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Africa in Transition -- Nexus Between State Building & Regional Integration

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AFRICA IN TRANSITION --
NEXUS BETWEEN STATE BUILDING & REGIONAL INTEGRATION

by

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ABSTRACT

Regional integration in Africa is at a nascent stage, despite long-standing interest in continental unification since the Pan-African independence movements. The current surge in continental-wide economic integration builds on previous efforts, yet is markedly different in terms of the ideas, interests, and institutions today. A primary reason for the failure of the first East Africa attempt to integrate was the lack of a strong private sector. Research on African regionalism has focused mostly on limited success, lack of economic growth, and persistent wide-spread poverty. Recent developments present an opportunity to objectively study the gradual evolution in African perspectives and state capacities.

This dissertation employs a neo-institutional theoretical construct within a temporal frame to examine factors motivating states to attempt the complicated and potentially risky process of economic competition. Using a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) followed by process-tracing case studies, this research analyzes variables impacting elite bargaining and decision-making. Results demonstrate that conjunctions of certain conditions are at work in creating cooperative institutions, specifically economic pressures, regional insecurity, plus state capacity. These conditions have influenced the evolution of states' perceptions regarding the potential for integration to maximize states' welfare as well as national ability to navigate the process.

The temporal dimension reveals a change in the relationship between government and business elites is a significant departure from the failed East African attempt in the 1960s. Gradual convergence in national preferences, combined with exogenous support for integration are subtle but measurable. The argument made here is not that regional

integration will be successful or that conditions will not change in the future. Rather, this study focuses on the gradual evolution in underlying dynamics influencing changing relations, namely the strengthening interaction between government policymakers and economic powerbrokers. Today, business pressure groups have a vested interest in regional trade and, consequently, an influential role in international politics as theorized by neo-institutionalism. Empirical evidence demonstrates interest in interdependence can drive support for creation of mechanisms conducive to economic integration. Mutually reinforcing forces resulted in observable state direction of resources to enhance economic competitiveness, human capital, and regional security via cooperative regional programs and institutions.

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DEDICATION

This achievement would not have been possible without the support of my family who sustained me with their encouragement during this journey. Above all, I owe my love of learning to my father, Lt Col Arthur L. Erickson, USA, who inspired all who knew him with his courage and quiet thoughtfulness.

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ADF	Alliance of Democratic Forces
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AFDB	Africa Development Bank
AIDI	Africa Infrastructure Development Index
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ARIA	Assessing Regional Integration in Africa
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AUDA	African Union Development Agency
BREXIT	British Exit (from EU)
CAR	Central African Republic
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CoW	Coalition of the Willing
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
csQCA	Crisp Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIB	European Investment Bank

EAC-EU EPA	EAC-EU Economic Partnership Agreement
EPRDS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies
ESSP	Energy Sector Strategic Plan
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDLR	Democratic Foces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
fsQCA	Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
FTA	Free Trade Area
GCI	Global Competitiveness Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
GFCF	Gross Fixed Capital Formation
GLTFP	Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Project
GNI	Gross National Income
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
HDI	Human Development Index
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IEA	International Energy Agency
INUS	Insufficient-Necessary part of Unnecessary-Sufficient condition
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
IRAI	International Development Agency Resource Allocation Index
KLP	Kigali Logistics Platform

KSEZ	Kigali Special Economic Zone
M23	March 23 Movement
MICE	Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, and Events
MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR
MONUSCO	UN Stabilization Mission in Congo
MVA	Manufacturing Value Added
NEP	National Electrification Plan
NHDR	National Human Development Report
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NST	National Strategy for Transformation
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OEC	Observatory of Economic Complexity
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAP	Priority Action Plan
PIDA	Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
PPI	Private Participation in Infrastructure
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PoE	Pocket of Effectiveness
PT	Process-tracing
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
RAI	Rural Access Index
RDF	Rwanda Defense Force
REC	Regional Economic Community

RO	Regional Organization
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAMIM	SADC Mission in Mozambique
SDG	Sustainable Development of Goals
SGR	Standard Gauge Railway
SHS	Solar Home System
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TFTA	Tripartite Free Trade Area
TRALAC	Trade Law Centre
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	AU-UN Mission in Darfur
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNISFA	UN Interim Security Force for Abyei
USM	The University of Southern Mississippi
UNMISS	UN Mission in South Sudan
WEF	World Economic Forum

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

Regional integration in Africa has an extensive history beginning with Pan-Africanism during the independence era of the mid-20th century. However, progress in bringing about the deep integration required to affect desired economic transformation has not been realized. Most analysis of regionalism in Africa has been limited to its effects on economic growth and development, in part because of the limited success of these efforts, as well as a preoccupation with frequent bouts of violent conflict. This dissertation examines factors motivating states to attempt the complicated and potentially risky process of economic competition from a non-normative perspective as opposed to attempting to ascertain the likelihood of success. Most significantly, it seeks to demonstrate when and how national preferences align with endogenous and exogenous factors seeking to influence policy positions regarding regional integration.

Basic assumptions include the well-accepted premise that economic growth is a prerequisite for economic development and enhanced standards of living. However, while economic integration has the potential to create regional markets and increase economic growth, this process is hampered given Africa's colonial legacy of resource extractive economies. Resulting constrictions, such as poor infrastructure, trade barriers, and inadequate competitiveness, are difficult to overcome. Moreover, newly independent state leaders focused primarily on political unification. It wasn't until the adoption of the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) Agreement in 2015 that Africa exhibited a serious interest in regional economic integration which demonstrates evidence of an evolution in continental preferences for transforming African economies (Calestous and Mangeni 2018).

This dissertation focuses on the transformation of innovation in regional integration strategies in Africa. It analyzes relations between national, regional, and global actors from a temporal perspective with respect to the ideas and interests that drive innovation in institutions. Processes involved are examined through a neo-institutionalist lens that identifies how, when, and why innovations in integration strategy emerged in Sub-Saharan Africa, either significantly or partially. The construct employed uses Signé's (2017) neo-institutional framework in combination with Moravcsik's (1998) liberal intergovernmentalism framework. Moravcsik emphasizes the importance of negotiation between the public sector and business interest groups in affecting institutional evolution.

This dissertation explores what evidence is there of a transition in African relations and what conditions are contributing to this transition? The focus is on states' interests in economic development, given their importance for the functioning of institutions and the formulation of development strategies. The issue is to explain the form and mechanism of the emergence of innovations in the last two decades. A neo-institutional theoretical model offers an effective operational framework for paying particular attention to the role. of actor's ideas, interests, strategies, and temporal/contextual factors in defining and explaining political innovations.

This dissertation conducts a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of 45 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) followed by post-fsQCA process-tracing case studies of the most significant cases explaining integration in SSA. Of the14 cases identified by the best fsQCA solution, the average for East Africa was 1.6 and the average for West Africa was 1.3, confirming the conditions leading to the greatest degree of integration – competitiveness, state capacity, and security agency – are strongest in east Africa. This approach was chosen because the progress in the eastern region has increased markedly in recent years and is markedly different from other sub-regions. It, therefore, merits a more intense focus. Therefore, the cases selected for post-fsQCA process-tracing case studies were chosen from East Africa. While the conditions found in this solution also lead to a high degree of integration in West Africa, because the average score is not as robust, the dynamics of integration in the Sahel region are likely different from those of the littoral countries in West Africa or those of East Africa. Consequently, East Africa case study process-tracing results and overall conclusions are not necessarily generalizable to other regions in SSA or elsewhere. The intent is to focus on and put forward conclusions germane to East Africa but not applicable to the African continent or other regions therein more broadly.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

My primary research question is: "What conditions explain ideational and institutional changes driving cooperative integration in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)?" Supporting questions that help further explore this topic are:

- What evidence is there of a transition in SSA relations motivating cooperation and integration?
- What processes and mechanisms are contributing to the transition to increased cooperation?
- How applicable is regional integration to conflict and state-building ?)

The dissertation tests the above research questions with the following two hypotheses:

H1: In terms of the development policies and strategies, regional integration in the last decade in SSA reflects a progression along a spectrum of paradigmatic and ideational perspectives. In essence, its strategies and initiatives are an evolution in state-building dynamics from earlier ones exhibited in the 20th century.

H2: The development of a specific continental-wide institutional framework for facilitating interstate integration and increasing intra-regional trade through the AfCFTA signifies a novel development. The AfCFTA represents a change in the behavior and political attitudes of African leaders in terms of integration and cooperation. In effect, the AfCFTA represents an innovation in elite ideas, interests, institutions, and capacities in intrastate economic development and continental integration in Africa.

The overarching question of concern here is what necessary conditions move states from individualistic, self-interested contestants to more integrated, cooperative partners? The aim is to examine social, economic, and political motivations driving Sub-Saharan countries to choose to support regional integration. Moreover, how does the integration process within the most interdependent sub-region, the East African Community, help explain changes in national perspectives and willingness to participate in greater regional collaboration? The underlying assumption is that greater capacity to compete successfully in integration requires greater state-building characteristics.

Theoretical Approach

The theoretical approach employed is a blending of historical institutionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism to highlight significant critical junctures in elite decision-making to examine why some states are able to tackle challenges of development while others remain mired in institutional weakness. This study advances the discussion on state capacity building and national interests in regional integration by examining qualitative data (including historical research, content analysis of political structuring, and examples of institutional success) along with quantitative data (e.g., indices of economic growth and development, human development, and the prevalence of conflict).

This analysis seeks to examine the development of innovation in regional integration from a non-normative, process-based perspective over time, rather than a static, prescriptive one. It thus provides a more comprehensive understanding of processes through which integration strategies have evolved in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the relations between actors at various levels taking temporal horizons into account. The approach used to study the region's transformation avoids a normative posture such as Afro-optimism ("Africa Rising") and Afro-pessimism (perpetual stagnation). This position goes beyond the two dominant analytical visions: political-technocratic, liberal perspective emphasizing good governance and the stages of economic growth, and the activist neo-Marxist-inspired standpoint that critiques imperialism and dependence. While these two approaches both contribute to understanding the historical and current issues facing the region, they are also limited in their ability to understand innovation and transformation as processes. Most researchers of economic development in Africa focus primarily on the substance of strategies and normative concepts of best practices rather than how mechanisms have emerged or succeeded in practice.

Rather than prescriptive and prospective evaluations, an alternative, multifaceted approach to understanding transformation as a process can provide a more comprehensive explanation of the mechanisms through which institutions and public policies emerge and develop (Signé 2017). Integration theorists propose that causal mechanisms influence state-building indirectly via a variety of intermediate social, political, or economic factors (Moravcsik 1998). This dissertation tests the presumption that the interaction of certain conditions enables state-building, which, in turn, facilitates cooperation in political and economic relations. The first level of analysis employs Ragin's Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to assess the effects of state capacity, national economic circumstances, and socio-political constructs of conflict on the extent and pace of integration within the continent. The second level of analysis examines relevant national cases of evolution revealed in the first level through fsQCA to examine the evolution of ideas, interests, and negotiated outcomes (institutions) over time.

African Interests in Integration

African leaders have long recognized the need for interdependence and economic integration since gaining independence. Most understand that the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers can increase regional trade, stimulate economic growth, and improve economic developmental potential for the continent overall, which will attract investment as well as expand opportunities for small and medium businesses to take advantage of (UNECA 2020). It is well understood that trade integration results in winners as well as losers, as the historical record of ineffective and failed efforts shows. Openness to trade can be beneficial in the aggregate for states, but costs differ depending on factor endowments and differences in comparative advantages of states. How states benefit depends on political influences of states' trade policies, determining which groups benefit from trade and which ones are disadvantaged (Blackmon, 2017).

Although liberalizing intra-regional trade through eliminating import duties can boost economic growth, it will also reduce income, initially through loss of tariff revenue, unless states build capacity for production, pursue product diversification, attract investments, and improve competitiveness (Shinyekwa et al 2021). Countries and companies face major challenges such as enabling a robust private sector, identifying strategic commodities for development into regional value chains, and creating trading strategies that will support comparative advantages. In addition to adapting to the new single market and technical issues such as producing quality market information and addressing rules of origin issues, they must overcome huge infrastructure deficits. In essence, successful integration requires creating institutional structures and enabling subject matter experts to effectively plan and implement programs (UNECA 2020a).

In addition to technical expertise to maneuver national development programs, effective negotiations require cogent and astute leadership in international fora to avoid pitfalls in trade relations. Many have failed due to historical, social, and cultural factors that led to distrust, cheating, and reluctance to give up sovereignty (Moravcsik 1993). Successful integration depends on national government capacity to overcome risks and the ability to negotiate beneficial trade agreements. Early integration efforts in the immediate aftermath of independence were severely hampered by domestic capacity shortcomings. Furthermore, effectual negotiation involves a shared perspective that absolute gains through trade growth can bring about overall greater welfare benefits than those from relative gains (Nye 1966).

African ideas, interests, and institutions have evolved from the post-Cold War era with the emergence of prominent actors more concerned with an African-centric development agenda (Taylor and Nel 2002). Countries increasingly adopted new approaches to conflict management interventions and economic development with mutual goals of solving the continent's problems (Francis 2006). Consequently, while at a nascent state, the last two decades have seen African intentions to deepen ties further, replace old institutions with new paradigms, and enhance social welfare, demonstrating innovations in interdependent relations on many different levels (Obasaju et al 2021).

Seen as a means to lift Africa out of poverty, regional integration has been hailed as a way to transform a spectrum of political and economic problems such as resolving long-standing political and economic conflicts, enhancing state capacity and governance, and developing transnational political institutions (Levin and Nagar 2016). Moreover, regionalism has the potential to drive forces that create innovation -- new processes, tools, or organizations -- by bringing networks of actors and institutions together in coordinated efforts that can overcome individual national capacity limitations (Oloruntoba et al 2019).

However, integration in Sub-Saharan African has only recently begun and has a long way to go before it can achieve potential benefits. Most countries are at a significant disadvantage in terms of their level of competitiveness due to low levels of income, manufacturing capacity, infrastructure, human resources, and innovation (Allard et al 2016). Nevertheless, some progress has been evident, for example, in eastern Africa in recent years (ARIA IX 2020). Moreover, East Africa has experienced sustained growth and development for several years, due in large part to the interests and institutions by the four countries with the strongest level of state agency and capacity, specifically, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda (Obasaju et al 2021). This performance is seen as a reflection of the benefits of economic integration and national interest in deepening their economic and security ties further (Sutton 2012).

The recently enacted African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement is the most prominent in a series of programs that indicate a transformation of interests and capacities on the part of African nations. The AfCFTA, a flagship program of the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063, represents the latest effort in over two decades of growing African agency in promoting peace and security. Based on the Eurocentric approach to regionalism which involves the promotion of peace and security in addition to the creation of trade linkages between states, African states have adopted several norms and regimes (e.g., Agenda 2063, the AfCFTA, and greater participation in securitization operations) in recognition that successful economic development and prosperity depend on integration, which, in turn, depend on prolonged stability, the rule of law, good governance, and peace (Akinola 2019, Jumo and Mangeni 2018).

Much of the literature on African regionalism focuses on economic integration. Less well appreciated is the security cooperation aspect of regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Based on the Eurocentric approach to regionalism, African regional integration entails economic development as well as security cooperation within an interactive relationship in recognition that peace and stability are requisite for business productivity while, at the same time, economic opportunity can reduce outbreaks of conflict (Aniche 2020, Mulongo 2010, Oloruntaba et al 2019).

In recent years, a number of countries in SSA have pursued new security cooperation strategies, increasing participation in international and regional peacekeeping operations (Arthur 2017). With surging violent conflict at the end of the Cold War, African agency emerged beginning with West African intervention in the 1990s, followed by a plethora of hybrid regional/African Union-United Nations operations, including East African operations in Somalia, a Southern African offensive mission in the DRC, and joint operations in Mozambique (Adetula et al 2021). African determination to pursue endogenous means to solve Africa's security problems illustrates three decades of transformation in continental ideology and institutional approaches toward cooperative actions (Arthur 2017, Francis 2006).

This dissertation explores the rise and progress of interstate cooperation designed to enhance economic growth and regional stability in Africa. The analysis of newly forming regional institutions provides an opportunity to explain their functions, further understand their emergence, and establish a baseline of the evolution of continental organizations. This research area of international affairs adds value to understanding the spectrum of conflictual and cooperative relations under anarchical conditions, especially in conditions where no overarching body governs interstate interactions. The theoretical construct used is based on neo-institutionalism which contends that cooperation in the system of African relations is enabled through mutually accepted rules, regimes, mechanisms, and institutions in response to the lack of an overarching regulating authority, which is known in international relations as anarchy (Alumona and Azom 2019).

The overarching question at hand is what necessary conditions move states from individualistic, self-interested contestants to more integrated, cooperative relations? Moreover, how does the integration progress within the most progressive sub-region, the

East African Community, help explain changes in national perspectives and willingness to participate in greater regional integration?

This dissertation argues that a combination of conditions can explain the increased willingness in Sub-Saharan Africa to integrate. Using an intergovernmentalist theoretical construct (interests, bargaining, and institutions) to demonstrate the evolution of SSA from the 'old form' of competitive regimes described by Nye (1966) to a growing convergence of shared beliefs of deeper interdependence, it aims to demonstrate the importance of state-building and institutions in facilitating processes of learning and socialization overtime.

Research Approach

I employ a multiple methods approach which first undertakes a form of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), an approach based on set-theory developed by Ragin (1987) that examines relationships between combinations of causal conditions and an outcome of interest. This dissertation employs fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) -- a form of QCA that measures variables in terms of the degree to which they are in or out of a set to analyze factors influencing integration. One of the benefits of fsQCA is that it assumes the possibility of more than one pathway can lead to the same outcome, known as multiple conjunctural causality. Moreover, a particular condition (similar to an independent variable) can have different effects in different contexts. This methodology is particularly useful in analyzing conditions within particular contexts because it can take into account environmental factors that affect combinations of conditions leading to an outcome. In this dissertation, fsQCA is preferred to quantitative only methods to study cooperation within contexts of conjunctural conditions (e.g., state-building, economic scarcity, and conflict) rather than observations of additive causation of variables.

Unlike regression analysis, QCA does not provide results that identify the degree of impact of certain variables. However, conjunctural causation can offer new insights in that it assumes conditions to be interrelated and can demonstrate multiple pathways for the same outcome. In the mix-method approach used in this dissertation, fsQCA results are used to select cases for process-tracing and descriptive statistical analysis to explain why some countries demonstrate more willingness and capacity to undertake integration. Factors examined in state-building include the role of ideas (e.g., economic ideology), interests (e.g., political and business elites' preferences, relative disparities), institutions (e.g., governance indicators, public administration, fiscal management, government consumption, and investment) within an inter-temporality framework.

Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) has had growing application in social sciences since its development by Ragin (1987) for its usefulness in examining causal mechanisms where statistical analysis or qualitative studies may not be as effective. Empirical studies that provide evidence on links between regional integration and causal mechanisms is limited. Qualitative case studies are the predominant fora for exploring processes involved in international integration. However, because of the limited breadth of focus, case studies typically aren't generalizable, especially since important individual context-specific conditions are not necessarily evident.

FsQCA allows a cross-case comparison of a medium-size sample to discover patterns of conditions as well as explain contradictory results by filling in gaps in empirical studies (Bretthauer 2014). This method sheds light on the conditions that favor a country's willingness to enter into a complex integration relationship. Unlike quantitative methods which tend to look for causal relationships, fsQCA allows exploration of conditions leading to integration such as economic forces, state capacity, and socio-political instability.

My methodological approach first applies fsQCA to examine links in SSA between government capacity and socio-economic conditions playing a role in degrees of integration at the national level. Results are then examined through process-tracing of case studies of East African states through a liberal intergovernmentalism framework to determine factors motivating long-standing competitors to cooperate in integration efforts. Unlike many static methods, intergovernmentalism analysis seeks to explain the evolution of influences at work propelling acceptance of integration over time that differs from that of earlier decades. The combination of fsQCA and process-tracing case studies provides valid methods to account for the evolution of African efforts at regional integration, in particular, state-level socio-political dynamics of elite bargaining and institution building as espoused by Moravcsik (1993).

The dependent variable in the model of causality is regional integration in SSA as measured by the UNECA Regional Integration Index (UNECA 2019). I examine the varying degrees of integration relationships in Sub-Saharan African countries and conditions hypothesized to promote integration based on the theoretical underpinnings as developed by Signé's neo-institutionalism plus the time dimension of Moravcsik's liberal governmentalism. Independent variables measuring the influence of socio-economic and governance factors on integration (2000 – 2020) include conflict experience and agency (peacekeeping and enforcement), government effectiveness (competitiveness), resource allocation (governance), well-being reference point (economic wealth), and future perspective frame (change in economic growth.

George and Bennett (2005) contend that conducting case study comparisons using fsQCA results presents the most suitable research design for producing a "systematic body of knowledge which can both advance theory and produce findings that have policy relevance within and across different contexts." The research approach chosen for this dissertation is inspired by Signe's model (2017) combines multiple levels of analysis to identify innovation mechanisms in cooperation and integration over time in Sub-Saharan Africa with a focus on eastern Africa. In order to test the research questions and their underlying hypotheses, this dissertation analyzes the context of regional integration in term of the institutional environment, the norms and ideas it transmits, and the interests of the actors involved.

To illuminate the evolution and institutional development of regional integration, I examine the degree of readiness for regional integration and assess the implementation of programs designed to enhance competitiveness as functions of state capacity building. The study of countries that hold themselves accountable to regional commitments and those that do not provides researchers with information on levels of state-building, agency, and governance capacity (Hickey 2019, Signé 2017). The factors influencing Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries' interest in entering into intricate economic, security, and political relations in the face of potential drawbacks is the fundamental research issue of this dissertation.

Eastern Africa is selected for case study analysis because while the level of integration is low in comparison with other regions, East Africa scores the highest in terms of making progress in economic development, productivity, governance, and infrastructural dimensions (UNECA ARII 2019, World Bank CPIA 2019, Obasaju et al 2021). Furthermore, it not only is the region encircled by countries immersed in conflict (e.g., eastern DRC, Somalia, and South Sudan) but also unstable countries that have emerged from violent conflagrations (e.g., Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda). Additionally, eastern African countries are among the largest contributors to UN and AU peacekeeping operations (Jowell 2018).

A mixed-methodology approach using fsQCA, followed by post-fsQCA process-tracing case studies was an obvious choice for researching the 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa due to these methods' strengths in dealing with medium N (10 to 50 samples) studies over parametric and non-parametric statistical analysis. Additionally, fsQCA is preferred for exploring complex social problems that are often influenced by multiple concurrent causalities (i.e., equifinality). It is also a useful technique for overcoming quantitative limitations in dealing with endogeneity, heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity, and asymmetric data which are typical problems for regression analysis due to data problems (e.g., missing, inaccurate, and uneven databases).

Current scholarship does not set minimum numbers for case study analysis. Established principles emphasize hypothesis-driven selection to examine the occurrence of the outcome in representative cases that offer a substantive explanation for why the outcome occurs in these cases. According to Schneider and Rohlfing (2011), single, within-case process-tracing provides the ability to search for theoretic reasons for comparative causal mechanisms in cases that display similar paths to an outcome. Consequently, this dissertation selected two cases from the 14 fsQCA results for being significant representatives of convergent and divergent elements of conditions within the most integrated region which, importantly, is aggressively pursuing programs to further expand integration going forward. Comparative within-case studies such as those chosen here can offer insights that can be reinforced by assessing another case that exhibits similar or different levels of conditional configuration, depending on research objectives. Single case studies on integration, by definition, explicitly expose causal process comparisons since integration entails an examination of, and comparison within the region of interest.

Organization

The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter Two discusses the existing literature on the evolution of regional integration throughout Africa, to identify progress that has been made and what challenges hinder advancement. It highlights theoretic constructs for understanding drivers of cooperative relations and deepening interdependence. It also examines knowledge gaps such as the lack of comparative studies of ideas, interests, and institutions across different temporal contexts as well as the understudied area of the types of processes and mechanisms that shape the emergence of consolidative regimes and effective forms of agency. Chapter Three presents and explains the two-stage methodological approach, involving fsQCA systematic cross-case analysis followed by process-tracing within-case study approach. Chapter Four summarizes and evaluates the results of the fsQCA method. Chapter Five presents the case studies of the two representative cases in East Africa resulting from fsQCA processing: Tanzania and Rwanda.[1] These two cases demonstrate high-performing state capacities that share the same outcome – support for regional integration – but which have varying set membership. Process-tracing case studies examine in detail the ideas and interests over time within these states impacting institutionalization of intergovernmentalism in the region. Chapter Six assesses the degree that fsQCA and case study process-tracing results validated the hypotheses, notes the shortcomings of the dissertation, suggests areas for future research, and closes with a set of policy recommendations.

[1] Both Tanzania and Rwanda have linkages to southern and central Africa respectively; however, their primary economic relationship is with the East African Community (EAC) (Kimenyi & Kibe 2014).

CHAPTER II - LITERATURE REVIEW ON INTEGRATION WITHIN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

Introduction to Conditions Driving Integration

This dissertation examines conditions that promote a greater willingness for independent states to transition to greater interdependence and cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It proposes a study of the evolution in integration strategies in Africa since independence in the post-World War II era. A primary focus is what conditions motivate some countries to enter into complex and potentially risky integration arrangements and others to be more reluctant to do so. Integration offers significant long-term benefits in the aggregate; however, increasing economic competition will undoubtedly result in winners and losers (Arizala et al. 2018, Olapade and Onyekwena 2021). A degree of statehood and capacity is one factor influencing countries to concentrate on policies and invest in programs that stimulate economic growth, security, and social welfare (Hickey 2019). Additionally, perceptions of potential risks versus benefits greatly influence states' willingness to pursue regional integration and economic competition. Countries that perceive their situation as in a positive frame (i.e., a gains frame of reference) are more risk averse while those who view their circumstance as more negative (i.e., a loss frame of reference) (Butler 2007).

This study analyzes the ways state capacity and risk-taking affect integration in SSA. It examines relations between national, regional, and international actors from a temporal perspective with regard to the ideas and interests that drive them. Based on a neo-institutionalist model, it offers an explanation of how, when, and why innovations in integration strategies emerged, either significantly or partially. Using Signé's neo-institutional framework (2017), this analysis examines the development of innovation in integration from a process-based perspective, rather than a substantive, normative one. It thus provides a more comprehensive understanding of processes by which integration strategies have evolved in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the relations between actors at various levels over time. The overarching construct used is that integration is a function of innovative ideas that take on the force of interests from which institutions are created which, in turn, develop critical strategies and infrastructure required to increase integration (Signé 2019).

A number of scholars have sought to answer why many African countries remain mired in institutional weakness and corruption, unable to manage the challenges of development. Siegle (2011) and Herbst (2000) point to the problems of arrested state development and an effective public sector. Yanguas (2017), Hickey (2019), and Signé (2019) observe that understanding the politics of state-building and bureaucratic development requires avoiding the constraints of concepts that overemphasize normative values. They contend a more objective perspective that employs concepts that allow for variation and change over time results in a better analysis of African relationships.

Current State of Regional Integration in Africa

It is widely acknowledged that regional integration is very low in Africa compared to other geographic areas (Obasaju et al. 2021). A primary reason for integration is to stimulate economic growth and development which involves the structural transformation of an economy and increased standard of living (Panth 2020). However, integration requires a certain extent of state capacity to perceive the potential benefits for mutual gains, let alone the skills for planning and implementing successful schemes. The potential for 54 disparate states to create a cohesive economic and political union that facilitates trade and security is not a certain outcome and will depend a great deal on the political acumen and technical skills of each state.

Although current plans for continental-wide African integration build on previous attempts, they are markedly different from those earlier attempts (Signé 2017). The focus of this dissertation is not the likelihood of success but the conditions at work leading states to enter into these complex and potentially risky relationships. The recently enacted Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) presents an opportunity to objectively study mechanisms affecting evolving African perspectives in regional integration. This chapter first reviews theoretical constructs of integration and state capacity building. It next examines the evolution of regional integration in Africa in terms of conditions leading to changes in ideas, interests, and institutions.

This chapter first presents a review of the literature on integration and its relationship to state-building and capacity development to ground the study. The next section introduces the analytical construct, advancing key theoretical concepts which formulate a model to answer the research questions. The final section identifies and explains the ways the dissertation contributes to the existing literature.

Approaches to Integration Analysis – Interests and Institutions

In an analysis of the "old form" of SSA relations, Nye (1966) characterized the region as exhibiting an absence of cooperative regimes and a lack of extensive institutionalization of shared beliefs of neoliberal economic policies. In the past, this contributed to the difficulty in achieving an integrated region but today's "new form," exhibits progress and greater convergence of deeper integration efforts (Chacha 2014).

This dissertation seeks to contribute to the understanding of the evolution of integration in SSA. It achieves this goal using an intergovernmentalist theoretical approach that emphasizes the importance of interests and institutions in changing learning developments, and socialization overtime. This dissertation combines elements from Neo-Institutionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism to examine processes and the extent of change in intra-African relations today compared to Nye's findings of the failed attempts at integration 60 years ago (1966).

Signé (2017) employs a new politico-institutionalism construct to analyze the evolution of African economies in the last four decades to explain the overall better economic performance on the part of some countries and the lack of progress in others. The factors Signé's neo-institutionalist model employs include the role of ideas, interests, institutions, and inter-temporality share similar characteristics to Moravcsik's Liberal intergovernmentalism. Neo-institutionalism also addresses the mechanisms of change. Institutions tend to remain static until a confluence of events or forces instigates an advantageous environment for change (Tang 2013). Crises can create favorable situations that stimulate windows of opportunity, or critical junctures, whereby initiatives emerge which may represent innovations (Schmidt 2010).

Liberal intergovernmentalism provides a framework for evaluating the processes at work influencing group interests and actions regarding integration (Moravcsik 1993). It holds that the interest group influence determines policymaker postures on major concerns and transactions in integration processes. For example, agents which represent certain sectors often influence domestic trade protectionist policies.

Internal and external processes, such as better infrastructures, liberalization of previously protected markets, enhanced productivity, and technological progress, may lead domestic economic actors to change attitudes to protectionist measures (Grossman 2003). Based on the assumption that states are unitary actors and are purposively rational, liberal intergovernmentalism holds that state behavior is constrained by domestic preferences (Moravcsik 1993). These preferences affect international conflict and cooperation in a three-stage process. First governments define a set of interests where interest groups that would be most affected by gains or losses influence state preference formation. Second, they bargain amongst themselves on the shape regional integration should take in order to attain those interests. States' leverage for or against cooperation is derived from how intense their national preferences for integration. In the third stage, liberal intergovernmentalism results in a delegation of authority to institutions to manage the agreements reached by states following interstate bargaining (Moravcsik 1998). Moravcsik finds that:

> "the pattern of underlying national preferences … is the most fundamental determinant of state behavior in world politics. … (A)symmetrical interdependence – the relative intensity of preferences – offers a distinctive understanding of power in world politics, one even more fundamental than military capabilities. Though universally applicable, asymmetrical interdependence is particularly likely to explain outcomes among democratic states, where the use of military force is an unlikely eventuality. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's world of 'complex interdependence' for example, … European integration has been, for the most part, the deliberate creation of statesmen and citizens seeking to realize economic interests through traditional diplomatic means." (Moravcsik, 1998, 497-500).

