U.S. Relationships with Iran, Israel, and Pakistan: A Realist Explanation

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The University of Southern Mississippi

U.S. RELATIONSHIPS WITH IRAN, ISRAEL, AND PAKISTAN:
A REALIST EXPLANATION

by

Aaron Daniel Coates

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate School
of the University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts

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May 2014
ABSTRACT

U.S. RELATIONSHIPS WITH IRAN, ISRAEL, AND PAKISTAN:
A REALIST EXPLANATION

by Aaron Daniel Coates

May 2014

The purpose of this work is to assess U.S. relations with Iran, Israel, and Pakistan throughout the Cold War into the contemporary age of Islamic extremism. It demonstrates how the international relations theory of realism is most applicable to these relations when compared to the four competing theories of neorealism, liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism. Each case study is examined and evaluated in full detail. Particular emphasis is allotted to variables such as foreign aid, interventionism, sanctions, geography, and political and cultural similarities. The thesis concludes by offering a brief explanation as to the lessons that should be learned from these relations. Ultimately, this work seeks to serve as a guideline for U.S. foreign policy-makers.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer would like to thank Dr. Robert Pauly, the thesis chairman, and the
other committee members Dr. Tom Lansford and Dr. Joseph St. Marie, for their advice
and support throughout the duration of this project. I would especially like to thank Dr.
Ngoc Phan, Dr. Marie Leonard, and Jack Covarrubias for their advice on how to handle
the mental fatigue and experience of a thesis process.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to assess the extent to which U.S. relations with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan are best explained by realist theoretical precepts. The theory of realism as promulgated by Hans Morgenthau in his 2005 work, *Politics Among Nations*, is the most effective theory of International Relations (IR) in explaining U.S. policies toward these states. With that approach as its foundation, the thesis will address the following research question: To what extent does the theory of realism effectively explain the U.S. relationships with and policies toward Israel, Iran, and Pakistan, respectively, from 1948-2012? In response to that question, the thesis will present and assess the extent of the validity of the following central argument. From 1948-2012, U.S. relations with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan have been conditioned by the degree to which each state actor behaved in ways that are supportive of, rather than detrimental to, America’s most significant national interests. Although the direction of U.S. policies toward these states has shifted on the basis of unfolding events at given historical junctures, realism has driven U.S. policy throughout the above period.

Unfortunately for Israel, Iran, and Pakistan (or, fortunately, in those cases where U.S. policies were beneficial to these states’ interests), U.S. cooperation was never anything more than a means to consolidate American influence within the region. Economic and security incentives, along with competing entities, have motivated U.S. foreign policy initiatives within the Greater Middle East. For the purpose of the thesis, the Greater Middle East extends from the states of North Africa in the west through the heart of the region as far as Turkey in the north to Central and South Asia in the east.
These competing entities included the Soviet Union, state sponsors of terrorism such as the regimes of the Taliban in Afghanistan, President Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran along with transnational terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and domestic and regionally oriented ones such as Hamas or Hezbollah. In order to gain a better understanding about why U.S. policies toward these states are most credibly explained by realism, instead of neorealism, liberalism, neo-liberal institutionalism, or constructivism, one must be familiar with each of these five strains of IR theory.

The balance of the thesis addresses the research question and assesses the extent of the validity of the central argument through the presentation of seven related chapters. The first of those chapters (Chapter II) is the literature review. A literature review generally focuses on considering the critical points of current knowledge including substantive findings as well as theoretical and methodological contributions to a particular topic. Hence, a literature review is a secondary source, and as such, does not report any new or original experimental work. Its main goals are to situate the current study within the body of existing literature and to provide context for the particular reader (Cooper, 1998; Galvan, 2009).

Within this thesis, the literature review seeks to differentiate between five competing IR theories: realism, neorealism, liberalism, neo-liberal institutionalism, and constructivism. However, its ultimate goal is to demonstrate why the theory of realism is most effective in describing behavioral interactions within the international system. The other theoretical models that will be used throughout the literature review serve as paradigms of countering examples and critiques relative to realism.
The second of those chapters (Chapter III) is the methodology section. This is a guideline system that is used for solving problems, consisting of specific components such as phases, tasks, methods, techniques, and tools. A methodological approach often includes multiple methods, each as applied to various facets of the whole scope of the methodology. Normally, research is either qualitative or quantitative in orientation (Berg, 2008; Silverman, 2004).

For the purpose of this thesis, the methodology intends to define case study analysis and display how it is useful in regard to explaining U.S. relationships with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan. This section is designed to show why case studies are the most effective technique for the given study, but also to identify the weaknesses that can be associated with case study analysis. Further, it provides a brief and descriptive overview of what each case study will discuss throughout the body of work.

The main body of the thesis includes three chapters, with Chapter IV focusing on the U.S.-Israeli relationship from 1948-2012, Chapter V focusing on the U.S.-Iranian relationship from 1948-2012, and Chapter VI focusing on the U.S.-Pakistani relationship from 1948-2012. As pertains to this work, the central purpose of the body text is to incorporate each case study with an in-depth analysis that centers upon the significance of each individual study. This section seeks to explore the relationships that the United States shares with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan. The body text represents the whole of this thesis, covering and situating the far majority of literature within its rightful perspective.

The penultimate chapter (Chapter VII) is the qualitative comparative analysis. This type of technique is used to mitigate the problems created by making causal inferences on the basis of only a small number of cases. The method attempts to
maximize the number of comparisons that can be made across the cases under investigation. Consequently, the technique allows for the analysis of multiple causation and interaction effects (Engelstad, Ragnvlad, & Brochman, 1997; Rihoux & Ragin, 2008).

With regard to this work, the qualitative comparative analysis focuses on the United States’ relationship with three distinct cases: those associated with its relationship with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan from 1948-2012. This chapter provides a descriptive overview of how and why these different relationships possess underlying similarities along with profound contrasts. While the technicalities of each relationship are placed into a comparative perspective, the theory of realism is used to establish an overarching theme that outlines and explains the entirety of these complex relationships.

Chapter VIII concludes the thesis. This chapter brings the reader back to the purpose of the thesis, revisiting and assessing the extent of the validity of the central argument. Also, it draws all the points together before making a final comment on the result of the argument. Often, this final statement points toward some consequence that the discussion may have for the future or makes an observation about what the discussion has revealed on a more general level (Benjamin, 1969; Lopate, 1997).

Relating to this work, the central purpose of the conclusion is to reconnect its stated goals with those mentioned in the introduction. This section reemphasizes Hans Morgenthau’s core ideals that are associated with realism, the critiques of adversarial IR theories, U.S. relations with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan, and the overarching explanation that can be linked to the research question. It helps to elaborate upon the objective that is the primary focus of this thesis.
If U.S. relations with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan are driven by realist theoretical precepts, then one must wonder as to what this means from a broader perspective. These same precepts can be applied to U.S. relations with other countries around the globe. It becomes safe to assume that U.S. foreign policy is strictly guided by incentives that promote its own national interests. For the most effective outcome of future U.S. international dilemmas, foreign policy should focus on what particular states within given strategic regions are willing to cooperate in accordance with U.S. policies and goals.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Realism is an IR theory that centers upon four primary propositions. First, realists firmly believe in the notion that the international system is anarchic by nature. While there are no actors above states capable of regulating their behavioral interactions, states must arrive at relations with other states on their own, rather than being dictated by higher controlling entities. In addition, the international system is perceived to be a venue that embraces ordinary potential conflicts and hostilities between competing states. Second, states are labeled as the most significant, influential actors within the international system. Third, all states within the international system are considered to be unitary, rational actors. States have habitual tendencies of pursuing their own self-interests. They attempt to achieve these interests by comparatively maximizing their power relative to those of other states. Fourth, the core concern of all states is national security via survival. States amass as much military power as possible in order to ensure their chances of survival (Morgenthau, 2005; Waltz, 2001).

In order to gain a better understanding of realism as a theory, one must become familiar with Hans Morgenthau’s (2005) six principles of political realism, which he initially promulgated in Politics Among Nations in 1948.

First, politics, like society in general, are governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society, it is first necessary to understand the laws by which the members of society live. The operation of these laws being impervious to one’s preferences, human beings will challenge them only at the risk of failure. Second, the main signpost that helps political realism
to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion. Without such a concept a theory of politics, international or domestic, would be altogether impossible, for without it, one could not distinguish between political and nonpolitical facts, nor would it be possible to bring at least a measure of systematic order to the political sphere.

Third, the concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it is not endowed with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place. Classical Greek historian Thucydides' statement, born of the experiences of ancient Greece, "identity of interests is the surest of bonds, whether between states or individuals," was taken up in the nineteenth century by Lord Salisbury's remark that "the only bond of union that endures" among nations is "the absence of all clashing interests." Fourth, political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action. And it is unwilling to gloss over and obliterate that tension and thus to obfuscate both the moral and the political issue by making it appear as though the stark facts of politics could be morally more satisfying than they actually are, and the moral law less exacting than it actually is. Fifth,
political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular state with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All states are tempted, and few have been able to resist the temptation, for long, to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe. To know that states are subject to the moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in relations among states is quite another. There is a world of difference between the belief that all states stand under the judgment of God, inscrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one's side and that what one wills oneself cannot fail to be willed by God also. Sixth, the difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound. However, although the theory of political realism may have been misunderstood and misinterpreted, there is no gainsaying its distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to political matters. (pp. 3-15)

In summary, realists believe that humankind is not inherently benevolent, but rather self-centered and competitive. This perspective views human nature as egocentric and conflicting, unless there are conditions under which humans can coexist peacefully and harmoniously. However, due to the anarchical nature of the international system, this idea becomes nothing more than a mere illusion (Morgenthau, 2005; Waltz, 2001).

