

Spring 5-14-2022

**CONSTRUCTING ROLES AND DISCOURSE: PRESIDENTIAL
SPEECH AND EUROPEAN UNION ACCESSION IN THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, 2000-2021**

John Horner

Follow this and additional works at: <https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations>



Part of the [International and Area Studies Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Horner, John, "CONSTRUCTING ROLES AND DISCOURSE: PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH AND EUROPEAN UNION ACCESSION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 2000-2021" (2022). *Dissertations*. 1995.
<https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations/1995>

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more information, please contact aquilastaff@usm.edu.

CONSTRUCTING ROLES AND DISCOURSE: PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH AND
EUROPEAN UNION ACCESSION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 2000-2021

by

John Benjamin Horner

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate School,
the College of Arts and Sciences
and the School of Social Science and Global Studies
at The University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Approved by:

Robert J. Pauly Jr. PhD, Committee Chair
Casey Maugh Funderburk PhD
Joseph J. St. Marie PhD
Tom Lansford PhD

May 2022

COPYRIGHT BY

John Benjamin Horner

2022

Published by the Graduate School



ABSTRACT

Yugoslavia's dissolution in the 1990s resulted in seven distinct nation-states vying for functional institutions, ethno-nationalistic coalescence, and external validation. To this end the European Union (EU) offered a pathway to nation-state building and membership via democratization, economic liberalization, and legal and civil improvements. However, to date only Slovenia (2004) and Croatia (2013) are EU member-states. Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia are candidate countries. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are potential candidates. What are the incentives for Western Balkan countries to reform and join the EU? Were motivations driven by rational, economic benefits of membership, or was the impetus identity-oriented to be seen not as "Balkan" but as "European?" This dissertation analyzes official presidential speech texts for all seven post-Yugoslav countries from 2000-2021 through a comparative case study. The research folds into Constructivist epistemology and utilizes K. J. Holsti's (1970) Role Theory as a model. Speech text was examined through content analysis and discourse analysis to garner breadth and depth of presidential discourse and its motivations. The results indicate that identity populates presidential speech three-times more often than rational, economic language. Further, regardless of status or role a country fell under, positive developments in the step-by-step EU accession process did not increase the use of either identity or rational language. EU membership and progress did not incentivize a specific linguistic response. These findings bolster the existent literature on identity in international relations, especially regarding the Western Balkans. The findings also call into question whether membership-based intergovernmental organizations can incentivize the idioms of national leaders.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to extend my deepest appreciation to my dissertation committee chair, Dr. Bob Pauly, for guiding me through the research and writing with encouragement and patience. I also had the pleasure of working with my committee members, Dr. Casey Maugh Funderburk, Dr. JJ St. Marie, and Dr. Tom Lansford and I am deeply indebted.

I am thankful to the University of Southern Mississippi's Gulf Coast campus, the International Development doctoral program, and all the peers I have met along the way. The faculty's engagement and instruction were welcoming, demanding, and insightful. I very much appreciate Dr. Pauly, Dr. St. Marie, Dr. David Butler, and Dr. Shahdad Naghshpour.

Additionally, I am grateful for those closer to home who have given me their support through the years. This includes my colleagues in the Department of History and Political Science at the University of Indianapolis, particularly Dr. Jyotika Saksena, Dr. Milind Thakar, and Dr. Ted Frantz. Additionally, I would like to thank Samantha Gutierrez for her diligent research assistance. Finally, I would like to thank Charles Tibedo for meandering on this journey with me, lending an ear for hours at a time, and for the professional and personal support.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my wife, children, and family. Monica, you have been my compass, the calm to my storm, and the steadfast rock when I was absent for hours, nights, and days. Without you and your love, none of this would have been possible. Gerard, when I started this journey, you were a year-and-a-half. We grew together. Always attach your inquisitiveness and wonder to the power of your heart. Amelia, thank you for pushing me and making me a better father. Your beautiful strength and determination inspire. Paul, keep pulling people together literally and figuratively. You disarm us with perfectly timed, perceptive wit. Jude, buddy, you will not remember the struggle, but your smile, energy, and charisma assails us all. I am nothing without you five. I love you.

Mom, Dad, and Emily, it cannot be overstated the love and encouragement you have given me. Mom and Dad, you have been there in every way imaginable at every turn. You taught me to be unbiased, nonjudgmental, and accepting. Thank you for opening doors of possibilities, your unending support, and the encouragement to succeed. Emily, you are powerful beyond measure and a great example for your girls. I am blessed to have you as my sister and to have you all as my family. I love you.

To my in-laws, I am so lucky. Mom and Dad Phillippe, what can be said besides “thank you.” You give without expectation. You model without reservation. Thank you for raising a caring, confident, and supportive family. Thank you, Josh, Leydi, Jacob, Morgan, Ben, Nathan, Ellie, Isaiah, John Paul, Colleen, Sam, Jessica, Cecelia, and all your children. Thank you for being a part of my life and standing with me. I love you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iii
DEDICATION	iv
LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW.....	14
Introduction.....	14
Constructivism	15
Role Theory	22
Foreign Policy Analysis	28
Leadership in International Relations	33
European Union and Enlargement	40
European Union and the Former Yugoslavia.....	47
How does the Dissertation Add to the Existing Relevant Literature?	53
CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY & METHODS.....	55
Introduction.....	55
Research Design.....	56
Comparative Case Study Analysis.....	58

Quality Control	60
Secondary Data, Measurement, and Data Collection	62
Official Speech Primary Data General Comments	68
Official Speech Primary Variables, Measurement, and Data Collection.....	70
Methods of Primary Data Analysis.....	73
Content Analysis.....	74
Discourse Analysis.....	76
Methodological Concluding Remarks	78
CHAPTER 4 – EU MEMBER STATES: SLOVENIA AND CROATIA	79
Slovenia.....	79
Slovenian Economic Development (ECON)	81
Slovenian Human Rights Protection (HURI)	83
Slovenian Democratization (DEMO)	84
Slovenian Domestic Sentiments (DMST).....	86
Slovenian European Constraints (EUCN)	87
Slovenian Presidents 2000-2021	89
Slovenian Presidential Speech (PRSI)	90
Croatia.....	96
Croatian Economic Development (ECON)	97
Croatian Human Rights Protection (HURI).....	99

Croatian Democratization (DEMO).....	101
Croatian Domestic Sentiments (DMST).....	104
Croatian European Constraints (EUCN).....	105
Croatian Presidents 2000-2021	106
Croatian Presidential Speech (PRSI)	108
Concluding Remarks on Slovenia and Croatia	112
CHAPTER 5 – EU CANDIDATE STATES: MONTENEGRO, NORTH MACEDONIA, AND SERBIA.....	114
Introduction.....	114
Montenegro.....	115
Montenegrin Economic Development (ECON).....	116
Montenegrin Human Rights Protection (HURI).....	120
Montenegrin Democratization (DEMO).....	121
Montenegrin Domestic Sentiments (DMST)	124
Montenegrin European Constraints (EUCN).....	125
Montenegrin Presidents 2000-2021	127
Montenegrin Presidential Speech (PRSI)	128
North Macedonia	133
North Macedonian Economic Development (ECON)	136
North Macedonian Human Rights Protection (HURI)	138

North Macedonian Democratization (DEMO)	140
North Macedonian Domestic Sentiments (DMST).....	142
North Macedonian European Constraints (EUCN)	144
North Macedonian Presidents 2000-2021.....	146
North Macedonian Presidential Speech (PRSI).....	147
Serbia	152
Serbian Economic Development (ECON)	154
Serbian Human Rights Protection (HURI)	156
Serbian Democratization (DEMO)	158
Serbian Domestic Sentiments (DMST)	160
Serbian European Constraints (EUCN)	163
Serbian Presidents 2000-2021.....	164
Serbian Presidential Speech (PRSI).....	166
Concluding Remarks on Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia	171
CHAPTER 6 – EU POTENTIAL CANDIDATES: BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA AND	
KOSOVO	174
Introduction.....	174
Bosnia and Herzegovina	175
Bosnian Economic Development (ECON)	177
Bosnian Human Rights Protection (HURI)	180

Bosnian Democratization (DEMO)	183
Bosnian Domestic Sentiments (DMST).....	186
Bosnian European Constraints (EUCN)	188
Bosnian Presidents	190
Bosnian Presidential Speech (PRSI).....	193
Kosovo	197
Kosovar Economic Development (ECON).....	199
Kosovar Human Rights Protection (HURI).....	201
Kosovar Democratization (DEMO).....	203
Kosovar Domestic Sentiments (DMST).....	206
Kosovar European Constraints (EUCN).....	207
Kosovar Presidents.....	210
Kosovar Presidential Speech (PRSI)	212
Concluding Remarks on Bosnia and Kosovo	216
CHAPTER 7 – COMPARATIVE CASE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS	219
Introduction.....	219
Comparative Analysis of Content Analysis Findings.....	219
Comparative Analysis of Micro Critical Discourse Analysis Findings.....	224
Comparative Analysis Meso Critical Discourse Analysis Findings.....	227
Comparative Analysis of Macro Critical Discourse Analysis Findings	230

Conclusions on Comparative Case Analysis	234
CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSIONS	236
Introduction.....	236
Assessment of Hypotheses.....	236
Shortcomings and Future Research Opportunities	245
Importance of Findings	250
Policy Recommendations.....	252
APPENDIX 1 – Official Presidential Speech Websites and URLs	254
APPENDIX 2 – Rational and Identity Coded Words	257
REFERENCES	258

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 The Area and Density of the Western Balkans.....	2
Table 2 Presidential Speech Data by Country	72
Table 3 World Values Survey.....	86
Table 4 Slovenian change in sentence type based on coded segment type	94
Table 5 Thematic Tone of Slovenian Speech	96
Table 6 Thematic Tone of Montenegrin Speech.....	132
Table 7 Chairman of the Presidency, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2000-Present.....	190
Table 8 Kosovo to Serbia Tonal Code Coverage.....	216
Table 9 Identity vs. Rational Coded Words.....	220
Table 10 Top 5 Identity Coded Words per Country	221
Table 11 Top 5 Rational Coded Words per Country	223
Table 12 Discourse by Sentence Time.....	225
Table 13 Discourse Temporal Orientation.....	227
Table 14 Discourse Tonal Orientation.....	229
Table 15 Pre & Post “Big Year” Top Code Coverage Results	231
Table 16 Pre & Post “Big Year” Code Coverage Results Averaged.....	232
Table 17 North Macedonian Randomness Example.....	233
Table 18 Bosnian Randomness Example.....	233
Table 19 PRSP Overall Positivity vs. Negativity	241

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Map of the Balkan Peninsula.....	3
Figure 2. Research Design	57
Figure 3. GDP per capita: World Bank.....	82
Figure 4. Cato Institute	83
Figure 5. Slovenia DEMO, V-Dem	85
Figure 6. Slovenian Presidential Speech: Identity Codes	91
Figure 7. Slovenian “Europe” vs. “Balkan” Word Frequency.....	92
Figure 8. Slovenian Presidential Speech: Rational Codes	93
Figure 9. Western Balkan GDP per capita, World Bank	98
Figure 10. Cato Institute’s Human Freedom Index	100
Figure 11. Croatia DEMO, V-Dem.....	102
Figure 12. Croatian Identity Words 2000-2021	108
Figure 13. Croatian Rational Words 2000-2021	109
Figure 14. Montenegro GDP per capita, World Bank	117
Figure 15. World Bank: FDI/GDP Ratio 2009-2019.....	118
Figure 16. Cato Institute	120
Figure 17. Western Balkan DEMO, V-Dem.....	122
Figure 18. Montenegro Identity Codes 2000-2021	129
Figure 19. Montenegro Rational Codes 2000-2021.....	130
Figure 20. Macedonian Border Changes (www.sofiaglobe.com).....	135
Figure 21. North Macedonia ECON, World Bank	136

Figure 22. Cato Institute	138
Figure 23. North Macedonia DEMO, V-Dem	140
Figure 24. North Macedonian Identity Codes 2000-2021	148
Figure 25. North Macedonian Rational Codes 2000-2021	149
Figure 26. Serbian GDP per capita, World Bank.....	155
Figure 27. Cato Institute	157
Figure 28. Serbian DEMO, V-Dem	159
Figure 29. Serbian World Values Survey 1996, 2001, 2006, & 2017	161
Figure 30. Serbian Identity Codes	167
Figure 31. Serbian Rational Codes	168
Figure 32. Bosnian GDP per capita, World Bank.....	178
Figure 33. Cato Institute	181
Figure 34. Western Balkan DEMO, V-Dem.....	184
Figure 35. Bosnian Identity Codes.....	193
Figure 36. Bosnian Rational Speech.....	195
Figure 37. Kosovar GDP per capita, World Bank	199
Figure 38. Kosovar DEMO, V-Dem.....	204
Figure 39. Kosovo Identity Speech.....	213
Figure 40. Kosovo Rational Speech.....	214

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Speaking in 2013 regarding Europe's future, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, President of the European Commission from 2004-2014, stated, "Like a book: it (Europe) cannot only stay in the first pages, even if the first pages were extremely beautiful. We have to continue our narrative, continue to write the book of the present and of the future" (Barroso 2013). This dissertation analyzes the constructed and prescribed narratives of the seven post-Yugoslavian nation-states and the European Union (EU) from 2000-2021. Speech transcripts are measured through content and discourse analysis. The presidential and EU narratives that emerge present ideational and pragmatic incentives for constituent audiences and semantics of "membership" and "belonging". The conversation starts with a discussion on words and language. What something is called. Its name.

First, the name Balkans. This is not an easy term to define. It has been misattributed, generalized, bastardized, and appropriated. Popularized after 1808 by August Zeune, a German geographer, "Balkan" later became synonymous with Ottoman Empire controlled Europe (Jezernik 2007). An "other," "oriental" (Said 1979), culturally and politically different than Europe "proper," the geography of the designation remained firm as the nation-state building process changed borders and nomenclature (Bakic-Hayden and Hayden, 1992). The terms Balkan, Western Balkan, Yugoslavia, and Southeast Europe are used almost interchangeably today. The European Union (EU) uses the term Western Balkans to distinguish between other peninsular countries that are already member-states. The Federal People's Republic and later the Socialist Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia stood out as standard bearer of “other” as both communist and autonomous from full Soviet influence from 1942-1992. Southeast Europe is used to be genteel and holistic, respecting the composite parts (Lampe 2006).

Second, the name Europe. “Europa” was a conceptual territory for the Greeks, mythologized by the Phoenicians, and might be traced to Semitic Akkadian, a Mesopotamian language, meaning sunset (Wallenfeldt 2021). It meant anything west of the Bosphorus Strait, essentially modern-day Turkey. The Balkan Peninsula is west of Turkey (Figure #1) and Table #1 provides area and density numbers for each country. Fast forward to the advent of the European Union (EU) through the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, with not every European “proper” country a member of the Union, and who and/or what is considered European proliferates the past three decades of academic literature (Agnew 2001) (Jezernik 2007) (Hooghe and Marks 2008) (Fouere 2021). The Balkan Conflicts in the 1990s and early 2000s reified the distinction between the two names, Balkan and European.

	Bosnia	Croatia	Kosovo	Montenegro	N. Mac	Serbia	Slovenia
Area km²	51,129	56,538	10,887	13,810	25,713	88,367	20,251
Density	3.28m	4.05m	1.87m	621,718	2.08m	6.91m	2.09m

Table 1 *The Area and Density of the Western Balkans*



Figure 1. Map of the Balkan Peninsula

Word choice, language, and speech create and perpetuate perceptions and, ultimately, produce reality. What names are used to describe a region, a people, a process, an idea helps create ownership, goals, accomplishments, and/or failures. In international relations, presidential speech communicates the leadership of a nation from the figurehead of a state. It is at once evocative, rallies nationalism and inspires collectivity. Concurrently, presidential speech can be formal and functional, specifying deliverables and deadlines. Further, language is shaped by one's "role" or "self-image". Language conforms or changes based on messaging, medium, and setting. Finally, language adapts based on feedback mechanisms with the audience and situation.

This dissertation investigates presidential speech in the nation-states of the former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia means "Land of the Southern Slavs" and has been used in three different instances. The first was the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1929-1946, the

second the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the third, in 1992 in particular to only Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. The former Yugoslav countries are Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia), Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia. Between these seven areas, there have been 70 different presidencies of 52 presidents from 2000-2021. Each has had to navigate language to build inclusivity and governance. Each has had to work amid a backdrop of EU democracy promotion and conditionalities.

When Yugoslavia dissolved in the early 1990s the resulting demarcation of state borders, appeals to nationalism, and in-group loyalty produced a range of outcomes evident today. Their trajectories were not reached in a straight line or uniformly as each dealt with internal conflicts and external pressures. Political leaders conflated outside interference and constrained repositioning or reprioritizations to place their nation-states squarely in the balkanized “repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the ‘European’ ... has been constructed” (Todorova 1997).

Rising from the dissolution came calls for independence and sovereignty. Slovenia and Croatia both declared independence on June 25, 1991. North Macedonia followed later that year on September 25, 1991, after a referendum on September 8, 1991, received overwhelming popular support. Bosnia was next, declaring independence in March 1992. All three became members of the United Nations on May 22, 1992. Serbia and Montenegro were still considered the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until Montenegro declared independence on June 3, 2006. On June 5, 2006, Serbia became an independent state. The contentious southwestern Serbian province of Kosovo, a UN

protectorate since 1999, formally announced its independence in February 2008. To date 117 countries have recognized Kosovo as a sovereign country (Republic of Kosovo 2021), which represents only 60% of all nation-states.

Today's headlines repeat and reveal the tension in the dichotomy of "Balkan" and "European". On the one hand there are constant reminders of past conflict. For instance, in the past three months, Bosnian Serb Gen. Ratko Mladic lost his appeal of a 2017 war crimes conviction (Holligan 2021), animosities continue to prevent enfranchisement of ethnic minority groups (Brezar 2021), and in April a leaked memo caused consternation when it contended that redrawing the borders of the Western Balkans was the answer to uneven recognition and opportunities for the region (Coffey 2021). On the other hand, the Balkans are trying to appeal to outside expectations, especially toward the EU and its conditionalities for membership that change in both European support and technical requirements. In the autumn of 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron pushed back on the idea of further EU expansion into the Balkans, suggesting the process had to change and incorporate what it means to be European (Emmott, Guarascio and Pennetier 2019). Greek and Bulgarian vetoes have blocked momentum for North Macedonia to start the negotiation process for EU accession twice (Zsiros and Somerville 2021). Even the criteria for EU membership have been adjusted yet remain opaque to Western Balkan aspirants after a recent regional symposium with the EU (EWB 2021) (Fouere 2021).

These incidents exemplify agitation. They highlight internal wrestling of entrenched contestations and they are connected to external pressures faced by Yugoslav *successor* states on their path to EU *membership*. Finally, these anecdotes illustrate the way words denote actions and next steps and convey belonging and acceptance. After

the break-up of Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War in 1990-1991, conflict, hostility, skepticism, identity politics, and haphazard recognition by the international community contributed to uneven tracts of political and socio-cultural development. Some countries quickly coalesced around a shared sense of identity and moved to be “accepted” by Europe with Slovenia (2004) and Croatia (2013) joining the EU. Some had to make amends and concede to demands of reform to varying levels of success, while others continue to deal with nation and state building and meeting the requirements of broader legitimacy. Even internally, plenty of interested groups consider themselves Eurosceptics and support nationalistic, populist political parties and elites.

Simultaneously the Yugoslav successor states are appealing to a broad and intentional European vision with specific European Union conditionalities. At its core, the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit outlined four conditions of EU enlargement: democracy, human rights, economic development, and the capacity of national populations to commit (Stanicek 2020). Specificity is derived from the thirty-five *acquis*, or rights and obligations, that must be adopted by EU member states, and whose restructuring and improving is the aim of the accession process. At the May 2020 EU and Western Balkan Summit, the European Union announced a change to their methodology:

four principles – credibility, predictability, dynamism, and a stronger political steer – and six thematic 'policy clusters' – (1) fundamentals, including rule of law, (2) internal market, (3) competitiveness and inclusive growth, (4) green agenda and sustainable connectivity, (5) resources, agriculture, and cohesion, and (6) external relations (Stanicek 2020).

Further, the EU has highlighted the Western Balkans in communication, pronouncements, and policy to help galvanize the accession process for those remaining states. Importantly, a changed methodology demonstrates a commitment to the region

and allocates attention, specialization, and resources to the five non-members states currently moving through the process. Concurrently, such a shift provides an opportunity for political leaders of Yugoslav successor states to construct intentionality, discourse, and actions, one way or another, on the road to EU accession.

This dissertation rests at that juncture. Its central objective is to study and explain how political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia have guided, helped, hindered, or otherwise directed the progression of their respective countries toward membership in the EU. That is the dependent variable. The dissertation will address multiple research questions, which are organized from general to specific. Beneath each research question is the corresponding hypothesis/central argument.

RQ#1) Is Role Theory an appropriate tool for international relations and foreign policy analysis with the Western Balkan accession process due to those countries' "roles" as potential candidate, candidate country, or full member state designations?

Hypothesis #1: Role Theory is a useful analytical tool for international relations research when actors conform their discourse and policy for admissibility and participation in a group.

Natural overlap and extension of Constructivism by accentuating collective identity via foreign policy decision-making can be applicable for situations whereby an institution or organization sets parameters for membership. It is hypothesized that

European Role Constraints (EUCN) measured and qualified by EU official speech toward the Western Balkans affects presidential speech, actions, and policy based upon their status as either an EU member, candidate, or potential candidate. More pointedly, how the EU labels, communicates with, and processes Western Balkan countries as they move through the accession process affects assertions, rebuttals, official communication, demonstrating that one's role impacts discourse and foreign policy.

RQ#2) To what extent are the role interactions of prospective member states amid the EU accession process identity-based or economically incentivized?

Hypothesis #2: European Role Constraint (EUCN) speech and Presidential Speech (PRSP) will be economically incentivized by positive momentum in the accession process.

The literature suggests that as a country moves through the transactional, checklist of improvements or structural changes for the EU, the deliverable benefits of integration become wholesale realized. It is a rather straightforward cost vs. benefit analysis of becoming a member of the EU. Therefore, a country's "role" will be established as all three factors (alter expectations, leaders' direction, and constituent interests) produce discourse that illustrates the rational benefits of EU membership *over* national proclivities of simple identity allegiances. EUCN will be affirming in their discourse to a particular country as Economic Growth (ECON), Human Rights Protections (HURI), Democratization (DEMO), and Domestic Sentiments (DMST) increase, which will in turn be reflected in presidential speech (PRSP) that emphasizes beneficial integrations

with Europe on economic, structural integrative, and cooperative terms rather than discourse rooted in identity as a member of the EU “club”.

Hypothesis #3: European Role Constraint (EUCN) speech and Presidential Speech (PRSP) will be ideationally driven by negative momentum in the accession process.

The converse to this research question is also hypothesized. If ECON, DEMO, HURI, and DMST do not increase together, or a given measure backslides, EUCN discourse will stiffen the role expectations it places on Western Balkan countries. A role prescription more dictatorial, accusatory, blaming, hesitant, or inconsistent will produce a recalcitrant DMST or PRSP that will be more identity-focused and nationalistic in discourse and content.

RQ#3) How does presidential official discourse affect foreign policy role formations and foreign policy decisions? Do presidential statements exhibit agency?

Hypothesis #4: Presidential Speech (PRSP) discourse with EU and regional leadership will be polite, agreeable, and eager toward the accession process.

Presidents’ speeches will tend to be amendable and orderly in their role when performing official speech acts *with* EU or regional leadership, or when speaking *to* EU or regional leadership. This conformity to expectations happens at the broadest level, but still represents a “played” role.

Hypothesis #5: European Union Role Constraint (EUCN) speech will be polite, agreeable, and affirming of the “role” and the process of accession.

The interactive form of foreign policy communication, especially at formal meetings, will demonstrate equally positive expectations and commendations to PRSP that aligns itself with the expected “role” of EU member, candidate, or prospective candidate. The positive affirmations of a “job well done” instigate further work toward the goal.

Hypothesis #6: Presidential Speech (PRSP) will be ideational and project power when talking to or with other Balkan countries about EU membership.

Nationalistic identity drives PRSP when communicating about the prospects of others in the region for EU membership so that each president appears as putting his/her country first and beyond outside influence. Speech about and/or toward the Balkan countries themselves will be more nationalistic, self-interested, and skeptical of wholesale or rapid change. There is a caution toward outside interference and manipulation – either by the EU, United States, Russia, and China – that is historically legitimized.

Hypothesis #7: Presidential Speech (PRSP) directed at within-country audiences/populations about the EU will include *both* identity and economically incentivized discourse.

At the domestic level, a president's "role" is that of another politician trying to maintain power. A political leader wants to emphasize the good (ideationally, economically, etc.) to appear to be doing a good job for reelection. These speech acts will try to create reciprocal integrative logic, ethno-centric mythos, and point to any collective anchor as rationale.

RQ#4) Is there a difference in the way leaders constructed discourse in Croatia and Slovenia (member states) versus ongoing discourse construction in Montenegro, North Macedonia, or Serbia (EU candidates) versus Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (not candidates)?

Hypothesis #8: Presidential Speech (PRSP) will be constructed differently based on where countries are in the EU accession process.

It is hypothesized that the stage of a country's progression through EU accession shapes its presidential constructed discourse (PRSP). The literature does not offer either "strategy" or discourse as more or less predictive. However, the realities of the anecdotes on page five and the tensions within the region still produce an Us vs. Them mentality that rests on foundations of collective identity in PRSP toward other former Yugoslav countries' progression and in relationship to EUCN discourse and prescriptions.

The dissertation's goal is to utilize case studies to analyze these questions in the Western Balkans from 2000-2021. The years were selected chronologically as the first 20 years of the 21st century, but also because hostilities had fallen from their apex in the 1990s. Additionally, EU enlargement sped up after a decade from the Cold War. Thirteen countries have joined since 2004. Further, the accession process for candidate countries is an exhaustive foreign policy exercise, one that spans years and must address countless programmatic adjustments. Thus, heads-of-state become emblematic of both internal voices, but also transmitters of national sentiments toward commitments of change, frustrations, and hesitations. As such, the discourse of presidents from each of the seven countries will be central to addressing the above research questions and assessing the hypotheses' validity through evidentiary case studies. Language matters. The fluidity of role and speech construction in a back-and-forth EU process, further complicated by the sheer number of effected areas, proves a suitable undertaking to apply social science scholarship in a complex region.

The remaining chapters unfold as follows. Chapter Two synthesizes the existing research in aggregate for the areas of Constructivism, Role Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, Leadership in international relations, the European Union, and the EU relationship with the Western Balkans. Next, a methodology chapter will outline the research model, define variables, talk about data collection, and survey the main methods of case study, content analysis, and discourse analysis. Chapters Four-Six will be clusters of former Yugoslav countries based on their position in the accession process. Chapter Four covers current E.U. member-states Slovenia and Croatia. Chapter Five focuses on

EU candidate countries: Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Chapter Six considers potential candidate countries Bosnia and Kosovo. Chapter Seven presents and explains the comparative analysis of the case studies. Finally, Chapter Eight will conclude with an assessment of the extent of the validity of the hypotheses, identify shortcomings in the research and put forward a set of closing policy recommendations.

CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The guiding literature for the dissertation falls within six categories. First, at the broadest level, Constructivism in international relations outlines the theory of social realities – identity and interests – as built through individual and collective perceptions, evolving ideations, and social interactions. Second, Role Theory offers a model to suggest that the way in which identity is expressed – through discourse and actions – is informed in part by the social “roles” each entity (individual, interest group, nation-state, and institution) encompasses. Third, the literature on Foreign Policy Analysis takes center stage as the relationship between Western Balkan countries and the European Union is inherently one of nation-states committing to a foreign policy with a supranational organization. Fourth, Political Leadership in international relations is examined. Political leaders are key to the decision-making, discourse, and policy of any country. As such, a review of the literature on leadership is indispensable to this project. Fifth, foreign policy also involves international institutions, and the relationships with countries within Europe, members and non-members alike, is a necessity to analyze. The rationales and theory motivating the institution’s and applicant country’s appeal to expand are detailed below. Sixth, the research narrows to literature discussing how the EU approaches former Yugoslavian states as newly independent nation-states seeking membership. Seventh, the chapter concludes by explaining how this dissertation adds to the existing literature and moves the scholarly conversation forward.

Constructivism

Constructivism rose to prominence in the late 1980s and 1990s for three principal reasons. First, the theory responded to the positivist and rational calculus assumptions of objective, statistical answers that prevailed Cold War thinking. Positivist rationalism was occurring in policy (Hopf 1998) and in the academy (Reus-Smit 2009). Concurrently, postmodernism's popularization allowed for subjective interpretations of truth, correctness, applicability, and a whole host of other questions regarding methods and methodology (Harvey 1989). Third, the post-Cold War was anything but an "end of history" (Fukuyama 1989) with forays into ethnic cleansing, authoritarianism, populism, and radical religious violence. Not only was the *end* of the Cold War not clearly forecast, neither were new webs of transnational actors and organizations proliferating technological advances and realizing global uniformity in health and environmental pandemics. Stepping into these contests was Constructivism postulating that meaning(s) of objects is constructed individually and socially through interactive subjective processes. Wendt (1992, 94) calls this the "structures which organize our actions."

To begin, the dissertation will drill down into the assumptions and propositions of Constructivism. Guzzini (2004, 208) offers three main characteristics. First, Constructivism envelops the level of action, the level of observation, and the relationship therein. That means a reflexive self-awareness of how what one analyzes is affected and changed based on the dramaturgical interaction between observation and observer. Secondly, Constructivism adheres epistemologically to the social construction of knowledge and meaning; and thus, third, it is ontologically positioned such that reality is socially constructed. Unpacking each of these "characteristics" follows.

In reverse order, Frederking (2003, 364) first clarifies the third point, noting Constructivists believe ontologically that “social factors primarily influence human interaction;” second explains that social structures germinate the ideas and interests of individuals; and third, stresses individuals and structures create each other: “rules make agents and agents make rules.” This points the conversation more directly into explaining how the state of being creates movement points or objects through which unitary actors are motivated. These movements (actions, policies, or discourse) can be captured, measured, and analyzed to answer questions about international relations (IR) and therefore create collective, objective knowledge that becomes actionable and incentivized.

Next, Constructivism contends that knowledge is socially constructed. The literature argues that interests are not static, but rather couched in identity. Hoffman (2013) notes that “existential realities are given” ... but the “context of the entrenched is malleable.” Because interests continue from identity, and identities themselves arise from ideas, the whole structure of meaning-making – inputs (information), processing (with cues and shortcuts), and outputs (discourse and actions/policy) revolves around contested collective notions of reality individually grounded. Weldes (1996) walks through how rhetoric and policy lead to a “national interest,” which further leads to political socialization (i.e., the American pledge of allegiance). Sen (2006) worries that narcissism and “othering” contempt are effectively creating enmity. For example, Foer (2008) shows how national soccer stereotypes are spread through media re-presentation. Nevertheless, having inputs, processes, and outputs for our thoughts, emotions, and actions demonstrates an interest/disinterest (Zahra 2010) in forming intersubjective

communication channels of meaning-making. And this further leads to constructed knowledge of both “realizations” that X represents Y *and* X represents Y as Z (Fossen 2019).

Finally, reflexivity and participant/observer cognition in discursive meaning-making undergirds Constructivism. Ideas are passed from person to person. The process of how ideas are thought of, communicated, received, and reified creates meaning through individual levels of analysis. Marx (1904) notes, “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their social being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.” As a social scientist the “social” becomes highlighted. In social sciences participant/observer discussions lend themselves to dramatological (Goffman 1956), thick descriptive (Geertz 1973), and ethnographic (Al-Saggaf and Williamson 2006) (Fusch, Fusch, and Ness 2017) methodological intersections. Geertz (1973) details this in his analysis of the Balinese cockfight, when he indicates the “disarranging semantic contexts” that “invite a transfer of perceptions ... at once a description and a judgment” (447-448). Whether descriptive or judgmental, discourse communicates the ideas that shape identities, the heuristic lens to “experience life” (Peck & Mummery 2017), which are formed both individually and collectively. Thereafter, the aggregate of ideas and identities facilitates micro-interactions between observer and observed and macro-questions on the construction of knowledge from constructed reality (Coppedge, et al. 2011).

However, Constructivism is not the only theory in IR. In comparison to Realism and Liberalism, Constructivism questions the units of analysis, their primacy, and issues around the uniformity of system change. Realism accepts states as the primary unit of

analysis, Liberalism considers states, groups, and institutions as paramount. Both, however, view their unit as rational and atomistic actors, or in other words complete and understandable in a vacuum (Shadle 2011). Pickering (1984), Giddens (1986), and Kuhn (1996), amongst others, situate change in a dynamic environment where both logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences are known and ideas/information change over time moving the proverbial “goal posts” to rationalize. Therefore, units of analysis are not just fluid in and of themselves (Anderson 2006) but are understood and studied vis-à-vis their changing real and perceived capabilities, language, and actions, and thus cannot be considered anathema to the integration of ideas and identity in the construction of reality (Sprinz and Wolinsky 2004). Berkenskoetter (2018) notes how this integration of identity introduces other questions and methodologies that can challenge the theoretical status-quo.

Another area where Constructivism differs from both Realism and Liberalism is by accepting substate actors’ attitudes and voices and finding them contributory. Devine (2009) explains how public opinion, elite mobilization, and social movements are either ignored (Realism) or seen as an “intermediary” through which governments gain their knowledge but are not of “stand alone” value (Liberalism). Shadle (2011) calls Realism’s and Liberalism’s positions presumptuous. Constructivists, on the other hand, argue that global civil society matters to shaping ideas, interests, and influencing elites. Delgado (2017) drives this notion globally connecting cultural globalization of businesses, popular culture, intellectual establishments, and religious groups as carriers of discourse and actions that necessitates changes in character, thoughts, and deed. Baird (2018) demonstrates how Constructivism can interact with strategic contextualization

(norms), strategic legitimization (accountability and transparency) and strategic communication (discourse and language), thus shaping actors and levels of analysis rather than taking them (IR actors) as a “black box” whereby everything is already present for analysis. Individuals come to their position, which is addressed in greater depth in the Role Theory section below, with a frame of reference that is their starting positing in constructing knowledge and interactivity. An individual’s frame of reference acts is a social setting through compromises of policy and collective action.

To deal with the social construction of meaning, knowledge, and reality, Constructivism upholds the uniqueness of the individual’s role in making, validating, and recognizing their unique and situated knowledge and interactive spheres of reality. In contrast, “Neorealism and neoinstitutionalism ... are obliged to treat identity and interests of their constituent actors as being exogenous and given” (Ruggie 1998, 13). Hopf (1998) contends that “Meaningful behavior, or action, is possible only within an intersubjective social context” (173). He further asserts that “The power of social practices lies in their capacity to reproduce the intersubjective meanings that constitute social structures and actors alike” (178). Kratochwil argues that if meaning and reality in international affairs are governed by organizational rules and norms, as Keohane and Nye posit, then rules are “speech acts” that depend on good communication, and which further can be studied to understand contexts (Zehfuss 2002, 16-17). Here again, Wendt (1995) offers strong clarity:

Social structures are collective phenomena that confront individuals as externally existing social facts. ... Constructivists, however, are modernists who fully endorse the scientific project of falsifying theories against evidence. ... All observation is theory-*laden* in the sense that what we see is mediated by our

existing theories ... But this does not mean that observation, let alone reality, is theory-determined. The world is still out there constraining our beliefs... (75).

More pointedly, the world and “social facts” confront individuals, forcing a reckoning onto the ways in which the “facts” situate within the existing knowledge. This leads to Constructivism’s useful contribution to social science and intellectual inquiry.

Also, it should be noted, that Constructivism in International Relations is different than its other disciplinary iterations. At its most general, Constructivism is an interdisciplinary epistemological concept. Gregory et al. (2009) suggest Constructivism’s use in both specialized knowledge and “everyday taken-for-granted knowledge” (690). There’s a rich history in the literature of a more activist orientation for Constructivism primarily in teaching (O’Loughlin 1992) (Jones and Brader-Araje 2002) (hooks 1994), nursing (Bassot 2012) (Walker et al 2014), social work (Berlin 1996), and environmentalism (Bassett and Peimer 2015) (Kallis and Bliss 2019). Further because of its malleable tenants, or maybe more aptly described as all encompassing, Constructivism gets picked up as a tangential theory used with terms like “critical,” “racial,” “structural,” “feminist,” and any of the other “post” schools of thought.

Even within international relations there are different varieties of Constructivism. Bettiza (2014) believes the interactionist approach should be made even more general and suggests civilizational politics. She does not get into the details of “civilizations” to the degree in which Huntington (2011) does, but nevertheless takes the concept and extrapolates it. Devine (2009) suggests a more critical approach to Constructivism that looks at domestic factors, blurred levels of analysis (as mentioned above), and “emancipatory” traditions. Hoffman (2013) calls for more dialectical applications of

Constructivism to consider geography and time as meaning making contributing factors that “interact” within the social environment. Grant (2018) believes agency should be more determinative in Constructivism to answer “how ... states and nonstate actors respond to, as well as help and disseminate, norms” (261).

Thus, Constructivism is an appropriate and informative theory to utilize, at the most general level. The main research themes circle role expectations, Europe, presidential official speech, and the seven nation-states of the former Yugoslavia. The research addresses questions about role construction, who or what makes expectations, does political leadership frame language a certain way, and does a procedural framework guide economically rational and/or ideational incentives? The words “construction,” “makes,” “frame,” “language,” “guide,” “rational,” “ideational,” and “incentives” all have actors and structure denotatively and connotatively. From an actor-centric perspective, there is an action or verb (build, make, border, communicate, lead, solve, think, move), which means there must be someone or something performing the action. From a structural perspective, each of those words propels thoughts, discourse, actions, and policy in a particular way. There areonyms: destroy, break, open-up, silence, lose, irrational, idleness, and stillness. For stability and peace one hopes these words do not gain traction.

Therefore, the research’s ideas, questions, themes, and language will wrestle with the literature and the data from a Constructivist theoretical perspective. Constructivism argues that discourse is indicative of intersubjective meaning-making, and therefore it offers theoretical utility to analyze speech transcripts as maps of meaning. Constructivism also contextualizes broader debates between Western Balkan countries

and the EU that situate the benefits of institutional membership between rational, tangible benefits and ideational, intangible factors. Therefore, as the main theoretical basis for the dissertation, Constructivism's epistemological discursive fulcrum is central. In order to look at specific speech patterns, the research now focuses in on identity, status, and roles.

Role Theory

Role Theory is a sociological theory. Its central premise is that identity and reality are based on the interactivity of how social roles guide, nurture, and constrain human behavior. "While role is a direction to action, *a role* is a set of norms" (Turner 1990). Therefore, social roles instigate social discourse, actions, and policy. This section will continue with a general overview of the broadest terms (i.e., "role"), introduction of Holsti's (1970) national role conception model, other uses of role theory in international relations, its symbiotic nature to constructivism, and its appropriateness for use in the dissertation as a "middle" theory.

At the individual unit of analysis, one's frame of reference or role conception can be created two ways: individually and collectively. Identity and the search for one's identity involves a socialization process that leads to autonomous choices of inputs (Maltese, Pika, and Shivley 2020). There is a back-and-forth there syntactically. Identity "involves," at disputable percentage levels, others as agents of socialization or part of the "socialization process". An individual chooses inputs, but *others* are involved experientially, which only extrapolates as one proceeds to broader unit levels of analysis.

Much of the literature distinguishes between "role" and "identity". Linton (1936) presented early that,

The role represents a dynamic aspect of a status. The individual is socially assigned a status and occupies it with relation to other statuses. When he puts the rights and duties which constitute the status into effect, he is performing a role (114).

More pointedly, “identity lacks agency since it is not a concept that has an action-driven meaning” (Wehner and Thies 2014, 418). Nabers (2012) argues that identity provides a lens to reason and think through expectations from the status/role before “moving” forward. The differentiation truly lies in parts of the chronology of it all. There is a linear progression when Wendt (1999) gives a name, thus status, thus a role, to “identity” labelling it as “enemy, rival, and friend”. Identity as a standalone concept or in a vacuum does not drive behavior. Individuals, organizations, arguably countries, cycle through multidimensional identities – conceptions of self – justifying modern individualism (Fukuyama 2018). Only once the status of a name is given and its denotation and connotation understood will discourse, action, or policy move from the status quo.

There are many examples of roles. Some can be “enemy, rival, and friend” or derivations of the same concept (companionship) such as pal, friend, compadre, or bestie. Sometimes the status designation comes from election (student class president) or appointment (board membership), other times it is something earned (graduate), merited (champion), or accounted for (taxpayer). Also, at times, statuses are self-identified (sexual preference) or given by another (rebel or terrorist). Wehner and Theis (2014) note that roles were easier to assign in Cold War bipolarity and explain why.

Role theory joins with other theories in describing the behavior induced by roles, statuses, and identity. Turner (1956) grouped roles into four categories: basic: rooted in societal norms; structural: based on occupied position/status; functional: informal but

recognized; and judgmental: organizes some values over others. Biddle (1986) outlines five ways to analyze roles. First, functional role theory looks at how stability and systemic expectations create behavior. Second, symbolic interactionists look at dynamic and fluid interactivity that evolves individual conceptions and thus changes role-centric discourse and actions. Third, structural role theory is the most positivist of the five. It tries to quantify the bell curve and dismiss outlier behavior. Fourth, organizational role theory views institutions as deciding on appropriate role behavior and accounts for hierarchy and having deliverable tasks. Lastly, cognitive role theory incorporates the most psychology to determine heuristic patterns of conformity to roles.

This research is most closely looking at structural roles and symbolic interactionist roles according to the above lists. Since the paper pivots on presidential leaders, their given status/role assumes that heads-of-state speak on behalf of both the citizens *and* the state (Melo 2018). The head-of-state analysis is one of the thrusts of this research. In Biddle's further delineation the research would be most closely aligned with symbolic interactionism since the use of official speech acts, discourse, is the primary data. At the same time, the "dynamic aspect" of changing ideas, identities, statuses, and roles can also be considered in the multitude of statuses, and thus roles, a person exchanges by the minute. Some of the literature finds inclusion in that fact, considering society all players performing their part/role in the play (Thies 2009).

Continuing, the literature has ample evidence of the utility of applying Role Theory to foreign policy analysis. Holsti's National Role Conception model (1970) is the starting point. He modeled the relationship between decision-making, identity, expectations, and roles as:

Dependent Variable (DV): Role Performance (Decisions & Actions) =
Independent Variables (IVs): 1) Ego's Role Conception +
2) Nation's Status +
3) Alter's Prescriptions.

In this way, the perceptions, attitudes, and values of the Ego, the actor, *and* the prescriptive expectations of outside influences, the Alter, combine with national factors to form a “performance” by a nation-state through discourse, action, or policy.

Holsti argues that “roles” are tripartite. First, there is a declared, public role – the role conception that suggests the “wheels are in motion” and that the normative part of the decision is fairly resolved. Second, there is an expected role – the role prescription that is assigned by society and might include specific pressures. Finally, there is a played role – the role performance that can be gathered from the discourse, actions, and policy of political decision-makers (Brzezinska 2020).

Holsti's national role conception model has generally been met favorably as social and political scientists started applying role theory to foreign policy and international relations. Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot (1996) study Ukraine and Belarus post-Soviet Union. Thies and Sari (2018) apply role theory to “middle power” status in Indonesia. Herbut (2017), Kurum (2019), Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2005), Smith (2019), and Bengtsson and Elgstrom (2012) specifically look at the role of the European Union internally and externally, with neighbors and candidate countries. Beasley et al. (2021) ascribes new roles to the United Kingdom after Brexit.

Now, there are contentions to Role Theory. Regarding the theory itself, Connell (1979) suggests that labeling roles, defining expectations, and then finding whether or not someone or something lived up to those expectations just creates a way to normalize what

the expectations themselves are, even if they are the wrong ones. Wehner and Thies (2014) contend that the concept came over too early before Constructivism really took hold in IR research so that that the concepts are still “fuzzy”. Herbut (2017) worries about oversimplification of expectations and roles. Baert, Van Langenhove, and James (2019) contend role theory needs more grounding and questions interactivity. To the former point, Jackson (1998) believes role theory is insufficient because it does not adequately account for power relationships and individual agency. Grant (2018) agrees and calls for a tilt toward “agential role theory”. Beasley, Kaarbo, and Oppermann (2021) attempt to address this through a “sovereignty – role nexus” that bridges the domestic and international environments.

Methodologically, there are critiques too. Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) argue that international norms of behavior are not *prima facie*, but rather much more attention needs to be paid to domestic interests and constituent groups. Kurum (2019) makes the case to consider multiple “roles” domestically and internationally to get a more complete picture. Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot (1996) make an important point in acknowledging the vast data needed to accurately create “roles” in the analysis. Jackson (2011) furthers that critique by claiming role theory segments society too thinly, which diminishes its generalizing application.

Nevertheless, since the theory’s original promulgation in IR in the 1970s, the literature has treated Role Theory as quite useful and analytically flexible. If one’s “role” – a word/title defined by relationships to/with others – effects one’s identity or interest, there must a symbiosis between Role Theory and Constructivism. Biddle’s (1986) symbolic interactionism role theory classification neatly folds into the Constructivist

paradigm whereby relationships and interactions help contribute to both the expectations and the resulting actions/behaviors of nation-states. Wehner and Thies (2014) demonstrate the use of combining both (Constructivism and Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory) as insightful on role conformity, consensus, and conflict, all of which are parts of the process. Breuning (2017) notes how Role Theory substantiates lesser countries' decision-making that may get subsumed by U.S. or global north centric scholarship.

From that summary, Role Theory neatly folds into a Constructivist theoretical perspective in two fundamental ways. First, the delineation between identity and roles as chronologically placed allows for a seamless categorization, a sublevel. Detangling identity to status to role is more properly titled here

1. Identity: individual identity expressed as national identity to
2. Status: President of a former Yugoslavian nation-state to
3. Role: Choice on how to speak about EU integration & accountability

Role theory as a “middle theory” should harness and in some way structure the overarching theory's propositions. That way as the funnel narrows the analysis gets clearer. As shown above Role Theory establishes parameters around the larger ideas/themes Constructivism posits.

Second, the unique relationship between the EU and candidate countries is intersubjective on four different official levels. At the outset there is a relationship between the EU as institution(s) setting standards on membership, resources, and policy. Next, there is a relationship between candidate countries on the continent of Europe and the EU based on the standards, perceptions, and politicking. And then there is a relationship between elected and appointed EU officials between each other, as they represent their home country. These officials, at times, also cross over into joint

committees or working groups that focus on accession chapters or specific EU policies. Finally, there is a relationship between all countries on the European continent. Therefore, at minimum, four different level nodes exist of discourse, actions, and policies. It should be noted that what was just outlined is only “official EU” levels of interaction compared to the countless levels of European interactions exist across public, private, and digital space. To summarize, Role Theory frames Constructivism seamlessly & analytical for utility in this research. Of the four areas mentioned above, the first two will be of particular note hereafter.

Foreign Policy Analysis

Foreign Policy Analysis as a discipline began as a cross section of disciplines trying to make sense of global affairs. The units of analysis it focuses on can span policy decisions, decision-makers, causes, and consequences of interstate behavior. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962) promoted that perception, choice, and expectations are all present within foreign policy analysis. Perception, choice, and expectations can be identified and cataloged. During that time James Rosenau suggested a more scientific, quantifiable emphasis in FPA. Later, Harold and Margaret Sprout emphasized the psycho-milieu as explanatory (Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 2016).

There are many paths where Foreign Policy Analysis literature can branch out. A more succinct answer might be, “what does what to whom, how”? First, as a subdiscipline within social science, FPA must address what the level of analysis is and what are the variables. Is the research looking at the individual, state, or system level? Is the approach structural or agential? What to do with psycho-social factors? Is the

foreign policy strategic or relational? The strictly methodological portion is explained in the next chapter. But in FPA, the dependent variable, the explanandum, the object of analysis, can be a policy (deliverable from an administration), process (operating procedures of decision-makers), the state, or independent actors.

At the individual level foreign policy can look at decision-makers and their cognitive lens, social contexts, and institutional and identity membership. Individual actors can be studied through individual heuristics, aspirations, and inspirations (Hussain and Shakoor 2017), biases (Hanania and Trager 2020), and leadership styles. This vein emphasizes cognition, beliefs, and personalities. The literature also highlights socialization and inputs toward frames of references (Rosati 2000), the effect of ideologies, and social traditions, rituals, or habits (Harrison and Huntington 2000). This speaks to the contextual, intersubjectivity of learning, sharing, and gaining information through volunteer associations and gossip (Haerper et al.). Finally, the individual level literature allows for research to be applicable toward heads-of-state and government (Hussain and Shakoor 2017), institutional and bureaucratic administrators (Kaussler 2011), and even organizational leaders (Mortenson and Relin 2017) (Mallaby 2006).

Further, FPA extends to looking at both internal and external factors that shape decision-making. Internal factors include bureaucratic and organizational structures (Zakaria 1990), logistical resource allocation (Nye 2016/2017), and public diplomacy (Shirky 2011). On the other hand, external factors that figure into FPA are just as consequential. Examples in the existing literature range from realignment of international alliances and priorities (Stokes 2018), the media (Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon 2005), and moral obligations. Putnam (1988) famously tied up domestic (internal)

and international (external) decision-making actors in a two-level game, which bound the actors to constituent demands, structural interactions, and pressures related to agency based on global positioning.

Foreign policy analysis at the state level discusses structures and interests. Structurally, FPA can ask questions about form of government, constitutional framework, and institutional decision-making rules. These inquiries focus on questions of centralized/decentralized authority, procedural delineations of power, and process-orientated bureaucrats. Morgenstern, Swindle, and Castagnola (2009) and CES (2010) investigate access to electoral and policy levers of power via political party and interest group systems. Djordjevic (2014) looks at local changes in mountain governance on the Balkan peninsula as new designations come from the European Union and other supported regional organizations. Questioning FPA structures, Chappell (2010) applies a comparativist feminist lens on foreign policy decision-making bureaucracies.

Interests at the state level of analysis include interest groups, public opinion, and the media. At the most general level, interest groups are aggregated collective identities trying to influence and incentivize. Groups take form around public and private identities, occupational (unions), ideological (religious institutions), and policy (x-cancer research). Interest groups try to influence and incentivize public opinion. Public opinion, a collection of shared private thoughts, is tracked through surveys, public relations, creative content, and social media trends. Much of this information is shared on media channels, which raises issues of framing, information cues, and media conglomerates (Snyder and Ballentine 1996) (Reese and Lewis 2009), technological change (Shirkey 2011), and new geographies of debate and vote (Appadurai 1990).

Lastly, the most abstract level of analysis considers cross-national capabilities and systemic formal and informal norms. Diamond (1997) considers natural endowments and benefits from flora and fauna distribution. Resource endowment also turns into collective goods problems (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2014) and curses (Ross 2001). Regional integration, more broadly global systems integration, has been addressed from nominal and functional levels (Kucera 2017) (Price and Cooper 2007) (Uvalic 2019). Holman (2019) looks at the neighborhood policy of the European Union. Grieco and Ikenberry (2003) acknowledge the security and geopolitical goals of the European Coal and Steel Community, and by extension the EU. Organic and migratory population growth compounds economically and educationally with innovation and entrepreneurship. Increasing this literature points to civilizational politics of the Huntington (2011) essentialist variety that brings in aspects of cosmopolitanism and works on universalist values (Horner 2019) and human rights (Howard 1997/1998) (Beitz 2001).

The global capitalist *system* is the most common subject of analysis at this level. How does the global capitalist system create norms, rules, and customs of interaction? Gartzke (2007) details how capitalism can deescalate differences and reify democracy. Haerpfer et al. (2020) point to the symbiotic relationship that is supportive for both (capitalism and democracy) especially around norms of collective action and legal frameworks. The system instructs and reflects economies of scale, domestic political economy, international trade, and multinational corporations. In a more critical vein, Wallerstein (1974) worries about dependency theory, Strange (1992) suggests that the corporation is an acceptable new global actor, and Cudworth and Hobden (2013) contend that a systems approach to foreign policy needs to think beyond historical notions to

become more complex and non-anthropocentric. Next, this section pivots to approaches in foreign policy analysis.

One of the through-lines of the preceding sections has been the tensions between structure and agency. The choice of approach to studying foreign policy also is one that can bifurcate between a structural and agential approach. The structural approach presents a number of factors to assess from a structural approach. In realism the researcher would look the state structure, the anarchic international system, or structures of domestic power capabilities. Liberalism would portend to highlight regimes as the structure that promulgates norms, expectations, and behaviors. Constructivists look at the identity frameworks on ideation and rationality (Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 2016).

The other approach to foreign policy is actor or agent centered. In some form or fashion individuals are responsible for state-level decision-making. FPA can detail out the cognitive or psychological impetuses of actors or differences in bureaucratic infighting with the institution being considered the actor here (March and Olsen 1984). Also, research asks questions regarding interest groups as a collective actor that shapes foreign policy choices (Dietrich 1999) (Varshney 2001) (Haass 2001). In any of these cases, the rationale, alternatives, and ultimately the decisions are weighed against their effects. Consequently, whether one takes a structural or agential approach to studying foreign policy, there is clear evidence in the literature that institutions and leaders matter.

Finally, FPA, Constructivism, and Role Theory align nicely as complimentary frameworks to analyze international affairs in four ways. First, the social construction of reality creates meaning through interactions at the structural, interactive, and individual level. Since foreign policy decisions will have different meanings in the decision-making

portion, it also creates different meanings for other international actors, nation-states, and institutions. Further, there are material and ideational factors affecting foreign policy actors and the norms/rules of institutions (Grieco, Ikenberry, and Mastanduno 2018). Role Theory argues that the norms/rules are prescriptive and the creation of material and ideational factors on the nation-state FP actor(s) are shaped by the prescribed roles they fill.

Third, an individual's frame of reference, identity, and "logic of action" (March and Olson 1989) are dynamic, fluid, and hybrid (Pieterse 2020) such that they play roles as independent variables in Holsti's NRC model through its constant (re)iterations. Fourth, foreign policy is an interactive structuration between agent and structure – both influencing the other (Giddens 1991). As the national role conception model suggests, both the Ego and the Alter work with the nation's status to maintain, strain, evolve, or change expectations and norms based on discourse, behavior, and policy. Thus, in analyzing foreign policy decisions to align and work through EU membership requirements the responsibility to discuss the foreign policy literature is established and sets the conversation off to its agent/structure particulars.

Leadership in International Relations

Leaders and leadership have always been useful variables and there are innumerable ways in which to take this literature review section. Anderson (2006) initiates that he "emphasize(s) *leadership*, because it is leaderships, not people, who inherit old switchboards and places (160-161). Therefore, to begin, the past one-hundred twenty years of leadership scholarship within political science and international relations

will (re)emphasize the tension between structuralists and agency proponents. Next, the section will speak to the agency vs. structure debate within leadership studies itself psychologically and institutionally. There will be particular attention paid to leaders in international settings and presidential decision-making situations. At the end, the section will fold in leadership to the literature reviewed thus far.

