Spanish or English.

nations. Usually hosted by the respective nation's commanders those celebrations allowed each nation to demonstrate respect to the other and to show unified support for the mission.

Two examples illustrated the IAPF's internal civil affairs. On July 4, 1965 US Army officers hosted a party to celebrate US independence attended by General Alvim as a guest of honor. During the ceremony Colonel Henry J. Muller, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the IAPF, gave a speech saying "although the purpose of our mission here may be questioned and criticized in some parts of the world---even within our own hemisphere---we may be confident that the concept that has brought us here, the belief that good neighbors have the right and the duty to help another in times of great trouble is also a just and enduring concept that in time will come to be accepted by all in the family of American nations."<sup>96</sup> The use of the term "good neighbors" represented a spin on Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy of the 1930s where the US ceased military intervention in Latin American affairs. However, Colonel Muller suggested that humanitarianism provided a valuable tactic in the western hemisphere to fight against the spread of communism. The phrase "accepted by all in the family of American nations" further illustrated the humanitarian policy shift and expressed the interests of Latin American nations to support those actions. This trend of hosting parties continued and on September 15, 1965 Costa Rican, Honduran, and Nicaraguan commanders hosted a

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<sup>96</sup> Bulletin Number 1 of the Unified Command of the Inter-American Peace Force, August 4, 1965; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 23 May 1965-20 September 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

celebration of their respective nations' independence attended by the US and Brazilian ambassadors as well as General Alvim.<sup>97</sup>

The recognition did not only manifest itself in ceremonies and celebrations targeted towards commanding officers but also in ways that reached the frontline troops serving throughout the IAPF. A popular tactic was to print a speech or letter in the IAPF weekly bulletin circulated to all units under the unified command. In one of these bulletins, an open letter to General Alvim from Colonel Gutierrez, the Nicaraguan IAPF Chief of Staff, congratulated the Brazilian general regarding Brazil's Army Day and in the letter stated "the glories of Brazil are also our own because we are the brothers of America, and we are aware of the important role that your great army has played throughout time and history, up to the present when we have just waged a decisive battle against a common enemy who is trying to enslave us and to take away from us the traditional heritage of the Western Hemisphere and the Faith through which He preached."<sup>98</sup> Colonel Gutierrez continued regarding the mission of the IAPF and stated how all of the nations involved are "engaged in a mission of peace and harmony immolating our blood on the land of Quisqueya so that tranquility and democracy may

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<sup>97</sup> Office of the Secretary of the Combined Staff, Quarterly Historical Report 1 July-30 September 1965, October 1, 1965; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 1 October-31 December 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>98</sup> Bulletin Number 12, HQS, IAPF, August 30, 1965; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 1 October-31 December 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

once more reign over the Dominican Republic invigorated with energy and hope.”<sup>99</sup> The humanitarian message of the intervention appears throughout the unifying message. The IAPF used the US forces message of humanitarianism to manipulate the perception among Latin American troops within the IAPF.

Promoting the coalition and the responsibility of neighbor nations was the primary talking point from the various celebrations and speeches along with humanitarian justification for the intervention and a sense of familial togetherness within the conflict. The notion of familial membership with the mention of brotherhood and neighborly duty to battle the spread of communism throughout Latin America and the Caribbean existed in both Colonel Muller’s speech and Colonel Gutierrez’s letter. When dispersed throughout the IAPF those messages acted as a form of internal civil affairs between the nations, essentially functioning as propaganda. The messages also motivated and educated the troops about their mission so to return to their prospective countries “satisfied with a job well done and with a bigger heart because we have made new friends and we have deepened our love and devotion toward our America.”<sup>100</sup> The IAPF was the first strictly American military coalition to exist outside of NATO and the UN and maintained a sense of unity throughout the occupation. Internal civil affairs ensured that member nations never felt isolated and that all nations contributed to ending the crisis in the Dominican Republic. Those acts demonstrated that the humanitarian programs existed to not turn Dominicans away from leftist organizations, but also to influence how

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<sup>99</sup> Bulletin Number 12, HQS, IAPF, August 30, 1965; NACP.

<sup>100</sup> Bulletin Number 12, HQS, IAPF, August 30, 1965; NACP.

other Latin American citizens perceived the intervention and role of the IAPF as allies standing against communism, similar to the French, British, and US in Berlin.

The IAPF Civil Affairs office aided by the engineers and medical sections conducted humanitarian civil action programs to generate a positive image of the IAPF and pacify the Dominican populations' hostility to the occupation. The engineering section of the IAPF fell under the Logistics branch (C4) commanded by Colonel Herbert B. Erb, also a US Army officer. For the first three months of the IAPF's existence the engineering section operated as a one-man office alongside the US forces' engineering section as an IAPF representative. It was not until August and September that the section operated fully under the IAPF but remained staffed with US officers and the section continued to work closely with US forces engineers. Both branches, civil affairs and logistics, acted as the primary operators during civil affair projects. However, while Latin American engineers held positions within the Logistics branch US Army personnel made up most of the IAPF's engineer section. This allowed the US to maintain heavy US influence over any IAPF engineering or civil affairs projects.

The engineering section of the IAPF remained active throughout the occupation of the capital city by settling real estate contracts and working on civil affairs projects. In handling of real estate contracts the IAPF worked closely with "governmental and private agencies to obtain property rights in completion of the IAPF Stationing Plan facilities requirements," to obtain property for IAPF camps to house IAPF troops primarily the Latin American contingents.<sup>101</sup> Along with those types of transactions the engineering

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<sup>101</sup> Engineer Branch, Logistics, C4, QHR 1 Oct.-31 Dec. 1965; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organization History, 1 October-31 December

section also handled personal property claims from Dominican citizens. The process for filing claims started with a front line unit trained in real estate appraisal and received forms to fill out on sight, and transfer back to the real estate officers.<sup>102</sup> Following the forms reception a claims officer launched an investigation into the claim for legitimacy, if the claim passed investigation it was sent to the OAS attorney working within the C4 office. During the course of the occupation the IAPF engineers fielded ninety-one property claims totaling about RD\$100,820. However, investigations reduced many of the claims with one example of forty-one claims filed between the beginning of April 1966 and the end of June 1966 for RD\$71,047 but claimants only received RD\$24,851.<sup>103</sup> The mass discrepancy illustrated a common complaint discussed throughout the IAPF, OAS, and US forces detailing attempts by Dominican citizens to receive money from all organizations, especially if one or the other rejected the claim. It is difficult to analyze whether the claimants received fair compensation as it appears the IAPF claim forms are not available in the archives.

Alongside of claims the engineering section of the IAPF also worked on a number of civil affairs projects classified as high priority and entered into agreements with institutions of the Dominican government. In January 1966 a water shortage impacted Santo Domingo due to the high population, including US and Latin American troops,

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1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>102</sup> Engineer Branch, Logistics, C4, QHR 1 Oct.-31 Dec. 1965; NACP.

<sup>103</sup> Engineer Branch, Logistics, C4, QHR 1 Apr.-31 Jun. 1966; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 1 April-30 June 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

placing increased strain on the system compounded with the stress from the months long civil war. A member of the engineering section served as a representative for the IAPF on a water conservation and planning committee that included various high ranking members of the Santo Domingo and Dominican government.<sup>104</sup> Working with the committee and a US forces' engineer a plan developed to provide free water to the population hardest hit by the crisis by shipping "a quantity of US Navy cubes with a 1,000-gallon capacity...from the US by surface transportation, and placed to good advantage in selected areas throughout the city. These water tanks would then be serviced by huge military water trailers on a regular basis."<sup>105</sup> The US forces provided the trucks to fill the US provided water tanks.

Throughout the water crisis the IAPF engineer section consistently used US forces equipment and vehicles to aid and complete other projects throughout the city. This is further illustrated by the IAPFs use of US forces' trucks to haul water to local hospitals to aid in cleaning wounds. The trucks also received use to provide water to the IAPF's Latin American units from the Ozama River as a tactic to relieve the city's water system.<sup>106</sup> The humanitarian operations allowed the US to manipulate the situation to control the use of equipment and to promote the US forces role in the occupation. The

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<sup>104</sup> Engineer Branch, C4, Logistics, QHR Jan-Feb 1966; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 1 January-31 March 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland. The members consisted of the Mayor and Fire Chief of Santo Domingo, Director of the National Water Company, senior members of the Dominican military, and a variety of charity groups.

<sup>105</sup> Engineer Section, C4 Logistics Branch, QHR Jan-Feb 1966; NACP.

<sup>106</sup> Engineer Section, C4 Logistics Branch, QHR Jan-Feb 1966; NACP.

water crisis received some relief when heavy rains impacted the Dominican Republic in April and May. However, the rains also caused a crisis when the runoff washed away a four-lane bridge connecting Santo Domingo to the port city of Haina. Conducting another high priority civil affairs project engineers of the IAPF once again turned to the USFORDOMREP for the supply of a M4T6 Tactical Floating Bridge to be constructed over the waterway.<sup>107</sup> The disaster occurred on May 28, 1966 and a couple of weeks later on June 6 a dedication ceremony opened the newly constructed bridge.<sup>108</sup>

Having a US Army officer in charge of the C4 branch commanding the engineering section was no doubt helpful in acquiring U.S forces support in many of the civil affairs projects. However, it was not the IAPF or OAS letters on the side of the trucks but rather US Army or USA. which demonstrated the control the US maintained over both the occupation and the IAPF. Even when US soldiers arrived in vehicles marked with the OEA (Spanish acronym for OAS) letters or wearing OEA armbands many Dominicans still viewed them as US Army soldiers. While no doubt alleviating the water problems and fixing the bridge aided the population of Santo Domingo both incidents helped to pacify and control the population through humanitarianism while not providing a permanent fix for either situation. In the case of the bridge, the Dominican

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<sup>107</sup> During the troop withdrawal the pontoons of the bridge were removed and returned to the US and replaced with a more stable long-term fix.

<sup>108</sup> Engineer Section, C4 Logistics Branch, QHR 1 Apr-31 June 1966; NACP. In attendance of this ceremony was officials of the Dominican government, the US Ambassador, IAPF commanding general and deputy commanding general, and numerous citizens of the Dominican Republic.

government returned the pontoons to the US Army when those units withdrew in September of 1966.

Within the realm of civil affairs, the logistics command signed multiple agreements and contracts with the city of Santo Domingo to improve community relations and to provide security for both the population of the city and IAPF troops. One of these deals was the Reciprocal Fire Protection Agreement signed by the Chief of Staff of the IAPF, Chief of Staff of the US forces and Santo Domingo's Fire Chief.<sup>109</sup> As with other issues within the IAPF's engineering section the only fire department existed within the US forces and contained only English speaking personnel. To resolve this issue the IAPF assigned three Latin American soldiers to the unit to receive training and to act as liaisons between the US Fire unit and Latin American units as well as the Santo Domingo Fire Department. Members of the engineering section also entered into negotiations with the National Water Company and US forces regarding water compensation for the ten months of the occupation and future compensation for the remaining months.<sup>110</sup> The primary issues of the negotiations revolved around the lack of metering and the constantly changing troop strength made it difficult to get accurate information on water usage. USFORDOMREP eventually took over the negotiations and agreed to a deal consisting of a flat monthly rate for water. The Latin American units' portion came out to RD\$5,144.37 which comes out to just over RD\$514 a month.<sup>111</sup> The ability to create contracts with the Dominican government and the Santo Domingo government illustrated

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<sup>109</sup> Engineer Section QHR 1 Jan.-31 Mar 1966; NACP.

<sup>110</sup> Engineer Section QHR 1 Jan.-31 Mar 1966; NACP.

<sup>111</sup> Engineer Section QHR 1 Apr-31 June 1966; NACP.

the IAPF engineering section's role in conducting civil affairs assignments. However, as in previous cases the US forces held a primary role in a very visible capacity making many of the IAPF projects in name only. Working through the IAPF also exemplified the pacification on the population of Santo Domingo without obvious control by the United States and to show the IAPF, controlled by the OAS, as a competent and functioning coalition. This further demonstrated the use of humanitarianism to not only turn Dominican citizens away from leftist organizations but also to create a positive image of the hemispheric coalition.

The IAPF medical section existed alongside the engineers in the C4, logistics branch and took on a number of roles during the occupation, specifically preventative medicine. The head of the medical section held the position of Preventative Medicine Officer with the mission of advising "the Commanding General, IAPF on conditions affecting the health of IAPF personnel," including environmental, epidemiological, sanitary conditions, liaison roles, and preventative medicine.<sup>112</sup> A US military officer, Captain Sunseri, commanded the medical section of the IAPF, which also turned out to be a predominately US led section. Similar with most of the other sections within the C4 command, in the early days of the IAPF medical command contained a staff of three people forcing the section to work closely with US medical units already in the

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<sup>112</sup> Medical Section, C4 Logistics Branch, QHR 1 Jul-31 Sept 1965; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 1 October-31 December 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Dominican Republic.<sup>113</sup> In this working situation the IAPF medical section's two primary problems consisted of sanitation and disease control representing particular problems that required distinct and improvised solutions involving a number of cross unit and command liaison activities.

The issue of sanitation lasted throughout the occupation and required a variety of plans and operations impacting Dominican civilians as well as US and Latin American military personnel. One of the largest operations involved the IAPF medical section working closely with the 714<sup>th</sup> Preventative Medicine Unit in developing a plan to inspect civilian owned restaurants, food processing plants, and slaughter houses for unsanitary conditions that influenced which places IAPF personnel visited within Santo Domingo.<sup>114</sup> These inspections occurred monthly and through the first seven months only six restaurants managed to remain on the approved list: The Carimar, Vesuvio, Embajador Hotel, Mandarin, Italia, and the San Cristobal Hotel. However, of those six only one, The Carimar, received continual food cleanliness due to having "its own chlorinator and its water and locally-made ice are considered potable, having consistently shown an adequate chlorine residual content."<sup>115</sup> Those inspections carried a heavy impact on society as any restaurant not on the approval list remained off limits to IAPF personnel.

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<sup>113</sup> Roster, Headquarters, Inter-American Peacekeeping Force, Dominican Republic; 707-04 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Military Personnel Assignment Files, 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>114</sup> Medical Section, C4 Logistics Branch QHR 1 Jul-31 Sept 1965; NACP.

<sup>115</sup> Medical Section, C4 Logistics Branch QHR 1 Oct-31 Dec 1965; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 1 October-31 December 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Even many of the often-visited bars around the city contained restrictions regarding edible food and inspectors deemed some of the local beer undrinkable. The national brewery's product "El Presidente" made from a private source of water received a passing grade. While a negative ranking hurt local businesses, it remained the business' responsibility to meet the IAPF's sanitary requirements. When considering the economic and institutional impact of the civil war and the continuing violence many of the businesses could not afford or remained unable to reach the IAPF code. That inability left them unable to access the economic possibilities tied to the numerous military personnel in the nation.

A source of unsanitary conditions throughout the occupation remained the increasing garbage problem building up in the streets of Santo Domingo and led to an increasing rodent population throughout the city. Those sanitary issues also existed within the military camps of the IAPF and led to the development of policies and inspections regarding food and other waste disposal. At the beginning of the intervention and subsequent occupation of the city US troops encouraged Dominican citizens to pick up garbage throughout the city. Soldiers aided the work by supplying bulldozers and trucks to transport the garbage to landfills. However, in January 1966 the Dominican Sanitation Department, the department responsible for garbage removal, went on strike leading to a build-up of garbage and an increase in the rodent population.<sup>116</sup> The IAPF medical section stressed to officials of the World Health Organization, acting as advisors

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<sup>116</sup> Medical Section, C4 Logistics Branch QHR 1 Jan-31 Mar 1966; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 1 January-31 March 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

to the Dominican Minister of Public Health, that the situation needed to improve. One way the medical section addressed this issue was through the creation of “IAPF Field Sanitation Teams...organized and trained under the supervision of the IAPF Surgeon.”<sup>117</sup> However successful in reducing waste build-up, garbage issues continued to plague the IAPF and in June 1966 personnel met with officials of the Dominican Ministry of Public Health and discovered a lack of heavy equipment prevented the carrying out of plans for cleanup. Further meetings organized between the IAPF C4 and C5, and US forces J4 and J5 determined adequate solutions to the problem. The solutions included increased training of sanitation teams and providing more heavy equipment to the Dominican Ministry of Public Health.<sup>118</sup> Providing that equipment demonstrated that the pro-US government had the capability to meet the peoples’ needs and undercut the arguments made by leftist organizations.

Immunizations and dealing with diseases took on the other primary portion of the IAPF medical section’s role within the occupation falling under preventative medicine. As a result of the increased rodent problem throughout the city, at the end of June the IAPF immunized all personnel against the plague even though all the rats tested contained no presence of fleas. Malaria and hepatitis also concerned the medical section and both diseases appeared throughout the occupation, malaria the most concerning. Plaguing armies for centuries the transmission of malaria occurs through the anopheline

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<sup>117</sup> Medical Section QHR 1 Jan-31 Mar 1966; NACP.

<sup>118</sup> Medical Section QHR 1 Apr-30 Jun 1966; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 1 April-30 June 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

mosquito which has a heavy presence in the Dominican Republic, and due to the tropical climate, the ability to increase population at a dramatic rate. A breakout of malaria during the occupation brought the very real possibility of an epidemic. U.S and later IAPF officials held great concern regarding US military personnel as “all personnel in the command who have served tours of duty in Vietnam are known to be potential carriers of malaria and therefore possible sources of infection.”<sup>119</sup> This concern took on a new aspect when IAPF medical personnel discussed the possibility of the Vietnam strain of malaria, which “is highly unresponsive to treatment by drugs,” appearing in the Dominican Republic transmitted by US military personnel.<sup>120</sup> If US troop presence led to the outbreak of a Vietnam strain of malaria the situation would not have helped the US image in the Dominican Republic and may have led to further instability. The solution started in December of 1965 when chemical units began an aggressive campaign against the mosquito to diminish the possibility of mosquito borne diseases. This “war” on the mosquito consisted of the spraying of a five percent DDT-Kerosene mixture, the elimination of stagnant water, and select personnel from US and Latin American units received training on the proper techniques of the anti-mosquito program.<sup>121</sup> The successful strategy prevented an epidemic breaking out and infections of malaria remained at a low level throughout the occupation.

While malaria generated great concern among the IAPF medical section the real threat appeared in the form of hepatitis, which infected forty-six military personnel

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<sup>119</sup> Unit Records, Medical Section, C4 Logistics QHR 1 Oct-31 Dec 1965; NACP.

<sup>120</sup> Medical Section QHR 1 Jan-31 Mar 1966; NACP.

<sup>121</sup> Medical Section QHR 1 Oct-31 Dec 1965; NACP.

throughout the first eight months of the intervention and subsequent occupation.<sup>122</sup> The cases of hepatitis appeared especially among soldiers stationed along the Line of Communication and among primarily US military personnel. It was not until the end of December 1965 that a Nicaraguan soldier developed a case of hepatitis.<sup>123</sup> The IAPF medical section dealt with the spread of the disease by administering gamma globulin to those infected and to those most at risk. When the Nicaraguan soldier developed hepatitis gamma globulin was administered to the entire Nicaraguan contingent. Headquarters, IAPF and a majority of IAPF personnel received two rounds of gamma globulin treatment that resulted in greatly reduced cases during the occupation and as “a result of this experience, gamma globulin has been made an immunization requirement for military personnel assigned to the Dominican Republic, and the same policy would be recommended for any area wherein the incidence of infectious hepatitis is significantly high.”<sup>124</sup> However, while not known at the time of immunization gamma globulin is now known to be a transmitter of Hepatitis C, which was not discovered until the 1980s, but is believed to have existed as far back as the 1940s. It is unknown whether or not any of the IAPF military personnel or Dominican citizens developed Hepatitis C from the gamma globulin immunizations, but as early as the 1980s the US government recommended people be tested for the disease to receive treatment if necessary.

The headquarters of the IAPF also employed many Dominican citizens during the occupation and the high concern of hepatitis placed many of those employees under the

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<sup>122</sup> Medical Section QHR 1 Oct-31 Dec 1965; NACP.

<sup>123</sup> Medical Section QHR 1 Oct-31 Dec 1965; NACP.

<sup>124</sup> Medical Section QHR 1 Jan-31 Mar 1966; NACP.

microscope of the IAPF medical section. One of the employment requirements for Dominican citizens working for the IAPF consisted of a medical examination. In order to adhere to the policy of medical examinations all Dominican citizens working in the employ of the IAPF received “extensive chest x-ray” exams. Many of the exams turned up no existence of hepatitis they did reveal one case of lung disease resulting in the employee referred to the Dominican Republic’s Social Security hospital for further treatment.<sup>125</sup> The discovery of any type of disease related illness further testified that “a policy of pre-employment examinations” should be required to gain employment within the IAPF facilities.<sup>126</sup> While these examinations aided the Dominican population seeking employment opportunities the examinations also discovered other illnesses allowing the individual to seek treatment. The medical examinations of possible IAPF employees gave the appearance of a dual reasoned humanitarian project, however, the IAPF medical section, under US personnel, used the examinations to control who received a job within the IAPF offices and to protect IAPF personnel.

From its creation the IAPF found itself in a difficult position regarding the possibilities and limitations of the organization within humanitarian civil affairs programs and community projects. On the one hand the IAPF operated as the first official military coalition in the western hemisphere outside of NATO and the UN. The force conducted many operations to portray competency and unification but remained heavily reliant on the US forces for personnel and equipment to carry out those operations. It did not help matters that even in IAPF operations many of the vehicles provided carried USA

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<sup>125</sup> Medical Section QHR 1 Oct-31 Dec 1965; NACP.

<sup>126</sup> Medical Section QHR 1 Oct-31 Dec 1965; NACP.

markings, while this was later remedied by adding OEA markings or armbands many Dominican citizens recognized US influence. The logistics and civil affairs branches continued working closely with their counterparts within US forces which allowed operations to run smoothly but also influenced the perception of the civil affairs operations. The humanitarian projects and operations undertaken did not have long term implications. Rather the programs sought to turn the population away from leftist organizations and provide stability long enough to establish a stable pro-US government. Meaningful and lasting reforms remained unfinished and left to the permanent Dominican government after the dissolution of the IAPF and withdrawal of military forces.

Those actions and operations illustrated the diversity of roles civil affairs offices experienced and the multiple challenges faced at all levels of the command whether within the US forces or the IAPF. Civil affairs projects required extensive coordination between the different branches such as Logistics and Civil Affairs and services within the respective branches such as medical and engineers. The civic action programs and the civil affairs operations sought to build support for a pro-US government while turning people away from leftist organization and activities. This chapter offers a brief glance across a wide spectrum at the general civil affairs involved in the Dominican Republic and illustrates the importance of those operations to creating stability in the strife ridden country. The chapter also demonstrates how the US military successfully used humanitarianism to build support among Dominican population for a permanent pro-US government, and to influence the perception the OAS and IAPF. That use of

humanitarianism successfully decreased Dominican interest for a leftist government and led to stable environment for the development of US friendly Dominican government.

### CHAPTER III - CLAIMS SERVICES

On May 1, 1965 US Marines came under sniper fire while manning a barricade at the intersection of Concepcion Bona and Pimentel Streets in Santo Domingo, and in response the marines returned fire.<sup>127</sup> At the same time, Maria de los Angeles Ogando, a young woman living in a house at the intersection, heard the shooting and ran to close her door, but as she closed the door a bullet fired from the Marine position struck her face, destroying part of her jaw.<sup>128</sup> Senorita Ogando remained in the hospital for three and a half months receiving medical treatment, but required plastic surgery for the wound to fully heal. She filed a claim with the US Army Claims Services for fifty-thousand dollars, but the US army rejected her claim due to her wound occurring from combat actions. The army only accepted claims regarding injuries or destruction of property that occurred outside of combat actions due to the belief that combat occurred during the completion of the mission not due to an accident. Durward Sandifer, a representative of the Inter American Commission on Human Rights, located within the OAS, sent a letter to Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer regarding Ogando's situation. It is unknown if General Palmer saw the letter, but the nature of the injury and the circumstances caught the attention of USFORDOMREP Chief of Staff General Linvill. From that point forward, Ogando's case blossomed into a bureaucratic debate illustrating the complexities of how the US Army dealt with personal and property claims throughout the intervention.

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<sup>127</sup> Letter from Durward Sandifer to Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, November 25, 1965; file name; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8, National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>128</sup> Sandifer to Palmer, November 25, 1965; NACP.