As realists believe that sovereign states are the principal actors in the international system, special attention is afforded to large powers because they possess the highest degree of influence such as imposing behavioral regimes on the world stage. International organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational
corporations, individuals, and other sub-state actors are viewed as having a marginal extent of independent influence. States are inherently belligerent and are obsessed with their internal security. Territorial expansion is only mitigated by adversarial powers who are constantly attempting to respond against this mode of imperialism. However, these forms of aggression eventually lead toward security dilemmas whereby increasing one’s security level elicits even greater instability as oppositional forces build up their own militant arsenals. Consequently, security becomes a zero-sum game where only relative gains can be considered as true victories (Morgenthau, 2005; Waltz, 2001).

Realists believe there are no universal principles that guide states’ actions. Instead, states must constantly be aware of other states’ actions around them and use a pragmatic approach to resolve conflicts as they occur. States are responsible for accommodating themselves toward changing circumstances within the international system (Morgenthau, 2005; Waltz, 2001).

The realist tradition, whose roots trace back to ancient Greece, has always had a strong thread of what may legitimately be called scientific thinking within its confines. Drawing on analyses of human nature, arguments about the necessary structure of international relations and laws of political behavior, realists have quite frequently posed as the clear-eyed apostles of objective reason. Realists seek to challenge the deluded idealism of their fellow men (Forde, 1995).

In light of realist tradition, the notion that power is the predominant currency and self-interest the predominant motivation among states, presupposes the negation of competing moral outlooks. For most earlier realists, this is the defining aspect of realism. Its fundamental opposition to moral idealism characterizes realism in a most literal sense.
Consequently, it is through this manner that realism can be classified as a derivative to moral idealism (Forde, 1995).

Early realists embed the scientific elements of their theories in rich and comprehensive analyses of human nature and domestic as well as international, political practice. In this respect, their approaches are *classical*, rather than simple anticipations of the contemporary scientific approach. As this makes them impossible to operationalize, they become less abstract at the same time (Forde, 1995).

The classical realists thought it imperative to explore human nature because their understanding of it directly affects their view of realism as a theory. The precise character of the compulsions that anarchy exerts on states, the urgency of the threats raised by it, and the prospects for its melioration are all deeply affected by their perspective of human nature. At a more philosophical level, classical realists’ interpretation of human nature may affect their view of whether or not the threats caused by it ought to be ameliorated. If human beings are simply beasts, there is no reason why they should not live by the law of the jungle (Forde, 1995).

Niccolo Machiavelli, a prominent classical realist, does not attribute the international security dilemma solely to anarchy but rather to an addiction of domination that all men seek to possess. Anarchy poses a threat to states only because of the way certain impulses of human nature express themselves within it. In fact, Machiavelli relies on appeals to human nature and ambition, rather than structure, to drive his realist argument. The “desire to acquire” (as cited in Forde, 1995, p. 147), which implies imperial ambition in this context, is now a natural impulse in its own right. He maintains that there is no valid moral objection to it. Following this thought to its conclusion,
imperial ambition is considered a force that ought to be liberated on its own account, wholly apart from the security dilemma that may also be used as a means of justification (Forde, 1995).

The most extensive argument for realism in Thucydides’ book is given by the imperial Athenians. Speaking of their own case, the Athenians assert that they were forced to take up their empire first by fear, then honor, and finally self-interest. Their position is that these compulsions are universal, ensuring that every state with the requisite power will become expansionists. The Athenians put fear first among the compulsions in this context because they are speaking about the beginning of their empire, which originated as a defensive alliance against the Persians. When reformulating their argument moments later, as a general law of human behavior, they place honor first, followed by fear, and then self-interest (Forde, 1995).

Although fear may explain the beginning of Athenian imperialism, it is not enough to account for the general law they describe later: “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must” (as cited in Forde, 1995, p. 147). Honor and self-interest are necessary to account for this entity. These impulses are rooted in human nature, independent of the structural imperatives of international politics (Forde, 1995).

Building on realism, neorealism is an IR theory that centers upon the existence of structural constraints within the international system. These constraints are used to explain international politics rather than strategies or motivations that derive from inherent human behavior. Only states whose outcomes fall within an expected range are capable of their own survival (Mearsheimer, 2003; Waltz, 1979).
Neorealist scholars believe that the international system is anarchical and the structure of the system drives the behavior of the states interacting therein. The number of great powers along with their capabilities within the international system is symbolic of this notion of competent distribution. Not only is there a lack of formal central authority within the international system, but all states inherit the status of being equally sovereign. States are forced to act in a self-help system, in which their own interests are prioritized over those of other competing actors across the globe (Mearsheimer, 2003; Waltz, 1979).

According to neorealism, states are constantly striving to increase their chances of survival, a necessity for states before they can begin pursuit toward other goals. States develop offensive military capabilities for foreign interventionism and to accumulate relative power. Since there is a significant lack of trust that exists between states within the international system, they must always remain on guard against relative losses of power in which rivaling states could threaten their internal security. Hence, the international system becomes defined by uncertainty and witnesses the emergence of a transcontinental security dilemma (Mearsheimer, 2003; Waltz, 1979).

Neorealism, which is more appropriately labeled structural realism, seeks to explain international conflict and war in terms of the imperatives imposed on states by an inherently insecure, anarchical environment. It is the dynamics of the system which compel states to behave in certain ways if they wish to survive, and survival is assumed to be the minimum objective of all states. In reality, neorealism provides a situational explanation of state behavior. States seek to maintain or expand their influence because they are forced to do so by the logic of the system. This type of explanation significantly
varies when compared to the classical realist viewpoint, which is centered on behavior motivated by *human nature* (Shimko, 1992).

The core of neorealism is not merely an attempt to make classical realism more rigorous, but rather a fundamental reconceptualization of international political dynamics. Its formulation of the security dilemma embodied in game theory does not assume that some of the actors are out to exploit others as it is agnostic on this issue. The only neorealist assumption rests on the possibility of being exploited, as opposed to an innate desire of world domination (Shimko, 1992).

The fear of the neorealists is imposed on states by the situation in which they find themselves. Fear is the product of circumstance and situation, not a fundamental feature of human existence. Consequently, struggle may exist nonetheless. However, what produces the struggle is different and its character is less likely to be amenable to resolution (Shimko, 1992).

Neorealism represents an attempt to refine classical realism and place it on a more *scientific* footing. Classical realism is too fuzzy and intuitive for those schooled in the methodologies of modern political science. Some attribute neorealist emergence to a behavioralist distaste for the unempirical and untestable elements of classical realism, particularly its assumptions about the nature of man. From another perspective, neorealism is classified as a product of efforts to *systematize* the insights of classical realism into a more rigorous theory of international politics (Shimko, 1992).

The elimination of assumptions about human nature produces a version of realism bereft of its conservative philosophical roots. A form of realism based on the rational choice model is created, falling well within the liberal paradigm. Although neorealism is
occasionally criticized for the apparently pessimistic implications of its analysis of international conflict, upon closer examination one detects a residual basis for optimism. The extent to which this optimism is stressed or suppressed varies, but it can be easily construed as optimistic if necessary (Shimko, 1992).

Neorealism represents an attempt to devise a theory of international relations on structural grounds such as international anarchy and the distribution of power. Neorealists reject attempts to explain the central phenomena of international relations by referring to features and characteristics of states or individuals. Instead, they treat states as self-interested, rational, unitary entities whose tendencies toward conflict or cooperation are primarily a function of systemic forces such as anarchy, power distributions, and the presence or absence of factors that inhibit or exacerbate the conflictual consequences of anarchy (Shimko, 1992).

John Mearsheimer (2003), who is known best for his “offensive” neorealist position, argues:

What drives the ongoing power struggle between states is a search for security forced by the anarchic structure of the international system, rather than human nature. When all states have capabilities for doing each other harm, each is driven to amass as much power as possible in order to be secure against attack. The search for power and security is insatiable, or without limits. Status quo powers are rarely found in world politics. The international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the
costs. Ultimately, states aim to become hegemons in the international system. (p. 21)

Offensive realism seems to predict much more conflict and war, as states are never satisfied with their current power statuses. They continue to compete for infinite power, and conflict becomes inevitable. States are constantly threatened by fear, and, in turn, pursue all measures that enable their imminent security (Snyder, 2002).