Although not without problems, the postwar order in Europe following centuries of war kept the peace for over 75 years (Van Evera 1991). The point of this dissertation is not that international institutions are necessarily permanent or without flaws, but rather that processes evolve over time whereby competing divergent interests enhance institutional regime functioning effectiveness while convergent social purposes strengthen cohesive integrative processes (Keohane 2012).

Foundations of African Integration

The eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) form the organizational foundation of African Union (AU) integration. Originators of these RECs recognized economic integration can create benefits by reducing trade costs, promoting employment, generating income, providing greater access to goods and services, and stimulating investment (Himbara 2020). Additionally, because successful industrialization depends on economies of scale, given the small size of Africa's 54 economies, economic integration is essential to economic modernization and development. However, regional integration in Africa remains very low in part due to the persistence of non-tariff barriers, ineffective regulatory measures, and lack of investment (African Development Bank 2019). The East African Community (EAC) is the only bloc with a fully operational customs union and a common market in Africa. Nevertheless, although the level of integration achieved since the EAC was launched in 2000 is impressive, it is prone to undermining its integration progress through trade wars and nontariff barriers (Africa Report 2020).

Multi-lateral trade liberalization in goods is only one aspect of the deep integration agenda. Regional integration is more than market access and tariff elimination. The continent is witnessing slow progress toward liberalizing trade services as well as globalization highlights the importance of service sectors as determinants of manufacturing productivity. Other aspects of regional integration include free movement of labor, financial integration, trade facilitation, creation of regional value chains, and cooperation in transborder public goods (e.g., transportation, energy, water source management, security, and the environment).

The slow progress in liberalizing trade services highlights the importance of policymaking and service sectors in manufacturing productivity (CPIA 2020). Africa's low level of productivity is directly related to deficits in factors that drive productivity and growth such as human capital, innovation, technology, and agile investment. The lack of competitiveness (which is fundamental to productivity) in Africa measured by the median 2018 World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) score of 45.2is well below the worldwide average score of 60.0 and the lowest GCI score among all other regions. Southern Africa achieved the highest score in SSA (48.0), followed by East Africa (46.8), and West Africa (44.5) (WEF 2018). Two EAC countries scored well in specific areas – 1) Kenya has fostered innovation and as a result, has the most competitive economy in East Africa (36.5); and 2) Rwanda leads Africa in terms of institutional quality (64.4) (WEF 2018).

In his study of African integration, Nye (1966) contended that European integration was a response to two catastrophic wars and a modernizing industrial economy, neither of which was characteristic of Africa. In the 'old form of integration, African integration was less influenced by economic consideration than by ideology, specifically that of nationalism and Pan Africanism (Nye 1966).

As opposed to the failed East African attempt at integration in the 1960s, today's EAC is influenced by private sector input which directly influences policy outcomes, a testament to the evolution in the region's political economy (Chacha 2014). Chacha finds that government-business interaction has the potential to formulate better policymaking processes that can strengthen longer-lasting outcomes. Current efforts to create a continental-wide free trade zone, provide a forum for studying mechanisms at work driving regional integration efforts, in contrast to the immediate post-independence period.

Arguably, today's new form of integration is influenced both by conflict and globalization of economic influences (Chacha 2014). Regional integration, a long-term vision for lifting Africa out of poverty, has become the focus for current transformation efforts which encompass a spectrum of political and economic factors such as resolving long-standing political and economic conflicts, enhancing state capacity and governance, and developing trans-national political institutions (Levin and Nagar 2016). Moreover, regionalism can drive forces that create innovation -- new processes, tools, or organizations -- by bringing networks of actors and institutions together in coordinated efforts that can overcome individual national capacity limitations (Oloruntoba et al 2019).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, integration is in a nascent stage, with most countries having been unable to achieve adequate levels of income and ranked at the bottom compared to other regions (Allard et al 2016). Eastern Africa has shown promise of late (ARIA IX 2020). This region has the highest level of integration as well as some of the best performers -- Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda. This level of sustained progress in economic development is a testament to the benefits of national interest and agency in deepening economic integration and security ties further (Obasaju et al 2021, Sutton 2012).

Transformational Processes

Transformation processes encompass a spectrum of political and economic factors such as resolving long-standing political and economic conflicts, enhancing state capacity and governance, and developing trans-national political institutions (Levin and Nagar 2016, Nye 1971). Moreover, regionalism can drive forces that create innovation -- new processes, tools, or organizations -- by bringing networks of actors and institutions together in coordinated efforts that can overcome individual national capacity limitations (Oloruntoba et al 2019).

The recently enacted African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement in 2019 is the most prominent in a series of programs that indicate a transformation of interests and capacities on the part of African nations. However, AfCFTA, the flagship program of the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063, represents the latest effort in over two decades of growing African agency in promoting peace and security. Based on the Eurocentric approach to regionalism which involves the promotion of peace and security in addition to the creation of trade linkages between states, African states have adopted several norms and regimes (e.g., Agenda 2063, the AfCFTA, and greater participation in securitization operations) in recognition of the interaction between prosperity and peace. Successful economic development and prosperity depend on integration, which, in turn, depends on prolonged stability, the rule of law, and good governance (Akinola 2019, Jumo and Mangeni 2018, Leshoele 2018). Because of the importance of security for economic development, scholars argue that initial interest in cooperative relations is often due to security interests (Tang 2011). Not only does deeper regional economic integration enhance economic opportunity and social welfare, but interdependence can inhibit conflict through the transfer of norms, better sharing of information, and creation of regimes and institutions for resolving disputes resolution (Keohane and Nye 2012, Kimenyi and Kuhlmann 2012, McMillan 1997)

Regional integration -- measured in infrastructural, trade, macroeconomic, and productive integration plus the free movement of people -- shows progress in recent years, according to the second Africa Regional Integration Index (ARII) Report (UNECA, AFDB, AUC 2019). This is due in large part to progress in economic development, productivity, governance, and infrastructural dimensions (UNECA ARII 2019, World Bank CPIA 2019, Obasaju et al 2021). While a number of countries have made considerable improvement, the average score remains low with an average score of .327 in 2019 on a scale of 0 to 1 (UNECA ARII 2016 and ARII 2019). Although trade and macroeconomic integration is improving according to the latest ARII report (2019), a major reason for the overall low score is Africa scores lowest production and infrastructure.

ARII 2019 ranks countries within Africa based on five dimensions (trade, productive, macroeconomic, infrastructural integration, and free movement of people) to compare how each country and region are integrated. It also ranks the continent's overall integration, including measures such as the ratification tempo of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as one of the four indicators of the level of intra-regional trade as an assessment of the progress in deepening interdependence[2]. South Africa is the most integrated country as well as the most advanced economy in Africa, as its strong performance in the productive dimension reflects. Kenya and Rwanda rank second and third respectively. Additionally, the East African Community (EAC) is the most integrated REC and has three of the twenty individual high performers at the continental level – Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda, all having ratified the AfCFTA agreement promptly (ARII 2019), an indication of a condition driving greater regional integration – the level of national interest in government and in regional integration (ARII 2019). The EAC is also in the lead in terms of enacting the multi-stage processes of the AfCFTA – finalizing tariffs schedules covering goods and services trade, rules of origin provisions on tariff lines (i.e., the amount of local content produced in order to qualify as originating from that country), and negotiating competition policy, intellectual property rights (IPR), and investment protection protocols (Signé and Madden 2021). The focus here is on the establishment of institutions that demonstrate a level of interest in integration, not necessarily how effective or enduring they are.

Signé's (2020) study of Africa's economic potential expounds on the region's improving integration, increased political stability in most countries compared to the 1980s and 1990s (the recent uptick in coups and Islamic extremism in West Africa notwithstanding), and capacity building are fostering economic growth and diversification, employment, and improved standards of living. In Signé's (2020) study

[2] As of May 2022, 80% of the continent (43 out of 54 signatory countries) has ratified the AfCFTA and deposited their instruments with the AU. 24 signatories deposited their ratifications between 2018 and 30 May 2019 when the AfCFTA went into effect. 19 signatories have deposited their instruments since 30 May 2019, an indication of a measure of differentiation between the two groups' interests and capacity to enter into deeper interdependence (Tralac file.html (tralac.org)).

of eight sectors with the highest potential returns on private investment (consumer markets agriculture, information and communication technology, manufacturing, tourism, and banking) four countries in the EAC score well. Kenya is among the top performers in all eight categories; Tanzania is in the top five categories, and Uganda and Rwanda are in three categories each. Improvements in overall governance, specifically ease of doing business, accountability, effective policymaking, and management have significantly improved scores in these countries, offering foreign investors maturing business environments growth opportunities. To be sure, the region faces significant challenges regarding the overall business environment and becoming a more attractive destination for investors. Nonetheless, these cases of 'pockets of effectiveness', offer interesting material for investigation that is the substance this dissertation seeks to examine -- factors leading to improving regional integration.

A fundamental question for this dissertation is why and how some countries demonstrate greater integration than others. While geographic conditions and economic endowments can play a role in creating comparative advantages and impacting transaction costs that offer opportunities to exchange goods and services, responses to opportunities differ across the region. Some countries with fewer advantages are among the most advanced in regional integration and economic progress, indicating that historical links and national policymaking also play a role.

There have been few studies have been done on the evolution of integration in Africa, examining the mechanisms at work driving cooperation in economic development. Nye's early study (1966) highlighted the importance of shared ideology, elite leadership, trust, and opportunity costs in the early failure of the east African countries to unify. Chacha (2009) provides one of the few examinations of how a region moves from one phase of collaboration to another using Moravcsik's (1998) liberal intergovernmentalism approach. This three-step model combines national preference formation theory with intergovernmental bargaining and a model of institutional choice.

In the last few years, a limited but growing body of research has focused on the conditions leading to growing state capacity for economic cooperation and development (Hickey 2019). Yanguas (2017) examines why some states have been able to build effective bureaucracies while others are mired in institutional weakness. He develops a theoretical framework that provides explanations for variations in public sector reform, including economic development and security efforts. Yanguas' research focuses on the nature of states' governance within international development. In particular, he found how the intersection of power relations and ideas affects states' integration efforts and innovativeness. Lack of investment in human capital and infrastructure, especially in science and technology, is a major hindrance to enabling innovation to stimulate marketplace innovative forces that accelerate economic growth and prosperity. Robust education and research systems enable countries to enter the global scientific community and benefit from international collaborative relations that generate innovation crucial for economic competitiveness (Gurib-Fakim and Signé (2022).

Hickey (2019) attempts to fill the void in studies on governance and state-building in economic development in Africa with a methodological approach for examining how 'pockets of effectiveness' (PoEs) can reflect processes of state-building. His research highlights the power of PoE norms and capacities to diffuse within regions. Moreover, Hickey shows the political conditions under which PoEs are formed and sustained. Signé

(2013, 2019) studied successful and failed states in Africa comparing the impact of ideational, institutional, and interest variables on innovation and economic development. He found that states with strong central governments and institutional capacities are more prone to cooperate in integration efforts than states confronting instability and conflict. These researchers contribute to the gap in understanding state-building in Africa. Their work examines why some countries demonstrated better overall economic performance in the past two decades.

Additionally, their methodological approaches offer insights into the disparity between more successful countries and those that are stagnant. Their research on variations between countries focuses on the combination of politico-institutional explanatory factors over time -- such as economic ideology, agency of elites, and public sector administration – uncovers the emergence and evolution of policies and institutions for economic development. Comprehending the interaction between dependent and interdependence of critical variables (e.g., ideas/culture, interests/actors, institutions/structures, context/opportunities, time/conjunctures) moves beyond traditional static analysis toward a larger, more eclectic perspective (Signé 2019). In his follow-on work, Signé's seminal book, *Unlocking Africa's Business Potential* (2020), noteworthy in that it strikes a balance between overly pessimistic and excessively optimistic perspectives about African economies in striking a neutral, unbiased study and avoiding oversimplification that is all too prevalent in reviews of African's mixed economic performance since independence, according to Dr. Mo Ibrahim (Signé 2021).

Integration and State-building

Integration typically is thought of as higher economic inter-dependency and trade linkages between member states (Keohane and Nye 2012). Deepening relationships also enable knowledge development and information transfer, thus enhancing creativity. Innovation, in turn, benefits productivity improvements, an essential component for economic competitiveness (Hickey 2019). Successful economic integration and development require peace and security for investment-attractive environments which ensure ease of doing business and low transaction costs. Therefore, conflict resolution mechanisms are also typically included in agreement regimes which often are associated with political integration (Oloruntoba et al. 2019).

Importantly for the SSA experience, a shared history of conflict and destruction often sets the stage for greater security cooperation which, in turn, can foster greater degrees of cooperation which lead to greater economic and political integration (Borzel and Risse 2020). Integration involves regional cooperation whereby states voluntarily agree to work together in certain areas such as economics, security, and political interests (Aniche 2009). It can result in a process of increasing interaction that leads to new perspectives of identity, resulting from the creation of greater political unity. The ideal apex of this institutionalization process is a tendency toward an overarching construct whose members purposely reject the use of force (Haas 1970, Keohane and Nye 2012). Regional cooperation can be considered an initial stage in the process of regional integration that is state-driven, and which is influenced by evolution in state capacities and institutions (Aniche et al. 2021).

State-building as a concept is founded on what defines a state beyond the most basic definition -- that "the primary requirement of a state is that it holds a monopoly on the use of violence" (Jabareen 2013). State-building has a more nuanced set of definitions beyond the ability to exert force, such as the capacity to provide services, economic functions, and physical security (Fukuyama 2004). State-building also includes a government that achieves a certain amount of legitimacy which entails a normative dimension. Developing state institutions requires a set of understandings and negotiations between various power brokers as to what the state should be, how it should govern, and how it fits within the international arena. (Miller 2013). Moreover, state-building can be viewed as an evolutionary process from a patrimonial system to a merit-based one as bureaucratic effectiveness becomes more valued in the implementation of national business, especially those actions requiring financial competence (e.g., resource generation through coercive revenue extraction (Fukuyama 2004).

Regional integration involves the free flow of goods, services, capital, people, and ideas to reduce impediments that limit economic growth and progress. Beyond concluding simple agreements, states must create effective strategies that support physical and institutional development (Mormul 2016). State-building and capacity development are requisite precursors for successful cooperative integration in addition to fostering national stability (Fukuyama 2004). In essence, a defining feature of weak states is that they are not well-endowed with management skills necessary for planning and directing complex national affairs. A strong public sector is necessary for the provision of public goods which help create environments conducive to economic growth. Economic growth can create space for developing human capital, building infrastructure, innovative productivity, value-added industries, and transformation to the fourth industrial revolution (Lewis and Harbeson 2016). Bureaucratic capacities, goals, and strategies are reflective of elite interests in effective economic development. Specifically, tax revenue collection and distribution capacities have decisive influences on economic management and public services (Herbst 2003).

Conflict and State-Building

Which factors give rise to fragile and failed states has been the subject of considerable research, in particular, how corruption, lack of democratic reform, and high levels of conflict lead to poor economic growth and human development (Cheeseman 2018, Collier 2011, Pitcher 2012). In contrast, the examination of factors that contribute to state effectiveness has generated greater interest in recent academic and policy circles. A growing body of research concludes that the quality of state and non-state institutions and structures plays an important role in creating favorable conditions that foster growth (Hickey et al. 2015). Specifically, political stability, good governance, the rule of law, and accountability are institutions central to state effectiveness. Additionally, structural factors such as power relations between government elites, bureaucrats, and business leaders, labor force quality, and a foreign direct investment (FDI) friendly environment significantly effect economic performance (Chemouni and Dye 2020).

Transition from patrimonial relationships based on largess to a mature bureaucratic/technocratic government, however, does not necessarily follow a clear, linear trajectory. It requires a shared political ideology and cultivation of entrepreneurship to overcome “status quo bias” (Tang 2011). The process of forming nation-states depends on negotiation of norms and relations between the government and the governed to create legitimacy and acceptance, a process that took centuries in Europe (Grotenhuis 2016). Political settlement plays an important part in the development of state effectiveness (Hickey et al. 2015). A unified approach by elites to strategies of legitimacy is more conducive to a well-functioning state (Yangas 2017).

International wars have been associated with state formation, as military campaigns require revenue which nations generally fund through taxes, hence the need for bureaucracies (Fukuyama 20, Tilly 1990). Traditionally, the lack of interstate conflict in Africa compared to Europe has been theorized as a contributing factor to the low level of state bureaucratic development. Compared to the pre-modern European experience, post-colonial Africa's geography, low-population density, relatively limited war-making technology created an environment where states had few meaningful external rivals and, therefore, relatively weak incentives for state-building , according to Herbst (2003). Critics of the external rivals theory of state formation highlight the hundreds of years it took from the fall of the Roman Empire to the emergence of integration in Western Europe following World War II. Moreover, much of the discourse on the problematic situation of weak state institutions in Africa typically comes from a normative perspective that compares the lack of progress in SSA to the Western state model, ignoring the length of time it took to achieve that degree of 'state-ness' (Péclard 2019).

Research by Sobek and Thies (2015) demonstrates that while the destructiveness of civil wars is unquestionable, nevertheless, intra-state conflict can have a state-building effect. They find that rebel victories that provide access to valuable resources can result in stronger states after a longer conflict. In some cases, post-conflict reconstruction can confer a learning and negotiation process that has parallels to pre-modern Europe state-building when roving bands consolidated power and security – security being a crucial factor in reconstruction (Young 2016). It is difficult for effective institutions to emerge in the midst of insecurity. Jabareen (2013) emphasized the interrelation between security and development in that without security, development is hindered; while, conversely, lack of economic growth and development is a major causal factor in insecurity.

An under-studied aspect of the relationship of conflict to state-building is the growing involvement of African countries in peace building in the last two decades and the effects of professionalization of security forces on state capacity. Since the end of the Cold War, African militaries have engaged in greater international cooperation undertaking peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance missions (Dwyer 2019). Securitization agency became institutionalized on a continental level when the AU established the Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) twenty years ago. African countries took on a new, proactive security approach within sub-regional cooperative organizations under the regional economic communities (RECS) as well as through individual state contributions to UN and AU securitization operations (Arthur 2017, Williams 2016, 2018).

Not only do Africans constitute the majority of fore contributors to United Nations (UN) peace keeping operations, but they are also engaging in indigenous solutions to instability. For example, conflict management interventions include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Sierra Leon, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, and the Gambia;); the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); and numerous African Union (AU) member individual states' leadership of UN Missions in Sudan, South Sudan, Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Mozambique (Arthur 2017, Obasaju et al 2021).

The greater involvement in security cooperation is in line with AU precepts that successful economic progress and development depend on sustainable regional peace and stability (Oloruntoba et al. 2019). The East African Community (EAC), for example, while technically created as an economic organization, cooperated primarily on security matters in the beginning of its formation (Walsh 2015). The first successful African intervention, the ECOWAS mission in the Liberian crisis in the 1990s, transferred lessons learned in conflict management and mechanisms for peacebuilding to AU members that have been replicated in the Horn of Africa, the African Great Lakes, Lake Chad region, and the Sahel (Mulongo 2010).

Military cooperation has been described by many African and U.S. officials as "one of the most impressive and well-established aspect of the integration agenda" that could eventually move eastern Africa into some sort of a security regime where norms and institutions restrain fear of aggression and instigate conflict traps (Walsh 2020). While no regional security cooperation arrangements have managed to completely eliminate instability, they have had some effectiveness in reducing conflict, and more importantly for this dissertation, these actions demonstrate an evolution on cooperation to address instability and promote peace and security (Adetula et al. 2021, Williams 2018, Walsh 2020).

Institutionalism and Regimes

As institutionalism emerged as a growing influence in international relations in the late 20st century, regime theory, also known as regime analysis or theory of regimes, became recognized as an important factor in institutional processes (Haas p 2013). Regimes are viewed as an element of institutions which, in turn, are the instruments that help organize and manage international relations. Specifically, regimes help states structure, regulate, and enforce institutions (Moravcsik 2018). Several types of regime analysis/regime theories emerged out of a need to account for a wide spectrum of transformative effects of variables on international relations. A commonly accepted definition of regimes is the implicit or explicit “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area” of international relations. (Krasner 1983).

Stephen Krasner provided one of the early contributions to understanding the dynamics of institutions and the important role of ideas, identities, and norms in world politics (1982). His views of world politics brought together what had been disparate constructs (e.g., realism, institutionalism, and constructivism) as complements that helped better explain the diversity and complexity of international relations (Keohane 2013). The discussion of regimes brought to the fore to importance of regimes, i.e., interests, norms, and principles, and their influence on outcomes. Regime analysis enables exploration of the influential impact of ideas as causal independent variables and potentially explanatory factors in regime creation and persistence as well as the transformative effects apparent as institutional integration expands (Haas 2013). Krasner describes ideology as an independent force that has the power to transform interests and institutions (Keohane 2013). There are significant processes in which regimes affect behavior in world politics. For example, the socialization process inherent in the expansion of regional integration.

Increasing emphasis on multilateral institutions, especially in the third world, highlights norm diffusion of a variety or norms, security and unity of effort being among the most fundamental drivers. Some scholars contend that ideas and interests are not fundamental to international relations (Strange 1983). Other researcher question what else explains the expansion of support for various ideologies at specific times – democracy, authoritarianism, revolution, ending conflict, etc. Moreover, regime analysis highlights the difference between different levels – domestic, national, transnational. Motivational drivers involved at each level are usually different and so should taken into account (Keohane 2013). Finally, while it should be obvious that the outcomes of normative influences are hard to discern, the influences on outcomes can be identified that explain a given behavior post hoc (Kowert and Legro 1996).

Keohane (2010, 2013) argues that norm diffusion requires agency to become effectively incorporated into regimes. The presence of regimes indicates progress in transitioning from self-interest to cooperative relations, according to Jervis (1982). If behavior is closely aligned with self-interest (e.g., self-preservation), it is not a regime. However, because regime influence on behavior becomes more than the original causal mechanisms creating it, it becomes self-perpetuating and a force on its own. International integrative institution creation is a manifestation of transformation in interests, norms, and principles (Krasner 1983). It allows cooperation not possible before were system-imposed restraint supersedes self-restraint (Jervis 1982). For example, when the benefits of joining an institution become apparent and encourage bandwagoning effect to accept regime norms and rules (e.g., joining a trade agreement that offers long term, increased market share at the cost of short loss of income from tariffs, or an international security organization that enables greater overall security but imposes conformity to certain norms such as human rights.

Krasner's statement (1982, 1983) that "Regimes do not arise of their own accord. They are not regarded as ends in themselves. Once in place they do affect related behavior and outcomes" is supported by Keohane's analysis (1982) that in a "self-help system," where war has had particularly devastating consequences, especially in terms market failure and systematic inadequacies, "conscious institutional innovation may be necessary" to agreements and cooperation possible. Keohane demonstrates that in cases of market structural deficiencies, demand for regimes may result for three primary reasons. Essentially, regimes make agreements possible because (1) they can provide a legal framework for redress in terms of liability or non-compliance; (2) they provide necessary information to enable efficient decision-making; and (3) they reduce transaction costs. Where relations are the most problematic and difficult to address through simple agreements and where there are more issues and uncertainties to deal, there is likely to be greater demand for regimes. Keohane astutely perceived the linkage between regimes and interdependence; the more dense the regimes, the greater the interdependence. The development of regimes, by definition, increases interdependence. In essence, regimes and interdependence are indicators of an evolution from self-help, self- interested states to greater degrees of commitment and cooperation. This is not to say interests in regimes will emerge from uniformly complementary interests, or that they will necessarily increase overall levels of welfare, or that regime harmony will endure. Keohane's message is to highlight the inherent conditions and interests at work in changing international relations to greater interdependence through regime norms, principles, rules, and procedures.

The most successful international institution, the European Union (EU), is viewed as a model for regional integration. However, the Economic Commission's transformation to the EU took many years of national interest promotion and negotiation between members to produce the current sophisticated regime network of norms, principles, rules, and procedures (Lipson 1982). Since the 1970s, its peace and prosperity has attracted new members (Diez et al 2008). Morovcsik's (1998) analysis of the EU emphasizes the importance of economic interests, relative power, and credible commitments in the willingness of states to participate in the deliberate national transfer of sovereign prerogatives. The impact of the development of the EU has been extensive. It has transformed governance and economics in Europe through norm diffusion and rules promulgation (Karns et al. 2015). Importantly to the focus of this dissertation, the EU has had significant influence in the advancement of regional integration in Africa. Its involvement in the promotion economic trade liberalization through regional integration is due to a variety of motivations. For one reason, it would open up access to large markets and create economies of scale in dealing with regional entities. While contradictory efforts have somewhat undermined progress at times, the recently promulgated AfCFTA is due in large part to information sharing and resource provision by several European organizations and individual countries, assisting more than 75% of the continent ratify the regime. (Dietz et al 2008, TRALAC 2022).

African Regional Integration

Africa has a long history of failed aspirations to form an integrated union of states dating from independence movements rooted in notions of Pan-Africanism, collective self-reliance, and economic transformation (Aniche et al. 2021). About a decade and a half ago, growing agency in securitization, most notably that of the East African- led AMISOM operations marks a transition from the competition of post-independence to greater integration of economic and security measures (Fisher 2012, Walsh 2021, Williams 2018). Old Cold War era ideas and interests began to be replaced by new paradigms and a transformation in development and stability constructs (Signe 2017, Taylor and Nel 2002). This dissertation investigates how regional cooperation in the last two decades differs from the previous Cold War era through comparing ideas, interests, and institutions that have crystalized to exert influence and enhance transnational interrelatedness and interdependence.

Overview of African Efforts to Integrate

Compared to other regions, the extent of integration in SSA is very low. The process of integration involves a level of state capacity and development that was virtually nonexistent at independence. Although integration has been slow to progress, there has been a dramatic increase in the last two decades, which suggests changing concerns amongst leaders and stakeholders. This dissertation demonstrates the evolution of regional integration in SSA as a function of changing ideas, interests, and institutions. This study examines institutions fundamental for facilitating economic integration, primarily infrastructure in the transportation and energy sectors (Deloitte 2021, IEA 2019, AUDA-NEPAD 2019, Signé 2020).

The planning and budgeting required to successfully design, construct, and maintain these institutions entail tremendous challenges not only in terms of technical expertise, but also in shifting perspectives of elite goals from narrow individual and national objectives to broader, global viewpoints. While integration in the post-independence era was sought for Pan African solidarity, today integration is pursued for the economic and social welfare benefits increased trade and development can bring. Achieving integration was stymied in the early independence period by a lack of shared goals and sufficient pressure from economic stakeholders (Nye 1966).

The resurgence of integration efforts in the 21st century has been hindered due to a number of reasons primarily regarding state capacity and governance (e.g., insufficient ability to adequately manage and sustain infrastructure, security concerns, lack of cooperation between national entities, poor investment environment, etc.) (IEA 2019, AUDA-NEPAD 2019). However, the number of cross-border projects underway is on the increase, indicating impediments have been reduced to some extent. Supportive government policies and regulations have encouraged market maturation, making foreign and private investment more attractive (IEA 2019).

Changing ideas and interests in SSA can be traced through the Organization of African Unity (OAU) transition to the African Union (AU) and revised agenda to accelerate the process of integration (AU Constitutive Act 2000). Marking a change in focus from a Pan-Africanism independence movement, the launch of the AU endeavored to increase cooperation in order to drive economic growth and development, reduce conflict and ensure security. While much of the research on Africa tends to focus on either security or economic issues, the AU signaled a change in African ideas and interests to focus on the nexus between the two (Signé 2017).

While some observers claim the African Union has not accomplished much in the early years after its establishment, the literature dominated by Afro-pessimism lacks a temporal perspective and rarely takes into account that it was less than half a century since independence when the Africa Union was established (Signé 2020, Sore 2020). A longer-term analysis reveals African inter-continental relations have gradually evolved from the anti-colonial Pan-Africanism to a more internal cooperative focus since the of the end of the Cold War (Aniche 2020b).

The numerous conflicts in SSA required a significant presence of peace keeping operations, especially as Islamic extremist presence grew. And the idea for stability to enable economic development became central to expanding African agency (Osiki 2021). For example, East African interest in countering growing regional instability emanating from Somalia ignited indigenous peacekeeping efforts as evidenced by the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM was remarkable in that, not only was it an early form of African agency as an African-led peace support mission, the AU's fifth), but it demonstrated remarkable resolve in driving al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and the strategic port of Kismayo, became the largest peacekeeping operation in 2017, and established a model for African capacity building, problems notwithstanding (Erameh 2021, Williams 2018).

Economic development priorities and strategies evolved from the 1980s to today from an international financial institution imposed structural reform to state government capacity building and good governance to enhance management of national resourced for development and attract foreign investment. Of note, aid has steadily declined while remittances and private capital inflows have increased significantly as a proportion of government revenues (Cilliers 2021). The trend is explained by enhancing governance as countries aimed to increase their business environment attractiveness as assessed by the Heritage Foundation *Index of Economic Freedom*, the Fraser Institute *Economic Freedom of the World Report*, and the World Bank's *Doing Business* series.[3] These annual reports measure performance in regulation that facilitates efficiency and ease of doing business. They are designed to assess infrastructure, legal systems, government adherence to the rule of law, and macroeconomic institutions .

While all measures are regularly revised and most have received some criticism (Murphy 2016, Ram 2014), there is general agreement that government institutions have been shown to be fundamental determinants of development (Acemoglu et al. 2014). Good governance can enhance both foreign and domestic business activity as well as reduce income inequality (Alexiou et al. 2020, World Bank 2020b). Economists note a spillover effect as countries economic development following reform inspires others to adopt regulatory reforms as well. For example, Rwanda's improving business environment score inspired Togolese visits to Kigali to learn from their experience and Kenya's model stimulated Nigeria's reform program (World Bank 2020b). As SSA increasingly committed to regulatory reform and improved governance, private investment grew from less than $7 billion at the beginning of the century to over $44 billion in 2015 (World Bank Database).

[3] While the World Bank series has come under significant criticism recently, the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom Heritage Foundation and Fraser Institute also provide a correlation between governance functionality in terms of competition, property rights, rule of law, and quality of life.

Nevertheless, SSA's doing business average score is below the global average and there are only two African economies that score in the top one quarter of the 190 economies ranked in 2019. Additionally, with a slowing GDP growth and decreasing demand for commodities, FDI declined significantly to $32 billion in 2019 in SSA (UNCTAD 2020). Global value chain manufacturing industries and service industries were particularly hard hit, for example tourism, hospitality, and aviation.

Although the COVID-19 caused further damage to SSA economies in 2020, there are signs of greater investment flows in the future due to interest of promotion of resources, industrial development, and infrastructure, especially under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) (UNCTAD 2020). One sign of potential economic change is the growing diversification of foreign investment moving from a commodity dominated landscape into manufacturing and services, especially in communications, information technology, and logistics (Quiang 2021). This consideration is particularly important to generate positive spillovers, such as internalizing foreign technologies and processes to improve productivity (World Bank 2018).

Progress in African Integration

AfroChampions (2020) found Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya to be in the top ten countries committed to the AfCFTA based on their elite's collaboration in signing, ratifying, and publishing implementation strategies. Rwanda and Kenya are also in the top five countries ranked according to trade facilitation readiness, based on the quality of trade infrastructure and efficiency of customs. Rwanda, Kenya, and Uganda rank in the top five countries according to overall performance, a combined ranking of commitment and implementation readiness, consistently measuring the progressive nature of East African states, in particular, regarding integration.