The primary duties of the US Army Claims Service involved handling issues arising from Dominican citizens regarding personal injury and property damage resulting from US military activities. The service was created during World War II to handle claims resulting from the confiscation or destruction of personal property in the liberated towns and cities. Located within the US Army Judge Advocate General (JAG) the claims teams investigated the validity of cases and determined the approval or rejection of claims. During the US intervention in the Dominican Republic claims officers handled 690 claims between January 1, 1966 and September 19, 1966. Of those, the army paid 323 claims amounting to over two hundred thousand dollars over the course of the seven months.<sup>129</sup> The payment of claims allowed US forces to avoid further liability regarding damages since the US held a dubious claim to intervene in the Dominican civil war under the laws and regulations within the OAS charter relating to non-intervention and not violating a nation's sovereignty. That issue may have potentially led to Dominican citizens suing the US government for personal damages. The claims also functioned as a form of humanitarianism to appease the Dominican population in order to further pacification efforts and develop positive relationships.

The foundation for the US Army's handling claims from Dominican citizens resides in the Foreign Claims Act within Title 10 of the US Code regarding military affairs and activities outside the continental US and its territories. Passed in 1946 due to the damage inflicted on civilian populations during World War II, the Foreign Claims Act states that an employee of the armed forces acting on a claims committee may settle

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<sup>129</sup> United States Department of the Army, *Stability Operations: Dominican Republic*, Vol. II, Judge Advocate General, inclosure 3.

claims from foreign citizens of no more than one-hundred thousand dollars. Those claims resulted from personal property damage or personal injury and death if “the damage, loss, personal injury, or death occurs outside the United States, or the Commonwealths or possessions, and is caused by, or is otherwise incident to noncombat activities of, the armed forces” however, the claim will be rejected if the damage, injury, or death occurred during combat activities.<sup>130</sup>

While the Foreign Claims Act allowed US forces to settle claims in order to build positive relations with the local population and to stabilize and pacify the situation there existed severe restrictions through the rejection of claims originating from combat activities. Rejecting claims resulting from combat activities was not a new phenomenon within military activities and followed a “precedent from a long line of international law primarily dealing with the doctrine of sovereign immunity,” which is the idea that a state cannot assume responsibility for the damages caused during military activities without waiving their immunity from other actions.<sup>131</sup> Those precedents in US history occurred during the Civil War when union forces occupied southern homes, during the Philippine Insurrection when US troops damaged local property, and the occupations of Haiti in 1914 and the Dominican Republic in 1916. The urban setting during the Dominican intervention led to the buildup of claims and the US military failed responded slowly to the massive filings. However, as the occupation progressed the claims service rejected a

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<sup>130</sup> Foreign Claims Act, US Code 10 (1946) §§ 2734 et seq.

<sup>131</sup> Jordan Walerstein, “Coping with Combat Claims: an analysis of the Foreign Claims Act’s combat exclusion,” *Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution* 11, no. 319 (2009): 321-323.

large number of those claims, and by the end of the occupation in September 1966 the claims service completed all investigations or passed existing claims to the OAS.

This chapter argues that in addition to alleviating Dominicans' frustration with US military actions the adjudication of claims payments manipulated the population away from the Constitutionalist propaganda labeling the US as an aggressive occupier and controlled the population by keeping them away from leftist political groups. This fits into the overall argument of this dissertation by detailing how humanitarian aid in the form of claims payments made the population less likely to turn to leftist political activism. The successful handling of claims allowed the US military to alleviate Dominican financial needs thereby keeping them away from the promises of political radicals and aiding the formation of a US friendly government. The US forces held conversations throughout the intervention regarding the limits of claim services as part of the humanitarian mission to achieve success in stabilizing the situation. Military commanders continuously questioned the role of claims services due to Army Regulations limiting the military's capabilities to provide humanitarianism through the claims services process. The formation of the IAPF, under the OAS, allowed for the military to turn over claims responsibility to the international organization. The push and pull of legal forces versus providing humanitarian aid occurred in the bureaucratic paperwork of the various command offices. The debates and the prevailing arguments are best illustrated through the filing of claims, which existed at the intersection of humanitarianism and legal liability and carried enormous influence regarding the actions of the US military.

The issues and controversies involving rejection, amount of distribution, and the use of money that surrounded claims services and the lack of status of forces agreement is displayed in three case studies that occurred during the intervention and subsequent occupation. The first elaborates on Maria de los Angeles Ogando's claim and illustrates the number of different and conflicting perspectives regarding how the military handled claims, and which cases received special attention. The second case study examines the influence of the US Embassy on how the military operated regarding humanitarian issues and how the intervention of the embassy forced the military to handle issues they might not have otherwise addressed. This case also offers a good comparison against Ogando's claim, which followed a different bureaucratic route that did not include the US Embassy's influence. The third case deals with how the US military investigated claim funds they believed did not get used as intended, such as instead of using the money on medical bills a claim recipient used the money to upgrade their household.

Maria de los Angeles Ogando's tragic situation began with her injury on May 1, but her complicated story continued after she filed a claim against the US military igniting full debates on the US general staff over the role of the military and the possible legal ramifications. On October 22, 1965 Ogando received the claim rejection letter signed by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Rouse which provided the reasoning behind the rejection as "that any wound you have suffered arose during the tactical position of the American troops in an hostile environment" and that "the laws applicable to the US prohibit arrangement or consideration of such claims."<sup>132</sup> The Foreign Claims Act is the

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<sup>132</sup> Letter from Joseph H. Rouse to Senorita Ogando, translated from Spanish, October 22, 1965; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating

law referenced and the portion of the law allowing the rejection says “a claim may be allowed only if it did not arise from action by an enemy or result directly or indirectly from an act of the armed forces of the United States in combat.”<sup>133</sup> Under this law the claims commission legally rejected Ogando’s claim as her injury occurred during a combat engagement involving US armed forces. However, on November 25, 1965 Ogando, along with her mother, visited the Inter-American Rights Commission offices in the Dominican Republic and made a statement to Durward V. Sandifer. On behalf of Ogando and her mother, Sandifer composed a letter to Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer Jr., deputy commander of the IAPF and commander of the US Forces in the Dominican Republic, saying that Ogando and her mother requested support “of her need for a plastic operation on her jaw. She says that they do not have resources with which to pay for such an operation.”<sup>134</sup> Sandifer further explained that he examined Ogando’s jaw which had not healed after three months in a Dominican Republic hospital and said “the case appears to be a deserving one and I express the hope that arrangements can be made for the performance of the operation,” the letter concluded by asking for General Palmer’s support.<sup>135</sup> It is unclear if General Palmer saw or was made aware of the letter, but the letter came across the desk of USFORDOMREP Chief of Staff General Robert Linvill who then asks for a further investigation and re-evaluation of the case.

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Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>133</sup> Foreign Claims Act, US Code 10 (1946) §§ 2734 et seq.

<sup>134</sup> Sandifer to Palmer, November 25, 1965; NACP.

<sup>135</sup> Sandifer to Palmer, November 25, 1965; NACP.

The letter from Durward Sandifer produced interest from the upper levels of the USFORDOMREP command and led to various interpretations of Army Regulations. Information on the case arrived to General Linvill in a letter from the SJA, Lieutenant Colonel Wallace S. Murphy, on November 29, 1965; four days after Sandifer's letter. In the letter the SJA mentions the Foreign Claims Act and that Ogando's claim did not qualify based on Army Regulations 40-3, Medical, Dental and Veterinary Care.<sup>136</sup> Furthermore, the SJA's letter stated "IAPF regulations provide that claims arising out of the accomplishment of the mission of the IAPF will be referred to the OAS for settlement," and since the army disqualified the claim any further investigation and re-evaluation is the responsibility of the OAS. However, the letter concludes the opening paragraph by explaining "that this claim arose prior to the formation of the IAPF."<sup>137</sup> The former statement is correct as IAPF Regulations state that "claims against the Force and its members shall be settled in accordance with procedures provided by the laws and regulations of the participating state or states concerned. But if the claims were as a result of the accomplishment of the mission, such claims should be directed to the OAS."<sup>138</sup> The main issue was the fact that this incident occurred before the creation of the IAPF and while it was in the accomplishment of the mission the primary action originated with US Forces, therefore the claim fell under US law and regulations, i.e. the Foreign Claims Act. While the SJA believed the case should have been passed onto the OAS as an IAPF

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<sup>136</sup> Letter from Lt. Col. Wallace S. Murphy to Chief of Staff, November 29, 1965; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>137</sup> Murphy to Chief of Staff, November 29, 1965; NACP.

<sup>138</sup> IAPF Regulations, 1965; NACP.

claim General Linvill had other ideas. He provided those ideas in a handwritten comment on the letter to J-4 (Logistics) and the US Forces Surgeon saying “I would like to help this gal. Admittedly we have no actual responsibility. Get J-5 into the act and see what we can do.”<sup>139</sup> The comment overruled the SJA and set the gears in motion for the forthcoming debate.

After the Chief of Staff asked the J-4, the US Forces Surgeon, and the J-5 to solve Ogando’s claim; each office responded with their own comments on the information provided by the SJA. The conversation started on December 8, 1965 with the J-4 taking the primary lead by asking the US Forces surgeon to have “subject examined to determine extent of damage,” and asked the J-5 to see “if the US unit is still in DOMREP, subject could be made a Xmas project or the 1st Bde could take on the idea.”<sup>140</sup> The J-5’s task illustrated the winning of the hearts and minds concept through providing a Christmas gift of money from a US military unit to provide medical care thereby improving the image of USFORDOMREP. However, Marine Corps units departed the Dominican Republic by June 6, 1965 so the responsibility, if initiated, had to fall to an army unit present in country most likely 1st Brigade mentioned in the message. This displayed the use of humanitarian operations to distract and control through using a

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<sup>139</sup> General Linville’s hand written comment on Murphy Letter, November 29, 1965; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>140</sup> Message from Lieutenant Colonel Myron H. Murphy to Surgeon and J-5, December 8, 1965; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Christian holiday in a nation with a large Christian population as a way for the US military to avoid legal responsibility while demonstrating humanitarianism with personnel from a US unit “voluntarily” providing money to the victim. The replies from the surgeon and J-5 represent the best contrasting sides within civil affairs. The surgeon responded that the evaluation would occur in due time with the report to follow shortly after. While it appears that the US Forces Surgeon’s report on Ogando is not present in the archival documents the response from the surgeon can be surmised from a similar situation. In that situation the surgeon provided a report on November 13, 1965 regarding treatment of Dominican citizens and notes that “Rodriguez Army Hospital is under the [jurisdiction] of CINCSOUTH [Commander in Chief-South], and no foreign nationals should be evacuated to that hospital without his authority.”<sup>141</sup> The J-5 responded with a three page report on December 13, 1965 that outlined why it is in the best interests of the US to accept responsibility of Ogando’s claim, the exact opposite perspective taken by the SJA and other officers in the chain of command.<sup>142</sup>

On December 13, 1965 the J-5, Major Edward J. Neal, sent a report to the Chief of Staff that detailed why he believed the US should accept responsibility for the claim and offered arguments in support of that belief. The report started out by saying that “the attached correspondence concerns a claim made by Maria de los Angeles Ogand[o] who

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<sup>141</sup> Letter From Forces Surgeon to Chief of Staff, November 13, 1965; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>142</sup> Report from Major Edward J. Neal to Chief of Staff, December 13, 1965; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

requested payment of \$50,000 damages for facial wounds received on 1 May 1965, allegedly from American fire” and described that the claim did not fall within the realm of the Foreign Claims Act, and that “both the Surgeon and the SJA feel that the claimant does not qualify for medical treatment at US Army Medical Facilities.”<sup>143</sup> The SJA used Army Regulations 40-3 as a justification for rejecting the claim, but Major Neal explained that after “a careful examination” of the regulation, he arrived “at an honest difference of opinion with both the SJA and the Surgeon” primarily regarding the regulations’ interpretation.<sup>144</sup> Paragraph 25c(7) of the Army Regulations 40-3 stated:

The Transfer of foreign personnel from outside the United States to the United States solely for the purpose of providing medical care in Army medical treatment facilities is not authorized except under unusual circumstances as determined by the Secretary of the Army. The US Army attache in the Country concerned is responsible for effecting through diplomatic channels such coordination as may be necessary with the local government and interested agencies will request the attache to render such administrative assistance as may be within his capabilities.<sup>145</sup>

The primary point of disagreement is in the interpretation of the meaning of United States, which the J-5 highlighted in the report and asked whether it meant the land mass of the continent or all fifty states. The J-5 then proceeded to use the regulation’s definition of United States which stated “this term means the 50 States and the District of Columbia.”<sup>146</sup> The J-5 interpreted this to mean that Ogando can be transferred to medical facilities in Puerto Rico to avoid travelling to the United States as defined in the Army Regulation. The report continued by analyzing the interpretation of Paragraph 34,

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<sup>143</sup> Neal to Chief of Staff, December 13, 1965; NACP.

<sup>144</sup> Neal to Chief of Staff, December 13, 1965; NACP.

<sup>145</sup> Neal to Chief of Staff, December 13, 1965; NACP.

<sup>146</sup> Neal to Chief of Staff, December 13, 1965; NACP.

particularly the delegation of authority. The report observed that the commanding officer can delegate authority to a “major subordinate officer” for determining whether medical care will be administered, and whether or not any fees will be waived for the treatment.<sup>147</sup> Another paragraph in the report supporting the J-5’s argument stated “medical care may be furnished to such persons outside the United States when it is determined that this action can be expected to contribute to the advancement of the public interests of the United States.”<sup>148</sup> There appears to be no information as to why Major Neal did not highlight this paragraph, as it relates to Ogando’s claim, but he did add it to the report. The report concluded by saying “I do not propose to establish a Dominican medicare program, but I do feel that certain cases should receive individual attention. Those concerning facial plastic surgery, particularly women, might be put into this category. One only has to recall the ‘Hiroshima maidens’ and the resulting favorable worldwide publicity the United States received to realize the importance of such situations.”<sup>149</sup> The Hiroshima Maidens consisted of a group of twenty-five women who suffered crippling and disfiguring injuries from the atomic bomb blasts from Hiroshima, Japan and in 1955 traveled to the US to receive reconstructive surgery under a program established by the US government.<sup>150</sup> Mentioning the Hiroshima maidens illustrated how the J-5 believed the military can use situations, such as Ogando’s case, to offer humanitarian assistance

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<sup>147</sup> Neal to Chief of Staff, December 13, 1965; NACP.

<sup>148</sup> Neal to Chief of Staff, December 13, 1965; NACP.

<sup>149</sup> Neal to Chief of Staff, December 13, 1965; NACP.

<sup>150</sup> Rodney Barker, *The Hiroshima Maidens: A Story of Courage, Compassion, and Survival* (New York: Penguin Books, 1985).

and to promote good will and press around the world, especially in the Dominican Republic; an opinion based on winning the hearts and minds.

The J-5 clearly believed that offering humanitarian assistance to Ogando was in the best interest of the US military the only question left was whether the Chief of Staff agreed, or if he followed the advice of the SJA and the US Forces Surgeon. The Chief of Staff responded to the comments from the Surgeon and the report created by the J-5 in a hand written note in the comment section regarding the November 29 report and under the J-5's December 13 comment bringing attention to the office's report. The Chief of Staff stated "SJA co-ordinate [with] other two [Surgeon and J-5] for answer to the letter. J-5 [and] Surgeon keep me informed,"<sup>151</sup> illustrating that the Chief of Staff followed the J-5's advice regarding Army Regulation 40-3, paragraph 34(c) dealing with delegation of authority, but wanted to continue following the developments of the case. The US Army responded to General Linvill's delegation of authority to the SJA, Surgeon, and J-5 in a January 18, 1966 memorandum to the commanding officer of the 42<sup>nd</sup> Field Hospital. The memo asked for an evaluation of Maria de los Angeles Ogando, but that "actual treatment and/or further evacuation will not be undertaken" without the headquarters' approval.<sup>152</sup> However, later on January 18, 1966 the SJA and Surgeon crafted a letter to

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<sup>151</sup> Chief of Staff General Linvill handwritten comment on memorandum, November 29, 1965; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>152</sup> Memorandum to Commanding officer, 42<sup>nd</sup> Field Hospital, January 18, 1966; 201-46 United States Forces Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Durward Sandifer, Ogando's representative at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, that stated "a careful examination of current United States Army regulations compels the conclusion that the treatment of Senorita Ogando at United States Army medical facilities would be in violation of law and regulations."<sup>153</sup> The letter again mentioned that the claim arose "out of the accomplishment of the mission of the Inter American Peace Force" and therefore Sandifer's letter along with attachments was sent to the Ad Hoc Committee acting under the OAS.<sup>154</sup>

The US Army continued conversations regarding Ogando's situation, as displayed in a communication to the commanding officer of the 16<sup>th</sup> General Support Group from Headquarters, 42<sup>nd</sup> Medical Hospital, which stated that "the IAPF Surgeon advises me that through the request of OEA [OAS] and C-5 [IAPF Civil Affairs], he has seen and examined this patient [Ogando]. He further advises me that a Dr. Cuervo of OEA has contacted Mr. Howard Rusk of the Institute of Rehabilitation and Physical Medicine, New York City where arrangements are being made for carefree of expense to the patient. OEA is planning to defray the transportation costs."<sup>155</sup> The letter further recommended "that USFORDOMREP withdraw its interest" taking away any possibility

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<sup>153</sup> Letter from Staff Surgeon to Adjutant General to Durward Sandifer, January 18, 1966; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>154</sup> Letter from Staff Surgeon to Durward Sandifer, January 18, 1966; NACP.

<sup>155</sup> Correspondence to Commanding Officer, 16<sup>th</sup> General Support Group From Headquarters, 42<sup>nd</sup> Medical Hospital, February 7, 1966; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

of US military liability.<sup>156</sup> Unfortunately, there appears to be no further documentation regarding Maria de los Angeles Ogando as the US military withdrew interest and left the situation to the OAS, but it also appears that Marie de los Angeles Ogando received the required treatment inside the United States outside of the US military's laws and regulations.

The case of Rosendo Garcia provides a comparison with Ogando's claim and while the case is not a claim handled by the Claims services it represents further issues surrounding the reasoning SJA and the Surgeon provided for rejecting Ogando's claim. On September 17, 1965, a month before Sandifer sent the letter regarding Ogando's situation to General Palmer, Dr. Luis Fernandez Martinez, President of the Dominican Red Cross, sent a letter to US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic William Tappley Bennet regarding Constitutionalist soldier Rosendo Garcia, who lost the use of one eye, and was in danger of losing the other.<sup>157</sup> Martinez wrote to Bennet hoping that Garcia may receive treatment from Walter Reed Military Hospital and asked the ambassador "to do all that is in your power so that this young man, only survivor of his family and his mother's only support as his father was killed in this war, is able to conserve the vision of his only good eye."<sup>158</sup> The situation is similar to Ogando's request as both are asking for further treatment within the United States deemed essential to the quality of life of the

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<sup>156</sup> Correspondence to Commanding Officer, February 7, 1966; NACP.

<sup>157</sup> Letter to William Tapley Bennet from Martinez, translated from Spanish, September 17, 1965; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>158</sup> Bennet to Martinez, September 17, 1965; NACP.

individual. The major differences between the two is Ogando's injury occurred when caught in the crossfire as a non-combatant and involved US troops, while Garcia received wounds fighting, possibly against US forces, as a Constitutionalist soldier. The US Embassy involved itself in Garcia's case and proved essential as Garcia eventually received the necessary treatment outside the Dominican Republic at US military facilities.

The US Embassy took immediate interest in the case and persuaded the US military commanders to transport Garcia out of the Dominican Republic for treatment. On the same day as Martinez wrote his letter to Ambassador Bennet, William Connett, the Charge de Affaires addressed Colonel Joseph F. Quilty, Chief of MAAG (Military Assistance and Advisory Group) in the Dominican Republic. In the letter, Connett stated "it seems that it may be possible to save the remaining eye by an operation which can be performed in American hospitals but could not be carried out here. In view of the special humanitarian considerations involved, I believe we should undertake, through military channels, to provide whatever medical treatment is required."<sup>159</sup> Connett continued by saying that "the operation should be conducted in the nearest appropriate United States military hospital and we should arrange for transportation. All costs will have to be borne by the United States Government" and that it will need to be conducted with expediency."<sup>160</sup> Receiving an endorsement from the US Embassy personnel enticed the

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<sup>159</sup> From William Connett to Colonel Joseph F. Quilty, September 17, 1965; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [2 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>160</sup> Connett to Quilty, September 17, 1965; NACP.

cooperation of the military and the Chief of Staff General Linvill, the same Chief of Staff that asked for a re-evaluation of Ogando's claim, took an interest in the case and requested the 15<sup>th</sup> Field Hospital evaluate Garcia.<sup>161</sup> Connett mentioning humanitarianism illustrated the importance of humanitarianism in controlling the Dominican population, but also seeks to maintain the illusion of support and aid for both sides of the conflict. The 15<sup>th</sup> Field Hospital undertook the evaluation on September 27, 1965 ten days after the original letter from Dr. Martinez brought the attention to the US Embassy. In comparison, it took over a month for a reply to be sent to Durward Sandifer regarding Ogando's case. In the report, the examining physician, Lieutenant Colonel Donald McLeod, rated Garcia's condition as "extremely poor" and recommended that "this individual be evaluated by an ophthalmologist for an expert opinion. This consultation can be performed at Rodriguez Army Hospital" in Puerto Rico.<sup>162</sup> This is almost the exact opposite of what the surgeon wrote over a month later regarding not shipping individuals to Rodriguez Army Hospital due to it falling under CINCSOUTH and outside the command of USFORDOMREP.<sup>163</sup> The day after the medical evaluation reached the

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<sup>161</sup> From Brigadier General Robert Linvill to Commanding Officer 5<sup>th</sup> Logistical Command, September 25, 1965; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [2 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>162</sup> From Lt. Col. Donald McLeod, Evaluation of Casualty Report, September 27, 1965; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>163</sup> Memorandum from Forces Surgeon, Policy Regarding the Treatment of Individuals in Army Medical Treatment Facilities, November 13, 1965; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Chief of Staff's desk, William Connett requested the transfer of Garcia to Puerto Rico for the required medical treatment.<sup>164</sup>

Rosendo Garcia reached Rodriguez Army Hospital on September 29, 1965 and if the US Embassy hoped for a show of good will from Garcia toward the US military, it did not occur as planned. Garcia received the required medical care, but the military believed he did not need to remain hospitalized or sent to the continental US, so arrangements proceeded to send him back to the Dominican Republic. While boarding the plane back to the Dominican Republic Garcia lashed out at US personnel and created a "disturbance within this office constantly cursing at the Americans for intervening in the Dominican crisis and further refused to sign any documents prior to boarding the aircraft in San Juan."<sup>165</sup> The attitude Garcia showed toward US military personnel was related to his service as a Constitutionalist soldier who very possibly received his wound fighting against US soldiers. His not wanting to return to the Dominican Republic was due to right-wing terrorist groups that targeted former Constitutionlists. Garcia's arguments proved fruitless as on October 6, 1965 he returned to the Dominican Republic while restrained on a US military aircraft; just over two weeks later the claims commission rejected Ogando's initial claim. There does not appear to be any

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<sup>164</sup> Letter from William Connett to US Commanding officer, September 28, 1965; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>165</sup> Letter from Colonel Harry J. Umlauf, Jr to Major Watkins, October 11, 1965; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

documentation of events after Garcia returned to the Dominican Republic, but judging by his actions, his view of the US and the US military is not likely to have increased due to the treatment he received.

A comparison of Maria de los Angeles Ogando's claim and Rosendo Garcia's case illustrates US military procedures in a humanitarian situation and that their actions reflected the use of civil affairs and humanitarianism to turn the population away from leftist political organizations. First, both cases found their way to the Chief of Staff, General Linvill, through an international organization; Ogando through the Inter American Human Rights Commission and Garcia's through the Dominican Red Cross. However, the appeal for humanitarian aid went through different bureaucratic channels, which ultimately determined the different treatment of the two cases. In the case of Rosendo Garcia, the US Embassy got involved in the situation and delegated instructions to the military, whereas Durward Sandifer, representing Ogando, sent a letter to the commanding officer of US forces, this action allowed the military to control the case and situation. While the military showed a willingness to cooperate under orders from the US Embassy. Ogando filed a claim against the US military and concerns existed that any further involvement in her case carried possible political repercussions such as opening the US military and government to further legal action regarding US military actions, and possibly the entire intervention. Ogando's case saw the US military push the burden of responsibility onto the OAS, but the similar case of Garcia, a Constitutionalist soldier, received a rapid response from the military without a strong or lengthy debate regarding the circumstances. The similarity of the two cases and that they received different

treatment with close to the same result, illustrates the questioning of motives behind the US military civil affairs and humanitarian actions throughout the intervention.