Mearsheimer (2003) asserts:

States with marked power advantages over their rivals will behave more aggressively when compared to powerful opponents. Mostly, this is because powerful states have both the capability and incentive to act accordingly. As states accumulate power, their marginal costs of further accumulation decline and marginal benefits increase, so that future increments are subject to increasing returns. (p. 37)

Like classical realists, Mearsheimer (2003) assumes:

The international system is anarchic, great powers possess some offensive capabilities, states can not be certain of others’ actions, actors are rational, and survival is the primary goal. (pp. 30-31) Great powers will fear each other and will constantly seek to alleviate this fear by maximizing their share of world power. States are disposed to think offensively toward other states even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short, great powers are seen as “maximizers” of their potential power, and display this by behaving with aggressive intentions. (p. 34)
According to Mearsheimer (2003):
States are never content with their degree of power because what may seem to be a satisfactory security level today might not be sufficient in the future. Great powers recognize that the best way to ensure security is to “achieve hegemony now,” thereby eliminating any possibility of a future deficit. Thus, great powers require a surplus of power over “appropriateness” to cover uncertainties, possible miscalculation, and future surprises. (pp. 34-35)

Kenneth Waltz (1979), who is famous for his defensive neorealist position, asserts:

There are limits as to how much power states strive to obtain. The international structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power. Instead, it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the main goal of states. (p. 126)

According to Waltz (1979):
In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely pursue other goals, such as tranquility, profit, and power. The first concern of states is not to maximize power, but to maintain their positions in the system. Survival can be assured with power that falls well short of the “hegemonic” amount. (p. 126)

Waltz’s (1989) defensive realism seems to predict:
Less war and conflict will occur in the international system. States are less fearful, more accepting of risks, more oriented toward particular nonsecurity interests, and more willing to live with only a modest amount of security.
Sensible statesmen pursue only an “appropriate” degree of power, given their security needs. (p. 40)

Waltz (1979) argues:

At some point well short of hegemony, power accumulation runs into diminishing marginal returns, until costs begin to exceed benefits and security purchases fade to nothing. The primary aim of states is to balance power, rather than maximize it. States can seldom afford to make maximum power their goal, as international politics is too risky of an arena. In other words, after a state has balanced against a dangerous opponent and thereby achieved a satisfactory degree of security, there is no further need for power accumulation. (p. 127)

Defensive realists accept that the international system is anarchic, great powers possess some offensive capabilities, states cannot be certain of others’ actions, actors are rational, and survival as their primary goal. They articulate that while great powers become apprehensive of each other, this fear gradually subsides as these powers seek to balance their fraction of world power. In addition, they see states as being reactionary to other states, as their primary goal is survival. Generally speaking, great powers are perceived to have limitations on power maximization and display this by behaving with non-aggressive intentions (Snyder, 2002).

There are four key differences between realism and neorealism. First, while realists locate the roots of international conflict and war in an imperfect human nature, neorealist scholars maintain that its deep causes are found in the structure of the anarchic international system. Second, in contrast to neorealism, the state is ontologically superior to the system in realism, allowing more space for agency in the former approach. Third,
while realists differentiate between status-quo powers and revisionist powers, neorealist academics regard states as unitary actors. Fourth, as realism confines its analyses to subjective valuations of international relations, neorealism attempts to construct a more rigorous and scientific approach to the study of international politics (Morgenthau, 2005; Pashakhanlou, 2009; Waltz, 1979).

Morgenthau (2005), a lauded realist thinker, preaches that the most important material aspect of power is armed forces, but even more significant is a nation’s character, morale, and quality of governance. In addition, he believes that power can be defined by anything that establishes and maintains the power of man over man, ranging from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. On a final note, he contends that although power tends to be equated with material strength, especially of a military nature, it can also be imposed via more immaterial aspects (Morgenthau, 2005; Pashakhanlou, 2009).

However, Waltz (1979), the seminal neorealist thinker, offers a considerably thinner definition of power than Morgenthau. His estimation of power includes components such as the size of a population and its territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence. Even though he evidently privileges material factors, non-material dimensions of power are also present in his theory as manifested by his emphasis on political stability and competence. The reason for the predominant emphasis on materialism is because of his commitment to scientific realism. He limits his definition of power to mainly tangible variables as they are much easier to quantify (Pashakhanlou, 2009; Waltz, 1979).
There are vast differences between Morgenthau and Waltz in their definitions of power. Since soft power trumps hard power in the former thinker’s account, both scholars’ understanding of power poses a fundamental anomaly to the orthodox view. In this respect, the latter thinker’s position is far easier to reconcile with the traditional view. Indeed, Waltz’s rather narrow conception of power is predominantly, but not entirely materialistic (Morgenthau, 2005; Pashakhanlou, 2009; Waltz, 1979).

Liberalism is an IR theory that centers upon the idea of states using their own internal political philosophies to guide them in foreign policy decision-making processes. For instance, liberals who believe that ending poverty within their own state is a necessity may couple this notion with tackling poverty across the entire globe. These sorts of idealist beliefs are mirrored by cosmopolitan approaches that favor the building of international institutions within the international system (Doyle, 2011; Kant, 2007; Markwell, 2006).

Liberalism holds that state preferences, as opposed to state capabilities, are the primary determinant of state behavior. Unlike realism, liberalism allows for plurality in state actions. Preferences will vary from state to state, depending on factors such as culture and types of economic and political systems such as capitalism, communism, democracy, or authoritarianism. In addition, this theory heavily stresses the fact that interaction between states within the international system is not strictly confined by security incentives. Rather, whether through commercial firms, organizations, or individuals, state interactions are also likely to encounter and embrace cultural diversity. Instead of an international system based upon anarchy, opportunities for cooperation and interdependence become readily available via absolute gains. This implies that the
The international system is a non-zero-sum game in which comparative advantages do not drive state behavior. As states achieve eternal peace within the international system, wealth becomes fully maximized across the global continent (Doyle, 2011; Kant, 2007; Markwell, 2006).

The democratic peace theory argues that liberal democracies have never engaged in any kind of major warfare against each other. Liberals believe that democracies conduct diplomacy very differently from totalitarian regimes. Consequently, the international system continues to be plagued by dissent and conflict. However, if authoritarian states can learn to adjust their foreign policies within a more modern context, then peace becomes reality over illusion (Doyle, 2011; Kant, 2007; Markwell, 2006).

Realism is a perspective dominated by cynicism, and perhaps can best be exemplified in the tenants of pragmatism and amorality. Its scholars place each state in the position of having to closely observe the actions of neighbors to resolve problems effectively, without regard to moral concerns. In conclusion, realists believe that the creep of morality into international relations handicaps players from adapting to new conditions (Hudson, 2010; Morgenthau, 2005).

Though it may be an oversimplification, one can argue that liberalism’s chief distinction is its assertion that peace is possible and can result from interdependence. Liberalism asserts that the preferences of states as manifest in their cultural, economic, and political entities determine their actions on the international stage. If two or more states share preferences, their aligned interests may result in absolute gains from cooperation (Hudson, 2010; Kant, 2007).
While realists tend to focus on either the individual or international levels, liberals tend to focus on the state level, believing that a certain type of domestic arrangement will lead to better international behavior. The idea of nation-building is, if a state can cobble together a favorable domestic climate in a previously hostile country, it will have a new ally or, at least, a far less hostile state. Realism’s focus on the individual and international levels would tend to reject the nation-building concept as one cannot change individuals without an initiative originating from them, and no amount of domestic alteration will change the overall international forces. Regardless of the intentions behind nation-building, the outcome is uncontrollable (Hudson, 2010; Kant, 2007; Morgenthau, 2005).

Neoliberal institutionalism is an IR theory that centers upon institution building within the international system. Neoliberal scholars are interested with how international institutions can arrange jointly lucrative compromises and negotiations amongst international actors. Therefore, the possibility of mutual wins becomes more than a reality across the globe (Keohane, 2005; Keohane & Nye, 2011).

In order to gain a better understanding about neoliberal institutionalism, one must become familiar with the idea of complex interdependence. Put forth by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the book *Power and Interdependence* in 2011, this ideal centers on the notion that states and their fortunes are inextricably bound together. The two scholars argue that while the various transnational connections and interdependencies between states are increasing, the use of military force and power balancing are decreasing but remain critical to state behavior. Complex interdependence is characterized by the use of multiple channels of action between societies in interstate and transnational relations, the
absence of a hierarchy of issues with changing agendas and linkages between issues prioritized, and the objective of bringing about a decline in the use of military force and coercive power in international relations (Keohane & Nye, 2011).

While neoliberal institutionalism as a theory does not discredit the presence of anarchy within the international system, it argues that the significance and effect of anarchy has been far too accentuated by realist thinkers. Neoliberals believe that there are many forms of cooperative behavior in existence within the decentralized international system. This type of behavior emerges through the building of norms, regimes, and institutions, regardless of an anarchic international system that is characterized by autonomous rational actors who seek self-help mechanisms. Although neoliberals agree with realists in considering states and their interests as the primary subjects of analysis, the former argues that it has a wider conception of these interests in comparison to the latter (Keohane, 2005; Keohane & Nye, 2011).

Neoliberals do not deny the existence of cases that involve extreme conflict. However, they do not see them as the entire or even a representative picture of world politics. In many cases, and in many areas, states are able to work together to mitigate the effects of anarchy, produce mutual gains, and avoid shared harm (Jervis, 1999).

In general, neoliberal institutionalism argues that there is much more potential cooperation in the international system, which states fail to recognize. The extent of conflict in world politics is avoidable in the sense of actors failing to agree when their preferences overlap. Neoliberals believe that changes are feasible and required in order to reduce the amount of conflict that takes place across the international stage (Jervis, 1999).
Neoliberals believe that changes in preferences over strategies usually are sufficient to produce mutual benefit. Much of this change can come by more and better information, such as information about the situation, information about what the other side has done and why it has done it, and information about what the other side is likely to do in the future. States can cooperate by reducing transaction costs, and, in turn, the successful reduction of such costs can facilitate cooperation. Institutions can play a large role here, and this helps explain why institutionalized cooperation can persevere, even when the initially propitious conditions have disappeared (Jervis, 1999).

Often, more fine-grained distinctions about preferences are required to understand what needs to change for the purpose of increased cooperation. Because states have ladders of means-ends beliefs, some preferences over outcomes are, from a broader perspective, preferences over strategies. Thus, many conflicts can be seen as both an avoidable security dilemma and the product of irreconcilable differences (Jervis, 1999).