To start, the literature outlines a move away from essentialist “great men” theory to that which suggests the dynamic interplay of environment on political leaders, furthering constructive leadership based on situation and group needs. Arklay (2006) notes that political biographical study is “old,” pointing to the writings of ancient Greeks and Romans. Thomas Carlyle, among others, believed great men were the beacons of history, born with essential skills that positioned them to be natural leaders. Hobbes (1651) essentially agreed with the “great men” thesis arguing that society must submit to an absolute ruler for law and order to be maintained. This idea prevailed until the mid-20th Century even as others called the “great men” notion naïve and unscientific, neglecting the interactive role the leader has on society and vice-versa (Villanova University 2019). Janowitz (1954, 405) calls the “great man” theory devoid of the “richness of human detail.”

During the Cold War, political leadership scholarship took one of two routes. First, the bipolarity and binary view of the world was ideal to “read” the idea of “structure” on the landscape. It was easy to see, assess, measure, and confer a level of factorability onto dynamics at play with the Soviet Union and the West. Scholarship looked at the constraints on leaders or the system/structure within which leaders worked. This research, for instance, could assess the global market system, institutional culture, or

the patterns of power-dynamics and vertical/horizontal trust in civic life. Byman and Pollack (2001) assess that individuality did not make a person generalizable for scholarship, nor significant in scope. Others comment on a lack of conceptual focus methodologically or ideologically (Paige 1977). In some ways, this is the era dominated by Realist and positivist thought (Waltz 2018) (Kane 2016).

As leadership started to be considered a process, one “born out of” rather than “born into”, the literature reflects an iterative systemization of leadership studies. Laswell (1948) suggests political motivations are subconscious and refract the denotative social settings of leadership. Lewin (1948) sees leadership as a process among small groups where the leader is a “transmitter” that helps and/or hurts the communication process. Seligman (1950) situates political leaders *within* political organizations and *between* political organizations. Thus, the literature moves from a leader alone, affecting society, to a relational leader with respect to social settings, groups of individuals, and organizations.

Parallel to this path, the scholarship was integrating postmodernism, individualism, and critical theories. Here the subjective becomes paramount and therefore Rustow (1970) sums up the symbiotic refocus in social science when he writes,

The new theorizing about political development and modernization led to the rediscovery of broad historical questions of change in the social world and broad philosophical questions about the range and limitations of deliberate human control over such change. From either kind of question it was only a small step to the systematic rediscovery of leadership as a central political process (687)

It is not just a focus on a single leader either, but conjointly as a leader who is both agent and structure of themselves. That is, analytically to be able to consider cognitive political psychology and the intersubjectivity of knowledge and meaning too. Grint (2005)

explores how decision-makers “actively construct” their context or situation. Goldstein (2003) commends leaders for social learning. Renshon (2000) places emphasis on the cultural framework “within which leaders operate and in which leadership is exercised” (207).

Further, the study of political leaders is presented as a dynamic interrelationship. Janowitz (1954) recognizes a new middle class of politicians and those that are positioned to “enter into” public/political life. Walter (1980) states simply that “politics is politicians; there’s no way to understand it without understanding them.” Grint (1998) argues that understanding leadership requires rhetorical analysis to find the gaps of indeterminacy between language, actions, and policies where the complex interactions occur. Wren (2007) summarizes that leadership is an ongoing process that influences the group, the decision-makers, and the leader. Horowitz, Mcdermott, and Stam (2005) demonstrate how leaders become more antagonistic, especially in democracies, as they age.

As no “new world order” came to dictate global normative nomenclature to distinguish between “good” and “bad” structures in the post-Soviet era, there increasing came research arguing for greater levels of agency and a rush to define a blurry structure amid a postcolonial, postmodern, 21st century hyper-technologic society (Hermann and Hagan 1998). Thus, studying leaders today is an exciting time because of the interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary forays and frontiers the research can take.

There are some who write on the nuance of international leadership. Even before Westphalia, there has been a foreign policy, conventionally defined, decision-making component for political leaders. Hoef (2019) details the influence of friendship between

heads-of-state. Berenskoetter (2014) talks about “world-building” efforts between leaders, a focus that ripples out regionally and/or supranationally. Dyson and Preston (2006) make a case that drawing analogies *outside* your immediate culture, a definition of “international”, points to a more highly complex leader. Putnam’s two-level game further speaks to these ideas. Fossen (2019) simplifies that X (person) represents Y (nation-state) *and* X (person) represents Y (nation-state) as Z (leader type), where “leader type” could be the head of an organization, articulate tourist, diplomat, and politician.

This formulation drills down into the agency/structure debate that has been emblematic in the literature herein. Fossen, above, is contradicting in one way, but ultimately complimenting to Holsti (1970). Holsti’s model is the model for the paper. In it “national role conception” is more than the product of a leader. It includes outside prescriptions and internal voices of contestation. Yet, Fossen is conveying that the relationship is more hierarchal, and that the leader is fulfilling a role on behalf of the state. The hierarchy is X-Z-Y. This folds into what was written earlier, where we can ascribe identity to X, status to Z, and role to Y: Identity (person) - Status (president) - Role (national role conception). Delineating the agency of the individual, in some measure, is critique the ascribed prominence of viewing the state as a unitary actor. Even more importantly, Fossen supports Holsti’s NRC by giving a coherent path of thinking about individual political leaders, which then would be added to domestic voices and outside expectations to construct a conception of the nation-state.

It must also be noted that political leaders as a category is an old term with recognizable characteristics. Seligman (1950) notes that leadership is both a personality type and a social status. Billsberry (2013) wants to distinguish between leadership

decision-making and “leader-like” decisions of “normal” people. Grint (2005) distinguishes between a manager and a leader through political acknowledgement of certain and uncertain futures. A political leader can also be seen as a classical ideal or archetype (Machiavelli 2003) (Wren 2007) (Dymarski 2019). Byman and Pollack (2001) argue that political leadership studies rebut the structural “inevitability” in IR writing.

For the present study that “leader type” means “president of a country”.

Presidents as executives most often gets distinguish from prime ministers in the parliamentary system (Dickovick and Eastwood 2018) (Haerper et al 2019). New presidents face pressures of utilizing the political capital from their campaign, obtaining institutional support (Weyland 1996), and making domestic and foreign policy (Risenfed 1987) decisions. Carlin and Singh (2015) contend that presidents are held most accountable when they are more involved with policymaking and that presidential authority is not a barrier to public accountability. Illes, Korosenyi, and Metz (2018) outline executive/presidential power as “order-shattering, order-affirming, and order-creating” (4). This can be especially true when there are crises (Mingst and Arreguin-Toft 2018).

Lastly, due to the dynamic interrelationship leadership involves, Constructivism is actively overlapped in the literature. Kane (2016) emphasizes the existing lack of appreciation for and neglect of leadership in international relations studies, specifically noting that the descriptive and normative spheres “collide” when studying leaders because there is a need to be situationally contextualized to understand decisions, while also being distant to operationalize and assess decisions and language. Wren (2007) quotes Edmund S. Morgan that political society is built on a series of fictions,

constructions that organize societal values and beliefs. Leaders emerge from these societies. Billsberry (2013) argues the emergence of this “truth” comes from individual creation of knowledge, through rhetoric, between political leaders and civil society. Illes et al. (2018) call this entrepreneurial. However, Smith et al. (2016) maintains that this becomes more structural than individualistic, more focused on societal and/or institutional constraints than individual determinacy. Smith et al.’s contestations of construction fit well with the introduction of a Role Theory framework amid foreign policy decision-making. It enables leaders’ or Ego’s role conception to be better understood, and yet speaks to the interplay between Ego and Alter, as structures or “roles” are deemed normatively important in explaining nation-state words, decisions, and actions.

Thus, the identity-status-role parameters can be utilized for political leadership, namely presidents, in their agential performance of rhetoric, actions, and policy. Presenting political leadership makes sense in the present study because foreign policy actions between nation-states and international institutions can be seen from the individual (head-of-state), state, and systems level (EU). The model suggests a national role conception partially dependent on the form and function of state leadership. And again, in the case of the Western Balkans, that means looking at the efficacy of the words, actions, and policies of presidents as both status and role. The other actor in questions about EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans (WB) is the Union itself. Next follows a review of literature regarding that institution more generally before rounding out this chapter with outlining current research on the regional accession process and areas of contribution to the existing body of scholarship.

European Union and Enlargement

The European Economic Community (EEC), European Community and, as of 1992, EU has been expanding its membership ever since 1973 when Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the original EEC Treaty of Rome (1957) member states: France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. European enlargement has occurred six more times since 1973. French President Francois Mitterrand (1991) saw Enlargement as a political necessity and historic responsibility. The literature tackling enlargement and integration of new nation-states has had to contend with how to view the institutions of the EU and predecessors (the EEC and EC) structurally and what are its intentions to enlarge membership and integrate new member-states, and the resulting effects from adjustments and structural changes of nation-states as they become “acceptable” for Union membership.

Beginning with its establishment through the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, the EU has been seen as either a multi-governance institution decentralizing EU rules and norms through federalism and loosened local autonomy and control, or a state-centric institution in a form of intergovernmentalism, buffering the decision-making of member states, and/or as a supranational institution (Kauppi 2005). Kuhnhardt (2008) argues that the EU should be seen as it was originally intended: a multi-governance federation. W. Wallace (1983) wrote how the EU was “less than a federation, more than a regime.”

Federalism is the middle between two extremes of unitary and confederation forms of government. Ideally power is split and shared between local substate political entities and centralized institutions. The federalist view of the EU sees multilevel

governance and interplays between interest and identity group networks (Jupille and Caporaso 1999) (Castells 2009). Pagden (2002) calls it a balance of power of collective consent. Some worry that multilevel governance can also be thought of as bypassing the state via substate and EU-level communications and functional interactions. Vos (2017) explains how cultural policy can circumvent state-directed cultural norms, values, or artifacts and start being normalized by local populations. Wallace et al. (1999) thinks federalism makes people feel trepidation and anxiety. Hix (1994) calls the EU an authoritarian institutional structure that only gets “closer” to the people through federalism. However, Immrgergut (1991) acknowledges there are numerous veto points that can derail policy.

Continuing, federalism and multilevel governance are also shown to have political benefits at the state’s expense. Kauppi (2005) explains how multilevel governance combining regionalism and supranationalism partly explains states losing power. Agnew (2001) views this above-and-below network as divergence rather than convergence in the sense that authority and control would be decentralized, diverging from the center rather than converging there. Kunhardt (2008) considers federalism a “shock absorber” that requires legitimacy, loyalty, and purpose from policy to be authored, voted for, and implemented/ingrained.

Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, is considered state centric. Governments of nation-states are still acting on behalf of a national-interest and will rationalize their behaviors in a realist way. Kunhardt continues by suggesting that intergovernmentalism has three assumptions: rational state actors, a primary goal is economic gain, and institutional arrangements lead to conflict mitigation. This manifests

itself through patterns of commercial advantage, national bargaining positions, and incentivized interstate agreements (Moravcsik 1998).

Further, thoughts across the field question intergovernmentalism in favor of multilevel governance. Mitrany (1975) worries that enlargement will lead to entrenchment of state-centric power concentrated in the hands of those member-states who already have the most capabilities. Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) state that the EU is defined by “system change” and therefore should be seen as a dependent variable based on polity in its own right. McCormick (2004) differentiated folks in the 1980s and early 1990s as deepeners and wideners; the former wanted deeper connections first before enlargement, while the wideners wanted the Union to have a larger footprint.

Third, “Supranational” implies ceding some control of domestic affairs to a “representative” body politik of member-state officials “above” the nation-state level. Suvavrierol and Duzgit (2011) try to find a middle ground suggesting the EU is a “pluralized cultural model” that is neither centralized nor supranational exclusively. Others consider the EU as a globalizing agent of democratization (Haerpfer et al 2019) (Lanoszka 2018). Some in the literature term intergovernmentalism as a “new supranationalism” in suggest utilizing interactions via EU channels for state-centric preferences and prerogatives (Jessop 2005). Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter (2015) discuss the topic as if people are trying to “talk past” what countries are actually doing: trying to integrate while resisting ceding sovereignty. Aggestam (2016) recommends focusing on supranational leadership. Now that the structural literature on the EU has been covered, next the literature raises questions about the intentions of that institution to expand.

Scharpf (1999) suggests integration is not optimal for either party (the EU and the new member state) because of assumptions of state rationality, economic motivation, and the extent, if any, to which cooperation leads to conflict resolution. Staab (2008) summarizes four key principles of EU Enlargement: 1) full commitment to the *acquis*; 2) new policies that address increased diversity; 3) slow review of institutional change; and 4) states that have a record of regional cooperation. Numbers one and four do not “raise flags” as much as numbers two and three. If the EU does not actually oversee prerequisite change and only haphazardly monitors progress toward completion of the 35 chapters of the *acquis communautaire*, then why make the requirements at all? What is the message? Hooghe and Marks (2008) claim “enlargement fatigue.”

The relevant literature has mixed reviews about the previous enlargement moments. Riley (2013) notes Bulgaria and Romania’s slide into corruption post-membership, warning about Western Balkan enlargement. Hupchick (2002) calls EU democratization efforts analogous to the millet system. Aggestam (2016) proposes that more nuanced conditionalities and the use of language from the EU to “sanction” underperforming candidate countries adds weight and consequence. For example, since 2013 Freedom House has changed Serbian and Montenegrin labels from the “Free” category to “Partially Free” (Freedom House 2021). Bieler (2002) views enlargement as a means by which new neoliberal institutional connections can plan future directions of transnational capital.

Enlargements can be vetoed by a single EU member-state; thus the literature also traces EU member’s levels of involvement through discourse *at* each of these junctures *on* the specific candidates and/or expansion more broadly. Schimmelfenning (2001)

notes Britain and Germany as favorable toward the 1998 enlargement, with France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy more hesitant. Up until 2003, Abazi (2018) termed EU expansion as “securitized containment” rather than true enlargement. Today, Aggestam (2016) and Gjevori (2020) find that Germany continues to look for deeper and wider integration, France is cautious about threats to EU power, and Britain wants to remain flexible. Obviously, English flexibility led to Brexit. Austria and the Baltic countries want WB enlargement (Emmott 2021). Yet, France denied Albanian and North Macedonia in 2019, Greece complained over naming issues in North Macedonia, Bulgaria has blocked North Macedonia and Serbia in the past, and Slovenia blocked Croatia upon membership (Dragas 2020) (Huszka 2020).

So, what is the benefit for candidate countries? Here the literature heavily recoils to institutionalist vs. constructivist camps: rational, economic logic vs. identity.

Literature on the EU is geographically differentiated. American political scientists often argue that the Union is a transactional institution versus European counterparts studying the institutional actors comparatively and through policy analysis (Jupille and Caporaso 1999) (Schimmelfenning 2001). Taydas and Kentmen-Cin (2017) indicate that both the utilitarianism and identity play a role in EU attitude formation. Institutionalism can be represented by transactional foreign policy too, as constitutional protection of minorities and representative frameworks have been recognition through EU promotion.

(Dimitrijevic 2012). Carl Bildt, former United Nations Special Envoy to the Balkans (1999-2001), suggests that the region has always worked best within a framework and that the EU is the best institution to deliver results (Erlanger 2018). March and Olson (1996) state that “the community is created by its rules, not by its intentions” (335).

Another way the economic rational benefits of EU integration is expressed is vis-à-vis globalization's network. Collier (2007) sees tangible economic benefits for the poorest of member-states to a convergence to a mean. Gregory et al. (2009) contend that integration looks for socio-economic embedded relationships to shape behavior. Stiglitz (2003) argues this is interwoven into the capitalist system. Conversely, Vachudova (2019) puts geopolitical rational as more prominent than economic rationale. Although Jupille and Caporaso (1999) argue that institutionalism is the best way to study the European Union, they admit Constructivism's merits if viewing the EU as a dependent variable with endogenous actor and institutional preferences and identities.

The second reason nation-states and populations want to join the EU is for affirmational ideational and identity reasons. Stokes et al. (1996) argues that essentialist identity has never been more wrong, and that identity is made up of imagined communities, nested in multiple identities. Van Middelaar (2013) points to the German strategy of "We Europeans" as ambitious, but problematic. Zakaria (2009) reminds of President of the European Council, Jacques Poos, stating in 1991, "If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country..." (221-222). Curly (2009) agrees and views social identity theory as informative when studying the EU to the degree that leaders that identify with Europe will be more exclusionary to nativists.

On the other end of the spectrum Euroscepticism expresses deep and unabating trepidation and hesitancy to either cede decision-making or national identity. Balaam and Veseth (2001) distinguish between skeptics that think it is naïve to believe that nation-states will cooperate just for economic reasons with the attractiveness and resolve of the

European “spirit.” Khana (2014), also concerned with identity convictions, wonders if tribal passions must precede European integration. Damjanovski, Lavric, and Naterer (2020) highlight the cultural orientations that predicate Euroscepticism. Belloni (2016) and Ker-Lindsay (2011) lay the skepticism at the feet of the procedural slog that EU enlargement has become for the region. Bulliet (2004) thinks idolizing the EU is ridiculous because there has been no one straight path to each member-state’s current relative position.

In sum, the reasons to join the EU are both rational and ideational. Keohane (1984) admits to a “mixture of instrumental, situational, and empathetic interdependence” (124) in Europe, suggesting not an either/or but a both/and approach. There is a delicate balance between the goals of increased access to resources, labor, markets, services, and goods – a quantifiable increase in standards of living in the long run – versus intrinsic rewards of being seen as equals and “fully” recognized as Europeans and not as a balkanized, backward, derogatory collection of people and culture. Additionally, this balance between rational and ideational incentives to join the EU must be explained, put in terms that are understandable and relatable, and argued for in front of individual nation-state constituents to get their buy-in. That is harder than it sounds and might relate to elites more than the general population (Jovic 2018) (Burazer 2020).

The EU is a central actor in the research questions under consideration. It is both an ideal and an institution. Talking through political leadership and the EU explains how each plays a role in foreign policy, broadly. Further, the EU is a “club,” a union, and countries must be accepted and fulfill requirements to be a member. This creates a level of expectation on the candidate country. The expectation carries prescribed notions of

what to build, what to legitimize, what to institutionalize. These are all aspects of a role expectation according to Role Theory. Role Theory acknowledges the social construction of role conceptions, prescriptions, and performances. The next section will flesh out the foreign policy of the EU vis-à-vis the Western Balkan nation-states.

European Union and the Former Yugoslavia

Ninety percent of the literature around the EU accession process in the Western Balkans paints the relationship and the respective actors in a negative, unsuccessful light. Part of the critique stems from it closing in on a decade plus since Slovenia (2007) and Croatia (2013) became a full member. Also, North Macedonia has been waiting for fifteen years, Montenegro has been mired in the process since 2010, and Serbia became a candidate in March 2012. The term “fatigue” is prevalent on both sides.

The EU has been dealing with the fallout of Yugoslavia’s dissolution since the mid-1980s. As a precursor, Zimmerman (1999) and Sachs (2005) see EU alignment with America and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) denying debt forgiveness in the late 1980s as precipitating the tragedies of the next decades. Post-conflict complications proved problematic for European integration. Pickering (2011) contends that the Dayton accords institutionalized national ethnic differences and created weak national political roles that continually worries of local devolution. Staab (2008) notes that the area is still far behind economically and has a long road before accession negotiations begin. Holman (2019) summarizes that the tradeoff is the difference between transitions and transformations.

In many ways the EU sees itself as the only viable option for nation-building in the region. Knaus and Cox (2005) write that EU development is one of three models of development along with the authoritative and traditional development models. The EU becomes a global democratization agent (Haerpfer et al. 2019). Pond (2000) points to a number of specific, targeted policies from the EU after the Kosovo conflict in 1999 whose reconciliations acknowledges the EU's soft power through accession talks.

The summary of EU-WB literature falls into three categories. Additionally, each of the three areas address the Western Balkan accession process from the European Union *and* the regional *and* the nation-state perspective. Most poignantly, the first two categories – rational institutionalism and identity - are the main areas of the dissertation and is the fulcrum on which the research questions and hypotheses rest. The third category, growing outside influences, is necessary to include, is fascinating as its own line of inquiry, but circumvents the research.

The first category of literature is rational, technocratic, and rule based. It critiques the EU from perspectives of candidate countries (not) attaining progress in the accession process (institutional), uneven application of membership requirements (regional), and the inability of candidate countries to meet their own obligations (nation-state). Here the literature relies most heavily on institutionalism and rational positivism. There are rational, net positive reasons to join the EU. Economically, Marangos et al (2016) highlights pre-accession assistance funding opportunities. Vachudova (2019) acknowledges that states see the material benefit, as do many political parties. Popovic and Eric (2018) address the logistics and positive ramifications of infrastructure development via EU loans. Codified laws and strong enforcement demonstrate

improvements as well (Hoxhaj 2021). Barkin (2019) moves for active and direct micro-involvement by the EU for best results.

Implementation of EU reforms, however, becomes complicated. Elbasani (2013) lays out the massive amount of rule transfers to the Union from the former Yugoslav states allowed for immeasurable influence over structural reforms and new policies. Kmezcic (2020) points to clientelism as political elites navigate legal loopholes. Mujanovic (2018) terms this “elastic-authoritarianism” as provincial leaders adapt to stay afloat in changing EU conditionalities. Economically, Holzner (2016) points to low levels of entrepreneurial competitiveness to adjust market conditions; Affandi and Malik (2019) calculate the detriments of informal/shadow economic activities stifling financial institutions’ transparency and reach.

Next, the uneven application of EU membership requirements frustratingly changes expectations on required deliverables. Marangos, Triarchi, and Anthrakidis (2019) discuss the strain mid-moment changes make within country, and how the litmus tests further become splintered when EU member-states can unilaterally slow the process. Pickering (2011) highlights the tension between nationalizing elites and local administrators. Gjevori (2020) sees this as an example of how uniquely domestic, accumulated issues are *not* on the radar.

Even more, the EU can step “into” and directly be involved in the politics of Western Balkan countries. This adds to an “uneven application” of conditionalities if the EU intervenes in a candidate country’s political process, elections, or laws, and can halt the accession process through one member-state’s whims (Keil 2013). Further, the worry of *existing* EU member-states backsliding to authoritarianism concerns observers with the

“how, when, and why” that EU investigations might untangle broader unethical political practices (Berend and Bugaric 2015). Covid-19 and its variants have done little to mask the imposition of mandates and control that have worked top-down (EU to the periphery) and as excuses to centralize local political authority (Vankovska 2020).

Finally, WB candidate countries are accountable for their own commitment and progress toward stated goals. A term that highlights the lack of leadership and results within the five WB non-EU members today is “state capture.” State capture occurs when provincial leadership devolves to clientelism, legitimized during EU negotiations making decisions unopposed by any horizontal accountability. Richter and Wunsch (2020) consider “state capture” as the reason EU compliance is considered unrelated to political decision-making and “results.” Tcherneva (2021) agrees and stresses that “technical processes will no longer suffice.” Bonomi, Hackaj, and Reljic (2020) are concerned the “state capture” set-up compliments a political strongman or populist nationalist leader and/or more entanglements with non-EU actors.

The second category of EU and WB literature looks at identity as the driving factor in the relationship. Schimmelfenning (2001) calls this the “great debate:” identity concerns vs. economic, rational institutionalism. Constructivism dominates this literature because of the linkage between it and identity in IR. From the outset of this research, the term Balkans implicated the region as a crossroads of different identity markers through geography, history, and empire. The term, and the region, navigates political legitimacy, tribal tensions, rallies and bouts with nationalism, and the influence of outside stakeholders. In the past thirty years specifically both “Balkan” and “Yugoslavia” have been titles commonly used as pejoratives, titles *against* something. “Balkan” is seen as

backward or non-European; “Yugoslavia” today is subversive and anti-establishment (Pogacar 2010) (Korchnak 2021). However, as Vezovnik and Saric (2015) point out,

the Other is never a permanent or stable category with unchanging characteristics but an empty signifier injected with a set of changeable meanings, features, and characteristics aimed at defining it (242).

In other words, identity markers constantly shift, become hybrid (Pieterse 2020), and have to be renegotiated. Dyrstad (2012) notes that ethnic civil war increases ethno-nationalism, highlighting Kosovo as exemplary. Similar to Anderson (2006), Bieber (2015) shows how the post-Yugoslav states use census categories to quantify identity. Marcovitz (2002) roundly believes identity is politicized.

Identity literature certainly populates Western Balkan and EU discourse. In her famous work *Imagining the Balkans*, Maria Todorova (1997) discusses “Balkanism” as an ambiguous, non-oriental, non-occidental characterization for an incomplete “dark,” negative rhetorical image by others. Kiossev (2002) traces the idea of the Balkans into a reductive, simplifying symbol that is inattentive and ignorant of the diverse ethnic and cultural mosaic regionally. Petrunic (2005) suggests that post-modern identity formation, specifically Balkan identity, occurs in hybridity amongst three distinct spaces: individual, collective, and liminal space. Bechev (2006) contrasts Balkan regional identity with the EU structural programs and implores “for who” and “against who” is identity defined.

Balkan and identity literature is especially rich navigating the Europe v. Balkan nominal issues that begin this paper. Subotic (2011) argues that identity convergence is stronger than identity divergence in explaining Serbian and Croatian moves toward EU membership. One of the interesting aspects here is that identity convergence relies on existing national and regional integration narrative roles that marginalize competing

identities. Curly (2009) agrees and points to stronger exclusionary behaviors from those with the greater EU affiliation. Others argue identity is used for political purposes and weaponized against native constituents for political gain. Swoboda (2020) contends that values rather than interests will underpin the accession process in the Western Balkans.

The third category of EU-WB literature details the waning influence of the EU in the Western Balkans. “Third Party” nation-state actors such as Russia, China, Turkey, and the Gulf States fill vacuums of accessibility as progress towards anything EU-related remains idle. General theories around international relations and security studies predominate this category. The literature is critical of the EU’s passive and indeterminate follow-through in the Western Balkans. Dobbins (2008) argues the EU has not processed Srebrenica to get out of the malaise to support nation-state building. Bieber and Kmezić (2017) suggest that the EU establishes “stabilitocracies” in the Western Balkans as pseudo-democratic client states, out of sight, out of mind. This is like Hopkins (2017) reporting on minority enfranchisement in North Macedonia, where he concludes that the EU works with authoritarian regimes to provide stability. From there, the literature suggests some of this is an overt security concern after the “Big Bang” enlargement of 2004 (Holman 2019). Deliso (2007) worries that EU conditionalities mean nothing to Islamists using weak borders and social media to establish sympathizers and patrons in the region. Khaze (2018) goes as far as calling the Union oblivious to increased foreign influence in the region.

Meanwhile, the four main “outside” actors are Russia, Turkey, China, and the Arab Gulf states. Russia stokes ethnic linkages in Serbia and the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), concentrates on providing energy contracts, and sows

doubt toward Western policies. Turkey, meanwhile, signs bilateral agreements with each WB country and tries to capitalize on its socio-cultural roots and political connections with Muslims (Bieber and Tzifakis 2019) (Emmott 2021). Third, China acts primarily as an investor at the moment, surpassing Russia in economic influence (Khaze 2019). Feyerabend (2018) highlights that Chinese trade to Balkan countries doubled from 2004-2014. Finally, the Arab Gulf states try to capitalize on a lack of influence. Koppa (2020) talks the use of Islamic soft power, while in sum, non-EU actors continue playing a role in the democratization, modernization, and interdependence of Western Balkan nation-states.

How does the Dissertation Add to the Existing Relevant Literature?

The dissertation research fits into and moves beyond the existing relevant literature in three ways. First, the use of Role Theory as a model to test Constructivist theories of identity for EU accession is unique in the literature. This research will test whether modeling symbolic interactionist roles when joining a supranational organization is efficacious. Identity certainly has been investigated and modeled in relation to the EU. The uniqueness of this research, however, will be in categorizing presidential speech acts as they relate in spatial, temporal, and political terms to the expectations and requirements of EU accession. From a Role Theory perspective, nothing has happened or been attempted over this duration and/or between all seven post-Yugoslav states.

Second, the research considers the full allotment of Yugoslav territories and focuses on the 2000-2021 timeframe. This is unique. EU Accession in the Western Balkans has been approached from an identity standpoint. However, the literature only

examines 1-2 cases at a time, never the entire region. Further, studying the first two decades of the 21st century allows for a longitudinal analysis that may unearth trends within country, within political parties/ideologies, and/or based on EU conversations or edicts.

Third, where the current research differentiates is that the examples of speech collected are official speech texts of presidents of each of the seven countries. The use of content and discourse analyses is nothing new to literature on the Balkans. However, Knopf (2006) suggests looking at the dissertation's contribution to existing literature as both a matter of belief and conviction. No research has balanced the official discourse from institutions as prescriptive roles against the coded language of national presidents. Therefore, the research's conviction is that by assessing and analyzing content, quantitative and discursive, qualitative methods illuminate the ways in which post-Yugoslav countries discuss, ascend, and continue to work toward EU prescriptions.

CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY & METHODS

Introduction

The dissertation's analytical framework was built from the existing literature foundation outlined above on Constructivism, Role Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, Leadership, the European Union, and Western Balkans. The research philosophy was a deductive interpretivist qualitative outlook on how presidential speech is used and/or constrained in making foreign policy decisions, bearing in mind the research questions surrounding associational ideation and rational pragmatism as foreign policy decisions on accession to the EU in the nation-states of the former Yugoslavia. Consequently, hypotheses were deduced from the existing theoretical literature rather than applied inductively *to* theory from data or observations.

Next, Constructivism's tenets on the fluid nature of knowledge and reality, constructed through discourse, centered the research on an interpretivist analysis of the data compiled. Interpretivism has a long history of being oppositional to a positivist perspective. Yet, interpretivism allowed for embedded data points – language – to be situated against their syntax, speaker, audience, and situation. Further, the Role Theory model was followed whereby one's choices are winnowed based on status and role, the presidential speech required “interpretation” based on who/what is creating the role and then what that role, itself, expected. A role is not fixed, nor does one have a singular role; therefore, the fluctuation of engagement with those expectations does not pigeonhole a static observation or data point. However, this research was not an assault on the benefits or valid arguments of either epistemology.

Careful consideration of other variables, both quantitative and qualitative, and the structure of research design and methods herein allowed for this qualitative research to achieve replication and reach the “bars” that quantitative positivists attempt with their statistical models. Additionally, the research designed centered the research aims as both descriptive and explanatory to find causal inference, “synthesizing a portrait of the phenomenon” (Thorne 2000, 70). It is what social science hopes to achieve by following the scientific method in the messy milieu of humans and society. The “systematic features” must be presented and analyzed to make generalized conclusions about political leaders’ behavior, discourse, and policy with other foreign actors and institutions (King, Keohane, and Verba (1994). At the same time, there was an acknowledgment of the leverage position of discourse and language in the dissertation that justified the research philosophy and methods to not,

...discard or devalue the genuine advances that more positivistic research methodologies have brought to the study of clouds, but will supplement them with better advice about how to cope with the clouds (McKeown 2004, 167).

The balance of the chapter details the research design, data collection, and data analysis methods used while presenting an account of the research process more generally.

Research Design

The dissertation utilized an embedded comparative case study and analyzed three clusters of cases representing the seven former Yugoslavian nation-states: 1) EU Member States (Croatia and Slovenia); 2) EU Candidate States (Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia); and 3) Potential EU Candidate States (Bosnia and Kosovo). Six within-case variables were selected: Economic Growth, Human Rights Protections, Democratization,

Domestic Sentiments, EU Constraints, and Presidential Speech. Together they address the research questions laid out in the introduction to assess the hypotheses' validity. Below, quality control, secondary data variables, data sources, primary data collection and analytical methods and data sets will be addressed.

The research applied Holsti's (1970) national role conception model to the presidential speech acts of the seven former Yugoslav countries. Holsti's conceptual map outlined three main "actors" that affected foreign policy decisions: Policymakers' National Role Conception, Nation's Status, and Alter's Role prescriptions. Figure #2 below structured the framing of this model in accordance with the current research questions. As discussed above, national presidents were the "actors" considered in this research under the policymaker's title due to their outward-facing role within country, but also because of their "performance" of foreign policy as their state's formal executive. Nation's Status was gauged based on the four non-speech variables, and Alter's Role Prescriptions was gained via the EU's accession requirements and through EU Commission speech data.

Holsti Model	Presidential Role Conception		Nation's Status		Alter's Role Prescription	
3 Cases	EU Member-States		Candidates		Prospective Countries	
6 Variables	ECON	HURI	DEMO	DMST	EUCN	PRSP

Figure 2. Research Design

The six variables were measured for all seven former Yugoslavian countries. Those countries fall into one of three cases. Each case represented a “role” that may or may not affect each of the presidents of those countries since 2000. Additionally, the way in which the EU has approached the enlargement and accession process generally, and in each country specifically, represented an interactive role in this story. Next, the question was: why case studies?

Comparative Case Study Analysis

The definition of a case study is wide ranging, but it conveyed a multi-methodological approach to piecing together an overview and systematic investigation of a unit of analysis. Case studies are unit analyses, defined by the researcher, which delved fully into the unit, the case, to illustrate a descriptive inference as to the causality or factors presented in the research questions. Berg (2007) defines a case study as “an approach capable of examining simple or complex phenomenon ... using a variety of lines of action in its data-gathering segments...” Eisenhardt (1989) claims that a case study “focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings.”

Case studies were selected for the present study because of the numerous factors that affect a country’s foreign policy decision making, especially regarding EU accession along 35 different areas, or chapters, of the acquis, which range from the free movement of capital, consumer and health protection, and fisheries. Yin (1981) is more specific, in that he notes that a case study “examines” contextually placed events or circumstances that are intermixed with the context in which the event or circumstance occurs. Here, again, comparative case study analysis was the best suited overall method to

contextualize nation-state building in the Western Balkans arising from Yugoslavia's dissolution and the ethnic conflict of the 1990s and early 2000s. At its core, a case study attempts to flesh out and describe a unit of analysis through a systematic multi-data source collection of information.

Summarily, the researcher must determine what is their unit of analysis; what case(s) do they want to analyze; and what method(s) of analysis are to be used. Adolphus (2021) distinguishes between holistic and embedded case studies based on unit of analysis specificity. Further, Seawright and Gerring (2008) note the difficulty in selecting a case, especially when a primary goal is for the case to be representative of a larger population. Additionally, Yin (2003) emphasizes the research design's role in selecting a case study. Case selection here grew out of a logical extension of both the "population" researched and the questions asked. First, the decision to study the former Yugoslavia necessitated the inclusion of each of the former Yugoslav states such that sampling or wondering "why" the countries within each case were selected became a nonissue. All seven countries were part of the study regardless of their status, their "independence" within the years analyzed, or their recognition as an actual country. Collier and Mahoney (1996) point to the use of "contrast space" or negative cases to enhance reliability and mitigate case selection bias. The five countries of the former Yugoslavia that are not members of the EU contrast the two that are. Also, the research acknowledged Ebbinghaus's (2005) contention that any regional or thematic case selection is already biased by some other event. For instance, the Europe of one era has more countries (i.e., one, Yugoslavia) than another era (i.e., seven, post-Yugoslavia).

Second, the decision on three cases, which countries were within each, and the timeframe (2000-2021) was rudimentary as each country's sequenced position on the path to EU membership clearly delineated three separate cases: member state, candidate, prospective candidate. Again, the three cases were: 1) EU Member States – Croatia and Slovenia; 2) EU Candidate States – Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia; and 3) EU Potential Candidate States – Bosnia and Kosovo. These cases may fall victim to a “family resemblance” (Collier and Mahon Jr. 1993), but that is what the research intended to find out. As to the timeframe, the turn of the new century allowed for a demarcation that was pre-EU member-state for any of the seven countries; it enabled the full realization of Serbia and Montenegro to be “seen” as their own, independent countries, separate from the nomenclature and residuals of Yugoslavia; and 2000-2021 provided a robust enough circumstantial context to assess the ideational vs. rational incentives of foreign policy decisions toward EU membership. Lastly, due to delays by the researcher, 2021 was available to download speech text even if a twenty-one-year study did not have the same “ring” as one of 20 years. Of the six variables analyzed, four had data for 2021, which further convinced the researcher to include 2021 in the analysis. Each of the three cases were umbrella categories with nested variables another unit level of analysis to be measured, which are the six variables in Figure 2.

Quality Control

Once a data collection strategy is recognized, reliability and validity must be established. Drost (2011) defines reliability as “the extent to which measurements are repeatable” (106). A case study research design becomes robust and substantiated

through its valid and reliable structure (Gerring 2007). Bates (2007) argues that the debate of using cases is not over explanation vs. interpretation, because both have their place. Reliable case studies can augment their findings with other, large-N methods, or through triangulation of multiple “micro” methods. Bulmer (1979) calls this approach “sensitizing concepts” that “satisfy” social scientific empiricism via conceptualizations of qualitative data. Seawright and Gerring (2008) acknowledge the “inherent unreliability of generalizing from small-N samples, but they can nonetheless make an important contribution to the inferential process” (295).

Reliability, or repeatability, in this research occurred two ways. First, the non-speech data pulled came from third-party sources on economic productivity statistics, survey results, ordinal rankings/scorecards. Links were provided within the current chapter, below, allowing readers to verify the numbers. Likewise, the official speech documents are linked in Appendix 1 and, because they are “official speech,” can be traced to, arguably, the most prominent name/face of a country over the past twenty-one years, catalogued and archived on governmental websites. Second, using MAXQDA software allowed for seamless coding of text that could be replicated using the same or similar software, especially at the quantification level of frequency and key-word-in-context (KWIC) relationships. The method with the greatest exposure to questions of reliability was critical discourse analysis (CDA). However, that was mitigated in two ways (articulated more fully below): 1) the text selection for CDA was flagged based on the intensity of association between coded categories; and 2) text selection also followed a chronological event-determined selection process. In so doing, the “which” text question could be reproduced and analyzed by a future researcher if necessary.

Yin (2003) refers to three different aspects of validity: internal, external, and construct validity. Internal validity is developed through selecting the unit of analysis for the case study, whether that is a town, an organization, or a country. The inclusion of all seven countries within the three cases represented the entire “population” of the former Yugoslavia to meet internal validity. In addition, internal validity refers to the theoretical underpinnings of the research and the case study. Constructivism and Role Theory are interconnected, with an emphasis on speech acts, allowing for a natural progression of theoretical frameworks. External validity occurs, more so when multiple cases can be compared, and cross-case generalizations are presented. Here, again, seven countries are considered under three larger rubrics: member states, candidate states, potential candidate states.

Construct validity ensures the use of multiple data collection methods, as mentioned above, to triangulate the findings of a case study. This dissertation considered descriptive statistics, ordinal ranking methodologies, and official speech texts from both EU candidate states, but also the EU itself to determine whether situational, societal roles played a factor in the EU accession process. While triangulation is not discussed specifically in this section, it validated the construction of the research that multiple information flows were utilized. Having established the reliability and validity of the research design and analysis, the chapter turns to the variables and data.

Secondary Data, Measurement, and Data Collection

It is essential to understand case study data collection tools. Baird (2004), Seawright and Gerring (2008), McDonnell, Jones, and Read (2000), Berg (2007), and

Yin (2003) – practically every piece of literature reviewed – admits that quantitative and qualitative data can be used to support a case study. Moreover, Eisenhardt (1989) goes so far as saying the more varied the more “synergistic” the case study becomes. More pointedly, a case study is the collection of data, in its broadest sense, through whatever methods that prove feasible. These can include surveys, interviews, demographics, historiography, ethnography, oral histories, archival research, etc. McDonnell, et al. (2000) suggest the key in determining which data collection methods are used is based on the research design and the theoretical prepositions the researcher is using. Crasnow (2012) insists that finding inference, though she uses the word “causation,” must be done deductively and requires process tracing variables.

Here the units or variables of analysis were six-fold. Each represented a proxy measurement of the underlying concept. Further, there was multicollinearity occurring between the variables as each affects the production and consumption of discourse, rules, and ultimate decision-making of multiple actors in a two-level game. That being the case, the six embedded variables were:

- 1) ECON: Economic Growth
- 2) HURI: Human Rights Protection
- 3) DEMO: Democratization
- 4) DMST: Domestic Sentiments
- 5) EUCN: European Constraints
- 6) PRSP: Presidential Speech

There were four variables using secondary data, the first four listed in the bulleted lists, and two using primary data, speech, drawn from the EU Commission and from the presidents of the post-Yugoslav nation-states. This subsection details the variables using secondary data before moving onto the primary data of the dissertation.

First, ECON measured the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, in United States dollars, of said countries. ECON data was collected via the World Bank. GDP per capita is a standard measurement to show the average productive income of a resident in a country. Though the countries of the Western Balkans did not all use the same currency, the adjustment of conversion to United States dollars was made in the conversion. GDP per capita does not, as a measure, equal increased standards of living, necessarily, because issues such as external costs, opportunity costs, informal economic activity, and assumptions that income increases equal satisfaction/happiness was presumptuous. Additionally, GDP per capita does not measure the income distribution within country (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2013) (Callen 2020) (Fouberg, Murphy, and Blij 2015). GDP per capita worked well, however, as a “controlled” economic proxy variable for each country’s standard economic productivity.

ECON was straightforward when collected. The data was found here: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>. Data was downloaded into an Excel document after filtering for countries and timeframe. ECON was processed by visually making the data reader-friendly based on font, columns, gridlines, etc. It also was organized so that a growth percentage formula could be applied so that each year, per country, was shown to have grown or shrank by X%. Finally, the researcher refreshed his graph skills on Excel for future preparation as necessary.

Second, HURI measured the legal protections of a non-corrupt judiciary through social rights, political freedoms, and economic mobility. The Cato Institute’s Human Freedom Index (HFI) was used as the proxy for human rights. Freedom, or liberty, is the

absence of governmental intrusion or coercion on one's everyday thoughts, actions, and lives. While not having a measurable for every year of the research hurts the study, it does not preclude its inclusion. The reason is that the HFI is the only index tracing back more than a decade with full publications available online. While Barsh (1993) emphasized the worry that theory was not guiding global ranking systems, the sophistication of these institutional methodologies has steadily improved, been more inclusive of changing global norms for legal protections (Sanders 1996) (Sumner 2007), and therefore been privy to reporting, follow-up, and more robust analysis almost thirty years hence, to demonstrate the relationship between economic and personal freedoms (Dolan 2021). Lastly, HFI is linked to the EU's Competence Centre on Composite Indicators and Scoreboards (COIN) (<https://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>).

HURI data was collected via the physical report of the Cato and Fraser Institutes. The 2021 Report was found here: <https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2021-12/human-freedom-index-2021.pdf>. The Human Freedom index is a combined score that encompasses personal and economic liberties including legal systems and rule of law, freedom of information, regulations, property rights, and freedom of trade and security. Each year's report had country profiles as part of its series. The country profile had two pages. The first was a breakdown of that particular year for the country, rankings in relations to their region (Eastern Europe is the region for the Western Balkans), and then the world more broadly. The 2021 Eastern European average score was 7.92. The Global HFI score was 7.12. The second country page in the report gave historical data for the country involved (2008-Present) and showed not just historical overall scores, but also the historical numbers of each subtopic. The researcher copied each Western Balkan

country's scores into an Excel spreadsheet and processed the numbers in a reader-friendly format to then be able to graph and compare scores/ranks within the region.

Third, the research's democracy variable, DEMO, utilized the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset, importantly also linked to the EU's COIN list. V-Dem's "liberal democracy" measurement specifically traces to Robert Dahl's polyarchy definition, which the literature positions as a conceptualization of democratization, a process, rather than a static term "democracy" (Dahl 1972) (Keman 2015) (Teorell et al., 2019) (Haerpfer et al., 2019). While there are several other organizations that measure and rank democracies, V-Dem was selected for a couple of reasons. First, connections to EU "verified" datasets provided a standardizing opportunity believed to increase reliability and validity of this contextualized variable. More important, while Freedom House and others provided better reports and in-depth country analyses, their datapoints were too vague (for instance: Not Free, Partly Free, Free), which is great for surveying rationale, but did not provide nuanced datasets needed for this research. For example, in 2020 Freedom House had Croatia and Slovenia as "Free" with the other five Western Balkan countries as "Partly Free". Yet, because V-Dem uses ordinal data, the actual difference between countries can be measured such that North Macedonia scored the highest of the five Freedom House labeled "Partly Free" countries in V-Dem's 2020 dataset.

Here, the data collection process was basically the same as the previous two variables. The researcher downloaded the V-Dem CSV file from the following website: <https://www.v-dem.net/vdemds.html>. The dataset contained both the overall democracy metrics, but also the underlying metrics, and thus rows and columns outside the

geographic and conceptual scope of the dissertation were removed. Because V-Dem's work has extensive historical reach, the data for 2000-2020 had to be copied to another page, or tab, within the same Excel file to pull out the relevant years for each of the seven countries. From there, the data were processed in a presentable fashion for subsequent use.

Fourth, DMST measured the interests and sentiments of the constituent populations from survey records. This variable had results from the larger and more historic World Values Survey (WVS) and the Balkan Barometer (BB) regional survey. WVS has seven different "waves" of surveys distributed between 1981 and 2020. From 1995-2020 at least one Western Balkan country answered a question on its confidence regarding the European Union in each wave. This formed a historical, regional outlook on the public's perspective. The BB has been conducted annually from 2015-2021. The main issue with the BB data is that Croatia and Slovenia were not surveyed, as both had "graduated" to EU member-states before this date. However, the depth of the questions for the other five Western Balkan countries is considerable. Fourteen specific EU, regional integration, and neighbor relations questions were extracted as data points. WVS and BB combined data provided evidence of the domestic sentiments necessary as an additional variable for the case studies.

DMST data could be rearranged in Excel also. The researcher's familiarity with Excel made it the easiest software to organize all of this, and the above's, information. WVS datasets were found here: <https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>. After the wave was clicked in the left margin, there were PDFs showing the survey instrument listing the numbered survey questions. The number of the EU confidence

question changed over time, but upon finding it, the second PDF was opened, and the results were found on a published table. That table was manually copied to Excel. Little processing was done with the WVS information since it was already in a table format. The BB surveys were found here: <https://www.rcc.int/balkanbarometer/database>. There were separate categories for public and business surveys. This research drew eight public survey responses and six Balkan business survey responses for each of the five non-EU countries. The results were exported to Excel and “cleaned” for presentation and usability. Next is a discussion on the dissertation’s two primary data variables.

Official Speech Primary Data General Comments

The language and speech texts for the primary variables were official speech text. Discourse may be found everywhere, on television and YouTube, in tweets or other social media platforms, in periodical interviews or by paparazzi waiting to catch a sound bite. Yet, to gauge the decision-making and motives of whether the EU accession process is ideational or rationally pragmatic for Western Balkan leaders, the parameters for the data were official speech text. Van Dijk (1997) calls official speech rather “straightforward” rather than the unpacking necessary to argue, rightfully or wrongly, that everything is political (Mitchell 2000). Because a nation-state “can’t speak for itself,” Lee (2005) places the legal and persuasive onus on official speech from politicians. Political speech domestically may be intimidation or preconditions for action (Lubianco 2021) (Sawatzky 2016) or shielded from legal liabilities (Wolfe 2022). But, in foreign policy analysis, a government’s “word,” or discourse, regardless of the “ought,” can be deconstructed to show the “is” (Weinstein 1969) (Sangar, Clement, and

Lindemann 2018). Ba and McKeown (2021) tie official speech into a grander theory for international relations due to the framing of political officials in their roles. Fierke (2002) argues that discourse can bridge the gap between positivists and interpretivists. The choice of *which* official speech texts was governed by three fundamental realities.

There were time and language constraints. Limiting textual evidence to “official texts” provided by national governments or international institutions allowed a streamlined summation of the available discourse directed at the president’s constituents, neighbors, and the international community. At the same time, while every government’s website had English available text for the speeches compiled – no translation services were necessary – there nonetheless must be a limitation inherent in not knowing the local vernacular or websites to find additional primary speech text.

Lastly, informational bandwidth was a problem not only for the research, but also based on societal and governmental realities. The collection processed outlined below catalogued approximately 3,504 pages of text with approximately 1,613,257 words analyzed across the fifty-two presidents of the Western Balkans in the last twenty-one years. This is only textual official speech by presidents. While argued that this provided ample data points to contextualize decisions surrounding EU accession for the research questions, nonpresidential administrative officials commented on EU enlargement, in their native language. This was not addressed. Theoretically, presidential speech “speaks” for the nation, but that also does not mean it is the only “voice”. Secondly, the world has changed quite a lot since 2000 from a media and internet aggregation standpoint. Not all governmental websites housed every official speech of each president over the past 21 years. Not only is this limitation based on administrative capabilities,

but also technologically based on archival capabilities. Tie that fact in with regional conflict and issues of nation-state building, and the limitation of societal (i.e., technology) and governmental (i.e., conscious and unconscious choices of record-keeping) also must be acknowledged. In this vein, sampling was nonrandom based on the nature of the research questions, the region analyzed, and the inherent focus on the European Union. However, sampling of the *entire* fifty-two presidents was accomplished even if some vastly outnumbered others for the reasons already mentioned. So, what official speech was collected?

Official Speech Primary Variables, Measurement, and Data Collection

The principal two variables for the research and where primary data was collected were EUCN and PRSP. The public knows which countries are EU member-states today and when they became members. Further, any role prescription entails the thirty-five chapters of the EU acquis required before admission to the EU. Again, this is public knowledge, found here: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/enlargement-policy/conditions-membership/chapters-acquis_en. The research model positioned the European Union as the “alter” whose prescriptions create a “role” that, theoretically, effects the discourse and policy of the candidate nation-states ideationally or practically. Yet, the principal research questions addressed revolve around discourse and the ways in which language shapes expectations, interactions, and decisions. Words matter. Therefore, in addition to the basic prescriptions of the EU institutionally, how were words guided, directed, communicated *to* the Western Balkans over the past twenty-one

years? To answer this, the researcher collected speeches on, or about, EU enlargement in the Western Balkans and/or the individual countries therein for the variable EUCN.

EUCN speech data was collected from the EU Commission. This repository can be found here: [Press corner | European Commission \(europa.eu\)](https://ec.europa.eu/presscorner/). The filters on the page were set to “speech” as the document type and “EU enlargement” as the policy area. This yielded 34 results, which were then narrowed to only include those speeches that discussed the region or a specific country in the Western Balkans. The speeches were cut and pasted chronologically into a running Word document for ease of uploading to the content analysis software. EUCN had a specified individual document, as did each country below. Paragraphs were spaced separately, and the time stamp was underlined to visually create a demarcation between speeches.

PRSP is the main variable for the dissertation. It represented collected official speech acts from the presidents of all seven former Yugoslav countries from 2000-2021. In total there have been seventy (70) individual presidencies, but forty-nine (49) individual presidents between all seven countries over the last 21 years. Transcripts of speeches were ascertained from governmental websites and from the EU and United Nations (UN). The speeches from the UN and EU sites were only those speeches made in from of the parliament/assembly from the president of a particular Yugoslav nation-state. Appendix #1 details every link from the governmental websites and those from the EU and UN. Each government had slightly different layouts whether the menu was tabular, or simply horizontal across the top. Google pinged search results from the United States seemed to default the language to English most of the time, though it is recollected that at least twice the Google translation pop-up menu appeared and was

accepted. Like EUCN, PRSP data was processed using Microsoft Word. The speeches were copied and pasted chronologically into a running Word document for each country. Dates were underlined and paragraphs were spaced.

Notably, a commonality in the data collection process was the inclusion of a research assistant. A former graduate student pupil was brought aboard to assist with obtaining the speech texts. The researcher and research assistant spent approximately two hours discussing the research aims and objectives and walking through examples of where to find the presidential speeches and how they should be brought over to their respective Word documents. Additionally, the research assistant was provided a detailed list (Appendix #1) of the websites to uncover the information. At no time did the research assistant conduct their own searches or research to find official speech text. They followed specific directions. A stipend was paid for their time. Between researcher and research assistant, approximately forty hours were spent on data collection. In sum, Table 2 outlines the cumulation of the collection effort. Thereafter the data analysis methods will be discussed.

Country or EU	Pages of Speech Text	Words within Text
Bosnia and Herzegovina	655	284,116
Croatia	91	43,924
EU Commission	57	24,036
Kosovo	711	283,695
Montenegro	278	128,830
North Macedonia	745	337,842
Serbia	117	60,789
Slovenia	850	450,025

Table 2 *Presidential Speech Data by Country*

Methods of Primary Data Analysis

Content analysis and discourse analysis were the main methods undertaken in the research, and certainly as it relates to the main two variables EUCN and PRSP. Each were used in tandem sequentially. Using both methods is debated in the literature. On one hand, Hardy, Harley, and Phillips (2004) acknowledge the epistemological antithesis of each method: content analysis being quantitative and positivistic, while discourse analysis interpretive and qualitative. Hopf (2004) argues they are incompatible. On the other, Wilson (1993) views both as complimentary methods with levels of textual analysis and clear definitions of “key relations” that bear themselves out linguistically. Neuendorf (2004) calls content analysis a “stimulant” for discourse analysis. Markoff, Shapiro, and Weitman (1975) and Hsieh and Shannon (2005) offer that content analysis reveals the programmable units of manifest content quantifiably, while discourse analysis looks at the latent, semantic content for meaning. Fierke (2002) contends that textual and discourse analysis can bridge a divide between positivists and linguists.

Yet, this was where Constructivism and research design played such an important balancing note. Mainstream constructivists argue for socially constituted knowledge and reality, but that does not abandon the ability to quantify experience *to determine* reality (Burchill et al., 2009) (Fosson 2019) (Faubert 2020). The goal for accession is EU membership. There is an endgame. Identity language can change over time: who is “us” now may not be who is “us” later (Macedonians?). The goalposts of economic rationality that would “justify” development and “success” also might move over time (adoption of a new technology or taking a vaccination); but the ultimate goal is to increase one’s standard of living, whether that “one” is an individual or country and however that

“standard of living” might be defined. Therefore, to infer why a country’s major international actor, its president, is making a foreign policy choice along the EU’s accession process decision tree can be quantified by the speech text of said president and then critically contextualized via discourse analysis. Further, research design allowed for a triangulating of interpretations. As argued above this is created through types of case study categorization, nested variables using secondary and primary data, and speech analysis via quantification and contextualization.

Content Analysis

Content analysis was a way to extrapolate meaning from written and visual text. Berg suggests that content analysis is a way to study social communication as artifacts and find patterns in the text (2007, 306). This works well with Weber’s definition of content analysis as being able to “infer reference from texts” (1999), or as a “systematic and objective means to make valid inferences” (Downe-Wambolt 1992, 314). More pointedly, by studying text and words, researchers can make connections between expressions and thought, and/or expressions and actions.

To successfully narrow down text for content analysis, the unit of analysis must be defined. Weber (1990) suggests that narrowing down text must take into consideration whether the units are mutually exclusive; and two, how narrow or broad the researcher is looking for themes/categories. MacLeod et al. (2009) suggest similarly creating themes, or, in their words, “typologies.” Berg (2007) recommends narrowing, too, although he disagrees with mutual exclusivity as a combining effect of the unit and the analysis can occur, recognizing the possibility of units of analyses overlapping, think

words and paragraphs or paragraphs and thematic content. Once a unit of analysis is chosen, it must be coded. This can be easily accomplished if the researcher is looking for a specific word. Or, this must be operationalized by defining the theme looked for, the unit that will be analyzed, and then whether that theme was found (and thus coded on or for) that unit.