In recent years, a few countries have made progress since the de-industrialization of the 1980s according to Brookings Africa Growth Initiative research (Coulibaly et al 2019, Leke and Signé 2019, Page 2020, Songwe 2019). For example, Kenya's growing manufacturing position has a major influence in East Africa as a role model for creating regional opportunities, for example, in the automotive industry. The creation of an automotive industry is an important driver of Africa's manufacturing sector. With a growing consumer market, low-cost labor relative to other regions, and a growing educated middle class, investors are turning to Africa for production. Emerging manufacturing hubs are evidence of shifting interests and institutions as the region pursues this critical avenue to sustainable economic development through industrialization (Pittaway 2021). Kenya, along with South Africa are leaders in contracting manufacturing with companies such as Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen, Chrysler, Mitsubishi, and Toyota. In recent years, multinational vehicle manufacturers established manufacturing plants in Angola, Egypt Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, and South Africa, demonstrating the growing attractiveness of emerging SSA economies for entrepreneurs looking for investment opportunities (Industri All 2020). Improving conditions improve, such as good governance, business-friendly climates, and security – a growing number of companies from other manufacturing sectors may decide to make components for global supply chains using parts from local suppliers in Africa (Economist 2021).

The AfCFTA aims to increase trade by reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Increasing trade requires increasing productivity through the creation of environments that foster manufacturing capacity. Transforming economies from low-value-added, subsistence agricultural activities entails government enactment of policies and plans that cut across all sectors to create business-enabling environments (e.g., skilled labor, integrated infrastructure, access to reliable energy).

Astute policymaking requires an evolution in state development from neo-patrimonialism to mature bureaucratic entities (Fukuyama 2014, 2016). Fukuyama (2007) argues that institution building is essential to ensure state strength and capacity to create the right environment for state-building . He explains that institutions are critical variables to permit sequencing of processes that enable state maturation. Moreover, sequencing is important in that security and stability facilitate economic development which, in turn facilitates democracy (Fukyama 2007). The importance of ensuring a foundational state of security within a complex set of conditions in order to permit economic and democratic progress is often underappreciated (Jabareen 2012).

State capacity-building is intrinsically linked with a greater ability to provide an environment of security and economic development. Economic policies that create conditions conducive for investment (i.e., security, rule of law, and social welfare) has a beneficial impact on per capita GDP growth (IMF 2020). Governments with high capacity facilitate private investment, promote human capital development, implement solid macro-economic policies, ad stimulate export volume growth. Collier (2004) demonstrated the strong, bi-directional relationship between conflict and development failure. In the 1980s, economic growth severely declined in most African states. In 1995 through 1997, 32 countries registered positive growth rates, twice the number of countries achieving growth from 1990-1994. Numerous studies have demonstrated that negative growth rates were correlated to intransigent economic problems and the long-standing destructive costs of past and ongoing violent conflict (Basu et al 2000, Collier et al 2008). Economic growth is required for economic development (i.e., investment in economic infrastructure and human capital) that facilitate poverty reduction and the emergence of a middle class with the political power to create democratic institutions (Easterly 2001, Fukuyama 1993, Fukuyama 2012, Muller 1995, Nie et al. 1969, Lipset 1981, Lu 2005, Rueschemeyer et al 1992).

Historically, the process of state formation involved the formation of bureaucracies in response to challenges primarily, security and economic concerns (Fukuyama 2014). According to Herbst (2014), the inability to exert power over territory inherited from the colonial legacy contributes to the low frequency of interstate African wars. The post-colonial African environment, unlike the pre-modern Western European experience, included states constructed by colonial fiat rather than war. The fundamental problem in the low level of state development in SSA is the inability to project control over territory due to Africa's: 1) sparse settlement, 2) widely different ecological differences, and 3) geographical features that inhibit long-distance transportation. Access to war-making industry also contributed to a lack of a need to defend against external rivals, unlike the European experience which created strong incentives for state-building. For the most part, countries that have had the most significant levels of conflict have had the least developed economies. The role of conflict in Africa in state-building is central to the research model used to explore conditions facilitating regional integration and creating environments conducive for growth. Conflict in Europe historically contributed to state-building by developing capacities for ensuring security through the evolution of what Hickey calls bureaucratic 'pockets of effectiveness' (Hickey 2019). These burgeoning bureaucracies contributed to the early establishment of military complexes through tax collection to fund the provision of security and the creation of financial institutions for managing income and expenses (Fukuyama 2014). The lack of widespread external threats and rivals, most notably the relative absence of interstate conflict, in SSA has been a significant factor in the lack of state-building according to Herbst (2014). This is not to say that state consolidation cannot find new pathways (Herbst 2003). Herbst (2014) acknowledges that significant conflict increased and that dramatic evolution in institution building has been evident since the early 2000s.

Although there is much research on conflict and fragile states, state-building in SSA and the effect of conflict short of territorial expansion (e.g., such as the centuries of warfare that drove state formation in Europe) has not been studied to any large extent. Arguably, however, the internecine conflicts of the last three decades can be viewed as existential threats and could provide similar incentives for governments to raise revenues to meet the costs of national security and for economic development. This, in turn, could promote the strengthening of state administrative capacity through the institutionalization of efficient bureaucracies. As Herbst (2014) admonishes, the evolution of state formation in Europe took centuries within a different international system. State consolidation in SSA has witnessed only a few generations.

Readiness for competition requires bureaucratic competence in order to reduce risk and adjust policies appropriately. The ability to compete effectively indicates the degree of bureaucratic effectiveness and a level of state development. State-building, in effect, is the process of transitioning from patronage systems and developing modern institutions based on meritocracy (Fukuyama 2014). Studying the mechanisms and forces influencing a continental-wide effort to transition SSA from disaggregated states to complex integration provides a baseline for how this process evolves and a comparison of competencies involved in that evolution.

In the 1960s, the East African Community (EAC), comprised of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda failed, in large part due to the absence of strong bureaucracies and interest groups, which Nye (1966) described as the motivating forces and engines of integration. Today, however, in addition to the original three, the EAC now includes Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan. Importantly, the petition of the largest country in SSA, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), to join the EAC has been warmly received by the region. In addition to greatly expanding the size of the EAC, the DRC's membership offers many potential benefits due to its enormous resource wealth, consumer market of over 90 million people, and geographic advantages accruing from linking up two coastlines from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean. This is not to say that admitting the DRC will not be challenging (as South Sudan has demonstrated), given its security issues, widespread poverty, frequent battles with dangerous epidemics like Ebola, and poor infrastructure, not to mention longstanding animosities and distrust. As Nye expounded in *Pan-Africanism and East African Integration* (1966), integration is a process that can be helped and hindered by social, historical, and economic factors that influence the ideology and interests of political and business elites (the main characters involved in state-building and integration efforts).

Current regional integration efforts in SSA present an opportune juncture to objectively compare this phase to previous attempts and evaluate increasing government capacity as well as interest group negotiation processes. To date, there have been few studies on this subject, likely due to the low level of integration on the continent in addition to the fact that the high level of conflict provides more material of interest. This research aims to fill the void by inspecting conditions that play an important role in determining whether African states are exhibiting greater willingness to engage in economic and political integration, specifically regarding economic status and state capacity.

Investment in Infrastructure Key to Development

The need for infrastructure is obvious given the large pipeline of potential projects (Deloitte 2020). A less well-known problem with solving Africa's infrastructure is that, although there is available funding, not enough money is being spent. This infrastructure paradox, where some 80 percent of infrastructure projects do not move from feasibility and planning stages to financial close, is at the heart of Africa's infrastructure gap (Lakmeeharan et al 2020).

Infrastructure's role in spurring economic growth is clear, having accounted for more than 50 percent to economic growth from 2010-2020 (AfDB 2020). In doing so, well-planned investment in infrastructure can contribute significantly to human development, poverty reduction, job creation, and is a key component for the AfCFTA's success. Infrastructure consists of hard (e.g., transportation and energy) and soft (e.g., digital) projects. Transportation and energy programs comprise the bulk of investment costs (Deloitte 2020). Significant investments in digital infrastructure in transportation and energy sectors can help countries reduce the costs of doing business, meet energy requirements, enhance labor productivity, and create millions of new jobs (EIB 2021).

Africa's future economic growth and development depends on considerable investment in infrastructure building, estimated between $150 billion per year annually (Lakmeeharan et al 2020). However, in order to attract investment, SSA needs to demonstrate the ability to create enabling environments and deliver quality projects, in other words address issues of good governance (AUDA NEPAD 2020).   Lack of delivery capacity to proceed to financial close seriously hinders project completion. The first iteration of the AU Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa Priority Action Plan (PIDA-PAP I, 2009-2020) comprised over 400 projects.

At its conclusion in 2020, 50 percent of the projects were in some stage of operation, construction, tendering, or financial close, contributing more than 16,066 Km of road, at least 4,000Km of rail, up to 3,500 Km of energy transmission line capacity, 7GW of hydro-electricity generation and resulted in more than 40 countries being connected with regional fiber optic cables as well as internet connectivity (AUDA-NEPAD 2020a). In order to close its 'infrastructure gaps' (i.e., the difference between existing and required infrastructure), African investment needs to increase to 4.5 percent of GDP per year (from current levels of 3.5 percent on average) and double from 2017 level of $75 billion (which is double the funding at the beginning of the century) (Lakmeeharan et al 2020). Almost half of the funding for infrastructure went to West and

East Africa (27 percent and 19 percent respectively in 2017, 75 percent of which was for transport and energy sectors).

The complexities of creating a business-friendly environment for infrastructure and make attracting private investors challenging. As a result, governments have been urged to produce new financing tools, such as pension funds and development bank financing for greenfield (new construction) foreign direct investments (FDI) (Golubski 2017). Although rising debt-to-GDP ratios (with a median greater than 50 percent) puts a constraint on government spending, McKinsey analysts estimate that international investor interest in funding infrastructures through government agencies, investment companies, and private-sector pension funds has risen considerably (Lakmeeharan et al. 2020).

East Africa Setting the Tone

East Africa is the best positioned region to take advantage of infrastructure investments. The region has made the most rapid progress where Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda are on track to provide 100 per cent access and Tanzania 70 percent access to electricity by 2030 (IEA 2019). Importantly, four East Africa countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Uganda) rank in the top ten of countries with the most internet users in all of Africa; Kenya ranks third below Egypt and above South Africa putting the sub-region in league with more advanced economies imbued with important drivers for economic development such as conducive business environment and state of development (e.g., physical and social infrastructure investment[4]) (AfDB 2021).

[4] Physical infrastructure requirements include power generation and transmission, transport, and ICT. Social infrastructure includes education, healthcare, etc.

Three East African countries were top recipients of funding for power sector development from 2008-2017 – Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia – an indication of the favorable investment environment and emerging consensus of the importance of quality institutions and policies in mediating growth effects of resource inputs (Cust and Mihalyi 2017, OECD 2019). Moreover, investment favors countries where there is a growth in demand from productive sectors of economies which also happens to coincide to growing demand due to emerging middle-classes, as in Kenya and Ethiopia.

Challenges to Integration

In addition to budget limitations, national government capabilities in design and implementation skills are lacking, hindering their ability to bring projects to financial close, despite available funding. African competitiveness depends on infrastructure which dropped in quality 6 percent from 2008 to 20017 (Golubski 2017). Several causal factors were identified for this ‘infrastructure paradox’ including lack of an overarching strategic plan for prioritizing projects, poor business planning, unnecessary administrative delays, poor understanding of risk allocations and management, inability to secure guarantees, and poor delivery due to insufficient capabilities in planning, managing, and execution (Lakmeeharan et al. 2020). In 2018 capacity building became a central goal of the African Union Development Agency- New Partnership for Africa’s Development (AUDA- NEPAD). PIDA PAP 2 identified limitations to the implementation of projects and designed long-term capacity-building plans to address impediments to project implementation through training programs, technical assistance, external consultant services, and targeted recruitment of specialized staff (AUDA-NEPAD 2020b).

While infrastructure development is critical to the long-term success of the implementation of the AfCFTA, even if more projects reach completion, the continent will have to address a number if challenges if the AfCFTA is to be successfully implemented and the region can benefit from increased economic integration (Erasmus 2022). Additionally, it will be difficult for some countries to eliminate protectionist tendencies and improve business climates for entrepreneurship (TRALAC 2021). Two fundamental limitations will likely plague many countries – inadequate state capacity to improve national finances and ensure stability to attract significant investment (AfroChampions 2020).

Nations that devote effort to improving governance and regional integration are more likely to prove successful if commitments and legal instruments are designed and implemented within a well-managed and effective framework. The extent to which countries reduce inefficiencies in investment policies and barriers to trade, has the potential to increase investor and consumer income, which can contribute to economic growth and development (Chidede 2020). One of the areas that can reduce trade barriers, the AU's burgeoning infrastructure planning and programming efforts, provides a field of under-researched material (Azolibe and Okonkwo 2020). It took several years to get a coherent strategy in place. With the latest PIDA-PAP II stakeholders in Africa and International organizations have produced an infrastructure strategy in the interest of integrating trade corridors in support of the AfCFTA, demonstrating increasing capacity through state-building efforts (AUDA-NEPAD 2021).

Countries with the greatest capacity to develop action plans, reduce trade barriers, and establish customs infrastructures will likely be more successful in the short term.

That capacity represents interests that are embodied by institutions. This is the focus of this dissertation – changing interests can be identified and examined in concrete institutional forms, such as infrastructure programs, whether or not the institutions themselves live up to their ideals or compare favorably with other parts of the world.

Theoretical Construct – Evolving Interests and Institutions

Neo-institutionalism argues that ideas, interests, and institutions influence actions and outcomes in national decision-making (Hall and Taylor 1996, March and Olsen 1984). Concepts of neo-institutionalism generally agree that institutional arrangements (e.g., organizational policies, procedures, and systems) and social processes have greater explanatory power than non-holistic theoretical constructs (Signé 2019). This is fundamentally a systemic approach that views political arrangements as subsystems that are socially connected at multiple levels and temporal scales. Neo-institutionalists tend to focus on conditions, regimes, and structures that favor processes and relations that can affect change (Frunzeti and Achimescu 2019). The analytical framework used here considers evolution in ideas, interests, and institutions that resulted in transformative innovations in integration. A fundamental question explored is the mechanisms at work driving alterations that result in significant socio-politico-economic change. The following section explores how the effect ideas and interests have on institutions is fundamental to the understanding of how institutions change.

Achieving integration through greater interdependence, as conceived by Keohane and Nye (2012), consists of a spectrum of three characteristics -- multiple channels between societies, numerous multi-lateral concerns, and decreasing threats or use of force among states that are interdependently linked. They highlight the example of post-World

War II Europe where intercontinental interdependence was limited to areas protected by the United States (i.e., under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]). However, with the end of the Cold War, security cooperation and economic integration spread through the former Warsaw Pact countries, exemplifying expanding areas of complex interdependence. Similarly, cooperation and integration, central African aims under the OAU, expanded under the AU in a seemingly parallel evolutionary process to that of Europe (Oyeranmi 2018, Sore 2010).

Empirical studies show that institutions and regimes that foster political stability, trade liberalization, human capital development, and foreign direct investment, can significantly affect Africa's economic growth and development positively (Acemoglu et al 2014). National policies that enhance the investment environment and improve the quality of the labor force are important conditions generating economic progress in SSA (Epaphra and Kombe 2017). Trade integration is a result of complex drivers that support and reinforce intraregional trade and financial links. National strategies and policies that enable financial and technological development, reduce cross-border impacts on prices and investment, and create structural transformation are key to promoting value-added, diversified, productive economies (Arizala et al 2018).

In spite of recent progress, a lack of robust institutions and integrated infrastructure inhibits economic growth. Achieving employment growth through structural transformation takes time. The successful evolution of SSA economies to global integration depends on the investments made in selected, well-targeted infrastructure that will enhance competitive industries, industrial parks, and export-processing zones linked to regional and international markets (Cilliers 2020). Policy interventions addressing human capital development require strategies aimed at reducing poverty through education, health, food, security, and job creation. (Signé 2018).

With these goals in mind, the East African Community (EAC), has received recognition for making changes that are reaping rewards over the past two decades. “The region has fast-tracked regional integration and has seen considerable progress in institutional reforms. Moreover, East Africa boasts much greater political stability than it has at any time in its recent past, and peace has been restored in most of the countries. The region has also seen major investments in both national and regional infrastructure.” (Kimeny and Kibe 2014).

The research questions addressed in this dissertation are designed to examine the degree to which interest linkages, agenda setting processes, and instruments of state policy compare in the AU era to that of the OAU. Have economic and social globalism forces changed African leaders’ ideas, interests, and incentives to a convergence of common motivations akin to what Keohane and Nye (2000) identified in the evolution of the European Community?[5] Has Africa reached the stage where interdependence leads to discord which requires the creation of institutions (Keohane 2002)? Have some countries achieved a level of political development that enabled escape from what Keohane called Hobbes’s Dilemma, which “encapsulates the existential tragedy that results when human institutions collapse and people expect the worst from each other” (e.g., the decades-long conflict in Somalia) (Keohane 1995)?

[5] While the AU has clearly not reached the level of integration of the EU (unsurprising after only two decades), it was nevertheless modeled after the European experience following a similar pattern of long-term, horrific periods of violence (Babarinde 2007).

The ability to enact the institutionalist solution to Hobbes's dilemma, whereby international institutions impose order within anarchic international relations, would require "demanding conditions to be realized" which in the 1990s "had not been met in much of the world," including in Africa. Because "(t)hey have not built-up social capital in the form of practices of cooperation, norms of participation, and institutions of civil society," increasing interdependence is more likely to result in friction, according to Keohane (1995). This dissertation asks whether there are observable shifts toward the use of African sovereignty as a bargaining resource in transnational networks? Have sufficient parts of Africa transitioned from a region where, as Keohane (2002) describes, "neither domestic institutions nor prospects of economic gain are likely to provide sufficient incentives for international cooperation" where "In these zones of conflict, military conflict will be common"? Is there evidence of a change in national and regional integration efforts, capacity building, and security cooperation out of fear of instability and lack of sufficient economic progress stymieing development and vital investment capital?

When ideas gain strength and are converted to general interests, they transform and create institutions in order to enable stakeholders to achieve specific goals, for example integration. If the interests are strong enough, they can be traced through the physical embodiment of strategies that enable interests to come to fruition. AU infrastructure concepts today, forged through coherent strategies designed in concert with national, regional, and international and actors, embody the evolution of African ideas, interests, and institutions that can be empirically observed through infrastructure development.

Ideational Evolution

An emphasis on ideas and their evolution is particularly useful for exploring how relations and institutions change over time (Kanengisser 2014). The importance of ideas and interests is particularly relevant with regard to processes of legitimation and institutional reproduction as can be seen in the transfer of certain aspects of the European integration model to the African Union regional organizational structure (Diez and Tocci 2017, Sicurelli 2010).

Norm diffusion is a critical feature in the transformation of states' perceptions of their relations with others, especially regarding conflict. According to Risse (2017), "diffusion is a process through which ideas, normative standards, … policies and institutions spread across time and space" (Risse, 2017, p. 293). He defines norms as "collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity … that contribute to identity formation of member states" and which set into motion a process of identity transformation (Risse, 2017 pp. 121-124). Even when norms are initially adopted for transactional reasons, they can become eventually internalized through widespread assimilation of standards of accepted behavior. Norm diffusion entails a stimulus of diffusion (e.g, European Union success model), an object of diffusion (e.g., regional cooperation and integration), and a process of diffusion (e.g., direct influence measures and indirect recipient-driven mechanisms) (Risse 2016). Norm diffusion, or socialization, can be an educational process, a systematic mechanism, or an informal acquisition (Diez 2017).

Conditions and mechanisms create environments conducive to the socialization processes as norms become institutionalized. A critical enabling factor, a community of agents -- “norm entrepreneurs” -- advocate acceptance and promulgation of new roles and norms (Flaspöler 2018). Norm entrepreneurs define and legitimatize values within a particular situation and initiate others to the benefits of mutual compliance. They institute organizational processes that establish social expectations of standards of behavior, codified responsibilities, and endowed privileges (Darkwa and Attuquayefio 2014).

Risse (2017) highlights four main scope conditions that tend to facilitate norm diffusion. For one, domestic interests and incentives motivate assimilation when domestic actors demand change and policies that meet their objectives. Secondly, the degree of statehood affects the ability of states to adopt, implement, and enforce decisions. Third, a regime’s democratic quality influences the willingness of leaders to promote change in response to internal and external influences. Finally, the global exchange of ideas and tangible products stimulates national transformative connections within the international community.

Institutional Transition

Institutions are the enactment of norms (Risse 2016) and the expression of codified ideas (i.e., social controls) that shape human relations (Tang 2011). Formal socialization mechanisms transfer norms through institutions such as regional integration mechanisms. Risse (2016) demonstrates that a major trend driving the rise in regionalism during the post-Cold War is the spreading acceptance of the potential benefits of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). The Economic Union (EU), for example, has had a significant influence on the growth of regional organizations (ROs) in SSA (Dietz and Tocci 2017).

Institutional change occurs as a result of the assimilation of new global standards and procedures for regional relations (Inglehart 2018). It involves the selection of ideas that compete for acceptance and are constituted as institutions in a process similar to the natural evolutionary process of variation, selection, and inheritance (Jervis 1997). The mechanisms of variation-selection-inheritance generate phases of institutional change that correspond to the phases of evolution in nature: mutation (generation of ideas), selection (political mobilization and struggle for power), and inheritance (rules setting and legitimatizing) (Tang 2010, 2013). Tang contends that systems tend to be generally stable in spite of a continuous cycle of variation-selection-inheritance within the system due to a variety of general tendencies: 1) the system is viewed as beneficial (either correctly or not), 2) a lack of perception of a superior system, 3) the tendency to prefer the status quo, and 4) it is too costly, risky and/or difficult to change (e.g., the current system is backed by power and/or entrenched in other systems).

The process of institutional change is difficult but facilitated when stabilizing tendencies no longer hold. Tang (2011) identifies four destabilizing factors – new ideas, new power, systemic incompatibilities, and external shocks – that can result in dynamic change under certain conditions. He notes that significant institutional change needs "an effective anti-ideology and political entrepreneurship that can overcome the problems of collective action and create a social movement" (Tang 2011 p. 17).

This explanation of institutional change does not imply that change will necessarily be for the better or last in perpetuity. However, human society has generally progressed for the better, as the competition of ideas and better institutional arrangements have eventually supplanted less beneficial conditions because, "while we will not arrive at welfare-improving institutions every time due to our limited knowledge, our desire for happiness guarantees that we will make progress in the long run, although the process has often been long, difficult, and sometimes bloody" (Tang 2011 p.23).

Infrastructure as Innovations in Integration Transformation

In the past decade, over 50% of economic growth was due to programs that enhanced the infrastructure system, a clear indication of its importance to enhanced standards of living and economic development (AfDB 2020). Significant attention is paid to infrastructure development because it promotes an environment conducive for competitiveness, necessary for structural transformation to occur (AfDB 2018). Infrastructure is also an indicator of state capacity, especially regarding efforts to enable integration (Deloitte 2020).

Moreover, infrastructure can be viewed as the embodiment of ideas that have strengthened into interests which, in turn, are transformed into institutions that enact policies to achieve objectives of economic growth and integration which depend on infrastructure (Signé 2020). Economic progress depends on robust transit and trade networks, reliable power, and access to telecommunication networks which Africa is well-known to lack. What is less recognized is the fact that the region has caught up with some other developing areas, for example, Latin America and Central Europe in the last decade and a half (Signé 2020). Nevertheless, progress has been uneven throughout the continent which is generally attributed to two main factors "political will and revenue capacity to allocate sufficient resources" (Signé 2020 p. 217).

At the beginning of independence, the level of infrastructure development in SSA was much lower than that of the rest of the world. This situation worsened in the early

1980s and stagnated until the early 2000's (Signé 2020). The Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCDE) was more than 20 percent lower than Latin America and more than 50 lower than East Asia (Signé 2020). In 2020 SSA still faces serious infrastructure gaps. Almost 600 million people lack access to grid electricity, accounting for two-thirds of the world's population without power (Lakmeeharan et al 2020).

In recent years, African governments have substantially increased infrastructure development which, in turn, augments economic growth, especially in the construction sector (Deloitte 2020). Support from international institutions in the last two decades began to focus more on building capacity through regional strategies to articulate priorities and processes. Efforts gathered steam in the last 10 years with the adoption of major continental approaches envisioning development and integration including the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063 in 2013, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) in 2015, and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2018 (AfDB 2018). Major changes in the Africa Development Bank (AfDB) led to the adoption of a new strategic framework that focused on five inter-linking priorities (power, food security, industrialization, integration, and quality of life) (Amoako 2020). The means for the AfDB to enable these priorities are by supporting infrastructure connectivity, trade and investments, and financial integration (AfDB 2018).

Bringing international economic expertise and financial resources to bear has helped spur private participation in infrastructure (PPI) development. In spite of the downturn in economies due to the pandemic, investment in SSA increased in 2020 from the five-year average. Moreover, it was the only region that saw an increase. Investments increased by 7% from 2019 to 2020 with 24 projects worth $6.3 billion, a

14% increase compared to the five-year average ($5.5 billion). Countries reporting PPI investments include Burkina Faso, Burundi (its first-ever PPI project), Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (its first PPI investment since 2000), Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo (World Bank 2020).

In 2019, the top five countries by number of projects included four SSA countries, three of which are in East Africa -- Tanzania, Kenya, and Ethiopia (Deloitte 2020). Also, in 2019 the East Africa region exceeded the other four regions in terms of number of projects and value of construction. The number of projects increased by 43, a 40% increase compared to 2018 and the value of projects increased by 68% putting East Africa in the lead for the first time with the largest value of projects (Deloitte 2019). In 2015, by contrast, East Africa was third in terms of number and value of projects (Deloitte 2015).

The region on the whole has demonstrated a major change in concentrating efforts on infrastructure development. For example, Ethiopia's aggressive strategy in the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) combined public and private investment in the build-up of infrastructure was the second highest in Africa increasing 15 percent between 2002 and 2012 (Signé 2020). Contributing factors include mega-projects such as the construction of the largest geothermal energy fam in Africa valued at $4 billion and a 600 mega-watt hydropower dam, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) (Deloitte 2019),

The East African region has been considered the least developed on the continent until recently, moving from one of the least integrated in 2003 to the first to reach Free

Trade Area (FTA), Customs Union, and Single Market status by 2016 (AfDB 2020, UNECA 2004, UNECA 2017). However, a concerted effort by East African partners has made significant strides to integrate regional economies through improving infrastructure connections contributing to it being the fastest-growing region in recent years improving its overall regional integration score on the Africa Regional Integration Index (ARII) from 2016 to 2019, albeit at a very low level compared to other regions (UNECA 2016, 2019). East Africa's share of the entire continent's infrastructure encompassed 40.3 percent of the total 452 projects and 29.5 percent of the $497 total value. In 2020, the evidence of the region's economic progress became evident when Tanzania joined three other countries in the middle-income status (Kenya, Djibouti, and Comoros) and one as high-income (Seychelles) (AfDB 2020) .

The discovery of oil and gas reserves in the African Great Lakes region has spurred investment in infrastructure considerably in the past decade. The number and value of infrastructure projects almost tripled from 2014 to 2019 in eleven countries in the region[6] from 61 projects (worth $57.5 billion) to 182 projects (worth $146.5 billion) (Deloitte 2019). Notably, construction projects in East Africa increased from $87 billion to $146 billion from 2018 59 2019 – a 67.6 percent increase in one year. With both countries constructing 51 projects in 2019, Tanzania not only caught up to Kenya's number of ventures, but more significantly, Tanzania took the lead in total value with $60.3 billion (Anyanzwa 2020). Increased investments in very large transportation and petroleum industry projects are driving much of the growth.

[6] Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda

The region prioritizes investment in transport infrastructure because reliable transportation networks are critical to economic development. The ultimate objective of the dramatic investment in infrastructure designed to strengthen regional integration in support of stimulating intraregional trade. While most of the value in the infrastructure projects are due to the oil and gas sector, the importance of enhancing regional connectedness is evident in that transport and energy sectors are the most numerous. Out of 182 projects, the transportation sector accounted for the most, (69), the energy and power sector was next (40), and real estate came in third (35) (TheAfrican 2019). In terms of value, the transport sector leads with 30 percent of the region's projects, totaling $44 billion.

Investments in road, rail, seaport, and airport projects contributed to the increased number of transport projects. Top projects include corridor rail projects that link all major economic centers. A growing number of airports and shipping ports in East Africa are expanding in order to respond to anticipated growth in passenger and cargo traffic. The region's governments have played a significant role in developing strategies for funding and building compatible infrastructure projects that enhance individual country competitiveness in order to increase the region's growth and development overall (V.e.n.t.u.r.e.s 2015).

Intra-regional trade is highest in the East African Community (EAC) compared to the rest of Africa. Recently, however, growth has slowed at around 20% of the continent's total exports (AfDB 2020). Additionally, the economic transformation has been too slow, due to low levels of industrialization and especially manufacturing value added (MVA) enterprises. As a result, poverty, unemployment, and economic inequality still permeate eastern Africa. Although the East Africa environment is more business friendly than the other REC, a pervasive infrastructure gap is a significant contributing factor in the lack of transformation.

Key infrastructure elements, electricity and cross border trade, are fundamental requirements for structural transformation (World Bank Group 2017). SSA has the largest percentage of people without access to electricity -- more than 50 % of SSA and 75% of the world's total (Blimpo and Cosgrove-Davies 2000).   Lack of access to reliable electricity due to low connection rates, power outages, and high electricity costs impede private sector business and thereby, economic growth (AfDB 2018).

Meanwhile the lack of transport corridors hinders intra-regional movement of goods which is so essential to the landlocked areas in East Africa (Burundi, eastern DRC, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Uganda). Since infrastructure is critical to development, in 2012 the African Union implemented a consolidated Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) which, in conjunction with states and development partners (e.g., AfDB, UN Economic Commission for Africa, UNECA, etc.) defined 51 priority transboundary projects under the four major categories (Energy, Transport, ICT, and Water), totaling more than 400 separate projects. (UNECA and AU 2020). Transport leads the with the greatest number of projects. ICT comes next, followed by Energy. Water comes in last.

As of 2019, around half of the ICT projects were completed but only 19% of Transport, 11 % of Water and 6% of Energy projects had gone into the operational stage. Altogether, approximately 37% phase one PIDA projects were under construction or in operation at the time of the review and half were nearing or under construction. The benefits of the projects won't be known for some time. However, the ability to conduct needs studies, achieve stakeholder consensus, design projects, garner financing, and bring programs to construction within a typical five-year timeframe demonstrates a growing capacity on the part of African states, due in no small part to the evolution in ideas, norms, regimes, and institutions. Moreover, improved African capacity is testament to the evolution in regional integration through transformation in continental level institutions and overall move forward with the 2020-2030 PIDA phase two projects led by the AU. Specifically, African agency developed through the PIDA framework is evident in the expanding execution of projects designed to enhance economic connectivity (AUDA-NEPAD 2020a).

Additionally, the RECS have developed master plans to develop major projects that will promote individual countries and regions economic cooperation and integration. Regional integration plans in eastern Africa begun in the last decade covering transport corridors linking major economic centers, water resources, energy transmission are in different stages of development and completion (e.g., Dijibouti-Addis Ababa Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), Mombasa-Nairobi-Kampala-Kigali SGR, Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and power transmission lines throughout East Africa, new ports in Kenya and Dijibouti, Uganda-Kenya petroleum pipeline). National capacity building and international partnership technical and financial assistance have been crucial to the successful planning, programing, and completion of various projects. The progress of completing the requisite steps to implement the AfCFTA (e.g., submitting ratification instruments, constructing national strategies, tendering tariff lines, agreeing to rules of origin, etc.) has encouraged FDI inflows which will have a positive impact on getting infrastructure projects completed which, in turn, can accelerate integration (Deloitte 2019).