The US Forces surgeon carried an important role in both cases as they determined the level of treatment and provided recommendations for where that treatment occurred. Insight into why the surgeon changed opinions two months after the Garcia case can be found in the report from November 13, 1965. This report provided an explanation into how the surgeon treated Ogando's claim, while providing insight into how that opinion changed. The report stated that the primary reasons for the treatment of Dominican individuals is "often to placate the individual patient, full use of available DOMREP Medical Facilities and personnel has not been made, DOMREP authorities have an erroneous and exalted opinion of the capabilities of the 15<sup>th</sup> Field Hospital."<sup>166</sup> Those reasons provided describe the numerous requests for treatment the army medical units received and the overall reason for the report is in regards to the inability to treat the requests due to limited personnel. The surgeon went so far as to call out US Embassy personnel and the MAAG for encouraging and proliferating those requests and that they needed to be made aware of the situation.

If a claim occurred against the US military outside of combat circumstances and if money was distributed the military took exception if use of the money went towards anything else other than acquiring medical attention related to the claimant's injury. On May 2, 1965 Francisco Almonte Rodriguez picked up a live grenade that exploded in his

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<sup>166</sup> Memorandum from Forces Surgeon, November 13, 1965; NACP.

hand leading to the filing of a claim.<sup>167</sup> In settling the claim the US military distributed 14,000 dollars to the family to handle the medical costs for treatment.<sup>168</sup> However, the issues with the case did not end with the disbursement of money as a Baptist minister, Reverend Shumaker, drew further attention to the case when he solicited army doctors to treat Rodriguez. According to Lieutenant Colonel Donald McLeod, Reverend Shumaker showed concern due to “the claims money is being used for other than this patient’s care.”<sup>169</sup> Reverend Shumaker also approached Captain John Lamb, a US Army surgeon, to assist with treatment of Rodriguez. Those actions caused an issue when the services affected Lamb’s ability to keep up with his regular duties at which point Captain Henry Wise ordered Lamb to cease assisting with the recovery.<sup>170</sup> The US Embassy got involved at Reverend Shumaker’s request when Captain Lamb stopped visiting Rodriguez. The primary concern of the Embassy regarded the treatment Rodriguez received from the US military and to discover the circumstances around his situation. The Embassy’s questioning prompted the investigation from Lieutenant Colonel McLeod. In the letter to the Chief of Staff, made necessary due to the Embassy’s interest, the head of J-4 mentioned a discussion with an embassy staffer. After the discussion the decision was

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<sup>167</sup> Disposition Form, Treatment of Senor Francisco Almonte Rodriguez, March 30, 1966; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [3 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>168</sup> Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, March 30, 1966; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, 1965 [3 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>169</sup> Disposition Form, March 30, 1966; NACP.

<sup>170</sup> Disposition Form, March 30, 1966; NACP.

made for USAID to send a letter to the family “to suggest they apply the money to necessary medical procedures for the boy. We feel this is a case of the parents having their cake and eating it too,” and recommended that the US Forces take no further action in the case.<sup>171</sup>

The primary commonality in the Rodriguez case and the Garcia case is the participation of the US Embassy, which pressured the US military to re-evaluate cases and participate in actions where the military might not otherwise focus, such as flying individuals to Puerto Rico for medical treatment. Both issues originated from individuals of humanitarian organizations outside the sphere of the US government and therefore did not have the same concerns regarding legal issues or precedents. The US Embassy asked the military to handle Garcia’s case without any discussion regarding alternative actions and the military performed the actions requested along with the necessary treatment. For Rodriguez, the military settled a claim with the family but did not believe the money was used appropriately, and the child needed further medical attention at Dominican medical facilities. All the cases, especially the Rodriguez and Ogando cases, illustrated the military’s use of humanitarian operations to control the Dominican population regarding what individuals do with money rewarded to them and the delegation of cases in which the military has an overriding legal interest to other organizations such as the IAPF or OAS. There appears to be no documentation of what happened if the family did not use the money as the military saw fit. Rather once the claim was settled the military washed their hands of the situation evidenced in asking Captain Lamb to stop attending to

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<sup>171</sup> Memorandum for Chief of Staff, March 30, 1966; NACP.

Rodriguez. USAID also passed on the Rodriguez case due to the family filing a claim against the U.S military, which further pushed the military into a humanitarian role. The Civil Affairs officer spoke at length about each of these situations in their report regarding Ogando's claim, but those comments can be broadened to claims in the Dominican Republic in general. If the military truly wanted to pursue humanitarianism in the Dominican Republic then their participation in these cases and claims would have occurred sooner and lasted longer regardless of the US Embassy's intervention, or the involvement of individuals and organizations outside of the US government. The military humanitarianism in the intervention remained about successfully controlling the Dominican population.

The situation around Maria de los Angeles Ogando and her claim illustrated how the US military's perception of claim services as a humanitarian operation led to the continued viewing of those operations to control the Dominican population. If humanitarian aid was not about controlling the Dominican people then following the recommendations of the J-5's report to sponsor Ogando for reconstructive surgery in Puerto Rico, and following suit with other incidents on a case by case basis provided a sensible tactic. The precedent for such a situation already existed in the Hiroshima maidens' example, but the US government sponsored those women, so the military did not see that situation as their responsibility. Instead, the most productive discussions that occurred out of the re-evaluation of the case was the recommendation by the J-4 (Logistics) that Ogando might be a good candidate for a Christmas project and the delegation of authority by the Chief of Staff to the SJA, Surgeon, and J-5. This case represented the military's interest in using claims services as a part of humanitarian

programs to control the Dominican population through ignoring the recommendations made by the Civil Affairs office, and the transfer the issue to the OAS or recommending treatment at a Dominican medical facility. However, the military had no issues dealing with cases inquired about by the US Embassy displayed in the military's handling of the Garcia and Rodriguez case as those cases held authorization from the US government and worked within the restrictions of the Army Regulations. Furthermore, if Ogando's claim fell under the Foreign Claims Act and was rejected due to occurring during combat actions, why did the same not occur in the Rosendo Garcia case? Those cases illustrated that Dominican citizens may have been better off not filing a claim with the US military and instead operating in accordance with the OAS to influence treatment at US medical facilities outside the Dominican Republic. In the instances where Dominicans followed that route, they received the assistance and treatment required.

The settling of claims is an issue still impacting the US military at present regarding the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) "from fiscal years 2003 to 2006, DOD has reported about \$1.9 million in solatia payments and more than \$29 million in condolence payments to Iraqi and Afghan civilians who are killed, injured, or incur property damage as a result of US or coalition forces' actions during combat."<sup>172</sup> The report continues stating that "these payments are expressions of sympathy or remorse based on local culture and customs, but

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<sup>172</sup> United States Government Accountability Office, *Military Operations: The Department of Defense's Use of Solatia and Condolence Payments in Iraq and Afghanistan*, Report to Congressional Requesters (May 2007), 1-2.

not an admission of legal liability or fault.”<sup>173</sup> While the money distributed in Iraq and Afghanistan is much larger than the distribution in the Dominican Republic. The issues in all three locations remain largely the same. The Dominican intervention provided the context of how the military handled claims in a limited conflict, but also provided the basis for future arguments made by military officers that claims can be treated as a form of humanitarian aid. The claims presented during the Dominican conflict hold links to the claims in the present and provide valuable insight into how the military has changed and adapted to the ever-evolving environment of providing humanitarian aid while engaged in theaters of conflict.

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<sup>173</sup> United States Government Accountability Office, *Military Operations: The Department of Defense’s Use of Solatia and Condolence Payments in Iraq and Afghanistan*, Report to Congressional Requesters (May 2007), 2.

## CHAPTER IV – MEDICAL AID

On the morning of April 1, 1966 a Special Forces Group operating in Samana, Dominican Republic, requested a US Army medical helicopter evacuation for Gustavo Yopez, a Dominican national who suffered a heart attack.<sup>174</sup> Two hours later the 42<sup>nd</sup> Field Hospital approved the medical evacuation, and forty minutes after the approval the helicopter took off from Santo Domingo carrying a Dominican physician and an interpreter. The trip from the 42<sup>nd</sup> Field Hospital to Samana and back to Santo Domingo took an hour and twenty minutes; the entire process from the first call to request the helicopter to the final landing with Yopez took four hours. After Gustavo Yopez arrived at the field hospital US Army medical personnel examined him, and then loaded him onto an ambulance for transport to a local Dominican hospital. The report regarding the incident to the commanding general described that “the patient did suffer a heart attack and went into cardiac failure” and “an air evacuation was most beneficial” since there was no certainty of the patients survival via ground transportation.<sup>175</sup> While there appears no available documentation of Yopez’s situation after he left the US Army hospital it appears he did survive the ordeal.

The transportation of Gustavo Yopez illustrated one of many ways the US Army medical units serving in the Dominican Republic provided treatment to Dominican civilians over the course of the intervention. When the medical units arrived in the

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<sup>174</sup> Medical Incident Report regarding Gustavo Yopez, April 6, 1966; 901-02 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Surgeon Section, Medical Care Instruction, 1966 [2 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 14; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>175</sup> Gustavo Yopez Report, April 6, 1966; NACP.

Dominican Republic the primary task was to ensure the medical treatment of US personnel and to provide humanitarian medical care for Dominican citizens. The Dominican intervention saw medical personnel treat over 50,000 Dominicans while providing “realistic training opportunities” for rotating US medical personnel.<sup>176</sup> Those operations involved opening clinics throughout the capital city and making trips to the towns and cities surrounding Santo Domingo. Outside of caring for the personnel of the US military units and Dominican citizens, the medical units also provided medical care to IAPF soldiers, US government employees, and assisted Dominican hospitals when overrun or in need of supplies. Considered additional advantages, those services aided the US military’s effort to provide a stabilizing force and further ensured the cooperation of the Dominican population.

This chapter argues that the medical services provided through humanitarian aid tended to the Dominican populations needs and kept the population from supporting leftist policies. As the occupation continued the US military medical units pushed the population to Dominican medical facilities to support the pro-US government and eliminate the support for leftist political promises. This fits into the overall argument through show how the military’s use of medical humanitarian aid through civil affairs and civic action programs turned the Dominican population away from radical political activism and toward supporting the pro-US government. This also demonstrated how the US military struggled to find a balance between providing medical care for Dominican

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<sup>176</sup> Darrell G. McPherson, *The Role of the Army Medical Service in the Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1966), iii.

nationals and rebuilding the Dominican medical establishment's capabilities. The military faced difficulties when Dominicans became dependent on US military medical aid instead of Dominican medical institutions. While Dominicans flocking to US military hospitals risked uncovering the military's use of humanitarianism to control the population. Those circumstances allowed the commencement of political negotiations to create a government without the threat of riots or the burden of a continuing humanitarian crisis consisting of a public health crisis caused by the civil war and included a lack of access to medical treatment.

US military medical operations in foreign nations gained popularity throughout the Cold War and were commonly implemented during the Vietnam War. There are similarities between the medical operations in the Dominican Republic and the Medical Civil Action Programs (MEDCAPs) used in Vietnam in terms of military assistance of civilians in areas of operation. However, the conflicts themselves remain vastly different and the Dominican Republic offered a better environment for medical operations to flourish. This better environment was due to the Dominican intervention being a limited conflict that saw fighting diminish after a couple months and transitioned to an occupation. The Dominican Republic is also a smaller country compared to Vietnam and allowed the military easier mobility and logistical advantages such as distribution, mobility, and access. The US military's interest in MEDCAPs revolved around the tactic's counterinsurgency applicability and that interest continued well into the 1990s and the present.

Robert Wilensky provides an analysis of MEDCAPs during the Vietnam War and examines "the motivations for these programs as well as their implementations" while

asking the question “was the major aim the provision of medical care, or...the use of the programs to advance the war aims of the administration?”<sup>177</sup> The Dominican conflict fits into this analysis as medical civic action program used humanitarianism to prevent a communist takeover of the nation. Medical civil affairs projects have several upsides such as: access to areas other aid organizations cannot reach, the ability to offer more services than other agencies, and the ability to provide security for the medical operations.<sup>178</sup> Medical units also provided Dominican health institutions with medical supplies and administrative aid although the units preferred to pass the latter to regular civil affairs units to maintain the units’ ability to offer treatment and handle any possible situations. Military analysts also observed that MEDCAPs were more effective when deployed in a low conflict situation, demonstrated in the Dominican Republic, and “that Vietnam was not a low intensity conflict after 1964.”<sup>179</sup> So, while Wilensky offered a solid analysis of MEDCAPs in Vietnam the Dominican intervention offers the chance to further explore evidence of MEDCAP operations in an atmosphere conducive to the operations. The discussion seeks to discuss questions of how MEDCAPs and humanitarian aid were used by the US government and the US military to reinforce foreign policy stances.

At the onset of the intervention the medical situation received top level support by the US government and military much to the chagrin of combat commanders leading the

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<sup>177</sup> Robert J. Wilensky, *Military Medicine to Win Hearts and Minds: Aid to Civilians in the Vietnam War* (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2004), 4.

<sup>178</sup> Wilensky, *Military Medicine*, 7.

<sup>179</sup> Colonel Elray Jenkins, *Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPS) and Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETES) as Instruments of Foreign Policy*, (Army War College Paper: 1988), 11.

first wave of forces. To handle the public health humanitarian crisis the US military sent the entire 15<sup>th</sup> Field Hospital, which contained 400 beds within the unit's supplies and required thirty-six military aircraft. Displeased at the arrival of hospital units General Robert York, commanding officer of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, believed combat troops held priority rather than medical units during the initial deployment.<sup>180</sup> It turned out that while the humanitarian situation did reach a crisis level initial reports exaggerated the amount of civilian casualties reported, and medical personnel and supplies during the first weeks exceeded the requirements for the number of casualties.<sup>181</sup> Even though the medical mission at the beginning of the intervention was exaggerated in terms of the number of medical units required those units stationed in the Dominican Republic found themselves in prime position to assist in the humanitarian medical civil affairs and civic action missions that took shape after initial combat actions.

After the US military separated the two factions through creating the Line of Communication on May 3 through 5, 1965 military medical units conducted operations to treat civilians in Santo Domingo and the surrounding areas. Many of the operations carried a dual mission of serving both US military personnel and Dominican citizens as “military preventive medicine activities and civil public health activities...which are carried out benefit everyone in a given area, not just those persons for whom the measures are taken.”<sup>182</sup> The preventive medicine and public health operations took on added importance as the violence between the two Dominican factions led to a collapse

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<sup>180</sup> McPherson, *Role of the Army*, 8.

<sup>181</sup> McPherson, *Role of the Army*, 14.

<sup>182</sup> McPherson, *Role of the Army*, 20.

of public services in Santo Domingo when people fled the conflict raging throughout the capital city. This collapse resulted in hospitals closing and the evacuation of private physicians. The Dominican Red Cross and the Pan American Health Organization also experienced destruction and violence from both Constitutionalist and Loyalist groups. The Pan American Health Organization lost 30,000 dollars of medical equipment and the US military worked closely with both organizations to recoup the losses. Some of this aid appeared when the military “loaned equipment to the Pan American Health Organization, the Dominican Red Cross authorities, and the Ministry of Health, and issued thousands of dollars in medical supplies to help the organizations function effectively” throughout the course of the intervention.<sup>183</sup> While the US army medical units assisted humanitarian organizations, those units also turned their attention to the Dominican civilian population.

Medical units consistently conducted operations that dealt with the large swaths of insects that descended on US military personnel and Dominican citizens due to the lack of sanitation services. Adding to the uncleanliness of pests such as flies and roaches, those insects also transmitted diseases such as malaria and yellow fever, so the preventive medicine units operated smoke and fog machines in their attempts to eradicate the problem. The US military took particular care to broadcast messages about the role of the fogging operations whenever the units operated. Those broadcasts made sure “Civilians were warned that food should be covered and children brought in off the streets,” but many did not heed those warnings and the Constitutionlists used the fogging missions in their own propaganda to illustrate claims that the US military engaged in chemical

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<sup>183</sup> McPherson, *Role of the Army*, 21.

warfare against the Dominican population.<sup>184</sup> The smoke and fogging operations proved successful, but had to be performed every week in the first half of the intervention. Those missions illustrated the impact of preventative medicine units and the work to eliminate the possibility of disease. While many of those missions fell under the purview of traditional medical units, those units also participated greatly in community outreach as well.

Preventative medicine units evolved into a primary resource of the US army medical teams in the Dominican Republic and those units implemented a variety of programs to ensure the health of both US military personnel and Dominican citizens. The restaurant inspection program, discussed in a previous chapter, fell under US Forces medical units and is worth expanding on the details of how and why this program functioned. The purpose of the “Civilian Restaurant Inspection Program” was to “establish procedures and standards for the inspection and approval of local civilian food service facilities for use by US Military Personnel.”<sup>185</sup> As noted earlier, most preventative medicine operations benefitted not only US military personnel but also Dominican civilians who used the services of the inspected restaurants. The inspections included procedures such as inspection by members of the 714<sup>th</sup> Preventative Medicine Unit who followed a checklist used by the Dominican Ministry of Health and operated on a one-hundred-point system. The restaurant then received a grade of A, B, C, D, or fail, as long

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<sup>184</sup> McPherson, *Role of the Army*, 24.

<sup>185</sup> “Civilian Restaurant Inspection Program, USFORDOMREP, Circular No. 40-4,” September 13, 1965, in Darrell G. McPherson, *The Role of the Army Medical Service in the Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General and Department of the Army, 1966), Appendix F.

as the businesses received at least a D they continued serving US personnel.<sup>186</sup> However, if the establishment failed to pass the inspection then the business in question was deemed off limits to US patronage.

The US Forces inspection teams attempted to provide a level playing field through using the Dominican Ministry of Health's checklist. Investigations also expanded by "concurrently conducting inspections and evaluations of various wholesale food producing and processing activities...to correlate these results with the disposition of food-stuffs at local restaurants."<sup>187</sup> There are no details of how far those inspections went outside of Santo Domingo into rural areas or other cities and towns. The inspections and grades also provided a service to the Dominican civilians through advising them of which restaurants qualified for a passing grade by Dominican standards, but it appears that the US Forces did not broadcast those standards to the Dominican population. The preventative maintenance unit also encouraged US military personnel to avoid "street and sidewalk, push cart, bicycle, and 'hand carry' food" vendors as they were a "continuing menace to health and must be avoided at all times."<sup>188</sup> The inspections continued for the duration of the occupation but only in the vicinity of Santo Domingo, which contained the majority of US military personnel and US government officials. The restaurant program demonstrated how the military's humanitarian aid controlled the population through providing information regarding the sanitation of restaurants. It is unknown how closely Dominicans followed US postings. Dominican civilians likely followed the

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<sup>186</sup> Restaurant Inspection Program, September 13, 1965, Appendix F.

<sup>187</sup> Restaurant Inspection Program, September 13, 1965, Appendix F.

<sup>188</sup> Restaurant Inspection Program, September 13, 1965, Appendix F.

system as restaurants were increasingly added to the list demonstrating an incentive existed for the restaurants to at least receive a “D” grade.

Preventative medicine units operated for the duration of the US military presence in the Dominican Republic and served in various roles that aided US soldiers and Dominican civilians. Many of the operations conducted by the preventative medicine units allowed for the normal operation of Santo Domingo’s businesses, restaurants, and stores which in turn allowed a level of normalcy to return to the city after months of violence. The preventative medicine units represented the pinnacle of humanitarian assistance to Santo Domingo due to their taking on many of the sanitation and health tasks. This was required after the fall of the Dominican government and the closing of Dominican health and sanitary institutions such as trash collection, rodent and insect control, and restaurant health inspection. The primary objective for many of those services was to aid US military personnel the missions also aided the health and well-being of Dominican citizens. Those operations calmed the worries and tensions throughout the city and eased the peacekeeping duty for US combat troops who controlled the two fighting factions, and Dominican civilians. At the same time the sanitation operations provided a positive image of the US military intervention and activities. Calming the worries and tensions of the Dominican population remained at the heart of humanitarian operations. The military successfully controlled the population through those operations and allowed political negotiations to continue under a stable environment.

After most of the fighting subsided after May 5 medical units turned their primary attention to Dominican civilians to compliment military operations. From the period of

May to August 1965 “82d Airborne Division medical personnel treated 55 Dominican civilian inpatients and had 50,792 outpatient visits. In the same period 104 civilian inpatients and 212 civilian outpatients were treated by 15<sup>th</sup> Field Hospital personnel.”<sup>189</sup> The more patients US army medical units serviced the more popular the US military found themselves. That popularity, made possible through humanitarianism, allowed the military to distract and control the local population, thereby aiding the overall mission of stabilization. To expand their ability to treat Dominican citizens the US military formed Civil Medical Assistance Teams that contained doctors, airmen, interpreters, ambulance drivers, and a number of assistants.<sup>190</sup> Those teams, similar to the MEDCAPs used in Vietnam, held the mission of taking humanitarian service directly to the Dominican population through offering free medical service, prescribing antibiotics, and administering immunizations. By mid-May those teams serviced 500 to 600 people a day and started running out of medical supplies requisitioned for civil assistance.<sup>191</sup> With the draining of supplies and lessening of the humanitarian crisis the military leadership believed that it was time for the medical units to transition back to a more civil affairs policy of helping the Dominican doctors and hospitals return to operation.

One of the primary roles of the medical personnel in the Dominican Republic was to ensure that the Dominican population regained confidence in the nation’s medical institutions which translated to confidence in the Dominican government. Wilensky described how providing too much medical assistance had the possibility to be

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<sup>189</sup> McPherson, *Role of the Army*, 27.

<sup>190</sup> McPherson, *Role of the Army*, 43.

<sup>191</sup> McPherson, *Role of the Army*, 44.

“counterproductive to the overall goal of creating confidence in the local government. It might also foster a false impression about the local government’s ability and desire to meet the population’s needs.”<sup>192</sup> So while US medical units stemmed the humanitarian crisis in the Dominican Republic they did not want to start a US military form of Dominican health care. Instead the military wanted to encourage support of the new Dominican government, while supporting the mission of stabilizing the crisis. During the attempted support of the Dominican medical institutions the US military medical mission “took on more of the character of a charity program and less of an emergency operation,” especially after the Dominican hospitals reopened. Many of those hospitals referred Dominican civilians who could not afford medical service to US army hospitals. This led the military to have issues controlling where the Dominican population sought aid.<sup>193</sup> This relationship and form of operation emerged as the status quo for the duration of the intervention and occupation despite the attempts of the army medical units to control the population and shift primary responsibility onto the Dominican institutions. The status quo provided an example of how the military’s use of humanitarianism to control the population backfired. The Dominican population wanted the continued treatment from the US military and pushed back on the military’s attempts to scale back aid.

Medical civil affairs programs enacted a number of operations that led to stability, but established control of where and how Dominicans received medical treatment from US military units while boosting confidence in the Dominican medical institutions. One way was through medical units providing consultations for further treatment. The case of

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<sup>192</sup> Wilensky, *Military Medicine*, 111.

<sup>193</sup> McPherson, *Role of the Army*, 46.

Ramiro Matos Gonzalez provides an example of a consultation. On September 16, 1965 the US Army Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) in the Dominican Republic received a letter from Francisco Caminero, the commander of Dominican military forces and the national police, that requested treatment for Lieutenant Colonel Ramiro Matos Gonzalez, who sustained wounds in the right eye from a grenade fragment.<sup>194</sup> The following day, the US Embassy approved the medical treatment and “suggested that treatment be without charge to the Dominican government,” and the case received further endorsement from the Chief of MAAG Colonel J.F. Quilty.<sup>195</sup> Carrying out the orders of the Embassy, the Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Robert Linvill, requested the “necessary action and effect coordination to have this individual [Lt. Col. Gonzalez] evaluated under provisions of change 12, AR 40-3, paragraph 34.”<sup>196</sup> This was the same army regulation provided by the civil affairs officer when arguing for medical attention and aid for Maria de Los Angeles Ogando, which was eventually denied by the medical and JAG officers. Two weeks after the Chief of Staff’s request, Lt. Col. Gonzalez received a medical evaluation from the 15<sup>th</sup> Field Hospital and the evaluating doctor, Lt. Col. Donald McLeod, recommended “that this man be evaluated by an

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<sup>194</sup> Letter from Caminero, September 16, 1965; 901-02 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Surgeon Section, Medical Care Instruction, 1966 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 14; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>195</sup> Letter From US Embassy, September 17, 1965; 901-02 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Surgeon Section, Medical Care Instruction, 1966 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 14; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>196</sup> Letter from General Linvill, October 6, 1965; 901-02 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Surgeon Section, Medical Care Instruction, 1966 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 14; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

[ophthalmologist]. There is such a specialist at Rodriguez [Army Hospital], in Puerto Rico. This man may travel without assistance on routine inter island flights.”<sup>197</sup> There appears to be no further documentation on whether the US military provided travel to Puerto Rico for treatment. However, Lt. Col. Gonzalez did visit medical facilities in Puerto Rico as evidenced by a medical report from Ashford Medical Center, office of K. Ocasio Cabanas, Condado, Santurce, Puerto Rico, which stated that the prognosis was extremely poor, and surgery was not recommended.<sup>198</sup> There appears to be no further documentation regarding the case of Lt. Col. Gonzalez but the case offered details regarding US military medical aid, and the role of medical units during the intervention.