There were two main categories in the content analysis: Identity and Economic Rationality. These correspond to the main theoretical views outlined in the literature on the benefits of joining the European Union. At a level “below” the categories of Identity and Economic Rationality numerous codes were made to flag the text as indicative of the categories for further inspection. Examples of codes used for Identity were us, them, we, they, ours, theirs, nationality words such as Croatian or Yugoslavian, and regional words such as Balkan or European. Examples of codes used for Economic Rationality included progress, development, growth, globalization, integration, and betterment. Since the research is deductive and categories and codes were created from the literature, the articles read that spoke to recontextualization, inductively finding themes in the data, and grounded theory did not apply (Johnson 2014) (Bengtsson 2016) (Chouliaraki, Georgiou, and Zaborowski 2017)

The coding and processing of the speech text was done through MAXQDA software. The researcher used this software for the first time in the dissertation, and reflections on its utility will be discussed in the conclusion. Frequency and cross-tabulations statically and longitudinally were measured (Sebald 1962) (Davies and Mosdell 2006). This was also done chronologically to find “gradual accretion of details” (White and Marsh 2006, 39). Next, a key-word-in-context (KWIC) breakdown was used,

so that the coded speech could be contextualized based on sentence and paragraph construction (Wood 1984) (Weber 1990) (Ishida, Shimizu, and Yoshikawa 2020). Thereafter, directional connotative logic was presented for the subsequent discourse analysis.

Discourse Analysis

The first thing to address is how Discourse Analysis differentiates from Content Analysis. Whereas content analysis uses qualitative or quantitative analysis of texts, or defined units of content, “discourse” encompasses larger “systems of thought” that go into the production of the language, its audience, the socio-cultural symbols within that discourse, and the historical context by which the discourse is produced and consumed (Foucault 1981). Discourse Analysis can be formal and linguistic, empirical using conversation and genre analysis, or critical. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) aligns with the need to see discourse and text couched in a social setting that reveals the producers and users of language and the means of production (Hodges et al. 2008). CDA is the frame of discourse analysis used in the subsequent research.

One particular aspect of CDA germane to this dissertation is the emphasis on power relationships in speech because each consumption and production point for discourse has meaning attached for a variety of reasons and that discourse is what “constitutes” reality through materialized words (Gregory et al. 2009). Shenhav, Rahat, and Sheafer (2012) agree through a study of Israeli legislators. Johnson (2014) notes that discourse analysis is a great addition to triangulation or case studies because it provides another “lens” for analysis compared to more traditional methodologies. Butler (1995)

uses discourse analysis to emphasize the creation of identities and roles of constructivism. The power dynamic of being a presidential leader, of being able to execute a national role conception in relation to prescribed behavior in a foreign policy decision underlined the research questions. Therefore, CDA made most sense as a methodological choice.

Moving CDA from theory to reliable research design followed the Fairclough model. Fairclough (2003, 2010, 2014) outlined three dimensions/steps for discourse analysis: micro, meso, and macro. The micro-level analysis looked at the syntax, diction, and verbal creativity (metaphor, turns-of-phrase) of the speech itself. What does the raw language say? The meso-level considered the production and consumption of the speech. In other words, who spoke, why, who was the audience, and what was the setting. When the researcher taught speech or presentation skills for nearly ten years, those textbooks called this the speech communication process. Lastly, the macro-level contextualized the speech according to the socioeconomic and political environment.

Therefore, the content and discourse analyses worked together. The content analysis was able to find frequency and intensity of salient theoretical institutional incentives: identity and rational pragmatism. The coding helped identify and explain literal and figurative directions of the speech; in other words, what was being said to whom and in what manner. Then, the Fairclough model of critical discourse analysis allowed the research to integrate the four non-speech variables to situate the speech and decisions in their time and place.

Methodological Concluding Remarks

This dissertation balanced the need for a social scientific research design with an interpretivist philosophical outlook. Research design included all possible countries in a systematic comparative case study arrangement based on their assigned “role” along the EU accession trajectory. Multiple points of evidence were used, four non-speech secondary data and two primary speech data, to make the empirical evidence robust for inference. The presidential speech collected provided ample data to contextualize the Western Balkans between 2000-2021. Finally, content analysis and discourse analysis created a quantitative basis to dive deeper into the situated knowledge, discourse, and policy of Western Balkan presidents as they jockeyed for attention, power, and sympathy among their people, the region, and the EU. The next three chapters present the findings for all seven nation-states of the former Yugoslavia. Each chapter corresponds to one of the three cases. Each chapter discusses a general overview of the country and then each of the six variables. Finally, each chapter also structurally mirrors one another to continue the demands of social science research.

CHAPTER 4 – EU MEMBER STATES: SLOVENIA AND CROATIA

Introduction

The two countries in this chapter, as the title indicates, are both member-states of the European Union (EU). Slovenia joined in May 2004 and Croatia in July 2013. Therefore, in the 2000-2021 study timeframe, each had shorter windows for the expression of presidential speech about *their* incentives to join. Additionally, the presidential speech texts *after* becoming members might, it stands to reason, affect proclamations on the accession process, the EU, and their former Yugoslav counterparts.

Each country profile within the case study chapters has a congruent organizational structure. There is a short introduction on the country, followed by overviews of the non-speech variables: economic development (ECON), human rights protection (HURI), democratization (DEMO), and domestic sentiments (DMST). EU speech constraints (EUCN) is laid out thereafter to find the Alter's prescriptions of said country. Next, there is a discussion on the presidents of the country, a brief biographical overview, and explanation of the presidentialisation of the relatively new, independent nation-state. Finally, presidential speech (PRSP) is presented and interpreted via content and discourse analysis.

Slovenia

Slovenia is the third smallest country of the Western Balkans by area within which approximately two million Slovenes, 20% of whom are over the age of 65 live. Slovenia's population is roughly the size of North Macedonia's, which puts the two countries in the middle of the seven post-Yugoslav states by density. Eighty-three

percent of the latter's population is ethnic Slovenians and its native language, Slovenian, is overwhelmingly spoken by the population (Eurydice 2021). Ethnic and linguistic lineages can be traced back to the Slavic tribes. Religiously, however, 58% of Slovenes identify as Catholics, with atheists as the second most identified minority group in terms of faith (or, in this case, lack thereof) at 10%. Less than 2.5% of people either identify as Orthodox Christians or Muslims (Office of International Religious Freedom 2018). For context, the Balkans generally are approximately 64% Orthodox (Hupchick 2002) and all but Slovenia survey over 65% that religion is important to them (Tanner 2018). Hupchick (2002) continues that based on imperial and Roman influences, Slovenia, and Croatia for that matter, are more Western European than Eastern European.

Politically, the role of empire has necessitated Slovenia consciously maintaining a distinct identity in relation to their socio-political self-determination. What does that mean? Well, between the Roman Empire, Holy Roman Empire, Hapsburgs, and Austro-Hungarian Empire, Slovenes were "conquered" or subsumed by an empire for nearly 1,800 years (Melady and Laurent 2011). Sweeney and Derdzinski (2010) note that the ability and recognition to have sovereignty, basically for the first time, spurred Slovenia to pursue independence as soon as possible following Yugoslavia's structural dissolution and maintenance control. Therefore, the religious, linguistic, and ethnic homogeneity historically, but more practically politicized during the lead-up to independence and thereafter has positioned Slovenia in a unique situation in comparison to the other Western Balkan nation-states.

Slovenian Economic Development (ECON)

The Slovenian economy is the most economically productive of the seven former Yugoslavian states. In 2000 its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (the variable ECON) was approximately \$5,000+ more than that of its most similar Western Balkan neighbor, Croatia, and by 2020 was fully \$11,000+ greater than Croatia's. Its average GDP per capita of \$25,517 puts it practically in the middle of all EU countries (14th of 27 member-states) (Eurostat 2021), and in the Western Balkans, it is the only member of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD).

The Slovenian economy today is post-industrial and service based. Novak (2003) shows that Slovenia post-independence relied heavily on foreign direct investment in its transition to a market economy, and that it also invested in production factors, education, and labor. In 2000, approximately 55% of GDP came from the private sector (Freedom House 2001). Lampe (2008) details the quick reform and transparency in the banking sector. Early in the 2000s, Slovenian trade capitalized on its remanent Yugoslavian infrastructure (Gosar 2022) but struggled in competitive advantages with raw materials and agriculture (Bojnec and Ferto 2007). However, their embrace of a market economy while working with and through EU counterparts evolved the Slovenian economy. Today, two-thirds of its workers are in the service sector (Nared et al., 2020), tourism is growing at a rapid pace, with numbers increasing every year from 2013-2018 (Locker 2018), and its trade is primarily with EU members at the tune of 67% of their imports and 75% of exports (Simoes and Hidalgo 2011). Salecl (2012) worries that hyper-capitalism has replaced Slovenian national identity exceptionalism (itself not a good thing, she

argues) as corporate branding and selling lifestyles creates disorienting abundances of choice.

Connecting Slovenian economic growth to the EU is tricky. Campos, Coricelli, and Moretti (2014) highlight that new EU member states gain an approximate 12% increase in GDP per capita, modelling that Slovenia is no different. A later study by Anderson and Vanhuysee (2019) finds the opposite when the comparison is made to wealthier non-EU countries in and outside of the OECD. Yet, interestingly, three of the best five growth years over the past two decades were the two years *leading up to and the year of* Slovenia joining the EU (2002-2004). Figure #3 charts the Slovenian economy between 2000-2020.




Figure 3. GDP per capita: World Bank

Slovenian Human Rights Protection (HURI)

Slovenia’s human rights record is a mixed one. On the positive end, in comparison to the other countries arising from Yugoslavia, it is ranked as having the highest Human Freedom scores for human rights according to the Cato Institute (Figure #4). It is also well above the global score of 7.0 and the regional, Eastern European score of 8.0. Hendrickson (2002) points to a clean record through the independence transition and early on in the 2000s. Further, the Council of Europe has noted improvements in the treatment, accessibility, and opportunities of Roma in Slovenia (2011).




Figure 4. Cato Institute

Yet, below the surface, there is a “darker,” worrying side to Slovenian human rights. First, historical “erasure” of non-Slovene ethnicities occurred in the 1990s and have not been resolved. Yugoslavia allowed members of any ethno-religious group to live in any of its former republics. However, after independence, Slovenia required non-Slovenes to register for citizenship. Not everyone registered in time and on February 26, 1992, 25,671 people had their citizenship status, records, rights, and recourse erased (Hervey 2018). Court rulings and orders from the European Court of Human Rights re-recognized over twelve thousand people, and over €26 million has been paid out in restitutions (Vladislavljevic 2021). Second, the Borgen Project (2017) noted that Slovenia has “more human rights violations per capita of any other European country” and “has lost 94% of its cases in the European Court of Human rights.” Additionally, their Human Freedom Index score ranks Slovenia 20th of 27 EU member-states. Third, Amnesty International (2020) points to a Slovenian Supreme Court ruling that found constitutional the accelerated and forceful removal of illegal immigrants back into Croatia who had been making their way to Europe through the infamous “Balkan Route” popularized during the 2015 European & Syrian refugee “crisis” (Tufts University 2020).

Slovenian Democratization (DEMO)

Slovenia’s democratization efforts, while enough to earn a passing grade into EU membership, are nonetheless interesting when one considers the following graph (Figure #5):




Figure 5. Slovenia DEMO, V-Dem

According to the V-Dem data, Slovenia and Croatia tie for the most democratic Western Balkan countries in 2020. Yes, Slovenia’s “floor” is still 0.4 points higher than that of Bosnia, the “worst” democracy in the WB; however, the slope of the decline over the past five years bears some consideration.

Some of the most recent annual Freedom House “Freedom in the World” reports flesh out this decline in three areas. First, its 2016 report noted that, for Slovenia, “corruption, cronyism, and illiberal politics remain the status quo” (Freedom House 2016). The European Parliament further noted that delays in appointing legal counsel or to file paperwork accounted for investigations being corrupted and misaligned with the interests of the people (Freedom House 2021) (Freedom House 2018). Second, from 2015-2020 the maritime border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia at the Bay of Piran illustrates issues of geography, water access, and trade influence bilateral cooperation (Reuters 2020). Third, there has been a steady attack on the media. The government has

proposed legislation to influence media outlets, defamation cases are easily prosecuted, and a three-year trial (2013-2016) against female journalist Anuska Delic highlight balancing open access, free speech, and precedents of censoring dissenting voices (Freedom House 2020) (Nazar 2016) (McGoey 2021). Additionally, the Slovenian government defunded public television and press agencies last year, while suspending the sale of newspapers at small neighborhood stands (Reporters Without Borders 2021).

Slovenian Domestic Sentiments (DMST)

Slovenian public surveys were compiled from three separate “waves” of the World Values Survey (WVS). Slovenia was not surveyed for the Balkan Barometer project from 2015-Present. The three WVS waves covered the years 1995, 2005, and 2011. The question on each survey was:

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The European Union (Inglehart et al., 2021).

Each survey sample had *less* faith or confidence in the EU than they had positive confidence. Thus, are the survey results pointing to a pre-EU hope and a post-EU resignation? Table #3 shows the aggregated numbers.

	1995 Total	2005 Total	2011 Total
Great Deal	6.40%	3.30%	2%
Quite a Lot	31.50%	29.60%	22.50%
Not Very Much	40.90%	47.30%	59.80%
None at All	10.80%	11.30%	12.50%
No Answer	N/A	1.70%	0.30%
DK	10.40%	6.80%	2.90%
(N)	1007	1037	1069

Table 3 *World Values Survey*

The trend toward lack of confidence in the EU occurred across every age bracket and across both men and women.

Slovenian European Constraints (EUCN)

The data for this Slovenian variable lacks robustness. Only one of the European Commission speeches on EU Enlargement or the Western Balkans, archived on their website, mentions Slovenia outright. Part of this shortcoming stems from a lack of formal, archived speeches before 2008. At the same time, Slovenia's admittance into the EU also means it is not the "subject" or "object" for directed speeches communicating to the Western Balkans thereafter and/or about changes or new directions in the EU's enlargement. There can be inferences of Slovenia read in the sole text and referentially in other EU Commission speeches.

The single mention of Slovenia, when included with words referring to the 2004 "big bang" accession, starts to paint a fuller picture. In 2008, the "big bang" accessions, where 10 new countries joined the EU in one cohort, was held up as exemplary for driving "many new initiatives in the field of justice, liberty and security, as well as the pursuit of better policies for growth and jobs" (Rehn 2008). The single instance of the word "Slovenia" highlighted its role as a lead partner for Bosnian and Serbian disaster relief after floods in May 2014. Pointing out their leadership on organizing financial and tangible relief conveys confidence and affirmations on Slovenian proactiveness within the EU. This "nod" came after Slovenia held the six-month rotating EU Council presidency from January-June 2008. Third, in 2015, again pointing to the "big bang" enlargement, Hahn (2015) states,

Let me take your minds back to 2003. The EU is on the brink of its biggest ever enlargement, the “big bang”. The will to follow our European model of democracy, rule of law, human rights and free markets is bringing transformation change to our Central and Eastern European friends ... It was against this backdrop that “Wider Europe” was conceived, as a way to use that power of attraction, with countries who do not have a direct ‘European Perspective.’”

This is notable for two reasons. First, the text again suggests that the model followed by those 10 countries, Slovenia one of them, brought positive, pragmatic change, and by “following the European model,” allowed that positive change to occur. In other words, Slovenia did what was right, followed directions and expectations, received an early turn at the EU Council presidency, and then stepped up with initiatives to help its Yugoslav neighbors.

Second, and a quote that will be revisited due to its explicitness, is that countries not admitted as of 2015 (meaning *not* Slovenia and Croatia), that are trying to get into the European Union do *not* have a “direct ‘European Perspective.’” This language suggests that the inverse is true: the 10 in 2004 (including Slovenia), Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and Croatia (member-state in 2013) *had* or *has* a “European Perspective.” Slovenia was identifiably European. Thus, not just its identity, but the expectations set forth, its accession, and then subsequent leadership implies a “well-behaved” candidate country, in line with European values, demonstrating doing the right things to become a full-fledged member-state. The Alter’s, the EU’s, prescriptive role for Slovenia was based on ideational commonality and expectant follow-through on what was asked to reach accession in 2004, and thereafter Slovenia affirmed its “role” through leadership.

Slovenian Presidents 2000-2021

Slovenia has had four presidents since 2000. In order, they are Milan Kucan (1991-2002), Janez Drnovsek (2002-2007), Danilo Turk (2007-2012), and Borut Pahor (2012-Present). Kucan and Turk claimed independent of a party. Drnovsek started out in the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) party and then became independent. President Pahor, originally a member of the Social Democrats (SD), later ran as an independent as well. All four men are ethnic Slovenian and were educated in the capital city, Ljubljana. Only Drnovsek has a non-political background, earlier having been a banker. Presidents are elected through direct elections, serve a term of five years, and can be reelected twice.

Constitutionally, the Slovenian presidency is ceremonial, but strong public appeal also points to the centralizing tendency of presidential characteristics more in-line with a single candidate majoritarian system. Fink-Hafner and Krasove (2019) and Boban (2007) label Slovenia as a semi-presidential system. Fink-Hafner and Krasove detail how the strong personalities of presidential elections have spilled over into Slovenian political party dynamics, with party leaders often centralizing structure and decision-making. Second, Slovenian presidents are the commander-in-chief, and Sweeney and Derdzinski (2010) note the civil-military relations have had to build military expertise, and even then, find a role of where and when to train or operationalize their relatively small force via the president and military leadership. Third, while the “real” governmental power is in the prime minister and the parliament, Boban (2007) shows that the relationship between the presidents and the parliament is neither hierarchal nor transactional, which speaks to a political environment that, he argues, does not have extreme formal polarization.

Slovenian Presidential Speech (PRSI)

Slovenian presidential speech will be presented through content and discourse analysis. To begin with content analysis, the data is coded based on two categories: identity and rational, pragmatic code choices. Once the text is coded, it is exported to Excel to present the general trends over the research's two decades; additionally, all coded segments of the speech transcripts are also exported, which brings the research to discourse analysis. The discourse analysis then is a summation of how presidential speech is constructed via a multilevel (micro, meso, and macro) CDA per Norman Fairclough's model.

In the 850 pages of Slovenian presidential text there were 7,400 instances of identity marker coded words and 2,684 instances of rational marker coded words. There were 16 code words in each of the two categories. Only three words did not appear at all: foolish and villain for identity, and neoliberal for rationality. However, once aggregated, eight of 16 identity words appeared more than 1% of the time (between 2000-2021) and only five of 16 rational words appeared more than 1% for any specific year's collection of speeches. Another aggregate statistic to highlight is that coded identity words represented 1.6% of all Slovenian transcripts. Economic Rational words were pinged 0.6% of the time. The codes that failed to reach a 1% frequency rate were excluded from the aggregation longitudinally. The following chart shows the distribution of the top eight identity words.




Figure 6. Slovenian Presidential Speech: Identity Codes

There are two interesting things that stand out. First, the four pronouns that literally create an “Us vs. Them” differentiation occur more regularly. Besides 2000, “our” was the most frequent coded identity word. In eight of the twenty-one years “us” is the second highest word. The other thing that stands out with pronouns is the regularity that “their” has between 2000-2005, mostly before Slovenia became a member-state of the European Union. Also, when looking at Figure #6, the years 2008-2011 are somewhat curious given that identity code words fall below 10% before ramping back up in the 2010s.

Second, the geography of what is being discussed is notable. “Europe’s” usage regularity in the first six years of the 21st century is apparent. Not only does it appear at

10+% usage from 2000-2006, but in 10 of the 21 years it is the second most frequently appearing code. Yet, from 2015-2021 the use of the word “Balkan” becomes more regular. The spread, the difference between these two geographies’ mentions, narrowed considerably. Figure #7 shows this change.




Figure 7. Slovenian “Europe” vs. “Balkan” Word Frequency

Some possible explanations for this are: 1) after focusing on EU membership, Slovenia focuses on itself between 2007-2014 and then starts turning its attention toward its neighbors; 2) as more responsibility is “released” from EU and UN oversight post-conflict, the onus of “taking care of” or “administering” or “fixing” problems is on the individual states and/or regions; and 3) as more Western Balkan countries move through or appeal for consideration in the enlargement process, maybe Slovenia starts talking more as an example-setter rather than selfishly being worried about its own goals and aspirations to be considered “European,” which they achieved in 2004.

Moving to economic rationality coded language, the results are surprising. It was already mentioned that interest-oriented words were only found in the speech transcripts 0.1% of the time. The distribution longitudinally is as follows:




Figure 8. Slovenian Presidential Speech: Rational Codes

Again, only five of 16 code words appeared more than 1% of the time in the text.

“Progress” and “success,” goal-oriented words, appear very little before Slovenia becomes an EU member-state, but are seen more clearly on the chart thereafter.

The two most frequently used words are the most abstract: economic and development. The first, “economic,” is multifaceted and could be directed at internal geography, industry, sector, and/or fiscal policy to name a few. Second, “development” is the holy grail of definitions to consecrate. Is development political, economic, socio-

cultural, or via security needs and/or concerns? This is a rhetorical question but is meant to argue that there are not cohesive through-lines with either of these words that a pure quantitative presentation can ascertain. Having provided an overview of the content, the research drills down into the specifics of the discourse.

Micro CDA considers sentence-level analysis, and applying that rubric to Slovenia, shows presidential speech that is overwhelmingly focused on statements rather than judgments. The speech, as outlined above, is broken into two categories: identity coded segments and rational, interest-focused coded segments. From there, each segment was read to find whether it was a declarative (statement/opinion), imperative (request/demand), interrogative (question), or exclamatory (emotional) sentence. Regardless of the audience, Slovenian presidential speech was declarative +50% in every instance except when speaking to or about Bosnia. Ideationally, the rate of declarative speech moves to +55% in all samples.

An interesting thing occurs in Slovenian rational speech: declarative speech decreases and imperative speech increases. Table #4 shows the movement from ideational speech *to* rational speech by sentence type.

	Declaratives (I v. R)	Imperatives (I v R)
Bosnia	55% drops to 42%	9% rises to 17%
Croatia	76% drops to 45%	7% rises to 27%
Kosovo	79% drops to 33%	0% rises to 50%
Montenegro	100% drops to 50%	0% remains at 0%
North Macedonia	86% drops to 75%	0% rises to 25%
Serbia	85% drops to 82%	0% remains at 0%

Table 4 *Slovenian change in sentence type based on coded segment type*

Montenegro and Serbia do not have imperative sentences, but declarative sentences directed at them declines. More to the point, in each other country, when the discussion

moved to rational economic language, the demands/requests increased in four of the six countries. This points to Slovenian expectations on fellow Western Balkan countries such that their ideational affinities notwithstanding, getting stuff done, or accomplished, from a material perspective becomes much more important and in focus. For instance, Turk (2008) states, “despite of the great and long-lasting efforts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina we need decisive action for territory cleaning ... for economic and social development in these countries.” Another example is when President Pahor (2019) calls on the Western Balkans to “eliminate the lagging of development after the western part of Europe.”

Meso CDA considers the speech situation and context. More pointedly, meso discourse analysis follows the adage “it’s not what you say, but how you say it.” Here, the “how” is the listener/receiver and the message. Slovenian speech overwhelmingly focused on itself and Europe, two diametrically polar forces, but those that also converge in the sense of examples of, or instigators toward, the EU accession process. Slovenian identity and rational speech segments mentioned other WB countries 143 times, with Croatia the object of 54 of those instances. What was said?

Temporally, Slovenian speech consistently focused on the present. On average, combining identity and rational text, only speech about or to Bosnia focused on the future. Speech toward Serbia was split at 36% in both the present and the future. In the other five countries, speech focused on the present. It is worth noting that when separating the two types of speeches, the “past” was more laden with identity coded speech when speaking to Croatia, Kosovo, and Serbia.

Further, the message of Slovenian speech was found through six thematic dichotomies. The pairings are compliment/criticism, cooperation/dissociation, and hope/pessimism. Table #5 shows the tone for each country per Slovenian speech.

	Bosnia	Croatia	Kosovo	Montenegro	N Maced.	Serbia
Compliment	13%	5%	17%	50%	32%	5%
Criticism	25%	1%	7%	0%	7%	24%
Cooperation	17%	29%	26%	13%	0%	17%
Dissociation	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	5%
Hope	9%	31%	36%	13%	33%	42%
Pessimism	5%	9%	7%	0%	0%	0%

Table 5 *Thematic Tone of Slovenian Speech*

As can be seen, very little of Slovenian presidential speech is throwing away or dissociating their relationship with the fellow post-Yugoslavian neighbors. Between criticism and compliments, Bosnia and Serbia are negatively aligned. In fact, these are the only two instances where the negative tone outweighs the positive one. All six countries are spoken about in cooperative tones and messages; and Slovenia is hopeful toward each as well. Macro CDA analysis will be presented in the findings chapter. The research now turns its attention to the other current EU member-state situated in the Balkans, Croatia.

Croatia

Croatia is the second largest country of the post-Yugoslav states by area and density. It sits along the eastern Adriatic seaboard and has nearly 4,000 miles of coastline between inlets, islands, and mainland coastline (Jennings 2016). Croatia's approximately four million people are ethnically Croatian (or Croats) and primarily speak Croatian, a dialect of Serbo-Croatian, a polycentric language very similar among

Bosnian, Serbian, and Montenegrin (Eurydice 2021) (T.J. 2017). Like Slovenia, Croatia ethnically and linguistically derives from the southern Slavs.

Croatia's population has long affiliated with Rome. A collective 86.3% of the population is Catholic and whether as an anchor throughout its time within the Ottoman Empire or during the Yugoslavian communist years, Catholicism has been intertwined with Croatian identity. Glenny (1999) highlights the cloistered acting as fiscal and political negotiators with the Ottoman Turks. Lampe (2006) discusses the lack of unity between competing Catholic groups: the Croatian Peasant Party, the Eagles gymnastic society, and the Crusaders through the 1920s and 1930s that referred to Yugoslavia as only the "state" rather than to construe a national identity separate from a religious or parochial one. The Office of International Religious Freedom (2019) reported that Croatia budgeted approximately \$46 million for Catholic churches, including ordained and laity salaries, compared to \$3.4 million for all other religious groups.

Croatian Economic Development (ECON)

Croatia easily has the second largest economy of the former Yugoslavia, but as noted above, does sit quite a way off from "competing" with Slovenia. At \$13,828 per year, Croatia's economy is the third poorest in the EU, only in front of Romania and Bulgaria. Croatia's ECON graph mirrors that of its Yugoslav neighbors, just with higher peaks and valleys against all but Slovenia. Figure #9 demonstrates this.




Figure 9. Western Balkan GDP per capita, World Bank

Nguyen (2020) notes that its Gini index is middle-of-the-road for income inequality distribution in the EU, but points to the global recession of 2007-2008 crippling economic productivity. Duckworth (2017) suggests geographic disparities, fallout from the wars in the 1990s, and transitioning to a market economy as the main reasons for Croatia’s uneven economic progress.

During the 1990s, Croatia initially struggled with transitioning economic models, but leveled out by decade’s end. Stojcic (2012) contends that Croatia had initial advantages based on trade relationships structured with Western and Eastern partners, institutional organization as a “socialist self-management” economy, and productivity that centered on manufacturing and services (combined 87% of output). Stojcic biggest complaint during the 1990s is that economically transitioning during a war *and* postwar is extremely difficult. Kecmanovic (2012) walks through the effects of war on men born in 1971 and finds that while educational attainment suffered (the men

were fighting/dying), employment and earnings opportunities increased afterwards. Skreb (1998) points out that inflation went north of 1000% in 1993, but improved monetary policy got things under control by the end of the decade.

Removing the shackles of the 1990s has led to Croatia's trade and economic growth steadily growing, even if economic development has been in fits and starts through the first two decades of the 21st century. Campanelli (2021) notes that Croatia had budget surpluses before the 2008 global recession, and today is rebounding from two earthquakes that compounded the COVID implications in 2020. Jovancevic (2007) shows that FDI inflows have increased and been contributory to higher levels of production. Approximately 30% of Croatia's exports are to its Western Balkan neighbors (including Slovenia), with only 16% of its imports coming from those same places (Simoes and Hidalgo 2011), though Campanelli (2021) argues that exports are growing too slowly. Tourism, as with Slovenia, is one of the fastest growing sectors, which helps the overall economy (Ivandic and Sutalo 2018). Partially this is due to EU membership and the core freedoms of "stay, work, and movement" therein (Vlahov 2014), though Mihaljevic (2013) worries that Croatia will remain on the EU periphery and be considered the "European Florida" (73).

Croatian Human Rights Protection (HURI)

Croatia's Human Rights scores are high. Figure #10 shows their trend, and with 7.0 as the global average and 8.0 as the Eastern European average, also demonstrates that Croatia is well above both marks over the past decade+. Generally, the trend has been

annual higher scores, with only 2016 and 2019 moving lower than the previous year.

While the HURI scores are high overall, persistent human rights realities exist in-country.




Figure 10. Cato Institute's Human Freedom Index

Croatian human rights issues fall into two categories: reckoning with war crimes and everything else. Vajda (2019) catalogs 600 convictions for the 3,500 cases of Croatian war convictions between 1995-2018. Yet, Josipovic (2006) notes the backlog of cases and the lack of the Croatian judiciary proactively working through the proceedings. Banjeglav (2013) suggests Croatian civil society has not reconciled their compatriot's wartime actions, nor have erected monuments to fairly reflect public memory. The UN (2021), as recently as this past December, strongly recommended Croatia stepping up its commitment to transitional justice, noting "progress appears to have stalled in the last seven years".

Elsewhere, media freedoms, immigration, and conservative policies regarding abortion access highlight Croatian human rights. At the broadest level, journalists and activists face public extolling at the least, and criminal charges at the worst, for

investigating and reporting human rights abuses and corruption. Amnesty International (2020) and Vladislavljevic (2020) point to hundreds of annual lawsuits *against* journalists aimed at censorship and intimidation. Second, Child (2021) documents violent, illegal pushbacks of immigrants trying to get into the country. Amnesty International (2020) put the number at more than 15,000 pushbacks. Third, at the individual level, Bogdanic and Batisweiler (2020) detail that 59% of Croatian doctors refuse abortion procedures, allowable in a 2003 amendment to the original 1978 legislation. However, since 2000 misogynistic-viewed criminal and accessibility issues such as child trafficking, sexual assault, harassment, and domestic violence prosecutions, and appropriate healthcare options (The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy 2001) have notably been improved over two decades (Vladislavljevic 2019) (OECD Development Centre 2019).

Croatian Democratization (DEMO)

Croatia has the highest DEMO score from the V-Dem metric of any country in the Western Balkans. Its score is 0.05 points higher than Slovenia, moving past them in 2020. There has not been a continuous upward trend. Figure #11 plots the trajectory.




Figure 11. Croatia DEMO, V-Dem

Croatia’s score steadily increased from 2009-2012 in preparation and/or anticipation of EU membership. Thereafter, their DEMO score dropped from 0.858 in 2011 to 0.753 today in 2020.

While the score does not move noticeably from 2000-2009, the literature points to a few factors supporting Croatian democratization. Grittersova (2012) suggests that international actors, the EU and other countries, constrained choices for authoritarian elites and politicians that moderated political electoral choices, which helped “decentralize power and introduced a parliamentary system” (Zakosek 2008, 606). Though Garding (2018) does not extend such “outside” help to the Croatian diaspora, blaming party and institutional infighting in-country for underwhelming returns and remittances. On decentralization, Antic (2002) writes how fiscal decentralization, incorporating trainings for municipal level employees, and civil society partnerships with private and nongovernmental organizations (NGO), smooths transitions of power.

Borzal and Grimm (2018) emphasize that Croatia is the “only post conflict country in the world that has become a liberal, constitutional democracy” (121). Further, the uptick in the DEMO score from 2009-2012 is substantiated. For example, resolution between Slovenia and Croatia regarding the Bay of Piran and the Ljubljanska Banka brought Slovenia to the table affirming Croatia’s accession aspirations. Additionally, Croatia finally cooperated with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Freedom House 2013) (Freedom House 2014).

However, DEMO declining after 2012 speaks to a lack of democratic consolidation in Croatia. Maldini (2015) argues that meeting the requirements for EU accession was window dressing and is an example of an “asymmetric relationship (or cleavage) between the formal and substantive democracy” (28). Public sector corruption and an underdeveloped independent judiciary hampered full trust in governmental institutions (Freedom House 2017). Grob and Grimm (2014) contend that responding to the external demands of reform, and their uniform characteristics, limited the “emancipation of domestic actors” (930), where, when cojoined to the literature above, neuters the accountability and ownership necessary for political change. All these points noted, the problems undergirding Croatian democratization does not preclude the presence of democracy, but rather requires separating the “presence of” with the substantiation or consolidation of institutional structures and social capital/trust for which to aspire.

Croatian Domestic Sentiments (DMST)

Croatian domestic sentiments are compiled from one wave of the World Values Survey and through seven different questions on the Balkan Barometer public and business survey sponsored by the European Union. The WVS question is from 1996, a handful of years from Croatian independence, and sets an expectation moving into the 21st century that Croats were pessimistic about the European Union. A collective 42.6% of adults surveyed stated they had “not very much” confidence in the EU, while 18.3% said they had “none at all”.

The prospect of EU membership does not get much better with the Balkan Barometer (BB) questionnaire. BB only polls Croatia from 2015-2017. Of those questioned, there is no trend away from pessimism or apathy in comparison to the WVS survey. On the question of if EU membership is a good or bad thing, Croatian sentiment sat at 33% (2016) and 32% (2017) in the affirmative. Most respondents said it was neither good or bad: 48% in 2016 and 50% in 2017. Yet, when asked what EU membership would mean to them, Croats were singularly individualistic in their answers. They overwhelmingly listed freedom to travel, study, and/or work in the EU as the biggest incentive for joining the EU. No other answer in relation to security, economic, or political development reached 20%. Apparently, joining the EU is good for individuals, but not for the country.

Croatian businesses saw it a different way. BB asks whether EU membership would be good or bad for “your company.” In the three years (2015-2017) of Croatian responses, 59+% of companies said it would be a positive, while <7% said it would be a negative move. Additionally, 85% of the companies believed they could absolutely

compete against other EU member-state countries. These responses suggest that the barriers to trade and the opening of markets were tailwinds for Croatian businesses. In sum, between the two responses, the rational, economic opportunities available for Croats to work, travel, sell, learn, and market themselves and their products were the biggest drivers of public sentiments. Membership in the EU institutionally was not a factor, was not believed to be important nor consequential for the nation-state, but rather individuals and collective actors (businesses) could benefit from having regulations lifted to move about and interact/transact on the continent.

Croatian European Constraints (EUCN)

Piecing together how the Alter, the EU, prescribed a role to Croatia is based on EU Commission speeches, but also the Croatian experience of accession. EUCN text mentioned Croatia by name seven times, and “2013” stood in for Croatia and that precise moment three times, indicating a pre/post temporal association with necessary presumptions of the EU moving forward. In the specific instances four of seven mentions had to be thrown out. Two were repetitious, as it was found that two different dated EU speeches, given by different people, with different audiences, had identical speech texts in many, but not all, instances. Two uses of Croatia were declarative: “Croatia is already a member” and “following the accession of Croatia.” The remaining mentions were condescending, direct, and supportive. The first was a supposition that the Croatian foreign minister in 2008 agreed that a simple process was a better process. It reads a little condescending, considering only Croatia was well within the candidacy pipeline. Next, Rehn (2008) states the obvious, noting that “2008 can be a decisive year

for Croatia's accession negotiations," but then becomes more direct in his word choice, "if the country makes substantial progress in meeting the benchmarks".

It is mentioned in the preceding paragraph that the Croatian experience affected the EU's role expectations, and this is due to two reasons. First, and primarily, the literature casts the Tudjman regime in the 1990s as authoritarian, which delayed the political transitions to a pluralist, democratically open country. Jovic (2006) writes on how the "narrative" of past leadership had to change, and corresponding overt discrimination against minorities and apprehension to international institutions were to be improved.

Second, Sabic (2019) details specifically the issue of judicial reform, especially around participation in the ICTY and "turning in" their own war criminals. On the one hand, it can be understood that changing a single person's frame of reference, let alone an entire cultural worldview in less than twenty years might be considered, nay impossible, but certainly difficult. On the other hand, there were known reforms necessary for EU accession and any delays, speak more to the former than the later. Therefore, the EU's role expectations for Croatia appear cut-and-dry such that the EU Commission speech reads matter of fact: reform here, change there. It also reads as annoyed that evolutions of external sentiments and policy, and indicting people who 15 years ago were considered national heroes, was more difficult than originally conceived.

Croatian Presidents 2000-2021

Croatia has had four presidents since 2000. They are: Stjepan Mesic (2000-2009), Ivo Josipovic (2010-2014), Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic (2015-2019), and Zoran Milanovic

(2020-Present). Mesic was a member of the HNS – Croatian People’s Party, which is a center/center-left liberal democratic party. Josipovic and Milanovic are members of the SDP – Social Democrat Party. SDP is center left and one of the two largest political parties in the country. HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union, a conservative party, was represented in the presidency by Grabar-Kitarovic and currently has the most seats (61) of the Croatian Sabor, its unicameral legislature. All four Croatian presidents are ethnically Croatian, were born there, and educated in Zagreb. Mesic and Josipovic have legal backgrounds, though Josipovic also was a teacher and musician, while Grabar-Kitarovic and Milanovic were bureaucrats before becoming president. Presidents are elected directly and serve five-year terms.

The literature suggests that Croatian presidents are enabled by presidentialization of centralizing political party forces even if constitutionally, Croatia is structured more as a parliamentary system. Lamont (2008) contends that elites pivoted their emphasis after Franjo Tudjman died to “capture” a prominent role in political parties. Sekulic and Sporer (2002) highlight that elite minority voices vanish after 2000 and that business elites’ role increase. Cakar (2019) argues that organizational structure, decision-making, and leadership formation has been historically cohesive. He continues that though the Croatian system is deemed semi-presidential, the electoral campaigns, autonomous candidates, and “monarchial prime minister” position the president as formative in military and foreign policy.

Croatian Presidential Speech (PRSI)

In the 91 pages of Croatian presidential speech text there were 1,591 instances of identity words coded and 263 economic rational words found. There were sixteen coded words in each of the two categories. Eight of the sixteen words did not appear all: “villain,” “scared,” “smart,” and “foolish” for identity and “neoliberal,” “evolving,” “modernity,” and “globalization” for rationality. Aggregated, coded identity words represented 3.6% of all Croatian presidential speech text. Economic rational words were found 0.6% of the time. Longitudinally, seven of twelve identity words met the 1% average threshold and five of twelve rational words got to 1% per annum. The following chart shows the distribution of the top identity words.




Figure 12. *Croatian Identity Words 2000-2021*

This chart shows an emphasis on the Croatian nation. The four pronouns are pronounced and lead almost every year. It is interesting that during the Josipovic and Grabar-Kitrakovic presidencies (2010-2019) the overall frequency of any identity word falls from over 35% usage to under 20%, and even more so, the “their, them, and European” focus becomes barely noticeable. But, across the timeline, “nation” is usually the third most used word of the seven, hits the top spot in 2011 two years before EU membership, and averaged out to being used 11.7% of the time. In 2011, for instance, Josipovic calls for “reconciliation, restoration of national unity, and peaceful transitions,” and later states that there must be “work at the national level” (Josipovic 2013).

In comparison, Croatian rational words are not spoken as often.




Figure 13. Croatian Rational Words 2000-2021

“Economic” and “Development” lead the way and both measure at 3.3% frequency. “Economic” was used early on, but noticeably drops off after 2002; meanwhile, “development” becomes more common parlance thereafter. One explanation is that traces of the economic transition conversation, post-independence, are prevalent 2000-2002, and then figuratively transition to holistic “development” in correlation with EU accession negotiations and EU member status. “Success,” “Institution,” and “Progress” mirror each other and range from 1.2-1.8%, with the only spike in 2013 for “success,” which could be tied to the year of EU membership.

Moving to discourse analysis, Croatian speech text is primarily declarative. A collective 94% of Croatian speech is declarative for both identity and rational speech. Declarative sentences are found in 96.5% of identity speech. The other identity speech was exclamatory. There was neither interrogative nor imperative speech in the identity text. Rational speech was 89.4% declarative. The other type of rational speech was imperative, such as when Josipovic (2010) tells Serbia that refugee issues “have to be resolved step by step by proceeding from the most pressing cases,” or Milanovic (2021) imploring Bosnia that “constituent peoples ... choose their representatives at all the appropriate political levels.” The fact that a vast majority of speech is declarative raises interesting questions, and might suggest that 1) Croatian speech is matter of fact when talking about regional politics and relations with other countries (which also might be reflected in how the EU speaks *to* Croatia), 2) there are cultural constraints on asking too much (imperative), questioning, or emotionally speaking in public, official settings, and/or 3) past experiences construct a frame of reference that does not employ imposition or rhetorical flourishes and is more resigned and direct.

Temporally, Croatian speech is in the present, and thematically it focuses on cooperation and hope. Overall, 8% of the speech toward its WB neighbors concentrated on the past, and the vast majority, 79%, was in the present moment. Again, as conjectured above, Croatian diction and delivery might be straightforward and prescient by nature. It just may be part of the linguistic culture. Of the thematic tones of the speech – the message relayed – 48% of speech centered on cooperation and 33% centered on hope. 10% of the speech was pessimistic, and compliments/criticism both registered at 4%. Bosnia faced the most criticism of Croatian speech, universally in the identity coded words. Serbia had the most even distribution of tonal themes across the three dichotomies, and Croatian identity speech focused half of the time on the past with Serbia as it did in the present. It is noteworthy that Bosnia and Serbia alike featured rational speech totals of 0% looking at the past; Croatian presidents focused pragmatically on the here-and-now and moving forward.

Finally, in comparison to Slovenia, and mitigating the differences in volume of text, Croatia and Slovenia both show a 0.1% rate of speech about their neighbors, either by specific name or by using the term “Balkan”. Unpacking the 0.1% bears mentioning. Slovenia had 201 coded results of the word “Balkan,” versus only six “Balkan” references by Croatia. The ratio of words contributing to the numerator is heavily biased toward the Slovenian use of the word “Balkan”. In contrast, Croatia speaks much more often about its neighbors. Slovenia generalizes the region. This suggests the interlaced role that Croatia had, has, and/or sees of itself within the WB. To fairly and objectively highlight the weight of word choice, the majority of Croatian speech referenced Bosnia

and Serbia. In the speech text collected Slovenia was mentioned three times, North Macedonia and Montenegro twice, and Kosovo received a single reference.

Concluding Remarks on Slovenia and Croatia

Slovenia and Croatia stand well above, beyond mere membership in the European Union, their Western Balkan neighbors. Members they are, and that can influence and provide opportunities for additional levels of interactions, sharing knowledge, and investment and business opportunities. Regardless, both countries were in a stronger place economically in 2000, have stronger economies today, and have the institutional infrastructure to cohesively move their societies forward. Part of this “institutional infrastructure” is due to homogeneous demographic make-up. The inter-ethnic contestations that will be on display in the successive five countries inhibits many avenues of reform. However, in both countries a homogenous political outlook also has enabled both governments to curb dissenters, the media, and nontraditional or minority perspectives. Further democratic consolidation is still necessary and remains on the horizon.

From the European Union’s perspective, its Alter’s prescription aligns with the sequential accession of both nation-states. Slovenia becoming a member in 2007 allowed for the EU Commission speech to easily be read as both expectant and complimentary of Slovenia’s progress, leadership, and proactiveness in relation to other Western Balkan countries. Slovenia’s presidential speech also illustrates more of a concern, post-accession, for its Yugoslav neighbors. EU speech toward Croatia is more direct and more formulaic. It asks for tasks to be completed, and it emphasizes a pivot in how Croatia

should, and needs to be, seen from the 1990s into the 21st Century. The EU speech is matter of fact, and therefore until Croatia's 2013 accession has a managerial tone toward Croatia. Yet, for both Slovenia and Croatia, there is a clear overture to them being European or having a European "perspective," which also sublimes the expectations.

Finally, presidential speech often reflects expectations, and is certainly identity oriented. First, Slovenian speech has a noticeable redirect in language that moves *at* or *toward* Balkan countries, structured to ask and implore reforms to transition away from conflictual and stagnant development. This aligns with how the EU talked to/about Slovenia. In Croatian presidential speech, the language was matter of fact and overwhelmingly in the moment (present) and declarative. Again, this aligns with how the EU was also dry and systematic in its references to Croatia. It would have been nice to have more Croatian speech transcripts, as there is a nine-fold difference in quantity of primary data (Slovenia 850 pages vs. Croatia 91 pages). Second, from a comparison of identity language versus rational, economic language, Slovenia uses 3x more identity code words than rational ones and Croatia uses 5x more. Pronouns of "us," "our," predominate. Inclusion of "nation" often in Croatian presidential speech supports identity-orientation and emphasis. Having presented a case study of the current EU member-states, the research now turns to its second case – the candidate countries of Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.

CHAPTER 5 – EU CANDIDATE STATES: MONTENEGRO, NORTH MACEDONIA, AND SERBIA

Introduction

This case study is a presentation and analysis of the three Western Balkan (WB) countries that are candidates for EU accession: Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. Beginning alphabetically, Montenegro has been a candidate since December 2010 and by December 2013, 34 of 35 acquis chapters had been opened, with only three “closed” and satisfied. The Republic of North Macedonia has been an EU candidate since December 2005, but accession negotiations on *any* chapter have been consistently delayed and are not open currently. This is due to disputes between Greece, Bulgaria, and North Macedonia, not including internal issues over “identity, language, and history” (De Munter 2021). Serbia became a candidate in March 2012 and have 18 of 35 acquis chapters open, with two “closed”. “Since December 2019, no new chapters have been opened” (ibid).

Each country profile within the case study has congruent organization. There is a short introduction on the country followed by overviews of the non-speech variables: economic development (ECON), human rights protection (HURI), democratization (DEMO), and domestic sentiments (DMST). EU speech constraints (EUCN) are laid out thereafter to find the Alter’s prescriptions of said country. Next, there is a discussion on the presidents of the country, some biographical overview and the presidentialisation of the relatively new, independent state. Finally, presidential speech (PRSP) is presented and interpreted via content and discourse analysis.

Montenegro

Montenegro is the second smallest former Yugoslav country by area, and the least dense nation-state, with approximately 620,000 citizens. It is more pluralistic than either Slovenia or Croatia; but, more poignantly, Montenegro and Serbia's ties historically, culturally, and politically, create complexities in a globally recognized, European, and multicultural future. Montenegro's population is 45% Montenegrin, 29% Serbian, and 5% Albanian ethnically. The official language, Montenegrin, is spoken less (37%) than Serbian (43%). With respect to religion, 72% of the country is Orthodox Christian and 16% is Muslim (Eurydice 2021). Geographic and cultural separation from Belgrade by Kosovar and Albanian peoples, both of which steadily adopted or converted to Islam under Ottoman rule, removed tangible, logistical connections between Serbs and Montenegrins. Yet, their underlying "commonalities" made "most Serbs see Montenegrins as 'Mountain Serbs,' and many – but certainly not all – Montenegrins see themselves as Serb in origin (Allcock, Poulsen, and Lampe 2021). Polackova and Van Duin (2013) suggest that the portrayal of a distinct Montenegrin image of bravery and stubbornness is intertwined with its history with Serbia and the romantic nationalism other European countries started heaping upon it during the peasant uprising of the early 1800s.

Politically, after multiple Yugoslavian republics started to declare independence and fighting broke out in 1991, Montenegro stayed joined with Serbia as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until 2003, at which point the two countries changed their name to State Union of Serbia and Montenegro per the opinion of the Badinter Commission and continued under that title from 2003-2006 (Pellet 1992). Independence followed in 2006

after a narrow 55.5% independence vote. It was a mere 2,300 actual ballots that surpassed the 55% threshold established by the European Union (Kajosevic 2021). However, in the past 15 years, that narrow margin of citizens wanting independence has morphed into a polarized country. The centrality of two political parties and basically two presidential leaders, castigate the “opponent” or “other” and use political, economic, and cultural cleavages as opportunities to exploit and demonize. Thus, the country profile proceeds acknowledging the unique struggle Montenegro has when determining its unique character while honoring its historical commonalities.

Montenegrin Economic Development (ECON)

Montenegro has the third most productive economy in the Western Balkans. The World Bank disaggregates the 2000-2006 period when Montenegro and Serbia were politically joined. Both countries mirror each other’s economic output until 2014/2015 when Montenegro grew faster, separating itself by approximately \$1,200 until 2020 when their economy dipped and ended a mere \$20 per capita more than Serbia. Montenegro’s productivity lags second place Croatia, however, by approximately \$6,000 annually since 2003.

As with the other Western Balkan countries, Montenegro met the difficult, common theme of a transitioning economy after 1991. Even before Yugoslavia disintegrated, Rajovic and Bulatovic (2013) note the geographic impediments of that made labor immobile and created a substantial informal economy in Montenegro. A more current analysis of the same effect, termed the “undeclared economy” in this paper, is found in Baric and Williams (2012). Hollinshead (2006) worries that ethnocentrism

hinders structural adjustments, with Radovic, Zugic, and Milovic (2013) highlighting a lack of institutional and judicial frameworks hurting competitiveness. Post-Covid, Hadzic and Clare (2021) tout Montenegro’s economic rebound but also caution about a growing unemployment rate. Figure #14 shows the Montenegrin 21st century ECON trend.




Figure 14. Montenegro GDP per capita, World Bank

Additionally, Montenegro’s economy is interesting for its external relations and forward-thinking policies. First, the country attracts considerable outside attention. From independence (2006) forward the Montenegrin government claims it has the highest level of foreign direct investment (FDI) per capita in the region (Chamber of Economy of Montenegro 2019). Mirkovic (2019) notes the large gross and net FDI inflow and points out that Montenegrin FDI to GDP ratio averaged 14% over the past 10 years, with the largest investments coming from Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and China. Generally, FDI correlates to the potential of a growing economy as investors assess a return on their investment. For context, the 2019 global FDI/GDP ratio was 1.65%, 0.75% in the EU, and 1.85% in upper middle-income countries (the World Bank

classification for Montenegro). Montenegro’s 2019 FDI/GDP was 7.53%. Those same groupings’ ratio over the past decade (2009-2019) show FDI/GDP averages of 8.6% (global), 3.5% (EU), and 2.5% (upper-middle income countries) (The World Bank 2021). Finally, in comparison to other regional countries, Figure #15 shows the regional 2009-2019 averages.




Figure 15. World Bank: FDI/GDP Ratio 2009-2019

Therefore, Montenegro’s average of 14% speaks to a substantial level of expectations and/or appreciable forecasting by global capital, which may or may not be accompanied by externalities.

Second, China is Montenegro’s largest non-Europe trade partner. In 2019 (Do not start any sentence with numerals.) exports to China represented a 10.6% share (Simoes

and Hidalgo 2011) of Montenegrin trade. It also puts Montenegro as the most Chinese focused exporter in the Western Balkans (Zweers, et al. 2020). Some of this stems from Montenegro's early adoption of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Tourism is important for the small Balkan country. It accounts for 20% of the economy and attracted two million visitors in 2018, almost three times its population overall, (Glusac 2018). A national highway project partially financed by China would connect the coast to Montenegro's mountainous villas and ski resorts, and then farther on to the Serbian border. It was initially seen as a compliment for economic development and integral to making the entire state an "easier" destination for tourists to navigate. Higgins (2021) reports, however, that the project is two years past the completion date, has bloated costs to the tune of \$1 billion, and worse, the section China built is the middle, albeit a more difficult engineering feat, but remains stranded in forests with no connecting parts. So, while the ambition was there, the heavy financial strain and the worry of Chinese influence pitted against Russian linkages and "schizophrenic" EU and US commitments (Brennan 2021) puts the partnership between Montenegro and China on tenuous, if not tempting, grounds.

Third, Montenegro's economy is forward-thinking on environmental initiatives. Slovenia and Bosnia have coastlines on the Adriatic Sea; however, Croatia and Montenegro are the two Western Balkan countries positioned to take advantage of maritime industries, marine biodiversity, and aquaculture. In Montenegro's case, there has been conscious policies directed at those objectives. Concurrently, Callaway, Kascelan, and Markovic (2010) detail the Montenegrin government's recognition of projected costs and effects of climate change, whose genesis and focus stem from the

“Declaration on Montenegro as an Ecological State” in 1991 with constitutional provisions that announce Montenegro as a “democratic, social, and *ecological state*” in its 1992 Constitution, or reworded as a “civil, democratic, *ecological state*” in its 2007 Constitution (Ministry of Tourism and Environmental Protection 2007). Nikcevic (2018) details the international conventions and legal protections Montenegro has agreed to that protects maritime ecosystems, monitors shipping in the Adriatic, and begets stewardship of its coastlines.

Montenegrin Human Rights Protection (HURI)

Montenegro’s Human Freedom Index score puts it third among the seven Western Balkan countries. Figure #16, however, shows that its “peak” was reached in 2010, fell to a low in 2017, before rebounding slightly to its level today. The Eastern European average is 8.0, and thus Montenegro does not currently meet that bar.




Figure 16. Cato Institute

One area where Montenegro made international legal “news” was in the *Bijelic v. Montenegro and Serbia* (2009) decision by the European Court of Human Rights that

found violations occurring *before* secession could be transferred to a new state (Brockman-Hawe 2010). That precedent notwithstanding, Montenegrin human rights revolves around a lack of civil liberties and judicial negligence.

The literature highlights a lack of civil liberties or follow-through by the government to intercede on accusations/allegations. Amnesty International (2020) notes “impunity for war crimes” that “were neither investigated nor prosecuted,” dating back to the mid-to-late 1990s. To this end, and confusingly just starting in 2021, the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe started a three-year trial monitoring project in Montenegro to oversee the efficacy of the judicial system. Kajosevic (2022) points to an increase in Montenegrin citizen petitions to the European Court of Human Rights as indicative of lost confidence in the system. These feelings stem from an increase in attacks on the media, as, for instance, occurred in the detention of journalist Jovo Martinovic (Abrahams 2016) or its failure toward the “Responsibility to Protect” that the government claims under the watchful eye of the UN Mission in Podgorica, but which has consistently been undermined by the lack of judicial efficacy on the ground (Lakatos 2017) (Sinanovic 2020) (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2021).

Montenegrin Democratization (DEMO)

The DEMO score for Montenegro is the first time in this portrait where the country does not rank third in the region. According to V-Dem, Montenegro is sixth in the Western Balkans, above only Serbia for its democratization score. Transitioning to a Montenegrin democratic society in the past 21 years has two distinct timeframes: pre-

independence and post 2006 independence. This is not reflected in Figure #17 below, which shows basically a straight line of middling efforts. However, the lack of reforms when isolated in union with Serbia and then any moves, or lack thereof, from independence differentiates the timeframe.




Figure 17. Western Balkan DEMO, V-Dem

From 2000-2006 Montenegro had to determine its relationship in union with Serbia, while simultaneously creating institutions that were politically effective and trustworthy for Montenegrins. However, Mochtak (2015) traces how electoral violence in 1997 socialized Montenegrin voters and political elites, thereafter, utilizing nationalist rhetoric (Bunce 2005), and exacerbating the disenfranchisement of political, and ethnic, minorities. Lukic (2005) notes that Montenegrin President Dukanovic, centralizing his political power and “brand” as an opponent of Serbian President Milosevic, failed to acknowledge the legitimacy of the joint parliament leading into 2000. Thus, Montenegro

wrestled with how to assert its “sovereignty” in a federal structure with Serbia while also kowtowing to growing domestic sentiments for its own independence, mad that the 2002 Belgrade Agreement was forced upon them. Vukovic (2011) contends that these precious six years were spent in isolation from EU or international expectations, and necessitated Montenegro “democratizing before Europeanizing”. Fawn (2008) affirms the use of referendums for independence movements, noting the positive results, if not necessarily unanimity in process, that Montenegro achieved in 2006.