Huge infrastructure upgrades in roads, railways and power generation and increased public private partnerships (PPPs) is expected to continue expand East Africa infrastructure industry growth through 2022. Some three dozen infrastructure projects out of 286 priority EAC projects were completed by 2018 including the 472km Mombasa-Nairobi railway line and 454 km Mombasa-Nairobi refined petroleum oil pipeline, and rehabilitation and expansion of the Kilimanjaro International Airport, Tanzania. (AfDB 2018, AUDA 2020,).

Not only is integration of infrastructure important for each country's development but a well-planned and implemented system can offers neighboring landlocked countries' economies access to transportation hubs and markets. Connecting to Kenyan and Tanzanian transport systems will provide vital transit networks to resource rich areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, and South Sudan that have the potential to stimulate less well-endowed economies as well. Consequently, East Africa Community (EAC) members have agreed to a number of accords and implemented sector reforms aimed at integrating regional infrastructure, improving business environments, and attracting investment (EAC 2019)

In 2003, Rwanda and Uganda scored higher than Kenya and Tanzania on the Africa Development Bank Infrastructure Index (AIDI), which measures four main components of economic development: transportation, electricity, information and communication technology (ICT), and water and sanitation (World Bank Data Bank). By 2015, Kenya surpassed all East African countries in infrastructure (Figure 1) (World

Bank Databank 2020) and until 2019, had the largest gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure 2) (World Bank Databank 2020). Kenyan policy makers have made infrastructure a central element in the development agenda in supporting economic growth and poverty reduction. Two pillars serve to enhance the business environment by increasing capital accumulation and improving productivity which lower the cost of production and facilitate trade. Infrastructure investments encompass energy, transportation, water and sanitation, and social welfare projects.



Figure 1. East Africa infrastructure growth

(Source: World Bank Databank)



Figure 2. Eastern Africa GDP, current $US

(Source: World Bank Databank)

If appropriately applied, the frameworks and institutions of the AU's Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) and the newly enacted African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) are generally assessed to likely achieve its objectives of enhancing regional integration, inter-continental trade, economic growth, and social welfare and development (Aniche 2020, Signé 2019).

Contribution to Scholarship

This dissertation adds to the literature that examines changing dynamics in African relations with regard to evolving intra-regional norms and expectations over the last two decades. It conducts one of the few Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) studies of the region that identify conditions contributing increasing integrational regimes and institutions which could create mechanisms to facilitate efforts to reduce intra-state tensions while creating processes to generate greater regional prosperity. The research attempts to provide insights about cooperation amongst nations situated in SSA in the face of anarchical conditions, the absence of an effective, overarching supreme authority with coercive power and legitimacy, as defined by international relations theory. The emergence and perseverance of new African development institutions and standards and their ability to change regional relations in terms of development and interstate cooperation has been, for the most part, largely ignored. Moreover, forces for change, specifically diffusion mechanisms and their outcomes, such as South-South influence on institutions, are under-researched subjects (Risse 2016). The study of the dynamics of the emergence of a continent-wide, African-centered development integration process and how it affects international relations as well as development outcomes can help fill the academic void. To this end, the author proposes to construct a holistic model of interests and institutions driving integration in a novel framework for understanding cooperation in SSA's international relations.

CHAPTER III - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Overview of Methodology

This dissertation combines two research methods – Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Case Study Process-tracing (PT). It employs Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) in a theory-building construct, followed by the presentation and analysis of a PT case study of the most robust evidence from the QCA.

FsQCA, (a sub-category of Qualitative Comparative Analysis originally developed by Ragin in 2008), combines quantitative and qualitative processes. Based on Boolean set-theoretic algebra and in-depth case knowledge, QCA uses descriptive ontological methods to assign a range of rankings for variables (known as conditions and outcomes) rather than a bi-nominal (0 or 1) score. Not only is this methodology more effective for use in small- to medium-N studies than either parametric or non-parametric quantitative means, but most scholars argue that QCA is inappropriate for large-N studies. This is because of the QCA programmatics, in addition to the extensive case knowledge required to assign set membership scores for model conditions (Finn 2022).

While fsQCA is able to identify what causal configurations (combinations of conditions) lead to outcomes of interest, it provides limited insight as to how and why these elements interact, especially within a temporal domain. Consequently, post-fsQCA case study process-tracing was chosen as a complement to fill in these missing explanatory aspects.

Initially, Ragin proposed an ideal number of cases for QCA study of about 8-10 based on the fact that larger numbers overwhelm the method’s capacity and are unwieldy for making sense of results, given the requirement for in-depth case knowledge in order to interpret concepts and establish membership thresholds. Current QCA advocates, however, generally recommend from up to 50 cases and a minimum of ten cases for program effectiveness (Legewie 2013).

Case selection for post-fsQCA processing tracing followed best practices outlined by Schneider and Rohlfing (2011). Systematic selection is not based on a numerical requirement (e.g., the earlier focus on 8-10 cases recommended in the early days of QCA for the data processing program). Today, scholarly literature highlights the value added of conducting the between-case analysis based on the outcome of interest (e.g., regional integration in this dissertation) first, followed by within-case process-tracing analysis of conditions of interest.

Process-tracing case studies take the fsQCA results and select cases for specific within-case analytic purposes based on an fsQCA solution formula. Current scholarship does not proscribe minimum numbers for case study. Proposed principles emphasize hypothesis-driven selection to examine the occurrence of the outcome in representative cases that offer substantive explanation for why the outcome occurs in these cases.

An overview of the fsQCA results of the 45 cases assessed in the fsQCA program illustrates the major elements examined in the selection of the cases for post-fsQCA process-tracing. The fsQCA configuration with the most significant results (the configuration with the highest degree of consistency/necessary conditions) is organized according to the variables studied: the outcome of interest – regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa (ARII), and the configuration with the highest degree of consistency/necessary conditions, solution #6 – resource allocation (IDA), governance capacity (COMP), and security agency (SEC). The 14 cases demonstrating degrees of consistency with the configuration are analyzed according to their relative conformations within the model. Five of these countries are in East Africa (Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Tanzania). Eight countries are in West Africa (Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. South Africa is the only country from the southern region .

Using the most robust result from the fsQCA, this dissertation selected the two most significant representative cases demonstrating convergence and divergence within the most highly integrated region in Sub-Saharan Africa, East Africa. This sub-region is aggressively pursuing programs to further expand integration going forward. Moreover, single within-case studies can illustrate mechanisms and processes at work that can provide a framework for assessing other cases exhibiting the same level of conditional configuration. Single case studies on integration specifically, by definition, explicitly expose causal process comparisons. According to Schneider and Rohlfing (2011), single within-case process-tracing provides the insights to search theoretic reasons for comparative causal mechanisms in cases that display similar paths to an outcome.

This research focused on the East Africa, the results of which are not generalizable beyond that region. However, the fsQCA results indicate a similar level of causal configural influence resulting in the outcome of interest (integration) for both western and eastern Africa, indicating this area requires further investigation to determine potential generalizability, at least in these two sub-regions.

In this approach, PT is used in a theory-testing manner to empirical test whether there is evidence supporting the hypothesized causal mechanism exists between the outcome and the conjunction (a combination of variables) obtained from QCA. QCA is especially beneficial for analyzing cross-case comparisons using set-theoretic methods (Legewie 2013). It is especially useful for qualitative research involving medium-N data sets (about ten to 50 cases (Ragin 2008). Variables that are not independently linked directly to an outcome can, in combinations confer a relationship indirectly via a variety of mechanisms. Examining conjunctural causation provides information as to how different conditions work together, for example, the way combinations of conditions influence incentive and capacity for deeper institutional integration. A unique benefit of fsQCA is that it can provide systematic cross-case comparison, unlike statistical methods or qualitative case studies alone (Bretthauer 2014).

The fuzzy set form of QCA (fsQCA), is a variant of the original QCA, which is sometimes also known as crisp set QCA (csQCA) (Pappas and Woodside 2021). FsQCA assigns a degree of membership as opposed to QCA's binary values (Ragin 1987) and thus, has advantages over csQCA in capturing the complexity in cases that naturally exhibit degrees of variability (Ragin 2000, Rihoux and Ragin 2009). FsQCA combines qualitative analysis with quantitative processes using set theoretic[7] principles of Boolean and fuzzy algebra which generates truth tables for all possible solutions (Segewie 2013, Schneider and Wagemann 2010, Wagemann 2017).

Fuzzy set theory defines membership of cases in terms of the degree as well as type based on scores ranging from 0 to 1. Three 'anchor' points -- non-membership/completely out (0), full membership/completely in (1), and a crossover point score (0.5) define a set (Ragin 2008). In-depth case knowledge is integral to

[7] a subset of mathematical formal logic, i.e., deductive reasoning that produces "if…then" hypotheses that can identify sufficient or necessary conditions

determining calibration scores within this range. The use of fsQCA requires an initial analysis of cases to identify a set of conditions that are expected to lead to the outcome of interest based on the formulation of a conceptual construct by the researcher that expresses explanatory variables. Applying case knowledge, the researcher assigns fuzzy membership scores in the different conditions and the outcome to the cases (Legewie 2017). According to Ragin (2008), cases that fall on the same side of the crossover point differ in explanatory power (i.e., degree of in set membership) while cases on different sides of the crossover point differ in terms of impact of combinations of conditions (i.e., qualitatively). Examining the differences between dividing lines offers potential areas for case study analysis as an underlying assumption of fsQCS is “complex causality” -- that a combination of causal factors interacting together can lead to an occurrence of an event or phenomenon (Ragin 2008, Schneider and Wagemann 2010).

Post-QCA process-tracing can determine evidence of causal relationships by empirically identifying mechanisms using detailed within-case analysis of the component parts of each case. Case study process-tracing deconstructs mechanisms and traces them empirically, which requires a systems understanding of the relationship between mechanisms and causal forces.

In theory-testing, post-QCA process examines how causal mechanisms link X and Y within a setting that enables the outcome of interest. Studying mechanisms between causal conditions and outcomes though process-tracing helps gain additional information about how QCA-identified conjunctions operate in practice and how the conditions work in conjunction. This process addresses the strengths and weaknesses of each methodology (Beach 2018).

Qualitative Comparative Analysis

QCA combines qualitative, case-oriented (i.e., phenomenon-descriptive) analysis with quantitative, variable-oriented (i.e., independent variables) analysis and offers an opportunity for generalization of case-based studies from data-derived methods (Ragin 2008). A major strength of the QCA method, as opposed to traditional statistical multiple regression analysis, is that it explains the outcomes of combinations of variables rather than simply identifying numerical relationships between variables. This combination of variables allows the researcher to discern the interaction between each of the various variables. This method provides a technique that can determine the extent to which combinations of conditions are *sufficient* conditions (cases with the condition is a subset of the set of cases with the outcome) or *necessary* conditions (whether the set of cases with the outcome is a subset of the set of cases with the condition) (Sallan 2021).

QCA is a technique to analyze asymmetric data using a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques in a mixed-methods approach. QCA is particularly appropriate for qualitative research in making meaning of context-rich data on processes and mechanisms (Metelits 2009). QCA offers alternative processes that address limitations of parametric-based regression analysis, in particular when asymmetry exists in the data. QCA can be used to determine if datasets contain causal asymmetry and equifinality (multiple paths to an outcome) results (Pappas & Woodside 2021). The analysis of data by case instead of by variable through qualitative reasoning, combined with statistical testing of conditions to identify outcomes allows researchers to thoroughly review the impact of combinations of conditional antecedents on outcomes (Ragin 2000, Rihoux and Ragin 2009). QCA, based on set theory, Boolean logic, and fuzzy algebra, has gained greater recognition for its contribution to analysis of complex phenomena (Russo et al. 2016, Schneider et al. 2010). Equifinality, a fundamental tenet of QCA, occurs when different combinations of conditions (which are somewhat analogous to variables in quantitative analysis) can achieve the same outcome (Ragin 2008). QCA examines how conditions are combined into configurations or ‘recipes,’ which allows empirical investigation of relationships between the outcome of interest and all possible combinations of its conditions (Ragin 2000).

QCA measures the degree to which causal conditions are “relevant” to the effect (a metric similar to R^2 model explanation in regression analysis). Case selection in QCA is based on the underlying research question and preliminary hypotheses (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). The number of cases studied using QCA should be between 10 and 50 to provide the requisite level of complexity in addition to the ability to generalize (Legewie 2013). (At a minimum, one must include eight such cases.)

QCA identifies conditions that are (1) either necessary or sufficient to explain the outcome and (2) *insufficient* but *necessary* elements of a condition that itself is *unnecessary* but *sufficient* for the solution that results in the outcome, known as INUS conditions (Ide and Mello 2022). QCA can identify necessary and sufficient conditions that have a strong causal influence on the outcome or elements with weaker influence (Ragin 2000).

This dissertation uses the fuzzy set form of QCA (fsQCA), which assigns a degree of membership in which a case belongs to a set (as opposed to crisp set QCA binary values, 0 and 1) (Ragin 2000, Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Calibration measures help interpret relevant and irrelevant variation, as well as position cases relative to one another

(Ragin 2008). In contrast to typical multivariate methods (e.g., multiple regression analysis), which focus on the net effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable in a model, fsQCA examines asymmetric relationships that combinations of conditions have on an outcome (Pappas and Woodside 2021). Another benefit is that fsQCA can be employed on small sample sizes which can be broken down for closer interpretation at the case level to identify solutions not only for large parts of the population but also for outliers that are not explained by the main effects.

Meaningful implementation of fsQCA requires a meaningful level of understanding of the conditions and outcome selected for the model regarding set membership within a theoretical context (Ragin 2000). A certain amount of expertise is important for several stages of the analytical process, including data calibration, solution simplification, and result interpretation (Pappas and Woodside 2021). While subjective bias can be a weakness, issues can be ameliorated by transparency in reporting results Moreover, in-depth understanding of the subject matter adds accuracy and richness of understanding (Pappas and Woodside 2021).

Data for the model's five conditions defined below are calibrated on a scale of 0 to 1.0 to form fuzzy sets using indirect methods based on qualitative assessments (Legewie 2013). The resulting 'truth table' is then computed in the fsQCA software to obtain configurations of solutions. Solutions that can result in the outcome of interest (integration) are then examined for specific propositions or hypotheses regarding conditions and for how many cases the solution covers (Pappas and Woodside 2021). This step provides a system for identifying cases for further examination through case study process-tracing.

A key procedure in fsQCA is interpreting and calibrating qualitative information into fuzzy sets. Calibration is the process of assigning membership scores to cases with regard to respective conditions and outcomes (e.g., events, phenomena, situations, etc.) based on empirical data and subject matter knowledge prior to the fsQCA analysis (Legewie 2017). Calibration entails three processes: 1) systematically identifying conditions in relation to the outcome; 2) establishing a framework for anchoring based on empirical data consideration, and 3) assigning membership scores to cases within the anchored framework (Legewie 2017).

An interval-scale variable for each case within each condition describes the degree to which the case is in or out of the set condition base on the three qualitative anchors: full membership (a phenomenon is completely present), full non-membership (the complete absence of a phenomenon), and the crossover point (Ragin 2008). The crossover point is the point of maximum ambiguity between non-membership and full membership. Fuzzy sets can consist of numerous levels of memberships. A typical breakdown is four groupings where 0.0 for completely out, 0.25 -- mostly out, 0.75 -- mostly in, and 1.0 -- completely in membership numbers. However, the preferred process is to examine the data and make grouping based on researcher familiarity with individual cases and knowledge of individual mechanisms of conditions within those cases (Legewie 2017).

Research Model

The research model uses fsQCA to examine 45 SSA countries (all but small island countries) and conditions hypothesized to promote integration based on the theoretical underpinnings previously discussed and depicted in figure 3. The fsQCA model measures configurations of five conditions indicating the outcome of interest and regional integration. A configuration is a set of causal variables (conditions) that indicate an observed outcome (similar to a dependent variable in regression analysis) (Pappas and Woodside 2021).

The conditions chosen for this study are proxies for the underlying assumptions that the degree of state capacity and stakeholder frame of reference (regarding gains or losses) drive national interest in developing institutions for increasing integration (Hickey 2019, Tversky and Kahneman 1992). The conditions employed represent government effectiveness (greater competitiveness, better resource management, and higher agency in security operations), well-being reference point (degree of national economic wealth through exports), and elites' perspective of future well-being (expectation of economic growth trajectory).

The outcomes of interest in this model are the assessed level of integration based on the UN Economic Commission for Africa's (UNECA) Africa Regional Integration Index (ARII). The ARII measures integration scores of five dimensions: macroeconomic, trade, infrastructural, productivity, and free movement of people. This index provides a picture of how SSA countries and regional economic communities (RECs) are progressing in comparison to each other. It assesses the efforts to enact policies and programs that expand regional integration aimed at stimulating trade, markets, cooperation, and social welfare while mitigating risk and instability (UNECA ARII 2019). ARII 2016 concretized the objectives of Agenda 2063, the 2013 vision set forth for transforming Africa from a low-income, impoverished continent to enable development toward a better standard of living (UNECA ARII 2016). According to the

2019 ARII report, the majority of countries (25) perform below the overall average, indicating most areas are in need of improvement. This index also helps identify conditions involved in enhancing progress in the 20 above-average performers, providing concrete information for underperformers to use for improving their scores.

Integration is central to implementing the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). Just as ARII is an indication of progress toward institutionalizing the ideas of Agenda 2063, in turn, the AfCFTA embodies the process of the evolution of ideas and interests transformed into institutional frameworks and processes. The AfCFTA seeks to accelerate trade and deepen international economic relations in Africa. As such, it represents a long-standing pan-African vision that aims to unite the states as a continental trading bloc. The success of Africa's inspirations captured in the AfCFTA depends on a complex set of procedures. These procedures entail effective creation and implementation of processes and institutions to coordinate members' activities geared to promote trade and integration. Because it relies on fundamental changes in intra-state relations, the AfCFTA aspires to move the continent from a distrustful paradigm to a cooperative, interdependent one. The conditions required to achieve these objectives include greater state capacity and a perspective that pursuing absolute benefits of integration for the region as a whole is preferred to relative individual gains.

The fsQCA model includes causal conditions (similar to independent variables) selected as leading to integration -- states' ability and willingness to take risks involved in integration. They fall into two primary categories of conditions – (1) a level of state capacity and (2) a perspective of well-being (gains or loss reference point). State capacity is both a result of state-building as states move from a patrimonial level to a technocratic bureaucracy as well as a requisite factor for managing the complex processes of economic development today. Additionally, taking the risks required to successfully enter into interdependent relations of the level of the AfCFTA entails a perspective that the status quo is not acceptable and that the potential benefits outweigh the risks. In order to ascertain indicators of state capacity and frame of reference creating configurations of conditions leading to integration, the fsQCA model conditional variables are as follows:

State Capacity – Competitiveness, Resource Allocation, & Security Agency

1. Competitiveness (Comp). Data from the 2019 World Economic Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)8 examines progress in creating an enabling environment for economic productivity through policies and factors that facilitate prosperity (Schwab 2019). The GCI measures 12 indicators grouped into four categories: 1) Enabling Environment: institutions, infrastructure, ICT adoption, and macroeconomic environment; 2) Human Capital: health and skills; 3) Markets: product market, labor market, financial system, and market size; and 4) Innovation Ecosystem: business dynamism and innovation capability. (Schwab GCR 2019).

2. Resource Allocation (ResAl). Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) for Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) (World Bank 2018b). The IRAI focuses on key factors that foster growth and poverty reduction. It measures countries' performance

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[8] The Global Competitiveness Report defines competitiveness as "the attributes and qualities of an economy that allow for a more efficient use of factors of production. The concept is anchored in growth accounting theory, which measures growth as the sum of growth in the factors of production—that is, labour and capital—and of total factor productivity (TFP), which measures factors that cannot be explained by labour, capital or other inputs. The GCI measures what drives TFP. Productivity gains are the most important determinant of long-term economic growth." (Schwab GCR 2019). WEF_TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2019.pdf (weforum.org)

based on four subindices divided into 16 criteria. The four main categories are: 1) economic management; 2) structural policies; 3) policies for social inclusion and equity; and 4) public sector management and institutions (World Bank 2019).

3. Security Agency (SEC). Data from African troop contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions, leadership of securitization efforts, and participation in African Union/UN hybrid peace enforcement operations measure African assumption of responsibilities for peace operations as a component of nation-building (Bybee et al. 2020, Dobbins et al. 2019; UN PKO). Increasing agency in peace operations offers theoretical evidence of the use of armed force in conflict zones to promote stability as a component of mechanisms that facilitate regional integration.

Frame of Reference. Maintaining Status Quo versus Taking Risks

1. Exports (Exp). Exports of goods and services in current US$ (World Bank Database, 2014-2018, 5 -year average). Natural resource-rich countries have high income from exports of goods and services which in Africa have directed the political economy of a country and the resulting power base of elites (Isham et al. 2005). A gains perspective where elites perceive their future is secure by the status quo (e.g., loss-averse behavior) of high income from exports makes them resistant to arguments for integration with the objective of economic diversification (Acemoglu et al. 2002). On the other hand, a loss frame of reference, for example during oil price shocks, has been empirically linked to economic diversification in some cases (Ross 2019).

2. Decreasing economic growth rate (decgrwth). Decreasing rate of economic growth from 1988 to 2007 based on average annual percentage growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in constant U.S. dollars (World Bank Database). A period of

decreasing growth can confer an anticipation of a future loss (i.e., a reference point) which can encourage risk-taking. A perception of decreasing well-being can create conditions where actors are more willing to pursue changing the status quo even if they are relatively weak compared to others (Butler 2007).

fsQCA Model Factors					
CONDITIONS					**OUTCOME**
High level of Exports (**Exp**)	High degree of Competitiveness (**Comp**)	Decreasing Growth rate (**decgrth**)	Resource Allocation (**ResAl**)	High degree of Agency in International Security Operations (SEC)	Integration (ARII)

Figure 3. fsQCA Model - Outcome and Conditions

(Source: Author)

Case Studies Process-Tracing

In order to draw causal inferences, QCA is combined with other data analysis techniques in a complementary manner. In this dissertation, fsQCA results provide the best solution and alternative models that express the same outcome, which are used to identify specific cases used to conduct Case Study Process-tracing. FsQCA results identify cases that fit hypotheses (i.e., typical cases that produce the outcome of interest) and those that do not fit (i.e., deviant cases), which can be further investigated using process-tracing (Ragin 2012, Beach and Pedersen 2019). Schneider and Wagemann (2012) recommend using fsQCA results to compare typical cases (those that share membership in necessary terms as well as the outcome). However, the most common use of post-fsQCA process-tracing case studies is to discover causal mechanisms that link the minimal configurations of conditions that are sufficient to produce the outcome (Dusa 2021, Schneider and Rohlfing 2013) Post-QCA process-tracing of cases that do not show congruence with the outcome (i.e., deviant cases) can identify additional important conditions and mechanisms which produce the outcome (George and Bennett 2005, Schneider and Wagemann 2012).

The essential role of process-tracing is to gain greater understanding of factors that produced the outcome of a particular case by conducting empirical within-case analysis of mechanisms and their component parts (mechanistic evidence of processes) as they operate on outcomes (Beach and Pedersen 2019). By examining pathways of change, this method can assist with the identification of explanations for why change took place (George and Bennett 2005). Process-tracing can be helpful in addressing multiple pathways to the outcome (equifinality) as well as in identifying alternative outcomes for the same causal factor (multifinality) (George and Bennett 2005). It provides more detailed explanations for sources of causal inference beyond covariation (Beach and Pedersen 2019). Process-tracing is particularly useful for assessing deviant cases which have outcomes that existing theories don't adequately explain or predict (George and Bennet 2005). There are four basic uses for process-tracing, according to Beach and Pedersoen (2019): theory-building, theoretical-revision, explaining outcomes, and theory-testing. Theory testing process-tracing is useful when potential hypotheses of causes of outcomes are being investigated. It enables an understanding of whether causal mechanisms work as hypothesized (Beach and Pederson 2019).

When there is significant evidence to trace and credible mechanisms to examine in detail, Beach and Penderson (2019) recommend a three-step process using process-tracing for in-depth theory testing: 1) Conceptualization of the cause and outcome in a set-theoretical manner (e.g., selecting typical cases through fsQCA); 2) Making estimations about conditional mechanism that could translate theoretical concepts into case-specific tests, potential disconfirming evidence, and alternative explanations for atypical/deviant cases (e.g., cases that do not achieve the outcome through the predicted causal mechanisms); and 3) Collection and analysis of observations for each proposition (i.e., empirical footprint). Links from propositions to actual empirical evidence are assessed as to their degree of analytical certainty and potential for generalizability.

The process-tracing assesses the effects of socio-cultural evolution and institutional change on the transformation of ideas, interests, and institutions leading to greater interdependence in SSA. This dissertation will incorporate Risse's Norm Diffusion Theory of Institutional Change (2017) and Tang's Social Evolution Theory (2013) into a Transformation Process-tracing Model (Fig.3.2). This model will enable the tracing of causal mechanisms that link causes with the outcome by observing the empirical traces left by the actions of a causal mechanism in a case. Positive cases in which the outcome results from fsQCA conditions (i.e., congruence) and contextual factors will be selected for theory-testing process-tracing and compared to cases where the outcome and/or conditions do not match the positive cases. Positive and negative findings, where predicted evidence was either detected or not evident will be evaluated. The fsQCA results will be examined to see if the predicted results provide significant evidence of a causal relationship or if the empirical evidence was problematic. Case-specific knowledge helps to craft additional propositions for potential further study.

Unlike fsQCA alone, process-tracing can clarify whether a condition is a cause in a mechanistic sense or if it acts as a scope condition. In PT mechanism terminology, a cause 'triggers' a process while a contextual scope condition facilitates the operationalization of other causes (Beach 2018). As fsQCA does not make this distinction, evaluating conditional triggers and scope conditions provides greater granularity, highlighting the rationale for conducting post-fsQCA process-tracing case studies. Figure 4 illustrates this dissertation's model for conducting process-tracing of mechanisms that build on existing theories.



Figure 4. Process-tracing Model

(Source: Author)

Summary of Methodology

In sum, this dissertation aims to identify and explain the transformative factors that have contributed most to decreasing conflict and greater interdependence in SSA in the evolutions of ideas, interests, and institutions. In light of what Tang (2013) identifies as the two primary forces for transformation -- conflict and cooperation -- this research seeks to examine theoretical constructs for apparent changes in SSA relations, trace transfiguration processes, and explain causal mechanisms for variations in the system. Using a combination of theoretical approaches, this research offers a conceptual model for understanding factors in institution building in support of iteration.

Hypothesizing that this transformation is an indication of processes that activate greater state-building capacities that enhance integration, the theoretical construct developed and implemented here draws on mutually supporting theoretical constructs that explain the evolution of ideas to interests which embody institutions: socio-cultural evolution and institutional change. A mixed methodological approach that combines fsQCA with case study process-tracing operationalizes cross-case and within-case analysis. In-depth process-tracing reveals evidence for the causal mechanisms which are investigated to determine mechanistic explanation can be generalized to other cases.

A set of cases that appears to be causally similar in terms of shared conditions cannot be assumed to also encompass mechanistic similarity. The mechanistic similarities must be tested empirically in different cases until a level of confidence can be demonstrated about regarding generalization. The number of cases analyzed through fsQCA are 45 Sub-Saharan countries minus the smaller islands. FsQCA results determine the choice of cases selected for case study analysis via process-tracing.

Preliminary analysis identified likely candidates exhibiting membership in the five conditions facilitating integration in Africa. Mechanisms exhibited by the most relevant cases will be used to compare drivers of cooperation and competition. Resulting combinations of conditions based on fsQCA present the most opportune material for further investigation through process-tracing case study analysis of mechanisms driving integration in the most integrated region in SSA, eastern Africa.

CHAPTER IV – FsQCA FINDINGS

This section presents the results of the Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) process. It describes the fsQCA analysis of the interaction of the conditions on integration in the previously described model based on Sub-Saharan Africa regional data. The reporting of the analysis includes the calibration to fuzzy membership scores the conditions and outcome variable data values. Additionally, this section provides an analysis of the necessity/sufficiency solutions which result in the outcome variable. Finally, an explanation of condition variable configurations within the truth-table and consistency results are reported (Dusa 2021, Ragin 2008)

The transformation of qualitative or quantitative data into fuzzy sets can have a strong influence on the results of the fsQCA (Ragin 2008). As discussed previously, data for each variable must be calibrated, i.e., re-scaled in the form of fuzzy membership scores from 0.000 to 1.00. Calibrating data as sets entails developing definitions of fuzzy-set values based on substantive knowledge in a theoretical context, as opposed to creating uninformed quantities without valid meaning (Basurto and Speer 2012). Prior to calibration, theoretically relevant explanatory factors and the outcome of interest are identified based on gathering data and case knowledge as previously discussed (Ragin 2000, Rihoux and Ragin 2009). This is followed by the calibration process which entails determining the conditions and the outcome, developing anchor points, defining the fuzzy-set scale and fuzzy-set values, and potentially amending fuzzy set values for variables as necessary.

Ragin's direct method (Ragin 2007) is used to establish fuzzy membership values based on qualitative anchors within the set-theoretic range of set membership --

completely in, mostly in, mostly out, and completely out – (Ragin 2008, Verkuilen 2005), The qualitative anchors create fuzzy sets of full non-membership, crossover point, and full membership (Ragin, 2008). The fsQCA process used in this research entailed identifying the 5th percentile, 50th percentile, and 95th percentile associated with each variable (condition and outcome). In this method, subject matter knowledge is employed in conjunction with various scales whereby fuzzy scores are allocated according to fit based on expertise and theoretical justification. Initial anchor points are established to differentiate the main thresholds that structure a fuzzy set, in other words, cases that are more in the set than those that are more out of the set. Anchor points can be revised and adapted, when necessary, based on researchers' knowledge of the theoretical concepts and knowledge of the context of the cases (Basurto and Speer 2012).

To avoid the level of maximum ambiguity where the case is neither in nor out of set membership, i.e., 0.5, raw data are transformed into fuzzy sets based on the thresholds chosen respectively for each condition in terms of the distribution. Because social science variables are often not normally distributed but are typically asymmetric, sets are defined by assigning values for each condition within each set (Vis 2012). Since each country (i.e., case) has different thresholds for set membership within each condition, establishing exact values for set membership is not a mathematical equation (Dusa 2021). Instead, each value is a qualitative relationship that is understood from a qualitative familiarity with each country of interest rather than a quantitative research approach (Beynon et al 2012). It is important to understand the connotation of each condition for each particular country in order to assess a value within the fuzzy scale (Dusa 2021).

Because membership indicates qualitative properties, substantive knowledge informed by theoretical reasoning is central to generating fuzzy variables from data.

Fuzzy-set values for cases and measures are revised and adjusted as necessary based on an evaluation of fuzzy-set value differences between cases in terms of case knowledge and relevant dimensions of the theoretical concept appropriate to the context. (Basurto and Speer 2012). Social science research may result in skewed distribution of cases where cases are concentrated and asymmetrically distributed. Such limited diversity can provide issues for further inquiry.