The case of Lt. Col. Gonzalez offers insight into how US medical units offered aid in the months after the initial combat actions and humanitarian crisis and on how those units viewed their role in the intervention. While providing humanitarian aid medical units continued controlling where and how the Dominican population sought treatment. For instance, while the US Embassy approved of using military transportation and not charging the Dominican government. The military doctors with the 15<sup>th</sup> Field Hospital believed that Lt. Col. Gonzalez maintained the ability to travel on his own to Puerto Rico to receive further medical care. There is also the issue that Lt. Col. Gonzalez received the required treatment due to his status as a Dominican military officer and that

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<sup>197</sup> Report from McLeod, October 14, 1965; 901-02 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Surgeon Section, Medical Care Instruction, 1966 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 14; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>198</sup> Report on K. Ocasio Cabanas, October 26, 1965; 901-02 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Surgeon Section, Medical Care Instruction, 1966 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 14; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

the recommendation for treatment came from Francisco Caminero, a figure whom the US needed to cultivate a positive relationship with to control the crisis.

The continued support of Dominican military members was further illustrated in the case of a medical evaluation regarding the six-year-old son of a Dominican Air Force officer. The reason given for the evaluation of the child was provided through paragraph 34, Army Regulations 40-3 and it was “recommended that a ophthalmologist evaluate this lad...such a specialist is a staff [consultant] to Rodriguez Army Hospital, Puerto Rico.”<sup>199</sup> Furthermore, military and embassy leadership agreed that treatment should be provided without cost to the Dominican government and “that all charges incident to this evaluation be waived under the provisions of Paragraph 34e, AR 40-3,” which highlighted this incident as an unusual circumstance per wording of the Army Regulation.<sup>200</sup> Paragraph 34 of the Army Regulations is in regard to foreign nationals and stated that the individual may receive medical care when the “action can be expected to contribute to the advancement of the public interests of the United States,” and further stated that this “care under this paragraph will be afforded only to foreign officials of high national prominence.”<sup>201</sup> This regulation was used to rationalize many of the evacuations for high ranking Dominican Republic military personnel while turning away average Dominican citizens. Those regulations allowed US army medical units to fulfill

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<sup>199</sup> Request for Medical evaluation; 901-02 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Surgeon Section, Medical Care Instruction, 1966 [1 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 14; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>200</sup> Medical Evaluation; NACP; Army Regulation 40-3, paragraph 34(e), 1964.

<sup>201</sup> Department of the Army, Army Regulations 40-3, Paragraph 34 (a), (d1), 1964.

the evaluation and at times evacuation request of high-ranking Dominican military officers and government officials. There did not appear to be any debate as to whether the officials' families fell under that regulation. However, other than Dominican officials, the medical units also conducted evaluations of Dominican civilians.

Two cases illustrated the US Army medical units' ability to evaluate Dominican civilians but not to conduct the evacuation or treatment provided to high ranking Dominican officers or officials. The first involved seven year old Altagracia Grullon Ventura who received an examination on March 8, 1966 regarding burns she received five years prior to the US military intervention.<sup>202</sup> The examining doctor concluded that "this child has severe scarring of the thorax which could be improved by plastic surgery... There is no current urgency of treatment" and "it is recommended that she be evaluated by such a specialist [plastic surgeon] within the next six month. It is further recommended that such referral be accomplished through charitable or Human Rights channels."<sup>203</sup> The second case involved Estervina Cabrera, examined August 19, 1966 Cabrera was shot in the leg during the fighting in 1965. The evaluation reported that "she underwent emergency surgery at what was then the 15<sup>th</sup> Field Hospital for a shattered bone in the right leg" and she remained under the 15<sup>th</sup> Field Hospital's care for a couple of days before transferring to Dominican medical facilities.<sup>204</sup> The evaluation described

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<sup>202</sup> Physical evaluation, March 8, 1966; 901-02 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Surgeon Section, Medical Care Instruction, 1966 [2 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 14; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>203</sup> Physical evaluation, March 8, 1966; NACP.

<sup>204</sup> Medical Evaluation of Estervina Cabrera, August 20, 1966; 901-02 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Surgeon Section, Medical Care Instruction, 1966 [3

her condition as “she has an osteomyelitis of the right tibia (infection of the bone of the leg) and a chronically draining wound. The treatment...is surgery to debride the bone of infection and bone chips to replace the destroyed bone.”<sup>205</sup> It was further concluded by the evaluating doctor that “this type of treatment is within the scope of an orthopedic surgeon and therefore available from local Dominican resources. Recommend no further action be taken.”<sup>206</sup> Those two cases, especially the latter, displayed the unwillingness of the medical units to provide medical care offered by Dominican facilities. Those cases are also the best illustration regarding the US military’s control of Dominican civilians by sending them to Dominican hospitals and doctors. The military wanted to rebuild the trust and reliance on Dominican medical facilities to demonstrate that the pro-US government had the capability to take care of the population and to diminish support for leftist political organizations.

The four cases outlined represented the varying kinds of treatment the US medical units and personnel provided to Dominican civilians compared to high ranking Dominican officials. It is important to note that evaluation of the cases occurred at different times in the intervention with the two regarding high ranking Dominican military officials occurring earlier in the intervention when Dominican institutions operated at minimal capacity. Evaluations of the two Dominican children occurred later in the occupation when the US military attempted to build up the new Dominican government and institutions. However, the cases demonstrate discrepancies in how the

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of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 14; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>205</sup> Medical Evaluation of Estervina Cabrera, August 20, 1966; NACP.

<sup>206</sup> Medical Evaluation of Estervina Cabrera, August 20, 1966; NACP.

medical units treated Dominicans as a whole. The issue was further illustrated by the fourth case regarding Estervina Cabrera in which medical units originally operated on the child's leg, and then transferred responsibility to a Dominican hospital during the early stages of the intervention. The transfer occurred at the same time medical units administered further treatment in Puerto Rico to a high-level Dominican officer. No records existed to aid the US medical evaluator in 1966 and there appears to be no date offered when Cabrera originally received treatment.

The medical units' primary mission throughout the intervention and occupation focused on treating US military personnel, alleviating the public health crisis, and assisting Dominican medical institutions to the best of their ability. The biased treatment toward high ranking Dominican officials that held positions in the pro-US government demonstrated that the US military's humanitarianism was about stabilizing the crisis and controlling the population to build up the Dominican government. It also illustrated the influence of the US embassy which held close relationships with Dominican officials who provided access to high level Dominican military officials. The access allowed the US Embassy to influence the US military in a desired way or to perform certain duties to support the establishment of a pro-US government. However, all medical actions initiated by the embassy fell in accordance with US Army Regulations describing treatment of foreign personnel, so the embassy did not ask the military to do anything illegal according to military policy.

While evaluations took up a significant amount of time for medical personnel, venereal disease (VD) caused a significant and lasting problem for US military soldiers for the duration and the treatment of those diseases outside of administering medicine

never experienced full success. The problem took an immense toll on US military personnel and accounted for more medical issues than battle and non-battle casualties.<sup>207</sup> Attempting to aid in the reporting and treatment of VD the medical command released orders that reminded commanders “that men were not to be punished for having venereal disease, and unit surgeons were reminded that personnel treated for venereal disease were not to be reported” to maintain privacy in the hopes that soldiers kept reporting their conditions.<sup>208</sup> During the initial stages of the intervention testing equipment did not accompany the medical units to the Dominican Republic, so many soldiers received treatment presumptively if they exhibited any symptoms of disease.<sup>209</sup> While treating soldiers for the disease medical personnel also attempted to treat the disease within the Dominican population as a way of stemming the amount of cases.

The medical personnel attempted a number of tactics to both warn US personnel and to stop the number of cases of venereal disease. One of the first attempts occurred in a medical bulletin regarding health hazards in the Dominican Republic, which read “VD is prevalent in the Dominican Republic...We cannot legislate morals and non-fraternization and continence are almost impossible to enforce, but troops should be informed of the fantastically high risk they are taking with sexual contacts here.”<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> McPherson, *Role of the Army*, 17.

<sup>208</sup> McPherson, *Role of the Army*, 19.

<sup>209</sup> “Confidential Nature of Venereal Disease Information, 82d Airborne Division,” in Darrell G. McPherson, *The Role of the Army Medical Service in the Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General and Department of the Army, 1966), Appendix C.

<sup>210</sup> “Medical Bulletin Number 1, Health Hazards in the Dominican Republic, USFORDOMREP,” May 12, 1965, in Darrell McPherson, *The Role of the Army Medical Service in the Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General and Department of the Army, 1966), Appendix G.

Following the issue that there was no prevention of mingling between US military personnel and Dominican civilians the commanders of the US Forces medical units and the IAPF medical unit worked together in attempting to track the origins of the infections. Officers worked alongside health services in North Carolina, the location of Fort Bragg, the home base of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, and the Dominican health services to track down women who encountered infected US military personnel. While able to track some women through the process the overall program did not lead to a decrease in VD reports. Instead beginning in 1966 cases of VD actually went up.<sup>211</sup> The rates of VD across US military personnel remained at high levels throughout the intervention with the only decreases attributed to the withdrawal of US troops from the Dominican Republic until the full withdrawal in September 1966.

Decreasing the exposure to VD led to the medical personnel confronting several challenges related to the relationship between Dominican women and US military personnel. US military commanders attempted to control the personnel through educating US troops. Soldiers did not always distinguish the difference between regular Dominican women and prostitutes and treated any woman as the latter.<sup>212</sup> The primary problem was how to approach Dominican women still living with their families about sexual health. The issue existed due to the Dominican Republic representing a strong conservative catholic country at the time of the intervention. The military hesitated to create issues regarding accusation of a middle class, catholic Dominican teenager of sexual relations with a US soldier, which inevitably would have led to further problems for the US

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<sup>211</sup> McPherson, *Role of the Army*, 20.

<sup>212</sup> Yates, *Power Pack*, 139.

military. Instead, medical command monitored US troops and created screening units including check-ups for soldiers that transferred out of the Dominican Republic, especially if they received treatment for VD while in the country.<sup>213</sup>

While the treatment and programs to limit VD among US personnel may have included Dominican citizens it did not seek to aid Dominicans in general. The plans' primary goal, especially the plan to track the origin of the VD, revolved around protecting US military personnel and if the medical units aided Dominican citizens then all the better. The attempts to limit the cases of VD added an extra dimension to the Dominican intervention in that more casualties occurred due to VD compared to combat actions that occurred during the initial months of the intervention. The US military accepted that banning sexual interactions between military personnel and Dominicans was unenforceable. The military believed the best strategy remained education about the susceptibility to diseases and constant testing.

While the medical units in the Dominican Republic served both military personnel and Dominican civilians discussions existed as to whether or not US Army medical personnel had the responsibility to treat military and government dependents inside the Dominican Republic. The conversation started on May 10, 1966 when Lt. Col. Donald McLeod, commanding officer of the 42<sup>nd</sup> Field Hospital, sent a communication letter that detailed how the daily bulletins sent out by the US Forces "restricted medical support to 'Tourist Type' dependents of military or [Department of the Army] civilian

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<sup>213</sup> "Redeployment Physical Evaluation, USFORDOMREP Circular Number 40-12," June 7, 1965, In Darrell McPherson, *The Role of the Army Medical Service in the Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General and Department of the Army, 1966), Appendix D.

personnel.”<sup>214</sup> “Tourist Type” dependents referred to dependents that did not have to be in the Dominican Republic, but were visiting family or living alongside a spouse. Lt. Col. McLeod referenced army regulations that stated “the eligibility of these individuals for treatment” is required and defined the parameters for treatment.<sup>215</sup> Seven days after Lt. Col. McLeod’s initial communication, on May 17, 1966 Lt. Col. Edwin F. Pegelow, Assistant Chief of Staff J1 (Personnel), sent a Disposition Form to the J4 (Logistics) and the US Forces Chief of Staff. The form summarized Lt. Col. McLeod’s position and stated that his “inference is that the hospital is capable of supporting the needs of dependents notwithstanding the operational posture of USFORDOMREP” and that the regulation “states in part that support to dependents will not be permitted to interfere with the primary mission.”<sup>216</sup> Lt. Col. Pegelow concluded by mentioning that once the policy regarding the treatment of dependents was set it may have increased dependents arriving in the Dominican Republic, which carried the possibility of raising problems regarding the treatment administered by medical units.<sup>217</sup>

After Lt. Col. Pegelow’s form reached the Chief of Staff and Lt. Col. McLeod, the conversation reverted to Lt. Col. McLeod who on May 20, 1966 created a Disposition Form sent to the Chief of Staff of the US Forces. In the form Lt. Col. McLeod stated that

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<sup>214</sup> McLeod communication, May 10, 1966; 901-02 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Surgeon Section, Medical Care Instruction, 1966 [3 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 14; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>215</sup> McLeod Communication, May 10, 1966; NACP.

<sup>216</sup> Pegelow Disposition Form, May 17, 1966; 901-02 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Surgeon Section, Medical Care Instruction, 1966 [3 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 14; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>217</sup> Pegelow Disposition Form, May 17, 1966; NACP.

“Dependents of active duty military are authorized medical care by law” and that if they did not receive treatment at military facilities then the military covered their treatment at civilian facilities.<sup>218</sup> Lt. Col. McLeod also expressed a worry regarding the image of the US military both within the Dominican Republic and in the United States when he stated that “local civilian medical care as judged by our standards is less than ideal. A most embarrassing situation would arise if a dependent was denied care at our medical facility and expired in a local civilian hospital,” and that he did not want to “encourage an additional workload but to preclude the possibility of an embarrassing situation arising.”<sup>219</sup> That statement illustrated the US military’s desire to maintain a positive image of their presence in the Dominican Republic by treating dependents of US military or civilian personnel. The military also wanted to demonstrate publicly that Dominican healthcare facilities under the pro-US government operated in a capacity to handle Dominican casualties or any medical issues that arose. The Chief of Staff received Lt. Col. McLeod’s Disposition Form and signed a handwritten note on it for the J-1 (Pegelow) and the J-4 (Walsh) to “see me please.”<sup>220</sup> While it is unknown what was said during the meeting, the Chief of Staff agreed with Lt. Col. McLeod’s position. Lt. Col. Owen Walsh (J-4) sent a communication to the surgeon section, commanded by Lt. Col. McLeod, confirming “the C/S [Chief of Staff] agrees in principle with the position stated...however, he does not want to advertise or ‘unadvertise’ the dependent eligibility

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<sup>218</sup> McLeod Disposition Form, May 20, 1966; 901-02 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Surgeon Section, Medical Care Instruction, 1966 [3 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 14; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>219</sup> McLeod Disposition Form, May 20, 1966; NACP.

<sup>220</sup> McLeod Disposition Form, May 20, 1966; NACP.

and medical service. The matter will remain at status quo.”<sup>221</sup> The Chief of Staff not wanting to advertise the ability of the medical units to treat dependents attempted to keep the number of dependents in the Dominican Republic at a negligible level, a concern expressed by the J-1 (Pegelow), but expressed that if issues developed then dependents remained available for treatment at US Army medical facilities.

The discussion regarding the treatment of US military dependents in US Army medical facilities illustrated the US military’s perception of the Dominican medical facilities and the military’s desire to control not only Dominican civilians but also military dependents. Controlling the Dominican population and the image of the intervention remained a primary importance throughout the intervention and occupation of the Dominican Republic, and the treatment or non-treatment of dependents allowed for embarrassing situations to arise in multiple settings. The first, was the situation Lt. Col. McLeod mentioned, where if a dependent died in a Dominican hospital after US medical facilities turned them away. That issue, other than not great publicity for the military, also brought other issues to the forefront. Lt. Col. McLeod commented on the superiority of US medical facilities compared to the Dominican Republic’s medical facilities. It is unclear if the comment was about US facilities in general, such as inside the United States or at Puerto Rico, or if the comments regarded US military medical facilities in the Dominican Republic. What is clear is that the facilities Lt. Col. McLeod expressed may cause embarrassment to the US military are the same facilities the US military sent

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<sup>221</sup> Walsh communication, May 23, 1966; 901-02 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Surgeon Section, Medical Care Instruction, 1966 [3 of 3]; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 14; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Dominican citizens for treatment to demonstrate the ability of the pro-US government to support the population while denying Dominicans the “superior” treatment available at US medical facilities.

The case of Maria de los Angeles Ogando, discussed in a previous chapter, or Altigracia Ventura and Estervina Cabrera mentioned earlier, are examples where the military had the opportunity to use US medical facilities. Instead the military deemed Dominican facilities capable of administering the treatment required. The US military’s humanitarianism through civic action projects and civil affairs operations created an environment for the formation of a pro-US government to support the populations needs and to turn Dominicans away from leftist political groups. The conversation regarding the control of dependents also illustrated how the US military attempted to avoid embarrassing situations, and bad press. Humanitarian aid provided by the US military controlled the Dominican population throughout the occupation and eliminated the threat of leftist political groups to the pro-US government through the appearance to take care of the Dominican people.

From the beginning of the intervention medical units gained top priority from the US government much to the chagrin of the combat troops and commanders deployed to the country. While the civilian casualties were not as high as initially believed, the humanitarian crisis remained high on the list of US government concerns and the US military used the crisis to successfully control the population. Overall, the US military medical units that served in the Dominican Republic treated over 60,000 people during the intervention and subsequent occupation and performed civic action programs all over the country. The units’ role in the intervention took center stage ahead of combat actions

and remained an important factor by serving in an emergency and advising capacity to the Dominican Republic's health services. It is unknown how the civil affairs operations impacted Dominican medical facilities long term. The primary role of civil affairs was to restart the institutions and to assist with the bureaucracy not to improve the facilities. However, judging by military comments on the state of Dominican medical institutions the hospitals improved only marginally from before the crisis.

US military medical units that operated in the Dominican Republic successfully turned the Dominican population away from radical political groups and completed the US military's goal of stabilizing the Dominican crisis in support of a pro-US government. Those intervention and occupation displayed how medical units treated high ranking Dominican military and government officials compared to average Dominican citizens to control where and how Dominicans sought medical treatment. The former had the ability to receive treatment at US facilities outside of the Dominican Republic while the latter remained in the Dominican Republic. Dominican military officers and government officials aided the overall mission of forming a pro-US government whereas the military wanted the average Dominican to support the government. The medical units operated in an assisting capacity further represented their control of the Dominican population. The US military maintained that US facilities offered better treatment but forced Dominicans to seek help from Dominican hospitals in order to reserve US facilities for US troops and diplomatic personnel.

The medical and humanitarian issues impacted the US military intervention from the very beginning as the US military held the dual role of acting as peacekeepers and serving as a humanitarian force. Some of the first US medical providers in the Dominican

Republic before the US military arrived were Peace Corps nurses who operated within Santo Domingo when the fighting broke out. Those volunteers continued working through the violence while Dominican doctors fled the capital city, or to the safe havens of foreign embassies. The Peace Corps nurses kept returning to the hospitals, many existed behind Constitutionalist lines, to offer aid to Dominican citizens wounded in the fighting. The journey to those hospitals routinely went against US military orders to remain within the safe zones, or behind the Line of Communication. When the US military started to focus heavily on aid the Peace Corps nurses provided liaison duties between the military, and the Dominican hospitals and civilians to provide better care for those involved. Peace Corps operations and the relationship with the US military throughout the intervention remained a key component of all US civil affairs activities. The US military medical mission aided the overall US military mission of stabilizing the Dominican Republic, thereby furthering US government policy initiatives in the region. Using humanitarianism, the US military controlled the Dominican population and aided the build-up of Dominican health institutions.

## CHAPTER V – BASEBALL AND MUSIC

In the summer of 1966, the US military started conducting band concerts around the Dominican Republic. Those concerts provided the opportunity for US forces to build relationships with the Dominican people, and to improve the image of the US as the intervention dragged on. Alongside the concerts, US forces conducted carnivals and festivals to entertain the local population. At one band concert in the town of Constanza information trickled up the chain of command that candy was not going to be distributed. The Chief of Staff of the US Forces produced a handwritten note asking why and the civil affairs officer explained “all coordination at the local community level was effect by SF [Special Forces] Detachments in the area, plans were not made by this office for loudspeaker support or candy distribution.”<sup>222</sup> Clearly incensed at the explanation, the Chief of Staff wrote back in big bold letters “WHY NOT CANDY?”<sup>223</sup> Unable to provide a satisfactory answer the civil affairs officer responded saying “I will make arrangements for and see that candy distribution is made in Constanza” followed by a handwritten note expressing “candy will be issued in connection with all band concerts.”<sup>224</sup> Those suggestions provided by upper level commanders demonstrated the importance of the band concerts to the US military effort. The US military continued conducting band concerts through the final phase of withdrawal from the Dominican Republic in September 1966. The entertainment and recreational activities provided by the US

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<sup>222</sup> Memorandum between Chief of Staff and J-5, July 20, 1966; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Civil Affairs Project, 1966; Unit Records Created during the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>223</sup> Memorandum between Chief of Staff and J-5, July 21, 1966; NACP.

<sup>224</sup> Memorandum between Chief of Staff and J-5, July 23, 1966; NACP.

military throughout the intervention played a large role in the military's mission of stability to ensure a Dominican government friendly to US interests in turning the Dominican population away from radical political organizations.

This chapter argues that the US military successfully used recreation and entertainment as humanitarian aid to diminish the populations interest in leftist political activism. That decreased interest in the leftist political message allowed for the creation of a stable pro-US government. Using sports, such as baseball, and entertainment, such as concerts, was not only about improving relationships. The events provided activities for people to attend that kept their focus away from the political violence carried out by left and right-wing political groups and US and IAPF military operations. Events such as the concert in Constanza acted as a key tactic for civil affairs as it provided entertainment to the population and allowed the military to paint a picture of celebration and cohesiveness, rather than that of violence and oppression. Military action usually involved violence, guns, bombs, and subterfuge. Instead with band concerts and other recreational activities the military provided a different perception of military action. Baseball kept youth away from the radical political groups conducting political violence throughout the intervention and occupation. By keeping young people out of political activism, US military sponsored baseball leagues provided a stable environment for political negotiations and elections to occur and bring to power leaders favorable to the US.

The Dominican Republic was not the first or the only time the US government or military used the entertainment of military bands as a diplomatic vehicle. During the 1950s through the 1960s the US State Department ran a musical diplomacy program. Performers such as Dizzy Gillespie, Louis Armstrong, and Dave Brubeck travelled

throughout the world promoting US music culture, particularly jazz. For US diplomats and performers jazz was the equivalent of democracy. Dave Brubeck before his European tour in 1958 said to a reporter “Jazz represents America in so many ways. Take freedom for example. In jazz you have freedom of expression within the structure of the musical form. In the United States we have individual freedom within the structure of the Constitution.”<sup>225</sup> How the State Department used jazz and jazz performers around the world provided a blueprint for how US Army bands performing in the Dominican Republic performed during their concerts to showcase and promote the United States’ image.

It was not only independent professional musicians that toured the world promoting US democracy and freedom during the 1950s and 1960s. During this period, the United States Air Force Band (USAF Band) performed a number of concerts around the world to promote the United States’ cultural differences and heritage.<sup>226</sup> Military bands made an important contribution during the Cold War as ambassadors of the United States through their performances in foreign nations. Their musical ability may have led to the increase or decrease in reputation of not just the US military but the US government. When performing, a military band carried a heavy burden whether playing a national anthem, culturally appropriate music, or ignoring the musical history of the

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<sup>225</sup> Quoted in Stephen A. Crist, “Jazz as Democracy? Dave Brubeck and Cold War Politics,” in *The Journal of Musicology*, Vol. 26, 2 (Spring 2009) 162. From Russ Wilson, “Brubeck Quartet Off for Poland,” *Oakland Tribune*, February 2, 1958 (Brubeck Collection, 1.E.1a.8).