Since 2006, state institutional capacities, civil society protections, and political party plurality have lagged. Dzankic (2014) disagrees with the authors in the previous paragraph and credits the EU with state building and instigating cohesive political representativeness. However, to start, Freedom House (2013) points out that it took until September 2011 for a new election law to get approved shoring up voting procedures and increasing minority representation. Vukovic (2011) calls this “personalized” party power via a charismatic leader versus “institutionalized” organization around party structure. It is one reason why, as noted in the Montenegrin presidents’ subsection below, Montenegro has only had two presidents in twenty-one years. Second, as noted above in the human rights subsection, there increasingly has been a lack of faith in the enforcement of basic rights and liberties for Montenegrins. Drakic and Kajganovic (2012) point to declining trust in state institutions, rising trust in nongovernmental organizations, and yet the exclusion of NGOs at EU accession talks creating a counterintuitive approach for such a sparsely populated country, where social trust is at a premium. Third, Vukovic (2013) blames the primacy of an, essentially, one-party rule by the Democratic Party of Socialist (DPS). It has cornered political authority and

legitimacy such that it took until 2020 before the opposition party won the majority of seats in the legislature (Bieber and Marovic 2020).

Montenegrin Domestic Sentiments (DMST)

Montenegro was surveyed twice by the World Values Survey, in 1998 and 2001. It bears stating that while Montenegro and Serbia were a part of the same nation-state during these years, each have separate responses in the WVS, which suggests that the surveyors did their due diligence and were “on-the-ground” in each geography. In 1998, 34.6% of respondents had positive confidence in the EU, 51.6% had negative confidence, while 13.8% answered “did not know.” One interesting aspect of the 1998 survey is that women were more unfavorable to the EU than men. Women responded as confident in the EU at a 26.4% rate and not confident at 59.2%. Men were split at 43.5% confident to 43.4% not confident. Fast forward to 2001 and the overall numbers were more evenly distributed: 46.9% confident and 44.4% not confident with the EU. This occurred primarily with women’s responses jumping from 26.4% favorable in 1998 to a “confidence” response of 43.4% in 2001.

Moving to the Balkan Barometer results from 2015-2021 paints a modern picture. First, Montenegrins are resolutely on the fence about EU membership. During the six years of BB surveys, answering that EU membership would be a “good thing” never got above 33%. However, that it would be a “bad thing” never fell below 9%, with the highest negative responses in 2017 at 22%. Although roughly 10% responded that they “didn’t know,” that still means that 1/3 of Montenegrins are unsure whether EU membership is good or bad. They have not been persuaded by either the EU or their

domestic political and civil society leaders where the accession process will lead. Second, Montenegrin views of when they would reach the “finish line” was always optimistic. Over 50% of people responded that Montenegro would be a member-state by 2020 or 2025. Last year, however, only 27% thought 2025 was realistic and every year an average of 16.7% did not think EU membership would ever happen. Third, on the question of what EU would mean to “you personally,” Montenegrins have a holistic view of the benefits. “Economic Prosperity” and “Peace and Stability” as answers are routinely the leading two responses. This is above the individual freedom responses of travel, study, and work that Croatians scored so high on. Uncertainty and a lack of responses for this particular question hover around 15%, below the rate responded for previous questions.

The Montenegro business community is eager for EU membership. Since 2015, 47% or more responded that it would be good for business. After a low of 47% in 2016, the favorability has been 60+%. An average of 3.6% responded that it would be a negative. So, there is still approximately 25-30% of Montenegrin businesses that are unsure of any economic benefits. When asked if they, private businesses, could compete in the EU, they overwhelmingly thought so. Between 2015-2021 an average of 71.4% of companies surveyed said they absolutely could compete, with 18.7% pessimistic about their chances.

Montenegrin European Constraints (EUCN)

The EU Commission speech texts mention Montenegro 15 times, but only once after 2015. Each instance reads the same, a structure the sales profession calls a

“hamburger,” first the top “bun” of a compliment, then the “meat” of an ask or critique, and then the bottom “bun” or another compliment or reassurance. Rehn (2008), Hahn (2014), and Hahn (2015) start by complimenting Montenegro on its “track record” or “progress” thus far. They then turn to the critique or the “ask” for continued reform. Rehn (2008) says “pursue reforms with determination.” Hahn (2014) details economic structural reforms “that need to be addressed,” or that Montenegro “must behave as a candidate for EU accession at all levels.” Hahn (2015) continues that “the track record on corruption and organized crime remains limited.” Finally, the Montenegrin reassurance: “the Commission will always be by your side” (Hahn 2014) and “The support of the Committee and your continued bilateral contacts with enlargement countries will be crucial” (Hahn 2015).

The speech indicates an institution (the EU) with expectations of reform that will be watching for progress. The role prescription is that of baby steps toward the finish line. It is not overtly critical or complimentary. It simply points to a “good job thus far” but “more needs to be done” mentality. It is a prescribed role of a candidate, which Montenegro has technically been since 2010, that needs to “behave” as such. Eight years ago, Hahn (2014) pointed out that “Montenegro is currently in the lead of the accession process ... With this, comes additional responsibility. Montenegro will be more closely scrutinized than in the past.” Hahn compliments Montenegro that they are “in the lead,” but pivots to what that “lead” entails, which is greater responsibility, being noticed and watched more intently. Again, the prescription is nothing more than that of being a candidate. Baby steps moving forward. It is a prescription of guidance, watchfulness, and eventual Montenegrin ownership of success, delay, and/or failure.

Montenegrin Presidents 2000-2021

Montenegro has had only two presidents since 2000. Milo Dukanovic served as president from 1998-2002, was reelected in 2018, and currently serves in the role. In 2002 Montenegro had two acting presidents for three days (Drgan Kujovic and Rifat Rastoder) sandwiched between Filip Vujanovic “holding” the office while three successive elections occurred until voter turnout rose above 50 percent. Thus, Filip Vujanovic basically served from 2003-2018. The Montenegrin constitution only allows for two consecutive terms, but Vujanovic and his DPS – Democratic Party of Socialists – backers argued and forced through the contention that because Montenegro did not separate from Serbia until 2006, 2008-2013 was Vujanovic’s “first” term (Milosevic 2013). Vujanovic is ethnically Serbian, was born in Belgrade, and graduated from the University of Belgrade. He practiced law before entering politics. Current president Dukanovic is Montenegrin and attended the University of Montenegro in the capital city of Podgorica. He is a lifelong political operative and politician. Both men are also members of the DPS party, which is more of an umbrella party, since it has been the primary power broker in Montenegro since 1945 and only became the minority party in Montenegro’s parliament in 2020 (Bieber and Marovic 2020).

Montenegro is considered a semi-presidential system, but, in reality, a lot of power is tied to Dukanovic, Vujanovic, and the Democratic Party of Socialists. The president, the executive, represents Montenegro internationally, oversees the military, and has some legislative discretion. The president can veto a bill but must sign it if it passes through the legislature twice. If he refuses to, ≥ 26 members of parliament can

appeal to the Constitutional Court (Kajosevic 2021). Practically, Vujovic and Tomovic (2019) highlight that since Dukanovic and Vujanovic simultaneously hold presidential or vice-presidential position *in their DPS political party*, any weak executive constitutional power gets subsumed by the explicit and implicit power these men hold in government and party structure. This is certainly a perversion of the notion that parties are to regulate themselves from being overrun by authoritarian candidates (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2019). It is also why Tonino Picula, European rapporteur (evaluator) for Montenegro, said Montenegrin citizens need “uncompromised people” as their executive/president (European Western Balkans 2020).

Montenegrin Presidential Speech (PRSI)

Montenegro presidential speech is coded for identity and rational use. In the 278 pages of text there were 2403 instances of identity words and 1232 economic rational words. Sixteen coded words were used in each category. Five identity codes were not found at all: hero, villain, scared, brave, and foolish. Of the remaining 11 identity codes, seven met the 1% threshold. Identity codes occur in 1.6% of Montenegrin presidential speech. Next, rational words appear in 1% of all text. Three rational codes were absent: neoliberal, evolving, and modernity. Of the remaining 13 rational codes, only six were found above 1% of the time. To start, the following chart highlights the distribution of seven identity words between 2000-2021.




Figure 18. Montenegro Identity Codes 2000-2021

Montenegro identity speech uses “us vs. them” pronouns consistently, which highlights a subject/object positionality toward Europe. 33% of the identity speech includes our, their, us, and them. Its union with Serbia through mid-2006 and then its forward-facing position to EU membership could suggest that it is trying to weigh or counterbalance their identity, sovereignty, and differentiation versus its former Yugoslav counterpart (Serbia). Yet, usage of “Europe” averages 18.1% over 21 years, is over a 25% rate in 5 of 21 years, and only drops to single digit use in two years. This points to active appeals to Europe as both a recognizing entity – we are Serbia and Montenegro, we are Montenegro, we are Montenegro pursuing EU membership – and as a “character” or “essence” that Montenegro is trying to convince itself and others of. This rationale is

supported by the increasing use of “our” as the speech comes to the present. After independence, recognition as sole owners of their path to EU membership creates an ownership and determined nation-state that charts, and is responsible for, its own choices.

Montenegro’s rational words revolve around “economic” and “development,” general terms and umbrella categories for all sorts of things, yet the word choice of “integration” increases after 2007. Figure #19 shows the longitudinal rational codes.




Figure 19. Montenegro Rational Codes 2000-2021

“Economic” appears 11.6% of the time, while “development” shows up in 8.6% of the speech text. As mentioned in the ECON subsection, there are some positive trends economically from a rational GDP perspective, but also from an enticing FDI/GDP

calculation. Therefore, the use of the two broadest concepts relates to their economic development, as seen internally and via opportunistic international capital investors.

More interestingly, “integration” trends after Montenegrin independence. This corresponds somewhat to the comment in the paragraph above. As Montenegro broke free from Yugoslavia literally and figuratively, it had to venture into the global environment alone. It did/does not want to be an autarky, so it must pursue integration economically, diplomatically, with security agreements, and politically with EU and non-EU specific institutions. Thus, seeking “integration” as a rational choice portends to the self-authorship that Montenegro was finally free to do. It also aligns with conditions and contracts through external investor relations dominated by EU, Russian, Chinese, and Gulf State interests.

Turning to discourse analysis, micro level CDA shows that Presidents Dukanovic and Vujanovic are straightforward, declarative, and more assured when discussing identity compared to rational pragmatism. Sixty-four percent of their speech was declarative, stating facts and/or opinions without the need to question or implore the behavior of others. Further, the frequency of declarative sentences increased when raising the issue of identity compared to rational, economic subjects. The only place this was not the case is when talking to/about Serbia, where declarative sentences went down from a 75% rate on economic coded sentences to a rate of 56% for identity sentences. There is some credence to this finding due to Montenegro and Serbia’s historical and cultural commonalities and linkages. It still occurs the majority (56%) of the time, but possibly the assured wherewithal of “we’re Montenegro” and “you’re X” becomes lessened when talking to their former Yugoslav and union partner(s). A final interesting

finding is the repetitiousness of Montenegrin speech. Across the board 27.5% of their speech sentences, regardless of coding, is repeated. This is higher than Slovenia (11.4%) and in line with Croatia (27.2%). It could be contributed to the notion of a “stump speech,” which is a block of text, a motto, or point that most readers would easily register as something they have heard politicians say and repeat. A little more humorously it could also be read as just two guys saying the same stuff a quarter of the time over two decades.

Next, a meso CDA analysis shows Montenegrin presidential speech to be overtly positive and in the present. By far the most talked about country was Serbia, which had 63 mentions total compared to “second place” Croatia with 25 mentions. Table #6 lists each of the other Western Balkan countries and the direction of the message from Montenegro.

	Bosnia	Croatia	Kosovo	N. Maced.	Serbia	Slovenia
Compliment	9.5%	24.5%	13.5%	21.5%	30.5%	50%
Criticism	3%	0%	0%	4.5%	9.5%	0%
Cooperation	25.5%	15.5%	14.5%	13.5%	26.5%	33%
Dissociation	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%
Hope	36.5%	39.5%	20.5%	21.5%	13.5%	11%
Pessimism	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Table 6 *Thematic Tone of Montenegrin Speech*

Every country listed is spoken to in complimentary, cooperative, and hopeful terms. There is not pessimism, nor is there disassociation worth noting. There is a little criticism, primarily toward Serbia, but that text stemmed from Montenegrin contrition regarding war crimes by Serb forces in the 1990s wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Lastly, Slovenia is complimented and “cooperated” the most, while speech toward Croatia is the most hopeful. It is interesting that these two countries are EU

member-states and thus Montenegro might be “hoping” their praise might bandwagon them onto the coattails of “successful” Yugoslavian EU members.

Temporally, Montenegrin speech is focused on the present. Fifty-three percent of speech was oriented to the present, with 13% focused on the future. Speech toward Serbia and Slovenia were present-focused more in rational coded sentences than identity coded ones. For every other country, the identity language was more “present” than the economic language. It is possible that Montenegro’s priority with Serbia is geared toward tangible logistical support and/or separation; and similarly, language toward Slovenia is partnership and complimentary to mimic their quick integration with the EU. For the other countries, however, Montenegro may want its identities to be interlinked as a move toward solidarity regionally and/or historically. Montenegrins’ use of the word “Balkans” doubles the usage by Slovenia and triples the usage, or non-usage, by Croatia. Thus, the small (population) country of Montenegro uses its language to be direct and affirming to its regional neighbors as a pathway to Europe and integration.

North Macedonia

North Macedonia, the fourth largest country in the Western Balkans by size, is landlocked, and has roughly the same density as Slovenia, with approximately 2.1 million people. Ethnically, North Macedonia is 64% Macedonian, 25% Albanian, 3.5% Turkish, and 2.7% Roma. Macedonian and Albanian are official languages. Religiously, 61.6% of Macedonians are Orthodox Christian; 36.6% are Muslim (Eurydice 2020). North Macedonia became an independent nation-state in 1991. Both Greece and Bulgaria, member-states of the EU, have voted against North Macedonian progress in the accession

process. This was partially resolved by the 2018 Prespa Agreement, which formally changed the country's name from Macedonia to North Macedonia.

North Macedonia has a long running cultural feud with Greece and Bulgaria. The conflict with Greece stems from academic and historical debates on who is Macedonian, the Macedonian empires of the Mediterranean constituting different Greek, Bulgarian, and Slavic tribes (amongst others), incorporations *into* "empires" through the Greeks and Romans in antiquity, the Bulgarian Empire in the 10th and 11th Century, and the Ottoman Empire from the 14th century to 1911/1912 when it was divided after the failed Ilinden Uprising of 1903 (Willi 2009 and Nimetz 2020). Marshall (2016) explains how a simple 16-rayed sun design, the Vergina Sun, on Macedonia's 1991 flag, attributed to Alexander the Great and his father, was disputed by Greece until 2006 when Macedonia changed to an eight rayed sun. Agnew (2007) thinks the antagonism and essentialist contests between Greece and North Macedonia arose from the need to put a border on "it" (Greece and the EU) and the "other" (North Macedonian or non-EU). The following map shows the power of borders historically.



Figure 20. Macedonian Border Changes (www.sofiaglobe.com)

These ideas are not new phenomena either as fluid identities, nations, and socialized cultural rigidities create entrenchment oftentimes.

Relations between North Macedonia and Bulgaria are also over history, ethnicity, and language. Bulgaria rejects the idea of a separate Macedonian ethnic group, derived from the Southern Slavs, the uniqueness of their language, and shared national holidays and symbols, such as commemorations of the 1903 Ilinden Uprising (Bechev 2022). People of Bulgar descent, to the Bulgarians who follow this line of reasoning, were “seduced by a Macedonianist propaganda ... fabricated by the Serbs” (Dodovski 2012, 93). They believe a disputed number of ethnic Bulgarians living in North Macedonia are being “subtly erased,” disenfranchised, and that North Macedonian history textbooks are unduly harsh toward any Bulgarian interaction referenced such as Bulgaria’s Nazi-allied occupation of North Macedonia during World War 2 (Georgeoff 1966) (BIRN 2021). It

is against this contentious, dynamic backdrop that North Macedonia's position, prospects, and pronouncements are laid out.

North Macedonian Economic Development (ECON)

North Macedonia's economy is slow moving and having a difficult time finding its footing regarding comparative advantages in trade and implementing economic reforms to bolster entrepreneurship. Dimova (2010), holistic in her analysis, suggests that the transition to a market economy has stratified ethnic groups, blurred differences, and therefore created more socio-economic resentment than cooperation. Nevertheless, North Macedonia's GDP per capita in 2020 was \$5,888, which puts it sixth of seven Western Balkan countries. Its growth rate over two decades is third worst in the region at 11% annually, which in a vacuum is respectable. Yet, their economic growth shows an initial pop, like Montenegro and Serbia, but is incremental thereafter in Figure #21.




Figure 21. North Macedonia ECON, World Bank

One noticeable area North Macedonia struggles in is the quality and competitiveness of its trade. Nenovski, Smilkovski, and Poposki (2011) describe an overreliance on too few sectors that, in turn, Kostoska et al. (2012) argue are of low quality, contradicting the Heckscher-Ohlin theory that a country should trade in the factors where they are most abundant and advantaged. Domadenik, Lizal, and Pahor (2012) lay blame at owners and managers that used the breakup and spin-offs of state enterprises during the market economy transition to put their “profit over people,” hurting sustained, efficient, competitiveness regionally and globally. Sekuloska (2018) demonstrates that foreign direct investment increased North Macedonian automotive export growth. The literature reflects the reality as nearly 33% of all exports are in the automotive and vehicular space: catalytic products, electrical control boards, vehicle parts, buses, and seats (Simoes and Hidalgo 2011). Yet, as Figure #15 in the Montenegro profile shows, North Macedonian FDI/GDP ratio between 2009-2019 sits at 3.6%, which would need to increase to jump start other floundering sectors.

Further global market competitiveness can be connected to education, transfer of knowledge, and geography. Dimitar and Bozidar (2012) point to deficiencies in “infrastructure, higher education and training, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication and innovations” (132). Gashi and Mojsoska-Blazevski (2016) detail how Macedonian children are less content, engaged, happy, and have fewer parents with educational attainment than those in Kosovo. Mitreva et al. (2015) note that small and medium sized businesses lack quality control standardization systems that affect everything from point of sale (POS) infrastructure, food and drug oversight, and occupational health and labor standards. Businesses do not have the capital to upgrade

and generally do not receive the research and development investments needed to improve innovation and thus competitiveness (Fiti et al. 2017). Geographically, Kurecic (2017) notes the incentives that larger outside economic actors have in forming partnerships and integrating into smaller states' economies and that one possible solution is stronger regional alliances. Yes, North Macedonia belongs to the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), but only 13.3% of its exports and 12.7% of its imports are to/from other WB countries (generously including Albania here) (Simoes and Hidalgo 2011).

North Macedonian Human Rights Protection (HURI)

North Macedonia's HURI scores have been scattered over the past two decades. In 2000 it ranked third of seven Western Balkan countries. At its 2016 lowest point it was last. Since, it has rebounded and sits fourth. Figure #22 plots this course.




Figure 22. Cato Institute

Koinova (2011) makes two interesting points for this summary. First, security and stability are prioritized over human rights such that contests around identity, naming rights, and stabilizing majority/minority agitation was more important than the broad implementation of new laws and judicial oversight. This occurred almost immediately when the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) confronted Macedonian security personnel in February 2001. Fighting lasted until November beyond the cease-fire and signing of the Ohrid Agreement in August 2001. HURI does not precede 2008, but if one looks at the DEMO scores (human rights and democratization are intertwined) 2001 is the lowest point and moves steadily upward thereafter in the short term. Musliu (2015) writes that historical “mistrust, power struggles ... caused a continual decline in confidence in the political process (36). Marusic (2021) details that while the unitarian government was maintained, Albanian minority participation has been consciously undertaken through politics, civil society, and police and military personnel. Even though the European Court of Human Rights’ Convention is “part of the domestic legal order and as directly applicable,” Trajkovska and Trajkovska (2016) pessimistically note that the “case law ... is used in a formalistic way without substantive analysis” (288).

Second, Koinova points to the behavioral socialization required by *local* elites who take more time to realize, accept, and change behavior than *national* elites who might be incentivized by international actors, pressures, power, and prestige. This is not unique to North Macedonia but appears in the literature. Alcheva, Gerovski, and Beletsky (2013) discuss the medical rights’ “gaps in implementation” affecting marginalized communities including Roma, disabled people, women, and those in rural settings. This discrimination has extended to disparities and religious discordance during

the COVID-19 pandemic (Matache and Bhabha 2020) (Vankovska 2020). Ananiev and Stojanovski (2012) highlight these same issues with these same groups as it portends to political participation, representation, and feeling enfranchised. Bornarova (2019) also writes of the disconnect between the treatment of migrants “on paper” versus “in practice” during the Syrian migration crisis of 2015-2016.

North Macedonian Democratization (DEMO)

After the initial upward tick in 2002, North Macedonian DEMO scores mirror the HURI metric. There is a sharp decline and “bottoms out” in 2016, though it never ranked last in the region, before moving higher, as shown in Figure #23. North Macedonia started DEMO regionally ranked 4th of 7 in 2000 and ends 2020 ranked third best of WB countries.




Figure 23. North Macedonia DEMO, V-Dem

Riese, Roehner, and Zuercher (2011) point to the high elite and popular buy-in to democratization and the low costs of “adaptation” as countries transition to independence from a conflictual situation. This can help explain the initial jump in DEMO scores.

At the same time, similar to the HURI summary, the literature suggests that a lack of transparent, domestic-led institutionalization of horizontal and/or vertical accountability has been detrimental for North Macedonia. A lack of institutional reforms hurts North Macedonian democratization. Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Reports for 2008, 2008 and 2011 detail corruption and scandals affecting trust in the political process, violence against fellow members of the Sobranie (Assembly) during elections in 2008, and widespread judicial inefficiencies. Borzel and Grimm (2018) argue North Macedonia faces “a lack of resources ... as well as institutionally entrenched structures of corruption and clientelism” (121). Abdullai and Cupi (2016) contend that North Macedonia’s prioritization of Christian Orthodox interests, by definition, represents a challenge to a secular and multireligious, vis-à-vis multiethnic, state, which mythologizes Christian Orthodoxy politically (Leustean 2008) and delegitimizes pluralism and enfranchisement of minority groups. Keiichi (2004) details how there were no foreign actors or institutions supporting *alternative* options for Albanian minority groups *except for* working with the Macedonian political process.

Further, while the DEMO score has moved higher, analysts are not fully “signing off” or “praising” North Macedonia’s democracy. Markovikj and Damjanovski (2018) point to the international community taking “short-term” conflict mediation as “wins,” rather than institutionalizing changes in socialized behavior and civil liberties, creating a dependency on international/outside actors to fix problems rather than internal resolutions

and consensus-building among different interest groups. Political party apparatuses and financing, even if legally mandated, tend to benefit power-concentric local leaders (Bertoa and Taleski 2015). Freedom House (2018) writes that “patronage networks remain influential ... due process remains compromised ...” and there are “allegations of widespread wiretapping and monitoring of private citizens, journalists, politicians, and religious leaders” (576-578). Finally, Gorgevik and Janeska (2020) document that North Macedonian citizens have a lower level of trust in the transparent efficacy of the Sobranie (Assembly) than any time over the past five years, lower than their faith in the executive/president.

North Macedonian Domestic Sentiments (DMST)

North Macedonia was surveyed twice by the World Values Survey in 1998 and 2001. In 1998 33.3% of their citizens were confident in the EU compared to 54.8% “not very” or “none at all.” This breakdown held between men and women and amongst all age cohorts. 12% overall were unsure, and those 48 years old and older polled at more than 16%. In 2001, the uncertainty disappeared and joined those that were not confident in the European Union. 2001 polling showed a 30.6% confidence and a 64.1% vote of no confidence. The age cohorts change a little between the two “waves” of the WVS, but unsurprisingly, those over 50 were least confident with only 24.7% polling that they had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the EU.

The Balkan Barometer surveys do not show the same lack of confidence. Between 2016-2021 only an average of 13.3% said that EU membership would be a bad thing. 50% said it would be a good thing on average; 53% in 2021. A full third, 33%,

were in the “neither good nor bad” category. In other words, comparing the BB to the WVS, more people were excited for the EU, more were on the fence as to the ramifications, and fewer were negative in the Balkan Barometer surveys. At the same time 27.4% did not think North Macedonia would ever join the EU, which is a matter of degrees more pessimistic than not knowing whether joining would be good or bad. Individual Macedonians ranked freedom to travel, freedom to study/work in the EU, economic prosperity, and peace and stability as important 25% of the time. This is the first instance of the first five Western Balkan countries outlined where “peace and stability” scored as high. Their top two priorities were economic prosperity (42.4%) and freedom to study/work in the EU (39.4%). These answers certainly are self-interested and individualistic since there is something that a person is “getting out of” the situation whether it is educational or career opportunities, or a higher standard of living.

The Balkan Barometer Business Survey aligns with what has been found previously. North Macedonian businesses think EU membership will be a good thing for their company at a 61.3% clip. 31% did not think it would be a good or bad thing, while 5.4% said it would have negative impacts. And again, North Macedonian employers know they can compete. 67.5% agree or totally agree that they can compete, with 22% disagreeing or totally disagreeing. In other words, joining the EU would be good and North Macedonian businesses can/could be competitive.

Thus, the BB surveys, aggregated or personalized, do not portray an indifferent or underwhelmed prospect of full EU membership. Rather the results suggest a hopefully Macedonian. They are driven by economic opportunities and returns on their investments, literally and figuratively. Business excitement continues to lead the way in

this metric. Tempering that thought, though, is the acknowledgement that the individual poll results straddle 45-53% positivity and are not overwhelming majorities. Plus, from 2018-2021 14% of respondents said that membership would be a loss of sovereignty for North Macedonia. This means that 15-20% in the BB survey still are disinclined to be excited, hopeful, or anticipating EU membership.

North Macedonian European Constraints (EUCN)

EU Commission speech text prescribes a hopeful, but stern tone toward North Macedonia. In the collected speeches North Macedonia arises six times. One instance is a repeated phrase, and one instance is a salutation. Additionally, as mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, *no accession chapters* have been opened for North Macedonia delayed by Greece, Bulgaria, and their own, slow reforms. The EU Commission speech never addresses the vetoes by other EU member-states. The closest it gets to this is discussing the 2015/2016 migration crisis when it is said, “We can’t blame them for lax border controls if our own Member States don’t do their job ... The Western Balkans must not become a parking lot or ‘no man’s land’ for stranded refugees” (Hahn 2015a). The first part of this quote pokes at Greece and Bulgaria, and their porous and challenged borders (Vice News 2015). The Balkan route mentioned elsewhere in the case studies also cautions all WB states, but in this speech section specifically, the need for North Macedonia to set an example and handle refugee logistics in a “professional” manner is clear.

Beyond this, however, the EU Commission speech is goading with imperatives and an expectation that North Macedonia implements structural changes for the “carrot”

of opening accession negotiations. Rehn (2008) discussing financial assistance states, “This shall ... be conditional on the continued implementation ... and substantial progress in the implementation of the urgent reform priorities.” Conditions or hoops to jump through are present, but “continued implementation” suggests North Macedonia has not been static, but that there is an “urgency” to get the job done. Later in the same speech Rehn tells Macedonian leadership that there must be “determined efforts to meet key priorities.” There is an onus for North Macedonia to do its part, focused on the thresholds laid out.

Six years later, Hahn (2015) notes improvement, but is still frustrated. He says North Macedonia has been “at a relatively good level of legislative alignment. But the content of the wiretaps ... shows that the political system is seriously undermined by political interference and corruption.” It is a “yes, but” statement. There is a compliment, but then a criticism. The dance between the carrot and the stick is more pronounced here. Thus, in sum, the EU’s speech toward North Macedonia is comparative and complimentary, but impatient. It sets an expectant role that North Macedonia must quickly reform and implement change. Yet it does this acknowledging problems with EU member-states similar to North Macedonia, and by criticizing North Macedonia. This might, combined, be subtle innuendo that the EU “sees” the issue of Greece and Bulgaria’s North Macedonian position, but that blame must be shared *with* North Macedonia and its structural/institutional problems that still need to be addressed.

North Macedonian Presidents 2000-2021

North Macedonia has had five presidents since 2000. They are Boris Trajkovski 1999-2004, Ljupco Jordanovski, acting president in 2004 after Trajkovski died in a plane crash, Branko Crvenkovski 2004-2009, Gjorge Ivanov 2009-2019, and Stevo Pendarovski 2019-Present. Trajkovski, Ivanov, and Pendarovski are all ethnically Macedonian and were born there as well. Crvenkovski is Bosnian and was born in Sarajevo. All four men attended SS. Cyril and Methodius University in the Macedonian capital city of Skopje. Trajkovski and current president Pendarovski worked in the legal field, Crvenkovski was a businessman, and Ivanov a journalist and political science professor. Trajkovski and Ivanov were members of the VMRO-DPMENE – Internal Revolutionary Organization Democratic Party for National Unity party, which is a Christian democratic, center-right party that more recently has promoted cultural nationalism (Ku Leuven 2020). VMRO-DPMENE is one of two main parties. The other, SDMSM – Social Democratic Union for Macedonia, is the party of Crvenkovski and current president Pendarovski. SDMSM is center left.

North Macedonia is considered a semi-presidential system. Complimenting the DEMO subsection, Ecevit and Karakoc (2017) find that public trust towards political institutions is lower in semi-presidential arrangements. Taleski, Dimovski, and Pollozhani (2019) level some of the Macedonian distrust at the “genetic” party system that gives junior coalition parties, divided ethnically, incentives to have strong executive leadership. Then, in direct presidential elections, a “wider legitimacy” is claimed by the winners. Magyar (2019) claims this is a holdover from a more patrimonial system of hierarchal networks from the communist days. Though sometimes the president simply

looks to correct course and level out the antagonism within the legislature (Kumarasingham and Power 2015).

North Macedonian Presidential Speech (PRSI)

North Macedonian presidential speech was coded for identity and rational words. In 337,842 words of speech text there were 6,990 instances of identity words and 1614 instances of economic rationality words. This represented 2.1% identity words usage and 0.5% rational word usage. Sixteen terms were coded in each of the two categories. Five identity words were not found: foolish, smart, scared, villain, and hero. Of the remaining 11 codes, four did not meet the 1% threshold for inclusion in the content analysis. Within the rational words, six words had zero results: neoliberal, rational, wealth, expansion, modernity, and evolving. Of the remaining 10 codes, four did not meet a 1% usage rate. Figure #24 shows the identity word use and Figure #25 shows the rational word use between 2000-2021.




Figure 24. North Macedonian Identity Codes 2000-2021

North Macedonian identity words have a clear winner (“our,”) which is overweighted to the “us v. them” pronouns. The first thing to highlight is the very high usage rate of “our” at 21.3%, and when adding it to the second (“us”) and third (“their”) ranked words, makes up a code coverage rate of 34.6%. The frequency of North Macedonians having such in-group affiliation conceivably stems from a preponderance of outside actors (Greece, Bulgaria, the European Union) questioning the authenticity of their ancestral ethnicity and identity. Also, the domestic contestation between an approximate 65% Macedonian majority and 25% Albanian minority, which led to outright conflict in 2001, signals both a need and a recourse to use collectivist speech words. Secondly, “Europe” ranks fourth at a rate of 4.0% usage. Interestingly, there are

years where Europe is not even mentioned and falls below its average between 2018-2021. This suggests that Europe is not top-of-mind for those years' samples. Moreover, there may be a fatigue in the European Union accession process that resigns North Macedonian presidents to not bother referencing it, especially considering COVID-19 created a more poignant immediacy for their attention.




Figure 25. North Macedonian Rational Codes 2000-2021

The North Macedonian rational codes are quite even amongst the six that met the 1% threshold. The order is economic (2.9%), development (2.4%), integration (1.9%), prosperity (1.2%), progress (1.2%), and success (1.1%). The delta between any two codes is never more than 0.7% and from first to sixth is 1.8%. As can be seen in Figure #25, “economic” is not even used in 2002 and 2004. Further, “development” ranked highest in 2000, 2020, and 2021; “economic” was highest in 2011-2013; “integration” received top billing in 2002, and “success” in 2004.

What can be made of a fairly even distribution of economic words? To start, “economic” and “development” are the largest categorical codes in that they can holistically include a variety of subtopics. The fact that “development” is the lead rational word in 2000 and 2020-2021 suggest that the idea of development traced both HURI and DEMO. In other words, both HURI and DEMO started fairly middle of the road in the Western Balkans for North Macedonia and then rebounded to put them basically in the same spot as where they started. ECON does not decline to the same extent, but as mentioned above, its level pace still leaves much to be desired, so the need and want for North Macedonia is still to “develop.” “Integration” and “success” are path-dependent words that correspond to a process, i.e., EU accession, that North Macedonia is and has been aspiring toward. Further “progress,” leading the way in 2019, corresponds to the North Macedonian name change and could reflect a presidential feeling that a hurdle has been cleared to more fully “develop” and “integrate.” “Integration” was the second most frequent word in 2021.

Next, a critical discourse analysis of North Macedonian presidential speech begins with the micro level of analysis. North Macedonian presidents were as declarative as the previous presidents; overall 78.3% of their sentences stated facts and/or opinions. They were repetitious 12.6% of the time. There were no instances of imperative or interrogative sentences. Two exclamatory statements were made, one each in each category. Otherwise, there were not any revealing comparative findings. There were no major differences between type of sentence structure and coded category. Any numeric movement simply represented a difference in sample size. For instance, the biggest delta between rational and identity sentence types was between North Macedonian speech

toward Croatia at 25%, but that was because speech toward Croatia totaled two rational sentences (2 of 2 were declarative, or 100%) compared to identity sentences (6 of 8 were declarative, or 75%, while the other 25% was repetition).

At the meso level of CDA, North Macedonia most often spoke to Kosovo, focused on the present, and usually bounced between compliments and cooperative statements. Kosovo had the most mentions (19) with Bosnia and Herzegovina second (17). The ethnic overlap between North Macedonia's main minority ethnic group, Albanians, and Kosovo's *majority* ethnic group (Albanians are 92.9%) draws this referential inference. Additionally, North Macedonia shares its northwestern border with Kosovo. So, again, this makes sense from a referential standpoint. Slovenia had the fewest mentions at five. Next, North Macedonian text was focused on the present in all speeches to all countries 82% of the time.

Tonally, North Macedonia was typically fully of compliments, focused on cooperation. These categories led the speech 36% and 29% respectively. In all but one sentence was North Macedonia negative and critical during rational economic sentences. When speaking about identity, however, criticism does creep more into the speech patterns. In descending order of criticism, North Macedonia was critical of Serbia (33%), Slovenia (25%), Croatia (13%), and Bosnia (9%). Part of this reflects the numeric reality, such that Slovenia had fewer, and Bosnia more, sentences about them, so the percentages are not quite a reflection of the reality. Serbia's criticism revolved around their antagonism during the 1990s. However, the glaring omission here, from an assumptive critical standpoint, is Kosovo. Regardless of the issues that might arise between the two countries, identity and rational speech only fell in the compliment,

cooperation, and hope categories. There was not a negative thing said about Kosovo by North Macedonia. Macro CDA will be covered in the Findings chapter, so the attention now switches to the last Western Balkan *candidate* country.

Serbia

Serbia is the final country in this case study. It became a candidate for EU membership in March 2012. Serbia is the largest country in the Western Balkans by land size (approximately 88,367 kilometers squared) and population (6.91 million). It is landlocked, but borders three countries (Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania) that are larger geographically, demographically, and economically. Ethnically, 83% of people are Serbs, 3.5% Hungarians, and 2.1% Roma. Serbia's religious demographics are 85% Orthodox Christian, 5% Catholic, and 3% Muslim (Eurydice 2021).

Part of the Serbian story is its historical and ethnic lineage amongst the people of the Western Balkans. Slavic people are first recorded in Byzantine writings around the 6th century B.C.E. (Violatti 2014), employ the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets, and are usually Christian Orthodox or Catholic. Those are very broad strokes to describe a historical ethnic group. Why? Put simply, Slavic people number over 300 million globally and typically are divided into Western Slavs (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia), East Slavs (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine), and South Slavs (Balkans) (The Editors of Encyclopedia 2020). Yugoslavia in Serbo-Croatian translates to South Slavia, Southern Slavland, or Land of the Southern Slavs. Six of the seven countries that rise from Yugoslavia's disintegration trace their ethnicities to the Slavic tribes (all but Kosovars, who are Albanian) that started migrating south in the 7th Century. It is here

where the Slavic Serb and Slavic Croat tribes, amongst others, start diverging (Judah 2000).

The mythologizing, however, continues from the Middle Ages into the age of nationalism. First, the burgeoning Serbian Nemanjic dynasty (approximately 1217 C.E.), was arguably the preeminent kingdom in the Western Balkans for 150+ years. It successfully held off encroachment from the Ottoman Empire until the Serbs, with marshalled support from Albanian, Bulgarian, and Macedonian vassals, along with units from Montenegro, Bosnia, and Kosovo, made, as it were, their “last stand” at the Field of the Blackbirds, in Kosovo proper, on June 28, 1389 (Hupchick 2002). Fast forward to 1812 and the Treaty of Bucharest gave autonomy to the Belgrade pashalik from the Ottoman Empire. That document was the first international agreement that recognizes Serbs, or any Balkan ethnic group (Meriage 1978), and served as a springboard over the next 66 years that included complete autonomy from Ottoman control in 1815 (Lukovic 2011), a new constitution in 1835, rewritten in 1838 (Sowers 1996), and finally a recognition of the Serbian state at the Congress of Berlin 1878.

This short historical overview serves to highlight the romantic Serb notion of its predominance and exceptionalism among people of the Balkans. First, the argument is that all “people,” for intent and purpose, of the Balkans are Slavic and therefore have a commonality that unifies. Unity often is shown by power: tangible and intangible, coercive and persuasive. Second, tangibly, the predominance of a Serbian medieval dynasty that fought the imperial Ottoman Empire, to the death, resonates as a herald to follow. Third, intangibly, this martyrdom synthesizes religious overtures with dynastic absolutism as impetuses, 426 years later, to have multiple uprisings that again sought to

push out the “invaders,” and reclaim autonomy. The first Balkan ethnicity to do so, Serbia vis-à-vis the commonality of the Slavs, then further carries the mantle and the narrative to Yugoslavia, the land of the Southern Slavs, of its post-World War 1 or post-World War 2 iterations. Fourth, this mythology then becomes propaganda as Yugoslavia breaks up in the late 1980s. Serbian politicians petition and market “Serbia for all Serbs” unification geographically, culturally, and politically, impeding on newly declared sovereign states’ territorial claims, and then rights, and consequently employ war and genocide to remove non-Serbians and unite “their” Serbian, lands.

Serbian Economic Development (ECON)

The Serbian economy is ranked 4 of 7 Western Balkan countries at \$7,666.24 GDP per capita in 2020. However, that is only \$20 behind Montenegro for third place in the region. Additionally, since 2000 Serbia has an average annual growth rate of 37%; or, put another way, Serbian GDP per capita has grown 738% in 20 years, by far the best in the region. The growth was incredible from 2000-2008 and has been fairly stagnant since. Therefore, there are two different periods to consider. Figure #26 highlights this path.




Figure 26. Serbian GDP per capita, World Bank

The literature is quite negative towards the Serbian economy regardless of its initial eight-year burst of productivity. The incredible growth of 2000-2008 is revealed to have been based, actually, on how far down Serbia’s economy was after the tragedies and mismanagement of the 1990s. Uvalic (2015) highlights the positives, growth and stabilizing inflation, however she points out that the 2008 real GDP was only 72% of the 1989 level. Real GDP adjusts GDP for inflation. More pointedly, GDP per capita in 2008, \$7,101.04, was 72% of the GDP per capita in 1989 (\$9,862.56). That is pretty incredible. Zaman and Drcelic (2009) argued for austerity measures due to trade imbalance risks and high unemployment. This becomes difficult to achieve when small and medium sized businesses make up “99.8% of total non-financial sector companies,” (Ivkovic, Karavidic, and Vujicic 2012, 44), since structural problems abound, and there were underproductive industries, poor labor incentives, and unqualified workers (Nikolic, Fedajev, and Svrkota 2012). Popovic (2011) called for “reindustrialization”.

Post 2008/2009 the Serbian economy leveled out and has become stagnant since. Domazet and Stosic (2013) cut to the chase and reveal that a lack of modernization

toward the global market was exacerbated by the 2008/2009 financial crisis. It revealed the Serbian economy to have shoddy infrastructure, structural and competitive deficiencies, and poor investment in education or labor productivity that hinder it rebounding or growing. Anicic, Anicic, and Kvrjic (2019) discuss the lack of monetary and fiscal policy to increase exports and bring the Serbian trade balance out of the red. Part of this is that there is no single industry that accounts for a larger than 17% portion of GDP (commercial service sector) Vale (2020).

Finally, as with the other countries in this chapter, a picture of the trade and FDI for Serbia is required. The trade imbalance mentioned in the last two paragraphs, in 2019, measured as \$28 billion in imports compared to \$20 billion of exports (-\$8 billion trade balance). Four of Serbia's top six import partners were authoritarian regimes (Russia #2, Hungary #4, China #5, and Turkey #6). Trade between Serbia and other Western Balkan countries accounted for 21.7% of its exports and 12.3% of its imports. Conspicuously missing from both summarized lists (exports and imports) was Montenegro (Simoes and Hidalgo 2011). Figure #15 above shows that Serbia has averaged a 6% FDI/GDP rate from 2009-2019, with the most external investments coming from Russia (9%) (Dudic et al. 2018).

Serbian Human Rights Protection (HURI)

Serbia's HURI scores were at the bottom of the Western Balkans in 2008, the year the Cato Institute started the measure, and it is at the bottom in 2020. Its average score of 7.51 is below the Eastern Europe average of 8.00, and amongst that collection of

countries sits below every country (the Baltics, Central & Eastern Europe, and Balkans) *except* Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation. That is not good company to keep.




Figure 27. Cato Institute

A main fault line of Serbian human rights is the lack of enforcement on outstanding war criminals as defined by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Amnesty International highlights that there are 2,500 cases awaiting trial, reparations legislation required an undue burden of proof in addition to applying only to those injured *in* Serbia (where the fighting did not occur), and there has been no closure for nearly one-thousand bodies and remains that have been discovered and coarsely cared for by the Serbian police and administrative bodies (2020). Subotic (2013) argues that,

Serbia’s political actions do not include revisiting or reimagining the human rights abuses of the past, but instead further solidify foundational blocs of state narrative (victimization, injustice, reclaiming power and international prestige) (317).

More pointedly, Serb elites and politicians participated with the ICTY for headlines, but once it was no longer “top of mind,” any accountability or pursuit of truth and

reconciliation becomes neutered, tabled, and/or forgotten (Ostojic 2013). David (2014) calls this “silencing”.

More broadly, there appears to be a laissez faire attitude toward enforcing human rights norm expectations from the EU, and a simple lack of restraint toward marginalized communities and dissidents. Blagojevic (2016) calls this the Serbian “provincial mind” that is “uniform” ... procedural “community homogenization” that excludes “what is different and other,” which is counter to the expectation of a “superiority and integrity of European ‘values’” (33). Huszka (2017) argues this stems from the perception that further acquiescence to EU conditions challenges Serbian power structures and status quo; the “power of veto players” according to Subotic (2010). From an enforcement level, domestic violence, LGBTQ communities, Roma, environmental and COVID-19 protests, etc., are met heavy-handed by the Serbian police with short thrift on allowing demonstrations or consequences for gang or police violence (Dzombic 2014) (Human Rights Watch 2021). But enforcement turns a blind eye to labor violations and human trafficking by Chinese subcontractors (European Parliament 2021).

Serbian Democratization (DEMO)

Serbia’s DEMO score was second lowest, just above Kosovo, in 2000 and sat at the bottom in 2020. Democratization efforts over the past twenty-one years in Serbia are rife with institutional malaise and clientelist power networks that embolden fringe elements toward violence, stunt horizontal accountability and disillusion the population. The intractableness gets compounded when considering that the SNS – Serbian Progressive Party has been the party of the presidency since 2012 and of the prime

minister since 2014. That is 8-10 years of single party rule, which further degrades tangible opportunities for pluralism, checks and balances, and incentive structures to appeal to a wider voter base. It is a form of state capture. Petrovic (2020) explains that,

Under these conditions, the National Assembly was transformed not only into a machine for the rapid adoption of laws proposed by the ruling majority, but also into an instrument of public settling of scores with the diminutive and fragmented parliamentary opposition (17).

Hebda (2020) concurs with these problems, which are not disappearing. But to be fair, he is complimentary of the structural political changes that Serbia has made, acknowledging the difficulties from Yugoslavia’s dissolution, active military engagements (regardless of culpability) and then being “post-conflict” in the 1990s, and then further their necessitated decisions to deal with Montenegrin and Kosovar declarations of independence.




Figure 28. Serbian DEMO, V-Dem

One issue often illustrated is the relationship between Serbian administrations, state institutions, and civil society. Kostovicova (2006) makes an interesting point that civil-society, and nongovernmental organizations, which should be working with

government institutions to promote democratization, are in fact, perpetually opposed to the Serbian illiberal government that, once Communistic, became transitory in the 1990s, and remain authoritarian today. Markovic (2012) positions the 2006/2007 student protests similarly. While active historically, student protests found themselves trying to find a middle ground between what they felt were old cleavages and new, and inexcusable retractions of civil liberties. Milacic (2017), continuing this thread, argues that the “stateness” problem of Serbia, having to deal with both “issues” of its relationship to Montenegro and Kosovo, prevented state institutions to develop autonomous of those two foci, and thus civil society had another fulcrum point by which to stand in opposition of the government. It does not help that conflicting, self-interested motivations of international actors muddle the extrinsic “rewards” dangled in from of Serbia (Chansa-Ngavej and Kim 2021). Freedom House (2017) discusses voter intimidation, a lack of transparency, corruption, and hostility to journalists and the media. This year, Bieber (2022) writes that President Vucic’s permissiveness toward propaganda, his inability to comply with restitutions regarding the 1990s conflicts, and his placating to “denialists” threatens trust, efficacy, and alternatives for moving forward in tandem with widespread democratization support.

Serbian Domestic Sentiments (DMST)

Serbia is the only Western Balkan country to participate in more than two World Value Survey polls, completing one in 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2017. The question was the same in each instance, and is the same as discussed in each of the previous country profiles: “could you tell me how much confidence you have in ... the European Union”?

Figure #29 shows the responses per year. Tying the associations together paints a very skeptical Serbian society. Confidence every year is below 30% with the lack of confidence answer 64+%. Even more damning is that the 2017 results are the “worst”; 18.8% of Serbs have confidence in the EU while 75.1% do not.




Figure 29. Serbian World Values Survey 1996, 2001, 2006, & 2017

Moving to the Balkan Barometer 2015-2021 results show contradictory, nuanced results. Here “joining the EU” as a “bad thing” never topped 30% and was 15% in 2021. The EU as a “good thing” hovers around 30% too, but is 42% in 2021. Yet, this poll is much more indecisive, “neither good nor bad” is 36% or higher every year, than the WVS surveys. There also is Serbian pessimism in the BB surveys with an average annual score of 33.8% of respondents thinking EU membership will “never” occur.

Finally, the individual Serb responded with less ambivalence when asked “what would the EU membership mean to you personally.” The answer “nothing good/positive” starts at 25% in 2015 but drops to 18%, 4%, 16%, and 12% in 2018-2021 respectively. What stands out for Serbs is that EU membership will provide “economic prosperity” 30% of the time and “freedom to travel” 28%, the two highest scoring answers. “Economic prosperity” is different than the answer “freedom to work in the EU,” suggesting that Serbs want to travel, but that the economic benefits of integration will be felt at home, upon their return abroad.

The ambivalence of individual Serbs is supported by Serbian businesses’ Balkan Barometer results. Joining the EU as “neither good nor bad” polls at a 38.7% average. Naysayers decline from approximately 15% in the first four years to single digits (8% and 4%) in 2020 and 2021. Hopeful businesses cross 50% in 2020 and recorded EU membership is a “good thing” 65% in 2021. The middle third is still indeterminant of the benefits. However, Serbian businesses are just as confident in their abilities as other Western Balkan businesses, averaging a 75% confidence in the competitiveness of their product/service versus similar EU businesses.

In sum, the survey results point to Serbians being pessimistic about membership, when it will happen, and unsure about its results. The WVS results really stand out here. Marrying them to the BB scores pivots on the word “confidence.” Serbs might not be as judgmental on the benefits of the EU, which ties into the “economic prosperity” lead answer or that Serbian businesses are confident in their ability to compete. Serb citizens and businesses are not confident either in the EU’s stated goal of enlargement, Serbia’s

accession into membership, or what it will actually “deliver” to Serbia and/or for Serbians.

Serbian European Constraints (EUCN)

EU commission speech talks to/toward Serbia 23 times and uses language that reads as someone, some group, that prescribes hopeful, almost desire, for Serbia to proceed through the accession process. The first few mentions include exclamations of how important Serbia is and imperatives asking Serbia to make the “right” choice. Rehns (2008) states, “Serbia is central for regional stability and good neighbourly relations. Serbia has a crucial choice to make ... it can either turn to the European future or risk self-imposed isolation.” In 2015 the text continues emphasizing the need for Serbia to participate cooperatively in the region, “dialogue with Serbia remains vital” (Hahn 2014). Again, this speech is desireful, wanting Serbia to be a part of the process. From there, however, this associational emphasis amplifies.

The next instances illustrate an EU that is conscientious of Serbian reception of their language, making sure the EU is prescriptively managing Serbia’s feelings. Hahn (2015), on speaking of the migrant crisis, contends, “while Serbia is making good progress on the road to Europe, we must not overburden them either.” Sure, there is a lot for Serbia to reform and new global issues – migration in this case, but COVID-19 today would also be an example – that might be foisted upon a country. However, not “overburdening” Serbia sounds odd. When are other countries not also dealing with an influx of migrants at this moment? Why, in the absence of mentioning any other country, Serbia the one not to be “overburdened”? Later in 2015 Hahn (2015a) says, “Serbia has

taken major steps on its EU path” and “should now build on this progress.” Run of the mill compliments by the European Union. Finally, Hahn (2016) points out that the “EU-facilitated dialogue with Serbia is therefore a legal obligation. Kosovo will need to implement the agreements it has reached...” Yes, this statement is directed at Kosovo, but the implication is that they, Kosovo, will have to live up to their end of the “legal obligation” as Serbia is itself doing.

In sum, EU Commission speech text is overly complimentary, heaping praise on Serbia’s work on reform and cooperation, and worried about them taking on too much. It is an interesting discursive strategy, when arguably, Serbia has been in the “most trouble” between ICTY convictions of war criminals, a lack of extradition and arrangement, and populist appeals by its essentially single-party political system. This is not even addressing whether or not there has been actual progress in regard to Kosovo, or other issues, which the other variables within this profile suggest are not being met. But it does play into Serbia’s historical self-image and self-imaginings. The prescriptive role the EU is giving to Serbia by their speech is that of an important regional actor, one that has responsibility and can wield influence, and that is wanted, and should be aspiring to, the structural changes necessary to join the EU.

Serbian Presidents 2000-2021

Serbia has had seven presidents since 2000. First, Slobodan Milosevic was ethnically a Montenegrin, but was born in Serbia, attended the University of Belgrade, and served as the leader/president of Serbia from 1989 until October 2000. Milosevic was a member of the SPS – Socialist Party of Serbia. Second, Vojislav Kostunica, 2000-

2003, was a Serb, born in Serbia, and an alum of the University of Belgrade. He was a political science professor and a member of the DSS – Democratic Party of Serbia.

Third, Svetozar Marovic, 2003-2006, is the other Montenegrin on this list and was also born there. Marovic was a member of the DPS – Democratic Party of Socialists and practiced law after graduating from Velko Vlahovic University. Fourth, Boris Tadic, 2006-2012, is Serbian, born in Bosnia, and was both a journalist and psychology professor before becoming president. Fifth, Slavica Dejanovic, was the acting president in 2012 for 56 days, and is the only woman on the list. She was also a member of SPS, Serbian by ethnicity and birthplace, and was a clinical medicine professor while rising in the ranks of politics.

Next, the final two Serbian presidents and their SNS – Serbian Progressive Party – have controlled the presidency for the last 10 years and the prime minister position for eight years. Tomislav Nikolic served from 2012-2017 and Aleksandar Vucic 2017-Present. Both men are ethnic Serbs were born in Serbia. Nikolic never went to college, but Vucic went to the University of Belgrade. Both men worked in business and are not career politicians. SNS is considered center-right, increasingly skeptical about the EU while demurring on Russian and Chinese financial and socio-political investments, and populist in tying politics tightly around nationalism and the Serbian Orthodox church (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2020).

Serbia is considered a semi-presidential system, with strong executive-focused tendencies arising from historical, and thus inherited personality-cults (Tito and Milosevic) and a party structure preferencing strong executives who often are unopposed within their party who become the “face” of their party. Pejic (2019) comments that the

2006 constitution provides executive privileges that “can be used as controlling instruments in the system of separation of powers if ... head of state has “his own” political majority in Parliament and, on the same basis, “his” Government” (53). Pavlovic (2019) demonstrates this with Milosevic and Tadic’s behavior during election years. Dusan and Zoran (2019) write about the passive approach of Serbian citizens to the electoral process, where they poll more often as articulating their presidential vote rather than their party membership.

Serbian Presidential Speech (PRSI)

Serbian presidential speech was coded for identity and rational words. In 60,789 words of speech text there were 1,061 instances of identity words and 166 instances of economic rationality words. This represented 1.7% identity words usage and 0.3% rational word usage. Sixteen terms were coded in each of the two categories. Five identity words were not found: foolish, scared, villain, brave, and hero. Of the remaining 11 codes, four did not meet the 1% threshold for inclusion in the content analysis. Five rational codes had zero results: neoliberal, expansion, modernity, globalization, and evolving. Of the remaining 11 rational codes, seven did not meet a 1% usage rate. Figure #30 shows identity word use between 2000-2021.




Figure 30. Serbian Identity Codes

Serbian identity speech text also retains a pronoun as the top used word; however, Europe is in a strong second place position. “Our” code coverage was 20.1% and, much like the previous countries, the four “us v. them” pronouns represented 4 of the top 5 words used in identity sentences. “Europe,” though, was coded in 19.1% of the sentences, and claimed top usage in 4 of 10 years of Serbian presidential speech. Further, readers can see that after 2013 use of “Europe” drops off precipitously and never exceeds 7%. On one hand, remember, that in 2006 Montenegro splits from Serbia, and Kosovo declares independence in 2007. Serbia was trying to ascertain their individual country’s identity in relationship to Yugoslavia, its union with Montenegro, and then its retainment of Kosovo. Use of “Europe” could have been “we, Serbia,” are here, in whatever

iteration, and “Europe” is there and “we, Serbia” are confident in our position as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, or, now, Serbia. On the other hand, Serbia becomes an EU candidate country in 2012. Another rationale could be that Serbia used “Europe” consistently before and within a year of its EU progression as an identity marker that signified what it wanted to be a part of rather than what it stood in opposition and/or in relationship toward. Figure #31 shows the rational word use of Serbian presidential speech




Figure 31. Serbian Rational Codes

Serbian rational word choices reveal a concurrence of “development,” “economic,” and “progress.” As previously mentioned in the presidential speech subsections, “development” and “economic” are often the most used words, which demonstrates their ubiquity. They are the “largest” umbrella terms that many subtopics may rest under. For Serbian rational speech, both words are used 2.8% throughout the sample. “Progress” is used 2.6% of the time. Their mirrored usage therefore moves beyond the generalities because “progress” denotes a linear path dependency, and

therefore the rational use of these three words over 21 years suggests that Serbian presidents wanted to move the country forward. They depicted the pragmatic policy choices as aligning with a future Serbia that was better than before, “progressing” toward something of more “value” economically and developmentally. This possibly can also be attributed to Serbia’s varied nomenclature, finding self-determination and economic growth.