This dissertation employs a clustering technique to assess fuzzy sets of membership groupings based on statistical analysis of data distribution. Visualizing the distribution through a histogram enables assessment of where breaks in case set membership fall for calibration of the data table. The next step is to process the fuzzy set values within the QCA-program algorithm which aggregates measures into the respective conditions and creates a summary' truth table.' The truth table contains fuzzy-set combinations of conditions from which the QCA program computes configurations that produce a given outcome (Rubinson 2019). The next step of the QCA program then presents all configurations with cases of membership scores greater than .5, as well as consistency and coverage scores for each solution. FsQCA results are further analyzed via cross-case comparison through XY plots to highlight individual observations.

FsQCA results for conditions – Exp (high export levels, i.e., economic well-being frame); Comp (high competitiveness, i.e., government capacity); decgrth (decreasing economic growth, i.e., perception of future loss); ResAl (well-managed resources, i.e., government capacity & social welfare); and SEC (security agency, i.e., state-building/government capacity) leading to integration are shown in Table 1. The overall solution consistency of the model is 0.81 and the overall solution coverage is 0.86. The overall coverage describes the degree to which the resulting configurations explain the outcome of interest, similar to the R-square used in symmetrical, regression analysis (Pappas and Woodside 2021). The higher the solution coverage, the greater the number of cases where the outcome is present and are members of a recipe explained by the model (i.e., the better the model's 'fit') (Legewie 2013). Solution consistency is similar to significance in variable-based analysis in that it signifies the degree cases in the solution exhibit the outcome (Legewie 2013). Solution coverage and consistency describe "the strength of the empirical support for theoretical arguments describing set relations" or, in other words, the degree of specification in the model (Veri 2018).

The overall solution coverage result for this model (0.86) indicates that a significant share of the outcome, integration, is explained by the seven solutions (Table 1). The findings indicate that for a high degree of integration to occur, Solution 6 reflects the greatest coverage (0.6.2) with combinations of conditions related to greater state development—competitiveness, resource management, and security agency. Solution 5 has the next highest coverage (0.58), with government capacity (competitiveness) plus decreasing perception of economic wellbeing (decreasing economic growth plus lower exports) leading to integration. The subsequent two solutions (2 and 3) combine absence of security agency plus lower sense of future well-being—decreasing exports and competitiveness or decreasing growth with lack of resource management. Solution 7 indicates a configuration of decreasing growth (decgrth), high resource management (ResAl), high security agency (SEC), and low export income (Exp) is another path to integration. Exports plus decreasing growth and the absence of security agency (4) or exports plus security agency and the absence of resource management (1) are additional solutions of conditions facilitating integration.

Raw coverage scores for all seven solutions are greater than 0.30, indicating the model provides good configurations of equifinality. A reliability test calculated based on the Cronbach alpha indicator showed an acceptable threshold of 0.7020 (Legewie 2013). Additionally, an alternative measure of reliability which is preferable for items that vary in how strongly they are related to the construct being measured, McDonald's omega calculated scale reliability coefficient of 0.7379.

Table 1 *fsQCA Solutions (models) for Outcome ARII*

Solutions (models) for outcome ARII				
Models from subsample		**Raw Coverage**	**Unique Coverage**	**Consistency**
1	Exp*~ResAl*~SEC	0.398437	0	0.864407
2	~Exp*Comp*~SEC	0.539062	0.02344	0.907895
3	decgrth*~ResAl*~SEC	0.539062	0.02344	0.821428
4	Exp*decgrth*~SEC	0.445312	0.02344	0.904762
5	~Exp*Comp*decgrth	0.578125	0	0.891566
6	**Comp*ResAl*SEC**	**0.617187**	**0.10156**	**0.929412**
7	~Exp*decgrth*ResAl*SEC	0.476562	0.00781	0.924242
	Overall solution coverage:	*0.859375*		
	Overall solution consistency:	*0.808823*		
	Exp, Exports; ResAl, Resource Allocation; SEC, Security Agency;			
	Comp, Competitiveness; decgrth, decreasing economic growth			
	*Logical conjunction (AND), ~ Negation (NOT)			

Table 2 *Solution Consistency /Coverage Scores*

	Solution (ARII)						
Configuration	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Exp	•	~		•	~		~
Comp		•			•	•	
decgrth			•	•	•		•
ResAl	~		~			•	•
SEC	~	~	~	~		•	•
Consistency	0.864407	0.907895	0.821428	0.904762	0.891566	**0.92941**	0.924242
Raw Coverage	0.398437	0.539062	0.539062	0.445312	0.578125	**0.61719**	0.476562
Note: Black circles (•) indicate the presence of a condition while ~ indicates its absence							

Table 2 presents necessity and sufficiency solutions as "consistency" and "coverage" values. *Sufficiency* is the degree that cases exhibiting a condition or conjunction of conditions also exhibit the outcome. *Necessity* is the degree that cases exhibiting the outcome also exhibit the condition or conjunction of conditions. (Rubinson 2019). The consistency threshold for fsQCA computation was set to .85, producing the solution displayed in table 4.2. The output reports important information for each configuration: (1) the configurations of conditions that explain to the outcome, and *integration* and (2) each configuration's consistency and coverage scores.

Solution #6's consistency .929412 score indicates that government competence (*Comp*), resource allocation (*ResAl*), and security capacity (*SEC*) are almost always necessary for *integration*. An examination of the observations explained by solution #6 provides greater fidelity of the cases covered by solution #6. The average score for the East African countries was only slightly higher -- *average score 1.6*: Rwanda (1,1), Kenya (0.8,1), Uganda (0.8,0.8), Tanzania (0.6,0.6), Ethiopia (0.6,0.6) -- compared to the average for West African countries -- *average score 1.3*: Ghana (0.6,1), Senegal (0.6,1), Burkina Faso (0.6,0.8), Cote d'Ivoire (0.6,0.8), Mali (0.6,0.8), Togo (0.6,0.8), Niger (0.6,0.4), Sierra Leone (0.6,0.2).. This indicates the solution that integration almost always results from government competence, resource allocation, and security capacity for both regions and may be generalizable.

After all the solutions that explain the outcome are revealed through the fsQCA processing software, the proposition of the configuration with the largest coverage (#6 term -- Comp*IDA*SEC) was tested for the proposition to see how many cases in the sample holds true. The proposition this solution represents is "*Countries having high competitiveness, high degrees of resource management, and high levels of security agency will have high interest in regional integration*." This proposition was plotted agent the outcome of interest using the XY Plot option from the fsQCA menu (Figure 5). Consistency and coverage findings show that the proposition is useful in that the consistency is above 0.90.

The raw coverage results for solution #6 of .617187 describes 14 countries (cases) that display the solution ranging from the highest display of conditions leading to integration Rwanda (1,1) to the lowest, Sierra Leone (0.6, 0.2). The solution with the greatest coverage range, #6 term Comp*IDA*SEC, includes the following cases/countries:

East Africa (average score 1.6): Rwanda (1,1), Kenya (0.8,1), Uganda (0.8,0.8), Tanzania (0.6,0.6), Ethiopia (0.6,0.6)

West Africa (average score 1.3): Ghana (0.6,1), Senegal (0.6,1), Burkina Faso (0.6,0.8), Cote d'Ivoire (0.6,0.8), Mali (0.6,0.8), Togo (0.6,0.8), Niger (0.6,0.4), Sierra Leone (0.6,0.2)

South Africa: South Africa (0.6,1)

The solution plot reveals a consistency of 0.93, indicating a configuration of necessary conditions. Five of these countries are in eastern Africa (Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Tanzania). Eight countries are in western Africa (Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. South Africa is the only country from the southern region and there are no countries from central Africa.



*Figure 5. Configuration #6 term – Comp*ResAl*SEC*

The following section provides an overview of the data involved in the fsQCA model results for this dissertation organized in terms of the variables studied: the outcome of interest – regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa (ARII), and the configuration with the highest degree of consistency/necessary conditions, solution #6 – resource allocation (IDA), governance capacity (COMP), and security agency (SEC).

Integration Rankings (*ARII*)

The outcome examined in the fsQCA, regional integration, measured by the Africa Regional Integration Index (ARII) (UNECA 2019) compares individual states' level of integration. Integration is considered not only necessary for economic growth and development, but also for stimulating state development. Integration entails an awareness of the potential benefits and pitfalls involved in addition to an ability and willingness to develop institutions in order to take advantage of opportunities while mitigating potential barriers. The ability to improve productive capacity and comparative advantages requires technical skills, leadership, and buy-in at multiple levels of political, social and economic sectors. The ARII examines how geographic regions compare to other regions and how each country compares to others in their own region based on five areas: (1) Trade integration, (2) Productive integration, (3) Macroeconomic integration, (4) Infrastructural integration, and (5) Free movement of people. While the overall level of integration is very low compared to other regions, ARII data provides detailed evidence that progress is being made. Compared to 2018, a record 87% of countries either improved or maintained their scores in 2019. This indicates the value of examining processes and mechanisms at work in integration. The evolution from independent adversaries to cooperative competitors provide rich material for studying changes in African relations.

East Africa Integration

The most integrated regional economic community is the East African Community (EAC) with an average score of 0.537 which is considered relatively well integrated. Three east African countries scored as high performers: Kenya (2nd highest score of 0.444), Rwanda (3rd with 0.434), and Uganda (15th with 0.376). Kenya is the best performer in the EAC, followed by Rwanda, and Uganda. Tanzania scored in the average range (0.312) and Ethiopia scored in the low performer range (0.287). Kenya and Rwanda ranked second and third in overall continental integration. Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia ranked 15th, 28th, and 40th respectively.

Kenya and Uganda score high on productivity capacity. This means they have comparative advantages and can benefit from economies of scale compared to other countries in the region (UNECA 2019). Kenya's position as the second most integrated country on the continent is due to strong performance in productive, infrastructure, trade and free movement of people dimensions. Rwanda is the EAC's top performer in regional convertibility of currency (Macroeconomic integration). Tanzania inflation rate was the best compared to other countries in the region.

West Africa Integration

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has an average score of 0.425, indicating a moderate level of integration. ARII rankings for West African countries in the 6th fsQCA solution are high performers --Senegal (7th), Ghana (6th), Togo (9th), Burkina Faso (16th), Cote d'Ivoire (17th), and Mali (18th). Low performers include Niger (36th), and Sierra Leone (51st). Senegal (0.404), Ghana (0.403), Togo (0.399), Burkina Faso(0.370), and Côte d'Ivoire (0.357) are ECOWAS's strongest performers.

Guinea-Bissau (0.301), Liberia (0.244), and Sierra Leone are its weakest. ECOWAS countries performed best in the free movement of people dimension, derived from being ECOWAS members' open visa policies.

Southern Africa Integration

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) integration level is low (0.337). The only fsQCA Solution #6 SADC member, South Africa, is the highest overall performer in all of Africa. South Africa's high score (0.625) is well above the continental average of .327. The country is the highest performer in terms of productivity and infrastructure, in the top four in trade, and average in macroeconomic integration.

Resource Allocation (ResAl)

Scores from the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (WB CPAI 2020) examine trends in International Development Association (IDA) eligible country performance in 1) economic management, 2) structural policies, 3) public management and institutions, and 4) social inclusion. Overall Africa's scores declined in 2019 and trailed IDA countries in other regions. However, Africa's fragile countries performed better than fragile countries in other regions. Moreover, non-fragile African IDA countries scored higher on average than in other regions, primarily due to an improving business regulatory environment. Deteriorating CPIA scores are particularly discouraging given the additional challenges inflicted on the region due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The highest-ranking countries on the CPIA scale, Rwanda, Kenya, Senegal, and Uganda, Benin, and Ghana, also had the fastest growing economies in the region in 2018. Moreover, a majority of fragile and conflict-affected countries, scored below the regional average CPIA scores and growth demonstrating the link between good governance and economic progress.

In East Africa, Rwanda, Kenya, and Uganda ranked 1st, 3rd, and 4th in resource allocation. Tanzania and Ethiopia are 9th and 10th. In West Africa, Senegal ranked 2nd. Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Togo ranked 6th, 7th, 8th, 11th, 12th, 14th. Sierra Leone ranked 23rd.

East Africa Resource Allocation

The scores for Solution #6 countries in East Africa in 2019 were Rwanda (4.0) Kenya and Uganda (3.7), and Ethiopia and Tanzania (3.5). For three years running, Rwanda maintained its overall score of 4.0, keeping it in the first-place ranking for overall resource allocation out of 39 IDA African countries. Rwanda's and Ethiopia's real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates, boosted by public and private investment, helped drive EAC average growth rate of 6.0 percent in 2019. With a strong business regulatory environment score of 4.5 Rwanda and Kenya with a 3.5, reflecting the benefits of the component to measure health and education service delivery. Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia are three of the five countries in Sub-Saharan Africa whose Global Health Security Index exceeds the world median. Kenya's Human Capital Index, a measurement of economic productivity per capita, was the only one to match the lower middle-income level in 2018. Rwanda, with a 3.8, was second in the Governance cluster followed by Kenya (6th), Ethiopia (7th), Uganda (10th), and Tanzania (20th).of non-fragile environments as opposed to the more challenging conditions for business operations in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

Ethiopia Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda all scored 4.0 in Building Human Resources.

West Africa Resource Allocation

The correlation between rapid economic growth and high CPIA ranks is evident in West Africa similar to East Africa. Senegal (3.7) tied at 3rd with Kenya and Uganda. Benin (3.6) and Ghana (3.6) joined Senegal in leading West Africa and marked an increase of 0.1 for both Benin and Ghana. Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire scored 3.5, a decrease of 0.1 for Burkina Faso. Mali and Niger scored 3.4. Togo's score increased 0.1 to 3.3. Sierra Leone's score decreased 0.1 to 3.1.

Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal have the two highest levels of internet access in Sub-Saharan Africa. Senegal's regulatory environment score increased while Cote d'Ivoire and Mali's decreased. Ghana was third in overall Human Capital index. Countries with an above average regional health score of 4.0 or higher in, also achieving above average overall scores, were Benin, Ghana, and Senegal. Benin, Ghana, Senegal, and Niger demonstrated strong business environments. In spite of a decrease in its overall CPIA score, Cote d'Ivoire managed to perform well. Ghana (3.6), Cote d'Ivoire (3.5), and Senegal (3.5) took 3rd, 4th, and 5th place respectively in governance. Ghana's trade facilitation score increased contributing to its overall score increase.

Competitiveness (Comp)

The World Economic Forum Global Competitive Index (GCI) measures twelve domains – business dynamism; financial system; health; information, communications, and technology (ICT) adoption; infrastructure; innovation capability; institutions; labor market; macroeconomic stability, market size; product market; and skills (WEF 2019).

The rationale for these measures is that economic development does not happen automatically. It requires fundamental conditions and ongoing sustainment for economic growth and progress. GCI helps identify problem areas inhibiting economic advancement.

In 2019, while most of the economies in Sub-Saharan Africa were in the bottom worldwide 20, many countries were showing greater competitiveness, achieving the third most improvement after the Middle East and North African region. South Africa's competitiveness (60th place) is well-ahead of the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa due to its transportation, energy, and ICT infrastructure, market size, and level of industrialization. Importantly, political stability and security were regarded as the most important factors affecting investment decisions (Figure 6) (World Bank 2018). The following section delineates competitiveness rankings for the rest of the Solution #6 countries.

East Africa Competitiveness

Kenya ranked the highest in eastern Africa for competitiveness (95) a decrease of 2 places from the previous year. Rwanda ranked next at 100, an improvement of 8 places. Uganda increased its rank by 2 to 115. Tanzania, at 117, had decreased by 1. Ethiopia decreased by 4 places to 126.

West Africa Competitiveness

Ghana ranked first in West African competitiveness at 111, a decrease of 5 places. Senegal was second at 114, a decrease of one place. Cote d'Ivoire decreased 4 places to 118. Benin decreased by 2 places to 125. Mali decreased by 4 to 129. Burkina Faso decreased by 6 to 130. Sierra Leone was ranked 132 in 2017. Niger ranked in the bottom 10 globally and neither Sierra Leone were ranked in 2019.

Southern Africa Competitiveness

South Africa's competitiveness (60th place) is well ahead of the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. This ranking reflects South Africa's economic development in a class of its own. In addition to being a regional financial hub, with a large market size, South Africa's transportation infrastructure, which includes the most extensive road and rail network in Africa, is one of the best on the continent, making it attractive for investment.



Figure 6. Factors Affecting Investment Decisions

(Source: World Bank GIC)\

Security Capacity

Security Securitization mechanisms and regimes provide a source of material for examining conditions that facilitate peacebuilding and integration. Evidence shows that political and economic inducements are important factors explaining how peacekeeping works to maintain peace (Matanock and Lichtenheld 2017). Professional militaries, those that are better trained and equipped, are not only better able to conduct peace operations but they also represent indications of government institutional capacity (Haas and Ansorg 2018, Herbst 2003, Hinkey 2019). In the last two decades, international peacekeeping organizations (e.g., the UN) have relied on closer cooperation with African regional actors to provide quicker reaction to regional security threats, a clear indication of the growing agency and ability of certain African nations (de Coning et al. 2016, Dobbins et al. 2019). The rankings of securitization capacity based on the Defense Institutional Effectiveness (IDA 2021) assess (1) acquisition and requirements management, (2) financial management, (3) force management, (4) human resource management, (5) infrastructure management, (6) materiel management, and (7) strategy and planning.

East Africa Security Capacity

Rwanda was rated as having highly effective national defense institutions in 2021 and ranked 5th in security capacity based on the Institute for Defense Analyses "Measuring Effectiveness of African Defense Institutions" (2020) assessment of security assistance absorptive capacity and multinational securitization operations experience. Uganda ranked 6th in security capacity Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Kenya ranked 8th, 9th, and 11th respectively. Rwanda was rated the highest in capacity to receive training and field equipment, ability to apply training and operate equipment, and capability to sustain training and equipment.

Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya have developed unique security approaches based on their country's domestic experience with peacebuilding. Rwanda and Ethiopia are in the top three force contributors to UN peacekeeping operations.

Uganda, Ethiopia, and Tanzania have led peace enforcement efforts in regional AU hybrid and UN missions for over a decade. The Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) is recognized as a very professional force, with strong leadership, a well-disciplined and motivated force. In spite of being under-resourced and lacking advanced training, the RDF performs with increasing skill due, in part, to the operational experience of having one-fifth of its military force continuously deployed operationally. Ethiopia and Uganda have demonstrated the capacity to conduct long-term, sustained operations against al-Shabaab since 2007. Uganda has also conducted counterinsurgency operations against rebels throughout the region operating in neighboring countries for over two decades. Since it deployed as an original contributor in 2013, Tanzania maintains its support to the UN Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

West Africa Security Capacity

In security capacity, West African countries -- Senegal ranked 7th and Ghana ranked 10th, Sierra Leon Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso ranked 14th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th.

The western African countries have participated in several peace enforcement operations since the civil wars in Sierra Leon and Cote d'Ivoire in the 1990s. Growing extremist violence in the Lake Chad basin area and in the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso areas have contributed to greater operational experience, however, for the most part the region's armed forces are mostly ineffective. High operations tempo, reduces training opportunities, although U.S. trained and advised Nigerian Special Operations Forces (SOF) units have a higher capacity to absorb moderately advanced training and equipment. Budget and infrastructure limitations limit armed forces sustainment capabilities.   Senegal is the most capable military force in west Africa, despite not having had many internal or external threats, due to the nation's high degree of commitment to in peacekeeping missions. Notably, Senegal led the regional response to the crisis in the Gambia in 2017, operates sophisticated equipment, and provides training to neighboring countries.

Southern Africa Security Capacity

South Africa ranked 4th based on the country's economy and infrastructure. However, since the end of apartheid, the military has been underfunded and unable to contribute to sustained, high operations tempo peacekeeping operations.   The size of its military is slightly more than Rwanda and its economic has long been the most advanced on the continent. Yet it has only recently started to take on a more vigorous leadership role in peace enforcement, most notably initial successful operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo serving in the UN Force Intervention Brigade. But since 2013 have yet to keep pace with the rest of the continent that has seen the need to take on greater roles in peace operations.

Summary

The results of the fsQCA process reveal seven solutions that explain the outcome of integration, demonstrating the advantages of QCA in research in terms of the identification of complex causal patterns, (Ragin 2008). Unlike variable-based methods that use linear solution net effect analysis, as a middle ground between quantitative and qualitative approaches, fsQCA allows the observation of complex phenomena through identification of relationships between configurations of conditions and an outcome. The results of the fsQCA process are employed in the following section on process-tracing case studies, strengthening the combination of fsQCA with qualitative research in a multi-methodology approach. This set-theoretic method for causal-oriented exploration identified a configuration (Solution #6) with significant coverage of 0.92 that included a combination of a high level of *state capacity*, *security agency*, and *resource allocation* to achieve integration. Two cases selected from the configuration with the greatest degree of coverage, solution #6, are covered in the next section, Chapter V -- Case Study Process-tracing. Tanzania and Rwanda represent the two cases with the most significant progress and agency in regional integration and the conditions encapsulated by solution #6: Resource Allocation, Competitiveness, and Security Capacity.

CHAPTER V – POST-fsQCA PROCESS-TRACING CASE STUDIES

The central objective of this dissertation, to identify mechanisms apparent as countries work to overcome barriers to economic integration and political union, is the focal point for this chapter on post-Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) process-tracing case studies. The neo-institutional research construct proposes that the ideas, interests, and institutions driving integration are different than what Nye observed when the initial group — Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda – first attempted to establish the initial East African Community (EAC). Differing national interests between the three countries, primarily amongst the elites, was a major source of discord (Mbogoro 1978). Additionally, economic benefits and costs were not equitably distributed, as the disparity widened between Kenya's economy and those of the other two countries. One of the conditions missing in the post-independence movement was the lack of a significant entrepreneur class to help shape and rationalize integration processes (Nye 1966).

The environment was considerably different in 1999 when the treaty re-establishing the East Africa Community was signed between Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. A key factor in this new agreement is that the treaty outlined specific steps in the integration process. By 2007, Rwanda and Burundi joined the community and in 2016 South Sudan became the sixth member state.

Today's EAC is not just made up of a greater number of countries — seven which includes the original three plus, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, and the imminent addition of the DRC – but actors whose interests have been shaped by a global environment of ideas in regional integration have led to the development of different kinds of institutions from those of the 1960s. A major objective is the development of the requisite regional infrastructure to promote trade within the bloc. One of the two main transportation spheres is the Northern Corridor connecting Kenya's ports of Mombasa to Uganda, South Sudan, and Rwanda. The Central Corridor spans from Tanzania's port of Dar es Salaam to Rwanda and eventually Burundi and the DRC.

While progress has not been without problems (e.g., border closures over trade and political conflicts between competitor pairs Kenya—Tanzania and Uganda--Rwanda), in 2015, the EAC had become one of the fastest-growing economic blocs, second only to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Drummond and Williams 2015). After a period of economic nationalism in reaction to perceived threats from Kenya, Tanzania achieved middle-income status and has become more forward leaning in working to achieve greater regional integration, reaching out to Kenya to resolve intra-state commerce tensions. Rwanda and Uganda ended a two-year border closure in response to claims of Uganda's mistreatment of Rwandan citizens. Private sector lobbying in both cases helped bring these trade disrupting crises to a resolution, a role previously not observed by Nye (1966).

The following case studies examine ideas and interests evident in processes driving state-building and agency in creating institutions in order to achieve regional integration. Two cases chosen from the fsQCA results exhibit conditions driving integration (high degrees of state development – responsible resource management, competitiveness, and securitization agency) –Tanzania and Rwanda. The case studies chosen for process-tracing of the conditions and mechanisms driving cooperation examined ideas and interests driving state-building and agency in creating institutions designed to achieve regional integration. The two cases chosen from fsQCA results exhibit conditions driving integration — high degrees of state development – responsible resource management, competitiveness, and securitization agency. Tanzania and Rwanda are two countries in eastern Africa competing against a pair of countries that started out endowed with better resources and institutions. Tanzania's competitor, Kenya, and Rwanda's competitor, Uganda, both began at higher levels of development but currently, both pairs are in relatively similar growth and levels of development (fig. 5.1.).

Kenya and Tanzania are the most prominent members of the EAC today, given that they have the largest economies in the bloc, and are both coastal countries and important trading colonies. Kenya's and Uganda's fertile land attracted large populations of colonial settlers and infrastructure development, giving them a head start in development compared to their respective pair — Tanzania and Rwanda. Early interest in Kenya, driven by British strategic concerns in Uganda's position as the source of the Blue Nile, led to the construction of the railways from Kenya to Uganda by British colonial authorities between 1895 and 1903, considered the first stage of regional integration in the region Both Tanzania and Rwanda have not only caught up with their rivals, but are exceeding them in some categories, e.g., competitiveness in attracting investment.

African Interests and institutions in Transition

The neo-institutionalism model used in this dissertation examined regional and national level integrative potential and process mechanisms based on Nye's construct (1970). This model analyzed elements of integrative potential influenced by perceptual conditions (e.g., perception of costs and benefits) and structural conditions (e.g., state capacity). This integrative potential, in turn, is influenced by process mechanisms (e.g., coalition formation, elite socialization, regional group formation, and involvement of external factors) which hinder or promote integration.

Nye (1970) describes the integrative capacity of the state and region to as its ability to adapt and respond to opportunities and challenges involved in economic integration (e.g., identifying national comparative advantage opportunities and developing conditions that foster effective competition). In the early EAC effort to integrate, strong process mechanisms (e.g., ideological-identitive attraction of anti-colonialism) were undermined by unfavorable integrative conditions (e.g., strong shared elite values, perceived inequality of distribution of benefits). Fundamental differences between the original three members of the first EAC, the most significant being the uneven distribution of development which enabled increasing net gains for Kenya and net losses for Tanzania and Uganda which were not overcome during its existence (1967-1977) eventually resulted in its failure (Mugomba 1978). Kenya's head start as a diversified economy, advanced human capital base, and a strong private sector due to free-market forces made it the region's economic hegemon in the first EAC (Kimenyi and Kibe 2014). The commercial and industrial interests within the Kenyan system, however, were unable or unwilling to apply the political pressure necessary to keep their long-term concerns at the forefront of efforts to further regional cooperation, eventually leading to the demise of the first EAC in 1977 (Bailey 1993). Tanzania's early trajectory was hampered by the implementation of post-independence policies of economic nationalism to protect domestic industries which, in turn, limited the private sector (Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003). The lack of a capitalist class until fairly recently enabled the ruling elites in Tanzania to stymie participation in regional integration (Cooksey 2016).

In 1985, the new administration embarked on an economic reform policy of liberalization which brought about a period of modest economic growth, higher levels of foreign investment, and per capita income growth; however, the business environment was considered very poor in the early 2000s. As a result, considering the overall weaknesses of the investment and business climate, formal business associations were judged to have little impact on policymaking and regulation at the turn of the century (Cooksey and Kelsall 2011).

The current EAC takes into account the relative disparity between members by balancing the goals of trade integration with the principle of flexibility, which allows progression in cooperation among members in certain areas and at different speeds. But by addressing variances in the implementation of measures in integration, distributional equity allows states to build their relative capacities for integration in order to mitigate potential costs in trade liberalization (Gathii 2011). The three original countries (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) re-established the EAC in 1996, this time identifying specific steps for achieving integration through an evolutionary process -- moving from a customs union (whereby restrictions on trade and movement are abolished) to a common market (involving an economic union requiring the establishment of a supranational authority to enforce decisions), eventually to a monetary union, and, at some time in the future, to a political federation similar to the European Union (however, an unlikely event at the present) (EAC History, Gathii 2011).

The process of developing higher levels of integration through more effective institutions and cooperative economic regimes involves letting go of traditional sources of national control. These mechanisms are ameliorated as perceived benefits of increased national wealth become more apparent and appreciated by various stakeholders. Steady progress in the implementation of trade liberalization (elimination of internal tariffs and implementation of a common external tariff) promoted intra-regional trade, production efficiency, and foreign investment. This process takes place over time, often imperceptible to observers, but typically brings a spillover effect, whereby cooperation among a group of states influences other states to join the group. The addition of Rwanda (2007), Burundi (2007), South Sudan (2016), and the DRC (2022) lends credence to the spillover effect and norm transfer of ideas, interests, and institutions. Today, the EAC has expanded from three to seven members with a total population of almost 300 million and a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of more than $275 billion in 2021.

The current EAC, unlike the first period, is marked by greater parity between Tanzania and Kenya on the one hand as two dominant lower middle-income economies, and Rwanda and Uganda on the other as two less developed economies with growing convergence in GDP per capita. The pursuit of differing economic interests led to disputes between Kenya and Tanzania that continued in the 2010s. As a result, Kenya, seeking to maintain its economic dominance in east Africa, created the Coalition of the Willing (CoW) with Uganda and Rwanda aimed at pressing regional integration through the Common Market Protocol. Consequently, by reducing trade barriers, promoting tourism, and building infrastructure, the bloc experienced increased cross border trade. A major institution in facilitating trade through the Common Market was the Single Customs Territory (SCT) to minimize border controls affecting goods trade rolled out in 2014. In addition to reduced times for cargo clearance by more than 70 percent between

Kenya's port of Mombasa and Uganda or Rwanda (Tay 2016). The volume of goods handled at the port increased by almost 12 percent from 2014 to 2015 saving Uganda and Rwanda $400 million in port fees. The CoW played a pivotal part in the progress made in implementing the EAC Common Market Protocol and the SCT.

In spite of these gains, a number of challenges remain, including slow progress in eliminating Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs), delays in implementation of regional commitments in accordance with Customs Union commitments, appropriate application of Rules of Origin, uniformly enacting the common market protocol free movement of people, goods, and services. Although competing interests of all members have impacted progress, Tanzania has been the most recalcitrant in supporting efforts to speed up integration, since President John Pombe Magufuli's election in 2015. Magufuli promoted an inward-looking policy of promoting local industries rather than regional trade and liberalization of free movement of people, capital, and services.

President Samia Suluhu Hassan succeeded Magufuli when he died suddenly in 2021 of COVID-19. Soon after her inauguration, President Suluhu delineated reforms her administration was undertaking to improve the business environment, indicated support for EAC-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EAC-EU EPA) talks, and encouraged Kenya's private sector to invest in Tanzania. She noted the shift in her administration's policies, stating, "The private sector is key to driving growth, that will deliver these jobs, transform labour market, open up opportunities and unleash entrepreneurial spirit," (Latest News 2021). The private sector has lauded President Suluhu Hassan's pro-business approach, highlighting the government's commitment to continue to dialog with the private sector members and initiation of a review of laws inhibiting a business-friendly climate (The Citizen 2021).

Table 3 *African Community – Key Indicators*

(Source: World Bank Databank)

	East AricanCommunity -- Key Indicators				
	Land (sq km)	**GDP** (current US$, million)		**Population** (total)	
Country	**2020**	**1990**	**2020**	**1990**	**2020**
Burundi	25680	1,132	2,842	5,438,959	11,890,781
Kenya	569140	8,572	101,014	23,724,574	53,771,300
Rwanda	24670	2,550	10,334	7,288,883	12,952,209
Tanzania	885800	4,259	62,410	25,203,848	59,734,213
Uganda	200520	4,304	37,600	17,354,395	45,741,000

Making comparative measurements of driving forces within conditions at the national and regional level is difficult, especially from a static viewpoint. However, four main categories of issues that shape the integration process can be observed over time: 1) Politicization (when conflicting interests become exacerbated or settled); 2) Redistribution (changes in welfare and power between countries); 3) Sovereignty (reduction of options); and 4) Externalization (influences from and with external actors) (Tang 2011).