Neoliberal institutionalists stress the role of institutions, broadly defined as enduring patterns of shared expectations of behavior that have received some degree of formal assent. Institutions are the product of states’ interests and the constraints imposed by the system, which influence whether states should cooperate. Hence, neoliberals believe that establishing institutions help to increase cooperation between states (Jervis, 1999).

Neoliberal institutionalism holds that all states are different and that preferences, in part, arise internally. To the extent that this is correct, international arrangements can alter the power, beliefs, and goals of groups in society in ways that will affect foreign relations. Thus, arms control agreements can strengthen the hands of doves, lowered
tariff barriers can drive out inefficient producers, and an expanded NATO can give reformers in Eastern Europe greater influence on the world stage (Jervis, 1999).

According to Robert Keohane, who is a lauded neo-liberal institutionalist thinker, realists tend to view international relations through a Hobbesian lens, in which world politics is compared to a state of war. While states compete with each other for power and influence, due to the lack of an authoritative government that can enact and enforce rules of behavior, the international system remains anarchic. Within this realist interpretation, the prevailing discord results from fundamental conflicts between the interests of states in a condition of anarchy. Realists deny the importance of transnational norms and rule structures as causal factors in state behavior. Instead, they perceive such norms and rule structures to be mere reflections of the interests of powerful states (Keohane, 2005; Morgenthau, 2005).

At the other extreme, neo-liberal institutionalism asserts that shared economic interests create a harmony of interests among states, which, in turn, generate a demand for international institutions and rules that states will voluntarily agree to follow. Keohane attacks realism by divulging its ignorance about the possibility of cooperation between states. Perhaps, more importantly, rather than basing his opinion on wishful-thinking, from Keohane’s perspective, there is solid empirical evidence of this cooperative notion in modern international relations (Keohane, 2005; Keohane & Nye, 2011).

Constructivism is an IR theory that centers upon historically and socially contingent aspects of international relations, as opposed to the inevitable consequences of human nature or other significant attributes related to world politics. Constructivism
seeks to demonstrate how core elements of international relations are socially constructed via processes of social engagement and interaction. There are two rapidly evolving basic tenets of constructivism that help to define its meaning within international relations theory. First, shared ideas outweigh material forces as the primary catalysts that determine human behavior and interaction. Second, these shared ideas, rather than human nature, are responsible for constructing social identities and interests within actors across the international system (Finnemore, 1996; Wendt, 1999).

Some of the more prominent constructivist scholars, such as Alexander Wendt, have argued that the structure of the international system is directly related to social practice. As with realism and liberalism, constructivism accepts the existence of anarchy within the international system. However, because all features of social behavior cannot be fully explained by anarchy, interests and identities become essential for maximum understanding. The way in which anarchy constrains states depends on how states conceive of anarchy, identities, and interests from their own perspectives. Anarchy is not necessarily a self-help system. If states hold cooperative and collective conceptions of security, then social interaction with other states will suddenly become critical for survival. Consequently, anarchy will not produce states that are compelled to limit themselves with the cynical notions of isolationism and self-reliance (Finnemore, 1996; Wendt, 1999).

Wendt is well known for his contention that “anarchy is what states make of it” (as cited in Thies, 2004, p. 160), which is perhaps the foundational statement of the constructivist approach to international relations. The cultural artifacts that it examines are the roles adopted by states in the international system. The analogue of high culture
for constructivism is a culture based on cooperation and the role of friendship, while low culture corresponds to a culture based on conflict and the role of enemy (Thies, 2004).

Wendt addresses the problem of stasis and transformation of the system in his discussion about the three cultures of anarchy. Each of these cultures, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, is based on the dominance of a particular social role among states, such as enemy, rival, and friend. Wendt assumes that anarchy itself has no particular logic but instead must be given meaning via the types of roles states adopt through their interaction. In addition, he assumes that states will learn the dominant role of any international system through role-taking and interaction with other states. At some point, one of the aforementioned roles will come to dominate the system, giving rise to a particular culture of anarchy. Once that culture is in place, state behaviors and identities will seem fairly predictable. However, innovation may give rise to a new role that may diffuse over time and after reaching a tipping point, a new culture may be produced. States need to be aware of the malleability of international culture and the possibility of transforming interstate interaction to produce a culture based on the role of friend (Thies, 2004).

While constructivists reject realism’s conclusions about the influential role that anarchy plays in regard to determining the behavior of international actors and materialism as the catalyst for all social interaction, they leave enough space for the identities and interests of these actors to take a central place in theorizing international relations. Since the social behavior of actors is not simply coaxed by the imperatives of a self-help system, their identities and interests become crucial for helping to explain this behavior. Like the nature of the international system, constructivists believe that
identities and interests are a direct result of ideas followed by their social construction. The meanings of ideas, objects, and actors evolve through the process of social interaction. Different actors attach their own eccentric meanings to objects in which comprehension becomes deliberate and easy (Finnemore, 1996; Wendt, 1999).

While realists view the international system as static and war as unavoidable, constructivists counter by arguing that interests and identities change over the course of history, allowing cooperation between states where previously there had been conflict. According to constructivist thinkers, the effects of anarchy can be lessened through the creation of institutions, as they internalize identities and interests and, in turn, create new understandings of self and other. Although constructivists recognize anarchy’s existence in the international system, they argue that the effects of anarchy are dependent upon the inter-subjective meanings that actors attach to its very existence. Constructivist scholars do not appear to subscribe to the view that war is inevitable within the international system but suggest that conflict is overcome by observing and reconstructing identities and interests. While constructivists agree that self-help and power politics can be identified in international relations, these features are not permanent but shift or disappear when the meaning of anarchy is modified (Dornan, 2011; Morgenthau, 2005; Wendt, 1999).

Realists argue that anarchy, and its resulting security dilemma, cannot be overcome, unless a world government is created. Realist scholars claim that this would never occur, as states are constantly in a mode of insecurity. This is a highly pessimistic view, which suggests we are to continually expect conflicts with periods of peace being explained by the balance of power. However, constructivists dispute this approach,
arguing instead that anarchy itself does not explain the behavior of states. When seeking to explain international politics, constructivist academics stress the need to recognize the importance of identity, interests, and inter-subjective understandings (Dornan, 2011; Morgenthau, 2005; Wendt, 1999).

As this thesis progresses, it seeks to explain how the theory of realism undeniably represents U.S. relations with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan from 1948-2012. Each of those particular states is placed under examination from a realist perspective. The primary objective of this thesis becomes embedded with demonstrating how core realist principles, which stem from Morgenthau’s concept of political realism, serve as a more efficient model when compared to other competing theoretical principles, including neorealism, in light of understanding U.S. relations with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan.

Although the structure of the international system has shifted from bipolar, which was represented by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, to unipolar, with the former state acting as the sole contemporary hegemon, human nature remains unchanged. U.S. foreign policy has always been about self-interest and power, especially in regard to Israel, Iran, and Pakistan. Also, the latter three states have juxtaposed their own national interests, based upon the same realist precepts, with those of the United States. Each individual actor has sought to increase its relative strength against similar and different competing factions, by way of a mutual parasite-host relationship. This thesis attempts to demonstrate how U.S. relations with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan have stayed consistent, regardless of the international system’s given structure.
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

The thesis employs the qualitative research methodology of comparative case study analysis. In order to gain a better understanding of case study analysis, it is essential to provide a clear definition. Case studies are profound inquiries of individual units that emphasize developmental factors in relation to context. They may be either descriptive or explanatory. The former type of case study is often used to illustrate events and their specific context, while the latter seeks to link an event with its effects on a given population and is suitable for investigating causality. In addition, they may be prospective, in which criteria are established and cases fitting this criteria are included as they become available, or retrospective, in which criteria are established for selecting cases from historical records for inclusion within the study (Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg, 1991; Ragin & Becker, 1992; Yin, 2008).

Case studies are qualitative research approaches that focus on the analyses of people and events. In order to properly construe human behavior within given events, broad examinations are made by researchers via these methods. The purpose of these examinations is to help researchers predict the behavior of people and similar events in the future (Feagin et al., 1991; Ragin & Becker, 1992; Yin, 2008).

There are some significant advantages that can be linked to case study analysis. First, case studies allow researchers to collect data that would otherwise be difficult to obtain via different alternative research designs. The data that is collected offers more substance and greater depth than what one could achieve by employing other experimental designs. Second, case studies tend to be conducted in rare cases where
large samples of similar participants are not available. Third, case studies help experimenter adapt ideas and manifest novel hypotheses that can be used for later empirical testing (Feagin et al., 1991; Ragin & Becker, 1992; Yin, 2008).

Although more divergent amongst scholars, there are two other positive attributes that can be connected to case studies. First, many advocates of these specific qualitative research methods believe that researchers gain sharpened understandings as to why people behave and events unfold in certain ways during critical historical junctures. Second, researchers gain heightened awareness levels about what becomes most essential to observe within future research (Feagin et al., 1991; Ragin & Becker, 1992; Yin, 2008).

Unfortunately, while there are many positive aspects of case study analysis, its weaknesses need to be considered as well. One of the primary criticisms is that the collected data cannot be universally applied to broader populations. This leads to irrelevant and redundant data. In addition, some case studies are not scientific. This indicates that they are not generalizable. If evidence is deemed to be inapplicable, then researchers and scientists lack the means of eliciting their desired results. Correlation is not causation. Finally, it is extremely difficult to elicit a definitive cause and effect relationship from case studies (Feagin et al., 1991; Ragin & Becker, 1992; Yin, 2008).