Next, the Serbian profile unpacks presidential speech text from a micro critical discourse analysis lens. 69% of Serbian speech was made through declarative sentences, which is the lowest rate seen thus far. There were many more linguistic turns of phrase: 3% imperatives, 1% interrogatives, 6% exclamations, and 11% repetitions. Drilling down to speech toward specific countries shows even more bluster. Rational speech toward Montenegro was 6% imperatives and 12% exclamatory, the latter being often praise or hope toward their once union. Identity speech toward Croatia was 25% imperatives directed 50% of the time in the past, clearly as co-agitators in the 1990s conflict. Identity speech toward Kosovo was 3% imperatives, 7% interrogative, and 5% exclamatory. Finally, a full 29% of identity speech about Bosnia was exclamatory. Generally, this demonstrates a more robust command of language, but also the inclusion of more emotion, gumption, accusations, and speech that “calls shots” and is less “by the book”.

Also, the frequency of speech toward specific countries is noteworthy. Slovenia is not mentioned once either in identity or rational sentences. They are an afterthought. On the other end of the spectrum, Kosovo ranks first, with 145 mentions. Montenegro is second with 78 mentions. Both countries’ association with Serbia is well documented

and thus makes sense to have been mentioned as many times as they were. Also, both countries are mentioned more in identity sentences with Kosovo 8x greater than rational sentences, and Montenegro a 3.8x difference. Again, their respective relationships with Serbia was literally part of their identity for portions of the 21st century.

At the meso CDA level, Serbian speech is a 60/40 split between present and past orientations in identity sentences. There is only one rational sentence that speaks about the past. Otherwise, everything is present focused, with a mere 9% of rational speech toward Kosovo and Montenegro future facing. Conversely, reminiscent identity speeches occur 40% of the time: 50% for Croatia, 29% for Bosnia, 21% for Kosovo, and 5% for Montenegro. Clearly thinking about the 1990s is tantamount for Serbian identity speech in the first two cases (Croatia and Bosnia), while the reiterated relationship with Kosovo and Montenegro is clear too.

Of course, tone matters, and Serbian presidential speech does not just show sentence structural variety, but also directs more criticism and pessimism than previous outlined countries. Croatia was criticized 100% of the time; again an indicator of the built up animosity between Serbia and Croatia. Kosovo speech checked all boxes: 8% complimentary, 35% critical, 13% cooperation, 4% dissociative, 17% hope, and 12% pessimism. Serbian speech tried literally and figuratively any rhetoric to keep Kosovo a part of Serbia. Bosnia had 29% criticism and 14% pessimism. These rates were evenly split between compliments and criticism, hope and pessimism, which appears both as contrition and contriteness. Speech directed at Montenegro was 5% critical and 5% pessimistic, while skewing toward cooperation (42%) and hope (19%). The underlying cultural commonalities, shared border, and more synergistic relationship between Serbia

and Montenegro, while challenging for Serbia, was ultimately one that they want to continue building.

Concluding Remarks on Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia

This concludes the EU candidate country chapter. On the positive side, all three countries have a higher standard of living than when the 21st Century began, and all three countries' businesses believe that they can compete and are excited for EU membership. Otherwise, there is no consensus. Montenegro was slightly higher in DEMO and HURI, while their DMST broke into approximately 1/3 thinking EU membership would be positive, 1/3 unsure, and 1/3 either opposing it or not answering. North Macedonia's DEMO finished higher in 2020 but was very uneven throughout the two decades. Its HURI finished lower, and its DMST sat barely over 50% of respondents favorable for the European Union. Serbia's DEMO score dropped over the past two decades. Its HURI metric was slightly higher, but its DMST had a higher percentage of "neither good nor bad" than North Macedonia, and higher than Serbians in favor of it. Also, the Balkan Barometer Business Serbia scores show the highest indecisiveness toward the prospects of EU membership. This variety of outcomes demonstrates a collection of issues that all three countries contend with, including incomplete socio-cultural frames of reference, reluctance of changing demographics and/or identity marketers, outside actors' influence, transitional political institutions, and middle-of-the-road competitiveness and economic development.

European Union Commission speech ranges in its Alter's candidate prescription for each country. Speech towards Montenegro is incremental and fluctuates between

being complimentary and watchful. The EU recognizes improvements, but also then sets higher expectations for Montenegro. In the North Macedonian case, the EU Commission text subtly acknowledges the problems it has with Greece and Bulgaria blocking accession progress, yet the EU still holds North Macedonia accountable for its internal lack of reform. There also is a level of impatience that is read in the text. Finally, speech towards Serbia is an odd case. The EU Commission praises Serbia, acknowledges its importance in the region, and has clear overtures to wanting it to get its act together. There are instances of insisting reform, but comparatively the language is not overly critical, and more so hopeful that Serbia will join the European Union. Summarily, the Alter's prescription of a "candidate" role is present yet done so in different ways.

Last, presidential speech by the candidate countries indicates a level of prioritization that ranges from "let's get this done" (Montenegro), conciliatory (North Macedonia), and hostile (Serbia). All three countries are overwhelmingly identity language oriented. First, Montenegro is the least focused on the past. They are in tune to the present and future speaking in terms of hope, cooperation, and compliments. Montenegro is ready to get this process started, turn the page, and be recognized by Europe. Second, North Macedonia is in the present 86% of the time, and the presidential speech falls to single digits on the past and the future. They are complimentary but are also the least hopeful, constantly considering the ramifications of non-Yugoslav outside actors. Third, Serbia, of the candidate countries, is most stuck in the past. It is the most critical, most pessimistic, and least complimentary. Serbia's role in post-dissolution conflicts, its relationship with Montenegro and Kosovo, and yet its strong natural capacities, sentiments *from* the EU, and connections with Russia position it as an

interesting, antagonistic focal point for the region. Next, Chapter 6 will present a case study on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, both of which are prospective candidates for the European Union accession process.

CHAPTER 6 – EU POTENTIAL CANDIDATES: BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA AND KOSOVO

Introduction

This chapter presents and analyzes a case study of the two Western Balkan countries that are potential candidates for European Union (EU) accession in the future: Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and Kosovo. Bosnia signed the stabilization and association agreements (SAAs) in June 2008, which did not immediately materialize because of Bosnia's inability to adhere to the European Court of Human Rights. Seven years later in July 2015 the SAA went into effect. The SAA allows for the Stabilization and Association Parliamentary Committee (SAPC) to cooperate, meet, and work through the accession process with the applicant country. The rules and procedures governing that interaction were approved by the Bosnian Parliament in July 2020 and then adopted by the EU-Bosnia SAPC in June 2021 (De Munter 2021). Kosovo is naturally a bit behind the other countries due to declaring independence in February 2008 and the subsequent denial of recognition by five EU countries (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain) and two Western Balkan countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia). Nevertheless, their SAAs went into effect in April 2016 (*ibid.*).

Each country profile within the case study has a congruent organizational structure. There is a short introduction on the country followed by overviews of the non-speech variables: economic development (ECON), human rights protection (HURI), democratization (DEMO), and domestic sentiments (DMST). EU speech constraints (EUCN) are laid out thereafter to find the Alter's prescriptions of said country. Next,

there is a discussion on the presidents of the country, a brief biographical overview, and explanation of the presidentialisation of the relatively new, independent nation-state. Finally, presidential speech (PRSP) is presented and interpreted via content and discourse analysis.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) is the third largest country in the Western Balkans by size and third largest by density, with approximately 3.3 million people. It holds a small 12-mile stretch along the Adriatic Sea that was given to the Ottoman Empire by the city-state of Dubrovnik as a bulwark against Venetian agitators after the Treaty of Karlowitz 1699 (Jennings 1996). This stretch is known as the Neum corridor today. Ethno-religiously, Bosnia is primarily divided into three groups: Bosniaks (50.1%), Bosnian Serbs (30.8%), and Bosnian Croats (15.4%). Each of these ethnicities corresponds to a religious affiliation in the country, too: Bosniaks are Muslims, Bosnian Serbs are Christian Orthodox, and Bosnian Croats are Catholic. The linguistic breakdown within Bosnia approximates the same ethno-religious percentage breakdown; Bosniaks speak Bosnia (52.9%), Bosnian Serbs speak Serbian (30.8%), and Bosnian Croats speak Croatian (14.6%). (CIA 2022). Bosnia's unique ethno-religious makeup is important to explore further.

Bosniaks are simultaneously tied to the Ottoman Empire's rule of the Balkans, to the greater Islamic world, and yet also seen as a European religious minority within their own religious majority country. The Ottoman Empire millet system was a taxation policy that required a greater tax burden for non-Muslims who chose not to convert to Islam.

However, approximately 600 years of Ottoman rule in the Balkans naturally evolved intergenerationally whereby people converted to Islam, which leads to the statistical demographics present today. This creates transnational networks that serve as linkage areas for Muslims globally to support their fellow believers socio-culturally, politically, and economically. For instance, Deliso (2007) contends that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during the violence and post-war reconstruction of the 1990s become subversive Trojan horses that brought radical jihadist ideological and political support to Bosniaks. Vice (2012), for example, details the Saudi Arabian financing of Sarajevo's largest mosque and the strict Wahabi Islamic village of Gornja Maoca. Yet, whether or not this support is benign or cancerous, essentialist or strategically anti-essentialist, to an overwhelmingly Christian Europe or communist secularized former Yugoslavia, Muslims in the Western Balkans are stigmatized and politicized (Bougarel 2012), slurred as "Turks," and/or targeted for extermination (Rohde 2006), and must contend with religion as a co-determinant variable of othering (Roddy 2019) (Helms 2008) that had, and continues to have, geo-political ramifications since independence.

Bosnia's political geography is important to elucidate as an explainer for its development from 2000-2021. Husukic and Zejnilovic (2017) position Bosnia, and Sarajevo specifically, as symbolic of ethnic and religious tensions that postulate identity onto geography such that geography nurtures and embroiders identity onto the landscape. The political arrangement from the 1995 Dayton Accord peace agreement furthers this argument with its bifurcation of Bosnia into two main states: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS), and its consociationalism. The states represent approximately 51% and 49% of the total Bosnia area respectively. A

third area in the northeast, Brcko District, is government by the other two (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2018). The two states are predictably split along ethno-religious lines, with 92.1% of Bosnian Serbs living in RS and 88.3% of Bosniaks and 92.1% of Bosnian Croats living in FBiH (Toe 2016). Further, each state's government has its own institutional makeup and there is a tri-partite presidency with one member from each ethno-religious group. More will be elucidated below; however, the fight over people, power, and geography of the Bosnian conflict became crystalized in the Dayton Accords because of its partitioning of Bosnia (Korkut and Mulalic 2012) (Stroschein 2014) (Hozic 2021). The subsequent entrenchment of leaders and civil society along those fault lines adds another layer to this country and its progress the past 26 years.

Bosnian Economic Development (ECON)

Bosnia's economic development nominally positions it as the fifth best economy in the Western Balkans, with the third best growth rate over two decades.




Figure 32. Bosnian GDP per capita, World Bank

Bosnia, similar to the other regional countries, shows an initial increase in productivity until the global recession of 2008. Its annual average of a 16% growth rate and cumulative total of 311% ranks as the third largest trajectory. The average foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP) over the past decade, per Figure #15 in the last chapter, ties Bosnia with Croatia as second worst, with an average of 2.3% FDI/GDP. Suhrke and Buckmaster (2005) outline that ballooned foreign investment after the Dayton Accords was tied to the pragmatic interests of donor countries/institutions in the immediate aftermath; but, unfortunately, both funding and interest in Bosnia's plight tapered off in the 2000s. Thus, the gains from the first eight years do not materialize into an internationally incentivized landscape for investors as the past 12 years' 1.5% average annual growth insinuates. It is worth noting that Dell'anno & Piirisild (2007) point out the high (57% of all economic activity) shadow, informal, or non-observed economy in Bosnia. A large shadow economy is typical of a transitional economy, but still 57%

ranks almost twice as high as the Central and Eastern European current average of 30.4%. This intensity of under-the-table economic activity is not being captured in the World Bank GDP per capita metric.

Further, Bosnia's economy needs to institutionalize incentives and transparent legal and financial frameworks to harness a wanting and willing public. Kostovicova and Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2014) discuss that any reconstruction focused on institutions and claiming to be nonprejudiced to one ethnic group or another,

miss a thick web of connections between institutional and noninstitutional as well as licit and illicit actors that effectively controlled access to markets and public assets ... setting up business, winning contracts, or obtaining business finance (202-207).

Even bringing economic reconstruction "down" to small and medium-sized business is where Dzafic and Omerbasic (2018) write of quite expensive financial barriers to entry, and hurdles of legal and structural inadequacies that inhibit start-ups, pragmatically, in lieu of a strong Bosnian entrepreneurial spirit. Durakovic and Trgo (2020) highlight a highly educated, though underutilized, workforce needed to increase domestic production value-adds and increase global competitiveness. Even if Jasarevic (2012) finds a Bosnian "finite economy" built on anxieties habituated through existential fears, Calori and Jurkat (2017) commend the sense of ownership workers felt as their company, Energoinvest, privatized under market reforms of the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Today, Bosnian economic activity is quite decentralized and finding the right mix of scalable comparative advantages, to couple with catalyzing their entrepreneurship domestically in an institutional environment that is stable and predictive, will help create growth, attract business, and improve standards of living. Bosnia's largest exports are

electricity (4.9%) and seats (4.3%). The next nine most exported items do not reach 3%: leather footwear (2.8%), “other furniture” (2.8%), insulated wire (2.7%), iron structures (2.6%), sawn wood (2.5%), vehicle parts (2.4%), footwear parts (2.3%), hot-rolled iron bars (2.1%), and petroleum coke (2%) (Simoes and Hidalgo 2011). So, 11 products account for 31.4% of its exports, and, as one can imagine, if the list is expanded the product “share” goes down from 2%. This summation simply highlights the myriad of directions and industries with Bosnia. Arguably that can be a good thing, but that is a discussion for another time. From a comparative trade perspective, larger multinational corporations can penetrate markets faster, create higher paying jobs, and be able to invest in research and development at a greater rate, and hopefully a greater efficacy, than broad, small, business sectors.

Bosnian Human Rights Protection (HURI)

Bosnia is tied with Serbia at the bottom of the Cato Institute’s HURI metric for the Western Balkans. It started in 2008 as sixth of seven, above Serbia, but has fallen since to match meager improvement by Serbia. Figure #33 shows Bosnia’s HURI path.




Figure 33. Cato Institute

Outside sources highlight Bosnia’s persistent problems surrounding discrimination, minority rights (internally and toward refugees) and freedom of the media, and civil society more broadly, to be independent arbiters, commentators, and actors within Bosnian society. This subsection will illustrate these issues through two examples: the 2020 elections in Mostar and the aftermath and remembrance of the 1995 Srebrenica genocide.

Human Rights Watch (2021) starts its Bosnian report with the statement that local elections in Mostar were held in 2020 for the first time since 2008. Great. But, it also highlights two “levels” of discrimination over minority rights. First, the Bosnian Constitutional Court ruled that the municipal government’s “power-sharing structure was unconstitutional and discriminated against the residents” of Mostar in 2010 and it had not relooked, and Mostar had not amended, the document thereafter (ibid). No elections in 12 years. The irony is that the Bosnian constitution specifically creates its *own* power-sharing structure. Second, Behram (2020) reports that election results did not sway from

a preponderance of support for the stalwart ethnic parties of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA). He writes that “parties suffer from similar maladies – corruption, egoism and lack of accountability” (ibid). Nevertheless, second, this anecdote substantiates both structural discrimination from the “center,” or federal government vs. a city or municipality. It also demonstrates structural discrimination against minority political parties to enfranchise, organize, and run for office, under a shadow of transparency as a municipal court banned “all activists in the region” (Mastracci 2022). Third, this story shows the, almost apathetic, consequences or political realities locally that preference the known over significant change, and/or in-group familiarity to a differentiated approach to local politics.

Next, discrimination, hate crimes, and unequal access for non-majority ethnicities is a tantamount issue exemplified by the calculated genocide in Srebrenica. As mentioned earlier, the two main states of Bosnia practically divide along ethnic lines, which positions the “other” ethnicity, let alone those who do not identify as any of the main three ones (i.e., Roma), as disadvantaged. Srebrenica is in northeastern Bosnia, within the Republika Srpska (RS) state. RS is approximately 90% Bosnian Serb. In 1995 Serbian militants led by General Ratko Mladic systematically killed nearly 8,372 Bosniaks, mostly men, in less than two weeks (BBC 2020) (Rohde 2012). Since that awful period, Smelimovic (2011) notes that the survivors have been left primarily to their own devices. They are treated to infusions of humanitarian aid, support, and assistance, yet no governmental oversight or remedies are being proposed, let alone implemented, there. Hasic, Karabegovic, and Turkovic (2021) use this event to highlight transnational advocacy work that is going beyond traditional state-led public diplomacy. Toom (2020)

presents “ontological dirty knots” of Srebrenica’s forensic evidentiary process, employed asymmetrically by a variety of domestic and online actors, as means to obfuscate “truth” or “facts” and thus culpability.

The same ideas can be applied to other groups, too. Journalists are threatened verbally, physically, and online (Reporters Without Borders 2021). Refugees along with those assisting them in Bosnia, have received death threats, been attacked verbally and physically, and they and their families are subject to defamation (Lawlor 2020). Minority groups also have to contend with Bosnian law. The constitution literally identifies seventeen national minorities, approximately 400,000 Bosnians as “others,” ineligible to run for the presidency or upper houses of parliament, in favor of the “constituent” Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats (Human Rights Watch 2019). In summation, the tribalism that leads to verbal and physical altercations and abuse between the three constituent ethno-religious groups and then *from* them to anyone else permeates the Bosnian human rights front.

Bosnian Democratization (DEMO)

Bosnia’s DEMO scored started in 2000 as third-best in the Western Balkans, but by 2020 it had fallen to fifth. This can be seen in Figure #34. Its “fall” is not precipitous, but rather Kosovo and North Macedonia improve. Andjelic (2012) centers the lack of democratization around ethno-religious identity, which shapes communal notions with neighboring countries in Serbia and Croatia and deflects cooperation or consensus building toward a collective Bosnian nationalism that can work across partisan and entrenched lines. Added to this, one can outline the tangential issues of sectarian political

parties, clientelism and patronage networks, and therefore elites using identity as a bludgeon toward oppositional parties, civil society, and/or the media they deem as anathema.




Figure 34. Western Balkan DEMO, V-Dem

At the broadest level the phrase *de jure* recently, identity politics, is realized to the nth degree in Bosnia. To quickly summarize what has already been written here, ethnicity (Bosniak, Croat, and Serb) is synthesized with religious affiliation (Muslim, Catholic, Orthodox) and starts to materialize as citizenship in the upswell of nationalism in the 19th century, until it is suppressed by the idealized or communist state (Yugoslavia 1918-1941 and 1943-1992) until disintegration where seven distinct countries claimed independence through 2008. The Bosnian War from 1992-1995, in part, was both a territorial and identity conflict attempting to find “greater” Serbia or Croatia *and*

protecting one's own ethno-religious groups that had intermingled, intermarried, moved, and settled throughout Yugoslavia proper the preceding 49 years. This summary acknowledges, but must gloss over, atrocities committed by all sides toward one another. Marcovitz (2002), Hupchick (2002), and Lampe (2006), amongst others, argue that identities get politicized by elites for their own power programs. That can certainly be true. Yet, the parsimonious sketch above also *understates* the role of history, empires and imposition, psychology, trauma, retribution, and the amplification of narratives via technology and media. Add anything from the past few sentences into the "picture" and cross-sections of interactive effects can magnify difference, retrench tribal attitudes, "othering" those in one's outgroup.

Ok, so then, how does Bosnia create a national, Bosnian, not Bosniak or Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Croat, a Bosnian national identity? That is the question that democratization is supposed to help solve. It *is* called "nation" "state" building. Until 2008/2009 police units were divided along ethnic lines (Freedom in the World 2009). Veto powers allow for political parties to remain dominated by nationalistic stripes, by allowing for oppositional or multiethnic parties to be cancelled or "dead on arrival" (Freedom in the World 2021). Dzihic and Wieser (2011) stress that Bosnia's ethnically divided geopolitics dilutes the EU's "power" in country and therefore empowers local elites to devolve and entrench themselves in ethno-nationalist rhetoric. Basta (2016) assess that political demarcation of groups, whether by party, institutionally, or militarily, creates a "weight" that the general populace uses to gauge the representativeness of their grievances upon the political system. This impediment can be seen in contrasting methods of integrating/segregating schools and curriculum

(Hromadzic 2008), through “criminal” networks, once customary during anarchical conflict, “corrupting” members of political and institutional networks (Belloni and Strazzari 2014), and the prioritization of “interest groups” over enforced structuration or citizen-directed, decentralized democratization (Perry 2015). As a result, Pickering (2006) is hopeful and demonstrates that pragmatism can trump ethnic hesitations when local intersubjective habits, concerns, and grievances are allowed to manifest themselves in politically expressive avenues.

Bosnian Domestic Sentiments (DMST)

Bosnia was targeted by the World Values Survey (WVS) in 1998 and 2001. Both questions are the same for both surveys and were the same one previously noted in previous chapters, “how much confidence do you have in the European Union?” In 1998 72.5% of respondents had a positive outlook on the EU, which was evenly shared amongst men (72.7%) and women (72.1%). However, in 2001, confidence fell to 47% and a lack of confidence rose from 23.7% in 1998 to 50.4% in 2001. Again, this is evenly distributed between men and women. While this alone does not look or read well, a more telling sign is the intensity of dissatisfaction. In 1998 the answer “none at all” was at 6.2% of all respondents having zero confidence. In 2001 “none at all” jumped in sum to 16.2%, a difference of 10% in three years, moving 7.5% for men (7.3% to 14.8%) and up 12.6% for women (4.8% to 17.4%).

Fifteen years later the Balkan Barometer (BB) survey stops the snowball effect. Between 2016-2021, 43.7% of Bosnians said joining the EU would be a good thing, 36.8% were indifferent, and 15.7% responded it would be a negative. These numbers

almost exactly correspond to those found in 2001. The average annual rate of those who responded that Bosnia would never join the EU was 33.9%. Bosnians appear slightly favorable toward the EU, with a slight majority believing it will eventually happen. Maybe predictably, with the history and narrative laid out above, when asked what EU membership would mean to them, individually, the highest categorical response was “economic prosperity” at 40%. Tied for second place were “freedom to travel” (27.2%) and “peace and stability” (27%). The ability to study and/or work abroad was fourth at 23.4%. “Economic prosperity” deconstructed refers to prosperity at home, in Bosnia. The ability to study/work abroad, on one hand could not even refer to “working” part of the answer since the respondent might have selected it for the cojoined “studying.” By contrast, being able to leave Bosnia for work speaks to economic mobility to some degree greater than a neutral choice answer of “economic prosperity,” which assumes that prosperity is where one is. This is unpacked because economic prosperity and peace and stability are both directionally pointed at the respondent’s native country. Bosnians are responding that EU membership will benefit them where they are. It will improve their lives *in* their country.

Moving to the business sector, Bosnian enterprises are just as confident as their Western Balkan counterparts in their ability to compete amid the opportunity to join the EU. An average of 58.5% of business owners said that the EU would be a positive development. Those sitting on the fence came in at 33%. Both of these numbers are not terribly different than other countries profiled. On average 82.3% of Bosnian businesses agreed or strongly agreed they could compete with companies of EU member states. Thus, while there was an initial downward trend in the early 2000s regarding faith in the

European Union, Bosnians stabilized their sentiments and were positive mid-40% of the time, unsure and/or indifferent 1/3 of the time, but viewed membership as a positive outcome for the country and their individual needs of peace, security, and that entrepreneurial spirit mentioned earlier. Bosnian businesses are ready for that chance too and overwhelmingly are ready to compete, gain market share, and profit from less regulation doing business with the EU.

Bosnian European Constraints (EUCN)

The EU Commission talks to/about Bosnia and Herzegovina in 28 instances. Twenty-one of those are from the same speech in December 2014 and provide the characterization of the EU's Alter role prescriptions. Before that, however, the first mention sets the stage for that later speech. Rehn (2008), hopeful for the ratification of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, says, "As ever, it will depend on the country's leaders rising above local political games..." This is foreshadowing. It not only directs ownership and responsibility to Bosnian domestic leaders, but also insinuates that they are not taking matters seriously or refusing to be pragmatic and "fool around" with the substantiation of necessary reforms. This will also undergird the 2014 speech.

In December 2014 Johannes Hahn delivers a speech titled "Enlargement Policy: The EU delivers when the EU-aspiring countries deliver." The key word here is "when." There is a linear progression that the candidate and/or prospective candidate countries must do something before the EU "delivers." Hahn (2014b) continues,

Various attempts and initiatives ... have tried to unlock the damaging political stalemate and enable the country to move forward ... The lack of vision and agreement between the various political leaders in the country, the complexity of

the institutional set up and the socio-economic problems that plague the country have hampered its development

Again, the EU places blame on Bosnian political leaders. There is a slight jab at the structure of the Dayton Accords through its “complexity of the institutional set-up,” but the “game” mentioned in 2008 has remained “unlocked.” The speech continues,

Bosnian citizens did not demonstrate over the share of legal competencies ... of the complex institutional set up ... did not demonstrate either about ethnic quotas ... What they demonstrated about was jobs, better education for their children and better living conditions for them as a whole.

In other words, according to Hahn, equality, representation, and minority ethnic rights are not the issue. It is the economy. It is a rational pragmatism to better the lives of children, the next generation, and to improve standards of living. Identity is, not necessarily irrelevant, but on the backburner. Tangible, rational improvements are what is being called for by the demonstrations.

Taken together, the EU’s prescriptive role certainly “sounds” as though Bosnia is a prospect, but one that must make real, tangible changes that effect real, tangible outputs for its population’s material well-being. There are hints of exasperation calling on Bosnian leaders to stop playing games, not looking toward the future, and being tone-deaf to the needs of their citizens. Hahn ends the speech with the promise that “The EU is ready to look with fresh new eyes at the situation ... if there was a serious response from the side of the political leaders and institutions of the country” (ibid). This is 2014. The first 14 years of the dissertation’s analysis, the first 14 years of the 21st Century for Bosnia, must be “unseen.” Progress has not been made. It can happen, Hahn maintains, but it “will require a common vision ... courage to reach difficult agreements ... as well as a strong commitment to back up words with deeds” (ibid). Thus, the EU constructs a

prescription of Bosnia that it is indeed a prospect. It is not close to being a candidate. Bosnian leaders are not being serious; they are not producing pragmatic improvements institutionally or for their citizens. The EU will deliver “when” Bosnia delivers.

Bosnian Presidents

A simple sentence will not suffice in laying out the Bosnian Presidents who have served over the past 21 years. The Bosnian presidency is a tripartite arrangement that has a member of each “constituent ethnicity,” as part of the governing body. For the purpose of introduction only the “chairman” will be listed below because it is they who *speaks* on behalf of the formal “head of state” that the tripartite represents; and it is their presidential speech that gets catalogued on the Bosnian governmental website. There has been 36 turns as chairman of the presidency since 2000. Of those, 18 men have filled the role. The full list is in Table #7 with stars denoting number of repeat appearances on the list and the letter B, C, or S to designate whether they are Bosniak, Croat, or Serb. For instance, Zeljko Komsic is the current chairman, has five stars behind his name, therefore this is his sixth time in that position, and he is a Croat. Shading is provided to make the list more readable.

Ante Jelavic (1999-2000) – C	HDZ BiH – Croatian Democratic Union
Alija Izetbegovic (2000-2000) – B	SDA – Party of Democratic Action
Zivko Radisic (2000-2001) – S	SP – Socialist Party
Jozo Krizanovic (2001-2002) – C	SDP BiH – Social Democratic Party
Beriz Belkic (2002-2002) – B	SBiH – Party for Bosnia & Herzegovina
Mirko Sarovic (2002-2003) – S	SDS – Serb Democratic Party
Dragan Covic (2003-2003) – C	HDZ BiH – Croatian Democratic Union
Borislav Paravac (2003-2003) – S	SDS – Serb Democratic Party
Dragan Covic (2003-2004)* - C	HDZ BiH – Croatian Democratic Union
Sulejman Tihic (2004-2004) – B	SDA – Party of Democratic Action

Table 7 *Chairman of the Presidency, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2000-Present*

Table 7 Continued

Borislav Paravac (2004-2005)* - S	SDS – Serb Democratic Party
Ivo Miro Jovic (2005-2006) – C	HDZ BiH – Croatian Democratic Union
Sulejman Tihic (2006-2006)* - B	SDA – Part of Democratic Action
Nebojsa Radmanovic (2006-2007) – S	SNSD – Allia. of Indep. Social Democrats
Zeljko Komsic (2007-2008) – C	SDP BiH – Social Democratic Party
Haris Silajdzic (2008-2008) – B	SBiH – Party for Bosnian & Herzegovina
Nebojsa Radmanovic (2008-2009)* - S	SNSD – Allia. of Indep. Social Democrats
Zeljko Komsic (2009-2010)* - C	SDP BiH – Social Democratic Party
Haris Silajdzic (2010-2010)* - B	SBiH – Party for Bosnia & Herzegovina
Nebojsa Radmanovic (2010-2011)** - S	SNSD – Allia. of Indep. Social Democrats
Zeljko Komsic (2011-2012)** - C	SDP BiH – Social Democratic Party
Bakir Izetbegovic (2012-2012) – B	SDA – Party of Democratic Action
Nebojsa Radmanovic (2012-2013)*** - S	SNSD – Allia. of Indep. Social Democrats
Zeljko Komsic (2013-2014)*** - C	DF – Democratic Front
Bakir Izetbegovic (2014-2014)* - B	SDA – Party of Democratic Action
Mladen Ivanic (2014-2015) – S	PDP – Party of Democratic Progress
Dragan Covic (2015-2016) – C	HDZ BiH – Croatian Democratic Union
Bakir Izetbegovic (2016-2016)** - B	SDA – Party of Democratic Action
Mladen Ivanic (2016-2017)* - S	PDP – Party of Democratic Progress
Dragan Covic (2017-2018)* - C	HDZ BiH – Croatian Democratic Union
Bakir Izetbegovic (2018-2018)** - B	SDA – Party of Democratic Action
Milorad Dodik (2018-2019) – S	SNSD – Alli. of Indep. Social Democrats
Zeljko Komsic (2019-2020)**** - C	DF – Democratic Front
Sefik Dzaferovic (2020-2020) – B	SDA – Party of Democratic Action
Milorad Dodik (2020-2021)* - S	SNSD – Alli. of Indep. Social Democrats
Zeljko Komsic (2021-Present)***** - C	DF – Democratic Front

It would be too time-consuming listing each president’s demographic information on a spreadsheet within text, although an overview follows. Of the 18 presidents, only two (Ante Jelavic and Jozo Krizanovic) were born outside of Bosnia. Both men were born in Croatia. Table #7 shows the rotation of ethnicity, but also highlights that since 2003 only two Bosnian Chairmen have *not* served a second term as Chairman of the Presidency. More pointedly, there has been a repetitious “old boys’ club” of the same gentlemen filling the same role for nearly two decades. One must wonder how they are

still electable. Occupationally, ten were former politicians. Three worked in the legal field, with one of those including in criminal justice. There is also a businessman, an architect, journalist, and two teachers.

The Bosnian political landscape presidentializes partisan ethnic political parties and concentrates power in the Bosnian Presidency. Arnautovic (2019) states this is based on “the thesis of the ‘endangerment’ of their own people and the need for unity and unification of their ethnic group” (94). By having three “constituent” people labeled in the constitution, and through the structure of the tripartite presidency, the ethnic differentiations become embedded in the representative process. Nardelli, Dzidic, and Jukic (2014) contend this reifies general goals for each ethnicity, “Republika Srpska seeking greater autonomy, Croat parties angling for a third entity, and several Bosniak parties hoping for a more centrally governed country.” And, to reiterate, this is also geographically specific because of the high concentration of specific ethnic groups in each state (RS and FBiH) as discussed above. Therefore, the *motivations* of parties create a centralizing tendency for leadership that maintains differences and pursues narrowly focused, in-group priorities to the detriment of bipartisanship or *national* reform. Keil and Anderson (2021) label this a “minority complex.” Further, the centralizing tendencies just outlined manifest themselves in strong executives that are both heads of state and party presidents. This, reasonably, puts more decision-making and agenda-setting power in the hands of a single individual, which, as shown in Table #7, has often been a merry-go-round of the same individuals for nearly 18 years.

Bosnian Presidential Speech (PRSI)

Bosnia presidential speech is coded for identity and rational use. In the 278 pages of text there were 2,403 instances of identity words and 1,232 economic rational words. Sixteen coded words were used in each category. Five identity codes were not found at all: hero, villain, scared, brave, and foolish. Of the remaining 11 identity codes, seven met the 1% threshold. Identity codes occur in 1.6% of Bosnian presidential speech. Next, rational words appear in 1% of all text. Three rational codes were absent: neoliberal, evolving, and modernity. Of the remaining 13 rational codes, only six were found above 1% of the time. To start, the following chart highlights the distribution of seven identity words between 2000-2021.




Figure 35. Bosnian Identity Codes

As with all other Western Balkan countries, Bosnian identity speech revolved around pronoun use, but a curious finding occurred with “Balkan,” “Europe,” and “history.” Off the top, “our” was by far the most coded word with 20.8% coverage. “Their” and “Us” were second and third dropping coverage percentages to 8.4% and 7.1% respectively. Each of the top three words coded were evenly distributed as one can imagine. Yet, “Europe,” ranked fourth, “history,” ranked fifth, and “Balkan,” ranked seventh. Each had one to three years where their usage rate spiked helping their overall averages rise above the 1+% threshold for inclusion in Figure #35. “Europe” coded 17% coverage in 2002, 13% coverage in 2009, and 13% coverage in 2015. “History” jumped up to a usage of 12% in 2021. “Balkan” spiked to 10% in 2009. Bosnia signed its EU Stabilization and Association Agreement in June 2008 after Kosovo declared its independence in February of that year. Also, this happened one year after Slovenia was admitted as an EU member-state in 2007. These events might explain the “history” and “Balkan” narratives shown vis-à-vis increased frequency of speaking those words. The “history” jump in 2021 may be the easier conjecture that amid the “historic” nature of the COVID-19 pandemic presidential speech emphasized the unique/abnormal qualities of the year to both reassure that all was being done to combat the virus *and* that “this too shall pass.” Next, Figure #36 details the Bosnian rational coded language.




Figure 36. *Bosnian Rational Speech*

“Economic” and “development” again led the way in presidential rational speech. As with 2009 just previously discussed, the use of “economic,” or any rational pragmatic word hits double-digit usage in that year. Otherwise, the doldrum blanket categories of “economic” and “development” rank first and/or second every year. Even in years in which one of the words does not singularly occupy *both* ranks, they are tied atop the leaderboard. This occurs in 2017 with “economic” and “progress,” 2019 with “development,” “progress,” and “integration,” and in 2020 with “economic” and “progress”. To reiterate what has been written in previous chapters, “progress” is a directional word that implies moving “higher” or to a “better” standard of living, and thus

its inclusion points the use of “economic” or “development” in a continuum rather than as simply a categorical umbrella word-choice.

Next, micro critical discourse analysis (CDA) will present the sentence structure of Bosnian presidential speech. First, Bosnian text was declarative 76% in rationally coded sentences and 68% of identity sentences. This is standard fare. Second, a rate not normally found in the other countries is that Bosnian rational sentences have a higher percent of both imperative and exclamatory sentences. Imperative sentences occurred 12% rational to 1% identity. Exclamatory sentences occurred 12% rational to 6% identity. In the former, this is a statistical misdirection. A single sentence, “We have to develop more intense economic relations with Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro” not only codes in four different “instances” because it mentions four different countries. But, based on the quantity of economic sentences at/toward each country, the percentage of one instance makes for a higher rate. That is, sentence totals per country were Croatia (11), Montenegro (7), Slovenia (4), and Serbia (4). Having one sentence as an imperative makes it 9%, 14%, 25%, and 25% preponderance respectively. Third, in the latter, the exclamatory sentences are not misleading. The exclamations are primarily gratitude and thanks for entering into agreements, hosting, and cooperating with Bosnian.

Meso CDA reveals Bosnian speech as less focused on the future but nevertheless complimentary and cooperative. In sum, 67% of rational sentences and 64% of identity speeches were temporally in the present. Backward looking were 21% of rational sentences and 11% of identity speeches. That leaves 12% of rational speeches and 5% of identity sentences looking toward the future. This “speaks” to the hold that the past has

on Bosnian presidents, but also the immediate needs and short-term interests and/or resolutions they are conveying. It also is noteworthy that rational sentences were more forward-looking implying economic opportunities are in the future and cannot hang on the past.

Tonally, the majority of Bosnian speech was gracious and collaborative. In total, 58% of the speech balanced those ways (32% complimentary and 26% cooperative). Hope was found in 10% of the speeches. There were no instances of dissociative speech. Bosnia apparently did not want to separate from the Western Balkans or their role therein. Criticism and pessimism, adding up to 16% speech coverage, never reached double digits for any particular country except Slovenia. Slovenia was mentioned 4 times in economic sentences and 14 times in identity sentences (on a side note, Croatia led the way with 61 total mentions). One critical economic sentence propelled that rate to 25%, disproportioning the results. Otherwise, the highest level of criticism was leveled at Kosovo, Serbia, and Croatia in identity sentence at an 11% rate for each. The contested 1990s and the three “constituent” ethnicities in Bosnia can explain why these two nation-states were at the “top” of the “critical” list. Additionally, Bosnia does not recognize Kosovo. So, there is that. From here, this chapter unravels the variables and results of the aforementioned newest country, Kosovo.

Kosovo

Kosovo is the smallest country of the seven former Yugoslav nation-states and is 6 of 7 by population with 1.9 million citizens (World Bank 2022). It is a landlocked country and former province of Serbia. Ethnically, 92.9% of Kosovars are Albanian with

only 1.5% Serb, with each group having their language officially recognized by the constitution. Religiously, 95.6% are Muslim, 2.2% Catholic, and 1.5% Christian Orthodox (Allcock, Lampe, and Young 2021). Two notes on Kosovo's demographics. First, an interesting realization is that in 2008 the Kosovo population was 2.1 million and was made up of 5.3% Serbs (Woehrel 2011). Some quick math shows that equaling 111,300 Serbs in Kosovo. The more recent numbers, however, indicate that there are only 28,500 Serbs there now. So, between 2008-2021 approximately 82,800 Serbs left their homes and were either displaced and unaccounted for, or they returned to Serbia proper. This speaks to the larger Serbia – Kosovo braid that Serbia tried to tighten through war but has since unwound to Kosovar independence and rhetoric of contention and cooperation.

Second, Kosovo's overwhelming Albanian ethnicity links it to both North Macedonia and Albania. First, with North Macedonia, there are issues related to economic cooperation hindered by Serbia's lack of Kosovo recognition. North Macedonia's "mini-Schengen" Western Balkan proposal has not been met with enthusiasm in Pristina (Marusic 2021). Brezar (2021) references Kosovo political leaders who fear this economic arrangement would lead to "autocracy, corruption, and war criminals." There also have been, and are, concerns related to Albania Kosovar militants aiding and abetting their North Macedonian kindred, which disrupts North Macedonia's sovereignty and their ability to build a national identity irrespective of ethnicity (Chiclet 2001) (Morina 2017). Second, Kosovo and Albania are connected via ethnicity, religion, and borders. However, after a brief greater Albanian state (1941-1944) the two developed in isolation from each other, where skepticism grew, during the Cold War.

Only in the last 30 years has their commonalities reawakened options for cooperation and connection (Sulcebe 2014). Krasniqi (2013) compares the two as part of a nexus of “nationalizing states, national minorities, external national homelands, to the ... ‘Euro-Atlantic space’.” King, Piracha, and Vullnetari (2010) discuss the relationship between migration, remittances, and how each constructs the concept of diaspora for Kosovars and/or Albanians that have crossed the border.

Kosovar Economic Development (ECON)

Kosovo had the second poorest ECON regionally in 2000, and today has the poorest at \$4,287.20 per capita. Their growth rate over 20 years is fourth best at 15% annually or 294% cumulative; however Serbia, which was below Kosovo in 2000 has grown the fastest and every other country had a higher starting point. Figure #37 shows a steadier upward trend than the other Western Balkan countries who all spike in 2008 and taper off.




Figure 37. Kosovar GDP per capita, World Bank

This general trend upwards highlights a growing economy. From 2010-2020 Kosovo is one of four Western Balkan countries with a 30+% cumulative growth (Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, and North Macedonia). In aggregate Kosovar unemployment has improved from approximately 55% in 2006 (Bardos 2007) to 25% in 2020 (World Bank 2021). Their trade encompasses regional partners. The top three countries exports go to are Albania (16.2%), North Macedonia (12.2%) and Italy (10.6%), while six of the top seven import countries are from the Western Balkans and the Balkan peninsula (Greece equals 5.9%) (Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2022). Kosovo is the third ranked Western Balkan country for FDI/GDP at 5.3%, which at minimum conveys an improving economic scene that could prove a solid return on investment. Lastly, the World Bank (2022) commends Kosovo for building inclusivity into its economy.

Next, there are negatives or areas with room for improvement. First, to pick up on the unemployment statistic from the preceding paragraph, 25% is a rough number. A dynamic, formal economy will create more opportunities for people of all ages and skill levels trusting that their work and relationships net respect, meaning, and productivity (World Bank 2022) (Kijewski and Freitag 2018). Second, Kosovo has two main trade products, metals (35.1%) and manufactured articles (17.2%). A total of 52.3% of exports coming from only two industries will disproportion those companies and their partners with financial and, sadly, political power. Krasniqi and Branch (2018) link business growth to the network ties they have with political institutions, which correlates “corruption” to better performance as the size of firms increases. In other words, the larger the company the better it is positioned to leverage its connections to political and local elites to get things done. Sopjani (2019) agrees and argues that policies that would

benefit entrepreneurship are agreed to, but never implemented, which affects small business access to financing and innovation to enter a modern, knowledge-focused economy. Third, there appears a lack of emphasis on federal Kosovar spending on welfare staples that can assist the infirm and the young. Rentas (2017) notes the government priorities of roads and infrastructure over health and welfare fiscal budgeting, and that Kosovar youth score extremely low on standardized tests globally. Schrag (2020) argues that there has been poor implementation of foreign aid and funneling the monies through official channels is inadequate. Economic development requires a global focus within a functioning domestic environment. These twin problems continue to plague Kosovo despite acknowledging the post-conflict difficulties *and* growing ECON.

Kosovar Human Rights Protection (HURI)

Kosovo is not measured in the Cato Institute's Human Freedom Index, and therefore this variable is discussed via the literature and other third-party human rights evaluators. Generally, Kosovar human rights issues fall into three categories: accountability for war crimes and the post-conflict environment, treatment of minorities and immigrants, and press freedoms. First, Human Rights Watch (2021) commends Kosovo and indicted former President Hashim Thaci, who resigned, for cooperating with the Hague and its Specialist War Crimes division. Amnesty International (2017) explains that war-time rape victims finally started receiving reparations, though the amount falls short of "international standards." This reality supports a broader study by Murdie and Davis (2010) that argues the "presence of peacekeeping interventions ... does not help

human rights,” and only “help support future physical integrity rights” (75). And yet for some the wartime dichotomy between “good” and “bad,” giving aid or not, extends to the present. Ispanovic (2022) reports French far-right groups are donating to minority Serbian Kosovars but are also politicizing their struggles vis-à-vis Muslim Albanian Kosovars as tactics in a larger platform of anti-immigration and anti-Muslim rhetoric.

Second, lack of full civil liberties toward minorities and immigrants in Kosovo continues to be a concern. Many minorities face a decision to either seek asylum elsewhere because of lack of law enforcement, poor job prospects, or extreme poverty (Halili and Ibrahim 2017), *or* remain in Kosovo and face discrimination, lack of political will or enfranchisement, shoddy educational or employment opportunities, and, worse, “intercommunal hate crimes” (Minority Rights Group International 2018). LGBTQ persons, for instance, are subject to social ostracizing by family members, social acquaintances, and via online forums even though the Kosovo constitution bans discrimination based on sexual orientation or ethnicity (Fauchier 2013). A 2015 National Democratic Institute study “found that Kosovo is the most homophobic country in the Balkans, a region that is not known for tolerant views on sexuality” (AFP 2018). Arenliu and Weine (2016) discuss the psychological trauma displaced persons and migrants have including post-traumatic stress disorder, detachment syndrome, and reintegration complications, especially for children (Zevulun et al. 2021). Further, environmental conditions, including lead poisoning, remains a problem primarily for Roma communities with little to no resolution and/or participation in a United Nations fund created to assist community renumerations or projects to alleviate the hazardous conditions (Vice 2012) (Human Rights Watch 2021). Stojanovski et al. (2017)

confirm lower levels of health care for Roma, Ashkali, and Balkan Egyptian peoples, and worse still when those communities are displaced.

Third, press freedoms are a problem. Reporters Without Borders (2021) lay out the ethnically partisan accessibility to information and the lack of freedom of movement of journalists based on ethnicity. Reporters are harassed and subject to cyber bullying and disinformation. Jungblut and Hoxha (2017) label this self-censorship that then creates unspoken “pacts” between journalists and elites based on fear of retribution. Isufi (2022) writes about an “editorial oversight” that kept a journalist’s note in an uploaded article text, just momentarily, but a moment too long because its viral sensation prompted President Osmani’s allies, including her husband, to unleash on Gazeta Express, the media outlet, the journalist, and the editor that resulted in firings and slander. Additionally, Reporters Without Borders (2021) notes that journalists abducted in the 1999 conflict are still considered missing 22 years hence.

Kosovar Democratization (DEMO)

Kosovo’s DEMO score started in last place in the Western Balkans but has ended 2020 ranked fourth of seven. From 2002-2014 the DEMO rank was idle and declined a little as Figure #38 illustrates.




Figure 38. Kosovar DEMO, V-Dem

Kosovo’s democratic aspirations are hard to discuss succinctly because of its staged 21st Century existence: “recognition, capacity, and cohesion” (Tansey 2007). Post-conflict, the United Nation’s Mission in Kosovo (UNMK) created a protectorate government. Beha and Hajrullahu (2019) argue that elites manipulated UNMK’s recalcitrant enforcement of democratic norms, looking the other way as long as lip service was being paid to international mandates. Thus, elites were able to maintain patronage networks and centralize their local power (Freedom House 2006, 2008). Anderson (2005) maintains that oppositional parties and leaders were more or less silenced and shut out of participating in the political process that would both create needed competition, but also create teachable moments for those oppositional forces to grow in political experience and consensus building. Upon independence, Kosovo struggled with the new, nominal

self-determination. Assumptions that the UNMK oversaw robust and functional institutions were overblown (Tansey 2009).

More recent political choices stress integration, security and liberal democratic norms. Gibler and Tir (2013) reject the clustering notion of democratic peace theory and argue that bordering countries are more determinative of democratization efforts, which suggests Kosovo's geographic relationship with Serbia as demonstratively problematic. This partial explains why Kosovo security issues are also present in the literature. Bardos (2007) writes of the porous borders which allow for not only migration concerns, but also the free movement of former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) personnel and other paramilitary groups that might re-instigate conflicts with Serbs or offer "support" for their North Macedonian allegiances. Maliqi (2012) offers that the nonviolent civil protests and social movements vying for Kosovar independence had to "accept the reality that the KLA had become the alternative Albanian response" (66). Vladislavljjevic (2012) notes the grievances internally between Albanian and Serbian Kosovars also portends to external conflict between Serbia and Albania proper. Peresin, Hasanovic, and Bytyqi (2021) point to female jihadist sympathizers from Kosovo, Bosnia, North Macedonia, and Albania having left to join the Islamic State, returning to find re-integration difficult and old sympathies hard to dispel. These security worries, coupled with the other aspects of this summary, requires Kosovo political elite to carefully juggle different interest groups, grievances, and stakeholders (Nowakowska-Krystman and Zakowska 2015).

Kosovar Domestic Sentiments (DMST)

Kosovo was not polled in the World Values Survey, but their Balkan Barometer (BB) results demonstrate the highest rate of enthusiasm, confidence, and hopefulness of any Western Balkan country. A robust 82% of Kosovars polled said that EU membership would be a good thing. Reiterating, that is the highest rate of any of the seven countries under consideration. Additionally, only 3.3% said it would be a “bad thing.” Is EU membership realistic? Only 9% of Kosovars did *not* think so. Sure, there were those that thought 2020 was a possibility, but between 2020 and 2021 surveys, 34% thought accession would come in 2025 and 46% believed this would happen by 2030. Ok, maybe the 2025 timeframe is unrealistic, but the hope is evident in the responses.

Individually, Kosovars are looking to “get away” to the EU. The highest response from the question about how EU membership would affect “you, individually” was “freedom to travel” at 46.4%. In second place was the “freedom to work and/or study” in the EU with a 34.4% response rate. Taken together, Kosovars want the opportunity to find opportunities in the EU whether that is recreationally, occupationally, or academically. Lastly, the third ranked response was “peace and stability,” which came in at 28.9%. This aligns with the narrative of the country profile that Kosovars want international recognition of their country, free from threats of conflict and instability, and greater integration regionally and globally.

Kosovo business confidence was equally pronounced and affirmed the desire to be a member-state of the EU. Overall, 78% of businesses answered that the EU would be a “good thing,” and starkly only 4% viewed it negatively. This is similar if not slightly higher than what has been found in other Western Balkan country results. Also in line

with other Western Balkan countries, Kosovar businesses are confident in themselves. Their responses were slightly lower than has been noted elsewhere, but 64% were confident they could compete, while 22.1% were not as confident. The discrepancy between the two aggregate figures is the last category. “Do not know, refused to answer” equaled 14.6% of responses. This is the highest figure for this categorical response. Does it speak to unfamiliarity with doing business on a regional and/or global scale? Does it speak to the “newness” of their independence with businesses still trying to figure out the regulatory and business environment? Or, does the preponderance of informal economic activity (30+%) stifle confidence in being on the “right side of the law” (Peci 2019)? A future study might delve into these questions, but the dissertation now turns to the way Kosovo was talked *to* by the European Commission.

Kosovar European Constraints (EUCN)

Kosovo is mentioned in EU Commission speeches 52 times. This is the most mentions of any Western Balkan country. Its speech starts off as being a caretaker of Kosovo, evolves to be prescriptive yet hopeful, and ends with pointing responsibility to Kosovar leaders. It is not unsurprising. It is a natural progression for a newly independent country trying to gain membership into the European Union. Yet, the curious component is that the speech quickly mirrors how the EU “talks” to the other Western Balkan countries who have been at “this” (state building at least, if not fully nation *and* state building) for much longer autonomously.

Two months after declaring independence, Rehn (2008) says, “We need to help Kosovo help itself.” This denotes a patrimonial view of the relationship, one of

assistance and nurturing. Speaking about the region more broadly, but pivoting after having just addressed Kosovo, Rehn continues,

I hear very often in the region the expression “This is the Balkans” – which usually implies that something is predestined to go bust or wrong. I’ve been enough in the Balkans to know the patchwork of ethnic, cultural, religious, and political cleavages there. But I refuse to surrender to it. In my view, if I were not a staunch supporter of free speech, the expression “This is the Balkans” should be forbidden. I don’t believe in historical determinism, but leadership and human action. If there’s the will, there is progress.

This is, arguably, the most powerful quote from all of the EU Commission speech texts. However, being stated in the recent aftermath Kosovo’s declaration of independence and coupled with wanting to aid Kosovo’s self-determined path, the quote rallies and inspires action. The future is not determined by what previously happened. Rehn does not state that history has *no* effect, but rather, agency can adjust, revise itself, and find new directions.

As previously alluded, however, the uplifting words of 2008 switch lanes by 2015 and alternate between compliments and urges to work harder. Hahn (2015a) states, “The elections in June were a success and ... difficulties experienced ... do not diminish this fact. ... progress will be determined by your capacity to negotiate and compromise.” He recognizes electoral reforms but wants Kosovo to stay the course and challenge itself to improve its outreach and integration of Serb minorities. Hahn (ibid) persists, “commitment, conviction, and courage will be required on your part.” Here he is starting to move the onus on Kosovar leaders. This speech ends with a more direct request, “I therefore appeal to you to strengthen your border controls and inform travelers that they will not be granted asylum.” This is in reference to both the Syrian migration Balkan Route mentioned elsewhere in the dissertation, but also to the previously written security

concerns the literature raises on nefarious actors using Kosovo as an “easier” means through which to reach Europe, or the “West,” to promote ideologies and/or actions of hate. Hahn (ibid) ends by wanting to “reiterate that the Commission is committed to helping you tackle them.” “Them” are the reforms needed. We, the EU, is there “with you.”

Finally, Hahn’s 2016 speech is less about mentoring or nurturing, and is not even about the “hamburger” sales technique of compliments and requests/asks, but rather shifts tones to more exhortations with hints of disappointment. He says,

I want to underline that the Agreement includes provisions that commit Kosovo to high international standards ... It means that the institutions set up to ensure democratic government and the rules that allow these institutions to do their work should be respected ... Obstruction and violence have no place in a democratic system. ... Allow me to use this opportunity to call on Kosovo’s politicians to engage in a free political exchange to solve their differences in a way that is worthy of the country’s European perspective; without obstruction, without violence and without threats and intimidation.

There are three distinctions in this quote. First, he sets a standard, a “high international standard,” that focus his expectations. Second, and maybe the most interesting aspect, is that the “respect” toward “institutions” can be read as directed at leaders, but *also* the public at large. Democratization does not occur, democracy does not last, when confidence in domestic institutions frays or collapses. This occurs based on how leaders are leading and/or interacting within institutions. But, this also occurs when the public refuses to substantiate institutions too. There may be reasons for not trusting institutions, but without new institutions to functionally carry out state tasks or implement policies, then the efficacy of government becomes a shaky lynchpin. Third, Hahn clearly is pointing blame at politicians for instigating or corroborating obstruction and violence.

One can “hear” the disappointment that this behavior will not reach the “high international standards” and directly threatens Kosovo’s path toward the EU.

Thus, the EU’s Alter’s role for Kosovo evolves over time. In the beginning it is quite patrimonial. The role expectation is one in tandem, of the EU helping Kosovo help itself. After seven years pass, realities and events dictate that the EU changes its tune to be more prescriptive – “you must do this.” They are still hopeful. However, the subsequent speech squarely conveys Kosovo as a “prospect.” Hahn is not pleased in his assessment and directs comments at the Kosovar politicians and public, persisting that events in Kosovo are unacceptable and will not reach the “high standards” that Kosovo envisions.