Nye's (1970) conclusion that integration would slow down rather than accelerate over time, especially in less developed areas, appears to hold in terms of the continental-wide free trade area where, after the initial flurry of signature through 2020, the process of coming to final agreement on some aspects, for example, rules of origin, have yet to be finalized, although 87% have been completed so far (TRALAC 2022). Yet, integration in Sub-Saharan Africa is clearly deepening, most notably in East Africa (problems notwithstanding). The EAC's approval to let the DRC join the EAC in December 2021 has already stimulated trade agreement, infrastructure development financing, and security cooperation operations to eradicate trade-inhibiting violent armed groups in eastern DRC.

The transition from the immediate post-independence period has been gradual as ideas and interests evolved. This evolution can be delineated by the codification of interests in the creation and changes in African institutions. Preeminent amongst institutions that exhibit altering interests is the African Union.

The AU exemplifies African ideas, interests, and institutions in transition having evolved from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) from 1999 to 2004 (Dobbins et al. 2019). The OAU was founded in 1963, with a primary focus on supporting national liberation movements as the continent became decolonized. Its initial guiding principles stressed sovereign independence and non-interference. However, in response to numerous violent conflicts that threatened regional stability, subregional African organizations, the OAU/AU, and the UN began to exhibit more agency in stabilization operations beginning with the West African multinational force intervention in Liberia (Rand 2019, Williams 2016). The UN's failure to stop the Rwandan genocide in 1994 marked a turning point in African willingness to take on more decisive roles in peacekeeping (Dobbins et al 2019). Since then, the AU and regional organizations have increasingly taken on the role of first responders before UN missions mobilized, becoming the primary combat force provider in Somalia (AU Mission in Somalia, AMISOM) and in the DRC (Force Intervention Brigade, FIB) (Williams and Bellamy 2021).

The AU's AGENDA 2063 is Africa's design plan for transforming Africa into an economic actor in the global scene. As the continental strategy for creating a means to achieve inclusive, sustainable development, it illustrates pan-African ideals of self-determination and demonstrates concrete African objectives for achieving shared prosperity. Agenda 2063 identifies key flagship institutions for creating transformative economic growth and development through profound cooperative integration.

Flagship projects include infrastructure, education, science and technology, as well as security cooperation. A major flagship program is the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which was created to transform the region from an external export market-oriented region to one that sources imports locally. The AfCFTA is aligned with Agenda 2063 which highlights major actions contained in 10-year Implementation Plans to measure progress in achieving overall strategies. A primary focus of the Implementation Plans is infrastructure in recognition that infrastructure development, especially in transportation and energy, is fundamentally critical to regional integration.

The African Union Development Agency-NEPAD (AUDA-NEPAD) has created an integrated, multi-infrastructure corridor plan that prioritizes projects designed to link different sectors and improve rural connectivity with economic activities. The overall strategy is to emphasize programs that address Africa's huge infrastructure gap while simultaneously stimulating job creation and prosperity under the second Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa Priority Action Plan, known as PIDA-PAP 2 (2021-2030) (UNECA and AU 2020). PIDA PAP II a master plan for Africa designed to move development into the second phase during 2021-2030, covers transportation infrastructure, energy, Information Communication Technology (ICT), and regional water sector issues (Cilliers 2021). The 69 PIDA PAP II regional infrastructure projects recommended by Regional Economic Communities and African Union (AU) Member states cover 28 transport projects, 18 energy projects, 12 transboundary water projects, and 11 ICT projects, worth an estimated $161 billion. The program aims to solve financing and execution capacity problems that have hindered infrastructure project completion in the past (ECA 2022, PIDA Center).

A central focus is creating regional integration through developing corridors to improve the movement of goods, services, and people. The lack of free movement hinders the realization of Agenda 2063 and of the AfCFTA. Prioritization of infrastructure projects ensures the most efficient way to decrease costs and improve productivity. Synchronizing linkages of critical regional programs, such as the network of energy centers within the Continental Power System Master Plan, is a major transformation of leaders from parochial interests in pursuing national development to regional coordination. Three tools have been created to accelerate rollout of the projects — the Service Delivery Mechanism, the Continental Business Network, and including infrastructure projects de-risking process in Africa reports (Klomegah 2021).

Although common ground on key elements to be included in the AfCFTA have yet to be worked out, including rules of origin (primarily for textile and apparel and non-tariff barriers), delays in tariff liberalization, intellectual property rights, and e-commerce guidelines, there has been considerable progress during the COVID-19 pandemic (Erasmus 2022). Specifically, in addition to the framework agreement on the establishment of the AfCFTA, protocols on the trade of goods and services as well as rules and procedures on dispute settlement have been agreed on and adopted. Elements like trade facilitation, transit trade, and customs procedures have also been agreed upon.

Bringing international economic expertise and financial resources to bear has helped spur private participation in infrastructure (PPI) development. In spite of the downturn in economies due to the pandemic, investment in SSA increased in 2020 from the five-year average. Moreover, it was the only region that saw an increase. Realizing a 7% increase from 2019 investments, 24 projects received \$6.3 billion, growing 14% compared to the 5-year average of \$5.5 billion (World Bank 2020c) . Countries reporting PPI investments include Burkina Faso, Burundi (its first-ever PPI project), Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (its first PPI investment since 2000), Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo (World Bank 2020c).

The elements of neo-institutionalism are encapsulated by the ideational aspirations of Pan-Africanism, interests of peace and prosperity identified by Agenda 2063, and embodied by the institutions of infrastructure and the AfCFTA. These elements are explored in this section through process-tracing case studies of two emblematic East African countries – Rwanda and Tanzania.

Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda re-established the EAC in 2000 following its earlier collapse in 1977. Economic and security concerns gave rise to its revival. Regional integration was considered a means to enhance individual states' ability to address the lack of political and financial clout in the face of globalization pressures. In the intervening decade and a half, the EAC also established a Customs Union (2005), ratified a Common Market (2010), and signed a protocol for the establishment of the EAC Monetary Union (EAC 2017). While the East African Community has achieved greater free movement of goods, significantly reducing transit times from economic centers to ports, many areas for improving implementation remain (Anami 2020).

Trade within the East Africa region is greater compared to other regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa; however, growth slowed to around 20% in recent years (AfDB 2020). Additionally, the economic transformation has been too slow, due to low levels of industrialization and especially manufacturing value added (MVA) enterprises. As a result, poverty, unemployment, and economic inequality still permeate eastern Africa. Although the East African environment is more business-friendly than the other RECs, a pervasive infrastructure gap is a significant contributing factor in the lack of transformation. Infrastructure is a prerequisite for increasing regional integration and trade. Consequently, a major effort to overcome the infrastructure gap is underway as is discussed below.

The East African region has been considered the least developed on the continent until recently moving from one of the least integrated in 2003 to the first to reach Free Trade Area (FTA), Customs Union, and Single Market status by 2016 (AfDB 2020, UNECA 2004, UNECA 2017). However, a concerted effort by East African partners has made significant strides to integrate regional economies by improving infrastructure connections contributing to it being the fastest-growing region in recent years and increasing its overall regional integration score on the Africa Regional Integration Index

(ARII) from 2016 to 2019, albeit at a very low level compared to other regions (UNECA 2016, 2019). East Africa's share of the entire continent's infrastructure projects encompassed slightly over 40% of the total 452 projects valued at $497 billion, almost 30Comp of the total value of African projects. In 2020, the evidence of the region's economic progress became evident when Tanzania joined three other countries in the middle-income status (Kenya, Djibouti, and Comoros) and one as high-income (Seychelles) (AfDB 2020).

The top five countries by number of infrastructure projects in 2019 included four SSA countries, three of which are in East Africa — Tanzania, Kenya, and Ethiopia (Deloitte 2020). Also, in 2019 the East Africa region exceeded the other four regions in terms of number of projects and value of construction. This represented the largest change, an increase by 40% compared to 2018 with 43 new projects and a US dollar value increase of 68%. Making East Africa the region with the largest share of projects by value for the first time (Deloitte 2019). Only four years earlier, in 2015, East Africa was third in terms of number and value of projects (Deloitte 2015).

Infrastructure construction in the three largest markets (Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania) increased considerably from US$6.73 billion in 2012 to US$25.92 billion in 2017, according to GlobalData, and is projected to reach US$98.82 billion by 2022. The energy and transport (rail and road) sectors in East Africa, make up a major share of the project schedule, making up 45.2% and 37.1% respectively, valuing US$94.55 billion and US$77.51 billion respectively. Public private partnerships (PPPs) are funding just over half of the East African projects in the works (51.8%), while a third of tracked projects (32.8%) are publicly funded (Globaldata 2021).

The region on the whole has demonstrated a major change in concentrating efforts on infrastructure development. For example, Ethiopia's aggressive strategy in the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) combined public and private investment in the build-up of infrastructure was the second highest in Africa increasing by 15 percent between 2002 and 2012 (Signé 2020). Contributing factors include mega-projects such as the construction of the largest geothermal energy fam in Africa valued at $4 billion and a 600-megawatt hydropower dam, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) (Deloitte 2019),

Oil and gas reserve discoveries in the African Great Lakes region are driving increased investment in infrastructure not only for extraction but collateral business endeavors as well. While most of the value in the infrastructure projects is due to the oil and gas sector, the importance of enhancing regional connectedness is evident in that energy/power and transport sectors are the most prevalent. Prioritization of investment in transportation is vital to facilitate freedom of movement and trade. The transport sector which accounts for 30 percent of the total value of projects ($44 billion) also had the largest number of projects (69 out of 182 projects). The energy and power sector was second with 40 projects followed by real estate with 35 projects. The ultimate objective of these efforts is to strengthen regional integration agenda and thereby, intraregional trade (Anyanzwa 2020).

The region's governments have played a significant role in developing strategies for funding and building compatible infrastructure projects that enhance individual countries' competitiveness in order to increase the region's growth and development overall (Anyanzwa 2020). Transportation is the primary focus for investment, most of which entailed rail, road, and airport projects. Top projects include corridor rail projects that link all major economic centers, as well as airport and shipping port expansion to handle the expanding volume of passenger and cargo traffic (V.e.n.t.u.r.e.s 2015).

Key infrastructure elements -- electricity and cross-border trade -- are fundamental requirements to facilitate structural economic transformation (World Bank Group 2017). Lack of access to reliable, inexpensive electricity impedes private sector business activity, considered the primary source of econo1mic growth (AfDB 2018). Concurrently, the lack of transport corridors hinders intra-regional movement of goods so essential to the region's landlocked countries (Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Uganda). Since infrastructure is critical to development, in 2012 the African Union implemented a consolidated Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) which, in conjunction with states and development partners (e.g., AfDB, UN Economic Commission for Africa, UNECA) defined 51 priority transboundary projects (consisting of over 400 individual projects) under the four major categories (Energy, Transport, ICT, and Water) (UNECA and AU 2020).

Transportation makes up the largest number of projects, with ICT, Energy, and Water following respectively (AfDB 2018). As of 2019, around half of the ICT projects were completed but only 19% of Transport, 11 % of Water, and 6% of Energy projects had gone into the operational stage. Altogether, approximately 37% of phase one PIDA projects were under construction or in operation at the time of the review and half were nearing or under construction. Although it is too early to determine long-term impacts of the projects, success clearly depends on governments' ability to conduct needs studies, achieve stakeholder consensus, design projects, garner financing, and bring programs to construction within a typical five-year timeframe (AUDA-NEPAD 2020a).

Each of the RECS has developed master plans to develop major projects that will promote economic cooperation and integration at the individual country and regional levels. Regional integration plans in eastern Africa began decades ago covering transport corridors linking major economic centers, water resources, energy transmission are in different stages of development and completion (e.g., Djibouti-Addis Ababa Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), Mombasa-Nairobi-Kampala-Kigali SGR, Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and power transmission lines throughout East Africa, new ports in Kenya and Djibouti, Uganda-Kenya petroleum pipeline). National capacity building and international partnership technical and financial assistance have been crucial to the successful planning, programming, and completion of various projects. The progress of completing the requisite steps to implement the AfCFTA (e.g., submitting ratification instruments, constructing national strategies, tendering tariff lines, and agreeing to rules of origin) has encouraged FDI inflows which will help to complete infrastructure projects completed, which, in turn, can accelerate integration (Deloitte 2019).

East Africa infrastructure expenditure and public private partnerships (PPPs) will likely continue to grow through 2022 and beyond, as significant infrastructure upgrades in roads, railways, ports, and power generation increase, especially in light of growing global demand for oil and gas. By 2018, approximately three dozen infrastructure projects out of 286 priority EAC projects were completed, including the Mombasa-

Nairobi railway line, Mombasa-Nairobi refined petroleum oil pipeline, and expansion of the Tanzania Kilimanjaro International Airport. (AfDB 2018, AUDA 2020).

Not only is the integration of infrastructure important for each country's development but a well-planned and implemented system can especially enhance neighboring landlocked countries' economies access to transportation hubs and markets. For example, the transport system in Kenya and Tanzania offers vital transit networks to Ethiopia, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. To that end, East Africa Community (EAC) members have implemented sector reforms and a number of agreements aimed at improving regional infrastructure and attracting investment (EAC 2019)

In 2003, Rwanda and Uganda scored higher than Kenya and Tanzania on the Africa Development Bank Infrastructure Index (AIDI), which measures four main components of economic development: transportation, electricity, information and communication technology (ICT), and water and sanitation. By 2015, Kenya surpassed all East African countries in infrastructure (Figure 7) (AfDB 2020) and has by far, the largest gross domestic product (GDP) in the EAC (but was surpassed by Ethiopia 2019) (Figure 8) (World Bank Databank 2020). Kenyan policymakers have made infrastructure a central element in the development agenda in supporting economic growth and poverty reduction. Two pillars serve to enhance the business environment by increasing capital accumulation and improving productivity which lower the cost of production and facilitate trade. Infrastructure investments encompass energy, transportation, water and sanitation, and social welfare projects.

Providing further evidence of the power of ideas and interests in driving regional integration, the DRC was admitted to the EAC in 2021. The country's many assets -- enormous resources, a gross domestic product (GDP) of over $2.5 trillion, a huge potential market of more than 1.2 billion people, and a growing middle class -- have tremendous potential for stimulating growth in the region. Its projected growth of over 6% in 2023[9], is a catalyst for intra-regional development agreements that confer norm transfer of security and stability (World Bank DRC 2022). For example, recent Tanzanian-Burundian discussions to extend the southern trade corridor to link trade from the DRC to Dar es Salaam include securitization considerations (East African 2021). Additionally, in the fallout from extremist violence in Mozambique, in an acknowledgment of the nexus between development and stability, growing support for regional cooperation led leaders to agree to strategic partnerships in security cooperation and regional trade expansion between eastern and southern communities as key to common interests (All Africa 2021).

The decision by Tanzanian's new president, Samia Suluhu Hassan, to make her first official state visit to Kenya, marks a turning point in bilateral relations by demonstrating her national priorities in overcoming regional tensions and strengthening economic ties (Horn ISS 2021). Similarly, relations between Burundi and Rwanda have begun to improve since Burundi's President Ndayishimiye took power and promoted an agreement between intelligence chiefs resulting in an expulsion of anti-Rwandan rebels (Journal du Cameroun 2021) not unlike a similar arrangement with the newly elected President Tshisekedi of the DRC (Africa Report 2020).

[9] Democratic Republic of Congo Overview: Development news, research, data | World Bank



Figure 7. Eastern Africa infrastructure growth 2000-2020

(Source: World Bank Databank)



Figure 8. EAC Africa GDP

(Source: World Bank Databank 2020)



Figure 9. Eastern Africa GDP (EAC plus Ethiopia)

(Source: World Bank Databank 2020)

Case Study #1 – Rwandan Interests & Institutions in Integration

In recent years, Rwanda experienced strong economic growth rates, driven by public investments in strategic sectors for transformation, creating new business prospects, improving standards of living dramatically, and lifting people out of poverty. The Rwandan development state, albeit authoritarian, has notably made considerable sustained progress in inclusive growth and reducing poverty (IMF 2019). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita rose from $270 in 2000 to $817 in 2019 (World Bank Data Base). In 2019 specifically, the economy grew more than 9% and was projected to continue to perform well in 2020, until the COVID-19 pandemic hit. (World Bank 2021 country report (World Bank Rwanda 2021).

Although there has been much progress, a significant portion of the population lives below the poverty line (approximately 38% in 2019, half of the rate in 2000) which is expected to worsen due to the COVID-19 pandemic (Penz 2020). Population growth rates are keeping up with job creation, especially in the manufacturing sector. Growth in industry is essential for transitioning from an agrarian society, however, sustaining a business is difficult due in large degree to the many barriers to trade. Some of these include limited access to financing, high transportation costs due to the landlocked geography, a small domestic market, and intermittent power interruptions (Ndagijimana 2020, Rwandan Government 2019, US Department of State 2021).

The government's approach to integrating development began in 2000, with Vision 2020, which outlines a long-term development path. Vision 2020 has been updated to Vision 2050 and bolstered by several international organizations sponsored sector plans, policies, and strategy documents, including Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies (EDPRS) and the 2017-2024 National Strategy for Transformation (NST). EPRDS focus on key priorities, such as improving and maintaining the road network, creating efficient air transport infrastructure, and transforming Rwanda into a regional freight logistics hub (GBN 2021). The NST aims to carve out a leadership role for the private sector in accelerating economic growth and transformation. Working with the Africa Development Bank (AfDB), it published its Transport Sector Review and Action Plan in 2013. In accord with Vision 2020 and the EPRDS, the government formulated the 2010 Rwanda Trade Policy to identify and coordinate interventions to mobilize investment, improve the investment climate, and generate trade. Its 2013 publication, *Trade Logistics and Distribution Services*, identified four key areas to strengthen: land-bridge improvements, regional logistics centers, horticultural production for exports, and building an air cargo services market. “Made in Rwanda” was launched in 2015 to promote domestically produced exports. The creation of the Kigali Special Economic Zone in 2009 attracted 75 companies (e.g., Volkswagen and over 100 Information, Computer, Technology [ICT] enterprises) which helped lower the trade deficit in three years (from 14% of GDP in 2015 to 9.5$ in 2018) (GBN 2020).

1. Competitiveness

After a four-year civil war and genocide that devastated the country’s already fragile economy, life expectancy, already one of the lowest in the world, fell to less than 30 years in 1994 and GDP dropped from almost $2 billion in 1993 to $754 million, a decrease of 38 percent (World Bank Data Bank). Evidencing strong political will to restore the country since then, the government has worked to address governance issues that are essential for increasing national competitiveness and achieving development goals. This required developing state capacity in terms of institutions and human resources to conduct essential planning, manage programs, design systems, and implement transparent and accountable measures (Mbaku 2020).

The government of Rwanda has focused efforts on economic development, reducing dependence on foreign assistance, reforming macroeconomics, and improving the business environment (USAID 2019). Evidence of the government’s interest in becoming more competitive can be seen in the impressive improvement in business climate scores between 2010 and 2020. Rwanda’s global rank increased from 139 in 2010, to 62 in 2016, and to 38 in 2020, which was the second-best in SSA in the annual

World Bank Doing Business Report (World Bank 2010, World Bank 2010, World Bank 2020b).

A major area of interest has been to improve major foreign exchange generating sectors – especially in mining, tourism, financial services, coffee, and tea. These sectors, and investing in export-oriented projects that help diversify the economy and reduce poverty have been a high priority (USAID 2019).

Its strong growth rate of more than seven percent per year for two decades is due to government investment in institutions and infrastructure that will attract foreign direct investment and generate synergy to transform the economy from one dependent on subsistence farming to a more productive one through value-added and service industries (e.g., agro-processing, business services, healthcare, information communications technology [ICT], tourism, ore- processing, mining, and manufacturing sectors). In 2018, approximately one-quarter of the 173 investment projects worth over $2 billion were export-oriented projects. Almost 60 percent represented manufacturing, mining, and agriculture (Nzohabonimana 2019, USAID 2019, World Bank 2020b).

2. Resource Allocation

Most countries in Africa find resource mobilization and allocation for development difficult. In order to generate national revenue, countries must improve the business climate in order to garner investment while making policy reforms to increase tax revenues and reduce corruption (Coulibaly 2020). Improving both governance and human resources is viewed as critical for domestic resource mobilization and sustainable economic development. Rwanda has prioritized ownership of development goals at all levels of society as a national priority. Development for poverty reduction is not an ephemeral ideology expressed in national strategies such as the UN Millennium Development Goals. In the Rwandan context, they provide a blueprint for galvanizing action, prioritizing plans, allocating resources, building institutions, and monitoring progress in achieving objectives (Rwanda VNR 2019). Overarching vision, specific objectives, good practices, measures to address challenges, capacity building, and stakeholder engagement processes and mechanisms are codified into national strategies and frameworks, for example, the National Strategy for Transformation 2017-2024 and Vision 2050 (Ndagijmana 2020). This approach helped Rwanda achieve many Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 and set it on a path to achieve all eight MDGs but one by 2019 (Coulibaly 2020). Additionally, improving competitiveness (for example as measured by the World Economic Forum Global Competitive Index[10]), business transparency, political stability, and security -- considered as the most important factor affecting investment decisions (World Bank 2018) -- generated a tripling in private investment between 2009 and 2018 and a quadrupling of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Rwanda (Ndagijimana 2020).

Since 2000, Rwanda has been driven in its ambition to become a middle-income country. Vision 2020, and its subsequent revisions, created a long-term framework for development goal (USAID 2015). Rwanda promulgated policies and invested in projects designed to enhance the standard of living and reduce dependency on foreign aid. This required better management of domestic resources, rent capture, and institutional capacity

[10] The World Economic Forum Global Competitive Index (GCI) measures the following domains: institutions; infrastructure; information, communications and technology (ICT) adoption; macroeconomic stability; health; skills; product market; labor market; financial system; market size; business dynamism; and innovation capability (WEF GCI 2020).

building. Tax reform was a critical element of achieving economic growth and independence. The success of which was evident in the growing share of tax revenue as a percent of GDP which grew from 3.6% to 13.4% between 1994 and 2013 (Redifer et al 2020).

3. Security Agency

The literature is robust regarding research on Rwandan involvement in armed conflict in the DRC. However, much less research has been conducted on Rwandan security operations within the international arena, let alone at the unit and individual level. One exception, provided by Kuehnel and Wilen (2018), is a close look at Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) soldiers' identity from a constructivist perspective. The authors focused on the military's image as transformed, professional peacekeepers, albeit with a national agenda. Lombard provided another unique field study of RDF troops deployed as peacekeepers and their perceptions of Rwanda's reputation. Two well-researched products by Bybee et al. (2020) and Burchard et al. (2020), detail Rwanda's institutional and unit-level effectiveness based, in part, on experienced professionals stationed in-country. A common thread is that, as a consequence of the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has developed a singular approach to security operations based on the nation's history with peacebuilding. Rwanda's agency in security operations relates to the wider context of the country's history of violent conflict, both within the country as well as as a participant in the Congo Wars and resulting regional instability (Stearns 2012, 2016).

Today, Rwanda is a stable country and one of the safest countries in SSA. Security is a priority for investors that often cite stability as an important driver of investments. However, the US State Department recommends caution when traveling in the vicinity of the Rwanda-DRC border due to the ongoing violence and potential cross-border attack from various armed groups located in eastern DRC, one of the most violent of which for three decades is the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) (State Dep 2019, 2012). The FDLR includes former soldiers who supported the 1994 Genocide carried out by the Hutus against the Tutsis. Although cross-border incursions have decreased since the height of the 2008-2014 period when grenade attacks in Rwanda were fairly frequent, instability has spilled over from Eastern DRC where violent armed groups have launched attacks in Rwanda's western region since 2016. Of even greater concern, the IS-aligned terrorist group known as the Allie Democratic Forces (ADF) has expanded its reach into Rwanda (Daghar et al 2022). Notably, relations with the governments of DRC and Burundi have markedly improved, although relations with Uganda are tense (US State Department 2019, 2021).

Although the military's levels of technical training and equipment are moderate, the RDF has developed a reputation as a very disciplined, professional force, with strong leadership and esprit de corps, which demonstrates capabilities above its given resources. In 2020, Rwanda was the second-largest overall troop contributor, and largest African contributor, to UN peacekeeping missions, deploying about 6,400 troops. In spite of a very high operations tempo, limited budget, and lack of highly skilled personnel, RDF capabilities are continuing to increase, albeit moderately (Bybee et al 2020).

In addition to contributing to the development of the country, the Rwandan military has pursued and acquired significant capabilities relevant to both territorial and security international peace operations, emphasizing critical tasks in peacekeeping and training efforts. RDF troops have demonstrated considerable capability in deep infiltration, ambushes, small-unit tactics, and the ability to adapt to the local environment, legacy skills from its civil war days and later counterinsurgency period against the former Hutu Rwandan government. Additionally, the Rwandan government specializes in two critical areas, airlift and medical support. The development of Level II medical support for UN missions demonstrates Rwanda's investment in peacekeeping success. Similarly, since purchasing six M8-17 helicopters in 2013, the Rwandan Air Force has become proficient in airlift, transporting more than 13,000 UN and African Union personnel in South Sudan between August 2016 and July 2017. (Burchard et al. 2020). Recently, the Rwandan military has positioned itself to respond to emerging threats, including providing rapid response to violent extremists in Mozambique, joint operations countering armed groups in the DRC, and preventing spillover from an Ebola outbreak in the DRC.

Rwanda has also taken a leadership role in a number of fora that help build coalition support for its objections, foremost among them the creation of an African agency for African solutions (Beswick and Jowell 2014). This includes support to UN and AU peacekeeping missions, reflected in Rwanda's vying for election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2013 and AU Chairmanship in 2018. In spite of being considered primarily a ceremonial position, as AU chairman, President Kagame was able to push through several major reforms including two prominent initiatives 1) the transformation of the AU Development Agency (from the OAU legacy institution known as the New Partnership for Africa's Development, NEPAD) resulting in enhanced development program processes and 2) the successful regional approval and launching of the AfCFTA (Chekol 2020).

Rwanda's contributions to security operations relate to the wider context of the government's political aims. The failings of UN peacekeeping in Rwanda 1993-1994 support the argument that Rwanda's unique experience endows it with a responsibility to ensure strong future responses, especially African agency in "African solutions" through AU missions, as well as support to UN missions (Beswick and Jowell 2014). Moreover, the provision of peacekeepers has become a source of domestic pride and conveys a transformational vision as part of Rwanda's post-genocide national identity. Also important is that training and professionalization transfer capacity building to other governmental functions, albeit somewhat limited by innovation stifling by top-down management practices (Hickey 2019).

Rwanda is increasingly perceived as a reliable regional partner in securitization missions in coordination with economic interests. The July 2021 deployment in response to increasing Islamist extremist violence is viewed as a transition in securitization efforts in that the Rwandan military is involved in a theater distant from its neighborhood of the African Great Lakes sub-region (Prashad 2021). To date, Rwandan peacekeeping operations have been fulfilled by up to 6,500 troops primarily in UN missions in Sudan and the Central African Republic. The Mozambique deployment took place after a two-month reconnaissance mission, organized initially as a unilateral rapid reaction response in coordination with the Mozambique government (Gras 2021). This deployment reportedly took place after a series of mercenaries (including the Russian Wagner Group) failed to defend the economic interests against the al-Shabaab-linked extremists (Prashad, 2021).

By November 2021, Rwandan security operations had since grown into a joint mission in cooperation with the Southern African Development Community (SADC), sharing intelligence, working together to assist to displaced people, and coordinating counter-insurgent operations (All Africa 2021). France and Rwanda appear to have reached a rapprochement in conjunction with security agreements to strengthen the security in the region where natural gas operations[11] have been halted since militants took control of the territory[12] in March 2021 which may entail economic arrangements possibly similar to those in the CAR where peacekeeping and economic agreements are intertwined (Mutambo 2021, Prashad 2021). Rwanda and the CAR reached several agreements including economic planning, mining, reform of the CAR's security sector, and cooperation in transportation. Moreover, Rwanda's major investment fund, Crystal Ventures, is planning on opening a food production and export center, entering into various infrastructure construction projects, and investing in a regional industrial center, signs that Kigali wants to extend its economic influence (Connolly 2019, Elion 2021).

4. Exports

Rwanda's top exports are unrefined natural resources — coffee, tea, minerals, ores, and precious metals (Workman 2021). In 2019, the value of merchandise exports of Rwanda increased substantially by 16 percent to reach $1.2 billion and 53 percent since 2016 (OEC). Merchandise exports in Rwanda were concentrated in precious metals and minerals. Trade is concentrated in two partners — the United Arab Emirates and the

[11] Total Energies SE and ExxonMobil
[12] In the Rovuma Basin and Mocimboa da Praia, Cabo Delgado

DRC (United Nations 2021)[13]. Forty percent of exports went to countries in eastern Africa in 2019 unchanged steady since 2016. Over the last decade, however, Rwandan exports to the DRC increased significantly from three percent in 2012 to 28 percent in 2019, when Rwanda became the third-largest exporter in SSA to the DRC, up from eleventh in 2012.

This change reflects a transition in political, economic, and security relations in the region since conditions reached a low in 2013. After a number of agreements between Rwanda and the DRC broke down, the Rwandan-backed Congolese rebels known as the M23 were defeated by a joint UN-SADC force spearheaded by the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) (Fabricius 2020, Rugeje and Maeresera 2016, Nduwimana and Njenga 2014, Stearns 2016, Whittle 2015) heightening international response.

Following the UN/FIB intervention, the World Bank Group met with regional leaders and promised $1 billion to support efforts designed to enhance economic development and stability (Relief Web). Among these efforts included the 2016 Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Project (GLTFP), a five-year program that included infrastructure, communications, policy reforms, and cross-border administration. The project is credited with increasing cross-border trade by expediting procedures to enlarge commerce volume and decrease costs, which, in turn, has contributed to decreasing regional tensions between neighbors (COMESA 2021). Although there is still instability due to armed groups in eastern DRC and occasional violence along the Rwanda-DRC

[13] In 2019, exports in order of monetary value were Gold ($444M), Refined Petroleum ($137M), Coffee ($75.5M), Tea ($72.5M), and Tin Ores ($71.2M). Rwanda exports most of its exports to the United Arab Emirates ($470M), Democratic Republic of the Congo ($371M), Uganda ($61.2M), United States ($45.2M), and Thailand ($37.1M). (OEC)

border, relations between countries, while at times tense, are generally resolved through political means (United States State Department 2019).

For Rwanda, increased trade is essential, given its low level of development, lack of resources, and landlocked status. One of the country's assets is its proximity to the DRC's potential consumer market. Rwanda is the largest EAC exporter to the DRC. The DRC's integration in the East African Community could increase Rwandan trade in value-added manufacturing industries (e.g., in agro-processing, metal products, mineral ores, chemicals/fertilizer, cement, and textiles industries), creating better paying jobs (United Nations Rwanda 2021).

The value of Rwandan exports decreased by almost 20 percent in 2019, from $1.71 billion in 2018 to $1.35 billion in 2019 (OEC 2019). But exports increased 13 percent compared to 2017. Better performance in non-traditional exports and re-exports, helped offset declining global prices in traditional commodities (BTI 2022). In 2019 Rwanda's earnings from tea exports declined by 4.6 percent to $86.3 from 2018. However, gold, tin, tantalum, tungsten, and refined petroleum earnings increased, contributing more than 57 percent to income from exports (OEC 2019). Tourism has been the country's leading foreign exchange earner, due to successes in leisure tourism as well as rapid growth in Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, and Events (MICE) or business tourism (United States International Trade Administration 2021). Total revenues from tourism were estimated at $438 million in 2017, according to the Rwanda Development Board (RDB).