When assessing U.S. relations with Iran, Israel, and Pakistan from 1948-2012, case study analysis provides substantial evidence. A variety of books and website articles are used to demonstrate the political, economic, and security related motivations that characterize U.S. relations with these states. This form of methodology is used to assess the extent to which American policies reflect realism’s core principles. The thesis assesses each case study in turn.
First, the case study of the relationship between the United States and Israel from 1948-2012 assesses the extent to which both states have favored international policies that promote their own national and regional interests. It examines the ways these shared interests have revolved and still revolve around achieving relative gains within the Greater Middle Eastern region.

Second, the case study of the relationship between the United States and Iran from 1948-2012 assesses the extent to which both states have advocated and continue to favor international policies that promote their most significant national interests. It examines the degree to which these contrasting states initially engaged in a relationship that was defined by similar goals and aspirations. In addition, it determines whether an emphasis on relative rather than absolute gains is emblematic of U.S.-Iran relations and their individual foreign policy agendas.

Third, the case study of the relationship between the United States and Pakistan from 1948-2012 examines the extent to which the relationship has fluctuated in opposite directions numerous times during that period. Also, it examines the ways in which undefined bilateral regimes, a lack of efficient communication mechanisms, and presuming standards of behavior have and continue to cynically affect the positive nature that once defined U.S.-Pakistan relations.

So, why have these particular case studies, Israel, Iran, and Pakistan, been selected for evaluation? First, as a state of similar political and cultural identity, Israel has always played a significant role in preserving U.S. security in the Greater Middle East. Second, Iran and Pakistan are located at critical points in the region, which give them tremendous geostrategic value. Third, the economic and cultural norms that Shah
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi displayed were symbolic of U.S. emulation. Fourth, the extreme rhetoric and fundamentalist ideology of Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini created incessant political tension relative to U.S.-Iranian relations. Fifth, the fickle political persona that has been demonstrated by Pakistan throughout its brief history represents a high degree of uncertainty for long-term U.S.-Pakistani relations. In conclusion, these similarities and differences have influenced the realist based actions, such as military cooperation, foreign aid, sanctions, shared intelligence, and interventionism, of the United States with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan.
CHAPTER IV


This case study follows a very chronological sequence. It outlines each U.S. presidential administration’s policy toward Israel, starting with President Truman in 1948 and concluding with President Obama in 2012. Most significantly, it also highlights the continuities and changes that occur from one U.S. administration to the next.

President Truman, 1948-1953

In 1948, the United States, under President Harry S. Truman, became the first country to recognize Israeli legitimacy. Subsequently, in 1949, the United Nations (UN) declared de jure recognition in favor of an established Israeli state, a vital event because it marked the beginning of U.S.-Israel relations (Benson, 1997; Rubenberg, 1989; “The Declaration Of The Establishment Of The State Of Israel,” 1948).

Due to the Armistice Agreements of 1949, the Arab-Israeli War, which began in 1948, came to a sudden conclusion. In 1950, the United States signed the Tripartite Declaration with Britain and France. Consequently, these three countries pledged to implement any type of action that would prevent frontier line violations. Also, they outlined their commitment toward peace and stability, opposition to the threat or use of force, and discrepancy toward the development of an arms race within the region. In response to changing geopolitical circumstances, this entity was significant because it symbolized a newly accommodated U.S. demeanor and perspective toward the region (Fawcett, 2009; Freedman, 2012; Rubenberg, 1989).
President Eisenhower, 1953-1961

During the October/November 1956 Suez Crisis, France, Britain, and Israel coalesced in order to regain control of the Suez Canal and occupy parts of the Sinai Peninsula. A few months prior, in July, Egyptian President Gamal A. Nasser nationalized this waterway and prevented free access to the Gulf of Aqaba. In response, with its sole intention being centered upon a forced retreat, the United States, now under the leadership of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, intervened on behalf of Egypt. Thereafter, President Nasser expressed an imminent desire to establish cordial relations with the Western superpower. However, as the United States decided to abide by the notion of accumulating influence within the region and prohibiting Egypt from becoming a Soviet ally, its stance on Middle Eastern foreign policy continued to revolve around complete neutrality. This concept was applicable to Israel as well. In fact, the only assistance Israel received during President Eisenhower’s tenure was foodstuffs and moderate amounts of economic aid. The United States did not want to offer the Soviet Union a genuine incentive for infiltrating the region (Fawcett, 2009; Freedman, 2012; Lenczowski, 1990).

President Kennedy, 1961-1963; President Johnson, 1963-1969

Under President John F. Kennedy, the United States maintained a favorable status amongst most of the states of the Greater Middle East. However, in November 1963 when President Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the presidency, after President Kennedy’s assassination, U.S. foreign policy took an egregious shift in favor of the Israeli state. Consequently, the Western superpower became highly distrusted by Islamic countries within the Middle Eastern frontier. This marked a monumental turning point in regard to
U.S.-Israel relations and U.S.-Arab relations (Freedman, 2012; Lenczowski, 1990; Rubenberg, 1989).

In 1966, after the Samu Incident erupted, the United States grew hesitant to continue supplying Israel with defensive weapons. This event consisted of an Israeli attack against Jordan, who was also a U.S. ally. In fact, due to its destruction, the $500 million in aid which Jordan received and used toward the construction of East Ghor Main Canal was wasted. Although the Western superpower was sympathetic toward the Jewish stance of defense against foreign opposition, it feared that the distribution of weaponry to Israel could potentially destabilize the entire region (Fawcett, 2009; Freedman, 2012; Rubenberg, 1989).

Much to the chagrin of the United States, in June 1967, after Israel launched preemptive strikes against Egypt, the Six-Day War broke out across the region. Perhaps, most importantly, Israeli jets and torpedo boats attacked the U.S.S. Liberty, a U.S. naval intelligence ship. While 171 people were severely injured, 34 were killed. Israel claimed that this occurrence was nothing more than a mere accident (Fawcett, 2009; Lenczowski, 1990; Rubenberg, 1989).

Following the war, the United States believed that most Arab state policies drifted toward Soviet favor. In response, President Johnson approved the sale of Phantom fighters to Israel. However, concurrently, the Western superpower also continued to equip Arab majority countries, such as Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, with military arms. The motive behind this occurrence was aimed at countering Soviet weapon sales within the region. These actions set a U.S. precedent of Israeli military supremacy, along with
counter Arab tactics across the Middle East (Freedman, 2012; Lenczowski, 1990; Rubenberg, 1989).

President Nixon, 1969-1974; President Ford, 1974-1977

The favorable status the United States imposed upon Israel reaped immediate benefits in regard to intelligence operations. For instance, during the Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition lasting from 1969-1970, Israeli commandos captured a Soviet-built P-12 radar station. In addition, Israeli spies procured designs of the Dassault Mirage 5, a French combat airliner, in order to build the IAI Kfir. The Israeli government shared this confidential information with the United States government (Fawcett, 2009; Freedman, 2012; Rubenberg, 1989).

In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon formally proposed the Rogers Plan, which called for a 90-day cease-fire and a military standstill zone on each side of the Suez Canal in order to calm the ongoing War of Attrition. However, its central purpose was to foresee the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank and Gaza, along with mutual recognition of sovereignty and independence amongst all Middle Eastern entities. While Israel failed to obtain sufficient support within its government, Egypt accepted this plan. Under the influence of National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon decided to reverse his original stance on the implementation and perceived effectiveness of this ideal. This situation was of extreme significance because it proved that although the United States sought to reduce tension within the region, the Western superpower allotted Israel full control over its ultimate position (Freedman, 2012; Lenczowski, 1990; Quandt, 2005).
Ironically, in 1972, Egyptian President Anwar E. Sadat expelled Soviet advisers from his country. This was an attempt to further possible negotiations with Israel and the United States. Neither one of the two allied states could achieve any type of mutual agreement with the Sadat administration. In response, Egypt prepared itself for military conflict. The Egyptian government saw war as necessary and inevitable (Fawcett, 2009; Lenczowski, 1990; Rubenberg, 1989).

Despite intelligence that indicated a possible attack from Egypt and Syria, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir made the controversial decision to prohibit any type of preemptive strike against Israel’s foes. She believed that if Israel was perceived as the cause of yet another war, it would lead to the alienation of its only true ally, the United States. In 1973, Egypt, Syria, and other Arab expeditionary forces launched simultaneous attacks against Israel in what became known as the Yom Kippur War. Perhaps, most important, was the fact that this Arab coalition was receiving heavy artillery from the Soviet Union. In response, Prime Minister Meir requested military assistance from the United States. President Nixon ordered the full scale commencement of a strategic airlift operation whereby military equipment was supplied to Israel. Before these supplies arrived, the Jewish state was gradually inching closer to military victory. This event was very significant because it revealed the genuine nature of Israel’s military power. Israel now became increasingly wary of the fact that it did not have to onerously depend upon the United States for military support (Freedman, 2012; Lenczowski, 1990; Rubenberg, 1989).

The Egyptian army, which at the time had no access to food or water, grew heavily reliant upon the United States for its security and protection from Israeli forces.
The Western superpower was presented with a monumental opportunity in regard to mediating a solution within the region. Hence, the United States sought to draw Egypt away from Soviet influence and exert tremendous amounts of pressure on Israel to refrain from further hostilities. Consequently, the Egyptian government withdrew all military requests that had been previously submitted to the Soviet Union. Due to the outcome of this war, the entire region seemed to perceive US military power as superior than that of the Soviet Union (Fawcett, 2009; Freedman, 2012; Rubenberg, 1989).