Kosovar Presidents

Kosovo has had twelve presidential terms since 2000 with nine people holding the office. Chronologically they are Ibrahim Rugova 1992-2006, Nexhat Daci 2006-2006, Fatmir Sejdiu 2006-2010, Jakup Krasniqi 2010-2011, Behgjet Pacolli for 41 days February 2011- April 2011, Krasniqi again as interim for three days in April 2011, Atifete Jahjaga 2011-2016, Hashim Thaci 2016-2020, Vjosa Osmani 2020-2021, Glauk Konjufca for 13 days March 2021-April 2021, and finally returning to Osmani from 2021 to present. This is the first time there has been substantial female presence in the presidency of a Western Balkan country. Only former Croatian president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic joins Jahjaga and Osmani as female executives for any substantial amount of time. Rugova, Daci, and Sejdu belonged to the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). Krasniqi and Thaci were members of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). Jahjaga was an independent. Osmani represents Guxo, a center-right party. Finally,

Konjufca is a card-carrying member of the social democratic Vetevendosje party. All of the presidents are Albanian Kosovars, born in Kosovo, and seven of nine were schooled at the University of Pristina.

These presidents are the most interesting of the Western Balkans for three reasons. First, Behgjet Pacolli, only president for 41 days, is the only president of all looked at in the dissertation that completed their undergraduate outside of their home country. He went to school in Hamburg, Germany. Even more interesting is that he is considered the richest Albanian in the world. Maybe that is why his political career was so short lived. Second, Kosovo is the only country with presidents born after 1970 of which they have three. Additionally, they are the only country with presidents born after 1980, Konjufca and Osmani in 1981. Third, Osmani and Jahjaga went to graduate school in the United States. Another first for any president(s) considered in the research. To top it off with impressive qualifications, President Jahjaga rose to the rank Major Lieutenant General in the Kosovo police force *and* was the youngest female head of state *ever* when she was elected at age 36.

Kosovo's political system was set up and administered by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMK) as a parliamentary style democracy, allowed to maintain the status quo, and since independence floundered to consolidate the appropriate balance between party platforms and presidential executive responsibilities. Beha (2017) writes that the UNMK "viewed the organization of elections before Kosovo's independence as an instrument for stability and buying time..." and therefore politics was "not guided by ideological principles, but by clientelistic and patrimonial reasoning" (9-11). Vladislavljevic (2012) argues that integrating both main ethnic groups, plus minority

ones, has “failed badly.” Krasniqi (2019) contends this oscillated between politics that was based on platforms and personalities that were either militaristic (from a past in the Kosovo Liberation Army) or pacifistic. He continues that the president has a fair amount of power, but exercising it revolves around the individual’s political acumen. Mikucka-Wojtowicz (2019) argues that international involvement in Kosovo’s political genesis and evolution has also stunted pluralist consolidation whether it is/was the United Nations or, more so now, the European Union.

Kosovar Presidential Speech (PRSI)

Kosovo presidential speech is coded for identity and rational use. In the 711 pages of text there were 6,086 instances of identity words and 1,627 economic rational words. Sixteen coded words were used in each category. Five identity codes were not found at all: villain, scared, brave, smart, and foolish. Of the remaining 11 identity codes, eight met the 1% threshold. Identity codes occur in 2.1% of Kosovar presidential speech. Next, rational words appear in 0.6% of all text. Three rational codes were absent: neoliberal, evolving, and modernity. Of the remaining 13 rational codes, only five were found above 1% of the time. To start, the following chart highlights the distribution of eight identity words between 2000-2021.




Figure 39. Kosovo Identity Speech

Kosovo had all four pronouns in the top four, but more impressive was that “our” earned the lion share of all Western Balkan countries in its code coverage. “Our” was found in 30.6% of identity speech. The high ranks of all four pronouns illustrates that Kosovo is its own nation-state, with its own people, and that it should proclaim to be insistently recognized as such intersubjectively. “Europe” gets up to 4% usage in 2014 and “Balkans” gets there too in 2019. 2014 was the initial wave of migrants from Syria, which could explain the uptick in “Europe” there. October of 2019 was the infamous French President Emmanuel Macron’s statement on halting accession of Western Balkan countries’ path to EU membership. Otherwise, the non-pronouns stay middling in the 1-2% range. Next, Kosovo rational codes show some variations as depicted in Figure #40.




Figure 40. Kosovo Rational Speech

Kosovo rational speech, as with the other countries, is a neck and neck race between “economic” (3.9%) and “development” (3.4%). “Progress” (2.1%) and “integration” (2.4%) make strong pitches for third and fourth place. To repeat from previous country profiles and cases here, “economic” and “development” can encompass many different ideas and their frequency makes sense from a speech perspective because using them may not require the specificity of the unknown and/or unsure. “Progress” and “integration,” for Kosovo, also is logical since they were working on getting away from Serbian control, pushing for self-determination, and then working towards a collaborative future on their own “two feet.”

Digging beneath the surface with micro critical discourse analysis (CDA), reveals that Kosovar presidential text was primarily declarative. In total 73% of rational speech and 86% of identity speech were declarative sentences. There was one instance of an interrogative, one instance of an imperative, and five instances of an exclamatory, all toward Serbia around identity, but those averaged out to 0%, 0%, and 2% respectively. Speaking of Serbia, and not surprisingly, it was talked “to” 132 times, by far the most addressed country. Second place was Montenegro with 21 mentions. However, North Macedonia and Montenegro were not brought up at all in rational coded sentences.

A meso CDA analysis reveals that Kosovar presidents were worried about the here and now. Rational sentences were 71% in the present, while identity sentences were 81% of the moment. Averaged out, the past was referenced 2% of the time as was the future. This seems to accentuate the stages of transition Tansey (2007) stated in the DEMO section, that of “recognition, capacity, and cohesion” of the Kosovar nation-state. Speech about Serbia showed a 7% rational code orientation to the past and 10% in identity sentences. Kosovo and Serbia’s entangled history explains this. Interestingly, identity sentences also showed 10% toward the future with Serbia, too, equal to that of the past. This balances the here and now grounding and suggests that Kosovo remembers but is trying to move forward.

Tonally, compliments and cooperation dominate the numbers, but negatively associated sentences were certainly present. Compliments occurred 23% in rational sentences and 15% in identity sentences; cooperation appeared 21% rational and 33% identity. Hope, meanwhile, was a distance third on the positivity scale at 6% and 9% respectively. But negativity was evident too. Criticism was 14% coded in rational

sentences, and 16% coded in identity sentences. Pessimism, though, crept up in 4% of pragmatic speech and 15% of identity speech. Lastly, there was one instance of disassociation speaking with Serbia, which, brings the reader to Table #8. Serbian speech by category is shown with its associative pairings.

Kosovo Sentences about/toward Serbia		
	Rational	Identity
Compliment	11%	0%
Criticism	7%	27%
Cooperation	33%	22%
Disassociation	0%	1%
Hope	22%	26%
Pessimism	15%	6%

Table 8 *Kosovo to Serbia Tonal Code Coverage*

Kosovo was less complimentary, more critical, more cooperative rationally, less cooperative on identity, a smidge dissociative, more hopeful, and more pessimistic. The first two categories and pessimism make perfect sense considering the history between the two countries. What stands out is the cooperation and hope that Kosovo has with Serbia. It is wanting to move past their collective past.

Concluding Remarks on Bosnia and Kosovo

This case study highlights the complexity of being Bosnia and Kosovo. Both countries are beset by the past, by the conflicts of the 1990s and early 2000s, and then the architecture of the peace. Outside actors tried, and continue, to foist themselves onto the Bosnian and Kosovar conceptions of “nation” and “state,” creating institutions to mixed results. Additionally, the constituent ethnicities in Bosnia, their geographic separation, and the governmental structures create a troubling pergola that is overgrown and throws shade rather than being open where light can bear fruit. Kosovo must deal constructively

with Serb Kosovars, Serbia proper, and forge ties of authenticity and recognition abroad. Those extreme challenges aside, however, Kosovo is shown to have done a fair job of managing and constructing their nation-state in a short 13 years. Both countries have “grown” economically, but Bosnia still is “behind” on basically every other variable metric.

The EU’s Alter’s prescription demonstrates two different types of language based on where Bosnia and Kosovo “started” and “ended” from 2000-2021. For Bosnia, the EU sounds impatient. It will act *when* Bosnia acts. The language was tone deaf for any acknowledgement of the institutional framework of the Dayton Accords that could contribute to reticent democratization. Its prescription to Bosnia speaks to keeping them a prospective country because theirs is a tribal entrenchment that must be crossed by them first. EU Alter’s prescription toward Kosovo evolved as Kosovo became independent and then worked through the next 13 years. At first it was kind and helpful, next it was more insistent of a shared responsibility to push forward with reforms, and then finally it read to be disappointed and impatient. It is as if the EU cannot rectify structural hinderances to agential behavior. This is not to imply that agency does not matter. It certainly does. But a supranational institutional that speaks as if there are no structural/institutional parameters that affect agency is a misgiving.

Presidential speech in both countries is overweight to an identity orientation, remains declarative, but is much more complimentary and cooperative than expected, while also exhibiting more criticism at targeted neighbors. Identity language for Bosnia doubled that of rational coded speech. Kosovo had 3.5x more identity language than rational, pragmatic ones. Bosnian speech 65% of the time was in the present, lower than

the 76% rate in Kosovar speech. Bosnian speech was 56% complimentary and cooperative while Kosovar speech was 46%. Finally, Bosnian speech was critical of Serbia, Croatia, and Kosovo 11% of the time, while Kosovo's ire was directed at Serbia in 27% of its sentences to/about them. Thus, Bosnia still harbored feelings about the past, was more gracious than Kosovo, but spread out its anger and/or frustrations. Kosovo focused more on the here and now, the fact that it has "independent" self-determination, but is more poignant in who/what is holding it back.

CHAPTER 7 – COMPARATIVE CASE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of the three cases presented in Chapters 4-6. The chapter is laid out in four sections. First, it presents a comparative evaluation of the Content Analysis portion of the dissertation considers the “big picture” of the presidential speech. Second, it presents an assessment of micro–Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) will be undertaken to deconstruct meaning(s) behind presidential diction and sentence structure. Third, a meso CDA will be comparatively presented via analysis of temporal and tonal structures, as both micro and meso levels of CDA were presented in the case studies. Fourth, it presents a comparative analysis of the macro CDA. This level of CDA connects discourse to the situation and/or environment in which it was given, and while it has been implied throughout based on the four non-speech variables discussed, will be explicitly addressed here.

Comparative Analysis of Content Analysis Findings

Presidential speech (PRSP), the main variable of analysis, was collected through official government websites for the presidents of each country from 2000-2021. Adding all the presidential speech texts equaled 1,589,221 words. Countries do not have a standard archival system for past presidential speeches. For some, the government websites had past speeches. Others did not. In those cases, searching for past presidents by name sometimes resulted in identifying their own, individual, websites where speeches were found. However, this discrepancy in governmental records explains the difference between totals of Serbia and Croatia with the rest of the Western Balkan

countries. Nevertheless, the dissertation used percentages rather than pure nominal results to offset sampling inconsistencies and then coded the speeches based on 16 identity words and 16 rational, pragmatic words per existing scholarship and the dissertation’s research questions. The codes for each category are found in Appendix #2.

Table #9 shows the broadest overview of the content analysis findings.

	Total	Identity	IDEA %	Rational	RAT %	Delta
Slovenia	450,025	7,400	1.6%	2,694	0.60%	2.67x
Croatia	43,924	1,591	3.6%	263	0.60%	6.00x
Montenegro	128,830	2,403	1.9%	1,232	0.95%	2.00x
N. Macedon	337,842	6,990	2.1%	1,614	0.48%	4.38x
Serbia	60,789	1,061	1.7%	166	0.27%	6.30x
Bosnia	284,116	4,927	1.7%	1,516	0.53%	3.20x
Kosovo	283,695	6,086	2.1%	1,627	0.57%	3.68x

Table 9 *Identity vs. Rational Coded Words*

At this 30,000-foot view, identity words dominate the speech texts. Not only are there far more instances of identity language, but the coverage of identity words to *all* words is above 1.6% for all countries, at least 1% higher in every case *than* the rational coded word coverage. The two countries with the most lopsided emphasis on identity are Croatia and Serbia. Both stand to reason, but for slightly different reasons. On one hand, both countries, prime instigators historically and in the 1990s, proudly consider themselves as standard bearers of ethno-religious communities, persecuted and/or prejudiced at different points in time. On the other, Croatia’s accession into the EU in 2013 also creates identity issues around being a member as opposed to being a candidate and Croatians holding themselves as “above” the other, non-EU Western Balkan countries. For Serbia, speech had to navigate being “Yugoslavia” early in the century, then the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, then Serbia by itself, and finally Serbia in relation to a breakaway Kosovo. Therefore, identity was central during four distinct

iterations in 21 years. Speaking of Montenegro, it shows the closest difference in frequency of identity versus rational words, which is backed up by the case study. Montenegro is simply ready to move forward and be recognized as a standalone, strong country and member of Europe. While Montenegrin language does emphasize “Europe” as shown in Table #10, there is a rational institutional approach to the EU accession process, of the sequential nature of making reforms for the EU’s *acquis*, and Podgorica’s proximate use of both types of language illustrates why the evidence points to both rationales for membership.

Table #10 details the top five identity coded words per country, where four items particularly stand out. First, generally three identity pronouns get into the top five for all seven countries, with all four pronouns in 4 of 7 instances. This can be an either/or result. It either reiterates the “us vs. them” othering process of in-groups and out-groups that predominates the literature of the Western Balkans, identity politics, and orientalism. Or, it can simply reflect that pronouns are a much more common form of speech.

IDENTITY	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth
Slovenia	Our 17.0%	Europe 7.3%	Us 6.5%	Their 5.6%	Them 3.1%
Croatia	Us 25.5%	Our 17.4%	Nation 11.7%	Europe 8.2%	Their 7.5%
Montenegro	Europe 18.1%	Our 17.5%	Their 18.1%	Us 4.2%	Balkans 3.2%
N. Macedon	Our 21.3%	Us 7.6%	Their 5.7%	Europe 4.0%	Them 2.5%
Serbia	Our 20.0%	Europe 19.1%	Their 7.1%	Us 6.0%	Them 4.1%
Bosnia	Our 20.8%	Their 8.4%	Us 7.1%	Europe 5.7%	History 2.8%
Kosovo	Our 30.6%	Their 9.4%	Us 8.4%	Them 3.8%	History 2.4%

Table 10 *Top 5 Identity Coded Words per Country*

Second, the aforementioned Montenegrin preponderance of “Europe,” catches one’s eye. To keep with Montenegro for a moment, it is also worth noting that it is the only country to have “Balkans” in its top five. The rationale in the above paragraph can be applied here, too. Their identity *and* pragmatic speech read more even keeled, and thus could suggest that their attention on the entire region is one of identification, cooperation, and integration. If one incorporates Table #11’s finding that Montenegro’s usage rate of “development” and “economic” is substantially higher than the other countries, the arguments just made become more robust. Third, however, Montenegro’s “Europe” usage is below the Serbian usage rate of 19.1%, which again, might and can be explained vis-à-vis Serbia’s shifting sovereign identity. Fourth, “Europe” places for six of seven countries, with Kosovo being the lone exception. Its independence in 2008, the fact that they are not recognized by two Western Balkan countries and five EU countries, can explain that they are speaking in terms of their own self-determination, their broader “history” reflected in a 2.4% usage rate, rather than in relation to a collective that does not unanimously acknowledge Kosovar independence.

Table #11 lays out the top five rational codes for each country. While arguably not as important as identity words, there are noteworthy comparisons to make.

RATIONAL	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth
Slovenia	Development 5.4%	Economic 4.1%	Integration 1.3%	Progress 1.2%	Success 1.1%
Croatia	Development 3.3%	Economic 3.3%	Success 1.8%	Institution 1.5%	Progress 1.2%
Montenegro	Development 11.6%	Economic 8.6%	Integration 4.1%	Progress 1.9%	Growth 1.6%
N. Macedon	Economic 2.9%	Development 2.4%	Integration 2.3%	Prosperity 1.2%	Progress 1.2%
Serbia	Development 2.8%	Economic 2.8%	Progress 2.6%	Integration 1.6%	N/A
Bosnia	Economic 4.5%	Development 4.2%	Progress 2.3%	Integration 1.8%	Prosperity 1.0%
Kosovo	Economic 3.6%	Development 3.1%	Integration 2.4%	Progress 1.9%	Success 1.0%

Table 11 *Top 5 Rational Coded Words per Country*

To start, “development” and “economic,” as mentioned throughout the case studies, lead the way for every country. These are umbrella categories that can refer to several different issue areas, directions, initiatives, and/or concerns. Also, “Progress” is in the top five for each country. This acknowledges that all Western Balkan nation-states are aware and mindful that they are not where they want to be, but rather they are moving, “progressing” toward either membership and/or a general betterment of their societies. Next, more interestingly, Croatia is the only country that does not have “integration” in its top five rational words. Combining this fact with its six-times more likely use of identity words, and highly referenced “nation” word choice from Table #10, further illustrates Croatia’s linguistic characterization of self-assurance, championing a unique, distinguished place among Western Balkan countries. Lastly, “success” only appears in the top five for Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo. The first two countries make sense in that they “progressed” to “successful” EU member status. In Kosovo’s case “success” is independence, simply.

Prospecting a case-to-case comparative analysis of the content analysis does not provide any meaningful conclusions. All three cases have eerily similar distributions of identity and rational word coverage. Member-states have an “outlier,” Croatia, which highlights the variance between countries. Candidate countries’ “outlier” is Montenegro’s rational word usage. This broad analysis results in an identity variance of 1.7%-3.6% and a 0.37%-0.95% rational word usage variance. The top five identity words for each of the three cases are roughly the same also. Croatia uses “nation” third most often and the prospective candidates have “history” ranked fifth. The preceding paragraph discuss this more directly. These are the biggest differences between cases. Rational language is similarly undifferentiated except for, again, Montenegro’s greater usage of rational speech.

Comparative Analysis of Micro Critical Discourse Analysis Findings

The Fairclough Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) model has three levels of analysis: micro, meso, and macro. Micro CDA looks at the word and sentence as its units of analyses. This was accomplished in the dissertation through the coded word Content Analysis discussed above. Further, each of the sentences were then read to determine their sentence structure based on the common English linguistic categories of declarative (informative), imperative (commands), interrogative (questions), and exclamatory (strong emotions). This categorization allowed the research to determine the intent of the sentence. Table #12 presents the findings.

SENT. TYPE	<u>Declarative</u>	<u>Imperative</u>	<u>Interrogative</u>	<u>Exclamatory</u>
Slovenia	67%	11%	2%	8%
Croatia	93%	5%	0%	2%
Montenegro	65%	3%	0%	5%
N. Macedonia	78%	0%	0%	9%
Serbia	77%	4%	1%	7%
Bosnia	72%	7%	0%	9%
Kosovo	80%	0%	0%	1%

Table 12 *Discourse by Sentence Time*

The results paint a clear picture of declarative language with some emotion and requests intermixed. First, Croatia and Kosovo demonstrate the most informative speech. The dryness in Croatian speech indicates a matter-of-fact manner of speaking. Kosovo, on the other hand, is trying to present itself as a serious nation-state worthy of international recognition. Their presidential statements sentences present their case, wanting and hoping that the record “speaks” for itself. One purely speculative thought for these countries is worth mentioning here. Both Croatia (Grabar-Kitarovic) and Kosovo (Jahjaga and Osmani) were the only countries that had female heads of state. How this could or does affect speech patterns linguistically or socially constructed could be an avenue for future research.

The second micro CDA finding is the 11% imperative sentence structure from Slovenia. Its early (2007) membership into the EU positioned Slovenia to be a “leader” for the former Yugoslav countries. The EU Commission speech to/about Slovenia also indicates this in a small sample. The requests, then, imply a level of responsibility and “taking-charge” that implies commanding, directing, and/or telling the other Western Balkan countries what to do, or what they should do. This is not to suggest that they were listened to by any means. However, the relationship of Slovenia’s status and role with the way its presidents spoke aligns.

Third, the 9% exclamatory sentences from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and North Macedonia adhere to grievances both proclaim. Bosnia naturally has consternation of being the main battleground for the wars of the 1990s. Further, its internal geopolitical structure and “constituent peoples,” who have obvious connections with nation-states in their own rights (Bosnian Serbs with Serbia, Bosnian Croats with Croatia) raises the stakes for Bosnia proper to try and integrate and create a Bosnian nationalist sentiment. Therefore, strong emotive sentences, pleas, and condemnations, are illustrative of this sentence structure. North Macedonian emotional sentences also come from grievances; for them it relates to Greece and Bulgaria interfering in their domestic politics and their progress in the EU accession process. Not only are there historical ethnic and linguistic discrepancies they have had to address, but its 2019 name change from Macedonia to North Macedonia can certainly be understood to elicit emotions in defiance, resignation, and acquiesce on this issue, and others, over the decades.

Between cases there are no recognizable differences that are not better explained *across* cases. The only standout is that prospective candidates have 0% interrogative sentences. They are not in the position to ask anything, which is reinforced here. Otherwise, the distribution of sentence type is fairly even across cases. There are higher scoring declarative speakers, but they are in both member-state and prospective candidate cases. Each case also has a country scoring 0% categorically. Slovenia is the only country with double-digit imperative speech, and its early adoption of EU standards and membership into the European Union has already been articulated. Interrogative speech falls under 2% across the board. Otherwise, patterns in the exclamatory results do not highlight any between case conclusions.

Comparative Analysis Meso Critical Discourse Analysis Findings

Meso CDA entails looking beyond “what” was said and turning attention to “how” it was said. This was accomplished two ways. First, the speech texts were read for temporal orientation. How did X country speak in relationship to temporal “space?” Were its leaders tied to the past, of the moment, looking toward the future? The EU accession process is a *process* that has a beginning, middle, and, eventual, end. Therefore, where one country is in time, in relation to the process, or conceptually in relationship to their 21st century history was important. More pointedly, these countries arose out of Yugoslavia, which is marked in time, itself having a beginning and end. Their independence dates as sovereign nation-states further cement a temporal orientation as important to assess. The only temporal cross-case comparison of note was that neither of the prospective candidate scored double-digits in future-oriented speech. Bosnia is almost there at 9%, but every other case has similar present orientation and at least one country over 12% backward facing. Table #13 drills down further.

TEMPORAL	<u>Past</u>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Future</u>
Slovenia	12%	43%	31%
Croatia	7%	69%	9%
Montenegro	5%	53%	13%
N. Macedonia	2%	82%	4%
Serbia	18%	67%	3%
Bosnia	16%	66%	9%
Kosovo	2%	77%	1%

Table 13 *Discourse Temporal Orientation*

The leaders in each category stand out. First, Slovenia, Bosnia, and Serbia all demonstrated double-digit past orientation. The most surprising of the three might be Slovenia. It could be garnered that this contradicts the “leadership” imperatives of the

micro CDA analysis. Yet, Slovenia's 31% future orientation dispels that argument. Instead, a 12% past orientation coupled with imperatives speaks of imploring other Western Balkan countries to stop litigating the past, move beyond it, forget and forgive because present and future cooperative opportunities are still possible. Bosnia's (16%) and Serbia's (18%) past orientation does not duplicate such a lofty explanation. They are stuck in the past. They are upset with past wrongs, to the "state" and to the "nation," and they hold onto their grudges, feeling slighted, hurt, and/or mistreated.

Second, North Macedonia and Kosovo are oriented in the here-and-now. Crassly, they are over it. They are ready to get after the work at hand to develop and build the society they envision. Both are below 4% in past *and* future orientation. Neither wants to focus on the past or expect too much in the future. In Table #14, which lays out the tonal orientation, both North Macedonia (6%) and Kosovo (7%) demonstrate the least "hopeful" presidential speech. Each can control what they can control and do not want to, and arguably should not want to, deal with outside actors affecting their self-determination.

The other primary meso CDA data was obtained through a reading of the intent of the message. Created dichotomies position "tones" to the presidential speech that could capture residual messages. Generalizing across cases finds that prospective candidates are the least hopeful and most pessimistic. This reflects their uncertain future and the internal strife each is contending with maintaining integrity as a nation-state. Table #14 shows country by country tonal results.

TONAL	Compliment	Criticism	Cooperation	Dissociation	Hope	Pessimism
Slovenia	20%	11%	17%	1%	27%	4%
Croatia	4%	3%	48%	0%	20%	7%
Montenegro	22%	3%	21%	0%	24%	0%
N. Macedo	36%	11%	29%	0%	6%	2%
Serbia	7%	28%	25%	1%	15%	5%
Bosnia	32%	6%	26%	0%	10%	10%
Kosovo	18%	15%	28%	0%	7%	11%

Table 14 *Discourse Tonal Orientation*

First, tonal language analysis revealed that five of seven Western Balkan countries were complimentary, and all had above a 17% cooperative tone. North Macedonia and Bosnia had the most compliments. This, generally, can be surmised based on the help and gratitude extended post-conflict (Bosnia), and in relation to external issues with Greece and Bulgaria, and after the 2001 insurgency with the Kosovo Liberation Army (North Macedonia). Serbia ranked in the bottom half for cooperation and next to last for compliments.

This dovetails into criticism and dissociation. Serbia was the most critical and was one of only two countries that spoke on dissociation. Their high criticism rate was due to being mad at Croatia (1990s conflicts), Bosnia for its ethno-religious portioning, and Kosovo for declaring its independence. However, across cases there was at least one country in each that had double-digit scores in criticism.

Finally, most countries were hopeful and optimistic. North Macedonia and Kosovo's *lack* of hope speaks to the reliance on outside actors for their future. Kosovo was also cynical as one of two countries with at least 10% pessimistic language. Bosnia is interesting because they were 10% hopeful and 10% pessimistic. It is ironic that this dichotomy in some ways reflects the two political entities, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska as, maybe, Bosnians' hopeful and pessimistic

future alternatives. Slovenia was the most hopeful, which is indicative of its early advancement into the EU and subsequent turn to a “leadership” role, such that it is working toward and “hoping” for cooperation amongst the Western Balkans.

Comparative Analysis of Macro Critical Discourse Analysis Findings

Macro critical discourse analysis (CDA), the remaining component in the Fairclough CDA model, permeates this subsection. As a reminder, micro level CDA assesses the sentence structure and diction. Meso CDA considers the direction of the speech. More pointedly, meso CDA looks at the audience, the tone, and the referential framing of time. Macro CDA, then, places the speech in its situational and/or environmental context. What is happening when the words are spoken? What are its contexts? How is the construction of speech indicative of the realities upon and whereby it is uttered? The dissertation’s model creates the situation/environment through the other variables employed and detailed in the preceding chapters. From here, it is compiled to demonstrate where each country found itself over 21 years and how the speech reflected that reality.

First, the “big year” for each country was highlighted on the spreadsheet when Slovenia (2007) and Croatia (2013) became member-states, when Montenegro (2010), North Macedonia (2005), and Serbia (2012) became candidate countries, and when Bosnia (2015) and Kosovo (2016) signed their Stabilization and Association Agreement. Table #15 shows the results of the top annual code coverage prior and after the “big year.” Yellow highlighting on Table #15 means the country *did not* match their previous

highs; green highlighting means that category *did* surpass a previous code coverage top score.

	Identity Before	Rational Before	Big Year Identity	Big Year Rational	Identity After	Rational After
Slovenia	2002 - 59%	2006 - 28%	2007 - 38%	2007 - 18%	2012 - 44%	2011 - 19%
Croatia	2000 - 75%	2000 - 30%	2013 - 40%	2013 - 14%	2020/21 - 65%	2014 - 16%
Montenegro	2003 - 53%	2005 - 47%	2010 - 44%	2010 - 24%	2019 - 63%	2012 - 28%
N. Macedon	2004 - 56%	2004 - 18%	2005 - N/A	2005 - N/A	2009/19 - 42%	2009 - 16%
Serbia	2005 - 69%	2004 - 23%	2012 - N/A	2012 - N/A	2013/18 - 46%	2020 - 13%
Bosnia	2002 - 56%	2004 - 26%	2015 - 41%	2015 - 18%	2016 - 46%	2016 - 15%
Kosovo	2013/15 - 55%	2013/14 - 21%	2016 - 49%	2016 - 8%	2020 - 62%	2021 - 9%

Table 15 *Pre & Post “Big Year” Top Code Coverage Results*

Thus, of the 14 separate trends (identity and rational language for seven countries) only *two* demonstrate an increased usage rate. Montenegro and Kosovo showed higher identity language after they became a candidate or an SAA signatory respectively. Everywhere else a step closer to EU membership reduced both identity and rational language than further back in the accession process.

Another way to look at the same phenomenon is to average the pre and post years to ascertain if averaging the values shows a similar or different trend. Table #16 depicts the results.

	PreIDEA Avg	PostIDEA Avg	PreRAT Avg	PostRAT Avg
Slovenia	45%	33%	15%	12%
Croatia	56%	49%	15%	9%
Montenegro	42%	45%	27%	22%
N. Macedonia	49%	36%	11%	10%
Serbia	52%	41%	12%	8%
Bosnia	41%	37%	15%	10%
Kosovo	48%	44%	16%	6%

Table 16 *Pre & Post “Big Year” Code Coverage Results Averaged*

Here, Montenegro still shows an increase in identity language after 2010. It is the only instance. Kosovo’s identity movement averages to below its pre-2016 numbers. There is some rationale for Slovenia and Croatia that would suggest that they have met their objectives and have other priorities for their official speech. Their “identity” is “set,” and their economic “rationality” is adequate. Conversely, the current status and/or role of five Western Balkan countries on the path toward EU accession is not the end goal. They have more to accomplish to become member-states. Therefore, the fact that their presidential speech is declining in identity *and* rational language is extremely interesting, as, poignantly, talk becomes “cheaper.”

Second, there were no year-to-year trends in language. Identity and rational speech, within or between countries, when a country’s ECON, HURI, or DEMO scores increased, decreased, or stayed the same was inconclusive. The other variables rarely moved in tandem. Whether the variable metrics did or did not have the same directional effect, the language usage did not result in a discernible pattern. Two examples illustrate this randomness in Tables #17 and #18. A plus sign means that metric went up, a negative sign means that it went down, and an “S” means it stayed the same.

N. Macedo	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
ECON	-	S	+	-	+	+
HUR	+	S	+	-	-	+
DEMO	-	-	-	-	-	S
MAC Idea	42%	36%	39%	15%	33%	36%
MAC Rat	16%	13%	15%	8%	10%	8%

Table 17 *North Macedonian Randomness Example*

North Macedonian ECON and HUR stayed the same in 2010, while its DEMO declined. Meanwhile its identity and rational language declined. In 2011 its ECON and HURI had a positive change, DEMO declined again, and the presidential language was more prevalent in both categories. All three metrics declined in 2012 and its language usage rate declined again. In 2013 ECON went up, HURI and DEMO went down, and identity and rational language increased. Finally, in 2014 ECON and HURI increased, DEMO stayed the same, identity language usage increased, but rational language decreased. Table #18 gives another example.

Bosnia	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
ECON	+	+	+	+	-
HURI	S	+	-	-	S
DEMO	-	-	-	-	+
BOS Idea	46%	38%	29%	35%	45%
BOS Rat	15%	6%	12%	10%	7%

Table 18 *Bosnian Randomness Example*

In this example Bosnia shows the same degree of randomness. The second column shows ECON went up, HURI stayed the same, DEMO declined, identity usage went up and rational word choice declined from 2015. In 2017 ECON and HURI appreciated, DEMO declined again, and identity and rational language usage declined. 2018 brought an increase in ECON, a decrease in HURI and DEMO, a decline in identity language, and an uptick in rational language. ECON and identity language grew in 2019, while HURI, DEMO, and rational language declined. Finally, 2020 saw a decline in

ECON, the same score for HURI, a rise in the DEMO score, more identity language, and less rational language. The reader should get the gist. Across countries and time frames, the correlation between variables year-to-year and language usage was not present.

Conclusions on Comparative Case Analysis

There are two principal, generalizable findings from the comparative case study analysis. First, identity language far outpaced rational language across the Western Balkans and for each particular country as well. This could be due to pronouns being a more common article of speech. However, a likelier explanation is that pronouns also reflect prioritization and in-group versus out-group identity markers that construct realities and meanings in conveying presidential speech messages across audiences. Second, macro CDA produced the most interesting finding. Comparing the identity and rational speech usage *before* a country's current position in the EU accession process to its usage *after* the establishment of that position found that there were 13 of 14 patterns of identity *and* rational coded language being reduced and/or used less often. Suggesting, that the lead up to the "decision" or acceptance of a new "stage" prioritized elucidating identity and rational, economic language than in the years that followed. While there were no other case level trends found, there were numerous country-specific findings through content and discourse analysis of interest.

Content analysis revealed the words particular countries favored. Croatia emphasized the "nation" and was the most identity driven. It wanted to stand alone, proudly. Montenegro was concerned with "Europe," the "Balkans," and rational language more often. It also wanted to stand by itself yet had to deal with dissolution

twice from previous political “unions.” Bosnia and Kosovo relied on their “history.” And Kosovo recognized its “success” of independence and self-determination.

Micro CDA demonstrated that presidential leaders’ sentence structure mattered. Croatia and Kosovo were the most declarative with nary a “peep” of other sentence types. This could be a linguistic, constructed, or artificially gendered phenomenon. Slovenia held itself out as commanding, thinking that it was “imperative” to get the other Western Balkan countries to “straighten up” and do what they needed to do. Slovenia, Bosnia, and North Macedonia were the most impassioned. High rates of exclamations detail praise and prerogatives of acrimony.

Finally, meso critical discourse analysis portrayed the ways in which time positioned and tone colored speech. Bosnia and Serbia focused on the past with less gauge of the future. Slovenia looks to the future. North Macedonia and Kosovo were squarely in the present without falling too far behind or ahead of themselves. Tonally, North Macedonia was complimentary, Serbia critical, and Croatia cooperative. Slovenia was the most hopeful, Kosovo the most pessimistic. At last, the dissertation turns to Chapter 8 to answer the research’s hypotheses, address limitations, spell out future scholarship possibilities, magnify the importance of the findings, and provide final recommendations on political discourse.

CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

This chapter completes the dissertation. It is organized into four subsections. First, the chapter examines the eight hypotheses and determines the extent of the validity of the initial presumptions based on the comparative case studies and presidential speech data collected. Second, it is important to detail both the limitations of the dissertation and new avenues it illuminated for future research. Third, the chapter explains the importance of the findings and how they push the existing academic literature forward with consideration toward the theoretical foundations of Constructivism and Role Theory in foreign policy analysis. Fourth, a section on policy recommendations will leverage the findings to address broader questions on the Western Balkans and the European Union (EU) accession process.

Assessment of Hypotheses

Chapter 1 laid out eight hypotheses asserting the pragmatism of Role Theory and the direction presidential speech would take along each country's respective paths toward EU accession. This section revisits those hypotheses and substantiates or refutes the educated guesses. The hypotheses are listed below with a narrative section discussing their veracity.

Hypothesis #1: Role Theory is a useful analytical tool for international relations research when actors conform their discourse and policy for admissibility and participation in a group.

No, Role Theory is not useful when there are institutional collectives with clear, specific membership requirements for entry. This is because the roles become tautological. The EU has three “roles,” member-state, candidate, and prospective candidate. It creates a category or role that designates attributes by which the country’s discourse, actions, and policies are prescribed and fit within. There must be adherence to gain a new status or role along the way. The strength of Role Theory is through the multiplicity of roles X can give to Y which Y can meet, delineate from, authenticate, nuance, etc. X’s and Y’s role can be adjectival. In a strict member, candidate, prospect arrangement it is binary and therefore the organic construction of roles, and therefore identities, becomes too regimented/standardized to illustrate Role Theory’s utility effectively.

Hypothesis #2: European Role Constraint (EUCN) speech and Presidential Speech (PRSP) will be economically incentivized by positive momentum in the accession process.

Yes and no. EUCN *is* economically incentivized by positive momentum. EU Commission speech text consistently demonstrated economic, rational, pragmatic references when talking about and toward Western Balkan countries. It bears repeating that rational, economic language is not relegated to the “economic” context alone. This language references any beneficial, tangible, institutional aspect of the accession process whether that is judicial reform, civil liberties, fair elections, and/or increased standards of living. There were references to the “European perspective,” an identity-based rationale for EU membership, however, they were outnumbered by pragmatic rationales at least

four to one. For instance, Hahn (2015) states “Economic performance is not only about money but important reforms.” Or, later in the year Hahn (2015a) underscores that values, arguably an underpinning of identity, are conceived through tangible things,

An independent judiciary and a system where justice is free from corruption is not only a value in itself, but it is also a key factor in the economic development of a country, indispensable to creating an environment for growth.

In contrast, presidential speech was not economically motivated by positive steps in the accession process. A corollary to one of the main two findings in the preceding chapter is that in 100% of instances, rational, economic language *decreased* after formal recognition of “moving to” the next step in the multi-chapter accession process. This occurred for Western Balkan countries becoming EU member-states (Slovenia and Croatia), upon being granted candidate status (Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia), or when signing the first prospective candidate requirement of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo). This is not to infer that economic, rational presidential speech did not *lead to* those milestones, but the hypothesis asserted that milestones would act as a proverbial pat-on-the-back and therefore increase the level of rational speech by Western Balkan presidents thereafter. It did not.

To illustrate the indeterminacy of EU progress on presidential economic and rational speech, consider the following excerpts from Bosnia. In November 2006, President Radmanovic stated, “Mistakes were made in the past, Europe had paid them dearly, and us, who live here, above all.” He is both accusatory and reflective in accepting partial blame. Eight years later in April 2014 President Izetbegovic continues the proclamation of a reset when he says, “In order to move forward on that road, a

change of the relation and approach is needed, both on our side, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as our friends around Europe.” Yet, four years thereafter President Dodik (2018), Bosnia’s national role conception, is still waiting for some support, “We will express our commitment with statements, but we also want to see the commitment of Europe.”

Hypothesis #3: European Role Constraint (EUCN) speech and Presidential Speech (PRSP) will be ideationally driven by negative momentum in the accession process.

Yes and no. Yes, EUCN speech, when there were instances of backsliding or domestic conflicts that needed to be addressed, *did elicit* condemnation or disappointment. These are the times, amongst others, when the EU Commission would use the phrase “European perspective.” The EUCN never threatened role status changes but positioned the rhetoric as a choice of joining the “future” of Europe or staying isolated. PRSP, on the other hand, *did not* resort to a correlated level of *increases* in identity speech if a variable turned negative or stagnated. There were no generalizable patterns between cases or by country that indicated the level of speech was tied to any movement of any variable from 2000-2021.

Speech reflected tone and temporality, and there were frustrations; yet, presidential discourse did not simply reflect identity or rational language, nor were they correlated with movement in the other variables. In 2021 Kosovo’s DEMO and DMST increased while its ECON declined. Kosovo had agreed to the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2016. Yet, the EU was increasingly frustrated with Kosovo at this point. President Osmani (2021, 2021a) conjoined the immediate problem, Serbia,

with the structural problem, the EU, by stating, “We have a cancer at the heart of Europe, fueled by fascist desires to create a ‘Serbian World’ and aided by their ally Russia” (2021). Then, two months later in December, she proclaims, “So, to accuse Kosovo of destructiveness is not only one-sided but to accommodate such a Serbia, such as I presented it to be and what the reality is, is a mistake that will cost our region and the whole of Europe a lot” (2021a). There is rational and identity language here, but it is not positive even though Kosovo is closer to the EU in 2021 than 2008 or 2016. She is actively criticizing and condemning the EU’s behavior toward another Western Balkan country. Kosovo’s other variables have and have not improved between years, and they are not “moving” in a uniform direction in 2021 either. Thus, this singular snapshot is illustrative of the larger phenomena in the data; and therefore, Hypothesis #3 is found as only true for one of the two actors.

Hypothesis #4: Presidential Speech (PRSP) discourse with EU and regional leadership will be polite, agreeable, and eager toward the accession process.

Yes, PRSP was polite, agreeable, and excited about EU membership prospects. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) revealed that positivity outweighed negativity. This is true for each country individually and for the broader Western Balkan region. Table #19 highlights the breakdown.

	Positive (Com+Coop+H)	Negative (Cr+D+P)
Slovenia	64%	16%
Croatia	72%	10%
Montenegro	67%	3%
North Macedonia	71%	13%
Serbia	47%	34%
Bosnia	68%	16%
Kosovo	53%	26%
Western Balkans	64%	17%

Table 19 *PRSP Overall Positivity vs. Negativity*

Positivity reflects compliments, cooperative statements, and hope. Negativity is criticism, disassociations, and pessimism. Over 50% positivity was found in six of the eight countries. Serbia was the only country that did not meet that threshold.

Regionally, there was a clear preponderance of goodwill and “appropriate” language towards its neighbors and the EU generally. President Pendarovski of North Macedonia phrases it this way,

To enable them to grow in a region of solidarity and familiarity, aware of the wealth created by the diversity, of the interdependence, convinced in the value of a united region in a united Europe, respecting human rights and freedoms and democratic, European values (2019).

Slovenian President Pahor similarly compliments both the region and the European Union as it works to strengthen individual countries, their connections with regional neighbors, underneath the EU rubric. He says,

We have taken part in various regional initiatives, and we have never understood them as a kind of integration that would run counter to a unified European Union but, on the contrary, as something that strengthens the unity of the European Union (2020).

Both of these examples demonstrate the cooperative and collaborative speech bore out in the percent of positive language in Table 19. Each quote also includes words such as “unity,” “solidarity,” and not wanting to “run counter” of the EU. This further suggests

pleasantries and discourse structured as polite and “professional” when talking to other countries and/or the EU.

Hypothesis #5: European Union Role Constraint (EUCN) speech will be polite, agreeable, and affirming of the “role” and the process of accession.

Yes, EUCN was polite, agreeable, and affirming to the accession process. EUCN was complimentary as necessary but also supportive. There were numerous instances through which EUCN acknowledged the improvements of a Western Balkan country as it reformed, or pushed for reforms, in different issue areas. Further, multiple times in the case study analysis the researcher referenced a sales technique that provided a compliment, a critique/ask, and then a comment of support or assistance. This suggests that while the EUCN might have been disappointed and/or wanting in the progress of Western Balkan countries, they nevertheless indicated that their ultimate desire was to incorporate the region’s countries into the EU and that they were present to assist and facilitate that “progress.” Hahn (2016) states, “...engage in free political exchange to solve ... differences in a way that is worthy of the country’s European perspective” and in speaking to the Kosovo delegation directly, he merges rational and identity motivations, “It allows Kosovo to join the rest of the region in sharing the benefits of deepening political and economic interdependence, and sharing in the common European perspective that makes peace, stability and prosperity our joint goal.” This symbolizes a wholistic agreeableness that is polite, affirming, and offering both rational and identity oriented “olive branches” the literature and data elucidate.

Hypothesis #6: Presidential Speech (PRSP) will be ideational and project power when talking to or with other Balkan countries about EU membership.

Yes and no. PRSP was in fact overwhelmingly identity oriented. The use of the pronouns “us,” “we,” “them,” and “their,” argues for a clear identity relational construction of each country’s foreign policy and domestic sentiments. However, that *does not mean* that the speech projected power towards one another. In fact, the highest scoring tonal speech pattern was Cooperative at 28% followed by Compliments at 20%. Poignantly, of all directions the presidential speech *could* take, the route most often used was that of cooperation. This, in turn, suggests that there was *not* a projection of power, but rather a willingness to work across national lines to achieve stability and progress “forward.”

Hypothesis #7: Presidential Speech (PRSP) directed at within-country audiences/populations about the EU will include *both* identity and economically incentivized discourse.

Yes, technically this is true. The framing of the hypothesis is misguided, however. It states that both types of discourse will be present rather than a direction or relationship therein. Naturally rational and identity speech would be present greater than 0% of the time. Yes, there was both identity and rational, pragmatic speech directed at domestic populations. At the same time, that speech was between 2-6% more likely to be identity oriented than economic, rational speech. There are both intangible and tangible benefits articulated.

Montenegro in 2012 is an example of the ubiquity and variability and of language within a given year. In 2012 Montenegro's ECON and DEMO decreased and its HURI increased. 2012 was also in the middle of Montenegro's candidacy status being approved (2010) and it having completed 34 of 35 acquis chapters (2013). Within that year, President Vujanovic had these nice rational words, "...the enlargement process brings the new economic resources into the Union, strengthens it politically, enriches its culture and opens the new room for citizens of its states" (2012). Seventeen days later President Vujanovic pivots to a positive identity reflection, "One of the main goals of the European and Euro-Atlantic processes is to create a community connected by the value standards accepted by everyone, along with preservation of particularities of the national and cultural identities, through various forms of cooperation" (2012a). However, President Vujanovic is cautious of a *carte blanche* acceptance of life without conflict. He warns, "...causes of numerous globalisation and crisis challenges lie not only in the economic but also in moral and cultural reasons" (2012b). This sample demonstrates the veracity of Hypothesis #7. Both rational and identity language is present. However, in aggregate, the mass overweight to identity-oriented speech is the main revelation here.

Hypothesis #8: Presidential Speech (PRSP) will be constructed differently based on where countries are in the EU accession process.

No. There was no correlation between the type of speech a president gave or delivered to his/her audience based on the stage in the EU accession process (member-state, candidate, potential candidate). The comparative case study analysis did not reveal any differences around type of speech, sentence structure, temporal, or tonal structures

based on which case, or EU accession status, a country fell within. Also, PRSP was not constructed “differently” *after* achieving progressive steps in the EU accession process. One of the principal findings was that speech occurred less often, but not that it was of a different type.

Using Serbia as an example illustrates the multiplicity of speech regardless of the stage or progress in the accession process. Serbia became an EU candidate country in 2012. Before then, in 2007, President Tadic announced, “One Europe, our Europe.” Serbia is hopeful and optimistic. A year after candidate status was granted, Serbian President Nikolic summed it up, “I would have to admit to myself that, in my fight for better relations in Serbia and the Balkans, I was not supported by those who taught me how to implement the principles of the Council of Europe” (2013). Here Serbia is confused and perplexed in the process. There is also an admittance of different perspectives within Serbian domestic politics. Yet, President Nikolic appears to acknowledge the tension, keeping region and Europe at arms’ distance, “The perception that European Union membership implies a distancing from the Balkans is humiliating” (2013). Again, these sentences simply reflect the conclusion for Hypothesis #8 that there is no correlated pattern of speech *based on status* within EU accession.

Shortcomings and Future Research Opportunities

The dissertation is presented with one important proximal shortcoming, two concrete limitations in the data, and uncovers at least five research opportunities with piqued interest. First, the proximal shortcoming is the relationship between presidential leadership and presidential discourse. The literature review discussed the importance of

presidential leadership as an integral actor in foreign policy decision-making and analysis, the “agent” in comparison to the “structure” of institutional and social parameters determining state actions. However, the dissertation’s model presented presidential discourse as a proxy variable illustrating a constructed manifestation of the president, his/her thoughts, intentions, and motivations to lead their respective post-Yugoslav country. The dissertation argued that presidential discourse as an outcropping of Constructivism and Role Theory was a suitable and robust variable in and of itself to stand for collective leadership. Leaders, in this case presidents, “transmit” (Lewin 1948) a “central political process” (Rustow 1970) that constructs a situation (Grint 2005) to become representative of the nation-state within their role (Fossen 2019), which is then used as the “national role conception” of Holsti’s Role Theory model. Language and actions are transmitted. The EU accession process and the status of the Western Balkan countries in the process is already a given. The actions are known. Therefore, the “transmission” of a national role conception becomes one communicated through language and discourse, which is the main variable of the dissertation, serves as a proxy for leadership, and is used to answer the research questions.

That all being said, there is an individual at “work” formulating the official speech discourse, working through social contexts and political institutions, who was voted into office, and who “holds” the mantle of president. It is readily admitted that an individual analysis of each or specific presidents and their leadership would trace greater nuance and layers to further research. A biographical approach could confront areas such as personality (Seligman 1950), psychology (Jervis 2017), social and institutional constraints and interactionism (Renshon 2000) (Wren 2007), and the contribution of

individual agency (Hermann and Hagan 1998) (Byman and Pollack 2001). Due to the scope of the research, the 21 years examined, and breadth across Southeast Europe, a more discreet analysis of presidential *leadership* traits, characteristics, and styles, of individual presidents more generally, was not possible for 49 specific individuals. Additionally, consideration of this kind of approach would also have to account for the electoral and electability differentiations between countries that present, for example, Montenegro having two presidents in 21 years and Bosnia having 18. Studying individual leaders is important, but based on the research questions and cross-sectional analysis, official presidential discourse was the proxy for national role conception in the research model.

Second, presidential speech was not collected evenly across all Western Balkan countries for the period 2000-2021. Some of these countries presented cataloguing errors for past presidents. Other past presidents had their own websites dedicated to archiving their speech texts. Thus, there was not a uniform *presentation* of the presidential discourse. Seven countries multiplied by 21 years equals a total number of 147 “years” of speeches available. Of these, speech texts were collected in 109 of 147 years for a 74.1% collection rate. Slovenia was the only country with text for every year. Some omissions make sense, for instance Kosovo did not have any presidential texts from 2000-2005. But the other countries’ lack of archives is more puzzling and frustrating.

Third, official presidential speech did not include either interviews, videos, or social media. The official presidential speech was catalogued and archived on a governmental website. They were official speech acts and therefore were formal, scripted, and consciously constructed. However, there are plenty of other speech acts

captured that could be included in the large data collection of presidential speech. This could come from interviews in the native language, in a foreign language, or via an interpreter. Next, speech acts are speech which includes both language, verbal communication, and nonverbal communication. Since the dissertation used transcripts, there are two other aspects of the speech communication delivery process that were unaccounted. Finally, Twitter and other social media outlets allow for public figures to reach their “audiences” more directly. Thus, official presidential speech constructs the formal presentation of a country’s role and image but might not reflect “true” intentions and/or “asks” that a president might make to his/her constituents if one were to include a wider swath of digital speech acts.

Moving to future research opportunities, five particularly interesting areas arose at different geographic scales or levels of analyses: domestic idiosyncrasies, regional issues, and then, the nation-state that was, Yugoslavia. First, at the country level, a fascinating dive into the presence and/or lack thereof of female heads of state and female political leaders more generally should be explored. As mentioned previously in the dissertation, Croatia had one female president and Kosovo two. That was it. There have only been two female prime ministers in any country (Croatia, and Serbia currently) in the 21st century. So, one area of research could explore the relationship between gender and politics in the Western Balkans and lean into presidential biography of the three female presidents. Second, Montenegro’s clear constitutional declarations of being an ecological state creates a unique formally constructed “stance” on the importance of environmental consciousness. Why was this so important to emphasize? How have Montenegro’s leaders implemented policies to achieve and showcase this “ecological state?” How does

comparing their actions to the broader Adriatic Sea instigate opportunities in multilevel environmental governance?

Next, three regional or transnational issues jump to mind as possible future research. First, the role of religion is fascinating. The Vatican's explicit funding of Croatian religious and lay ministries speaks to an entanglement of-the-moment with the acknowledged historical allegiances. A book purchased during this research that would/could serve as a starting block is Albertini and Deliso's (2015) *The Vatican's Challenge in the Balkans: Bolstering the Catholic Church in 2015 and Beyond*. Second, within Christianity the researcher entered the dissertation process largely unfamiliar with the Orthodox Church. Its transnational role across Southeast Europe, at sites of culture and conflict in for instance the Illinden Uprising and its annual ceremonies thereafter, its unique blending of religious and nationalistic rhetoric and iconography, and the role of national Orthodox patriarchs is extremely intriguing. Third, the transnational issue of migration could be looked at in the future. The "Balkan Route" came up in the research multiple times. The lack of rights and respect toward immigrant communities by governments and peoples continues to be problematic. And, this is nothing to say for the "internal displacement" of "Yugoslavians" that had to re(root) themselves in a new nation-state that certainly did not protect the rights of minorities as much as the Yugoslav state did.

Last, this dissertation looked at the Western Balkans approximately 10 years removed from the dissolution of Yugoslavia as it was known for more than 45 years beforehand. Traces of it were ever present in the research, speech, and dissertation. However, there was so much more found, read, heard, and considered of the project of

Yugoslavia. Today it practically symbolizes a subaltern rallying cry for socialism in the region. It represents more egalitarian economic standards of living that get displaced in transitional economies, while it has also provided respect for, if not at least curtailment, of ethnic differences. There were periods of strict differentiation from the Soviet Union, and there were periods of clear modernization achievements. The dissertation has explored the 21st century's remnants of Yugoslavia. It will be very satisfactory to invest more time studying the full project as it was realized between 1946-1991.

Importance of Findings

The dissertation contributes to the existent relevant literature and is important in five clear ways. First, theoretically, the research confirms that Constructivism and identity are important as motivating heuristic frames in international relations. Identity language dominated rational language. It was “close” in only Montenegro’s case, but even then, identity language doubled rational, pragmatic speech. Therefore, how people construct their realities and the pathos and ethos by which they address others domestically and internationally matter. Second, Role Theory, in some sense, can be further seen as useful in international relations, tied to Constructivism, especially utilized with discourse. The research rejects Hypothesis #1 as tautological because having specific categories in a process creates language that prescribes and ascribes participants in the process into the predefined categories. Hypothetically, is a 22-year-old in his/her last year of college speaking and acting as a “senior” because of the aforementioned attributes, or are they a “senior” and therefore speak and act as a “fourth year” as compared to his/her classmates in their respective years or “tiers?” Pointedly, Role

Theory's usefulness and utility is an important finding, as evidenced in the EU Commission speeches, however it becomes redundant in a procedural where the tiers, stages, and/or statuses are predetermined such that movement is unidirectional.

Third and fourth, the dissertation's findings are important because of their scale and timeframe. The contestations around identity are noted in the literature on the Western Balkans. However, the combining of identity and rational language *with* all seven former Yugoslavian countries *within* the years 2000-2021 has not been done before. The researcher acknowledges the level of depth required to flesh out micro and/or domestic levels of analysis for a single case study or a comparative case study of two countries. However, to conduct a comparative case study analysis of presidential speech toward EU accession for the entire region over 21 years creates a robust data set and inference that pushes the literature forward. Where does the literature get pushed to?

Fifth, the dissertation's importance revolves around the central findings of identity language dominating rational language use toward EU accession and between bilateral conversations *and* that identity and rational language usage *did not* increase *after* being "promoted" to the next stage in the accession process. Language matters, absolutely. Identity language matters more than simple, rational, cost and benefit tangible results. The words, terms, idioms, and discourses that bind person-to-person, group-to-group mean something. And yet, achievements and societal reforms that propelled a former Yugoslav country forward to reach EU member-state status or get one step closer *did not* inspire more of that language. EU membership did not "move the needle" to talk about, commend, consternate, or ruminate on matters of identity or rational, tangible benefits *more than* what was previously "heard" *without* having

accomplished EU accession milestones. Therefore, the EU accession process did not increase the type of language used in Western Balkan presidential speech.