<sup>226</sup> Susan Page Chumley, “The United States Air Force Band: Musical Ambassadors on a Cold War Stage,” (Masters’ Thesis, University of Maryland, 2014), 14.

target nation. The military band is always an ambassador when it travels within or outside US borders.<sup>227</sup> This status as a diplomatic ambassador is further displayed in the musical concerts performed in the Dominican Republic during the intervention.

A variety of recreation and entertainment programs for Dominican citizens and US military forces provided activities for both, but for very different purposes. For the US and IAPF forces, entertainment and recreation offered distraction from the periods of boredom that reigned after primary combat activities ended with the establishment of the Provisional Government. The forces also received a diminished role after the Dominican military and re-established police force moved back into the city making the IAPF primarily an on-call force. The US and IAPF troops had access to sporting leagues consisting of volleyball and softball tournaments which saw US units and Latin American Units squaring off against each other for friendly competition.<sup>228</sup> Parties also never decreased as troops sought to entertain themselves with shows and cookouts. General Palmer, deputy commander of the IAPF and commander of the US Forces, remembered fondly how Latin American troops loved to dance and admire the ocean, and that US personnel “found Latin American amateur troops shows remarkable and their huge pit barbecues irresistible.”<sup>229</sup> US military personnel also had access to USO shows visiting the Dominican Republic in July 1965.<sup>230</sup> Bob Hope started shows by yelling “Hello,

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<sup>227</sup> Chumley, “Air Force Band,” 3.

<sup>228</sup> IAPF Organizational History; 206-06 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 23 May 1965-20 September 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>229</sup> General Bruce Palmer Jr, *Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965* (University Press of Kentucky: Lexington, 1989), 123-124.

<sup>230</sup> IAPF Organizational History, 23 May 1965-20 September 1966; NACP.

Saigon east” and led the cast of characters, which also included Joey Heatherton, an actress, dancer, and singer.<sup>231</sup> When in the Dominican Republic the USO performed for 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne personnel, but Latin American units attended the shows alongside their US counterparts. While IAPF personnel had access to parties, sport leagues, and USO shows, the US military provided the primary entertainment and recreation for Dominican citizens which allowed the US to maintain control over the situation. Civil affairs units used a variety of programs throughout the intervention and two of the primary events consisted of band concerts, and baseball.

Musical concerts comprised one of the primary forms of recreation and entertainment the US military used to distract the Dominican population from political events occurring in Santo Domingo. Military bands have a long history of performing for deployed troops and the civilian populations where US troops are present. Musicians performed during the Spanish-American War in Cuba during official ceremonies and for the civilian population as part of relationship building.<sup>232</sup> During World War Two, music was used for propaganda purposes with recordings performed at Abbey Road Studios and hospitals used music and the formation of bands to help rehabilitate soldiers preparing to re-enter civilian life.<sup>233</sup> The use of music to entertain troops and civilian populations continued into the Vietnam era and continues into the present. During Independence Day celebrations, all military branches respective bands perform concerts at locations around

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<sup>231</sup> 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division Unit History, 1965.

<sup>232</sup> Bruce P. Gleason, “Military Music in the United States: A Historical Examination of Performance and Training,” *Music Educators Journal* 101, No. 3 (March 2015), 39.

<sup>233</sup> Gleason, “Military Music,” 41-42.

the Washington D.C. area before the city's firework display. The US military has long understood that music "provides the break that everyone must have from time to time in order to keep on with his job. And it is significant that music universally provides by far the largest portion of pure entertainment."<sup>234</sup> Music provides the opportunity for people to dance or raises their spirits and pride for their nation. For example, one does not need to listen to John Philip Sousa's "Stars and Stripes Forever" very long before they find themselves tapping their feet along with the rhythm, or to the jazz music of Charlie Parker or Dizzy Gillespie before they are carried away by the variety of complex beats and rhythms. Captain James Conely understood the influence of music and wrote "music reflects the lives and thoughts of people so much that if one studies their music he can better understand the people themselves."<sup>235</sup> This is the environment and philosophy military band concerts brought to the Dominican Republic in 1965 until the end of the occupation in September of 1966.

The US military used music to turn people away from leftist political activism within the first week of US troops conducting military operations in Santo Domingo. In the afternoon of May 10, 1965, a few days after the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne created the Line of Communication, the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne band marched down the line playing their instruments with their rifles slung on their backs. The scene did not escape American journalists at the time with one asking "are they playing 'We Shall Overcome,' or 'Marching through

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<sup>234</sup> Captain James Conely, "Music and the Military," *Air University Review* XXIII, No. 3 (March-April 1972), 70.

<sup>235</sup> Conely, "Music and the Military," 71.

Georgia’?”<sup>236</sup> After the stabilization of military activities individual musicians and groups from the band played in cafés and restaurants hoping to provide an atmosphere of normalcy. After the creation of the IAPF music continued to play an essential role within the military civil affairs entertainment programs with concerts held daily in front of US and Latin American troops, as well as Dominican citizens. The US military commanders in the Dominican Republic seemed to understand what Captain Conely discussed seven years later that “music may never be God’s Holy Authorized Answer to the military” but “it is entirely possible that music can be used both directly and indirectly to help the military do its job better.”<sup>237</sup> The military performs a variety of jobs, and while their primary job is warfighting and enforcing US foreign policy, the military does engage with civilian populations outside of combat. For many of those interactions military personnel are either the first American or the only American a person will see. Music and band concerts aided the military in representing the United States on missions and at locations where the military is deployed. In the case of the use of music in the Dominican Republic it helped the military to stabilize the situation and turn the Dominican population away from leftist political organizations through the combination with other events such as festivals, or carnivals.

US Army bands performed a number of concerts around the country outside of Santo Domingo to promote general good will between the Dominican population and the US military, but also to turn the population away from the leftist organizational activities that occurred in the capital city. During the early stages of the intervention a number of

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<sup>236</sup> Tad Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, 173

<sup>237</sup> Conely, “Music and Military,” 72.

Constitutionalists journeyed to the countryside in an attempt to start a rural insurgency along the lines of what Castro accomplished in Cuba. While achieving minor success in the beginning those attempts eventually fell apart. The US military recognized that rural communities needed to be controlled and separated from the events occurring in Santo Domingo. One strategy involved the band concerts, which occurred in a variety of small towns throughout the rural regions of the country. This strategy also saw use in Vietnam with a different twist, “while another unit screened people in a village for Viet Cong soldiers, the band presented concerts and variety entertainment to keep noncombatant populace away from the screening unit. The people enjoyed the concerts and screening was completed without disturbance.”<sup>238</sup> This tactic does not appear in any of the after-action reports regarding band concerts in the Dominican Republic. However, the Vietnam case illustrated that the army recognized and used musical concerts as a tactic for a native population to draw attention away from other events.

To illustrate the tactics used within the band concerts after action reports for three concerts provided a description of events, comments from the local population, and areas where the concerts needed improvement for future events. The first concert described by the reports was the June 19, 1966 concert in the northern city of Nagua. The day of the scheduled concert a Special Forces unit organized a field day and provided a sort of festival atmosphere that consisted of games found at US carnivals.<sup>239</sup> After the band

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<sup>238</sup> A History of US Army Bands, Edition D, US Army Element, School of Music, Sub-Course overview, October 2005. <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/armybands.pdf>, Accessed July 14, 2019.

<sup>239</sup> After Action Report of Band Concert in Nagua, June 27 1966; 201-46 J-5, United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Operating Procedures, Band Concerts, 1966;

arrived citizens threw a picnic on the beach followed by the band concert in the city plaza. Playing in front of a crowd of 2,000 people the band impressed the audience with their choice of music and “the band’s obvious proficiency deeply impressed the citizens of Nagua, especially the playing of the Dominican National Anthem.”<sup>240</sup> The playing of a national anthem was mentioned as a key point earlier in the chapter as part of the bands responsibility and the critical consequences if the band bungled the playing of the anthem. The primary objective of the concert mentioned in the report “was to improve the image of US Forces and to establish better relations with the Dominican people” which the report concluded was done successfully.<sup>241</sup> The primary recommendation made regarded holding a festival before the concert to draw the local population to the site with the concert as the main event for entertainment.

Combining a field day or festival type event along with the band concert appeared to have been a big take away from the Nagua concert, but it did not appear to have been taken into account according to the other two after action reports regarding concerts in El Seibo and Hato Mayor. The only mention of a carnival was in the after-action report for the Hato Mayor concert that involved “around 1000 persons” in attendance “most of whom had gathered in the park before the arrival of the band. In this audience there were many teenagers as there was some type of carnival in the town which they were attending.”<sup>242</sup> The carnival appeared not to have been a product of US civil affairs or

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Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>240</sup> After Action Report of Band Concert in Nagua, June 27, 1966; NACP.

<sup>241</sup> After Action Report of Band Concert in Nagua, June 27, 1966; NACP.

<sup>242</sup> After Action Report of Band Concert in Hato Mayor, August 22, 1966; 201-46 J-5, United States Forces, Dominican Republic Operating Procedures, Band Concerts,

Special Forces personnel. After both concerts in El Seibo and Hato Mayor the band attended a reception at the local government building where city officials praised the bands efforts and musical ability. In Hato Mayor, the local band leader “praised the band for its quality and the US Forces for presenting the concert and remarked ‘that the residents of Hato Mayor will long remember that when the Inter-American Peace Force was in the Dominican Republic, its band came to Hato Mayor’.”<sup>243</sup> It is unknown whether or not this is a direct quote from the town band leader or if the writer of the report paraphrased the speech. However, it is telling that the Dominican band leader said “Inter-American Peace Force” when referencing the band, even though the band was the 81<sup>st</sup> US Army Band. A similar phrase occurred after the concert in El Seibo, where the report stated “the Governess thanked the band and the US Forces for the concert and presented the Bandleader with a bouquet of flowers.”<sup>244</sup> This report contained the comments from the Governor who stated “Distinguished artists who are members of this Musical Band. We are very thankful for your visit to this town of El Seibo. Believe us that we will know how to keep this concert in our hearts sprayed with beautiful tones as these perfumed flowers which I give you.”<sup>245</sup> The comments from the Governor, while showing appreciation towards the band and band members did not mention the US Forces. Neither

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1966; Units Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>243</sup> After Action Report of Band Concert in Hato Mayor, August 22, 1966; NACP.

<sup>244</sup> After Action Report of Band Concert in El Seibo, August 22, 1966; 201-46 J-5, United States Forces, Dominican Republic Operating Procedures, Band Concerts, 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>245</sup> After Action Report of Band Concert in El Seibo, August 22, 1966; NACP.

comments from the band leader in Hato Mayor or the Governor in El Seibo mention the band as part of the US Forces. There may be a number of reasons for the not mentioning of the US military directly, one example is that the Dominican citizens of both towns differentiated the US band from the US military forces as two separate entities. The possibility also existed that Dominicans refused to acknowledge the US Forces in a positive view while acknowledging the talent and skill of the band members. In all three after action reports regarding the band concerts the primary mission of the band was to improve the image and relations of the US Forces. The non-mentioning of US Forces in comments from the community leaders illustrated this mission may not have been as successful as described in the reports.

US Army bands played an essential role in the Dominican Republic during the intervention and occupation providing entertainment for US and IAPF forces, and for Dominican citizens. While US forces used band concerts to improve relations and the US military's image the primary mission remained turning Dominican audiences away from the leftist political activities. The political divide of the civil war followed by the political terrorism that occurred after the establishment of the Provisional Government saw the US Forces prioritize making sure the violence and turmoil did not spill over into the rural population. Band concerts provided the Dominican population entertainment during the ongoing violence in the capital city, and during the political negotiations conducted by the OAS and the two opposing political factions. Outside of the rural band concerts, US Army bands participated in ceremonies within the Dominican government and the IAPF in Santo Domingo. There was even a case where army bands played for a local school

dance and experienced widespread use in civil affairs operations involving Dominican youth.

US military civil affairs in the Dominican Republic adopted baseball as a form of entertainment to turn people away from the leftist political activities. From the early stages of the intervention baseball played an important role in the civil affairs operations aimed toward the Dominican population. In propaganda pamphlets distributed throughout the city by US psychological operations units a listing of baseball scores from Major League Baseball (MLB) appeared on over 25,000 leaflets dropped over Santo Domingo in the opening months of the intervention.<sup>246</sup> The use of baseball games and leagues continued throughout the occupation as Special Forces units in towns around the rural and urban portions of the country sponsored baseball teams and leagues to provide entertainment and recreation for all demographics of the population.<sup>247</sup> Those civil affairs baseball operations consisted of setting up a small league within a town, or suburb of a city. The teams were then sponsored by a US military unit, usually the unit operating in proximity whose personnel donated money and equipment. The name of the unit appeared on the back of the player's jersey, so instead of displaying a local business as seen on US little league jerseys, the Dominican players' jerseys read "105<sup>th</sup> Trans. Co" or "Co. C 4/68<sup>th</sup> Armor."<sup>248</sup> The use of baseball as a civil affairs operation provided a dual

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<sup>246</sup> Department of the Army, *Stability operations: Dominican Republic*, Psychological Operations, Vol. II.

<sup>247</sup> Civil affairs operations chart; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Civil Affairs Project, 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>248</sup> Dominican Youth Sports Program Final Team Standings, August 4, 1966; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Civil Affairs

opportunity. It first provided entertainment, similar to the band concerts, for the local population. Secondly, it provided a way to keep Dominican youth away from the leftist political organizations that caused problems for the US military through protests and other more violent forms of political activities.

Baseball has a long history in the Dominican Republic and for the civil affairs units participating in the intervention provided an ideal event to aid in the success of the mission. First introduced to the Dominican Republic by US Marines during the first occupation of the nation, from 1916 to 1924, as a form of entertainment and recreation. The Dominican population adopted the sport as their own by expressing nationalistic sentiment through the various teams, especially when Dominican teams played teams comprised of the occupying marines.<sup>249</sup> Participation of the sport grew under the dictator Rafael Trujillo, who along with US owned sugar refineries organized and built “baseball facilities as partial outlet for cane cutters [idle] during the half of the year that they weren’t working.”<sup>250</sup> The 1930s saw US corporations use baseball to keep cane cutters from organizing or speaking out against the working conditions of the US companies, and the Trujillo government.<sup>251</sup> Those teams went on to form the Dominican baseball league which included the participation of not only highly skilled Dominican players, but also MLB players. The players participated during the offseason or because of their exclusion

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Project, 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>249</sup> Rob Ruck, *Tropic of Baseball: Baseball in the Dominican Republic* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998) Nook Edition. 52

<sup>250</sup> Alan Klein, “American Hegemony, Dominican Resistance, and Baseball,” in *Dialectical Anthropology* 13, no. 4 (1998): 306.

<sup>251</sup> Klein, *American Hegemony*, 307

from the MLB due to racial segregation. Rob Ruck described a multitude of reasons African American baseball players traveled to the Dominican Republic among them was not only continuous playing, but also for the pay and that African Americans did not experience the racial animosity experienced within the United States.<sup>252</sup> At this point the relationship between US and Dominican baseball existed strictly through the Dominican league as Trujillo did not allow MLB teams to sign any Dominican players. Instead Trujillo preferred to keep them on his team, “Escogido,” which won the league championship every year.<sup>253</sup> The US sugar industry’s use of baseball to control the population mirrored Trujillo’s tactics within the Dominican league. However, those tactics do not appear to have influenced the US military civil affairs program rather the military used an already a popular sporting event to their advantage. Baseballs use in Dominican politics continued after the overthrow of the Bosch administration in 1963 when Reid Cabral’s triumvirate attempted to calm the population, and reasoned that “a few hours at the ballpark would divert the minds of the Dominican people from thoughts of revolution, riot and mayhem.”<sup>254</sup> The US military built on baseball’s history of turning the Dominican population away from radical political activities and groups.

The civil affairs office created multiple sporting teams, baseball included, consisting of US military personnel that played Dominican teams. The signing of the Act of Reconciliation ceased hostilities between the Constitutionalist and Loyalist forces on

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<sup>252</sup> Ruck, *Tropic of Baseball*, 60.

<sup>253</sup> Klein, *American Hegemony*, 116.

<sup>254</sup> Quoted in Rob Ruck, *Raceball: How the Major Leagues Colonized the Black and Latin Game* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2011), 166, Nook edition. From Felipe Alou with Herm Weiskopf, *Felipe Alou: My Life and Baseball* ([Waco, TX?]: Word Books, 1967) 119-120.

August 30, 1965 and created a Provisional Government. This led to a decrease in combat activities for the US and IAPF and the two resorted to general peacekeeping and constabulary operations. The ceasing of combat activities allowed civil affairs units to conduct more recreational and entertainment-oriented programs as the US forces remained in the Dominican Republic to support the Provisional Government and ensure a peaceful transition to a permanent government after elections. One project consisted of establishing a US Forces, Dominican Republic (USFORDOMREP) baseball team “to represent US military forces in the Dominican Republic for competition against local civilian and Dominican military teams” mirroring the teams organized by marines during the previous occupation.<sup>255</sup> The circular announced the date for tryouts and encouraged all qualified US military personnel to attend with the season expected to last from October to March.<sup>256</sup> The fielding of a baseball team comprised of US military personnel to play against Dominican teams offered entertainment for the Dominican population, but also acted as a unifier for the Dominican people to rally around the Dominican team playing an occupying military force. The games between US military personnel and Dominican teams carried political meaning as occupiers played the occupied. The US military wanted to turn Dominicans away from the radical political activities and in doing so ensured stability for the completion of the mission. The games allowed people to unify

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<sup>255</sup> Circular 28-4, September 25, 1965; 205-02 United States Army Element, Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Publication Record Set, General Orders, 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>256</sup> Circular 28-4, September 25, 1965; NACP.

around a common cause and distracted them from political players seeking to use the military operations to inflame the violence.

Civil affairs units also included softball in the programs for recreation and entertainment. The civil affairs office within the USFORDOMREP created a command intramural softball tournament “to afford all US military personnel assigned to Dominican Republic the opportunity to participate in organized competitive sports activities.”<sup>257</sup> The tournament occurred in October and consisted of eight teams from the six major commands making up the USFORDOMREP.<sup>258</sup> Around this same time the USFORDOMREP Civil Affairs office created an intramural volleyball tournament.<sup>259</sup> Those programs primarily targeted US military personnel as the military stance shifted to peacekeeping and constabulary operations and boredom remained the number one issue facing a number of military personnel. However, while it is not explicitly mentioned in either of the circulars announcing the formation of the tournaments those games in all likelihood were open to the Dominican population to provide entertainment. Continuing with the unifying the population theme the US Air Force donated fuel to the Dominican Air Force, in 1965, to fly the Dominican Republic National Softball team to the First

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<sup>257</sup> Circular 28-2, August 17, 1965; 205-02 United States Army Element, Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Publication Record Set, General Orders, 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>258</sup> Circular 28-2, August 17, 1965; NACP.

<sup>259</sup> Circular 28-3, August 17, 1965; 205-02 United States Army Element, Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Publication Record Set, General Orders, 1965; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

World Championship of Male Softball in Mexico.<sup>260</sup> That year the Dominican team finished ranked ninth out of eleven teams finishing with three wins and seven losses. The team played the US national team and the Nicaraguan national team, while both nations had military personnel in the Dominican Republic as part of the IAPF. The US national team won the tournament with a defeat over Mexico.<sup>261</sup> The US military civil affairs office sought not only to turn the population away from leftist political groups but to also unify the nation using baseball and softball. Those attempts continued into 1966 when the USFORDOMREP sponsored a Dominican youth baseball tournament in the final months of the occupation.

A primary target of the US military civil affairs programs remained the youth of Santo Domingo as they made up the majority that participated in the political protests against the intervention. Youth also made up a majority of the multiple left-wing political groups concentrated within the universities and schools. The “international language of dissent” that ignited in the early 1960s spread to the Dominican Republic after the overthrow of the Bosch administration in 1963 and grew stronger during the Reid Cabral triumvirate and US intervention.<sup>262</sup> The civil affairs officers fixated on baseball as a distraction and control tactic and a major project began in March 1966 when civil affairs

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<sup>260</sup> Letter from Brigadier General Robert Linvill to Hipolito Medina Llauger; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Civil Affairs Project, 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>261</sup> Results of the playoffs and standings found at <https://www.the-sports.org/softball-1966-men-s-world-championship-epr23603.html>. Accessed April 22, 2019.

<sup>262</sup> Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 3.

units “organized and furnished coaching and equipment for youth baseball league in cooperation with USAID.”<sup>263</sup> The start of this program coincided with the beginning of the presidential campaign season on March 1, 1966 to choose a new president, who created a government to replace the Provisional Government. The season ran through the months of May, June, and July, which corresponded to the June 1 presidential election that saw Joaquin Balaguer defeat Juan Bosch, and the July 1 swearing in of Balaguer as president. There was little chance of the dates coinciding coincidentally as baseball season in the Dominican Republic runs from October through March. Youth also made up the majority of people that threatened instigating protests against the US occupation and the elections. A program that kept young people off the streets and out of the influence of political, especially left leaning, leaders and provided entertainment for the Dominican population seemed like a win-win situation for US military personnel. The added benefit also existed that US soldiers had plenty of opportunity throughout the baseball season to increase public good will and opinion of US military presence.

Running from March through the end of July the Dominican youth baseball season provided a good example of a long running civil affairs program that turned the Dominican population away leftist political activities. The six teams from suburbs surrounding Santo Domingo made up the league included Villa Francisca, Haina, Ensanche La Fe, Cristo Rey, Arroyo Hondo, and Villa Faro. Additionally, each team had a corresponding US military unit sponsor that provided coaches and a representative from the Dominican government to promote relationships. The following sponsors are:

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<sup>263</sup> Compilation of Information of Status of Military Counterinsurgency Programs, July 27, 1966; NACP.

Table 1 *Baseball Teams and Sponsoring Units*

Arroyo Hondo	42 <sup>nd</sup> Field Hospital
Haina	105 <sup>th</sup> Transportation Company
Cristo Rey	Higher Headquarters, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 504 <sup>th</sup> Inf.
Villa Faro	B Battery, 1 <sup>st</sup> Battalion, 320 <sup>th</sup> Artillery
Ensanche La Fe	Company A and B, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 508 <sup>th</sup> Inf.
Villa Francisca	Company C, 4 <sup>th</sup> Battalion, 68 <sup>th</sup> Armor

All six teams originated from almost every section of the city to provide for a complete covering of the youth population of Santo Domingo and the sponsoring unit was located in close proximity to the team they were sponsoring.<sup>264</sup> US military units varied in the participation with units providing one to three individuals to coach or assist with running the team. However, the number of coaches provided does not seem to correspond with commitment to the team as the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 504<sup>th</sup> Infantry contributed one coach, but in June 1966 “raised funds to provide...a complete set of uniforms to include shoes, socks, T-shirts, caps, and 2/504<sup>th</sup> lettering on back of uniform.”<sup>265</sup> The season ended with Villa Francisca as the season champion and the rankings based on season long records corresponded to seeding in the Dominican Junior Baseball Tournament held at the end of August.<sup>266</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> Dominican Youth Sports Program, Teams and Sponsors, May 6, 1966; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures Civil Affairs Project, 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Records Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>265</sup> Compilation of Information of Status of Military Counterinsurgency Programs, July 27, 1966; NACP.

<sup>266</sup> Dominican Youth Sports Program, Final Team Standings, August 4, 1966; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Civil

Organized at the end of July through early August the USFORDOMREP sponsored Dominican Junior Baseball Tournament provided one of the last opportunities for the US military civil affairs programs to impact the Dominican youth and turn them away from radical political organizations. In the planning of the event the Adjutant General described it as “a Civic Action activity at Quisqueya Stadium involving six (6) junior baseball teams which have been sponsored by various military organizations of USFORDOMREP.”<sup>267</sup> The primary planning of the tournament fell to the J5 Chief of Staff with almost all sections of USFORDOMREP on hand to participate including J4, Joint Information Office (JIO), Provost Marshal, Comptroller, and the sponsoring military units. Just like in the regular season the USFORDOMREP coordinated with USAID “on procurement of equipment and uniforms to the extent possible,” and set a budget for the equipment and trophies at five-hundred dollars.<sup>268</sup> The procurement of equipment came in at one-hundred dollars done through Clark’s Sporting Goods in Fayetteville, North Carolina located nearby Fort Bragg, the home base of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division and 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps, both of which made up the primary command personnel for the USFORDOMREP.<sup>269</sup> To officially follow through with the

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Affairs Project, 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>267</sup> Report, Dominican Republic Junior Baseball Championship, August 19, 1966; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Civil Affairs Project, 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-6/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Par, Maryland.