After the war, the United States pressured Israel into withdrawing from its occupied Arab territories. The first phases of a lasting Israeli-Egyptian peace were established. In 1974, as President Gerald R. Ford now sat in office, the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargo, which was imposed against the United States because of its alliance with Israel during the war, ceased to exist. This quick change of attitude that was being demonstrated by the United States served as a mere response to the oil crisis within its own borders (Fawcett, 2009; Lenczowski, 1990; Quandt, 2005).

President Carter, 1977-1981

In January 1977, when President James E. (Jimmy) Carter took office, the United States became actively involved relative to the Middle Eastern peace process. Within the same year, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was elected into office. Major changes began to evolve in consideration of Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories. From the Israeli perspective, its acceptance toward the full removal of all troops and citizenry within Sinai was the immediate effect of the Camp David Accords, along with the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. However, President Carter sought the
manifestation of a Palestinian homeland with its own independent governmental structure. Not only was little progress achieved between the United States and Israel, but very harsh relations were divulged for the first time between these amicable states. The Israeli government believed that the United States was imposing a tremendous amount of pressure on its Arab dilemma. The Jewish state was not particularly fond of this arrogance that the United States was displaying toward its national character (Freedman, 2012; Lenczowski, 1990; Quandt, 2005).

The Camp David Accords, which were officially signed by U.S. President Carter, Egyptian President Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Begin in March 1979, proved to be very ambiguous. On one hand, Israel agreed to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, a transfer that was completed in 1982. In a joint letter, these two states also agreed to negotiate Palestinian autonomy measures in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, but virtually no progress was made on this issue until the 1990s (Freedman, 2012; Lenczowski, 1990; Quandt, 2005).

President Reagan, 1981-1989

In January 1981, when President Ronald W. Reagan took office, the United States and Israel experienced an unprecedented relationship, which was exemplified by joint military, economic, and security cooperation. These two countries shared similar perspectives on terrorism and Soviet influence within the Middle East. Within the same year, each state signed the Strategic Cooperation Agreement. A framework of continued consultation and cooperation was established in order to enhance national security interests for both countries. Two years later, in 1983, these two sides formed the Joint Political Military Group. Most provisions of the previous agreement were officially
implemented. The following year, while joint air and sea military exercises had begun, the United States constructed two War Reserve Stock facilities in Israel for the purpose of stockpiling its own military equipment. When deemed necessary, this equipment could have been transferred to Israeli possession and used at any given moment. The incipience of these contractual entities was extremely significant because of the fact that a reliable and dependable cooperative military relationship emerged into existence (Fawcett, 2009; Freedman, 2012; Lenczowski, 1990).

Ironically, the U.S.-Israel relationship was somewhat flawed during the tenure of President Reagan’s first term in office. First, in 1981, an event known as Operation Opera unfolded in a cynical fashion. This was an Israeli airstrike on a nuclear reactor located within Iraq. While harshly criticizing Israel’s actions in regard to this incident, the United States suspended a shipment of military aircraft that was headed toward the Jewish state as well. Relations soured even further during the Lebanon War of 1982. In fact, the Western superpower contemplated sanctioning Israel in order to halt its Siege of Beirut. Instead of imposing overly strict measures, the United States only suspended shipments of cluster munitions and made a point that all distributed weaponry was to be used for mere defensive purposes. Although critical of Israeli actions, the United States vetoed a Soviet-oriented UN resolution, which would have placed an arms embargo on Israel. These events revealed some serious differences between U.S. and Israeli foreign policy, but the Western superpower maintained its status of favoritism shown toward Israel (Fawcett, 2009; Lenczowski, 1990; Rubenberg, 1989).

For the most part, under President Reagan’s second administration, relations between the United States and Israel started to move forward into a positive direction. In
1985, the Western superpower supported the economic stabilization of Israel via approximately $1.5 billion in two-year loan guarantees. Consequently, a bilateral economic forum called the United States-Israel Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG) was formed. Within the same year, not only did the United States decide to maintain its $3 billion annual grant aid to Israel, but it also implemented a free trade agreement with the Jewish state. From this point forward, all custom duties between the two trading partners were officially eliminated. Four years later, in 1989, Israel was granted major non-NATO ally status. The Jewish state was given access to expanded weapon systems and opportunities to bid on U.S. defense contracts. However, there were a few minor setbacks within this time period that should be noted. In 1988, the United States opened a dialogue with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Pollard spy case occurred, and Israel rejected the Shultz Plan. Despite the fact that both sides were vexed by these cynically perceived incidents, pro-Israeli organizations within the United States characterized this brief era as one of a very positive and successful nature (Fawcett, 2009; Freedman, 2012; Rubenberg, 1989).

President George H. W. Bush, 1989-1993

The beginning of President George H. W. Bush’s sole term in office could be categorized as one that engulfed anti-Israeli sentiment. In 1989, the United States and Israel disagreed over the latter state’s interpretation of a plan to hold elections for a Palestinian peace conference delegation. The following year, there was an incident in Jerusalem in which the Israeli police killed 17 Palestinian citizens. President Bush demanded that the Israeli government conduct a full-scale investigation pertaining to the cause of the event, but the Jewish state deemed this request to be redundant. In 1991,
President Bush claimed that East Jerusalem was occupied territory and not a sovereign part of Israel. The Jewish state was not particularly fond of this newly created U.S. stance toward its strategic position within the region. These incidents were significant because they symbolized a shift in the opposite direction from previous pro-Israeli sentiment (Freedman, 2012; Peleg & Waxman, 2011; Quandt, 2005).

Amid the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and Iraqi threats against Israeli security, the United States pledged its full support toward protecting Israel’s existence. In fact, in January 1991, when the Persian Gulf War began and the Jewish state became an immediate target of Iraqi scud missiles, tensions between the United States and Israel quickly subsided. The Western superpower asked Israel not to retaliate against Iraq for its vicious attacks. The United States believed that Iraq was attempting to draw Israel into the conflict, therefore, enticing Syrian and Egyptian forces toward Arab unity. Meanwhile, the Jewish state submitted to the American request and restrained itself from entering into war. The United States and Israel were able to establish a cordial and cooperative relationship in which the latter state’s security was of top priority within the region (Fawcett, 2009; Freedman, 2012; “New World Order,” 1991).

Following the Persian Gulf War, U.S. policy returned to the issue of Arab-Israeli peacemaking within the region. Due to the political capital generated by the United States’ victory, President Bush believed that a huge window of opportunity was available for settling this territorial dispute. After the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, President Bush outlined a new policy order that defined U.S. geopolitical stratagems within the Middle East. He sought to maintain a permanent U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf, provide funds for regional development, and institute safeguards against the
spread of unconventional weapons. The core message of his new policy agenda continued to be based upon the Arab-Israeli peace principle, along with the fulfillment of Palestinian rights. Hence, the United States decided to abide by its former pragmatic role of mediator within the region. The Western superpower chose to purposely demonstrate nonchalant and ignorant behavior toward the previous Israeli precedent that encompassed anger and frustration in regard to this given situation (Fawcett, 2009; Lasensky, 2002; Peleg & Waxman, 2011).

Unlike earlier American peace efforts, President Bush pledged that aid commitments would be completely omitted from any possible negotiation. He believed that America’s recent military victory over Iraq and increased U.S. prestige would induce a new Arab-Israeli dialogue. In addition, he favored a diplomacy that focused on process and procedure, rather than agreement and concession. Thus, in October/November of 1991, the two superpowers called upon delegates from Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon to openly discuss their grievances at the Madrid Peace Conference. From U.S. and Soviet perspectives, economic incentives were viewed as tools of futility relative to any plausible resolution. Monetary capital would eventually enter the realms of U.S.-Israeli conversation. In fact, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir called for a request of $10 billion in U.S. loan guarantees. Not only was a new dimension added to the United States’ diplomatic aura, but a political showdown escalated between both of these governments, as Prime Minister Shamir successfully outmaneuvered President Bush. While a new tone emerged yet again amongst the United States and Israel, only the near future would be able to predict any ultimate outcome (Fawcett, 2009; Freedman, 2012; Quandt, 2005).
Prime Minister Shamir and President Bush did not share an amicable relationship. However, in 1991, the Israeli government managed to win the repeal of UN Resolution 3379. This initiative connected Zionism with racism. In 1992, after the Labor Party won the election and replaced the Likud government of Prime Minister Shamir, once again, U.S.-Israel relations appeared to improve. For instance, this newly instituted government approved a partial housing construction freeze in the occupied territories set forth by the United States. This occurrence was of vital importance because although the previous Israeli administration had supposedly implemented it for certain loan guarantees, the fact remained otherwise. At the seating of this new government, U.S.-Israeli relations shifted toward a positive direction (Fawcett, 2009; Freedman, 2012; Quandt, 2005).