5. Economic Growth Trajectory

Rwanda's impressive progress in economic growth, good governance, and human development over 15 years, especially considering the post-genocide challenges, is documented by The Third Rwanda National Human Development Report (NHDR) (UNDP 2018). It highlights how home-grown solutions (HGSs) have greatly contributed to the transformation of the country. There are numerous unique solutions to address extraordinary challenges that have faced the country since the 1994 Genocide. The most recent report focuses on five of Rwanda's indigenous innovations to generate bottom-up institutions to enable goals of improved standards of living.

Rwanda's transformation from a collapsed state in 1994 occurred in specific economic planning phases: Emergency (1994-2002), Recovery (2002-2012), Development (2013-2020), Transformation (2021-2050) (Behuria and Goodfellow 2017). In recognition that economic growth is related to, but not equivalent to, economic development, and that human development is linked to national wealth creation, Rwanda's strategy for transformation for two decades emphasizes that these three factors are mutually reinforcing (UNDP 2021). While economic growth does not automatically result in higher standards of living, economic growth is essential for increasing national capacity to invest in human development. Furthermore, long-term economic growth approaches emphasize the importance of inclusive growth as a necessary component for sustainable growth through structural transformation. As a result of detailed action plans, human development in Rwanda since 1990 scored the highest average annual growth ever registered anywhere in the world and is now above the global average for countries in the low human development group (Behuria and Goodfellow 2017). According to the

UN Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI),[14] Rwanda's HDI value increased almost 120 percent between 1990 and 2019 from 0.248 to 0.543. Although this is in the low human development category (at 160 out of 189 countries), this change reflects significant gains in life expectancy (an increase of over 35 years), average years of schooling (an increase of almost 3 years) and expected years of schooling (an increase of almost 6 years), and GNI per capita (an increase of over 130 percent).

The government's emphasis on a combination of factors — human capital development policies, market reforms, and strategic investments — resulted in growth rates above six percent every year but two (2003 and 2013) for almost three decades due to a combination of factors (Figure 10) (Behuria and Goodfellow 2017). Exports almost doubled from 2014-2019, from $731M to $1.35B, demonstrating a steady rise in the last two decades ($55.2M in 2000 and $326M in 2010) (OEC). Notably, even though development transformation is still in early stages, Rwanda' economic complexity ranking of106 is third only to Kenya (87) and Tanzania (95) compared to the rest of east African countries[15] (OEC 2021).

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[14] "The HDI is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. A long and healthy life is measured by life expectancy. Knowledge level is measured by mean years of schooling among the adult population, which is the average number of years of schooling received in a life-time by people aged 25 years and older; and access to learning and knowledge by expected years of schooling for children of school-entry age, which is the total number of years of schooling a child of school-entry age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates stay the same throughout the child's life. Standard of living is measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita expressed in constant 2017 international dollars converted using purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rates". Human Development Index (HDI) | Human Development Reports (undp.org)

[15] Ethiopia (108), Uganda (111) -- Rwanda (RWA) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners | OEC - The Observatory of Economic Complexity



Figure 10. GDP Growth Per Capita (1990-2020).

(Source: World Bank Database World Development Indicators)

Human development and living standard measures, including life expectancy at birth and health outcomes, access to knowledge, and gender equality have improved tremendously, making Rwanda one of the top 20 best performers. Several indigenous innovations, such as Grinka (one cow per family), Umurenge (a social security program), community-based health insurance, Umaganda (community action to address local challenges), and Imihigo (local ownership of national priorities for addressing social challenges) (UNDP 2021).

Along with export growth, structural change gradually took place as agriculture's contribution to GDP fell from almost 50 percent in 1994 to 24 percent in 2019, reflecting gains toward achieving the government's Vision 2020 (figure 11) (World Bank Datatbank) Although Rwanda's economic complexity (106) is third in East Africa (OEC 2019), Rwanda remains one of the least transformed countries in Africa and vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations (Behuria and Goodfellow 2017). In spite of reducing subsistence farming as the primary labor activity, from 90 percent in 1995, in 2019, a majority of the population are still employed in agriculture (60 percent). Population growth and environmental insecurity further add to constraints on poverty eradication and achieving middle-income status.



Figure 11. Rwandan Agriculture Employment and GDP per capita.

(Source: World Bank Databank).

As a result of the internal and external restraints on Rwanda's ability to maintain a positive economic trajectory, the government stepped up efforts to marketize the economy through socio-economic development reforms and investments. For example, in 2015, a new policy, "Made in Rwanda," aimed at boosting economic growth, diversifying exports, and positioning Rwandan goods and services in the global marketplace, doubled exports by 2018 (US State Department 2021, World Bank Databank) (figure 12). Other efforts to increase investment in infrastructure and financial investment in value-added enterprises include creating companies, such as Crystal Ventures Limited, that reinvest earnings into long-term projects that may not attract local or foreign investors (e.g., milk processing (Connolly 2019). Another advantage is that the government ruling party can enforce internal control measures to ensure capital is strategically applied and not in jeopardy of graft and corrupt activities (Behuria and Goodfellow 2017). It is generally accepted that the Rwandan government's commitment to development has been characterized by growing effectiveness and low levels of corruption, stimulating increased foreign direct investment (FDI) (Beswick 2011, Beswick and Jowell 2014, Gomera 2021, Ingelaere 2010). The Rwanda Development Board (RDB) reported the country had attracted more than USD 2 billion in new investment commitments in 2018, approximately 50% coming from foreign direct investment (FDI). The primary areas for funding contributions went mainly to manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and agro-processing. (US State Department, 2019).

Rwandan development programs are not confined strictly to economic areas. Other national efforts to transform Rwanda's economic conditions include socio-cultural programs at local, regional, and national levels. These programs include 1) *Abunzi* (i.e., mediation), 2) *Ubudehe* (i.e., collective efforts to fight poverty), 3) Community-based Health Insurance (CBHI), 4) *Umuganda* (i.e., community work), 5) the Vision 2020 strategy, 6) *Umurenge* Program (VUP, i.e., social security), and 7) the *Girinka* Program (one cow per family) (UNDP 2018). Since the mid-2010s, these 'homegrown solutions' have been major drivers of the evolution of ideology, interests, and institutions embodied as integrated strategies at all levels of society. These programs are essentially the institutionalization of ideas and interests which have been which have fostered social cohesion, decreased poverty, improved social well-being, and enhanced participatory and accountable governance over the past two decades (Gomera 2021, UNDP 2021).



Figure 12. Value of Rwandan Exports

(Source: World Bank Databank)

6. Infrastructure

Importance of Infrastructure -- Infrastructure consists of manufactured structures that enable social and economic operations, for example, transportation, power, and potable water facilities. The close relationship between infrastructure and economic growth is clear. High transportation costs directly hinder trade. According to the World Bank, a 10 percent increase in transportation costs can reduce trade volume by 20 percent. Being a landlocked country is a major disadvantage, contributing to 50-60 percent higher costs and lower trade volumes compared to countries with a coastline (GBN 2020). In order to build its emerging business, industrial, energy, and mineral extraction sectors, Rwanda must reduce high logistical, transportation, and production costs. Although investors are beginning to be attracted to the potential investment opportunities (e.g., the Volkswagen Project and the Dubai Kigali Logistics Platform[16]), costs continue to be extremely high for many potential investors. Because goods to or from eastern seaports must travel through Kenya, Uganda, or Tanzania, transportation costs can be almost half of the total value of both imports and exports, as opposed to 17% on average for developed countries (GIIN 2015). Moreover, road and rail maintenance is challenged by Rwanda's heavy rainfall and mountainous topography. Finally, the lack of connectivity from neighboring countries into Rwanda hinders rapid transportation of goods (GIIN 2015).

The importance of infrastructure to economic development and facilitating a robust competitive private sector is well understood by the Rwandan government which has invested heavily in developing transportation and energy infrastructure in particular. Since the 1994 war and genocide devastated the country's economy, facilities, and institutions, the Rwandan government has prioritized infrastructure, especially related to transportation, as key to revitalizing enterprise and trade activities. Ideas and interests in development goals, first codified in 2000 with the government's Vision 2020 and institutionalized in concrete projects, began to come to fruition a few years later.

By 2016 a number of milestones were achieved: a water treatment facility, a deal to host a Volkswagen assembly plant, the world's first gas/water extraction energy plant, an agreement for building a new international airport, acquisition of three new airplanes

[16] IFC 2018 CwA_FDI_Report_IFC_Final-1.pdf (acetforafrica.org). DP World 2021 Presenting DP World Kigali (unctad.org)

for RwandAir, the completion of a convention center and three new hotels, including a Radisson and a Marriott (Bradley 2018). To date, much of the financing has come from international donors (e.g., China, the European Union, Japan, the World Bank). However, East Africa in general, and Rwanda in particular, are turning more to private-public partnerships (PPP).

Inadequate institutional capacity, lack of skilled labor, and difficult terrain exacerbated by the extremely low level of development two decades ago notwithstanding (One word.), the country is making significant headway toward achieving middle-income status within a decade. Challenges include poor road conditions, health, education, andpoverty alleviation. However, Rwanda's prioritization of infrastructure projects (e.g., water treatment facility, car manufacture factory, the world's first methane gas/water extraction energy plant, a regional logistics hub, a world-class air transport center) has helped the country attract investment and further economic goals espoused in Vision 2020 (Bradley 2018)

Rwanda commits about a tenth of its annual budget to investing in roads, rail, and water transport infrastructure geared to dramatically reduce the cost of transportation for businesses and individuals. Improvements in the transportation sector contributes about 7% to the GDP representing. Rwanda's transport sector has improved a great deal in the last decade and a half, primarily the road network, with around 5000 km paved by 2018. Eighty-five percent of the country's roads are kept in good condition, demonstrating the high priority of maintaining the national road network.

Expanding global and regional trade highlights the importance of national competitiveness. Surrounded by larger countries with larger markets, Rwanda's location offers opportunities for exploitation in potentially lucrative markets in Eastern DRC, Uganda, and Tanzania as well as the lessor markets in Central Africa (e,g, Burundi, Republic of Congo, and Gabon (Rwanda MINICOM 2011). As part of its trade plan, Rwanda is developing infrastructure to facilitate trade with its neighbors through a state-of-the-art regional logistics hub, the Kigali Logistics Platform (KLP). The KLP, East Africa's first inland port, became operational in 2018. Located close to the capital as well as the Kigali Special Economic Zone (KSEZ) and Bugasera International Airport (scheduled to open in late 2022), the KLP, in partnership with Dubai Ports, serves as a regional inland container services center with a multitude of trading amenities currently on offer. An expansion of a commodity distribution center will better connect venders (e.g., farmers) with distributors (Nkurunziza 2022). Connecting the KLP hub to export centers in East and Central Africa, the government is investing in smaller-scale logistics centers in 1) Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, 2) Djibouti, 3) Isaka, Tanzania, and 4) Mombasa-Kenya to facilitate Rwandan exports throughout and beyond the region -- from the Horn of Africa to the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean (Rwanda MINICOM 2011).

Transportation is one of two (in addition to energy) critical infrastructure challenges particularly problematic for improving Rwanda's export competitiveness. transportation. As a landlocked country, most imports and exports pass through seaports on Kenya's or Tanzania's coasts. Currently shipping a container overland from Mombasa, Kenya to Kigali, Rwanda costs four to six times more than shipping a container by sea from Shanghai, China to Mombasa (GBN 2020).

The National Strategy for Transformation[17], the implementation instrument for Vision 2050, identifies key infrastructure investments needed to accelerate transformation, stimulate economic growth, and enhance export competitiveness (World Bank in Rwanda). A primary focus for infrastructure development is key to Rwanda's goal of fashioning itself as a conference and events hub. This objective aligns with Tanzania's efforts to create a corridor with its landlocked neighbors bordering the resource-rich DRC. Tanzania's recent deals, including new railway lines linking the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania, will significantly reduce transportation costs and could recoup costs within 20 years once completed (Kiruga 2019). Another cost-saving investment is the Dubai Port (DP) World Kigali Logistics Platform (KLP), the first of its kind in the region. KLP is projected to reduce business costs as much as $50 million a year in logistics expenses by routing imports from overseas through the inland dry port for onward distribution to neighboring countries (i.e., Burundi, the DRC, Tanzania, and Uganda) (DP World 2019). Observers note this region of over 40 million people is growing and promises to be a lucrative trading market for investors and entrepreneurs (GBN 2020). According to the CEO of DP World, trading under AfCFTA would not be possible without infrastructure and facilities like the KLP. Moreover, the UAE sees "Rwanda as a gateway to the heart of Africa" (DP World 2019).

Roads -- Rwanda's road system is relatively good with around 10,000 miles of roads (World Bank Databank). While only five percent are paved, Rwanda's Rural Access Index for Roads (RAI) of 52 out of 100 is relatively high compared to countries with similar GDP per capita (Ethiopia's RAI score is 21.6 and its GDP per capita was

[17] National_Strategy_For_Trsansformation_-NST1-min.pdf (nirda.gov.rw)

$856 2019) and some countries with higher GDP per capita (Kenya's RAI score is 56.0 and its GDP per capita in 2019 was $1817). Road maintenance is a priority so primary roads are in fairly good condition; however, the poor condition of feeder roads hinders commerce. A primary emphasis has been on constructing an 80 KM ring road around the capital, Kigali City, roads to connect secondary cities (350 km), and building extra capacity for cargo freight and passenger transport between transportation hubs and ports (land and air) (IMF 2019).



Figure 13. East Africa Railway Projects. (Source: AfDB 2009).



Figure 14. Transportation Corridors (Source: Fitch Solutions 2020)



Figure 15. Trans-African Highway Network

(Source: MINNFRA 2012)



Figure 16. Trans-Continental Road Network

(Source: OECD 2019)

Airports – Rwanda ranks in the top 10 fastest growing markets for air travel in Africa and is expected to continue to grow for the next two decades, according to the International Air Traffic Transport Association (IATTA) (Times Aerospace 2020). Rwanda currently has several airports, the primary one being the international airport in Kigali which serves domestic and several international destinations as well as the country's national carrier, RwandAir as well as RwandAir Cargo, which provided transport service between Rwanda and Europe for over a decade (Times Aerospace 2020).

The government is building a second airport, Bugesera International Airport as a key element of a number of high-profile infrastructure projects to support Rwanda's goal of becoming a hub for logistics, services, and tourism, including the construction of (US State Department 2019). Construction preparation on the new world-class gateway to the region began in 2010, sped up after a redesign to accommodate the country's projected growth, and is expected to become operational in 2022. The original plan was for 1.7 million passengers per year. The redesigned airport can accommodate seven million passengers per year which will expand to 14 million after the initial ten-year phase (GBN 2019). RwandAir plans to open new routes including the US, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola (Mwai 2017).

The effect of Rwanda's investment in infrastructure has been to take advantage of its location in positioning the country as a regional hub that is overcoming its lack of resources and becoming more significant than its GDP per capita would suggest (DP 2019). Qatar Airway's decision to fund 60 percent of the new airport at a cost of $780 million, due to Rwanda's strategic location, political stability, and business-friendly environment (Shalton 2020). The airport will host several international airlines serving different destinations, among them, Ethiopia, the Netherlands, Congo Brazzaville, Belgium, Tanzania, Qatar, UAE, Uganda, Turkey, South Africa, Gabon, Kenya and importantly, the newest EAC member -- the underserved, resource-rich eastern DRC (Tabaro 2021).

Energy -- Economic growth and development in Rwanda is hindered, in part, by the exorbitant energy costs. Electricity in Rwanda costs almost twice, on average, that of neighboring countries. In 2021, the average cost for electricity in Rwanda was $206 per megawatt-hour, Kenya $161, Uganda $126, DRC $100, Tanzania $69, and Ethiopia $35 (Cable.co.uk). As a result, manufacturing costs are higher, and, as a result, foreign investment in the manufacturing sector has suffered. The Rwandan government is working with the private sector to find ways to increase electrical generation and alternate sources of electricity generation, such as solar energy and harnessing reserves of methane gas trapped in Lake Kivu.

Significant progress has been made when less than five percent of Rwandan population had access to electricity in 1995 and less than ten percent in 2010 (World Bank databank) (figure 17). In 2016, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development conducted a survey of the overall electrification rate which found grid connections as well as off-grid solutions totaled 28.6% of households had access (IBRD 2018). However, by 2018, the electrification rate in Rwanda had increased quickly to about 43% (31% from grid and 12% from off-grid solutions (World Bank 2018). The 2016 figure doubled by 2019, to more than 60% of Rwandan households with access to electricity, either via connection to the national grid (39%) or through off-grid systems (14%) (IBRD 2018, USAID 2019).

Rural areas are affected the most by the lack of access to electricity where the electrification rate is 23 percent. On the other hand, 89 percent of people living in urban areas have access to electricity (World Bank 2018). Other low-income SSA countries displayed an overall similar trend with substantial rural-urban variations (WorldBank Databank). That said, in the last decade, the growth in access to electricity outpaced population growth in Rwanda. Notably, it was one of the top three fastest countries in the world to increase electrification and energy sector transformation between 2010 and 2017, scoring higher than the average of other low-income SSA countries (SEforALL 2020).

While Rwanda is not typically thought to be particularly well-endowed with natural resources, it does possess certain natural energy resources. Rwanda's geological setting provides energy generation opportunities due to its mountainous terrain, numerous rivers, and amount of annual rain, in addition to solar, wind, geothermal, and methane gas sources (Rutagarama and Uhorakeye 2010). It currently has 241 MW of installed generation capacity according to the Rwanda Energy Group.[18] Rwanda's electric energy comes primarily from hydropower plants (Bimenyimana et al 2018). Additional electricity is provided by diesel and heavy fuel generators via thermal power plants, methane gas from Lak Kivu, and solar energy.

Most of the country's electricity supply is domestically generated with only around 2% imported from regional neighbors and shared power plants (Hakizimana, and

[18] Hydro Power (reg.rw)

Sandoval 2020). Additionally, the government rented thermal power plants in order to reduce the country's power deficit as alternative power generation sources are brought online. (MININFRA 2020) Hydropower has traditionally dominated the source of electricity but diesel fuel generators are becoming more significant in meeting peak demand (SEforALL 2020). The government's commitment to increase off-grid access as a means to make energy more affordable and sustainable led to partnerships with programs such as USAID's Power Africa Off-grid Project (PAOP) to fill the rural energy deficit (USAID 2019). Productive use in industry is, for the most part, in research and development. Potential business use envisioned that are close to being viable at scale are solar irrigation and off-grid cold storage.

Rwanda's strong policy agenda, including on- and off-grid electrification and cost-effective tariff structures, is credited for increasing electricity access (SEforAll 2020). National dedication to creating stable, efficient, anti-corruption governance focused on development results contributed to improving electrification from six percent in 2000 to over 50 percent in 2019 (USAID). World Bank research data has informed the Rwandan government's policy decisions including the creation of the Renewable Energy Fund, tariff restructuring, and energy sector reform programs (e.g., Energy Development Policy Operation series) (World Bank 2018). To meet its goal of universal access by 2024, Rwanda has established off-grid electrification for a large proportion of the population, promoting alternative sources of electricity such as solar home systems (Koo et al 2018).

Rwanda's rapid progress in energy policy reform is tied to it becoming one of the top three fastest moving countries in improving electricity access between 2010 and 2018

(SEforALL 2020). Enabling policies are key to creating investment-friendly environments and increasing finance commitments. Rwanda's energy strategy framework such as tariff subsidies, rural electrification, and alternative electricity generation initiatives is underpinned by integrated and enabling policies such as on-grid and off-grid electrification and restructuring of utilities, has been instrumental in increasing electricity access.

Vision 2020 and Vision 2050 construct processes for transitioning from a developing country to a middle-income country. These guides provide the focus for other planning documents such as the National Strategy for Transformation (NST), 2017-2024, which establish economic, social, and governance transformation goals. Access to modern infrastructure, in particular, electricity, is key for economic and social transformation. The Energy Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) 2018, designates planning actions and establishes targets for the complete energy sector (i.e., electricity, geothermal, and gas subsectors).[19] To facilitate private sector investment, each village is designated for grid, mini-grid, or Solar Home System (SHS) electrification by 2024 according to the National Electrification Plan (NEP). The Electricity Law governs licensing requirements, the determination of tariffs, and penalties for criminal offenses relating to electricity (USAID 2019).

Progress notwithstanding, Rwanda faces numerous obstacles to achieving its goals of economic transformation and middle-income status, not the least of which being

[19] Specific goals for electricity that the country aims to meet by 2024: Generating electrical capacity to meet demand plus a 15 percent reserve margin; Reduction of power interruptions 14.7 per year, and Reduction of average power blackouts per year to 91.7 hours; Connectivity to electricity to 100 percent of households; Connectivity to electricity to 100 percent of productive users; Streetlight illumination for all major national and urban roads. (USAID 2019)

the fact that actual investments in Rwanda still fall short of those required. International development organizations estimate. that increasing electricity access to 100 percent will require more than $500 million in the on-grid sector and almost $80 million in the off-grid sector per year between 2018-2024 (ESSP 2018) (SEforALL 2020).



Figure 17. Access to Electricity – Rwanda, % of population

(Source World Bank)

Case Study #2 – Tanzanian Interests and Institutions in Integration

In 2020, Tanzania reached an important milestone when it achieved lower middle-income status after two decades of sustained growth. In addition to its natural endowments and strategic geographic position, this progress is attributed to sustained macroeconomic stability and state development policies geared to evolving international and domestic contexts. The government's Sixth Phase of the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 established program objectives for engaging with multilateral and bilateral partners at the regional and global levels. A major focus of guiding principles is proactively engaging with the private sector in recognition of commercial stakeholders' role as the engine of economic growth. (World Bank Data Bank)

Until recently Tanzania's development strategy concentrated on protecting national businesses. The 2015 election of President John Magufuli ostensibly opened a new era of creating a better business environment which while it increased infrastructure, essentially meant continuing protectionist measures which stymied growth. As a result of slowing economy, the new administration under President Samia Suluhu Hassan has shifted the government's approach in 2021 to regional trade and cooperation, committing efforts to reforming domestic policies in order to improve access to financing, education, healthcare, and trade opportunities. (Moody's Analytics 2021).

1. Competitiveness

Moving from the Less Developed Country category to the Lower Middle-Income status entailed long-term strategy of creating conditions conducive to economic growth. Education has been a major factor in this transition. Tanzania prioritized development soon after gaining independence in 1961, making education a constitutionally guaranteed human right. The government introduced universal primary education in 1974 in keeping with its "education for self-reliance' policy. At that time 85% of the population was illiterate. While challenges remain, remarkable progress in the numbers of children enrolled in primary school (an increase of 39%) and those who completed secondary school (almost 30% in 2018) (Ngalomba 2021). In concert with its renewed focus on regional trade and cooperation, the government has implemented policy reforms, including anti-graft and corruption mechanism, to reduce protectionism, improve competitiveness, and create a more business-friendly environment. (Tanzaniainvest 2022).

Tanzania's competitiveness ranking was 117th of 141 in 2019, increasing marginally over 2018 (116th of 140, about equal the SSA average). The country's highest rank was 74 for macro-economic stability and lowest was 24 for ICT adoption (WEF 2019). In 2020, Tanzania's Ease of Doing Business Index ranking was 141 out of 190 countries in 2020, and fourth in the EAC (World Bank Doing Business 2020)). The country scored highest on Getting Electricity (74.9), Starting a Business (74.4), and Getting Credit (65). Its lowest scores were Trading Across Borders (20.2), Resolving Insolvency (39.1), and Protecting Minority Investors (50.0).[20] In order to increase its score from 141 to at least 100, Tanzania established a "Blueprint for Regulatory Reforms to Improve the Business Environment in Tanzania" which includes concrete measures to improve the business climate (World Bank Tanzania).

Compared to its regional peers (e.g., Kenya), Tanzania's economy has fared relatively well due to its strategic location and natural resource wealth; however, economic growth has slowed significantly since 2019. The shift in the government's approach to regional trade and cooperation under the new administration, support for national and regional infrastructure, improvement of the business climate through domestic policy reforms, and engagement with regional and global cohorts made the country an attractive prospect for foreign investment (US AID 2019).

[20] The ease of doing business score measures an economy's performance with respect to a measure of regulatory best practice across the entire sample of 41 indicators for 10 Doing Business areas: "Starting a Business, Dealing with Construction Permits, Getting Electricity, Registering Property, Getting Credit, Protecting Minority Investors, Paying taxes, Trading Across Borders, Enforcing Contracts, Resolving Insolvency" (World Bank Doing Business https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings).

2. Resource Allocation

Tanzania's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score for 2019 was virtually unchanged from the previous year, 3.5 (above the SSA average). However, Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda all score higher (see figure 18). Tanzania scored highest in Economic Management (4.0) and lowest in Public Sector Management and Institutions (3.0).[21] Its overall score for Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity was 3.6 and Structural Policies was 3.3 (World Bank CPIA 2019).[22]

The government has doubled efforts to bolster household consumption and reduce poverty, reaching GDP of $63.2 billion and GDP per capita of $1122.1 in 2019. Although Tanzania's population of 58 million grew at 3.0 percent per year, its Human Capital Index achieved .40 (World Bank CPIA 2019). Nevertheless, 49 percent of the population remained below the poverty line of $1.90 per day

Tanzania prioritizes careful macroeconomic and fiscal management to create fiscal space[23] to enable investments in infrastructure and human capital for sustainable growth. Fostering growth of small and medium enterprises, creating jobs for low-skilled workers, increasing agriculture productivity are priorities for the five-year economic strategy.

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[21] Economic Management: Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy, Fiscal Policy, and Debt Policy. Public Sector Management and Institutions: Property Rights and Rule-Based Governance, Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management, Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization, Quality of Public Administration, and Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the public sector (World Bank CPIA 2019) CPIA Africa : Strengthening Debt Management Capacity (worldbank.org).

[22] Social Inclusion and Equity: Gender Equality, Equity of Public Resource Use, Building Human Resources, Social Protection and Labor, and Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability. Structural Policies: Trade, Financial Sector, and Business Regulatory Environment. (World Bank CPIA 2019) CPIA Africa : Strengthening Debt Management Capacity (worldbank.org)

[23] Fiscal space consists of four categories according to the World Bank: government debt sustainability, balance sheet composition, external and pivate sector debt, market access (A Cross-Country Database of Fiscal Space (worldbank.org))



Figure 18. IDA Resource Allocation Index, Africa

(Source World Bank)

3. Security Agency

Tanzania is a relatively stable and secure state, especially in comparison to some of the countries in the region, where some of the longest and most violent conflicts are located (e.g., Somalia, South Sudan) (US State 2022). However, growing violent extremism from Islamic State-aligned terrorists across the border in Mozambique and Al-Qaida aligned al-Shabaab in Somalia have raised regional anxiety due to spillover that has crossed into Tanzania and caused oil and put gas exploration in Mozambique on hold (ICG 2021). Tanzania's defense institutions are considered moderately effective in strategy and planning and human resource management (Burchard et al 2019).

Tanzania has deployed peacekeeping troops to United Nations and African Union missions. In recent years, it has ranked among the top troop-contributing countries in Africa (7th), and 13th in the world (as of February 2022) [24] with more than 2,200 members of its defense forces participating in peacekeeping missions, In 2019 Tanzania was the 5th largest contributor in Africa and the 11th largest with over 2300 troops -- the most significant contributions included: 950 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Congo, MONUSCO), 690 in Sudan (African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur, UNAMID), 155 in Lebanon (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNFIL). The country has also contributed to other missions in the past including the Central Africa Republic (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, MINUSCA), Abyei (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, UNISFA), and South Sudan (United Nations Mission in South Sudan, UNMISS (UN Contributions 2019).

The Tanzania military was a significant contributor to the peace enforcing mechanism arm of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) known as the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). The FIB, composed of Tanzania, South Africa, and Malawi troops from the South African Development Community (SADC), was conceived as having a more robust mandate to fight armed rebel groups. The FIB contributed to defeating the Congolese Rwandaphone rebel group, known as the M23. However, the FIB has not been aggressive in pursuing the two most serious threats to stability in eastern DRC, 1) the

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[24] Troop and police contributors | United Nations Peacekeeping

Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), founded by genocidaires from Rwanda and 2) the Islamic State-aligned Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF), originally formed by rebels from Uganda. Consequently, the UN has proposed the FIB be replaced by a SADC Quick Reaction Force, although how that would differ from the FIB is not clear. Moreover, recent FIB operations against the ADF have not been successful and have resulted in significant Tanzanian casualties (Fabricius 2020).

Tanzania also contributes forces to another combat mission, the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). In conjunction with Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF), SAMIM is deployed to Cabo Delgado, Mozambique to combat terrorism and restore security in support of the government of Mozambique. Since its deployment in July 2021 as a regional response to combat acts of violent extremism, SAMIM has recaptured villages, dislodged terrorists from their bases, seized weapons stashes, and contributed a restoring order in the region where some of the largest liquid natural gas projects in Africa are located[25] (SADC Brief 2021, Goosen n.d.).

4. Exports

Tanzania's exports in 2019 were $4.28 billion and imports were $11.2 billion. The country's biggest exports by value in 2019 were gold ($1.39B), raw tobacco ($277M), coconuts, Brazil nuts, and cashews ($231M), other oily seeds ($179M), and refined petroleum ($157M), exporting mostly to India ($843M), United Arab Emirates ($573M), China ($349M), Switzerland ($280M), and Rwanda ($247M). Tanzania's main

[25] 1) Rovuma LNG Terminal ($30 billion FDI) consists of 3 gas reservoirs off 40km off the Cabo Delgado coast in Area 4 Block of the Rovuma Basin, estimated to contain about 85 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
2) Mozambique LNG facility& liquefaction plant ($20 billion FDI) in Cabo Delgado estimated to contain at least 75 trillion cubic feet of offshore natural gas (Goosen. [Top 5 Largest Oil and Gas Projects in Africa by Investment (energycapitalpower.com)]

imports in 2019 were refined petroleum ($1.59B), palm oil ($308M), packaged medicaments ($274M), cars ($230M), and wheat ($174M), importing mostly from China ($3.81B), India ($1.69B), United Arab Emirates ($1.38B), South Africa ($476M), and Kenya ($328M). (OEC 2019).

In 2018, Tanzania's major exports were gold ($892 million), tobacco ($333 million), raw copper ($231 million), refined copper ($150 million), and other furniture ($147 million), exported primarily to Rwanda, Kenya, the DRC, Zambia, and Uganda, for a total of $5.71 billion. Tanzania's major imports were refined petroleum ($1.77 billion), palm oil ($280 million), packaged medicaments ($220 million), cars ($191 million), and wheat ($182 million), imported mostly from China, India, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa for a total $5.71 billion. (OEC 2018).

5. Economic Growth Trajectory

Tanzania is one of the fasted growing economies, not only in Africa, but in the world, averaging real GDP growth rate of over 6%, 2010-2019. In spite of the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2020, the real GDP of Tanzania grew by almost 5%, totaling USD 64.4 billion (IMF 2021). As a result, Tanzania realized its ambitious industrialization plan to transform from a low-income country to a lower middle-income economy in 2020 (figure 19).