<sup>268</sup> Report, Dominican Republic Junior Baseball Championship, August 19, 1966; NACP.

<sup>269</sup> Request for Sports Equipment, August 17, 1966; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Civil Affairs Project, 1966; Unit

tournament the proposal was placed to the USFORDOMREP command staff for concur or non-concur. As often was the case with civil affairs programs the medical section caused an issue with planning.

Every level of the USFORDOMREP command staff concurred with the planning for the Dominican Junior Baseball Tournament except for the Surgeon of the US Forces, who described a couple of topics regarding the safety of the players, the Dominican population, and US military personnel. The first point the surgeon made was that “medical facilities at the present time are primary mission oriented only, and medical care is of the ‘routine’ and ‘extreme emergency’ variety.”<sup>270</sup> Part of the reason for this status among the medical facilities was that the withdrawal of US military personnel started at the end of July and beginning of August, so the personnel working in those facilities was limited. The surgeon went on to describe “injuries commonly encountered in baseball games are of the head injury or broken bone variety” and that field x-ray equipment was not available, nor any ambulances available if a serious injury occurred.<sup>271</sup> The final comment provided by the surgeon was that “without a backup hospital, responsibility for medical care of local Dominican Nationals involved in sports injuries should not be

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Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>270</sup> Tab A of Disposition Form, Dominican Republic Junior Baseball Championship, August 16, 1966; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Civil Affairs Project, 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>271</sup> Tab A of Disposition Form, Dominican Republic Junior Baseball Championship, August 16, 1966; NACP.

undertaken.”<sup>272</sup> Those details and comments are discussed not to provide a poor representation of the medical section within the USFORDOMREP, but to illustrate the issues between the different levels of command, as to the responsibilities and abilities of military personnel. The medical section pointed those issues out to the other levels of command to provide a scenario of a serious injury occurring. There is no evidence that a serious injury occurred but this program originated to provide a positive image of the US military. If a Dominican youth received a serious injury at a USFORDOMREP sponsored event with a heavy US military presence and did not receive adequate or quick medical care the impact of the event may have proven disastrous for the US military. The upper levels of command took the Surgeon’s comments into consideration and opted to follow through with the event as scheduled.

With approval of the tournament the US Civil Affairs Chief of Staff created a series of events celebratory in nature and included a heavy presence of US military leaders and military personnel. The first day of the tournament contained the most pomp and circumstance with the opening ceremony taking up most of the morning’s events before the first game. The two key events from the schedule were the band playing the National Anthem, and General Linvill, commander of USFORDOMREP throwing out the first pitch.<sup>273</sup> The first event, playing the National Anthem was conducted by

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<sup>272</sup> Tab A of Disposition Form, Dominican Republic Junior Baseball Championship, August 16, 1966; NACP.

<sup>273</sup> Attachment to Memorandum, Schedule of Events, August 12, 1966; 201-46 United States Forces, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Civil Affairs Project, 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

elements of the USFORDOMREP band, however, the schedule does not make clear which National Anthem was played, the United States or the Dominican Republic. In fact, within the comments on the schedule the bullet point “Band will play the National Anthem” is underlined with a question mark.<sup>274</sup> There appeared no detailed description in the documents regarding which anthem was played during the ceremony. Common sense points to the Dominican Republic’s anthem due to “playing the anthem...is a ceremony proclaiming that the strife on the field takes place under the overarching protection and harmony of the nation, to which players on both teams belong.”<sup>275</sup> The awkwardness and protest that would have occurred at the playing of the US National Anthem would have painted the tournament in an unfriendly light, and created more friction between the Dominican population and US Forces at the height of US military withdrawal. For comparison, imagine the protest and anger if the Dominican Republic national anthem instead of the “Star Spangled Banner” was played before a Major League Baseball game. The other major part of the ceremony was General Linvill throwing out the first pitch. In the schedule the event is listed as “General Linvill will throw the first ball to the Dominican Sports Director or his representative to open the tournament.”<sup>276</sup> The imagery of the US Forces commander throwing a ball to a representative of the Dominican government acted as an analogy for the US military withdrawal and the turning over of power and control to the Dominican government. The practice in the US is that “the

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<sup>274</sup> Attachment to Memorandum, Schedule of Events, August 12, 1966; NACP.

<sup>275</sup> Roberto Gonzalez Echevarria, “The Magic of Baseball,” *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 8, no. 1, Symposium in the Global Era: Economic, Legal, and Cultural Perspectives (Fall, 2000): 151.

<sup>276</sup> Attachment to Memorandum, Schedule of Events, August 12, 1966; NACP.

leader himself, not his proxy, the manager, or the pitcher, hurls the first ball,” which is why at most opening day baseball games the governor or community leader from whichever city the team is from throws out the first pitch.<sup>277</sup> While not surprising that the US military commander threw out the first pitch as the US military planned and sponsored the event, it would have brought attention to the US military’s role in the intervention and occupation and further attention on the US withdrawal.

The US military using baseball as a part of civil affairs operations provided inroads for Major League Baseball (MLB) to invest in the Dominican population and use the history of the sport within the nation. For example, with the fall of Trujillo and the stabilization provided by the US military the MLB started moving into the country to sign and produce big league talent. With the blockade of Cuba in 1961 and the opening of the Dominican Republic in 1966 major league teams started sending scouts to the area looking for players.<sup>278</sup> Almost ten years after the US withdrawal of military forces from the Dominican Republic MLB teams organized baseball academies in the country. Those academies operated in a similar way to sugar refineries “in which nearby sugar refineries operate in that raw materials are obtained cheaply, locally refined (at reduced cost), and shipped abroad,” the difference being that the baseball academies operated in obtaining and refining baseball players.<sup>279</sup> There appears to have been no discussion or apparent relationship between the US military and the MLB in the conducting of baseball games and tournaments. Although, the Dominican Junior Baseball Tournament concentrated

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<sup>277</sup> Echevarria, “Magic of Baseball,” 151.

<sup>278</sup> Alan M. Klein, “Culture, Politics, and Baseball in the Dominican Republic,” in *Latin American Perspectives* 22, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 116.

<sup>279</sup> Klein, “Culture, Politics, and Baseball,” 119.

talent from around Santo Domingo in the fourteen to sixteen age range, the age when MLB teams look to sign players to one of their academies. That leads one to wonder just how many MLB scouts attended the tournament to survey the talent. What started during with the military intervention in 1966 with the forming of a youth baseball league blossomed into “hundreds of amateur leagues with thousands of teams in the country.”<sup>280</sup> While the US military used baseball as a tactic to control and distract the Dominican population it unintentionally opened the door for a level of investment and control that still impacts the Dominican Republic into the present.

The use of the military band and baseball represented the use of recreation and entertainment to turn people away from leftist political activities and allowed for the creation of a pro-US government. There is no doubt that the US military band sought to build relationships between the US military and the Dominican population. However, as expressed earlier in the chapter there existed a valid question as whether the Dominican people recognized the band as operating under the US Army. The issue also existed whether there was any image to improve as most military operations took place in the capital city rather than among the rural populations. Baseball provided another interesting case as the setup of a junior league took place in Santo Domingo and much of the youth population of the various suburbs participated in and had the opportunity to build relationships with US personnel. The leagues and games diminished Dominican political interest in leftist organizations during elections, the most crucial period of the intervention. Baseball’s role in minimizing protests furthered the chances of a smooth

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<sup>280</sup> Klein, “Culture, Politics, and Baseball,” 306.

transition to a permanent government. The analysis of Army band concerts and the organization of US military sponsored baseball leagues illustrated the multiple tactics involved in civil affairs outside of propaganda and building infrastructure, but there is still more to be done.

Historians have severely overlooked the use of recreation and entertainment as tactics to control the native population of a nation under occupation. The US government used music and concerts during the Cold War to illustrate the multitude of US culture, and to combat the Soviet Union's argument that the US contained racialized institutions that treated non-white Americans as second-class citizens. Penny Von Eschen's *Satchmo Blows Up the World* analyzes the State Department's use of jazz musicians on US foreign policy tours to Africa and Latin America.<sup>281</sup> The tours conducted by Louis Armstrong displayed the United States' cultural diversity through music and attempted to downplay the racial tensions used throughout Soviet propaganda. Looking at the use of music by US soldiers Doug Bradley's *We Gotta Get Out of This Place* analyzes the culture of music among US soldiers that served in the Vietnam War and how that music shaped their experience.<sup>282</sup> Those historians represent analysis of music in both foreign policy and within the military, but the use of military bands in the use of foreign affairs or civil affairs has largely been overlooked. This chapter briefly discussed the USAF Band and the multiple foreign good will trips the unit embarked on, and on the importance of playing music that may draw praise or may offend. To this day the US military employs

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<sup>281</sup> Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

<sup>282</sup> Doug Bradley, *We Gotta Get Out of This Place: The Soundtrack of the Vietnam War* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2015).

the largest number of professional musicians than any other institution in the United States, and the role of the military band has only continued to grow with the taking on of new responsibilities. Historians, such as Bradley, have done an admirable job of discussing the influence of music on military personnel, particularly in a war zone, but that analysis must be broadened to look at military bands themselves and the soldiers that operated within those units both in and out of combat zones. The same argument can be made about the use of baseball. There is no question that historians have created a number of works regarding the influence of military occupation on the spread of sports throughout the different regions of the world, specifically how every nation in Latin American and the Caribbean occupied by the United States developed baseball as part of their national identity. Rob Ruck's *Tropic of Baseball* and *Raceball* analyzed the history of the sport in the Dominican Republic and its influence on the Dominican population.<sup>283</sup> While Alan Klein offered detailed analysis of how baseball shaped the culture within the Dominican Republic.<sup>284</sup> However, there is still more work to be done regarding the relationship between the military and the MLB. It is a convenient coincidence that in a short time after the US military secured the Dominican Republic as a nation friendly to US interests that the number of Dominicans participating in the MLB rose dramatically. The number of youth baseball leagues around the Dominican Republic also exploded in relation to the number of MLB baseball academies after the USFORDOMREP sponsored a youth baseball league and championship tournament. There are multiple avenues for

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<sup>283</sup> Ruck, *Tropic of Baseball*, 1998; Ruck, *Raceball*, 2011.

<sup>284</sup> Alan Klein, "American Hegemony, Dominican Resistance, and Baseball," 1998, and "Culture, Politics, and Baseball in the Dominican Republic," 1995.

recreation and entertainment in the realm of occupation and intervention and once those avenues are explored the full image of the US intervention and occupation activities can be revealed and studied.

The US military civil affairs office successfully used entertainment and recreation to turn people away from leftist political organizations. Whether it was creating the Provisional Government in 1965, the start of campaign season on March 1, 1966, the June 1 election, or the installment of the elected president on July 1 US band concerts and baseball games provided entertainment for the population to keep them from joining radical political organizations. Military leaders appeared to be fine having people cheer and organize against the military as long as the overall mission to stabilize the Dominican Republic succeeded. US military personnel at all levels and ranks used the development of relationships and programs to keep people away from radical political activity. The military allowed protest but wanted to keep people away from individuals seeking to distance the Dominican Republic from the US, called for violence against the occupiers (including both US Forces as part of the IAPF), or for political violence against the opposing political party. The successes of those entertainment programs in the Dominican Republic led to the creation of a stable environment and the electing of a permanent pro-US government.

## CHAPTER VI – RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEACE CORPS

On June 13, 1965, Sargent Shriver addressed an audience at St. John’s University in Jamaica, New York. The audience consisted of possible recruits to the United States Peace Corps who after enlisting traveled to developing nations as representatives of the United States to train, work, and live among the population. At the beginning of his speech Shriver provided a geography lesson and described how “symbolically, the rest of [the audiences’] lives will...be spent...in coming to grips with that geography lesson...in trying to establish a relationship between that name on your diploma and the world around you.”<sup>285</sup> Shriver elaborated on that relationship later in the speech while discussing the story of a Peace Corps volunteer (PCV) in the Dominican Republic. The PCV served in Santo Domingo during the initial stages of the US military intervention when the fighting was strongest between the US military forces and the Constitutionalist forces. In relating the story Shriver asked “what does it mean to be American?”<sup>286</sup> Shriver provided his definition through the lens of the relationship between the PCVs and the Dominican population and described how mentioning the words “Peace Corps” opened barriers and doors.<sup>287</sup> When one PCV challenged a Constitutionalist soldier after the soldier said all Americans should go home the soldier replied “We don’t mean you. You’re different. You live with us. When we’re hungry—you’re hungry. When we walk

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<sup>285</sup> Shriver speech at St. John’s University, June 13, 1965; Shriver Statements; Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1961-1966; Record Group 490; Box 5; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>286</sup> Shriver speech, June 13, 1965; NACP.

<sup>287</sup> Shriver Speech, June 13, 1965; NACP.

through the mud—you walk through the mud.”<sup>288</sup> For Shriver, that represented a new meaning of American, it meant that a PCV was a citizen of the world. The volunteers shared in the experiences of the people they lived and worked with and built different relationships compared to the more traditional relationships developed between the US Government and the government of another nation.

Shriver’s new definition of what it means to be American offers fascinating comparisons between PCVs and US soldiers deployed overseas. His definition of shared experiences with other peoples of the world indicated that PCVs were more American than US soldiers. For Shriver, PCVs were not only in a foreign nation to create US friendly governments but to better the peoples’ lives whereas the US soldier enforced US foreign policy and therefore does not share the same experience as the foreign citizen. That definition depicted the US soldier as an occupier and the PCV as a friendly neighbor concerned about the people. The definition also offered insights into how Shriver and the Kennedy administration wanted to move away from a military dominated foreign policy and to a policy like the 1930s Good Neighbor Policy of President Roosevelt. The situation further represents the perception of the military during the 1960s and set the stage for the domestic confrontations within the US of the late sixties into the 1970s over the Vietnam War.

Peace Corps volunteers living in the Dominican Republic believed the military intervention tested the resolve and independent status of the Peace Corps as a separate government organization. The intervention tested this resolve as it was the first time the

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<sup>288</sup> Shriver Speech, June 13, 1965; NACP.

Peace Corps and the military deployed to the same nation. During the intervention the US military and the Peace Corps conducted parallel programs to improve relationships with Dominican civilians. This chapter argues that the Peace Corps worked alongside the US military to provide humanitarian aid to turn the Dominican population away from the leftist political groups and to improve the image of the United States. This fits into the overall argument of the dissertation by demonstrating how the US military and Peace Corps supported a pro-US Dominican government through taking care of the populations' needs thereby diminishing their interest in a leftist government.

Conceived during the 1960 presidential campaign the Kennedy administration developed the key outlines of how the Peace Corps functioned and defined the corps' purpose within the realm of US foreign policy. The Peace Corps existed due to "Kennedy's belief that the United States had 'to do better' in competing with Moscow for the allegiance of the newly independent countries of the Third World."<sup>289</sup> In the article "Decolonization, the Cold War, and the Foreign Policy of the Peace Corps," Elizabeth Cobbs described how the Peace Corps "challenges historians to look through and beyond the Cold War" and that the "Peace Corps story also reveals the importance of going beyond the bounds of simply US policy."<sup>290</sup> Adding the Peace Corps to the study of US military civil affairs and civil action projects allows for a further in depth study of the policy surrounding the US military humanitarianism in the Dominican Republic. The Peace Corps adds an additional US government entity that conducted similar programs as

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<sup>289</sup> Elizabeth A. Cobbs, "Decolonization, the Cold War, and Foreign Policy of the Peace Corps," *Diplomatic History* 20, No. 1 (Winter 1996): 79-80.

<sup>290</sup> Cobbs, "Decolonization," 80.

the US military throughout the nation. The United States military organized and performed civil action projects in the Dominican Republic in order to further US foreign policy goals. The Peace Corps conducted parallel programs in order to accomplish the similar goals of bettering the lives of Dominican citizens, improving the image of the US, and eliminating Dominican interest in leftist organizations. Peace Corps volunteers lived alongside of the Dominican population and experienced the same restrictions imposed by the military occupation.

Many historians have offered their analysis on the Peace Corps with the majority focusing on the development of operations within the organization, the Peace Corps' role in foreign policy, and the spirit of the organization and its programs, rather than how the Peace Corps operated alongside other organizations of the US government, especially the US military.<sup>291</sup> These historians discuss how President John F. Kennedy's Peace Corps "initiative inspired, and continues to inspire, hope and understanding among Americans and the rest of the world."<sup>292</sup> However, historians have also asked questions regarding the overall role of the Peace Corps in US foreign policy. Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman's *All You Need is Love* uses the Peace Corps to analyze the "function of humanitarianism in US foreign policy" and asks the question "is humanitarianism real or is it a smoke screen for the most basic intent of policy, which is to fulfill the will to power? If it is a smoke screen, whom does it fool, Americans or the rest of the world or both?"<sup>293</sup> This question

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<sup>291</sup> Velma Adams, Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, Gerard T. Rice, Stanley Meisler.

<sup>292</sup> Gerard T. Rice, *The Bold Experiment: JFK's Peace Corps* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1985), IX.

<sup>293</sup> Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, *All You Need is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 4.

works alongside of Wilensky's question about the use of military medical aid in Vietnam and whether the military used medical aid to reach a specific foreign policy goal. The Johnson administration use of the Peace Corps in humanitarian operations carried significant impacts on the lives of Dominican citizens and blunted US military operations. The US government used the Peace Corps along with its humanitarian activities and programs to function as a "smoke screen" for the military and foreign policy goals and initiatives.<sup>294</sup> The Peace Corps' favorable view around the world was used in the Dominican Republic to obscure the heavy handed military action.

The Peace Corps struggled against other US government institutions to maintain its independence as the Cold War atmosphere prompted US government officials to seek an advantage in developing nations wherever available. Gerard T. Rice's *The Bold Experiment* analyzed the initial years of the Peace Corps in the early 1960s and goes into in depth analysis regarding the Peace Corps' role within foreign affairs.<sup>295</sup> During one of the Peace Corps' first meetings the head of the organization, Sargent Shriver, determined a number of principles and objectives in which the Peace Corps operated. Those principles centered on what Shriver believed allowed the Peace Corps to reach the three main objectives put in place by Congress. The objectives included "provide a needed skill to an interested country; to increase the understanding of Americans by other peoples; and to increase American understanding of other peoples."<sup>296</sup> The main objectives offer further context on the Peace Corps' role in the Dominican Republic during the military

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<sup>294</sup> Hoffman, *All You Need is Love*, 4.

<sup>295</sup> Rice, *The Bold Experiment*, IX-X.

<sup>296</sup> Rice, *The Bold Experiment*, 172-173.

intervention and determined to what extent the relationship between the Peace Corps and the US military impacted those objectives. The three objectives also fit into the question asked earlier by Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman regarding the function of humanitarianism as a smokescreen to achieve desirable foreign policy objectives. Analyzing information regarding how the different objectives complimented or contradicted each other further complicates the Peace Corps' role in US foreign policy during the Cold War. This is true especially in the Dominican Republic, where the US military and the Peace Corps functioned side by side with the same goals and interests of improving the US image and turning Dominicans away from leftist political organizations.

The Peace Corps navigated around the perception of working to further US foreign policy interests by primarily operating in nations that offered an invitation and only conducted programs authorized by the host government. One of the greater projects the Peace Corps participated in during the 1960s revolved around community development in which Frank Mankiewicz, the Chief of Latin American Programs, was the staunchest advocate. Mankiewicz viewed community development as the path to changing the way a nation operated and the way the people of a nation participated in their government. However, community development projects "ran the risk of becoming involved in internal politics" as those programs "were aimed at social reorganization; that is, encouraging people to take the action necessary to secure their community welfare and democratic rights."<sup>297</sup> The Peace Corps volunteers operating in the Dominican Republic's community development projects had the most encounters with US military personnel.

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<sup>297</sup> Rice, *The Bold Experiment*, 273.

Those volunteers promoted democratic principles of political participation to meet the needs of the Dominican population rather than revolutionary or insurrectionist ideology. Those efforts were realized on June 1, 1966 when Dominicans elected a permanent government. In the election, goals of both the US military and the Peace Corps were realized with the election of Joaquin Balaguer, who was elected through democratic means and headed a US friendly government.

The Peace Corps continued to struggle with separating itself from US foreign policy throughout the initial stages of its existence. One of the primary points Sargent Shriver maintained during his stint as Director of the Peace Corps was “insisting that the Peace Corps would never go to a country where the United States was actively waging war.”<sup>298</sup> However, while the military operation in the Dominican Republic represented an act of limited warfare the Peace Corps remained in the nation throughout the military’s occupation of the capital city. Peace Corps volunteers “were strictly forbidden to engage in any kind of political propagandizing or subversive activity overseas” while also working hard to maintain the Corps’ separation from political or military affairs.<sup>299</sup> This grew increasingly difficult during the Dominican intervention due to the fact that Peace Corps volunteers created relationships with Dominican citizens who fought on the side of the Constitutionlists when the civil war broke out. This led the Johnson administration to restrict Peace Corps volunteers from speaking out against US policies and the US military operations. Peace Corps volunteers during the intervention participated in an immense psychological, social, and cultural event that few have had the ability to

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<sup>298</sup> Rice, *The Bold Experiment*, 267.

<sup>299</sup> Rice, *The Bold Experiment*, 273.

experience. The actions of the 1965 US military intervention represented those significant experiences of the Peace Corps volunteers in the Dominican Republic.

When conflict broke out in the Dominican Republic in 1965 the Peace Corps had thirty-three volunteers in the country, most located in the capital of Santo Domingo. Tad Szulc built a number of relationships with Peace Corps volunteers to share their accounts and experiences, and he dedicated his book “to the Peace Corps volunteers in Santo Domingo.”<sup>300</sup> Stanley Meisler’s *When the World Calls* also discussed the Peace Corps in the Dominican Republic and provided narrative aspects of the Peace Corps’ mission.<sup>301</sup> Meisler also illustrated the fragility of the Peace Corps’ independence by describing how “throughout the crisis, President Lyndon Johnson made it clear that he regarded the Peace Corps as an instrument of his policies.”<sup>302</sup> The early days of the intervention were especially difficult for the Peace Corps volunteers located in the capital city as many of them remained in the Constitutionalist occupied area. There the volunteers experienced aerial attacks and gunfights while working as ambulance drivers or in the hospitals in any capacity that helped the wounded and suffering. Szulc called the Peace Corps nurses “the real heroines of the civil war” and further described hospitals without lights or medicine as part of the conditions where the nurses operated.<sup>303</sup> The Peace Corps made their name through their neutrality in the Dominican Republic during the first few days of the civil war and that reputation continued throughout the US military intervention.

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<sup>300</sup> Tad Szulc, *Dominican Diary* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1965), dedication.

<sup>301</sup> Stanley Meisler, *When the World Calls: The Inside Story of the Peace Corps and Its First Fifty Years* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012), Nook Book, 80.

<sup>302</sup> Meisler, *When the World Calls*, 80.

<sup>303</sup> Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, 64-65.

Peace Corps volunteers saw their role in the Dominican Republic after the landing of US Marines as aiding the Dominican civilians caught in the crossfire. One of the main tasks of that role included distributing medical supplies, especially painkillers, brought by the Marines. Naval ships emptied their own medical stores to aid the stricken hospitals and “the supplies were handed by the Marines at the Haina beach to Peace Corps representatives, who arranged for their delivery to the Dominican Red Cross and the hospitals downtown.”<sup>304</sup> This military-Peace Corps relationship continued during the initial stages of the intervention as Peace Corps volunteers in Santo Domingo operated as intermediaries between US forces and civilians in the Constitutionalist sections. The volunteers also participated in a variety of actions from the distribution of medical supplies to arranging meetings between Constitutionalist leaders and US government officials. Bob Satin, the Peace Corps Director in the Dominican Republic, conducted the latter duties and at times remained the only US official in constant contact with Constitutionalist leaders. During one of these liaison duties Satin discovered two marines captured by the Constitutionalist forces after getting lost on the streets of downtown Santo Domingo. After discussing their situation with the Constitutionalist leaders, Satin negotiated the release of the marines and escorted them back into the US occupied area.<sup>305</sup> While Satin acted as an intermediary between US officials and Constitutionalist leaders the perception of his services had a divisive effect on the Peace Corps volunteers.

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<sup>304</sup> Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, 45.

<sup>305</sup> Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, 147-148.