President Clinton, 1993-2001

In January 1993, when President William J. (Bill) Clinton took office, Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual recognition. Also, both entities signed the Declaration of Principles, in which Palestinian political rights and security were legitimized via proper Israeli recognition. President Clinton announced that the United States and the PLO would reestablish their dialogue relative to peace negotiations. One year later, in 1994, President Clinton witnessed the signing of the Jordan-Israeli peace treaty. Shortly thereafter, in 1995, Jordan, Egypt, and the United States witnessed the signing of the Interim Agreement, in which the occupied territories were provided with self-governmental rights, between Israel and the PLO. These signed agreements represented the first time that the United States was able to successfully act as mediator and make progress toward peace within the Middle East (Freedman, 2012; Peleg & Waxman, 2011; Quandt, 2005).
Toward the end of 1995, President Clinton attended the funeral of the recently deceased Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who had been assassinated by a religious Zionist. Following a visit to Israel in 1996, he offered $100 million in aid for anti-terror activities, $200 million for anti-missile deployment, and roughly $50 million for an anti-missile laser weapon. President Clinton disagreed with new Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and his policy of expanding Jewish settlements within the occupied territories. In fact, President Clinton stated his belief that Prime Minister Netanyahu was attempting to delay the peace process. In 1998, Israel and the PLO signed the Wye Agreement, which established new terms for Palestinian political rights and recognition. Within the same year, after Palestine declared its statehood, the Jewish state suspended its implementation of this agreement. This accord was delayed until new elections were to be held in 1999. Essentially, this specific time period was significant because it revealed the fact that Israel still possessed an independent mindset, regardless of U.S. influence and hegemony within the region (Freedman, 2012; Peleg & Waxman, 2011; Quandt, 2005).

In mid-1999, when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was elected, the United States and Israel reestablished cordial and genuine relations. In search of peace, President Clinton mediated numerous cooperative meetings between Prime Minister Barak and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. The American-Israeli relationship was reinvigorated, but, as usual, only time could predict its purpose and direction (Fawcett, 2009; Freedman, 2012; Quandt, 2005).

In July 2000, President Clinton arranged a meeting between Prime Minister Barak and PLO Chairman Arafat at Camp David, Maryland. Unfortunately, the Palestinians
viewed this summit as a covert trap that was designed to promote Israel’s interests, such as retaining the occupied territories. After two weeks, the conference adjourned without any resolution. Once again, little progress was made in regard to any sort of Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement (Fawcett, 2009; Freedman, 2012; Quandt, 2005).

President George W. Bush, 2001-2009

In January 2001, when President George W. Bush came to power, the United States and Israel continued to abide by a cooperative principle. However, this would prove to be very short-lived. After Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, new Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon accused President Bush of appeasing Palestinians at Israel’s expense. Prime Minister Sharon believed that the United States was trying to obtain Arab support for an anti-terror campaign within the region. President Bush became infuriated by this reckless mindset and sentiment. Rather than apologize, Prime Minister Sharon claimed that the United States failed to understand the Jewish position. The Western superpower began to criticize the popular Israeli practice of assassinating Palestinians who were labeled as perceived terrorists. Many Israeli citizens accused the United States of hypocrisy because this criticism was seen as contradictory in regard to its dead or alive policy that pertained to Osama bin Laden. This display of altered egos indicated that both countries were preoccupied and fearful about another era of terrorism unfolding within the Middle East (Gilboa & Inbar, 2008; Peleg & Waxman, 2011; Quandt, 2005).

Two years later, in 2003, the U.S.-Israeli relationship shifted into a positive direction. On the heels of intifada and a sharp economic downturn, the Western superpower provided Israel with $9 billion in conditional loan guarantees that were made
available through 2011. In fact, this monetary entity was negotiated each year at the JEDG. Although many former U.S. presidents disapproved of Jewish settlement within the occupied territories, President Bush argued the fact that times had changed, as many Israeli citizens were already too established on Palestinian confines. He claimed that it was the sole responsibility of Israel and Palestine to resolve their given dilemma. These events revealed U.S. submission to Israel’s ambitions and desires (Gilboa & Inbar, 2008; Peleg & Waxman, 2011; Sharp, 2010).

Shortly thereafter, in 2005, President Bush urged Israeli citizens to withdraw from Palestinian areas that were retaken during security operations. He insisted that the UN produce resolutions that were critical of both Palestinian and Israeli violence. President Bush wanted to see more balance in policy in regard to these adjacent territories. He supported Israel’s disengagement from Gaza as a way to possibly achieve peace. Within the same year, some Israeli citizens evacuated certain areas of Gaza and the West Bank. Although the Jewish state relinquished a little bit of sovereignty to meet U.S. demands, it still controlled the core of this relationship (Gilboa & Inbar, 2008; Peleg & Waxman, 2011; Quandt, 2005).

From 2006-2008, the United States and Israel reentered into a sphere of cordial relations. During the Israeli-Lebanese conflict, the Jewish state used U.S. purchased munitions against Hezbollah, a perceived Lebanese terrorist group. Unfortunately, the evidence proved that Israeli cluster bombs targeted civilian areas as well. Although most of the inhabitants had fled, Israel’s action was considered a violation of international law. Israel claimed that Hezbollah frequently utilized civilian areas to stockpile weaponry and fire rockets. This would also be considered a transgression of international law. The
Israeli government argued the fact that cluster bombs were legal and strictly imposed upon military targets. Shortly thereafter, Lebanon called upon the UN to draft any kind of a resolution that would force an immediate cease-fire. Not only was the plea rejected, but the United States opposed all council action that pertained to this given dilemma. The Western superpower’s decision to oppose an unconditional cease-fire was believed to be a strong sign of influence that Israel obtained over the United States. The Jewish state had officially solidified its presence and policy within the Middle East (Erlanger, 2007; Gilboa & Inbar, 2008; Pullella & Pomeroy, 2006).

President Obama, 2009-2012

After President Barack H. Obama took office in January 2009, the U.S.-Israeli relationship came under severe strain. President Obama made achieving a peace deal between Israel and Palestine his top priority in Middle Eastern affairs. In fact, he instantly placed insurmountable pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was now in his second term, to ponder the existence of an independent Palestinian state via mutual negotiation. In accordance with U.S. demands, Prime Minister Netanyahu imposed a ten-month freeze on settlement construction within the West Bank. Due to the continuous building operations that occurred in East Jerusalem, 3,000 pre-approved housing units that were already under construction, and failure to dismantle previously built Israeli outposts, Palestine considered this outcome to be inadequate. President Obama immediately began to develop a strong resentment toward Israel (Fawcett, 2009; Freedman, 2012; Peleg & Waxman, 2011).

Ironically, toward the end of 2009, there was a brief moment when the United States and Israel demonstrated some sign of sincerity. President Obama authorized the
sale of bunker buster explosives and fighter jets to Israel. Although the transfer was kept in full confidentiality, the fact remained that the Western superpower was still very willing to arm its longtime ally against perceived threats, such as Iran. This cordiality that suddenly emerged between the United States and Israel would prove to be ephemeral (“Israeli bunker-busters cause Mideast alarm,” 2011; Lake, 2011; Ramirez, 2010).

At the beginning of 2010, the Jewish state announced that it would continue to build 1,600 new homes that were already under construction in East Jerusalem. This incident was believed to be deeply cynical in regard to U.S.-Israeli relations. President Obama presented Prime Minister Netanyahu with a four-part ultimatum: that Israel cancel the approval of housing units, freeze all Jewish construction within the occupied territories, gesture for peace via the instantaneous release of several hundred Palestinian prisoners, and discuss a partition of Jerusalem. Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Netanyahu visited the United States for the sole purpose of engaging in further negotiation. President Obama demanded that Israel extend the time frame of its settlement freeze and restore troops to positions held before the inception of the Second Intifada. Prime Minister Netanyahu did not offer any written concessions on these issues. In addition, he claimed to have zero knowledge about the previous plans of construction. Thereafter, President Obama persuaded him to extend his stay for a day of emergency chatter that would encompass every possible peace solution relative to the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma. Unfortunately, Prime Minister Netanyahu departed without any official statement from either side (Freedman, 2012; Peleg & Waxman, 2011; “U.S.-Israel row: Israeli views,” 2010).
In 2011, President Obama gave a foreign policy speech in which he called for a return to pre-1967 Israeli borders with mutually agreed land swaps. Not surprisingly, Prime Minister Netanyahu objected this proposal. President Obama was criticized by many US conservatives in regard to this same incident. With backing from most U.S. diplomats, President Obama suggested that Israeli policies were partly responsible for its increasing diplomatic isolation within the Middle East. In response, the Jewish government linked this regional problem to growing radicalism, as opposed to its own hardliner policies. Essentially, these occurrences represented both internal and external divisions amongst the United States and Israel in regard to policy agendas within the region (Chaddock, 2011; Freedman, 2012; Peleg & Waxman, 2011).

The year 2012 was marked by further division within the United States government relative to Israel’s policies. President Obama and the U.S. Congress agreed to extend guarantees for Israeli governmental debt by another three years. On the contrary, National Security Advisor Tony J. Blinken lamented what undeniably seems to be a common U.S. tendency of using the Israeli position for political gains. These incidents have provided more evidence when considering the digression of bipartisan consensus within the United States relative to Israel and its past machinations (Freedman, 2012; Ravid, 2012).
CHAPTER V


This case study follows a very chronological sequence. It outlines each U.S. presidential administration’s policy toward Iran, starting with President Truman in 1948 and concluding with President Obama in 2012. Most significantly, it also highlights the continuities and changes that occur from one U.S. administration to the next.

President Truman, 1948-1953

From 1952-1953, when Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq began his process of nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), an incident known as the Abadan Crisis occurred. While the Iranian government nationalized the entirety of British assets within AIOC, Western oil companies were instantly expelled from the city of Abadan. The British responded by imposing an embargo on Iranian oil. Within the next few months, in response to this newly developed British stance, the Iranian economy witnessed a massive decline (Alexander & Nanes, 1980; Ansari, 2003; Gasiorowski & Byrne, 2004).