The government's concentration on creating a stable political climate, implementing structural reforms, and designing rational macroeconomic policies provided a certain amount of resiliency from external shocks. As a result, Tanzania was able to achieve an impressive real GDP growth rate of between 6 and 7% for the last 20 years (figure 20) . This sustained growth rate, combined with debt relief, gave Tanzania



Figure 19. Tanzania GDP growth (Source: Tanzanian Invest)

the wherewithal to make substantial investments in infrastructure and energy sectors which contributed to the development of local industries (Obasaju et al 2021). Transportation, agriculture, manufacturing, and trade have been among the major drivers of growth during this period. Following a contraction in 2020, in 2021, the economy experienced a recovery of a real GDP growth rate of 4.3 percent. The primary sectors driving growth in 2021 have been hospitality, mining, and electricity. (World Bank in Tanzania)



Figure 20. Tanzania GDP Growth Rate (Source: Tanzanian Invest)

Protectionist policies adopted by the late President Magufuli created a more unstable business environment and made investors wary about long-term prospects for foreign direct investment (FDI). However, under the current administration of President Suluhu Hassan, efforts are underway to increase regional stability and economic growth. While continuing the five-year development plans that underpin the general objectives of the Sixth Phase of the Tanzania Development Vision 2025, her focus on integration and economic transformation is evident in changes in response to social and development requirements (World Bank in Tanzania 2022).

Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) has been important in bolstering household consumption and accelerating poverty reduction. Prudent macroeconomic and fiscal management has helped create positive fiscal conditions for major investments in physical, human, and institutional capital which is key for sustainable growth. To continue poverty reduction, the country is seeking ways to create jobs, especially for low-skilled workers, by facilitating small and medium enterprise growth, fostering productivity, and creating value-added businesses in agriculture on order to end subsistence farming which still is the main source of income for the majority of households.

The government in engaging with the private sector engagement in recognition that businesses are essential to economic development by creating jobs, stimulating innovation, increasing competitiveness and generating tax revenue (Moody's Analytics 2020). The private sector can help generate systemic changes through norm transference and institutionalizing regime transformation from an agrarian society to an industrial, market-based nation. This process is critical for taking advantage of the growing youth bulge and for creating pathways to self-reliance (USAID 2019). The government is proactively working with regional leaders to strengthen multilateral and bilateral partnerships and attract foreign investment. Tanzania appreciates the critical role the private sector plays in generating economic growth by overcoming investment deficiencies (AfDB 2020).

Recognizing that job creation and industrialization is critical for reaching its goal of upper middle-income status by 2030, Suluhu Hassan's administration concluded an agreement to build the Egyptian Industrial City on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam, a 544 acres complex that will contain labor-intensive industries in pharmaceutical, automobile, textile, and agricultural sectors. The city will serve as an important facilitator for Egyptian and African business investment in the region, in anticipation of the economic growth of the region's nearly 500 million people in Tanzania and its neighboring countries. Egyptian economic experts note Tanzania's investment potential and the continent in general while highlighting the need to make improvements in banking, customs, shipping, transport ports, land tenure, and overall modernization of economic mechanisms to align with the global digital transformation (Al Monitor 2021)

Additionally, President Suluhu Hassan has recognized the important role of the private sector in generating investment and creating employment, stressing that greater collaboration with the private sector is essential to enhance a business-enabling environment. As a result, her administration has enacted policies and regulations that strengthen the rule of law, reduce impediments to economic growth, and address challenges for starting businesses. The overarching goal is to create employment and enhance transparency among regulatory agencies in regulating functions (Heritage 2020).

Following the economic slowdown due to COVID-19, Tanzania's economy is expected to improve in 2022 and 2023 to between 5% and 6% annual growth helping it to remain one of the top growing economies (Tanzania Invest 2022).[26]   Economic projections indicate foreign direct investment (FDI) in productivity-boosting projects and foreign-earnings generating exports will be a major driver of economic growth. The sectors receiving the most FDI include infrastructure, the liquefied natural gas industry (LNG investments are expected to rise by $10 billion), the mining sector (which currently generates half of Tanzania's exports), and the primary agricultural products sector[27] (TanzaniaInvest 2022). China, Kenya, India, South Africa, the UK, Canada, and have

[26] The Economy of Tanzania in 2021 and 2022 - March 2022 Update (tanzaniainvest.com)
[27] E.g., coffee, cashew nuts, and tobacco

been the most significant sources of FDI. However, these sources are likely to change[28] due to President Suluhu Hassan's renewed negotiations with LNG investors in 2022 that had stalled under her predecessor, President Magafuli. In addition to Tanzania's interest in exploiting its significant gas reserves estimated at 57 trillion cubic feet, Europe's need to diversify energy imports has spurred greater interest in quickly increasing Tanzania's fuel production (African Development Bank (AfDB), Ng'Wanakilala and Malingh 2022).

6. Infrastructure

Infrastructure is fundamental to enhancing economic growth and increasing income distribution, as well as making progress toward Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (Calderon and Serven 2004). SSA is recognized as the most underdeveloped region in the world, especially in terms of infrastructure (Foster et al 2009). The lack of progress in infrastructure provision is a major factor in the SSA falling behind other countries in economic development. Researchers highlight the fact that, in the 1970s, SSA exceeded India's electricity generation capacity per capita by 300%. However, by the turn of the century, the tables had reversed, and India was able to generate 200% more per capita capacity than SSA (Ndossy 2020). Furthermore, linking countries' infrastructure requires cross-border cooperation, especially for transport and power programs. To date, the region has lacked significant political will, economic wherewithal, sufficient security, private sector involvement, and technocratic skills to generate the requisite cooperation to make linking East African infrastructure feasible (Ndossy 2020). Creating awareness of tangible benefits and developing buy-in from

[28] For example, Norway's oil and gas company, Equinor, an LNG investor for almost a decade is ramping up its operations Tanzania (equinor.com).

surrounding communities in the region has encouraged cooperation in securitization efforts, investment partnerships between countries and with international organizations, and stimulated investment in technical, human, government, and political levels (Klomegah 2021). An uptick in international focus on the need for infrastructure development, physical as well as human, clarified the key role for public-private partnerships to bring about poverty reduction in SSA (World Bank 2016). For the past several years, the construction of strategic infrastructures has been a top priority. More than a dozen large bridges and over 3,000 miles of roads have been constructed, designed to reduce congestion, increase commerce, and facilitate smooth movement of people goods, and services across the country (Kamagi 2020).

Construction in support of infrastructure is forecast to grow by over 10% in the next two years. Critical projects include the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) and the East African Crude Oil Pipeline. Currently, under construction, the SGR is essential to decreasing freight costs between landlocked countries and Tanzania's port of Dar es Salaam by an estimated 40% (Construction Review 2021). The system will link Tanzania to Rwanda and Uganda, which will, in turn, link to Burundi and eastern DRC. A significant indication of investor perspectives of increased financial sustainability is that SGR projects in Tanzania have attracted non-Chinese lenders and construction firms (unlike in Kenya and Uganda where lenders have become more selective, including more risk-tolerant Chinese investors) (Fitch Solutions 2020).

Data infrastructure is another area of focus in Tanzania, one of the two largest telecommunications (telecoms) markets in East Africa (second behind Kenya). Growth in the telecoms sector, worth $859 million US dollars in the 2018 GDP, an increase of

28% compared to 2014, is due to internet and broadcasting services expansion. Infrastructure improvements helped reduce internet and voice access costs and facilitated business transactions. (Sinda 2021.)

Summary

This section compared the two most proactive East African countries in creating conditions conducive to integration, Tanzania and Rwanda. Leaders in these countries have demonstrated a strategic focus on building regional integration networks to increase jobs, trade, and productivity opportunities for themselves, neighboring countries, and other regional economic communities. The importance of state capacity building in government, supported by external organizations, can be seen in the vigorous efforts of these two countries. As economic growth and development have increased, the private sector has emerged as a significant investment partner for designing strategies, building infrastructure, and resolving problems. Overall, inter-state tensions that existed in the 1960s through the turn of the century have declined, as economic priorities have become a concern for a growing segment of public and private sectors of the population (e.g., government officials, business leaders, and labor. The regimes and institutions formulated to facilitate business activities, such as the one stop border posts (OSBPs) have demonstrated their effectiveness in decreasing business costs and increasing trade profits, thus expanding national interest in integration. These interests and conditions generate influential forces for cooperative international relations. Pressure from the private sector exerted strong influences on the competitor-pairs discussed in the case studies examined here to peacefully resolve border differences. This is not to say that there won’t be problems in the future. Growing private sector influence, however, clearly demonstrates East African integration is on a different level and trajectory than those described by Nye in the 1960s.

CHAPTER VI – CONCLUSION

(not) "A World without Ideas and Passions" (Mkandawire 2015)

Chapter Overview

This chapter provides an overview of the findings and contributions of this dissertation. This dissertation identified mechanisms influencing countries to overcome barriers to economic and political union, through post-Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) process-tracing case studies. The neo-institutional research construct proposes that the ideas, interests, and institutions driving integration are different than those Nye observed when the initial group — Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda – first attempted the initial East African Community (EAC).

Research results find conditions evidenced today highlight the evolution of socio-political relationships from insular elite group decision-making to more stratified influencing classes. The elements of neo-institutionalism are encapsulated by the ideational aspirations of Pan-Africanism, interests of peace and prosperity identified by Agenda 2063, and embodied by the institutional innovations to enhance regional integration (e.g., intra-regional infrastructure and trade regimes) in support of the AfCFTA[29].

The organization is as follows: 1) a presentation of the hypotheses and assumptions of the research project, 2) an explanation of the significance of the findings in terms of advancement of scholarly knowledge, 3) an exploration of shortcomings in

[29] As of November 2021, 42 countries have ratified the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), accounting for 78 percent of the 54 African countries. The region currently boasts of a combined GDP of over $3 trillion and a combined population of over one billion. Notably, 14 of the 42 ratifications happened during the pandemic (TRALAC 2021).

the findings and potential areas for future research, and 4) closing observations and policy recommendations.

Hypotheses Validity

This dissertation addressed the overarching question of what conditions move states from individualistic, self-interested contestants to more integrated, cooperative partners. Focusing on motivations driving Sub-Saharan countries to choose to support regional integration this research examined how integration processes within the most interdependent sub-region, the East African Community, can help explain changes in national perspectives and willingness to participate in greater regional collaboration. The underlying assumption is that greater capacity to compete successfully in integration requires greater state-building characteristics.

Two hypotheses were tested: 1) regional integration in the last decade reflects a transition in ideational perspectives compared to the 20th century, and 2) regional integration today represents evolving socio-political dynamics at the intra- and inter-state level that reflects changes in state capacities, relationships, and cooperative interests and behavior.

Hypotheses of the research methodology are informed by neo-institutionalism-intergovernmentalism constructs whereby interests drive the evolution of institutions. FsQCA and case study process-tracing confirmed hypotheses that conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa today are significantly different than those during the first East Africa attempt to integrate in the 1960s. As Nye found, integration can be facilitated when socio-political evolution reaches a point when other stakeholders, for example, the business sector and popular interest groups, have the ability to influence political leaders’ decision-making as witnessed today. The dissertation also confirmed conditions hypothesized to enable mechanisms for integration, perceptions of economic well-being and most importantly, degrees of statehood.

Using a neo-institutionalism model to identify regional and national level process mechanisms converting interests into institutions, this dissertation analyzed elements of integrative potential influenced by perceptual conditions (for example, costs and benefits of economic and political integration) and structural conditions (for example, state capacity for optimizing benefits of integration). Process mechanisms influencing the integrative potential in turn (for example, norm transfer from international and regional actors, regional and national coalition formation, private sector socialization) that hinder or promote integration. States' capacity for taking advantage of opportunities (for example, developing national conditions that enhance economic competitiveness such as human and physical capital) is fundamental to countries' integrative capacity and evolves as state-building processes.

The central agenda driving the formation of the EAC during its initial stage in the early 1960s was political federation (Nye 1966). Competing national interests made that impossible. Nevertheless, the need for co-operation remained a motivating force, eventually culminating in the re-initiation of EAC cooperation through stages starting with a customs union, progressing to a common market, a monetary union, and ultimately a political confederation.

One of the conditions missing in the post-independence movement was the lack of a significant entrepreneur class to help shape integration processes. Another major difference is the participation of private partnerships with government investment schemes. These changes were facilitated by an international consortium that has been assisting with strategy and institutional development. Today's EAC is not just made up of a greater number of countries — seven, which includes the original three plus, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, and the imminent addition of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – but actors whose interests have been shaped by a global environment of ideas in regional integration have led to the development of different kinds of institutions.

The EAC has made considerable progress in terms of economic cooperation. However, its trajectory is not necessarily a permanent one. It is vital to identify some of the factors affecting the process. An important aspect of this integration is relations between member states. Relations between member states are important factors in influencing the extent of the success of regional blocs. Analyzing the economic interests of the members is important in determining their effects on integration because they are concurrently cooperating on some issues and competing on others.   For example, until 2021, protectionist measures between Kenya and Tanzania on one hand, and Uganda and Rwanda on the other, hampered bilateral trade, costing businesses millions of dollars. Pressure by entrepreneurs brought the governments to negotiate bilateral settlements.

The case studies chosen for process-tracing of the conditions and mechanisms driving cooperation examined ideas and interests driving state-building and agency in creating institutions in order to achieve regional integration. The two cases chosen from fsQCA results exhibit conditions driving integration — relatively high degrees of state agency and development that provide evidence of interests and institutions leading to greater support for regional interdependence – i.e., infrastructure development, responsible resource management, competitiveness, and securitization agency. Tanzania and Rwanda are two countries in Eastern and Southern Africa competing against a pair of countries that started out endowed with better resources and institutions at independence. Consequently, Tanzania's competitor, Kenya, and Rwanda's, Uganda, began at higher levels of development. Both Tanzania and Rwanda have not only caught up with their rivals but are exceeding them in some categories, perhaps most notably by attracting investment.

Kenya and Tanzania are prominent members of the bloc today with the largest economies, both being larger, coastal countries and important trading colonies. However, Kenya's fertile land, like Uganda's, attracted large populations of colonial settlers, infrastructure development, and value-added export economies, giving them a head start in development compared to their respective pair — Tanzania and Rwanda. Uganda and Rwanda are similar in that they are both landlocked, smaller, low-income countries in the Great Lakes region, with few domestic resources, and low levels of industrialization. Both countries experienced extreme, protracted civil wars and both are leaders in UN peacekeeping operations.

Significance of Findings

The area of evolving interests driving integration is under-researched, especially with regard to Africa. Rather, research on Africa tends to focus on the lack of integration, uneven and insufficient growth, poor governance, illiberalism, and conflict. The findings of the importance of statehood represented by security agency, resource allocation, and competitiveness supports the findings of Nye that a private sector can create a political force to counter patrimonial states. The importance of economic development, which relies to a great extent on human capital development is clear. Economic development entails statehood capable of policymaking that creates conditions conducive to investment and productivity. This, in turn, creates a middle class of consumers and entrepreneurs that can leverage political power for greater socio-economic conditions that reduce poverty and promote economic growth. Moreover, the transfer of the norms of economic development has the potential to transform a region if countries develop skills to enhance policy and strategy-making regimes. While Sub-Saharan Africa is far behind other regions in developing these skills, norms, and procedures, the process of socio-political evolution conducive to development through norm transfer appears to be similar. Unfortunately, that capacity is too often overlooked. The study of economic development strategies is overshadowed by the preponderance of normative discourse that ignores the gradual evolution of policies and approaches within an African context as opposed to an ethnocentric view. The fsQCA methodology helps illuminate processes emerging in the evolution of African relations in an objective, heuristic approach.

This study gives insight into the integration process and identifies challenges affecting trade in the region in an effort to better inform how various state-building efforts can address challenges, such as protectionism, low levels of productivity and infrastructure, and lack of planning and programming skills to prepare the country to liberalize trade. This study contributes to the existing body of knowledge on EAC integration, in addition to providing opportunities for further research on the subject. In providing insight on the integration process, and areas requiring their intervention this dissertation could inform advocacy programs, researchers, and various organizations in attempting to assess EAC members' interests in supporting stabilization and development efforts.

This dissertation adds to the literature that examines changing dynamics in African relations with regard to evolving intra-regional norms and expectations over the last two decades. It conducts one of the few Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) studies of the region that identify conditions contributing to expanding integrational regimes and institutions which could create mechanisms to facilitate efforts to reduce intra-state tensions while creating processes to generate greater regional prosperity. The research attempts to provide insights into cooperation amongst nations situated in SSA in the face of anarchical conditions, in other words, the absence of an effective, overarching supreme authority with coercive power and legitimacy, as defined by international relations theory.

The emergence and perseverance of new African development institutions and standards and their ability to change regional relations in terms of development and interstate cooperation have been, for the most part, largely ignored. Moreover, forces for change, specifically diffusion mechanisms and their outcomes, such as South-South influence on institutions, are under-researched subjects (Risse 2016). The study of the dynamics of the emergence of a continent-wide, African-centered development organization and how it affects international relations and development outcomes can help fill the academic void. To this end, the author advanced a holistic model in a novel framework for understanding cooperation in SSA's international relations.

Potential for Future Research

The current transition in Sub-Saharan African interests and institutions has only just started to appear. The model used in this dissertation could be enhanced with greater fidelity of data that bring other conditions driving integration to light. Further studies as African regional integration progresses would shed light on conditions and forces motivating or discouraging cooperation.

Additionally, the state-building and economic conditions could change which may accelerate or hinder integration efforts. Future exogenous or endogenous factors such as global economic or local ecological catastrophes could change the course of integration. Furthering progress in regional integration in West Africa, especially in light of growing signs of violent extremism and political instability, requires resolution of competing interests and mandates. Successfully navigating the many challenges of increased economic integration entails garnering consensus and securing ownership. Regionalism depends on leadership, vision, and agency. West Africa was more advanced than the other regions of the continent at the turn of the century but is falling behind due to a flagging collective effort to continue to institutionalize progress in political security areas begun decades ago. Economic integration is weakening and with it, security. Central to economic growth is dynamic leadership at the regional level. Nigeria, the only real power accounts for 70% of the region's GDP and over half of its population. Whether or not it will become an impetus for accelerating the integration project remains to be seen and fruitful material for further investigation.

The nature of violence in Africa has changed significantly, and with it, African securitization capacity and agency as well. Since the new millennium, large-scale conflicts have decreased dramatically, allowing political stabilization and economic development. However, the last decade has witnessed an uptick in other forms of violence, including illicit trafficking, piracy, banditry, and extremism. Further research linking competitiveness with private sector influence, regional and country-level efforts to improve justice and the rule of law, along with strengthening governance, accountability, and improved social services could illuminate conditions that enhance state-building processes.

More research is needed that acknowledges and investigates African agency rather than promulgating a stereotypical picture of Africa as universally plagued by fragility, limited capacity, and never-ending violent conflict. The lack of research on the subject of African agency is not due to a lack of institutionalization of norms and interests, initiative, or influencing of preferences but rather a pervasive predilection for more dramatic events, while unacknowledging path-breaking trends. Altering this tendency requires understanding and perception of the different dimensions of agency, sovereignty as a mixture of state and non-state entities, and agency within a historical continuum. This new perspective of African agency entails more nuanced approaches that view international relations within a broader and deeper context within the global arena.

Finally, the nexus between state-building and security agency is an understudied topic. The theoretical application of fsQCA methodology would be enhanced by field research to conduct in-depth case studies of conditions enhancing and obstructing integration. Studies of security force professionalization, security sector reform, national agency, and the influence on technocratic bureaucratization of governments could provide more evidence of an alternative model for state development to that of the European experience.

Analysis that focuses less on the lack of apparent success and more on the gradual progress and emergence of continental norms and institutionalized agency. Among the most important (and least recognized) of which is the rejection of the OAU's non-interference prescription to an expanding embrace of the AU's non-indifference. This trajectory has clearly been demonstrated in a growing body of joint hybrid AU stabilization missions, a clear but underappreciated evolution in African interests, norms, institutions, agency, and capacity. Arguably, there is much yet to be achieved in terms of ensuring peace and stability. Yet, without the willingness to commit to offensive operations in the interest of imposing state law and order, progress in economic development and nation-building would be severely curtailed.

The growing contribution from African countries to UN Peacekeeping missions which now totals half of the total, receives less attention than the violent conflicts those missions confront. Moreover, the military professionalization and state-building processes these missions confer tends to be overlooked in favor of perceived political prestige and monetary benefits. In fact, few researchers address peacekeeping as a central element of state-building, agency, norm transfer, or institutional evolution within a historical framework. This is a fertile area for further research in light of growing African agency in peacekeeping/stabilization missions, especially given that military capacity building is not necessarily a pro-democratic process. What is clear is that African capacity in contributing to and leading regional stabilization missions has dramatically increased across Sub-Saharan Africa and thus warrants greater scholarly attention.

Closing Observations and Policy Recommendations

This study focused on the gradual evolution of dynamics influencing changing regional relations at the national level through the interaction between government policymakers and economic powerbrokers. As theorized by neo-institutionalism, African business groups growing interest in regional trade is creating an influential role in international politics as theorized by neo-institutionalism. This research demonstrated evidence that converging interest in interdependence can drive support for developing mechanisms conducive to economic integration. Over time, mutually reinforcing processes resulted in observable state direction of resources to enhance economic competitiveness, human capital, and regional security via cooperative regional programs and institutions.

If appropriately applied, the frameworks and institutions of the AU's Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) and the newly enacted African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) are generally assessed to likely achieve their objectives of enhancing regional integration, expanding inter-continental trade, increasing economic growth and development, and improving standards of living and social welfare. The key is effective leadership in policymaking, astute trade planning and management, and inclusive negotiations between stakeholders to minimize risk and maximize opportunities.

Today, regional integration may be deepening; however, successful resolution of mistrust and competition is not linear, nor is it inevitable. As Nye (1970) emphasized, the process of integration is not necessarily one-directional. Linkages can cause both spillover and spill-back effects. Achieving agreement on intra-Bloc trade patterns does not mean experiences will always be positive. They can also be negative. Inconvenient imbalances for a majority coalition of actors, if not resolved, ca result in the undoing of linkages, as the earlier EAC experienced demonstrated where a rapid rise in intra-East African trade resulted in severely unbalanced benefits and negative effects and the eventual dissolution of the Community (Nye 1966). Conflicts, like the ongoing EAC disagreement on staff recruitment and Rwandan-Ugandan tensions that threaten to split partner unity, will, no doubt, be unavoidable.

On the other hand, elite socialization, whereby stakeholders become conscious of welfare implications of regional integration, is recognized as a particularly important mechanism in overcoming obstruction by groups that are often most resistant to loss of national power. Specifically, bureaucrats in state governments or protected enterprise sectors who perceive a loss of power as the regional center and economic entities become more empowered may be less antagonistic if exposed to convergent attitudes favoring systemic integration. As in the early attempt at forming a Community, the ability of certain elites to support or derail integration depends on the concentration of their power (Nye 1966). Insecure, nationalistic, demagogues may view integration as a threat under conditions they view as unfavorable (e.g., loss of personal wealth, power, and ability to distribute largesse). For the purpose of examining integrative influences, elites who control economic policy decision-making are the level of interest and the changing settings over time that influences the effective power over policy as determined by pressures arising from internal and external influences (e.g., evolving economic environments, labor and political power brokers, international conditions).

In the earlier EAC period, member states lacked technical capacity, exhibited disparate and conflicting values, and lack capacity the ability to respond to perceptions of inequality). Although today's member states' integrative potential, structural conditions, and process mechanisms have evolved considerably and reflect 50 years of global change, successful integration is not guaranteed. Ideas and interests are not necessarily linear, as the United Kingdom BREXIT experience illustrates.

The UK referendum to leave the European Union (dubbed BREXIT) in 2016 raised doubts about the stainability of other regional integration schemes. The UK departure from the EU in 2020 raised questions about the long-term sustainability of the regulatory and institutional architecture governing international economic relations. The Eurozone crisis of BREXIT came amidst various challenges posed by the many crises in Europe in the last two decades (the global recession beginning in 2008 and resulting financial and debt crises, refugee crises, security crises from terrorist attacks, conflicts on the borders, political instability, and rising nationalism). These issues highlighted disparities within the Eurozone in terms of national endowments, socio-economic heterogeneity, and geographical fragmentation.

Similar to the EU's experience, Africa's attempt to launch a continental-wide economic integration zone faces myriad problems arising from disparate national situations. Moreover, Africa is also employing differentiated integration phases to give countries that are less economically developed more time to achieve objectives (e.g., tariff liberalization schemes). The rationale being that progress toward integration by a growing number of member states will benefit all members through increased trade and spillover effects. On the other hand, just as in the EU, significant interests and priorities between nations could potentially engender significant tensions. But for now, the momentum for integration within the AfCFTA is proceeding, no doubt better informed by the BREXIT experience. In addition to the potential economic benefits, like the EU whose impact exceeds the sum of its parts, a unified Africa operating collectively is able to exert greater influence and power than 54 independent nations,

The process of developing higher levels of integration with more robust institutions and greater economic interdependence involves letting go of traditional sources of national control is ameliorated as perceived benefits of increased national wealth become more apparent and appreciated by various stakeholders. The increased interest in joining the EAC since the original three countries (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) resulting in expanded membership to seven (Rwanda, Burundi, South Sunday, and the DRC) exhibits the four main categories of issues shaping the integration process identified by Tang (2013) – 1) Politicization – as securitization, trade, and infrastructure agreements aimed to resolve conflicting interests, 2) Redistribution - as greater parity between former competitors accrue with improving welfare and collective strength, 3) Sovereignty – as loss of some options in the interest of greater absolute benefits replaces interest in relative gains, and 4) Externalization — greater influence from external actors facilitate norm-transfer, capacity building, and produce cohesive forces for coalition building.

Nye's (1970) conclusion that integration would slow down rather than accelerate over time, especially in less developed areas, would seem to hold in terms of the continental-wide free trade area where after the initial flurry of signature through 2020, the process of coming to a final agreement on some aspects, for example, rules of origin, have yet to be finalized (although have which are 87% completed). On the other hand, integration in Sub-Saharan Africa is clearly deepening, most notably in East Africa (problems notwithstanding). The addition of the DRC to the EAC in December 2021 has already stimulated trade agreements, infrastructure development financing, and security cooperation operations to eradicate trade-inhibiting violent armed groups in eastern DRC.

Steady progress in the AfCFTA and deepening interdependence in the EAC are indicative of the changes that have taken place since the falling out between EAC members five decades ago. Nye (1970) contends that the process mechanisms that bring about transformation take time for several reasons. First, successful integration requires support from a cohort strong enough to bring pressure to bear sufficient enough to influence national policymakers. Second, the more difficult issues to agree upon typically are facilitated by liberalization concerns and market mechanisms (e.g., entrepreneurial resources, infrastructure), the lack of which generally complicates finding common ground. Third, issues of insecurity and identity have the strongest ability to undermine integrative efforts, Therefore, collaboration in security cooperation is more likely to occur when leaders have clear overriding common interests which translate to cooperation in integrative efforts rather than on the basis of ideology and security concerns.

To garner support, potential costs incurred in the process of integration must be balanced by perceived benefits. Above all, time is needed to work through issues, negotiate, and build capacity to make realistic economic policies in order to mitigate risk.

The evident increasing complex integration following decades of slow progress at the regional level since the original EAC failure provides evidence that popular support has grown, in no small part because of a growing middle and entrepreneurial class. Nye (1966) identified the lack of a private sector and pressure groups with a vested interest in the success of the EAC's earlier version contributed to its demise. What Nye (1970) described as lacking then -- 'widespread popular support or powerful coalition of intensely concerned interests' -- appears to have developed today to the degree that it has become a significant force influencing the decisions of government leaders. EAC integration had its roots in the colonial period wherein the United Kingdom initiated cooperative control measures between its three English-speaking colonies, Kenya, Uganda, and eventually Tanganyika (Tanzania's precursor). Unfair distribution of integration benefits created a rift between the countries in the earlier period and continues to disrupt cooperation today. However, unlike the earlier period, states have developed in terms of government capacity as well as through growing interest groups that influence government decision-making. While these influences are not necessarily always beneficial, they do provide a balance to the rent-seeking tendencies of the undeveloped African states of the 20th century. International norms of good governance practices (e.g., transparency, anti-corruption, human resource-oriented) have created space for economic growth and development that has allowed integration to proceed, albeit slowly. This integration is difficult but necessary for economic growth and providing resources for development. And today, countries are better prepared to create policies and processes to mitigate risks and take advantage of opportunities (e.g., developing the Southern Corridor from Tanzania's cost through Rwanda to the DRC). As a result, differences in Kenya's and Tanzania's economic interests within the earlier bloc, powered by divergent ideology and external influences inhibited coordination on EAC institutions. Presently, there is greater convergence in interests in creating economic growth through trade in the EAC, leading to cooperation in building institutional structures such as the Single Customs Territory. Although pursuit of national economic interests continues to dominate individual strategies, mutually beneficial interests are more apparent as countries have built state capacities for achieving comparative advantages, therefore creating opportunities for cooperation in integration processes.

Nye (1970) cautions that observers may overstate the difficult process of integration if the perspective is restricted to a short time frame. That noted, there is no doubt that greater difficulties are inherent in the process of integration in less developed countries. As this dissertation demonstrates, using a neo-institutional model can serve as a useful tool for analyzing the transformation of ideas (Pan-African independence to complex interdependence), interests (from national sovereignty to regional economic growth and development), and institutions (export commodity-driven economies to intraregional free trade supported by capacity building policies, investment attractive environments, and strategic infrastructure development). A comparative analysis of the evolution of the East African Community serves as a useful example for identifying, explaining, and mitigating the inherent problems and progress in converting disparate interests into formal institutions and the degree to which planning and negotiating are more or less substantive, depending on state capacity and interest in comprehensive integration.

If appropriately applied, the frameworks and institutions of the AU's Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) and the newly enacted African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) are generally assessed to likely achieve its objectives of enhancing regional integration, inter-continental trade, economic growth, and social welfare and development. Nevertheless, although regional integration may be deepening; successful resolution of mistrust and competition is not linear, nor is it inevitable. Conflicts, such as the ongoing EAC disagreement on staff recruitment and Rwandan-Ugandan tensions that threaten to split partner unity, will, no doubt, be unavoidable.

Elements of neo-institutionalism encapsulated by the ideational aspirations of Pan-Africanism, interests of peace and prosperity identified by Agenda 2063, and embodied by the institutions of infrastructure and the AfCFTA, for the present, indicate African transition on the path to transformation. It may be early in a new era of cooperation, yet programs, policies, and political outreach to institutionalize integration in East Africa are indications of government progress to advance a concept of mutual interest in 'making sure the environment is suitable for the private sector to do business.' (EAC Chairman 2021).

The findings in this dissertation highlight the interaction between state-building and economic cooperation is fundamental to economic development. State-building processes -- creating professional bureaucracies to manage efficient economic and securitization functions can help create capacities that can spill over into other arenas. Economic cooperation in Africa has been delayed by the lack of state capacity; however, expanding professional and business sectors in Africa is beginning to influence policies and programs necessary for economic development. State-building is fundamentally good governance. It remains to be seen if resources allocation will improve enough to significantly improve productivity and investment for the region as a whole to achieve middle income status to take advantage of the potential population dividend. Without good governance, economic development, poverty reduction, and progress on the emergence of a middle-class throughout the continent is unlikely. A large, vibrant middle class is essential for sustainable democratization. Regional integration, which can confer mutually supportive institutions and policies that enhance economic growth as well as peacekeeping capabilities, can play an important for reducing state fragility and creating conditions conducive to norm transfer and greater economic development.

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