Policy Recommendations

There are three policy recommendations to finish the dissertation. On the banal side, it is recommended that Western Balkan countries continue reforms to democratize and create dynamic economic opportunities; and therefore, present their entire populations with advancements in freedoms to live, work, and dream without fear of reprisals, tribal violence, or limitations of their emancipatory values or action resources. This is “water under the bridge” in an academic sense, but reform requires participatory democracy that moves beyond consolidations of power in elites and centers of influence tied to some of the worst atrocities of the 20th century. Reforms also must move beyond “us versus them” internal tribalism that represses consensus building and mutual respect.

Second, leaders need to lead. Membership in the EU does not equal a “Europeanization” that would deprive nor demean the inherent uniqueness of each of the five non-EU Western Balkan countries. Nor does EU membership sanitize or gloss over real differences that must be addressed and reconciled. Yet, Western Balkan presidents indicate that joining the EU is a goal for Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Therefore, purposeful presidential speech and action that can galvanize the entire populations to work toward a common goal must be found through present political and/or social leaders or via increased opportunities for new voices. This may seem Pollyannish. However, unifying urgency should not simply come

from conflict as seen in Ukraine with President Zelenskyy, but by the ever-pressing motivation to “improve” society.

Third, a policy recommendation for the EU revolves around the need to modify and extend assistance through which they help prospective and candidate countries. It is understandable how any institution delivering tangible and intangible assistance works through “official” channels and domestic leaders, elites, and institutions. At the same time, the historic and conceptual power differential between those elites and institutions with the provincial and middle-to-lower classes represents misguided priorities that can at once exacerbate stratification while also reinforcing social cleavages. The World Bank went through a similar transformation of one-size-fits-all projects and conditionalities to the incorporation of domestic, indigenous nongovernmental and civil society actors that could more explicitly utilize and direct the assistance “on the ground.” The EU would be remiss if it did not position itself as a knowledge center that could develop the local capacities of those European countries still on its periphery.

APPENDIX 1 – Official Presidential Speech Websites and URLs

BOSNIA

- Speeches from the President
 - o http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/Archive.aspx?langTag=en-US&fromDate=1%2f1%2f2000&thruDate=5%2f10%2f2021&template_id=156&pageIndex=30
- Speeches to the EU Parliament
 - o <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Speeches/Speech-By-Country-EN.asp>

CROATIA

Speeches from the President

- Stjepan Mesic 2000 – 2009
 - o https://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/doc/speech_mesic_2001_eng.pdf
 - o <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021122f.htm>
 - o https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-5-2004-02-26-ITM-008_GA.html?redirect
 - o <http://www.stjepanmesic.hr/en/speeches-current>
 - o TO UN:
https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/64/64_HR_en.pdf
- Ivo Josipovic 2010 – 2014
 - https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/66/HR_en.pdf
 - https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/HR_en.pdf
 - https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/69/HR_EN.pdf
- Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic 2015 – 2019
 - o THREE to UN
 - o https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_HR_en.pdf
 - o https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/71/71_HR_en.pdf
 - o https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/73/hr_en.pdf
- Zoran Milanovic 2020 – Present on Current Government Website
 - o <https://www.predsjednik.hr/en/speeches/>
- Speeches to the EU Parliament
 - o <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Speeches/Speech-By-Country-EN.asp>

KOSOVO

- Speeches from the President
 - o <https://president-ksgov.net/en/speeches/?offset=276>
- Speeches to the EU Parliament
 - o <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Speeches/Speech-By-Country-EN.asp>

MONTENEGRO

Speeches from the President

- Filip Vujanovic
 - o <http://filip-vujanovic.me/eng/?akcija=rubrika&id=5>
- Milo Dukanovic

- <http://www.predsjednik.me/news.php>
- Speeches to the EU Parliament
 - <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Speeches/Speech-By-Country-EN.asp>

NORTH MACEDONIA

Speeches from the President

- Boris Trajkovski (1999 - 2004)
- Ljupco Jordanovski (2004 - 2004)
- Branko Crvenkovski (2004 - 2009)
- Gjorge Ivanov (2009 - 2019)
 - <https://gjorgeivanov.mk/en/media-centre/speeches.html>
- Stevo Pendarovski (2019 - Present)
 - <https://pretsedatel.mk/en/category/speeches/>
- Speeches to the EU Parliament
 - <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Speeches/Speech-By-Country-EN.asp>

SERBIA

Speeches from the President

- Slobodan Milosevic (1997 – Oct. 2000)
 - <http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/speeches.html>
- Vojislav Kostunica (2000 - 2003)
- Svetozar Marovic (2003 - 2006)
 - https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-5-2004-01-13-ITM-018_EN.html?redirect
 - <https://www.yadvashem.org/events/15-march-2005/museum-special-assembly/serbia-montenegro.html>
 - <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Speeches/Speech-XML2HTML-EN.asp?SpeechID=140>
- Boris Tadic 2004 – 2012
- Slavica Dejanovic 2012 – 2012
- Tomislav Nikolic 2012 – 2017
- Aleksandar Vucic 2017 – Present
 - <https://www.predsednik.rs/en/press-center/press-releases>
- Speeches to the EU Parliament
 - <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Speeches/Speech-By-Country-EN.asp>

SLOVENIA

- Milan Kucan (1991 - 2002): <https://www.bivsi-predsednik.si/up-rs/1992-2002/mk-ang.nsf/GOV?OpenView>
- Janez Drnovsek (2002 - 2007): <http://www2.gov.si/up-rs/2002-2007/jd-ang.nsf/tiskovnosredisceweb?OpenView&RestrictToCategory=govori>
- Danilo Turk (2007 - 2012): <http://www2.gov.si/up-rs/2007-2012/turk-ang-arhiv.nsf/vseobjaveweb?OpenView>
- Borut Pahor (2012 - Present): <https://www.predsednik.si/up-rs/uprs-eng.nsf/all-pages?OpenView>

- Speeches to the EU Parliament
 - o <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Speeches/Speech-By-Country-EN.asp>

EU Speeches from European Commission

- [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/advancedsearch/en?keywords=&dotyp=4&parea=28&datepickerbefore=30%20April%202021&datebefore=Fri%20Apr%2030%202021%2000:00:00%20GMT-0400%20\(Eastern%20Daylight%20Time\)&commissioner=0&datepickerafter=1%20January%202000&dateafter=Sat%20Jan%2001%202000%2000:00:00%20GMT-0500%20\(Eastern%20Standard%20Time\)&pagenumber=4](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/advancedsearch/en?keywords=&dotyp=4&parea=28&datepickerbefore=30%20April%202021&datebefore=Fri%20Apr%2030%202021%2000:00:00%20GMT-0400%20(Eastern%20Daylight%20Time)&commissioner=0&datepickerafter=1%20January%202000&dateafter=Sat%20Jan%2001%202000%2000:00:00%20GMT-0500%20(Eastern%20Standard%20Time)&pagenumber=4)

APPENDIX 2 – Rational and Identity Coded Words

Rational Code Words

1. Prosperity
2. Growth
3. Progress
4. Rational
5. Economic
6. Development
7. Globalization
8. Integration
9. Success
10. Wealth
11. Expansion
12. Institution
13. Advance
14. Modernity
15. Evolving
16. Neoliberal

Identity Code Words

1. Tradition
2. Identity
3. History
4. Foolish
5. Smart
6. Brave
7. Scared
8. Villain
9. Hero
10. Them
11. Us
12. Their
13. Our
14. Nation
15. Balkans
16. Europe

REFERENCES

- Abazi, Enika. "EU's Balkans Test: Geopolitics of a Normative Power." *Europe Now Journal*, June 25, 2018.
- Abdullai, Jonuz, and Xhemail Cupi. "Policy making and secularism in Macedonia." *Revista de Stiinte Politice* 50 (April 2016).
- Abrahams, Fred. *Mockery of Press Freedom in Montenegro*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2019.
- Adolphus, Margaret. "How to Undertake Case Study Research." *Emerald Group Publishing*. 2021. <https://www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/how-to/research-methods/undertake-case-study-research> (accessed 2021).
- Affandi, Hina, and Qaisar Ali Malik. "Shadow Economy, Outreach of Financial Institutions and Financial Inclusion: A Study of Balkan Countries." *International Transaction Journal of Engineering, Management, and Applied Sciences and Technologies* 11, no. 1 (2019): 1-11.
- AFP. "Being LGBT in Kosovo: a battle to come out from the shadows." *France 24*. September 23, 2018. <https://www.france24.com/en/20180923-being-lgbt-kosovo-battle-come-out-shadows>.
- Aggestam, Lisbeth. "What kind of power? European Union enlargement and beyond." In *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, edited by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, & Tim Dunne, 431-451. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Aggestam, Lisbeth, and Markus Johansson. "The Leadership Paradox in EU Foreign Policy." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 55, no. 6 (2017): 1203-1220.
- Agnew, John. "How Many Europes? The European Union, Eastern Enlargement and Uneven Development." *European Urban and Regional Studies* 8, no. 1 (2001): 29-38.
- Agnew, John. "No Borders, No Nations: Making Greece in Macedonia." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 97, no. 2 (June 2007): 398-422.
- Alcheva, Gabriela, Filip Gerovski, and Leo Beletsky. "Implementation of Patients' Rights Legislation in the Republic of Macedonia: Gaps and Disparities." *Health and Human Rights* 15, no. 2 (December 2013): 20-31.
- Allcock, John B., John R. Lampe, and Antonia Young. "Kosovo." *Britannica*. April 7, 2021. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kosovo>.
- Allcock, John B., Thomas M. Poulsen, and John R. Lampe. "Montenegro." *Britannica*. April 2021. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Montenegro/additional-info#contributors>.

- Amnesty International . "Wounds that burn our souls": *Compensation for Kosovo's wartime rape survivors, but still no justice*. Paris: Amnesty International , 2017.
- Amnesty International . *Croatia 2020*. Country Reports, London: Amnesty International , 2020.
- Amnesty International . *Montenegro 2020*. London: Amnesty International , 2020.
- Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report 2020/2021: *The State of the World's Human Rights*. Washington D.C.: Amnesty International , 2021.
- Ananiev, Jovan, and Strasko Stojanovski. "Citizens Inclusion in the Macedonian Political Life: A Base for Human Rights Development Approach." *Law, Management and Medias in the XXI-th Century*. Blagoevgrad: South-West University, 2012.
- Anderson, Alex. "Consolidating Democracy in Kosovo." *International Crisis Group*. March 24, 2005. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/kosovo/consolidating-democracy-kosovo>.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. Brooklyn: Verso Press, 2006.
- Anderson, Thomas Barnebeck, and Pieter Vanhuyse. "EU membership has many benefits, but economic growth is not one of them - new findings." *The Conversation*. February 7, 2019. <https://theconversation.com/eu-membership-has-many-benefits-but-economic-growth-is-not-one-of-them-new-findings-111206>.
- Andjelic, Neven. "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Citizenship versus Nationality." In *After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics within Successor States*, edited by Robert Hudson, & Glenn Bowman, 120-131. London: Palgrave, 2012.
- Anicic, Jugolsav, Dusan Anicic, and Goran Kvirgic. "Sustainable Growth and Regional Competitiveness of Serbian Economy." *Ekohomhka* 65, no. 2 (April-June 2019): 65-74.
- Antic, Teodor. "Fiscal Decentralization of the Public Sector in the Republic of Croatia - Process and Effects." Edited by Katarina Ott, Anto Bajo, & Mihaela Pitarevic. *Fiscal Decentralization in Croatia*. Zagreb: The Fiscal Decentralization Initiative for Central and Eastern Europe, 2002. 55-74.
- Appadurai, Arjun. "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy." *Theory Culture and Society* 7 (1990): 295-310.
- Arenliu, Aliriza, and Stevan M. Weine. "Reintegrating Returned Migrants to Kosovo." *Psychological Research* 19, no. 1 (2016): 61-73.
- Arklay, Tracey. "Political Biography: It's Contribution to Political Science." In *Australian Political Lives: Chronicling political careers and administrative*

- histories*, edited by Tracey Arklay, John Nethercote, & John Wanna, 13-25. Canberra: The Australian National University, 2006.
- Arnautovic, Suad. "The Presidentialization of Political Parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Mitigated Presidency." In *The Presidentialization of Political Parties in the Western Balkans*, 73-96. London : Palgrave, 2019.
- Auerbach, Yehudith, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon. "Media Framing and Foreign Policy: The Elite Press vis-a-vis US Policy in Bosnia, 1992-1995." *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 1 (Jan. 2005): 83-99.
- Baert, Francis, Luk Van Langenhove, and Melanie James. "Rethinking Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis: Introducing Positioning Theory in International Relations." *Papers on Social Representations* 28, no. 1 (2019): 1-20.
- Baert, Francis, Luk Van Langenhove, and Melanie James. "Rethinking Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis: Introducing Positioning Theory to International Relations." *Papers on Social Representation* 28, no. 1 (2019): 4.1-4.20.
- Baird, Marian. "Comparing Cases: Studies of Commitment Systems in Australia and the United States." *The International Journal of Human Resource Management* 15, no. 3 (May 2004): 433-440.
- Baird, Theodore. "Interest groups and strategic constructivism: business actors and border security policies in the European Union." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 1 (April 2017): 118-136.
- Bakic-Hayden, Milica, and Robert M. Hayden. "Orientalist Variations on the Theme "Balkans": Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics." *Slavic Review* 51, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 1-15.
- Balaam, David N., and Michael Veseth. *Introduction to International Political Economy* . Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2001.
- Balfour ed., Rosa, and Corina Stratulat ed. *EU member states and enlargement towards the Balkans. European Politics and Institutions Programme*, Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2015.
- Banjeglav, Tamara. "Dealing with the Past in Post-War Croatia: Perceptions, Problems, and Perspectives." In *Transitional Justice and Civil Society in the Balkans*, edited by Olivera Simic, & Zala Volcic, 33-50. New York: Springer, 2013.
- Bardos, Gordon N. "Kosovo and Balkan Security." *Connections* 6, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 13-24.
- Baric, Marijana, and Colin C Williams. "Combatting the Undeclared Economy in Montenegro." *Journal of Economy and its Applications* 2, no. 2 (2012): 40-62.

- Barkin, Noah. "Democracy is Under Attack. Will Europe Fight Back?" *The Atlantic*, October 3, 2019.
- Barsh, Russel Lawrence. "Measuring Human Rights: Problems of Methodology and Purpose." *Human Rights Quarterly* 15, no. 1 (February 1993): 87-121.
- Basta, Karlo. "Imagined Institutions: The Symbolic Power of Formal Rules in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Slavic Review* 75, no. 4 (Winter 2016): 944-969.
- Bates, Robert H. "From Case Studies to Social Science: A Strategy for Political Research." In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, edited by Carles Boix, & Susan C. Stokes, 172-185. New York, NY: Oxford University Press Inc., 2007.
- BBC. "Srebrenica: Bosnia marks 25 years since massacre." *BBC*, July 11, 2020.
- Beasley, Ryan K, Juliet Kaarbo, and Kai Oppermann. "Role Theory, Foreign Policy, and the Social Construction of Sovereignty: Brexit Stage Right." *Global Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (March 2021): 0-14.
- Bechev, Dimitar. "Is a Breakthrough coming between Bulgaria and North Macedonia?" *New Atlanticist*, January 23, 2022.
- Beha, Adem. *Between Stabilization and Democratization: Elections, Political Parties, and Intra-Party Democracy in Kosovo*. Pristina: Center for Political Courage and the Political Science Department, University of Pristina, 2017.
- Beha, Adem, and Arben Hajrullahu. "Soft competitive authoritarianism and negative stability in Kosovo: state building from UNMIK to EULEX and beyond." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 21 (2019): 1-21.
- Behram, Mirsad. "Ethnic Parties Reassert Grip on Bosnia's Mostar at Landmark Election." *BalkanInsight*, December 23, 2020.
- Beitz, Charles R. "Human Rights as a Common Concern." *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 2 (June 2001): 269-282.
- Belloni, Roberto. "The European Union Blowback? Euroscepticism and its Consequences in the Western Balkans." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 10, no. 4 (2016): 530-547.
- Belloni, Roberto, and Francesco Strazzari. "Corruption in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: a deal among friends." *Third World Quarterly* 35, no. 5 (2014): 855-871.
- Bender, Kristof, Adnan Cerimagic, and Gerald Knaus. "EU has Turned Enlargement into a Hamster Wheel." *Balkan Insight*. January 21, 2020.

<https://balkaninsight.com/2020/01/21/eu-has-turned-enlargement-into-a-hamster-wheel/>.

- Bengtsson, Mariette. "How to plan and perform a qualitative study using content analysis." *NursingPlus Open* 2 (January 2016): 8-14.
- Berend, Ivan T., and Bojan Bugarić. "Unfinished Europe: Transitions from Communism to Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe." *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 4 (October 2015): 768-785.
- Berenskoetter, Felix. "Friendship, Security, and Power." In *Friendship and International Relations*, edited by S Koschut, & A Oelsner, 51-71. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- Berenskoetter, Felix. "Identity in International Relations." In *The International Studies Encyclopedia* Volume VI, edited by Robert A. Denemark, 3595-3611. London: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2018.
- Berg, Bruce L. *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. 7th. Pearson, 2008.
- Berryman, Mark, and Justyna Pytkowska. *A review of the Bosnian microfinance sector: move to financial self-sufficiency*. Warsaw: Microfinance Centre (MFC) and Microfinance Information Exchange, 2005.
- Bertoa, Fernando Casal, and Dane Taleski. "Regulating party politics in the Western Balkans: the legal source of party system development in Macedonia." *Democratization*, April 2015.
- Bettiza, Gregorio. "Civilizational Analysis in International Relations: Mapping the Field and Advancing a "Civilizational Politics" Line of Research." *International Studies Review* 16, no. 1 (March 2014): 1-28.
- Beyme, Klaus Von. "Leadership and Change in Party Systems: Towards a Postmodern Party State?" *Government and Opposition* 31, no. 2 (1996): 135-159.
- Bickerton, C.J., D. Hodson, and U. Puetter. "The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 53, no. 4 (2015): 703-722.
- Biddle, B. J. "Recent Developments in Role Theory." *Annual Review of Sociology* 12 (1986): 67-92.
- Bieber, Florian. "The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses." *Social Science Quarterly*, 2015: 1-31.
- . "Why Serbia's President is a Threat to Europe." *Foreign Policy*. January 5, 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/05/serbia-vucic-mladic-mural-lithium-china-russia-threat-europe/>.

- Bieber, Florian, and Jovana Marovic. "Seizing the democratic opportunity in Montenegro." *London School of Economics: European Politics and Policy*. September 8, 2020. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/09/08/seizing-the-democratic-opportunity-in-montenegro/>.
- Bieber, Florian, and Nikolaos Tzifakis, . *The Western Balkans in the World: Linkages and Relations with Non-Western Countries*. New York: Routledge, 2019.
- Bieler, Andreas. "The struggle over EU enlargement: a historical materialist analysis of European integration." *Journal of European Public Policy* 9, no. 4 (August 2002): 575-597.
- BIRN. "Bulgaria Tells North Macedonia to Stop "Erasing" Bulgarians." *BalkanInsight*. October 6, 2021. <https://balkaninsight.com/2021/10/06/bulgaria-tells-north-macedonia-to-stop-erasing-bulgarians/>.
- Blagojevic, Jelisaveta. "Between Walls: Provincialisms, Human Rights, Sexualities and Serbian Public Discourses on EU Integration." In *De-Centring Western Sexualities: Central and Eastern European Perspectives*, edited by Robert Kulpa, & Joanna Mizielinska, 27-42. London: Routledge, 2016.
- Boban, Davor. "'Minimalist' concepts of semi-presidentialism: are Ukraine and Slovenia semi-presidential states?" *Comparative studies* 44, no. 5 (2007): 156-177.
- Bogdanic, Sinisa, and Davor Batisweiler. "Is Croatia going the way of Poland on reproductive rights? ." *DW*, December 26, 2020.
- Bojnec, Stefan, and Imre Ferto. "The Catching-Up Process of European Enlargement: Hungarian and Slovenian Agricultural, Food, and Forestry Trade." *Eastern European Economics* 45, no. 5 (December 2007): 5-34.
- Bonomi, Matteo, Ardian Hackaj, and Dusan Reljic. Avoiding the Trap of Another Paper Exercise: Why the Western Balkans Need a Human Development-centered EU Enlargement Model. *IAI Papers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation*, Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2020.
- Bornarova, Suzana. "Transit Migration and Human Rights: Macedonian Policy and Social Work Responses to Transit Migration Crisis." *Journal of Human Rights and Social Work* 4, no. 1 (March 2019): 74-82.
- Borzal, Tanja A., and Sonja Grimm. "Building Good (Enough) Governance in Postconflict Societies & Areas of Limited Statehood: The European Union & the Western Balkans." *Daedalus* 147, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 116-127.
- Bougarel, Xavier. "Bosnian Islam as 'European Islam': Limits and Shifts of a Concept." In *Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence*, edited by Aziz Al-Azmeh, & Effie Fokas, 96-124. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

- Bremmer, Ian. *Every Nation for Itself: What Happens When No One Leads the World*. New York City: Penguin Group, 2013.
- Brennan, David. "US, EU Risk Losing 'Heart of Europe' to China, Montenegro Warns." *Newsweek*, November 11, 2021.
- Breuning, Marijke. "Role Theory in Foreign Policy." *Oxford Research Encyclopedias*. May 24, 2017.
<https://oxfordre.com/politics/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-334>.
- Brezar, Aleksandar. "As EU membership stalls, Balkan countries make controversial move to create their own mini-Schengen." *Euronews*. August 31, 2021.
<https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2021/08/31/as-eu-membership-stalls-balkan-countries-make-controversial-move-to-create-their-own-mini->
- . "Political quotas and ethnic engineering in the Western Balkans." *Al Jazeera*. March 9, 2021. <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/3/9/political-quotas-and-ethnic-engineering-in-the-western-balkans>.
- Brockman-Hawe, Benjamin E. "European Court of Human Rights *Bijelic v Montenegro and Serbia*." *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 59, no. 3 (July 2010): 845-867.
- Bruck, H. W. , Richard C. Snyder, and Burton Sapin. "The Decision-Making Approach to the Study of International Politics." In *Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics*, by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, & Burton Sapin, 60-74. New York: The Free Press, 1962.
- Brzezinska, Monika Maria. "Models of International Leadership and the Role Theory on the Example of the Federal Republic of Germany." *Journal Modelling the New Europe*, 2020: 156-178.
- Bulliet, Richard W. *The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization*. New York City: Columbia University Press, 2004.
- Bulmer, Martin. "Concepts in the Analysis of Qualitative Data." *Sociological Review* 27, no. 4 (1979): 651-677.
- Bunce, Valerie. "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience." *World Politics* 55, no. 2 (January 2003): 167-192.
- Burazer, Nikola. "Europe and the Balkans: The Need for Mutual Integration." In *The Balkans: Old, New Instabilities: A European Region Looking for its Place in the World*, edited by Giorgio Fruscione, 29-47. Milan: Ledizioni Publishing, 2020.
- Burchill, Scott, et al., *Theories of International Relations*. 4th. New York: Palgrave MacMillon, 2009.

- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. *2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Montenegro*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2020.
- Byman, Daniel L., and Kenneth M. Pollack. "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In." *International Security* 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 107-146.
- Cakar, Dario Kikic. "The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in Croatia: Institutional Change Matters." In *The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in the Western Balkans*, edited by Gianluca Passarelli, 23-48. London: Palgrave, 2019.
- Callaway, John M, Slavica Kascelan, and Marina Markovic. *The Economic Impacts of Climate Change in Montenegro: A First Look*. UNDP: GEF: *Investing in Our Planet*, Podgorica: Montenegro Ministry for Spatial Planning and Environment, 2010.
- Callen, Tim. "Gross Domestic Product: An Economy's All." *International Monetary Fund*. February 24, 2020.
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/gdp.htm>.
- Calori, Anna, and Kathrin Jurkat. "'I'm Both a Worker and a Shareholder.' Workers' Narratives and Property Transformations in Postsocialist Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia." *Sudosteuropa*, no. 4 (2017): 654-678.
- Campos, Nauro, Fabrizio Coricelli, and Luigi Moretti. "How much do countries benefit from membership in the European Union?" *VoxEU*. April 19, 2014.
[https://voxeu.org/article/how-poorer-nations-benefit-eu-membership#:~:text=The%20main%20finding%20is%20that,costs%20\(except%20for%20Greece\).](https://voxeu.org/article/how-poorer-nations-benefit-eu-membership#:~:text=The%20main%20finding%20is%20that,costs%20(except%20for%20Greece).)
- Cantir, Cristian, and Juliet Kaarbo. "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, no. 1 (January 2012): 5-24.
- Capannelli, Elisabetta, interview by Poslovni Dnevnik. Opportunities for Croatia have never been clearer and more vibrant The World Bank, (June 14, 2021).
- Carabine, Jean. "Unmarried Motherhood 1830 - 1990: A Genealogical Analysis." In *Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis*, edited by Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, & Simeon J. Yates, 267-311. London: Sage Publications, 2001.
- Carley, Kathleen. "Coding Choices for Textual Analysis: A Comparison of Content Analysis and Map Analysis." *Sociological Methodology* 23 (1993): 75-126.
- Carlin, Ryan E., and Shane P. Singh. "Executive Power and Economic Accountability." *The Journal of Politics* 77, no. 4 (October 2015): 1031-1044.
- Castells, Manuel. *The Rise of the Network Society*. New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.

- Ceaser, James W. "The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism." *American Political Thought: A Journal of Ideas, Institutions, and Culture* 1 (Spring 2012): 1-25.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Bosnia and Herzegovina." *European Election Watch*. October 7, 2018. <https://www.csis.org/programs/european-election-watch/2018-elections/bosnia-and-herzegovina>.
- . "Serbia." *European Election Watch*. June 21, 2020. <https://www.csis.org/programs/european-election-watch/serbia>.
- CES. *Special Interest Groups in the EU*. info DICE Report, Munich: info Institute, 2010.
- Chafetz, Glenn, Hillel Abramson, and Suzette Grillot. "Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime." *Political Psychology* 17, no. 4 (December 1996): 727-757.
- Chamber of Economy of Montenegro. *Montenegro Investment and Business Opportunities*. Podgorica: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro, 2019.
- Chansa-Ngavej, Vee, and Jaechun Kim. "Impact of International System on Democratic Transitions: A Comparative Study between Democratization in Post-Cold War Serbia and Post-Arab Spring Libya." *Journal of International and Area Studies* 28, no. 1 (2021): 39-57.
- Chiclet, Christophe. "KLA exports Albanian conflict to Macedonia." *Le Monde diplomatique*. April 2001. <https://mondediplo.com/2001/04/06macedonia>.
- Child, David. "Croatia, Greece, Romania illegally pushing refugees back: Report." *Al Jazeera*, October 7, 2021.
- Chouliaraki, Lilie, Myria Georgiou, and Rafal Zaborowski. The European "migration crisis" and the media: *A Cross-European press content analysis*. *Media and Communication*, London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2017.
- CIA. "Bosnia and Herzegovina." *The World Factbook*. February 8, 2022. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/bosnia-and-herzegovina/#people-and-society>.
- . "Kosovo." *The World Factbook*. February 2, 2022. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/kosovo/#people-and-society>.
- Coffey, Luke. "Redrawing borders in the Balkans would be a colossal mistake." *Arab News*, April 23, 2021.

- Collier, David, and James E. Mahon, Jr. "Conceptual "Stretching" Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis." *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 4 (December 1993): 845-855.
- Collier, David, and James Mahoney. "Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research." *World Politics* 49, no. 1 (October 1996): 56-91.
- Collier, Paul. *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*. New York City: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- . *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York City: Harper Perennial, 2009.
- Connell, R. W. "The Concept of Role and What to Do with It." *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology* 15, no. 3 (November 1979): 7-17.
- Coppedge, Michael, et al. "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach." *Perspectives on Politics* 9, no. 2 (June 2011): 247-267.
- Council of Europe. "Slovenia - "Further efforts to improve human rights of Roma and 'erased' persons needed"." *Commissioner for Human Rights*. June 7, 2011. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/slovenia-further-efforts-to-improve-the-human-rights-of-roma-and-erased-persons-needed->.
- Crasnow, Sharon. "The Role of Case Study Research in Political Science: Evidence for Causal Claims." *Philosophy of Science* 79, no. 5 (December 2012): 656-666.
- Cudworth, Erika, and Stephen Hobden. "Of Parts and Wholes: International Relations Beyond the Human." *Milennium: Journal of International Studies* 41, no. 3 (June 2013): 430-450.
- Curley, Tyler M. "Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion." *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (2009): 649-668.
- Dahl, Robert A. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.
- Damjanovski, Ivan, Miran Lavric, and Andrej Naterer. "Predictors of Euroscepticism in six Western Balkan countries." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 20, no. 2 (2020): 327-348.
- Darwin, John. *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire Since 1405*. New York City: Bloomsbury Press, 2008.
- David, Lea. "Between Human Rights and Nationalism: Silencing as a Mechanism of Memory in the Post-Yugoslav Wars' Serbia." *Journal of Regional Security* 10, no. 1 (2015): 37-52.

- Davies, Maire Messenger, and Nick Mosdell. "Content Analysis." In *Practical Research Methods for Media and Cultural Studies*, by Maire Messenger Davies, & Nick Mosdell, 98-107. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006.
- De Munter, Andre. *The Western Balkans. Fact Sheets on the European Union*, Brussels: European Union, 2021.
- Delgado, Alberto Martinez. "Fragmentation and Weakening of States: Instruments of Global Domination." *World Review of Political Economy* 8, no. 3 (Fall 2017): 295-316.
- Deliso, Christopher. *The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.
- Dell'anno, Roberto, and Marje Piirisild. "Measuring the Non-Observed Economy in a Transition Economy: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Comparative Economic Studies* 49 (2007): 609-631.
- Devine, Karen. "Stretching the IR Theoretical Spectrum on Irish Neutrality: A Critical Social Constructivist Framework." *International Political Science Review* 29, no. 4 (September 2008): 461-488.
- Dietrich, John W. "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy: Clinton and the China MFN Debate." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (June 1999): 280-296.
- Diez, Thomas. "Politics, Modern Systems Theory and the critical purpose of International Relations Theory." In *Observing International Relations: Niklas Luhmann and World Politics*, 30-43. London: Routledge, 2004.
- Dijk, Teun A. van. "What is Political Discourse Analysis?" *Political Linguistics*, 1997: 11-52.
- Dimitar, Eftimoski, and Milenkovski Bozidar. "The Knowledge Competitiveness of Macedonian Economy - Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Competitiveness* 4, no. 3 (September 2012): 122-135.
- Dimitrijevic, Vojin. "Constitutional Ethno-Nationalism after Fifteen Years." In *After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics Within the Successor States*, edited by Robert Hudson, & Glenn Bowman, 20-26. New York: Palgrave MacMillon, 2012.
- Dimova, Rozita. "Consuming Ethnicity: Loss, Commodities, and Space in Macedonia." *Slavic Review* 69, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 859-881.
- Djordjevic, Dusan. "International Agreements and Region-building in the Mountains of South East Europe." *Mountain Research and Development* 34, no. 1 (February 2014): 4-12.

- Dobbins, James. "Europe's Role in Nation Building." *Brookings Institute*. July 8, 2008. <https://www.brookings.edu/events/europes-role-in-nation-building/>.
- Dodik, Milorad. "Address by Milorad Dodik, the newly elected Serb member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the constitutive session of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina." 2018, November 20. [Speeches \(predsjednistvobih.ba\)](https://predsjednistvobih.ba)
- Dodovski, Ivan. "Pride and Perplexities: Identity Politics in Macedonia and Its Theatrical Refractions." In *After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics within the Successor States*, edited by Robert Hudson, & Glenn Bowman, 92-104. London: Palgrave, 2012.
- Dolan, Ed. Economic Freedom and Personal Freedom: What Can We Learn from the Cato and Fraser Indexes? *Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Open Society, Regulation*, Washington D.C.: Niskanen Center, 2021.
- Domadenik, Polona, Lubomir Lizal, and Marko Pahor. "The Effect of Enterprise Break-Ups on Performance: The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." *Revue Economique* 63, no. 5 (September 2012): 849-866.
- Domazet, Ivana, and Ivan Stosic. "Strengthening the Competitiveness of Serbian Economy and the Corporate Market Restructuring." *Economic Analysis* 46, no. 3-4 (2017): 108-124.
- Downe-Wambolt, B. "Content Analysis: Method, Applications and Issues." *Health Care for Women International* 13 (1992): 313-321.
- Drache, Daniel. *Defiant Publics: The Unprecedented Reach of the Global Citizen*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008.
- Dragas, Orhan. "EU enlargement: Beware the veto epidemic." *EURACTIV*, November 23, 2020.
- Drakic, Ivana, and Jelena Kajganovic. Civil Society - an important asset in EU accession negotiations in Serbia and Montenegro. Podgorica: *Center for Democratic Institutions*, 2012.
- Drost, Ellen A. "Validity and Reliability in Social Science Research." *Education Research and Perspectives* 38, no. 1 (2011): 105-124.
- Duckworth, Saru. "Why is Croatia Poor?" *The Borgen Project*. August 3, 2017. <https://borgenproject.org/why-is-croatia-poor/>.
- Dudic, Branislav, Zdenka Dudic, Jan Smolen, and Vladimir Mirkovic. "Support for foreign direct investment inflows in Serbia." *Economic Annals*, 2018: 4-11.

- Durakovic, Benjamin, and Erwin Trgo. "Perspectives and role of Bosnian defense industry in national innovation system." *Defense and Security Studies* 1 (December 2020): 26-33.
- Dusan, Spasojevic, and Stojiljkovic Zoran. "The Presidentialism of Political Parties in Serbia: Influence of Direct Elected President." In *The Presidentialism of Political Parties in the Western Balkans*, edited by Gianluca Passarelli, 49-72. London: Palgrave, 2019.
- Dylgjeri, Ardita. "Analysis of Speech Acts in Political Speeches." *European Journal of Social Sciences Studies* 2, no. 2 (2017): 19-26.
- Dymarski, Mirosław. "Serbian Political Leadership: Archetype and Modernity." *Studies into the History of Russia and Central-Eastern Europe*, 2019: 145-168.
- Dyrstad, Karin. "After ethnic civil war: Ethno-nationalism in the Western Balkans." *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 6 (November 2012): 817-831.
- Dyson, Stephen Benedict, and Thomas Preston. "Individual Characteristics of Political Leaders and the Use of Analogy in Foreign Policy Decision Making." *Political Psychology* 27, no. 2 (2006): 265-288.
- Dzafic, Zijad, and Admir Omerbasic . "Innovativeness in Bosnian Small and Medium Sized Businesses." *Economic Review: Journal of Economics and Business* 16, no. 1 (2018): 7-18.
- Dzankic, Jelena. "The role of the EU in the statehood and democratization of Montenegro." In *The EU and Member State Building*, edited by Zeynep Arkan, & Soeren Keil. London: Routledge, 2014.
- Dzihic, Vedran, and Angela Wieser. "Incentives for Democratization? Effects of EU Conditionality on Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Europe-Asia Studies* 63, no. 10 (December 2011): 1803-1825.
- Dzombic, Jelena. "Rightwing Extremism in Serbia." *Race & Class* 55, no. 4 (March 2014): 106-110.
- Ebbinghaus, Bernhard. "When Less is More: Selection Problems in Large-N and Small-N Cross-National Comparisons." *International Sociology* 20, no. 2 (June 2005): 133-152.
- Ecevit, Yuksel Alper, and Ekrem Karakoc. "The perils of semi-presidentialism." *International Political Science Review* 38, no. 1 (January 2017): 4-20.
- Economides, Spyros. *From Fatigue to Resistance: EU Enlargement and the Western Balkans. Dahrendorf Forum IV Working Paper No.17*, London: London School of Economics , 2020.

- Edinger, Lewis J. "Political Science and Political Biography: Reflections on the Study of Leadership." *The Journal of Politics* 26, no. 2 (May 1964): 423-439.
- Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. "Building Theories from Case Study Research." *The Academy of Management Review* 14, no. 4 (October 1989): 532-550.
- Elbasani, Arolda. *European Integration in the Western Balkans: Revising the Transformative Power of the EU*. *Monograph*, London: Routledge, 2013.
- Emmott, Robin. "EU no longer agrees on Balkan membership guarantee, diplomats say." *Reuters*, September 28, 2021.
- Emmott, Robin, Francesco Guarascio, and Marine Pennetier. "France under fire for "historic error" of blocking Balkan EU hopefuls." *Reuters*, October 18, 2019.
- Erlanger, Steve. "In a New Cold War with Russia, Balkans Became Testing Ground." *New York Times*, April 10, 2018.
- Eschholz, Sarah, and Jana Bufkin. "Crimes in the movies: Investigating the efficacy of measures of both sex and gender for predicting victimization and offending in film." *Sociological Forum* 16, no. 4 (2001): 655-676.
- European Network of Political Foundations. *Building Bridges between Civil Society and Party Political Actors in the Western Balkans - The Perspectives of Political Foundations*. Policy Paper, *European Network of Political Foundations*, 2015.
- European Parliament. "Human rights breaches in Russia, Cuba and Serbia." *European Parliament: News*. December 16, 2021. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20211210IPR19224/human-rights-breaches-in-russia-cuba-and-serbia>.
- . "Slovenia: MEPs discuss threats to media freedom and democracy." *European Parliament News*. November 21, 2021. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20211118IPR17626/slovenia-meps-discuss-threats-to-media-freedom-and-democracy>.
- European Stability Initiative. *Hamster in the Wheel: Credibility and EU Balkan Policy*. Berlin: *European Stability Initiative*, 2020.
- European Western Balkans. "Picula: It is in the interest of Montenegrin citizens that there are uncompromised people in the executive power." *European Western Balkans*. November 4, 2020. <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/11/04/picula-it-is-in-the-interest-of-montenegrin-citizens-that-there-are-uncompromised-people-in-the-executive-power/>.

- Eurostat. "Foreign direct investment - intensity ratios." *Eurostat: Statistics Explained*. July 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Foreign_direct_investment_-_intensity_ratios.
- . "GDP per capita, consumption per capita and price level indices." *Eurostat*. December 15, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=GDP_per_capita,_consumption_per_capita_and_price_level_indices.
- Eurydice. "Croatia." Population: demographic situation, languages and religions. November 30, 2021. https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/population-demographic-situation-languages-and-religions-14_en.
- . "Montenegro." Population: demographic situation, languages, and religions. December 1, 2021. https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/population-demographic-situation-languages-and-religions-51_en.
- . "Population: Demographic situation, languages and religions." Slovenia. December 21, 2021. https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/population-demographic-situation-languages-and-religions-77_en.
- . "Republic of North Macedonia: Population: demographic situation, languages, and religions." Eurydice. December 1, 2021. https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/republic-north-macedonia/population-demographic-situation-languages-and-religions_en.
- . "Serbia: Population: demographic situation, languages and religions." Eurydice. December 1, 2021. https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/population-demographic-situation-languages-and-religions-66_en.
- EWB. "Political will and a more clear guidance by EU key for reforms in the rule of law in WB." *European Western Balkans*. June 15, 2021. <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2021/06/15/more-clear-guidance-by-eu-and-political-will-key-for-reforms-in-the-rule-of-law-area-in-wb/>.
- Fairclough, Norman. *Analysing Discourse: Textual analysis for social research*. London: Routledge, 2003.
- . *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*. 2nd. London: Routledge, 2010.
- . *Language and Power*. 3rd. London: Routledge, 2014.

- Faubert, Sarah Emily. "This I Believe: Examining the Construction of Truth, Belief, and Reason." *Reflections* 26, no. 1 (2020): 68-74.
- Fauchier, Agathe. "Kosovo: what does the future hold for LGBT people?" *Forced Migration Review* 42 (April 2013): 36-39.
- Fawn, Rick. "The Kosovo: And Montenegro: Effect." *International Affairs* 84, no. 2 (March 2008): 269-294.
- Ferguson, Niall. *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire*. London: Penguin Books, 2004.
- Feyerabend, Florian C. *The Influence of External Actors in the Western Balkans*. Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2018.
- Fierke, K.M. "Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 46 (2002): 331-354.
- Fiti, Taki, Vladimir Filipovski, Marica Antovska, and Biljana Tashevka. "Innovations and entrepreneurship in the Macedonian business sector." *World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development* 13, no. 2-3 (March 2017): 194-210.
- Flick, Uwe. *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*. 3rd. London: Sage, 2005.
- Foer, Franklin. *How Soccer Explains the World: An Unlikely Theory of Globalization*. New York City: Harper Collins, 2008.
- Fossen, Thomas. "Constructivism and the Logic of Political Representation." *American Political Science Review* 113, no. 3 (2019): 824-837.
- Fouberg, Eric H., Alexander B. Murphy, and Harm J. de Blij. *Human Geography: Human, Place, and Culture*. 11th. New York: Wiley, 2015.
- Foucault, Michel. "The Order of Discourse." In *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*, edited by Robert Young, 48-79. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1981.
- Fouere, Erwan. "The EU's enlargement agenda is no longer fit for purpose." *Centre for European Policy Studies*. January 21, 2021. <https://www.ceps.eu/the-eus-enlargement-agenda-is-no-longer-fit-for-purpose/>.
- Frederking, Brian. "Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 363-378.
- Freedom House. *About the Report*. 2021. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>.
- Freedom House. *Freedom in the World*. Washington D.C.: Freedom House, 2018.

- Freedom House. *Freedom in the World*. Washington D.C.: *Freedom House*, 2020.
- Freedom House. *Freedom in the World*. Washington D.C.: *Freedom House*, 2016.
- Freedom House. *Freedom in the World*. Washington D.C.: *Freedom House*, 2017.
- Freedom House. *Freedom in the World*. Washington D.C.: *Freedom House*, 2013.
- Freedom House. *Freedom in the World*. Washington D.C.: *Freedom House*, 2014.
- Freedom House. *Freedom in the World*. Washington D.C.: *Freedom House*, 2008.
- Freedom House. *Freedom in the World*. Washington D.C.: *Freedom House*, 2009.
- Freedom House. *Freedom in the World*. Washington D.C.: *Freedom House*, 2011.
- Freedom House. *Freedom in the World*. Washington D.C.: *Freedom House*, 2021.
- Freedom House. *Freedom in the World*. Washington D.C.: *Freedom House*, 2006.
- Friedman, Thomas. "It's a Flat World, After All." *New York Times Magazine*, April 3, 2005: 32-37.
- Fukuyama, Francis. "Against Identity Politics: The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy." *Foreign Affairs*, 2018: 90-114.
- Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, Summer 1989: 1-18.
- Garding, Sarah. "Weak by design? Diaspora engagement and institutional change in Croatia and Serbia." *International Political Science Review* 39, no. 3 (June 2018): 353-368.
- Gartzke, Erik. "The Capitalist Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 1 (January 2007): 166-191.
- Gashi, Ardiana, and Nikica Mojsoska-Blazevski. "The Determinants of Students' Well-Being in Secondary Vocational Schools in Kosovo and Macedonia." *European Journal of Education* 51, no. 3 (September 2016): 333-344.
- Gee, James Paul. *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method*. London: Routledge, 1999.
- Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
- George, Jim. "International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate." *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (September 1989): 269-279.
- Georgeoff, John. "Nationalism in the History Textbooks of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria." *Comparative Education Review* 10, no. 3 (October 1966): 442-450.

- Gerring, John. "The Case Study: What it is and What it Does." In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, edited by Carles Boix, & Susan C. Sokes, 90-122. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2007.
- Gibler, Douglas M., and Jaroslav Tir. "Territorial Peace and Democratic Clustering." *The Journal of Politics* 76, no. 1 (October 2013): 27-40.
- Giddens, Anthony. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
- Gjevori, Elis. "Is the EU's new Balkan accession plan divorced from grounded reality?" *TRT World*, February 7, 2020.
- Glenny, Misha. *The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999*. New York : Penguin, 1999.
- Glusac, Elaine. "Returning to Montenegro." *New York Times*, August 22, 2018.
- Goffman, Erving. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. New York: Doubleday, 1956.
- Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. *International Relations*. 10th. London: Pearson, 2014.
- Goldstein, Joshua S. *War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Gorgevik, Aleksandra Jovevska, and Sara Janeska. The citizens and the Assembly of North Macedonia: Trust on shaky ground. Parliamentary Support Program, Skopje: *Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation*, 2020.
- Gosar, Anton. "Slovenia." *Britannica*. January 15, 2022.
<https://www.britannica.com/place/Slovenia>.
- Grant, J. Andrew. "Agential Constructivism and Change in World Politics." *International Studies Review* 20 (2018): 255-263.
- Gregory, Derek, Ron Johnston, Geraldine Pratt, Michael J. Watts, and Sarah Whatmore, . *The Dictionary of Human Geography*. 4th. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2009.
- Grieco, Joseph M., and G. John Ikenberry. *State Power + World Markets: The International Political Economy*. New York City: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2003.
- Grieco, Joseph, G. John Ikenberry, and Michael Mastanduno. *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives, Connections, and Enduring Questions*. 2nd. New York: Red Globe Press, 2018.

- Grint, Keith. "Determining the interdependencies of change leadership." *Management Decisions* 36, no. 8 (1998): 503-508.
- Grint, Keith. "Problems, problems, problems: The social construction of "leadership"." *Human Relations* 58, no. 11 (2005): 1467-1494.
- Grittersova, Jane. "The international dimensions of democratization in Slovakia and Croatia." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 13, no. 1 (September 2012): 1-24.
- Grob, Lisa, and Sonja Grimm. "The external-domestic interplay in democracy promotion: a case study on public administration reform in Croatia." *Democratization* 5 (2014): 912-936.
- Guzzini, Stefano. "Constructivism and International Relations: An Analysis of Niklas Luhmann's conceptualisation of power." In *Observing International Relations*, edited by Mathias Albert, & Lena Hilkermeier, 208-222. London: Routledge, 2004.
- Haass, Richard. Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker's Perspective. Washington D.C.: *U.S. Department of State*, 2002.
- The Balkan Series*. Directed by Evan Hadfield. Produced by Rare Earth. 2020.
- Hadzic, Jasmina, and Paul Clare. Montenegro on Course for Stronger Economic Recovery in 2021. Washington D.C.: *The World Bank*, 2021.
- Haerpfer, Christian W., Patrick Bernhagen, Christian Welzel, and Ronald F. Inglehart, . *Democratization*. 2nd. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Hahn, Johannes. Remarks on the EU's support for Western Balkans, Turkey and neighbourhood in the addressing the challenges of refugee crisis. Brussels: European Commission, September 17, 2015.
- . "2015 Enlargement Package." EU Commission, November 10, 2015.
- . "Enlargement Policy: The EU delivers when the EU-aspiring countries deliver." Brussels: European Commission, December 3, 2014.
- . "EU and Montenegro in partnership to prepare the country for accession." The European Commission, November 21, 2014.
- . "Main challenges to be addressed to ensure Kosovo and the EU grow closer together." European Commission, February 18, 2015.
- . "Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo." European Commission. European Commission, January 20, 2016.

- Halili, Xhevdet, and Adrianit Ibrahim. "Causes for the Irregular Migration Crisis: Case of Kosovo." *Strategos* 2, no. 1 (2017): 79-89.
- Hamid, Shadi. "The End of Pluralism." *The Atlantic*, July 23, 2014.
- Hanania, Richard, and Robert Trager. "The prejudice first model and foreign policy values: racial and religious bias among conservatives and liberals." *European Journal of International Relations* 27, no. 1 (June 2020).
- Hardy, Cynthia, Bill Harley, and Nelson Phillips. "Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?" *Qualitative Methods*, Spring 2004: 19-22.
- Harrison, Lawrence E., and Samuel P. Huntington, . *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
- Harvey, David. *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Hoboken: Wiley and Blackwell, 1989.
- Hasic, Jasmin, Dzeneta Karabegovic, and Bisera Turkovic. "Locally Embedded Civil Society Organizations and Public Diplomacy: the Advocacy Roles of the 'Mothers of Srebrenica' in Promoting a Culture of Remembrance." *Studies of Transition States and Societies* 13, no. 1 (June 2021).
- Haughton, Tim. "Beelines, Bypasses, and Blind Alleys: Theory and the Study of the European Union." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 54 (2016): 65-82.
- Hebda, Wiktor. The Republic of Serbia: Stuck in the Grey Zone of Democratization? Yearbook of the Institute of East - Central Europe, *Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, 2020.
- Helms, Elissa. "East and West Kiss: Gender, Orientalism, and Balkanism in Muslim-Majority Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Slavic Review* 67, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 88-119.
- Herbut, Maciej. "The Application of Role Theory in Explaining the Policies of Smaller States." In *Georgia and Moldova in the context of Russian imperialistic foreign policy: domestic and geopolitical implications*, by Andrzej Czajkowski, Maciej Herbut, & Renata Kunert-Milcarz, 161-186. Wrocław: Wrocław University Press, 2017.
- Herman, Edward S., and John Robles. "The Srebrenica Massacre was a Gigantic Political Fraud." *Centre for Global Research*. July 13, 2018.
<https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-srebrenica-massacre-was-a-gigantic-political-fraud/5321388>.
- Hermann, Margaret G, and Joe D Hagan. "International Decision Making: Leadership Matters." *Foreign Policy*, no. 110 (Spring 1998): 124-137.

- Hermann, Margaret G., and Charles F. Hermann. "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and Why: An Empirical Inquiry." *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (December 1989): 361-387.
- Hervey, Ginger. "Justice evades Slovenia's "erased" citizens." *Politico*, March 28, 2017.
- Higgins, Andrew. "A Pricey Drive Down Montenegro's Highway 'From Nowhere to Nowhere'." *New York Times*, August 14, 2021.
- Hix, Simon. "The Study of the European Community: the challenge to comparative politics." *West European Politics* 17, no. 1 (1994): 1-30.
- Hobbes, Thomas. "Leviathan." In *Essential Readings in World Politics*, edited by Karen A. Mingst, & Jack L. Snyder, 16-20. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2017.
- Hodges, Brian David, Ayelet Kuper, and Scott Reeves. "Discourse Analysis." *BMJ* 337 (September 2008): 570-572.
- Hoef, Yuri Van. "Leadership through Friendship: The Dangers and Advantages of State Leaders Establishing Close Personal Relationships." *Journal of Leadership Studies* 13, no. 1 (2019): 70-72.
- Hoffman, Irwin Z. "Response to Layton: Considering the Sociopolitical Context of Dialectical Constructivism." *Psychoanalytical Dialogues* 23 (2013): 287-295.
- Holligan, Anna. "Srebrenica massacre: UN court rejects Mladic's genocide appeal." *BBC*. June 8, 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57346523>.
- Hollinshead, Graham. "Educating Educators in a Volatile Climate: The Challenge of Modernising Higher Business Schools in Serbia and Montenegro." *European Journal of Education* 41, no. 1 (March 2006): 131-149.
- Holman, Otto. "The end of the Cold War, the enlargement strategy, and the European Union's Neighborhood Policy." In *Global Europe: The External Relations of the European Union*, by Otto Homan, 133-170. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2019.
- Holsti, K. J. "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 233-309.
- Holzner, Mario. Policy Options for Competitiveness and Economic Development in the Western Balkans. Policy Notes and Reports, Vienna: *The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies*, 2016.
- Hooghe, Liesbert, and Gary Marks. "European Union?" *West European Politics* 31, no. 1-2 (2008): 108-129.

- Hopf, Ted. "Discourse and Content Analysis: Some Fundamental Incompatibilities." *Qualitative Methods*, Spring 2004: 31-33.
- Hopf, Ted. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory." *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 171-200.
- Hopkins, Valerie. "What Happened in Macedonia, and Why?" *The Atlantic*, April 28, 2017.
- Horner, Rory. "Towards a new paradigm of global development? Beyond the limits of international development." *Progress in Human Geography* 44, no. 3 (2019): 415-436.
- Horowitz, Donald L. "Comparing Democratic Systems." *Journal of Democracy* 1, no. 4 (Fall 1990): 73-79.
- Horowitz, Michael C., Rose Mcdermott, and Allan C. Stam. "Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 5 (October 2005): 661-685.
- Horvat, Srečko, and Igor Stiks, . *Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism: Radical Politics after Yugoslavia*. Brooklyn: Verso, 2015.
- Howard, Rhoda E. "Human Rights and the Culture Wars: Globalization and the Universality of Human Rights." *International Journal* 53, no. 1 (Winter 1997/1998): 94-112.
- Hoxhaj, Andi. "The EU Rule of Law Initiative Towards the Western Balkans." *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* 13 (2021): 143-172.
- Hozic, Aida A. "Dayton, WPS and the entrenched 'manliness' of ethnic power-sharing peace agreements." *London School of Economics*. February 15, 2021. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2021/02/15/dayton-wps-and-the-entrenched-manliness-of-ethnic-power-sharing-peace-agreements/>.
- Hromadzic, Azra. "Discourses of Integration and Practices of Reunification at the Mostar Gymnasium, Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Comparative Education Review* 52, no. 4 (November 2008): 541-563.
- An Unfinished Project: EU Enlargement in the Balkans*. Directed by Emily Hruban. Produced by Bertelsmann Foundation. 2019.
- Hsieh, Hsiu-Fang, and Sarah E. Shannon. "Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis." *Qualitative Health Research* 15, no. 9 (November 2005): 1277-1288.
- Hudson, Valerie M., and Christopher S. Vore. "Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow." *Mershon International Studies Review* 39, no. 2 (October 1995): 209-238.

- Human Rights Watch. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Discrimination a Key Barrier. New York: *Human Rights Watch*, 2019.
- Human Rights Watch. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Events of 2020. New York: *Human Rights Watch*, 2021.
- Human Rights Watch. Serbia/Kosovo Events of 2020. New York: *Human Rights Watch*, 2021.
- Human Rights Watch. World Report 2021. New York: *Human Rights Watch*, 2021.
- Huntington, Samuel. *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011.
- Hupchick, Dennis P. *The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002.
- Hussain, Nazir, and Fatima Shakoor. "The Role of Leadership in Foreign Policy: A Case Study of Russia under Vladimir Putin." *Islamabad Policy Research Institute XVII*, no. 1 (Winter 2017): 1-25.
- Husukic, Erna, and Emina Zejnilovic. "The environmental aesthetics of Sarajevo: A city shaped by memory." *Urbani Izziv* 28, no. 1 (June 2017): 96-106.
- Huszka, Beata. "Human Rights on the Losing end of EU Enlargement: The Case of Serbia." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 56, no. 2 (August 2017): 352-367.
- Huszka, Beata. *The Power of Perspective: Why EU Membership Still Matters in the Western Balkans*. Policy Brief, London: *European Council on Foreign Relations*, 2020.
- Ilgit, Asli, and Binnur Ozkececi-Taner. "Identity and Decision Making: Toward a Collaborative Approach to State Action." In *Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance*, edited by Vaughn P. Shannon, & Paul A Kowert, 92-116. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012.
- Illes, Gabor, Andras Korosenyi, and Rudolf Metz. "Broadening the limits of reconstructive leadership: Constructivist elements of Viktor Orban's regime-building politics." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 20, no. 4 (2018): 790-808.
- Immergut, Ellen M. "Institutions, Veto Points and Policy Results: A Comparative Analysis of Health Care." *Journal of Public Policy* 10, no. 4 (1991): 391-416.
- Inglehart, R., et al., . "World Values Survey: All Rounds - Country-Pooled Datafile Version." Madrid: *JD Systems Institute*, 2021.

- Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. New York City: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Institute for Sustainability Leadership. *Global Definitions of Leadership and Theories of Leadership Development: Literature Review*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, n.d.
- Jordanova, Dina. *Cinema of Flames: Balkan Film, Culture and the Media*. London: British Film Institute, 2001.
- Ishida, Youichi, Toshiyuki Shimizu, and Masatoshi Yoshikawa. "An analysis and comparison of keyword recommendation methods for scientific data." *International Journal on Digital Libraries* 21 (February 2020): 307-327.
- Ispanovic, Igor. "French Connection: 'Humanitarian' Far-Right Claims Kosovo as Cautionary Tale." *BalkanInsight*. February 16, 2022. <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/02/16/french-connection-humanitarian-far-right-claims-kosovo-as-cautionary-tale/>.
- Isufi, Perparim. "Kosovo Cautioned Over "Dangerous" Verbal Attacks on Media." *BalkanInsight*. February 18, 2022. <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/02/18/kosovo-cautioned-over-dangerous-verbal-attacks-on-media/>.
- Ivandic, Neven, and Ivan Sutalo. "The Contribution of Tourism to the Croatian Economy: An IO Approach." *Ekonomski Pregled* 69, no. 1 (2018): 20-42.
- Ivkovic, Dragan, Marija Cukanovic Karavidic, and Sladana Vujcic. "Small and medium-sized enterprises as a factor of Serbian economy." *Economic Analysis* 45, no. 3-4 (2012): 31-45.
- Izetbegovic, Bakir. "Address by the BiH Presidency Chariman Bakir Izetbegovic at the Conference 'European Values and Identity: Compass for Political Cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.'" 2014, April 4. [Speeches \(predsjednistvobih.ba\)](https://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/speeches)
- Jackson, Jeanne. "Contemporary Criticisms of Role Theory." *Journal of Occupational Science* 5, no. 2 (August 1998): 49-55.
- Jasarevic, Larisa. "Grave Matters and the Good Life." *The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology* 30, no. 1 (March 2012): 1-15.
- Jennings, Ken. "How Bosnia Ended Up With Just 12 Miles of Coastline." *Conde Nast Traveler*, September 19, 2016.
- Jervis, Robert. "Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?" *Security Studies* 22, no. 153 (2013): 153-179.

- Jervis, Robert. "Hypotheses on Misperception." *World Politics* 20, no. 3 (April 1968): 454-479.
- Jervis, Robert. *How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.
- Jessup, Bob. "Multilevel Governance and Multilevel Metagovernance: Changes in the EU as Integral Moments in the Transformation and Reorientation of Contemporary Statehood." In *Multi-Level Governance*, edited by Ian Bache, & Matthew Flinders, 49-74. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Jevtic, Jana. A Critical Ethnography of Hijabi Women in Sarajevo. Supplement, Kripke Center, *Journal of Religion and Society*, 2019, 4-18.
- Jezernik, Bozidar. "Europe and Its Other (i.e. the Balkans)." *Periferia*, no. 6 (June 2007): 1-17.
- Johnson, Lauren. "Adapting and combining constructivist grounded theory and discourse analysis: A practical guide for research." *International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches* 8, no. 1 (2014): 117-133.
- Josipovic, Ivo. "Responsibility for war crimes before national courts in Croatia." *International Review of the Red Cross* 87, no. 1 (2006): 1-25.
- Jovancevic, Radmila. "The Impact of Foreign Investment Flows on Croatian Economy - A Comparative Analysis." *Ekonomski Pregled* 58, no. 12 (2007): 826-850.
- Jovic, Dejan. "Accession to the European Union and Perception of External Actors in the Western Balkans." *Croatian International Relations Review*, no. 83 (2018): 6-23.
- Jovic, Dejan. "Croatia and the European Union: A Long Delayed Journey." *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 8, no. 1 (April 2006).
- Judah, Tim. *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
- Jung, Hoyoon. "The Evolution of Social Constructivism in Political Science: Past to Present." *SAGE Open*, January-March 2019: 1-10.
- Jungblut, Marc, and Abit Hoxha. "Conceptualizing journalistic self-censorship in post-conflict societies: A qualitative perspective on the journalistic perception of news production in Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia." *Media, War & Conflict* 10, no. 2 (2017): 222-238.
- Jupille, J., and J. A. Caporaso. "Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond International Relations and Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 429-444.

- Jusic, Mirna, and Nikolina Obradovic. *Enlargement Policy and Social Change in the Western Balkans*. Sarajevo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Dialogue Southeast Europe, 2019.
- Kaarbo, Juliet. "A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory." *International Studies Review* 17, no. 2 (June 2015): 189-216.
- Kajosevic, Samir. "Deeply Divided Montenegro Marks 15 Years of Independence." *BalkanInsight*, May 20, 2021.
- . "Montenegrin Judiciary Risks Losing Public Trust, Rights Activist Warns." *BalkanInsight*, January 26, 2022.
- . "Montenegro's President Flexes Muscles with New Government." *BalkanInsight*, January 20, 2021.
- Kane, John. "Leadership and International Politics." *Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs*, Winter 2016: 5-13.
- Kauppi, Nilo. "A structural constructivist theory of politics and European integration." In *Democracy, social resources and political power in the European Union*, by Nilo Kauppi, 22-50. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2005.
- Kaussler, Bernd. "British-Iranian Relations, "The Satanic Versus" and the Fatwa: A Case of Two-Level Game Diplomacy." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 38, no. 2 (August 2011): 203-225.
- Kecmanovic, Milica. "The Short-Run Effects of the Croatian War on Education, Employment, and Earnings." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57, no. 6 (December 2013): 991-1010.
- Keiichi, Kubo. "Democratization and Inter-Ethnic Relations in Multiethnic Countries: A Comparative Analysis of Croatia and Macedonia." *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 21 (2004): 181-201.
- Keil, S. "Europeanization, state-building and democratization in the Western Balkans." *Nationalities Papers* 41, no. 3 (2013): 343-353.
- Keil, Soeren, and Paul Anderson. "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Constitutional Politics in a "State of Minorities"." In *Constitutional Politics in Multinational Democracies*, 162-187. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2021.
- Keller, Johnathan W. "Leadership Style, Regime Type, and Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior: A Contingent Monadic Peace?" *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (2005): 205-231.
- Keman, Hans. "polyarchy." *Britannica: Politics & Political Systems*. 2015. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/polyarchy>.

- Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discourd in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Ker-Lindsay, James. Southeast Europe's Outstanding Conflicts. *Institute of International and European Affairs*. London, August 18, 2011.
- Khana, Parang. "Dismantling Empires through Devolution." *The Atlantic*, September 6, 2014.
- Khaze, Nina Markovic. "European Union's enlargement fatigue: Russia's and China's rise in Southeast Europe?" *Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies* 10, no. 1 (2018): 48-63.
- Kijewski, Sara, and Markus Freitag. "Civil War and the Formation of Social Trust in Kosovo: Posttraumatic Growth or War-Related Distress?" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 4 (April 2018): 717-742.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- King, Russell, Matloob Piracha, and Julie Vullnetari. "Migration and Development in Transition Economies of Southeastern Europe." *Eastern European Economics* 48, no. 6 (November-December 2010): 3-16.
- Klose, Stephan. "Theorizing the EU's Actorness: Towards an Interactionist Role Theory Framework." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 56, no. 5 (2018): 1144-1160.
- Kmezic, Marko. "Rule of law and democracy in the Western Balkans: addressing the gap between policies and practices." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 20, no. 1 (January 2020): 183-198.
- Knauss, G, and Marcus Cox. "The 'Helsinki Moment' in Southeast Europe." *Journal of Democracy* 11 (January 2005): 39-53.
- Knopf, Jeffrey W. "Doing a Literature Review." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39, no. 1 (January 2006): 127-132.
- Kohlbacher, Florian. "The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research." *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 7, no. 1 (December 2005): 1-15.
- Koinova, Maria. "Challenging Assumptions of the Enlargement Literature: The Impact of the EU on Human and Minority Rights in Macedonia." *Europe-Asia Studies* 63, no. 5 (July 2011): 807-832.
- Koppa, Maria Eleni. "Turkey, Gulf States and Iran in the Western Balkans: more than Islamic factors?" *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 29, no. 2 (Spril 2021): 251-263.
- Korchnak, Peter. *Remembering Yugoslavia*. Podcast. Astoria, OR, 2021.

- Korkut, Hasan, and Muhidin Mulalic. "Implications of Dayton Peace Agreement on Current Political Issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina." Special Issue on Balkans. Sarajevo: *SDU Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Social Sciences*, 2012. 107-117.
- Kostoska, Olivera, Pece Mitrevski, Marjan Angeleski, and Gjorgji Manceski. "Measuring the Qualitative Competitiveness of the Macedonian Economy." *Economic Development and Entrepreneurship in Transition Economies: A Search for New Paradigms*. Banja Luka: Faculty of Economics, University of Banja Luka, 2011. 76-86.
- Kostovicova, Denisa. "Civil Society and Post-Communist Democratization: Facing a Double Challenge in Post-Milosevic Serbia." *Journal of Civil Society* 2, no. 1 (May 2006): 21-37.
- Kostovicova, Denisa, and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic. "Ethnicity pays: the political economy of post-conflict nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina." In *After Civil War: Division, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Contemporary Europe*. National and ethnic conflict in the 21st century, edited by Bill Kissane, 187-213. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014.
- Krasniqi, Albert. "The Presidentialization of Political Parties in Kosovo: Institutional Limits." In *The Presidentialization of Political Parties in the Western Balkans*, edited by Gianluca Pasarelli, 193-214. London: Palgrave, 2019.
- Krasniqi, Besnik, and David Branch. "Institutions and firm growth in a transitional and post-conflict economy of Kosovo." *Journal of Entrepreneurship in Emerging Economies* 12, no. 2 (2018): 187-204.
- Krasniqi, Gezim. "'Quadratic Nexus' and the Process of Democratization and State-Building in Albania and Kosovo: A Comparison." *The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 41, no. 3 (2013): 395-411.
- Ku Leuven. *European Party Monitor*. May 14, 2020.
<https://soc.kuleuven.be/io/english/european-party-monitor/north-macedonia/VMRO-DPMNE>.
- Kucera, Joshua. "Roads & Kingdoms: Edge of Europe Series." *Slate*, January 15, 2017.
- Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- Kuhnhardt, Ludger. "Academic Evaluation: Theorizing European Integration." In *European Union - The Second Founding: The Changing Rationale for European Integration*, by Ludger Kuhnhardt, 445-479. Baden-Baden: Nomos Publishing, 2010.

- Kumarasingham, Harshan, and John Power. "Constrained Parliamentarism: Australia and New Zealand compared." In *New Accountabilities, New Challenges*, edited by John Wanna, Evert A. Lindquist, & Penelope Marshall, 189-206. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2015.
- Kuper, Simon, and Stefan Szymanski. *Soccernomics*. Philadelphia: Perseus Book Group, 2009.
- Kurecic, Petar. "Small States and Regional Economic Integrations in the Multi-Polar World: Reegional Differences in the Levels of Integration and Patterns of Small States' Vulnerability." *World Review of Political Economy* 8, no. 3 (Fall 2017): 317-348.
- Lakatos, Istvan. "The Potential Role of Small States and their "Niche Diplomacy" at the UN and in the field of Human Rights, with Special Attention to Montenegro." *Pecs Journal of International and European Law*, 2017: 58-68.
- Lamont, Christopher. "Explaining the Regeneration of the Croatian Democratic Union in Post-Presidential Authoritarian Croatia: Elites, Legacies and Party Organization." *Balkanistica* 21 (April 2008): 57-86.
- Lampe, John R. *Balkans into Southeast Europe: A Century of War and Transition*. London: Palgrave, 2006.
- Lanoszka, Anna. *International Development: Socio-Economic Theories, Legacies, and Strategies*. London: Routledge, 2018.
- Laswell, Harold. *The Analysis of Political Behavior: An Empirical Approach*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1948.
- Latal, Srecko. "New EU Enlargement Strategy Leaves Balkans Unimpressed." *Balkan Insight*. February 10, 2020. <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/10/new-eu-enlargement-strategy-leaves-balkans-unimpressed/>.
- Lawlor, Mary. UN experts: Bosnia must investigate attacks against women aiding migrants. Geneva: *United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commission*, 2020.
- Lee, Gia B. "Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech." *Hastings Law Journal* 56, no. 5 (2005): 983-1058.
- Leustean, Lucian N. "Orthodoxy and political myths in Balkan national identities." *National Identities* 10, no. 4 (December 2008): 421-432.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. *How Democracies Die*. New York: Crown, 2019.
- Lewin, Kurt. *Resolving Social Conflicts*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948.
- Linton, Ralph. *The Study of Man*. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1936.

- Locker, Melissa. "Slovenia tourism is booming, but is it really because of Melania Trump?" *Fast Company*. February 1, 2018. <https://www.fastcompany.com/40524514/slovenia-tourism-is-booming-but-is-it-really-because-of-melania-trump>.
- Lukic, Reneo. "From the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Union of Serbia and Montenegro." In *Serbia Since 1980: Politics and Society under Milosevic and After*, edited by Sabrina P Ramet, & Vjeran Pavlakovic, 55-94. Spokane: University of Washington Press, 2005.
- Lukovic, Milos. "Development of the Modern Serbian State and Abolishment of Ottoman Agrarian Relations in the 19th Century." *Cesky lid* 98, no. 3 (2011): 281-305.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Prince*. Boston: Dante University Press, 2003.
- Magyar, Balint. "Towards a terminology for post-communist regimes." In *Stubborn Structures: Reconceptualizing Postcommunist Regimes*, edited by Balint Magyar, 97-176. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2019.
- Maldini, Pero. "Croatian Accession to the European Union: EU Democratization Potential and Issues of Democratic Consolidation." In *Croatia and the European Union: Changes and Development*, edited by P Maldini, & D Paukovic, 11-32. London: Routledge, 2016.
- Malic, Nebojsa. "How Srebrenica became excuse for atrocities around the world." *Russia Today*. July 15, 2015. <https://www.rt.com/op-ed/273157-srebrenica-tragedy-excuse-atrocities/>.
- Maliqi, Shkelzen. "Why the Peaeful Resistance Movement in Kosovo Failed." In *After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics within the Successor States*, 43-76. London: Palgrave, 2012.
- Mallaby, Sebastian. *The World's Banker: A Story of Failed States, Financial Crises, and the Wealth and Poverty of Nations*. New York: Penguin Books, 2006.
- Maltese, John Anthony, Joseph A. Pika, and W. Phillips Shively. *American Democracy in Context*. New York: CQ Press, 2020.
- Marangos, John, Eirini Triarchi, and Themis Anthrakidis. "Political Economy, Inward Foreign Direct Investment, and EU Accession of the Western Balkans." In *The European Union: Post Brexit Challenges and Prospects for Growth*, edited by Vasileios Vlachos, & Aristidis Bitzenis, 149-172. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
- March , James G., and Johan P. Olsen. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." *The American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (September 1984): 734-749.

- March, J.G., and J.P. Olsen. *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: Free Press, 1989.
- March, James, and Johan Olsen. "Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions." *Governance* 9, no. 3 (July 1996): 247-264.
- Marcovitz, Hal. *The Balkans: People in Conflict*. Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2002.
- Markoff, John, Gilbert Shapiro, and Sasha R. Weitman. "Toward the Integration of Content Analysis with General Methodology." *Sociological Methodology* 6 (1975): 1-58.
- Markovic, Vladimir. "A Re-examination of the Position of the Student Movement in Serbia." In *After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics within the Successor States*, edited by Robert Hudson, & Glenn Bowman, 105-119. London: Palgrave, 2012.
- Markovikj, Nenad, and Ivan Damjanovski. "The EU's Democracy Promotion Meets Informal Politics: The Case of Leaders' Meetings in the Republic of Macedonia." *REGION: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia* 7, no. 2 (July 2018): 71-96.
- Marshall, Tim. *A Flag Worth Dying For*. New York: Scribner, 2016.
- Marusic, Sinisa Jakov. "Balkan 'Mini-Schengen' Leaders Eye Open Borders by 2023." *BalkanInsight*. July 29, 2021. <https://balkaninsight.com/2021/07/29/balkan-mini-schengen-leaders-eye-open-borders-by-2023/>.
- . "On 20th Anniversary, North Macedonia Archives "Lost" Peace Document." *Balkan Transitional Justice*. August 13, 2021. <https://balkaninsight.com/2021/08/13/on-20th-anniversary-north-macedonia-archives-lost-peace-document/>.
- Mastracci, Matteo. "Djokovic Saga, Far-Right Rhetoric and Ethnic Bias Disrupt Online World." *BalkanInsight*, February 4, 2022.
- Matache, Margareta, and Jacqueline Bhabha. "Anti-Roma Racism is Spiraling during COVID-19 Pandemic." *Health and Human Rights* 22, no. 1 (June 2020): 379-382.
- McCormick, John. *The European Union: Politics and Policies*. 3rd. Cambridge: Westview Press, 2004.
- . *Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction*. 7th. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
- McDonald, A., M. L. Jones, and S. Read. "Practical considerations in case study research: The relationship between methodology and process." *Journal of Advanced Nursing* 32, no. 2 (2000): 383-390.

- McGoey, Sean. "Independent Research is the "mother" of any Investigation." *International Consortium of Investigative Journalists*. August 10, 2021. <https://www.icij.org/inside-icij/2021/08/independent-research-is-the-mother-of-any-investigation/>.
- McKeown, Timothy J. "Case Studies and the Limits of the Quantitative Worldview." In *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, edited by Henry E. Brady, & David Collier, 139-168. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.
- Mead, George Herbert. "The Self and the Organism." In *Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, edited by Charles W. Morris, 135-144. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1934.
- Mearsheimer, John J. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War." In *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, & Steven E. Miller, 78-129. Boston: MIT Press, 1995.
- Mearsheimer, John J. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/1995): 5-49.
- Melady, Thomas, and J. Cushman Laurent. "The Seven States of the Former Yugoslavia: An Evaluation." *The Ambassadors Review*, Fall 2011: 40-45.
- Melo, Daniela. "Outmaneuvering Kissinger: Role Theory, US Intra-elite Conflict, and the Portuguese Revolution." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2018: 1-20.
- Meriage, Lawrence P. "The First Serb Uprising (1804-1813) and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of the Eastern Question." *Slavic Review* 37, no. 3 (September 1978): 421-439.
- Middelaar, Luuk Van. *The Passage to Europe: How a Continent Became a Union*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.
- Mihaljevic, Domagoj. "The deindustrialization process of the Croatian economy." *Kurswechsel* 3 (2013): 63-73.
- Mikucka-Wojtowicz, Dominika. "The Impact of Europeanization on Internal Party Organizational Dynamics in Selected Post-Yugoslav Countries." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 21, no. 2 (2019): 121-145.
- Milacic, Filip. "A painful break or agony without end? The stateness problem and its influence on democratization in Croatia and Serbia." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, July 2017: 1-18.
- Milosevic, Milena. "Vujanovic Runs Again as Montenegro President." *BalkanInsight*, January 25, 2013.

- Mingst, Karen A, and Ivan M Arreguin-Toft. *Essentials of International Relations*. 7th. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2017.
- Ministry of Tourism and Environmental Protection. *National Strategy of Sustainable Development of Montenegro*. Podgorica: Government of the Republic of Montenegro, 2007.
- Minority Rights Group International. Kosovo. *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples*, London: Minority Rights Group International , 2018.
- Mirkovic, Milika. Montenegro economy briefing: Overview of Foreign Direct Investment Trends in Montenegro. Budapest: *China-CEE Institute*, 2019.
- Mitchell, Donald. *Cultural Geography: A Critical Introduction*. London: Blackwell Publishing, 2000.
- Mitrany, David. "A Political Theory for the New Society." In *Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations*, by A.J.R. Groom, & P. Taylor, 25-37. New York: Crane Russak, 1975.
- Mitreva, Elizabeta, Nako Taskov, Julijana Sazdova, Ivana Georgieva, and Hristijan Gjorshevski. "The Need for Implementation of Integrated Management Systems (IMS) in Macedonian Companies." *Quality Management* 16, no. 147 (August 2015): 62-66.
- Mittelman, James H. *Hyper-Conflict: Globalization and Insecurity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Morganstern, Scott, Stephen M. Swindle, and Andrea Castagnola. "Party Nationalization and Institutions." *The Journal of Politics* 71, no. 4 (October 2009): 1322-1341.
- Morina, Die. "Kosovo Veterans Protest at Macedonia Shootout Convictions." *Balkan Transitional Justice*. November 28, 2017.
<https://balkaninsight.com/2017/11/28/kla-veterans-protest-against-the-sentences-on-kumanovo-case-11-28-2017/>.
- Mortenson, Greg, and David Oliver Relin. *Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Promote Peace - One School at a Time*. New York: Penguin, 2007.
- Mujanovic, Jasmin. *Hunger and Fury: The Crises of Democracy in the Balkans*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Murdie, Amanda, and David R. Davis. "Problematic Potential: The Human Rights Consequences of Peacekeeping Interventions in Civil Wars." *Human Rights Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (February 2010): 49-72.

- Musliu, Ali. "Democracy and human rights as topics of the Macedonian political system research and practice." *Revista de Stiinte Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques* 46 (2015): 28-37.
- Myers, Garth Andrews. "Local Communities and the New Environmental Planning: A Case Study from Zanzibar." *Area* 34, no. 2 (Aug. 2002): 149-159.
- Nardelli, Alberto, Denis Dzidic, and Elvira Jukic. "Bosnia and Herzegovina: the world's most complicated system of government?" *The Guardian*, October 8, 2014.
- Nared, Janez, David Bole, Nika Razpotnik Viskovic, and Jernej Tiran. "Slovenian Economy." In *The Geography of Slovenia: Small but Diverse*, edited by Drago Perko, Rok Ciglic, & Matija Zorn, 181-192. London: Routledge, 2020.
- Nazar, Mitra. "Slovenia: How a Neo-Nazi Expose Almost Landed a Journalist in Jail." *Global Investigative Journalism Network*, February 22, 2016.
- Nenovski, Tome, Ivica Smilkovski, and Klime Poposki. "Remodeling of the Macedonian Economy." *Chinese Business Review* 10, no. 12 (December 2011): 1156-1166.
- Neuendorf, Kimberly A. "Content Analysis: A Contrast and Complement to Discourse Analysis." *Qualitative Methods*, Spring 2004: 33-36.
- Nguyen, Nga Thi Viet. Poverty and Equity Brief: Croatia. Europe and Central Asia Poverty and Equity Group, Washington D.C.: *The World Bank Group*, 2020.
- Nikcevic, Jelena. "Montenegro on the Path to Paris MoU Accession: Towards Achieving a Sustainable Shipping Industry." *Sustainability* 10 (June 2018): 1-18.
- Nikolic, Radmilo, Aleksandra Fedajev, and Igor Svrkota. "Serbian Economy in Transition Period." *Economics Management Information Technology* 1, no. 1 (2012): 1-19.
- Nikolic, Tomislav. "Speech Made to the Assembly." 2013, October 3.
<http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Speeches/Speech-XML2HTML-EN.asp?SpeechID=163>
- Nimetz, Matthew. "The Macedonian "Name" Dispute: The Macedonian Question - Resolved?" *Nationalities Paper* 48, no. 2 (2020): 205-214.
- Novak, Matjaz. "Analysis of the Nature of Economic Growth of Slovenian Economy." *Managing Global Transitions* 1, no. 2 (2003): 153-167.
- Nowakowska-Krystman, Aneta, and Marzena Zakowska. "Conflict in Kosovo through the Conceptual Framework of Stakeholders." *Connections* 14, no. 4 (Fall 2015): 69-82.
- Nye Jr., Joseph S. "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace." *International Security* 41, no. 3 (Winter 2016/17): 44-71.

- OECD Development Centre. Croatia. Paris: *Social Institutions and Gender Index*, 2019.
- Office of International Religious Freedom. "2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Slovenia." *U.S. Department of State*. 2018.
<https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/slovenia/>.
- . "2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Croatia." 2019.
<https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/croatia/>.
- Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. "Gross Domestic Product." National Accounts at a Glance. 2013. [https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/na_glance-2013-5-en.pdf?expires=1642357072&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=7EEC323B315904674EBE9DFD4DA0C720#:~:text=Gross%20Domestic%20Product%20\(GDP\)%20per,GDP%20is%20distributed%20between%20citizens.](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/na_glance-2013-5-en.pdf?expires=1642357072&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=7EEC323B315904674EBE9DFD4DA0C720#:~:text=Gross%20Domestic%20Product%20(GDP)%20per,GDP%20is%20distributed%20between%20citizens.)
- Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. *OSCE Mission to Montenegro and EU Delegation Launch Three-Year Trial-Monitoring Project to Support a More Effective Administration of Justice*. Podgorica: OSCE, 2021.
- Osmani, Vjosa. "President Osmani's annual address to the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo." 2021, December 17. [Speeches - President of the Republic of Kosovo - DR. VJOSA OSMANI - SADRIU \(president-ksgov.net\)](https://www.president-ksgov.net/speeches-president-of-the-republic-of-kosovo-dr-vjosa-osmani-sadriu)
- Osmani, Vjosa. "Speech of the President of the Republic of Kosovo, Vjosa Osmani at the United Nations Security Council." 2021, October 15. [Speeches - President of the Republic of Kosovo - DR. VJOSA OSMANI - SADRIU \(president-ksgov.net\)](https://www.president-ksgov.net/speeches-president-of-the-republic-of-kosovo-dr-vjosa-osmani-sadriu)
- Ostojic, Mladen. "Facing the Past while Disregarding the Present? Human Rights NGOs and Truth-Telling in Post-Milosevic Serbia." In *Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans*, edited by V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic, J. Ker-Lindsay, & D. Kostovicova, 230-247. London: Palgrave, 2013.
- Pahor, Borut. "President Pahor attends the 24th Consultations of Slovenian Diplomats." 2020, March 9. [President of the Republic of Slovenia | Press centre | All releases \(predsednik.si\)](https://www.predsednik.si/en/press-centre/all-releases)
- Paige, Glenn D. *The Scientific Study of Political Leadership*. New York: The Free Press, 1977.
- Pauly Jr., Robert J. *Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization?* Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004.
- Pavlovic, Dusan. "Prospect theory and presidential elections: Two cases from Yugoslavia and Serbia." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 52, no. 1 (2019): 11-24.

- Peci, Bedri. "Informal Economy: the devil on Kosovo's shoulder." *Pristina Insight*. June 25, 2019. <https://prishtinainsight.com/informal-economy-the-devil-on-kosovos-shoulder/#:~:text=However%2C%20local%20and%20international%20reports,to%20the%20state's%20annual%20budget.&text=The%20informal%20economy%20is%20widespread>.
- Peck, Blake, and Jane Mummery. "Hermeneutic Constructivism: An Ontology for Qualitative Research." *Qualitative Health Research*, May 2017: 1-19.
- Pejic, Irena. "The Constitutional Rationalization of the Separation of Powers: The Case of Serbia." University of Nis Faculty of Law (University of Nis), 2019: 45-62.
- Pellet, Alain. "The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples." *European Journal of International Law* 3, no. 1 (February 1992): 178-185.
- Pendarovski, Stevo. "President Pendarovski addresses the Summit of the South-East European Cooperation Process in Sarajevo." 2019, July 9. [Speeches - President of the Republic of North Macedonia \(pretsedatel.mk\)](https://www.pretsedatel.mk/en/speecies-president-of-the-republic-of-north-macedonia)
- Death of Yugoslavia*. Directed by Norma Percy. Produced by BBC. 1995-1996.
- Peresin, Anita, Melisa Hasanovic, and Kujtim Bytyqi. "Female Returnees from Syria to the Western Balkans: Between Regret and 'Caliphate Nostalgia'." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 15, no. 5 (October 2021): 29-45.
- Perry, Valery. "Constitutional Reform Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Top-down Failure, Bottom-up Potential, Continued Stalemate." In *State-Building and Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 15-40. New York: Routledge, 2015.
- Petrovic, Milenko, and Nicholas Ross Smith. "In Croatia's slipstream or an alternative road? Assessing the objective case for the remaining Western Balkan states acceding into the EU." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 13, no. 4 (2013): 553-573.
- Petrovic, Predrag. "State Capture in Serbia - A Conceptual and Contextual Introduction." In *Security Sector Capture in Serbia*, edited by Katarina Djokic, Sasa Djordjevic, & Marija Ignjatijevic, 11-19. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2020.
- Pettman, Ralph. *Commonsense Constructivism, or the making of world affairs*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Pickering, Paula. Evaluating the EU State-Building Model in the Western Balkans. *National Council for Eurasian and East European Research Working Paper*, Seattle: University of Washington, 2011.

- Pickering, Paula M. "Generating Social Capital for Bridging Ethnic Divisions in the Balkans: Case Studies of two Bosniak Cities." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29, no. 1 (2006): 79-103.
- Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. *Globalization and Culture: Global Melange*. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020.
- Pineles, Dean B. "Trump Administration's Bet on Kosovo's Thaci Fails to Pay Off." *Balkan Insight*. July 1, 2020. <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/07/01/trump-administrations-bet-on-kosovos-thaci-fails-to-pay-off/>.
- Pogacar, Martin. "Yugoslav past in film and music: Yugoslav interfilmic referentiality." In *Remembering Utopia: The culture of everyday life in socialist Yugoslavia*, edited by Breda Luthar, & Marusa Pusnik, 199-226. New Academia Publishing, 2010.
- Polackova, Zuzana, and Pieter Van Duin. "Montenegro Old and New: History, Politics, Culture, and the People." *Studia Politica Slovaca* 6, no. 1 (2013): 60-82.
- Pond, Elizabeth. "Come Together: Europe's Unexpected New Architecture." *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 2 (March/April 2000): 8-12.
- Popovic, Goran, and Ognjen Eric. "Economic development of the Western Balkans and European Union investments." *Economic Research* 31, no. 1 (2018): 1539-1556.
- Popovic, Nenad. "The New Industrialization of Serbian Economy." *Ekonomika Preduzeća* 60, no. 1-2 (January 2011): 95-104.
- Prakash, Deepa, Audie Klotz, Samuel Barkin, Matthew J. Hoffmann, Gavan Duffy, and Nina Tannenwald. "Should We Discard the "Qualitative" versus "Quantitative" Distinction?" *International Studies Review* 9, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 753-770.
- Prica, Ines. "Singing the Politics of the Croatian Transition." In *After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics within the Successor States*, edited by Robert Hudson, & Glenn Bowman, 132-143. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Price, Marie D., and Catherine W. Cooper. "Competing Visions, Shifting Boundaries: The Construction of Latin America as a World Region." *The Journal of Geography* 106, no. 3 (May/June 2007): 113-122.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. New York City: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Puchala, Donald J. "Review: Foreign Policy Analysis and Beyond." *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 3 (April 1970): 501-510.

- Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-460.
- Radmanovic, Nebojsa. "The Chairman of the BiH Presidency Nebojsa Radmanovic's address at the formal session." 2006, November 6. [Speeches \(predsjednistvobih.ba\)](http://predsjednistvobih.ba)
- Radovic, Milivoje, Radoje Zugic, and Nikola Milovic. "Economic Institutions and Competitiveness of Economy with Emphasis on Montenegro." *Montenegrin Journal of Economics* 9, no. 1 (February 2013): 63-75.
- Rajovic, Goran, and Jelisavka Bulatovic. "Some aspects of geographic view on economy: the case of northeastern Montenegro." *International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences* 6 (September 2013): 49-61.
- Reese, Stephen D., and Seth C. Lewis. "Framing the War on Terror." *Journalism* 10, no. 6 (2009): 777-797.
- Rehn, Olli. "A stronger Europe through deepening and widening." *EPP Conference on Enlargement and consolidation of the European Union*. Brussels, April 8, 2008.
- Renshon, Stanley A. "Political Leadership as Social Capital: Governing in a Dividend National Culture." *Political Psychology* 21, no. 1 (March 2000): 199-226.
- Rentas, Raven. "Why is Kosovo Poor, and How are the Poor Being Helped?" *The Borgen Project*. July 27, 2017. <https://borgenproject.org/tag/kosovo/>.
- Reporters Without Borders. Bosnia-Herzegovina. Paris: *Reporters Without Borders*, 2021.
- Reporters Without Borders. Kosovo. Paris: *Reporters Without Borders*, 2021.
- Reporters Without Borders. Slovenia. Paris: *Reporters Without Borders*, 2021.
- Republic of Kosovo. "International Recognitions of the Republic of Kosovo." *Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora*. January 20, 2021. <https://mfa-ks.net/en/politika/483/njohjet-ndrkombtare-t-republiks-s-kosovs/483#:~:text=The%20Republic%20of%20Kosovo%20is,obtaining%20more%20than%20100%20recognitions.>
- Reus-Smit, Christian. "Constructivism." In *Theories of International Relations*, edited by Scott Burchill, et al., 212-236. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Reuters. "EU court will not intervene in Croatia-Slovenia border dispute." *Reuters*, January 31, 2020.
- Richter, Solveig, and Natasha Wunsch. "Money, power, glory: the linkages between EU conditionality and state capture in the Western Balkans." *Journal of European Public Policy* 27, no. 1 (February 2019): 41-62.

- Riese, Sarah, Nora Roehner, and Christoph Zuercher. "External Strategies for Post-Conflict Democratization: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia." In *Yearbook 2010*, by Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 265-283. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbh & Co., 2010.
- Riley, Alan. "Croatia and the E.U." *New York Times*, June 28, 2013.
- Risenfed, Stefan A. "The Powers of Congress and the President in International Relations: Revisited." *California Law Review* 75, no. 1 (January 1987): 405-414.
- Roach, Steven C. *Critical Theory of International Relations: Complementarity, justice, and governance*. London: Routledge, 2010.
- Rohde, David. *Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre Since World War II*. London: Penguin, 2012.
- . "Denying Genocide in the Face of Science." *The Atlantic*, July 17, 2015.
- Rompuy, Herman Van, and Jose Manuel Durao Barroso. "From War to Peace: A European Tale." *Oslo: Nobel Foundation*, December 10, 2012.
- Rosati, Jerel A. "The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics." *International Studies Review* 2, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 45-75.
- Ross, Michael L. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (April 2001): 325-361.
- Ruggie, John Gerard. "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge." *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 855-885.
- Rupnik, Jacques. *The Western Balkans and the EU: 'An Hour of Europe'*. Chaillot Papers, Paris: *European Union Institute of Security Studies*, 2011.
- Rustow, Dankwart A., ed. *Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership*. New York: George Braziller, 1970.
- Sabic, Senada Selo. "(Ir)relevance of Croatian Experience for Further EU Enlargement." *Insight Turkey* 21, no. 2 (Spring 2019): 171-187.
- Sachs, Jeffrey D. *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time*. New York City: Penguin Group, 2005.
- Safwat, Suhair. "Speech Acts in Political Speech." *Journal of Modern Education Review* 5, no. 7 (July 2015): 699-706.
- Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. New York City: Random House Inc., 1979.

- Salecl, Renata. "Hypercapitalism As the Replacement of Old Nationalist Fears." In *After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics with the Successor States*, 207-222. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- Sanders, Douglas. "Getting Lesbian and Gay Issues on the International Human Rights Agenda." *Human Rights Quarterly* 18, no. 1 (February 1996): 67-106.
- Sangar, Eric, Maeva Clement, and Thomas Lindemann. "Of Heroes and Cowards: A Computer-Based Analysis of Narratives Justifying the Use of Force." In *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on the Emotional Turn*, edited by Maeva Clement, & Eric Sangar, 179-206. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
- Sawyer, W. Charles, and Richard L. Sprinkle. *International Economics*. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education Inc., 2009.
- Scharpf, Fritz W. *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Hanno Scholtz. "EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transitional Exchange." *European Union Politics* 9, no. 2 (2008): 187-215.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank. "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union." *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 47-80.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. *The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe*. Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2005.
- Schrag, Katarina. "The Success of Humanitarian Aid to Kosovo." *The Borgen Project*. November 22, 2017. <https://borgenproject.org/tag/kosovo/>.
- Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring. "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options." *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (February 2008): 294-308.
- Sebald, Hans. "Studying National Character through Comparative Content Analysis." *Social Forces* 40, no. 4 (May 1962): 318-322.
- Sekulic, Dusko, and Zeljka Sporer. "Political Transformation and Elite Formation in Croatia." *European Sociological Review* 18, no. 1 (March 2002): 85-100.
- Sekuloska, Jovanka Damoska. "Causality between foreign direct investment in the automotive sector and export performance of Macedonian economy." *Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy* 13, no. 3 (2018): 427-443.

- Seligman, Lester G. "The Study of Political Leadership." *The American Political Science Review* 44, no. 4 (December 1950): 904-915.
- Selimovic, Inela. "A Note from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Leading a Displaced Life." *Human Rights Quarterly* 33, no. 2 (May 2011): 397-407.
- Sen, Amartya. *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*. New York : W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2006.
- Shadle, Matthew A. "Constructivism." In *The Origins of War: A Catholic Perspective*, by Matthew A. Shadle, 75-93. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011.
- Shenhav, Shaul R., Gideon Rahat, and Tamir Sheafer. "Testing the Language-Power Assumption of Critical Discourse Analysis: The Case of Israel's Legislative Discourse." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (March 2012): 207-222.
- Shirky, Clay. "The Political Power of Social Media." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2011.
- Simoës, AJG, and CA Hidalgo. The Economic Complexity Observatory: An Analytical Tool for Understanding the Dynamics of Economic Development. *Workshops at the 25th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, OEC, 2011.
- Sinanovic, Ermin. "How the use of ethnonationalism backfired in Montenegro." *Al Jazeera*, September 4, 2020.
- Sjoberg, Laura. "Permutations and Combinations in Theorizing Global Politics: Whither Realist Constructivism?" In *The Social Construction of State Power: Applying Realist Constructivism*, by J. Samuel Beckett, 193-215. Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2020.
- Skreb, Marko. "Economic Transition in Croatia: An Insider's View." *SAIS Review* 18, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 1998): 71-88.
- Smith, Steve, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, . *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. 3rd. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Snyder, Jack, and Karen Ballentine. "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas." *International Security* 21, no. 2 (Autumn 1996): 5-40.
- Snyder, Richard C., H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin. "The Decision-Making Approach to the Study of International Politics." In *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics*, edited by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, & Burton Sapin, 60-74. New York: The Free Press, 1962.

- Sopjani, Xheneta. Challenges and Opportunieiis for Startup Innovation and Entrepreneurship as tools towards a knowledge-based economy: The Case of Kosovo. Pristina: *Rochester Institute of Technology* Kosovo, 2019.
- Sowards, Steven W. "The Serbian Revolution and the Serbian State." *Twenty-Five Lectures on Modern Balkan History* (The Balkans in the Age of Nationalism). March 15, 2012. <https://staff.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/lecture5.html>.
- Staab, Andreas. *The European Union Explained: Institutions, Actors, Global Impacts*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.
- Around the Balkans in 20+ Days*. Directed by VICE Staff. Produced by VICE . 2012.
- Stanicek, Branislav. "A new approach to EU enlargement." *European Parliament*. Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2020. 4.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York City: W. W. Norton & Co, 2003.
- Stojanovic, Milica. "Serbia President Praises EU's Reformed Enlargement Methodology." *Balkan Insight*. February 6, 2020. <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/06/serbia-president-praises-eus-reformed-enlargement-methodology/>.
- Stojanovski, Kristefer, Alaka Holla, Ilir Hoxha, Elizabeth Howell, and Teresa Janevic. "The Influence of Ethnicity and Displacement on Quality of Antenatal Care: The Case of Roma, Ashkali, and Balkan Egyptian Communities in Kosovo." *Health and Human Rights* 19, no. 2 (December 2017): 35-48.
- Stojcic, Nebojsa. "Two Decades of Croatian Transition: A Retrospective Analysis." *Southeast European Journal of Economics and Business*, November 2012: 63-76.
- Stokes, Doug. "Trump, American hegemony and the future of the liberal international order." *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (2018): 133-150.
- Stokes, Gale, John Lampe, Dennison Rusinow, and Julie Mostov. "Instant History: Understanding the Wars of Yugoslav Succession." *Slavic Review* 55, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 136-160.
- Strange, Susan. "States, firms and diplomacy." *International Affairs* 68, no. 1 (January 1992): 1-15.
- Stroschein, Sherrill. "Consociational Settlements and Reconstruction: Bosnia in Comparative Perspective (1995-Present)." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 2014: 97-115.
- Subotic, Jelena. "Europe is a State of Mind: Identity and Europeanization in the Balkans." *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 2 (June 2011): 309-330.

- Subotic, Jelena. "Explaining Difficult States: The Problems of Europeanization in Serbia." *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, no. 4 (2010): 595-616.
- Subotic, Jelena. "Stories States Tell: Identity, Narrative, and Human Rights in the Balkans." *Slavic Review* 72, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 306-326.
- Suhrke, Astri, and Julia Buckmaster. "Post-War Aid: Patterns and Purposes." *Development in Practice* 15, no. 6 (November 2005): 737-746.
- Sulcebe, Dritan. *Albania and Kosovo: In Quest of a Common Future*. Tirana: *Albanian Institute for International Studies*, 2014.
- Sumi, Irena. "Unable to Heal: Debate on the National Self in Post-Socialist Slovenia." In *After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics within the Successor States*, edited by Robert Hudson, & Glenn Bowman, 153-181. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Sumner, Andrew. "Meaning versus measurement: why do 'economic' indicators of poverty still predominate?" *Development in Practice* 17, no. 1 (February 2007): 4-13.
- Suvarierol, Semin, and Senem Aydin Duzgit. "Limits of Cosmopolitanism? European Commission Officials on the Selves and Others." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 36, no. 2 (May 2011): 155-168.
- Sweeney, Daniel R., and Joseph L. Derdzinski. "Small States and (In)Security: A Comparison of Ireland and Slovenia." *Connections* 9, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 35-50.
- Swoboda, Hannes. *NATO and the European Union: Values and Interests concerning the Western Balkans*. *International Institute for Peace*. September 15, 2020.
- T.J. "Is Serbo-Croatian a Language?" *The Economist*, April 10, 2017.
- Tadic, Brois. "Report on the Serbian Chairmanship." 2007, November 9. Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
- Taleski, Dane, Viktor Dimovski, and Lura Pollozhani. "The Presidentialism of Political Parties in Macedonia: The Role of Ethnicity." In *The Presidentialism of Political Parties in the Western Balkans*, edited by Gianluca Passarelli, 97-118. London: Palgrave, 2019.
- Tanner, Marcus. "Religion Remains Powerful in Balkans, Survey Shows." *BalkanInsight*, January 15, 2018.
- Tansey, Oisín. "Democratization without a State: Democratic Regime-Building in Kosovo." *Democratization* 14 (January 2007): 129-150.
- Tansey, Oisín. "Kosovo: Independence and Tutelage." *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 2 (April 2009): 153-166.

- Taydas, Zeynep, and Cigdem Kentmen-Cin. "Who Is Afraid of EU Enlargement? A Multilevel Comparative Analysis." *Political Research Quarterly* 70, no. 3 (September 2017): 604-617.
- Tcherneva, Vessela. "Western Balkans in trouble: Why the EU should make a new offer to the region." *European Council on Foreign Relations*. November 11, 2021. <https://ecfr.eu/article/western-balkans-in-trouble-why-the-eu-should-make-a-new-offer-to-the-region/>.
- Teorell, Jan, Michael Coppedge, Staffan Lindberg, and Svend-Erik Skaaning. "Measuring Polyarchy Across the Globe, 1900-2017." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 54 (March 2019): 71-95.
- The Borgen Project. "Five Facts about Human Rights in Slovenia." *The Borgen Project*. September 22, 2017. <https://borgenproject.org/five-facts-human-rights-in-slovenia/#:~:text=Slovenia%20has%20the%20highest%20recorded,European%20Court%20of%20Human%20Rights>.
- The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy. Women's Reproductive Rights in Croatia: A Shadow Report. New York: *The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy*, 2001.
- The Editors of Encyclopedia. "Slav." *Britannica*. May 6, 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Slav>.
- The Global Economy. "Foreign Direct Investment, percent of GDP - Country rankings." *The Global Economy*. 2019. https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/foreign_direct_investment/#:~:text=Foreign%20Direct%20Investment%2C%20percent%20of%20GDP%2C%202019%20%2D%20Country%20rankings,181%20countries%20was%204.31%20percent.
- Thies, Cameron G. "Role Theory and Foreign Policy." International Studies Association Compendium Project, Foreign Policy Analysis. *International Studies Association*, 2009. 1-45.
- Thies, Cameron G., and Angguntari C. Sari. "A Role Theory Approach to Middle Powers: Making Sense of Indonesia's Place in the International System." *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 40, no. 3 (December 2018): 397-421.
- Thorne, Sally. "Data Analysis in Qualitative Research." *Evidence Based Nursing* 3 (2000): 68-70.
- Todorova, Maria. *Imagining the Balkans*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

- Toe, Rodolfo. "Census Reveals Bosnia's Changed Demography." *BalkanInsight*. June 30, 2016. <https://balkaninsight.com/2016/06/30/new-demographic-picture-of-bosnia-finally-revealed-06-30-2016/>.
- Toom, Victor. "Ontologically dirty knots: The production of numbers after the Srebrenica genocide." *Security and Dialogue* 51, no. 4 (2020): 358-376.
- Trading Economics. "Kosovo Exports." *Trading Economics*. January 2022. <https://tradingeconomics.com/kosovo/exports#:~:text=Kosovo's%20main%20export%20partners%20are,Switzerland%2C%20Montenegro%20and%20Germany.%20>
- Trajkovska, Mirjana Lazarova, and Ilo Trajkovski. "Macedonia: The impact of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law on the Republic of Macedonia." In *The Impact of the ECHR on Democratic Change in Central and Eastern Europe: Judicial Perspectives*, edited by Iulia Motoc, & Ineta Ziemele, 266-288. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Trofimov, Yaroslav. *Faith at War: A Journey on the Frontlines of Islam, From Baghdad to Timbuktu*. New York City: Picador, 2006.
- Tufts University. "The Balkans Route." *Refugees in Towns*. 2020. <https://www.refugeesintowns.org/balkans-route>.
- Turner, Ralph H. "Role-Taking, Role Standpoint, and Reference Group Behavior." *American Journal of Sociology* 11 (1956).
- United Nations. "Croatia: Decades after Balkan wars, UN expert urges new push for justice." *Human Rights*. December 2, 2021. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/1107082>.
- Uvalic, Milica. Serbia's Transition: Challenges for policy-makers. New York: *Center on Global Economic Governance*: Columbia University, 2015.
- Uvalic, Milica. "The Idea of Balkan Regional Economic Integration." *Panorama*, 2019: 280-283.
- Uyesi, Ogretim. "Role Theory, the European Union and Turkey's Regional Foreign Policy." *Istanbul Commerce University Journal of Social Science* 18, no. 35 (2019): 681-700.
- Vachudova, Milada Anna. "EU Enlargement and State Capture in the Western Balkans." In *The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans: A Failure of EU Conditionality?*, edited by Jelena Dzankic, Soeren Keil, & Marko Kmezic, 63-85. Springer International Publishing, 2019.

- Vajda, Maja Munivrana. "Domestic Trials for International Crimes - A Critical Analysis of Croatian War Crimes Sentencing Jurisprudence." *International Criminal Law Review* 19, no. 1 (January 2019): 15-38.
- Vale, Givonni. "Serbia after COVID-19: "best economy in Europe"?" *Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso*. June 17, 2020.
<https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Serbia/Serbia-after-Covid-19-best-economy-in-Europe-202378>.
- Vankovska, Biljana. "Dealing with COVID-19 in the European periphery: between securitization and "gaslighting"." *Journal of Global Faultlines* 7, no. 1 (June-August 2020): 71-88.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. "Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society India and Beyond." *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (April 2001): 362-398.
- Vežovnik, Andreja, and Ljiljana Saric . "Introduction: Constructing Balkan Identity in Recent Media Discourses." *Slavic Review* 74, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 237-243.
- Vice. "Around the Balkans in 20+ Days." *Vice*. YouTube, August 29, 2012.
- VICE. "Europe or Die." Documentary. *VICE News*, 2016.
- Villanova University. *The Great Man Theory*. 2019.
<https://www.villanovau.com/resources/leadership/great-man-theory/>.
- Violatti, Cristian. "Slavs." *World History Encyclopedia*. September 10, 2014.
<https://www.worldhistory.org/Slavs/>.
- Vladisavljevic, Anja. "Croatia Toughens Penalties for Domestic and Sexual Violence." *BalkanInsight*, October 25, 2019.
- . "Croatian Journalists Union Deplores 'Intimidating' Rise in Lawsuits." *BalkanInsight*, April 16, 2021.
- . "Status Revoked: Slovenia's 'Erased' Recall Long Struggle for Justice." *BalkanInsight*, February 26, 2021.
- Vladisavljevic, Nebojsa. "Kosovo and Two Dimensions of the Contemporary Serb-Albanian Conflict." In *After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics within the Successor States*, 26-42. London: Palgrave, 2012.
- Vlahov, Dina. "Croatia: Freedom of Movement of Workers after Croatia's Accession to the EU." *Employment. Roadmap14*. 2014.
<http://roadmap2014.schoenherr.eu/croatia-freedom-movement-workers-croatias-accession-eu/#:~:text=Advantages%20for%20workers%20due%20to,EU%2C%20irrespective%20of%20their%20nationality>.

- Vos, Claske. "European integration through 'soft conditionality'. The contribution of culture to EU enlargement in Southeast Europe." *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 23, no. 6 (2017): 675-689.
- Vracic, Alida, and Blerjana Bino. *Media in Western Balkans. BiPAG*, 2017.
- Vujanovic, Filip. "President Vujanovic in Montenegrin Academy of Sciences at International Conference." 2012, June 7. [Filip Vujanovic \(filip-vujanovic.me\)](http://filip-vujanovic.me)
- Vujanovic, Filip. "President Vujanovic at the IX Annual Gathering of South-East Europe Officials." 2012, May 26. [Filip Vujanovic \(filip-vujanovic.me\)](http://filip-vujanovic.me)
- Vujanovic, Filip. "Montenegrin Presidents Address at the Reception on the occasion of Europe Day." 2012, May 9. [Filip Vujanovic \(filip-vujanovic.me\)](http://filip-vujanovic.me)
- Vujovic, Zlatko, and Nikoleta Tomovic. "The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in Montenegro: A Limited Semi-presidentialism." In *The Presidentialization of Political Parties in the Western Balkans*, edited by Gianluca Passarelli, 119-144. London: Palgrave, 2019.
- Vukovic, Ivan. "Diverging Party Outcomes in Hybrid Regimes: The Cases of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro." *Romanian Journal of Political Science*, 2011: 81-104.
- . "The post-communist political transition of Montenegro: Democratization prior to Europeanization." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 2011: 59-77.
- Vukovic, Ivan. "Political dynamics of the post-communist Montenegro: one-party show." *Democratization* 22, no. 1 (2015): 73-91.
- Wahlke, John C., Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson. *The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior*. New York: John Wiley, 1962.
- Wallace, Helen, James A. Caporaso, Fritz W. Schampf, and Andrew Moravcsik. "The Choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht." *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no. 1 (March 1999): 155-179.
- Wallace, William. "Less than a federation, more than a regime: the Community as political system." In *Policy-Making in the European Community*, edited by Helen S. Wallace, William Wallace, & Carole Webb, 403-426. New York: Wiley and Sons, 1983.
- Wallenfeldt, Jeff. "Where Does the Name Europe Come From?" *Encyclopedia Britannica*. 2021. <https://www.britannica.com/story/where-does-the-name-europe-come-from>.

- Wallerstein, Immanuel. "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16, no. 4 (September 1974): 387-415.
- Walt, Stephen M. "The World Wants You to Think Like a Realist." *Foreign Policy*, May 30, 2018.
- Walter, James. *The Leader: A Political Biography of Gough Whitlam*. Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1980.
- Waltz, Kenneth. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018.
- Weber, Robert. *Basic Content Analysis*. 2nd. London: Sage Publications, Inc., 1990.
- Wehner, Leslie E., and Cameron G. Thies. "Role Theory, Narratives, and Interpretation: The Domestic Contestation of Roles." *International Studies Review* 16, no. 3 (September 2014): 411-436.
- Weinstein, Franklin B. "The concept of a commitment in international relations." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13, no. 1 (March 1969): 39-56.
- Weldes, Jutta. "Constructing National Interests." *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 3 (1996): 275-318.
- Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make Of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organizations* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425.
- Wendt, Alexander. "Constructing International Politics." *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 71-81.
- Weyland, Kurt. "Risk Taking in Latin American Economic Restructuring: Lessons from Prospect Theory." *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (1996): 185-208.
- White, Marilyn Domas, and Emily E. Marsh. "Content Analysis: A Flexible Methodology." *Library Trends* 55, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 22-45.
- Willi, Andreas. "Whose is Macedonia, Whose is Alexander?" *The Classical Journal* 105, no. 1 (October-November 2009): 59-64.
- Wilson, Andrew. *Towards an Integration of Content Analysis and Discourse Analysis: The Automatic Linkages of Key Relations Text*. Technology Report, Lancaster University, Lancaster: UCREL, 1993.
- Wind, Marlene. *Europe Towards a Post-Hobbesian Order? A Constructivist Theory of European Integration*. *EUI Working Paper RSC No.96/31*, Florence: European Union Institute, 1996.

- Woehrel, Steven. Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy. CRS Report for Congress, Washington D.C.: *Congressional Research Service*, 2011.
- Wood, Michael. "Using Key-Word-in-Context Concordance Programs for Qualitative and Quantitative Social Research." *The Journal of Applied Behavior Science* 20, no. 3 (July 1984): 289-297.
- World Bank. "The World Bank in Kosovo." *The World Bank*. April 8, 2021. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kosovo/overview#1>.
- Wren, J. Thomas. *Inventing Leadership: The Challenge of Democracy*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.
- Yin, Robert K. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. 3rd. Thousand Oakes, CA: Sage Publications, 2003.
- Yin, Robert K. "The Case Study as a Serious Research Strategy." *Knolwedge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization* 3, no. 1 (September 1981): 97-114.
- Yin, Robert K. "The Case Study Crisis: Some Answers." *Administrative Crisis Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (March 1981): 58-65.
- Zakaria, Fareed. *The Post-American World*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009.
- Zakaria, Fareed. "The Reagan Strategy of Containment." *Political Science Quarterly* 105, no. 3 (Autumn 1990): 373-395.
- Zakosek, Nenad. "Democratization, State-Building and War: The Cases of Serbia and Croatia." *Democratization* 15, no. 3 (2008): 588-610.
- Zaman, Constantin, and Branko Drcelic. "Macro-stabilization issues in the Serbian Economy: Methodological Evaluation." *SSRN*, November 2009: 1-26.
- Zehfuss, Maja. *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Zevulun, Danielle, A. Elianne Zijlstra, Wendy J. Post, and Erik J. Knorth. "A qualitative study into the reintegration of vulnerable migrant children and families after return to Kosovo: Findings from a follow-up." *Children and Youth Services Review* 125 (June 2021).
- Zimmerman, Warren. *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers*. New York: Times Books, 1999.
- Zsiros, Sandor, and Hannah Somerville. "EU's credibility 'undermined' if North Macedonia delayed from joining the bloc." *Euronews*, May 7, 2021.

Zweers, Wouter, Vladimir Shopov, Frans-Paul van der Putten, Mirela Petkova, and Maarten Lemstra. *China and the EU in the Western Balkans: A Zero-Sum Game?* Amsterdam: Clingendael, 2020.