Despite the services provided by Bob Satin some Peace Corps workers perceived that Satin did not act in their best interests or represented the Peace Corps positively during the opening stages of the intervention. Those criticisms of Satin offer a glimpse into the relationship between the Peace Corps, the US military, and the US government during the intervention and how the three institutions interpreted their role in the ongoing crisis. One of the first criticisms of Satin described how he saw himself as a big US government official and “instead of concerning himself with the Volunteers” concerned himself with acting as an official representative of the US government.<sup>306</sup> Peace Corps volunteers questioned this role and asked whether “acting as the intermediary between Caamano [the Constitutionalist leader] and the US Embassy [was] a proper Peace Corps role.”<sup>307</sup> Those questions stemmed from the Peace Corps’ desire to remain neutral in events and as mentioned earlier in the chapter Sargent Shriver vowed to never send the Peace Corps to places where the US military was engaged in combat operations and especially to participate in diplomatic missions.

The Peace Corps were already present in the Dominican Republic at the start of the intervention, so the options were either remain operating in the nation or withdraw the volunteers. Almost all the volunteers elected to stay. While Peace Corps volunteers criticized Satin for his role in the intervention Stanley Meisler defended Satin against the criticisms. Meisler explained how Satin “felt that he could perform useful and peaceful service as one of the few US officials trusted by the rebels” and since “so many American diplomats were away from the embassy...he surely knew more about the rebels than any

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<sup>306</sup> Meisler, *When the World Calls*, 87.

<sup>307</sup> Meisler, *When the World Calls*, 87.

other American in the embassy.”<sup>308</sup> Regardless of how Satin saw his role, Peace Corps volunteers continued with their criticisms and one volunteer even filed an official complaint relating to Satin’s actions during the intervention.

The Peace Corps volunteer’s complaint against Satin offers insight into how the Peace Corps operated at the start of the intervention regarding the safety of Peace Corps volunteers and illustrates the possible relationship between Peace Corps volunteers and US military personnel. The complaint originated with Peace Corps volunteers Peter and Esther Podolsky, who sought to file four charges against Robert Satin. The charges included “gross negligence with regard to the safety of Peace Corps Volunteers in the Dominican Republic” during the outbreak of the civil war, “gross negligence with respect to the personal property” of the two Peace Corps volunteers filing the charges, and “abuse of authority...and conduct unbecoming a Peace Corps staff member.”<sup>309</sup> The charge that pertains to this subject and chapter was the conduct unbecoming of a Peace Corps staff member. The charge directly mentioned relations with the US military and Satin’s work with the Constitutionalist leaders. The first detail of the charge discussed “that Satin antagonized a Captain Sentori, of the United States Military Engineers Unit in Santo Domingo, by blaming him for an article which had appeared in a local newspaper about the Army Engineers trucking grain from Santo Domingo to La Vega for Peace

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<sup>308</sup> Meisler, *When the World Calls*, 88.

<sup>309</sup> Conference with Peace Corps Volunteers Peter and Esther Podolsky, November 18, 1965; Memos-Miscellaneous C, 1961-1966; Subject File of the Office of the Director, 1961-1966; Record Group 490; Box 5; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Corps purposes.”<sup>310</sup> There is no mention of the name of the newspaper and there does not appear to be any mention of the contact in US Army records. The report described that “Captain Sentori...refused to do anything more for the Peace Corps” due to the confrontation with Satin and that Podolsky had to work on fixing the situation. The other accusation under this charge was that “Satin had acted in a disloyal manner during the revolution” by providing information to US reporters in the Dominican Republic and that “Satin openly backed the rebels, thereby creating a serious conflict with the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division.”<sup>311</sup> While there appears to have been no follow up investigation of the charges the description of providing information to reporters appeared to have some fact. One of the primary contacts of Tad Szulc in reporting the experiences of Peace Corps volunteers was Robert Satin. Satin provided Szulc with information regarding the relationships between Constitutionlists and Peace Corps workers and described the work of Peace Corps volunteers working in hospitals inside Constitutionalist occupied sections of Santo Domingo.<sup>312</sup>

This filing of charges and the details of the charges provide a look into how two Peace Corps volunteers viewed Satin’s work and the issues created between the Peace Corps and the US military during the intervention. Detailed earlier in the chapter, US Marines provided medical aid to Peace Corps volunteers who in turn distributed the aid in areas held by the Constitutionlists. According to the Podolsky’s charges, Satin took

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<sup>310</sup> Conference with Peace Corps Volunteers Peter and Esther Podolsky, November 18, 1965; NACP.

<sup>311</sup> Conference with Peace Corps Volunteers Peter and Esther Podolsky, November 18, 1965; NACP.

<sup>312</sup> Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, 65.

exception to the fact that the US military aided the Peace Corps in its role and damaged relationships between the Peace Corps and the US military by antagonizing the US military personnel that provided aid supplies to Peace Corps volunteers. At the same time, Satin maintained good relations with the Constitutionalist who the US military perceived as the primary threat throughout the intervention. Peace Corps members actively tried to stay out of controversial political situations but “sometimes Volunteers had no choice but to play active parts in political imbroglios.”<sup>313</sup> Those active roles applied to the situation in the Dominican Republic when Peace Corps volunteers worked in hospitals tending to Constitutionalist soldiers wounded fighting Loyalist soldiers, and later US military personnel.

That Satin engaged in openly talking about the relations between Peace Corps and Constitutionalist soldiers more than likely influenced US military perceptions at the beginning of the intervention. However, the average soldier and marine remained just as confused about the overall situation. Tad Szulc described an encounter where a Marine sat down with him and a couple of Peace Corps nurses and expressed confusion with the entire situation.<sup>314</sup> There are many perceptions of the actions of Robert Satin. From the two marines who he helped release from Constitutionalist hands to the intermediary duties between the US government and the Constitutionalist leaders, and finally to the different perceptions of the multiple Peace Corps volunteers. The role of Peace Corps members, especially Robert Satin, and their overall objective in the Dominican Republic complicated the Dominican intervention. The volunteers perceptions of the intervention

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<sup>313</sup> Rice, *The Bold Experiment*, 278.

<sup>314</sup> Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, 123.

and the Peace Corps' role also reveal their internal struggle to remain an independent entity, and neutral in the volunteer's view, while conducting programs as a representative of a US government organization.

As the fighting ceased the overall question for the Johnson administration regarding the Peace Corps remained whether the volunteers had a role inside of the Dominican Republic that benefitted the administration's policy goals and the goals of the US military. The goals of the administration stood at preventing a second Cuba and installing a government friendly to the United States. The goals of the US military remained to use humanitarianism to fulfill the needs of the Dominican population to support the pro-US government. Due to the popularity of the Peace Corps in the Dominican Republic the Johnson administration believed that "if it behaves with proper discipline, it can be a very useful balance to more hardheaded activities which clearly will be necessary as we go ahead."<sup>315</sup> The military carried out those "hardheaded activities" which brought the military into direct contention with the Peace Corps' policy of remaining independent.<sup>316</sup> A memorandum from McGeorge Bundy, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, to President Johnson described a plan to use Peace Corps volunteers alongside US military personnel in order to diminish the perspective of overwhelming military force. That plan illustrated that the United States had harkened back to the military intervention tactics of the early twentieth century.

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<sup>315</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXII: Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, Guyana*, eds. Daniel Lawler and Carolyn Yee (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), Document 137

<sup>316</sup> FRUS, Document 137.

Those tactics included covering aggressive military action with humanitarian and civil action that benefitted the foreign nation.

The Johnson administration did not intend to flood the Dominican Republic with Peace Corps volunteers, rather, the administration highlighted specific programs in areas where the Peace Corps offered the best support to the US military's mission. The programs involving Peace Corps volunteers included elementary school teachers, public health volunteers, community development organizers, and town administration technicians. In total the Johnson administration requested about two hundred and ten volunteers for the Dominican Republic.<sup>317</sup> The vast majority of the volunteers provided for the operations were community development organizers. Numbering eighty volunteers, community development organizers worked in much the same way that military civil affairs personnel operated but wore civilian clothing rather than a military uniform. As mentioned earlier in the chapter community development remained one of the main programs of the Peace Corps and involved volunteers working in a community to diagnose a number of issues. Once identified, the volunteers mobilized the local population to either fix the issues themselves or to take their complaints to the local government.

US military and Peace Corps volunteers even used some of the same tactics although with different expected outcomes. In one of these projects, Peace Corps volunteers organized eight and nine-year-old kids into baseball teams in a similar way that the military organized baseball leagues discussed in a previous chapter. As the games

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<sup>317</sup> FRUS, Document 137.

started they “soon attracted older brothers who formed teenage and youth teams, and the teams turned into social clubs” which in turn provided the Peace Corps workers an opportunity to attract the parents and other adults to attend the meetings.<sup>318</sup> After a few months the volunteers “could boast that their baseball teams had evolved into a community association.”<sup>319</sup> Those tactics mirrored tactics used by the US military, although the goal of the military was not to create community associations but to keep Dominican youth away from the radical political factions that operated in Santo Domingo. The military and the Peace Corps conducted the same operations to better relationships with the Dominican people. While the military sought to keep people away from radical political groups those baseball leagues acted as an unintentional community gathering. Those gatherings may have provided an avenue of good will for the US military from Dominicans. On the other hand, the Peace Corps formed leagues to form community associations and to control political activities by turning them away from leftist policies while furthering Dominicans’ positive perceptions of the United States. However, while the Johnson administration looked into sending more Peace Corps members to the Dominican Republic the administration made sure the volunteers understood “the sensitive nature of their work” and the ramifications “if they start criticizing US policy down there, [the administration] will simply shut down the Peace Corps in the Dominican Republic and give the whole operation a bad black eye.”<sup>320</sup> The

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<sup>318</sup> Meisler, *When the World Calls*, 85.

<sup>319</sup> Meisler, *When the World Calls*, 85.

<sup>320</sup> FRUS, Document 137.

administration showed a willingness to work with the Peace Corps as long as the Peace Corps fell into line and followed the administration's policy goals.

Throughout the Dominican intervention the Johnson administration and the US military attempted to use the Peace Corps in order to provide cover for military actions. The Johnson administration viewed the Peace Corps as a possible alternative to military force or at least a counterweight to the military actions that occurred in the Dominican Republic. At the start of the intervention the US military deployed civilian clothed Special Forces operators into sections of Santo Domingo in intelligence gathering missions and to determine the level of communist activity within the Constitutionalist forces. The military expanded those missions into the rural cities and towns in the Dominican countryside to determine whether the Constitutionlists had spread to other parts of the country and if there existed any danger of a communist insurgency.<sup>321</sup> Those Special Forces operations, called "Operation Green Chopper," included personnel from the US embassy and US Agency of International Development (USAID) to "lend credibility to cover stories about conducting economic, agricultural, or medical surveys."<sup>322</sup> When those missions existed in the planning stages military and State Department officials asked if Peace Corps volunteers could be used on the missions as a show of good will and as a means to provide cover to the Special Forces personnel. The response to the proposal "personally authorized by Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver was 'Not only no, but hell no.'"<sup>323</sup> The Peace Corps worked throughout the intervention

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<sup>321</sup> Yates, *Power Pack*, 107.

<sup>322</sup> Yates, *Power Pack*, 108.

<sup>323</sup> Szulc, *Dominican Diary*, 302-303.

to remain independent from US military operations. While the corps refused to work alongside the Special Forces during Operation Green Chopper volunteers worked with and parallel to US military personnel in regard to community development and health care projects.

The Johnson administration along with the US military further sought to use the Peace Corps through the organizations participation in the Interagency Youth Committee (IAYC) which identified potential leadership within a nation or at least teenagers who demonstrated the ability to provide future leadership. The IAYC included members from the US Embassies around the world, US Information Service (USIS), US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Peace Corps and the US military, and possible participation by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The IAYC existed “as a result of a judgment by President Kennedy that official United States Government personnel were not adequately reaching the likely foreign leaders of tomorrow with a true picture of our ideals and our aims.”<sup>324</sup> The members of the committee included personnel that had direct access to the youth of a nation through the operation of country wide programs. The conflict of interest regarding the Peace Corps’ independence and role in foreign policy came to light in a letter from Warren Wiggins to William Josephson, the General Counsel of the Peace Corps. The letter described how “programs sponsored by the Interagency Youth Committee are tending to involve Peace Corps volunteers overseas in exactly what

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<sup>324</sup> From Sargent Shriver, Memorandum for all Peace Corps Representatives, December 21, 1965; (Special) Programs-Youth; Office of General Council, Subject Files, 1961-1980, Programs to Publications; Record Group 490; Box 31; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Peace Corps volunteers are not supposed to do.”<sup>325</sup> The Peace Corps saw itself as a tool of US foreign policy but did not participate in US foreign policy directly as they considered themselves neutral in events that occurred between the United States and possible host nations. While detailed information on the IAYC in the Dominican Republic appears not to be available in the archive a letter to the Department of State from the US Embassy in Ecuador illustrated how the IAYC operated. In order for the IAYC to have success and to obtain the committee’s objectives “all existing US agencies which have programs relating to youth” were “coordinated and monitored through the Youth Committee.”<sup>326</sup> This meant that US military personnel possibly monitored all Peace Corps programs and that Peace Corps volunteers worked in an intelligence collecting capacity for the US military and other US foreign policy and defense institutions.

The topic reached Sargent Shriver’s desk on July 17, 1965 in a letter from Adam Yarmolinsky, an aid to the Secretary of Defense, and described the good working relationship between the Peace Corps and the IAYC. The letter further described how the relationship between Peace Corps operations and those conducted by the IAYC provided

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<sup>325</sup> Letter from Warren Wiggins to William Josephson, July 8, 1965; (Special) Programs-Youth; Office of General Council, Subject Files, 1961-1980, Programs to Publications; Record Group 490; Box 31; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>326</sup> Airgram from American Embassy in Quito to Department of State, July 26, 1965; (Special) Programs-Youth; Office of General Council, Subject Files, 1961-1980, Programs to Publications; Record Group 490; Box 31; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

the opportunity to work together in individual nations.<sup>327</sup> For an example, Yarmolinsky used the ongoing military and Peace Corps operations in the Dominican Republic stating:

As I reported to you on my return from Santo Domingo last month, I found the Peace Corps staff the best source of information on what was going on in the Dominican Republic. I don't believe they saw any impropriety in responding to the questions that I put to them, although I can imagine all kinds of situations in which they would not feel it appropriate to provide information. One can always invent a parade of horrors, and the fallacy of the entering wedge is one that the Peace Corps must have had to overcome in many other contexts.<sup>328</sup>

Yarmolinsky discussing the Dominican Republic illustrates that the IAYC conducted operations in that nation and since the US military operated within the IAYC chances are the US military approached the Peace Corps in the Dominican Republic for information on youth in the country. After all, the military, as described earlier, attempted to use Peace Corps volunteers as a cover when conducting surveillance and intelligence gathering missions in rural Dominican towns and cities during Operation Green Chopper. After receiving the letter, on July 26, 1965 Shriver passed the letter on to Wiggins asking for a comment on the matter.

Those working within the Peace Corps, including Shriver, were not happy that the IAYC sought to use Peace Corps volunteers in the committee's activities and responded to Yarmolinsky's original letter indicating that the Peace Corps refused to participate any further. To start, Wiggins responded to Yarmolinsky's July 17 letter to Shriver by commenting that "we are all in agreement that we should not be involved in this

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<sup>327</sup> Letter from Adam Yarmolinsky to Sargent Shriver, July 17, 1965; (Special) Programs-Youth; Office of General Council, Subject Files, 1961-1980, Programs to Publications; Record Group 490; Box 31; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>328</sup> Letter from Adam Yarmolinsky to Sargent Shriver, July 17, 1965; NACP.

operation [and] the Youth Committee.”<sup>329</sup> That comment, and sentiment by the Peace Corps’ senior officials, preceded Shriver’s August 4, 1965 letter to Yarmolinsky that started by emphasizing “Secretary Rusk’s often quoted but nonetheless fundamental statement that the Peace Corps is not an instrument of foreign policy because to make it so would rob it of its contribution to foreign policy.”<sup>330</sup> The letter continued by detailing how the Peace Corps received constant attacks from the Soviet Union and its allies describing the Peace Corps as a CIA covert operation and that the Peace Corps already contributed to IAYC programs by continuing original Peace Corps operations.<sup>331</sup> Shriver also responded to Yarmolinsky’s example of the Dominican Republic by providing another example from the Dominican Republic, in which he stated:

Let me give you just one example of why we have such great concern in this area. Just a few weeks ago “Newsweek” published an article about the Dominican Republic. In but one brief phrase it referred to Peace Corps Volunteers providing information to the Ambassador. So far as we have been able to determine, there was no truth to this statement, except as the Ambassador might have had casual contact with individual Volunteers. But a few weeks later this phrase in this article was cited by a responsible official of the Government of Pakistan as one of the reasons why Pakistan was reducing its request for Peace Corps Volunteers.<sup>332</sup>

The example provided by Shriver demonstrated the Peace Corps’ unwillingness to work with other organizations of the US government so that the Peace Corps maintained a reasonable level of independence to continue proclaiming neutrality in US foreign policy.

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<sup>329</sup> Memorandum from Walter Wiggins to Sargent Shriver, August 3, 1965; (Special) Programs-Youth; Office of General Council, Subject Files, 1961-1980, Programs to Publications; Record Group 490; Box 31; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>330</sup> Letter from Sargent Shriver to Adam Yarmolinsky, August 4, 1965; (Special) Programs-Youth; Office of General Council, Subject Files, 1961-1980, Programs to Publications; Record Group 490; National Archives at College Par, Maryland.

<sup>331</sup> Letter from Sargent Shriver to Adam Yarmolinsky, August 4, 1965; NACP.

<sup>332</sup> Letter from Sargent Shriver to Adam Yarmolinsky, August 4, 1965; NACP.

Yarmolinsky responded the next day again wishing to maintain a working relationship with the Peace Corps adding that the Department of Defense “would be most unhappy at the thought of separation.”<sup>333</sup> In its early years, the Peace Corps worked to maintain independence and in the Dominican Republic with a high level of Peace Corps volunteers working alongside US military personnel that independence appeared threatened at every turn. The struggle increased when Peace Corps independence meant the possibility of working against US foreign policy goals.

In September 1965, the Peace Corps broke off relations with IAYC programs in order to maintain the independence deemed essential to work within host nations. A memorandum for the director dated September 30, 1965 “recommended that [the Peace Corps] change [their] position in the Committee to observer status, that [the Peace Corps] not participate in Committee ‘survey teams,’ and that [the Peace Corps] limit [their] participation abroad to routine cooperation” through providing funding for foreign citizens to visit the US in an education capacity.<sup>334</sup> The senior officials of the Peace Corps believed that if the organization participated in IAYC operations then the Peace Corps would exist as an intelligence gathering organization. That perception inside of a host nation carried the possibility of hurting the Peace Corps’ projects throughout the world especially in places where the US military operated, such as the Dominican

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<sup>333</sup> Letter from Adam Yarmolinsky to Sargent Shriver, August 5, 1965; (Special) Programs-Youth; Office of General Council, Subject Files, 1961-1980, Programs to Publications; Record Group 490; Box 31; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>334</sup> Memorandum, From Charles J. Patterson and Anthony Essaye to Sargent Shriver, September 30, 1965; (Special) Programs-Youth; Office of General Council, Subject Files, 1961-1980, Programs to Publications; Record Group 490; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

Republic. Sargent Shriver described the dangers of working with the IAYC, which included the US military, by saying:

we weaken ourselves by not emphasizing and re-emphasizing that we are the original emphasis on youth program and still are the most effective because we do it our way, the honest, no-ulterior motive way. To force us to gather information, etc. is a perfect means of wrecking the most effective program the USA possesses for reaching youth overseas...I expressed these identical sentiments 3 years ago when [Robert Kennedy] had this idea. It's the wrong way to use the Peace Corps.<sup>335</sup>

No documentation appeared within the archives that the Peace Corps split from the IAYC impacted the relationship with the military as both continued to operate in the Dominican Republic in order to accomplish their own goals. The Peace Corps did work with the US military during the Dominican intervention. The co-operation occurred on its own terms and required the Peace Corps to maintain their independence as a government organization. The operations alongside US military personnel led Peace Corps volunteers to grow concerned about the Dominican populations' perceptions of the Peace Corps working alongside the military.

The relationship between the US military and the Peace Corps lasted for the duration of the military intervention and benefitted Dominican citizens. The US military and the Peace Corps conducted civil action projects and civil affairs duties throughout the Dominican Republic to better the live of Dominicans while eliminating their interest in a leftist government. While upper level Peace Corps officials hesitated to work with US military personnel, volunteers in the Dominican Republic showed a willingness to work

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<sup>335</sup> Handwritten note from Sargent Shriver on memorandum from Charles J. Patterson and Anthony Essaye to Sargent Shriver, September 30, 1965; (Special) Programs-Youth; Office of General Council, Subject Files, 1961-1980, Programs and Publications; Record Group 490; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

alongside the military on a variety of projects. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the Johnson administration considered sending two hundred and ten Peace Corps volunteers to the Dominican Republic to offset the US military presence in the nation. This action occurred in November 1965 and in 1966 some of those programs started to bear fruit as Peace Corps volunteers worked alongside Special Forces operators in towns and cities throughout the Dominican Republic not just in Santo Domingo. One example occurred in the town of Monte Cristi, a Peace Corps volunteer along with a Special Forces soldier and a regular US Army soldier “organized an English class three nights a week lasting two hours each” and estimates indicated that one hundred Dominican civilians attended the classes.<sup>336</sup> English classes carried high importance as the Peace Corps considered English language classes the bread and butter of the education projects in host nations. Many of those nations’ governments believed the English language as an opening into building relationships around the world.<sup>337</sup>

While it appears that US military and Peace Corps documents do not discuss cooperation or the relationship between volunteers and military personnel it seems suspect that there existed no military-Peace Corps interaction. In a civic action project report dated April 15, 1965, the same report that describes the one instance of Special Forces and US Army soldiers working with a Peace Corps volunteer to conduct English

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<sup>336</sup> From John R. McIntosh to Commanding General, USFORDOMREP, April 15, 1966; 201-46, United States Forces, Dominican Republic, Operating Procedures, Military Civic Action and Community Relations Projects, 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 8; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>337</sup> Rice, *The Bold Experiment*, 182-183.

classes, many of the projects paralleled and possibly influenced Peace Corps activities.<sup>338</sup> Other than the English classes taught in Monte Cristi, in the town of Nagua Special Forces personnel constructed schools with playgrounds while offering English classes and donated baseball equipment to the local teams.<sup>339</sup> The example of Nagua showcased that projects conducted by the military more than likely crossed over with Peace Corps operations, especially when those operations involved construction of schools. Peace Corps volunteers possibly taught English courses and formed local baseball teams in those areas if not taught classes in military-built schools. However, while Peace Corps volunteers and US military personnel worked together and appeared to have at least a working relationship some Peace Corps volunteers grew concerned about this relationship. In *When the World Calls*, Meisler discussed how one Peace Corps volunteer showed concern when “thirsty PCV boys [crossed] the street for a...American beer at the army base or of lonely PCV girls dating GIs” and that those actions created “confusion in the Dominican mind about the autonomy and separate identity of the Peace Corps.”<sup>340</sup> The main concern of Peace Corps officials and a number of volunteers remained showing neutrality from US military actions and US foreign policy even though the actions of the Peace Corps existed to influence peoples’ perceptions of the United States. However, Peace Corps volunteers did not want to be seen in the same image as the US soldiers, the occupiers. The volunteers wanted to maintain the good neighbor status. The military

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<sup>338</sup> From John R. McIntosh to Commanding General, USFORDOMREP, April 15, 1966; NACP.

<sup>339</sup> From John R. McIntosh to Commanding General, USFORDOMREP, April 15, 1966; NACP.

<sup>340</sup> Meisler, *When the World Calls*, 94.

wanted the good neighbor status which led to both organizations seeking the same objective of stability and a good image of the US. However, having Dominican civilians identify the Peace Corps with the US military, many volunteers believed, endangered Peace Corps operations during and after the intervention not only in the Dominican Republic but around the world.

At the start of the military intervention Peace Corps personnel maintained a positive reputation with the Dominican population as their works contributed to bettering the Dominican peoples' livelihood and participation in the Dominican government. When the military arrived, US soldiers participated in programs that aided and contributed to the Peace Corps' work but joint programs or operations remained extremely rare. The example regarding the Peace Corps volunteer working alongside a US Special Forces soldier teaching English classes is one of the few examples apparent in military documents, while Peace Corps documents are full of attempts to differentiate themselves from military services and programs. Before the intervention the Peace Corps volunteers were "liked as a person, not manipulated as a door-knob to other American aid. Particularly in the urban barrios, the Volunteers are protected and cared for by their neighbors."<sup>341</sup> That perception of the Peace Corps volunteers stemmed from the works completed and started before the intervention. Those works and programs included rural community development that involved developing Dominican water sources through drilling wells, and reforestation and conservation. Other programs included community

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<sup>341</sup> Peace Corps Online Archive, <http://peacecorpsonline.org/frontpage/index.html>, 4<sup>th</sup> Annual Report 1965, 73, Accessed December 12, 2019.

action involving self-help school construction guidance, providing nurses to improve the standards of Dominican health care institutions, and providing secondary school teachers and training teachers.<sup>342</sup> Many of those programs operated before the military intervention in April 1965 and some continued through the end of the intervention and occupation in September 1966 therefore operating in a parallel fashion to military civil action programs.

The US military did not intend to work alongside the Peace Corps during the intervention and outside of the Johnson administration's attempts to co-opt the Peace Corps no documentation revealed that the military aspired to work with the Peace Corps. However, many of the military programs interconnected and crossed paths with the Peace Corps goals or aided other Peace Corps programs. From April 28, 1965 to June 21, 1966 the US military divided up civic action projects into two categories: military civic action and community relations.<sup>343</sup> Many of those projects received focus in an earlier chapter, but some of them crossover with, or potentially impacted, projects conducted by the Peace Corps.. A large part of the US military civic action involved community relations projects designed to work with community members and leaders in order to better community involvement or the community infrastructure.

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<sup>342</sup> Peace Corps Programs in Education and Training, 1962, 1963, 1964; Latin American Programs in Education and Training; Subject File of the Office of the Director, 1961-1966; Record Group 490; Box 3; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

<sup>343</sup> Military Civic Action and Community Relations Projects performed by the United States Forces, Dominican Republic, 28 April 1965-21 June 1966; 201-46 United States Force, Dominican Republic, J-5, Operating Procedures, Military Civic Action and Community Relations Projects, 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

The US military's civic action programs carried the potential to crossover with three realms of Peace Corps activities: water access and distribution, community organizing through recreational activities, and providing or teaching medical care and first aid. The act of providing potable water to Dominican civilians took the primary concern for US military personnel throughout the intervention. A number of missions involved repairing water lines and drains, installing water pumps and tanks, and deepening and improving water reservoirs in towns throughout the country.<sup>344</sup> For its part, the Peace Corps sent thirty volunteers between March 1963 and October 1964 to construct wells to provide water access to Dominican communities.<sup>345</sup> Peace Corps operations for digging wells in those communities ended in 1964 seven months before the US military intervention. The focus by Peace Corps members on supplying water to communities illustrated that personnel in both organizations, the military and the Peace Corps, recognized the importance of fixing water issues throughout the nation. Also, as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the Peace Corps only sent volunteers on a specific program if the host nation asked for the volunteers. The Peace Corps volunteers working on the water supply also demonstrated that the Dominican government recognized the importance of supplying water to civilians in the hopes of managing possible crises and maintaining stability throughout the nation.

While supplying water remained important throughout the intervention, both the US military and the Peace Corps invested a lot of time, personnel, and material into

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<sup>344</sup> Military Civic Action and Community Relations Projects, April 28, 1965-21 June 1966; NACP.

<sup>345</sup> Peace Corps Programs in Education and Training in Latin America 1962, 1963, 1964; NACP.

medical treatment and programs to educate the civilian population. The medical civil action projects discussed in a previous chapter carry over into this aspect, but the military and Peace Corps personnel worked together and within each other's programs at a variety of points throughout the intervention. One of the primary roles fulfilled by the Peace Corps during the opening stages of the intervention involved working in Dominican hospitals located in Constitutionalist occupied sections of Santo Domingo. Those volunteers continued to provide medical assistance after the initial fighting calmed down and more than likely encountered US military personnel. Adding to this connection, during the opening month of the intervention navy corpsmen worked in hospitals across Santo Domingo, including a children's hospital, assisting in multiple duties to provide added personnel.<sup>346</sup> After the initial stages, the US military sought to return civilian trust in the Dominican medical institutions through providing supplies and support to Dominican hospitals and clinics. The military also ran a number of clinics across Santo Domingo that provided healthcare to Dominican civilians. The Peace Corps nurses' primary goals in the Dominican Republic were to improve the care and practices of the Dominican institutions a role which they continued to play after the end of their enlistment in June 1965 when many of the nurses decided to re-enlist.<sup>347</sup> Those Peace Corps goals crossed over with the military as both sought to better Dominican health institutions to provide better healthcare to turn the population away from leftist political groups and to that the pro-US government could meet Dominicans' needs.

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<sup>346</sup> Military Civic Action and Community Relations Projects, April 28, 1965-June 1966; NACP.

<sup>347</sup> Peace Corps Programs in Education and Training in Latin America, 1962, 1963, 1964; NACP.

Medical assistance and training also spread to other regions of the Dominican Republic and into other professions. Starting in 1963, the Dominican government, at the time led by Juan Bosch, asked the Peace Corps and the US Embassy to send Peace Corps volunteers to work with Dominican fisherman in an attempt to create another export industry outside of sugar production.<sup>348</sup> In September 1963, the Peace Corps sent fisherman, along with other agricultural teachers, to the Dominican Republic for the “expansion and modernization of [the] fishing industry” with the volunteers’ tour ending in June 1965, the military intervention started at the end of April 1965.<sup>349</sup> It is unknown whether or not those Peace Corps volunteers re-enlisted, or if the program continued after June 1965. However, in November 1965, four months after the end of the Peace Corps program, US Army Special Forces in the town of Monte Cristi “provided instruction in first aid to local fireman and fisherman” until December 1965.<sup>350</sup> While it is unknown if Peace Corps volunteers attended the Special Forces instruction, the question does arise as to whether or not the work of the Peace Corps volunteer with the local population made the fishermen more willing to work with the Special Forces members. A second issue arises regarding whether the members of the community drew a distinction between the Peace Corps volunteers and military personnel and their reasons for operating the two programs. So, while the Peace Corps sought to maintain their independence and neutrality, and to differentiate themselves from the military the two organizations worked

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<sup>348</sup> John Bartlow Martin, *Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War* ([New York, NY?]: Doubleday, 1966).

<sup>349</sup> Peace Corps Programs in Education and Training in Latin America, 1962, 1963, 1964; NACP.

<sup>350</sup> Military Civic Action and Community Relations Projects, April 28, 1965-June 1966; NACP.

parallel to each other or benefitted from each other, intentionally or not, in a multitude of ways.

Community organizing through recreational activities had a plethora of support and involvement from both Peace Corps and US military personnel but for very different reasons. Mentioned earlier in the chapter, Peace Corps volunteers organized a baseball league with the hopes of creating a community organized event that had the potential to draw a majority of members from the community. Thereby offering the opportunity for Peace Corps volunteers to promote political participation to fix standing issues within the community. A previous chapter discussed the military's use of baseball leagues to keep Dominican youth away from the radical political factions that existed in the Dominican Republic after the conclusion of fighting. It does not appear that the US military or the Peace Corps used each other's leagues. Outside of baseball, both the Peace Corps and the US military invested in music as another tactic to promote their goals for the nation. From October 1963 to July 1965 the Peace Corps sent thirty-five teachers and teacher trainers to the Dominican Republic "to aid in the training of local teachers" and those volunteers included music teachers.<sup>351</sup> At the same time those teachers educated young Dominicans about the world of music the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division's band marched down the line of communication and conducted public concerts throughout Santo Domingo. The US 81<sup>st</sup> Army Band followed those concerts by conducting concerts throughout the Dominican Republic in 1966 until the military withdrawal in September. Unfortunately, it does not appear that the military or the Peace Corps mentioned or discussed the others

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<sup>351</sup> Peace Corps Programs in Education and Training in Latin America, 1962, 1963, 1964; NACP.

programs but music remained a key player throughout the intervention for the military as a means of distraction and control while the Peace Corps used music to further educational opportunities.

Very little mention appears in Peace Corps and US military records regarding the programs operated by the other government organization. However, the Dominican Republic is one of the few places and times where the Peace Corps and the US military conducted programs and operations at the same time and in the same country. The Peace Corps pushed to appear independent and neutral in order to maintain the perception that it was not acting as an arm of US foreign policy, and Sargent Shriver pushed to keep the Peace Corps out of any nations where the US military operated. The Dominican Republic represented a special case as Peace Corps volunteers ran programs in the nation at the outbreak of hostilities and did not seek evacuation when the US military intervened in the conflict. This provided the Johnson administration and the Peace Corps with a choice, keep the volunteers in the nation or have them withdraw. Both President Johnson and the Peace Corps opted to have the organization remain in the Dominican Republic and operate alongside of the US military actions. As discussed earlier in the chapter, Peace Corps administrators believed this choice and the subsequent actions removed any semblance of independence the Peace Corps had and threatened the Peace Corps' relations not only in the Dominican Republic but with nations around the world.

The military held a complex relationship with the Peace Corps throughout the intervention in the Dominican Republic. On the one hand, the military wanted to use the Peace Corps at the beginning of the intervention to cover Special Forces members around the Dominican Republic. The Peace Corps provided cover stories while those soldiers

gathered intelligence on whether the Constitutionalist cause had spread outside of Santo Domingo and if there was any danger of a communist insurgency starting in the countryside. The military also remained a member of the Interagency Youth Committee seeking to discover talented youths in at risk nations to train and develop into future leaders. Members of the IAYC saw the Dominican Republic as a good testing ground for Peace Corps volunteers to provide useful information on the nation's youth population. The Peace Corps for its part withdrew itself from participation on the IAYC preferring to operate its own youth programs and vehemently refused to work with Special Forces on their intelligence gathering missions. On the other hand, the Peace Corps and the US military appeared to have had a working relationship with each other throughout the intervention as long as the Peace Corps controlled its volunteers talking to the press. The military worked with the Peace Corps to distribute food, water, and medical supplies to Dominican civilians and the programs of both organizations crossed over at a number of occasions. At some intersections Special Forces members worked in conjunction with Peace Corps volunteers. Those relationships add to the complexity of the overarching relationship between the Peace Corps and the military and offers further insight into how the two organizations can work together even with separate goals and intentions.

During the initial stages of the intervention the US military alongside the Peace Corps and attempted to use volunteers' relationships with the Dominican civilians. However, as the intervention progressed, and the fighting slowly ended the military left the Peace Corps to conduct its own programs The Peace Corps at present is operating in sixty-five nations around the world and none of them have a heavy US military presence

acting in a combat or occupier stance.<sup>352</sup> The Peace Corps relationship with the military today is based on those early interactions with the military during the formative years of its development after the organization's creation in 1961. The Peace Corps managed to stay out of the conflict in Vietnam even though many within the organization and the Johnson administration believed there was a role for volunteers in handling refugees. The Dominican Republic remains the one theater where Peace Corps volunteers operated in a situation where US military personnel engaged in full combat operations and involved Peace Corps nurses providing medical treatment to those who minutes before fought against US troops.

The relationship developed between the military and the Peace Corp during the 1965 Dominican intervention offers insight into whether the two can ever work together in a nation while allowing the Peace Corps to maintain its independence as a separate government organization. The Dominican situation revealed how the US military and the Peace Corps conducted parallel programs to improve the image of the US and to support a pro-US government. The US government's use of humanitarian aid involving both the US military and the Peace Corps demonstrated that the two organizations can work together in joint operations. However, the Dominican intervention shows that the Peace Corps has, and always will, push back against those types of endeavors.

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<sup>352</sup> Peace Corps. "Countries." <http://www.peacecorps.gov/countries>. Accessed December 15, 2019.

## CHAPTER VII – CONCLUSION

Throughout August 1966 all elements of the Inter-American Peacekeeping Force (IAPF) finished operations and withdrew from the Dominican Republic. The Paraguayan contingent departed the country at the end of July, the Honduran contingent left on August 12 with the Costa Rican contingent the following day, and the Nicaraguan contingent left on August 22.<sup>353</sup> Brazil and the United States, the two nations that had the largest representation in the IAPF, made up the last foreign units to leave. The election of Joaquin Balaguer on June 1 and his swearing in on July 1, 1966 provided the Dominican Republic a stable and US friendly government. The final elements of the US military forces withdrew on September 21, 1966. This dissertation argued that the US military deployed to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to create the conditions to establish a pro-US government. The military relied on civic action programs and civil affairs operations to create the conditions due to humanitarian aid, from entertainment to medical care, made the population less likely to support a leftist government. Those humanitarian operations alleviated the hardships felt by Dominican citizens, improved the US image, and furthered the US mission to establish a pro-US government.

The civil affairs and civil action projects provided the by US military sought to turn the Dominican population away from radical political organizations. The military designed many programs to keep Dominican youth away from the radical left- and right-

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<sup>353</sup> Quarterly Historical Report, July 1-September 20, 1966, Office of the C3, Plans and Operations; 206-6 Unified Command Inter-American Peace Force, Organizational History, 1 July-20 September 1966; Unit Records Created During the Dominican Republic Intervention, 5/1965-9/1966; Record Group 546; Box 1; National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

wing political groups that gained popularity after the cease fire in September 1965. The formation of baseball leagues sponsored by US military units provided a form of recreation for Dominican youth to keep them away from those groups and provided interaction with US military personnel. Those leagues allowed the military to control and observe youths that demonstrated leadership capabilities, a role which benefitted the Inter-Agency Youth Committee's job in the Dominican Republic. The military baseball leagues also worked alongside leagues developed by Peace Corps volunteers. Those leagues aided the creation of community societies for community action and political activism not part of the leftist political activities.

The medical aid and claims services provided humanitarian services throughout intervention and remained an important fixture in the civil affairs and civil action operations around the Dominican Republic. Those programs demonstrated how the military aided the population, when the military helped, and how the military helped. The case of Maria de Los Angeles Ogando illustrated the limits of military humanitarian aid but also revealed the international and legal aspects of the intervention and occupation. The OAS grew immediately suspicious of the US actions and were widely critical of the US during the initial stages of the intervention. However, the OAS criticism abated as their role in the intervention increased through the creation of the IAPF. The US military passed Maria de los Angeles Ogando's claim along with other claims filed against the US military to the OAS for settlement. The medical aspect of Ogando's claim also reveals the military's medical humanitarian mission in the Dominican Republic. The military deemed Dominican military personnel and Dominican government officials essential to the mission and provided access to US medical facilities under army regulations.

However, the average member of the Dominican population did not experience this treatment and instead received referrals to Dominican medical facilities. Those actions illuminate the military's attempt to demonstrate that the pro-US government had the capabilities to meet the needs of the Dominican people and turned the Dominican population away from the leftist political organizations policies.

Civic action programs and civil affairs operations used in the Dominican Republic remain an example of the US military using humanitarian operations to promote and support US foreign policy goals. Through the claims services and medical aid provided in the Dominican intervention US medical units and claims teams controlled the Dominican population seeking assistance. The civil affairs and civic action programs carried out by the US military during the Dominican intervention acted as an instrument of US government policy. Those programs carried out the official military mission of providing an atmosphere of stability to allow US negotiators to form a permanent Dominican government friendly to the United States.

Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman's question about the use of the Peace Corps also provides insight into how the government organization operated alongside US military civil affairs and civic action programs. Seeking insight into the true use of humanitarian activities, Hoffman asks questions revolving around the intent of humanitarianism and whether humanitarianism is a means to power.<sup>354</sup> While meant to analyze Peace Corps programs within the realm of foreign policy Hoffman's analysis can apply to the programs conducted by the US military in the Dominican Republic. The US military

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<sup>354</sup> Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, *All You Need is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 4.

provided humanitarian aid but chose who received aid and the humanitarian operations created a favorable environment for the US government's negotiations to resolve the conflict favorable to the US. Humanitarianism also acted as a cover for the unilateral military action taken by the US during the initial stages of the intervention by providing an in road for the US to push the OAS to create the IAPF and for the US to legitimize the intervention on an international stage.

The US military's use of humanitarianism within civil affairs and civil action programs leads to the question of can the military forces of any nation be used in a purely humanitarian capacity? In the present, the military often engages in humanitarian actions as seen in the US response to humanitarian aid efforts after natural disasters such as the Indonesian tsunami disaster in 2004, and Japan's tsunami disaster in 2011 when the US sent an aircraft carrier to assist in the recovery. The military also deployed on humanitarian missions within the United States after Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina when the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division deployed to Miami and New Orleans respectively to provide security and humanitarian assistance. The question is not to ask whether the military should be used in humanitarian disasters but to analyze whether the military can be a humanitarian organization. The military's primary goal is to support and carry out the US government's policies in foreign relations and at times within the United States itself. With the advent of technology and the ever-growing capabilities of militaries around the world, particularly the US military, nations respond to humanitarian crises whether through conflict or natural disasters by sending military personnel as the leading representatives. The primary reason for the military moving to the frontline of

humanitarian crises is that militaries tend to be well organized, supplied, and available in a short period of time.

Issues arise with the military's use as a humanitarian organization due to the military maintaining its own regulations on top of the laws created by the US legislative body. Those regulations determine the way the US military reacts to a given crisis or to a situation that arises in a nation where they are deployed. This is illustrated fully in situations regarding claims services and medical aid situations. The military, at the time of the Dominican intervention, had to operate along the lines of its own regulations, and so while a humanitarian situation may require one action regulations force the military to complete another action. The Dominican intervention has a number of these situations, some of which are discussed in the preceding chapters, but they all lead to the question of the military acting in humanitarian endeavors. This topic requires further study in order to provide a firm conclusion and even then, that conclusion will change as the military is constantly changing and updating regulations. Studies specifically analyzing military actions, regulations, and policies in a humanitarian mission can provide further understanding of the methods and uses of the military as well as provide a lens through which to view not only US foreign relations, but also domestic relations in times of crisis. The military is first and foremost an organization that specializes in war. How the military responds to humanitarian actions and the civilian perception whether inside or outside of the US toward the mobilization of military forces can provide further insight into the function and actions of governments and militaries, and their relationships with civilian populations and organizations.

It has been fifty-five years since the beginning of the US military intervention in the Dominican Republic and there is a variety of material awaiting analysis. This dissertation seeks to restart the conversation regarding the Dominican intervention and US military interventions and occupations during the Cold War outside of Vietnam. There is no question that the Vietnam War represents a vital point in US history and military history. However, aside from Vietnam overt US military actions during the Cold War remained small, limited conflict interventions. In fact, the US did not fight in a high conflict military engagement after World War II, other than Korea and Vietnam, until the Gulf War in 1991 followed by Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003 both of which are ongoing and turned into counterinsurgency after a couple weeks.<sup>355</sup> Studying conflicts such as the Dominican intervention also provides a larger world perspective during the Cold War outside of Vietnam, and highlights US military action as a whole during the 1960s and into the 1970s. For example, the US occupation of Santo Domingo contains similarities with the occupation of Berlin after World War Two. This dissertation seeks to start the conversation by providing the context and motivations of the US military engaging in civil affairs and civil action programs throughout the Dominican Republic. The humanitarian operations carried greater value than combat actions regarding the success of the overall mission. The intervention in the Dominican Republic reignited overt and prolonged US military interventions during the Cold War and provides further

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<sup>355</sup> US military involvement in limited conflict includes, but no limited to: Lebanon in 1954, Cuban Missile Crisis 1961, Dominican Republic in 1965, Lebanon in 1983, Granada in 1985, Panama in 1992, Haiti in 1994, and the Balkans crisis in 1998.

analysis and context for how the US military operates alongside civil society, governments, and humanitarian organizations to accomplish the mission.

The 1965 Dominican intervention provides a variety of research opportunities that span across a wide variety of historical fields. In the field of war and society and military history for example, work in soldier experiences during the intervention remains undiscussed. Soldiers serving within the Marine Expeditionary Brigade and the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne division experienced a combat environment outside the Vietnam War and many of those Marines and soldiers did not deploy to Vietnam during the conflict but remained in the US or Caribbean theatres. Members of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne experienced the highest amount of deployments as they deployed to the Dominican Republic for the duration of the intervention, to Detroit during the race riots in 1968, and to Vietnam in 1969. Analyzing how those Marines and soldiers viewed their service in the Dominican Republic and how their experiences impacted their perceptions of the Vietnam War, particularly how Vietnam has been memorialized while the Dominican intervention has been forgotten, is beneficial to understanding the impact of the Vietnam War on military experiences during the Cold War. A discussion of soldier experience during the Dominican intervention also allows for a more complete comparison of the Dominican intervention alongside other Cold War interventions and military interventions that occurred toward the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The military interventions in Granada, Panama, and Haiti provided illuminating insight into the similarities and differences between the engagements, and to what extent the military actions influenced each other. All four occurred in the Caribbean region, and two of the four occurred during the Cold War while the Haitian intervention remains one of the vital military operations in the

region after the Cold War, and it too turned into an international intervention headed by the United Nations.

Further building on the military aspect of the Dominican intervention, there is a ripe opportunity to analyze the US military operating within a military coalition made up of solely western hemisphere nations, and US military combat units serving under a Latin American military general. The Inter-American Peacekeeping Force (IAPF) made up of military units from the United States, Brazil, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Paraguay remains the only strictly western hemisphere military coalition to have existed. A Brazilian general, Hugo Panasco Alvim, commanded the IAPF, continuing Alvim's and Brazil's relationship with the United States military dating back to the Italian campaign during World War II where Alvim served as an artillery commander. Relationships within the force go deeper as Nicaragua and Honduras have their own bloody history with the United States stemming from the interventions and occupations at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Paraguay and Brazil also have a heated rivalry dating back to the War of the Triple Alliance. An in-depth analysis of the coalition and why a coalition has not been created since will further the overall historical analysis of US and Latin American relations throughout the Cold War and into the present.

The Dominican intervention can also provide insight into the history of international relations and foreign policy of the US working with the OAS while trying to keep the UN out of the Dominican military operation. The US working within the OAS to provide the appearance of multilateralism within the international community while also working deliberately to keep the UN out of the Dominican Republic stained the reputation of the OAS. The UN maintained official diplomatic and military

representatives within the Dominican Republic during the intervention, the diplomatic representative came from Canada and the military representative came from India, but the two officials held no authority. The OAS claimed authority due to a clause within the UN charter that provided hemispheric organizations sole authority over any crises. The Dominican intervention and the IAPF also provides a unique comparison with the 1994 Haitian intervention in which President Bill Clinton formed an international coalition with the United Nations, rather than the OAS, that contained military units outside of the western hemisphere, including France which has a long and bloody history with Haiti. An analysis comparing the motivations of the two coalitions and the impact on the Dominican Republic and Haiti which occupy the same island will add to the analysis of foreign policy and international relations history of military interventions.

The economic aspect of the Dominican intervention is an avenue of research with great importance due to the Johnson administration's work to rebuild the Dominican economy in order to create an atmosphere of stability. Rebuilding the Dominican economy required financial aid from the US government and massive loans from the World Bank and US banks who turned to the US government for promises to back up the loans if the Dominican government defaulted. The economic aspect saw the US government throw money into Dominican banks in order to spur Dominican businesses and provided money to the Dominican government to provide pay to government workers. On one instance during the intervention the US threatened to withhold Dominican government salaries if the Dominican government did not complete a series of reforms the US wanted completed. An economic study of the Dominican intervention will further illuminate the US government's involvement in the Dominican economy,

particularly in the sugar and tobacco industries. Both industries are carried over from the US economic involvement of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century that led to the military intervention from 1916-1924 and offer an intriguing connection between the two interventions, and the economic and foreign policy of the United States.

The Dominican intervention offers insight into the US military's use of humanitarian civil affairs and civil action projects to diminish interest in a leftist government and to support a pro-US government. Humanitarian civil affairs and civil action projects, not traditional military strategy and tactics, allowed for the US military and government to view the Dominican operation as a success before proceeding to the conflict with Vietnam. President Johnson saw the Dominican operation as vital to the US national interest not only in the prevention of a second Cuba in the Caribbean but also within the international community as the ability to protect US interests. That interest reflects the US government's stance during the Berlin Airlift when the US government refused to abandon Berlin during the Soviet Union's embargo. The Dominican intervention and the soldiers that participated in the intervention have been largely overshadowed by Vietnam and US domestic events of the 1960s. However, lessons learned during the Dominican intervention and the actions by US civil affairs and civil action officers and the US military in general operating alongside multiple humanitarian and governmental organizations remains influential on military actions undertaken throughout the world.



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