Immediately, President Harry S. Truman urged Great Britain to moderate its temperament and refrain from invading Iran. Most Iranian citizens believed that the United States was fully behind Prime Minister Mossadeq and his policies. In addition, Iran expected the Western superpower to mediate a settlement and offer assistance toward its economy. Shortly afterward, Prime Minister Mossadeq visited the United States, whereby he received widespread acclaim from the American government. At the same time, not only did the Western superpower advocate the British embargo, but the two countries engaged in the orchestration of a plan that was designed to overthrow
Prime Minister Mossadeq. These happenings were significant because they demonstrated how crucial it was for the United States to maintain cordial relations with both Iran and Great Britain (Ansari, 2003; Gasiorowski & Byrne, 2004; Kinzer, 2008).

President Eisenhower, 1953-1961; President Kennedy, 1961-1963;
President Johnson, 1963-1969; President Nixon, 1969-1974;
President Ford, 1974-1977

In January 1953, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower came to power, Prime Minister Mossadeq’s reign witnessed its sudden demise. The United States was convinced that a collapse of government under Prime Minister Mossadeq would result in political advantage for Tudeh, the name of Iran’s communist party. However, the Western superpower and Great Britain coalesced via Operation Ajax, whereby a plan was devised for the expulsion and imprisonment of Prime Minister Mossadeq. This coup was implemented for geostrategic purposes, as opposed to personal grudges held against Prime Minister Mossadeq. In essence, this event was not only important because it marked the beginning of U.S. will in favor of disposing popularly elected regimes and replacing them with pro-Western autocrats, but a strong U.S. desire for Iranian oil was now exposed in its most literal sense (Gasiorowski & Byrne, 2004; Kinzer, 2008; Lesch, 2007).

In the immediate aftermath of this successfully orchestrated coup, U.S. assistance was rapidly provided to Iran’s new government and leader, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Within the first few weeks, American emergency aid equaled to the amount of $68 million. In addition, $1.2 billion was given to Iran throughout the subsequent decade (Alexander & Nanes, 1980; Kinzer, 2008; Lesch, 2007).
Under his regime, Shah Pahlavi made frequent trips to Washington DC where he received ample praise from numerous American presidents, ranging from President Eisenhower to President Richard M. Nixon. The Shah adopted Western customs and policies that were put on public display throughout Iran. These occurrences were of extreme significance, as many Iranian citizens became infinitely displeased, especially hardline Islamic conservatives (Ansari, 2003; Lesch, 2007; Wright, 2010).

Initially, most Americans viewed the August 1953 coup as an overarching success. In contemporary times, different perspectives have been manufactured by the U.S. populace. While many believe that this incident has placed a threshold on democracy within Iran, others argue about the traumatic sentiment that has been imposed upon its citizens. This event has become labeled as overly deceitful and manipulative by many Americans. These newly established opinions are not only important because they contrast with the U.S. government’s isolationist policy shown toward Iran but also in regard to the demanding apologetic nature that is considered essential for the resumption of cordial U.S.-Iranian relations (Alexander & Nanes, 1980; Kinzer, 2008; Lesch, 2007).

Cultural relations continued to prosper under the Shah’s influential regime. Three of Iran's top tier universities, such as Pahlavi University, Sharif University of Technology, and Isfahan University of Technology, were directly fashioned on American collegiate models. Also, he provided U.S. universities with ample financial donations. The University of Southern California (USC) received an endowed chair of petroleum engineering and George Washington University (GWU) was given $1 million in order to create an Iranian Studies program. These relations were significant because they
symbolized the conformity that Iran was willing to implement in favor of U.S. and Western entities. (Alexander & Nanes, 1980; Ansari, 2003; Kinzer, 2008)

Beginning in the 1960s, and carrying over into the 1970s, Iranian oil revenues increased dramatically. Not only did American influence become severely debilitated within Iranian affairs, but the state itself witnessed a massive gain in power via Iran’s public sphere. While the United States was viewed as the primary catalyst behind the new Iranian post-coup regime, influence over domestic and foreign policies actually resided within the state. This occurrence represented a more independent and less contingent Iran in regard to its own policy-making framework (Ansari, 2003; Lesch, 2007; Wright, 2010).

President George H. W. Bush, 1989-1993

In January 1977, when President James (Jimmy) E. Carter ascended into office, he was highly critical of human right standards within Iran. Consequently, the Shah granted amnesty to some prisoners and permitted the Red Cross access to Iranian prisons. In 1978, President Carter offered a New Year’s toast in the Shah’s honor. Not only did President Carter boast about the Shah's nearly impeccable leadership, but the former executive also claimed the latter executive as his favorite state figure across international borders. Once again, U.S.-Iranian relations became officially sincere. However, along with these newly improved diplomatic relations was a monumental cost. Through 1977, the fact was well known that liberal opposition existed within Iranian borders by way of organizations and open letters that rejected the Shah’s autocratic regime. President Carter believed that it was more strategic for America to appease the Shah at the expense
of Iran's rapidly growing ill-tempered population (Alexander & Nanes, 1980; Kinzer, 2008; Wright, 2010).

In 1979, as the Iranian Revolution was set in motion, Shah Pahlavi witnessed his ousting and replacement by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Six months earlier, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had issued a report, which stated that Iran was not even remotely close to the outset of revolution. The U.S. government was utterly shocked by the unfolding of this egregious development (Ansari, 2003; Kurzman, 2005; Lesch, 2007).

Immediately after his removal, the Shah crossed U.S. borders for medical treatment. While the American Embassy in Tehran was opposed to this decision, other U.S. diplomats remained loyal and supportive toward the Shah’s well-being. Hardline Islamist revolutionaries became highly annoyed with the U.S. government. These radical fundamentalists requested that the Shah be extradited to Iran for trial and execution. Although President Carter took an oath to abandon any means of favoritism directed toward the Shah, the U.S. executive verbally denied all Islamist wishes and desires. Not only did this incident mitigate any possibility of resumed cordial relations between America and the newly established interim Iranian government, but it also produced a legitimate reason for radical students to attack and seize the American Embassy. (Alexander & Nanes, 1980; Kinzer, 2008; Kurzman, 2005)

As a result of the Shah’s entrance into the United States, the revolutionary group, Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Line, stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Hence, 52 American diplomats were held hostage over a span of 444 days. Within Iran, most of its citizens viewed this incident as a step toward U.S. hegemony, along with the
liberal ideology that was associated with interim Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. Not only were many Iranians still deeply vexed by the coup of 1953, but they also feared that another one was being planned within the American Embassy. On the contrary, most U.S. citizens viewed this incident as a violation relative to the accepted principles of international law. The American perspective revolved around both diplomatic immunity from arrest and diplomatic compounds sovereignty within host borders. While the United States failed to empathize with the common Iranian sentiment, Iran continued to demonstrate extraordinary acts of anti-Western behavior (Ansari, 2003; Kurzman, 2005; Wright, 2010).

In 1980, the United States military attempted a rescue mission, which was known as Operation Eagle Claw. Eight men were killed instantly and the operation was quickly aborted. One year later, after the Algiers Accords were signed in Algeria, all hostages were released. The U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal was suddenly established in The Hague, Netherlands, with the intent of settling legal matters between American and Iranian nationals (Alexander & Nanes, 1980; Ansari, 2003; Lesch, 2007).

Although violent aggression suddenly came to a halt, impending economic and diplomatic damage culminated from this given crisis. The U.S. government continued its process of economic sanctioning and truncated all diplomatic ties with Iran that continued to exist within contemporary times. Since 1979, while American interests with Iran have been represented by Switzerland, the latter state’s interests with the former state have been represented by Pakistan. Both the United States and Iran were monumentally imprinted by way of the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979 (Alexander & Nanes, 1980; Kinzer, 2008; Lesch, 2007).
When placing the Iranian Revolution and Iranian Hostage Crisis into their rightful perspectives, one must consider the severity of the economic consequences the United States decided to impose against Iran. Before the outbreak of these cynical occurrences, America was Iran’s primary economic and military partner. Infrastructure and industry became the benefactors of massive U.S. financial assistance that spurred imminent modernization. After 1979, the U.S. government decided to freeze about $12 billion in Iranian assets. When the hostages were released in 1981, Iran was relieved of this monetary burden. Unfortunately, due to unresolved legal matters stemming from these events, some assets remain frozen (Ansari, 2003; Kinzer, 2008; Wright, 2010).

In 1980, after the Iran-Iraq War had begun, U.S. policy centered itself upon an ideal known as dual containment. President Carter believed that America's most strategic position within the region should revolve around military and economic neutrality. In contrast to this executive paradigm, the U.S. government decided to situate itself, diplomatically and financially, at the helm of Iraqi favor. During the second half of this militant conflict, from 1984-1988, not only did President Ronald W. Reagan pursue multiple sanction bills against Iran, but he also established cordial relations with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. This was done by removing the Middle Eastern dictator’s name from the U.S. list, titled as State Sponsors of Terrorism. In fact, President Reagan authorized the sale of poisonous biological chemicals to Iraq for wartime incentives. In 1988, at the conclusion of this military debacle, each side decided that a ceasefire was most appropriate, as it best suited their national interests. Although the U.S. government may have placed the notion of dual containment on display, in regard to Iran and Iraq,
when compared to the latter state, there is little reason to doubt that the former state was perceived as a bigger security threat (Kinzer, 2008; Lesch, 2007; Rajaee, 1993).

From the U.S. perspective, Hezbollah, a radical Shia Islamist organization, was the main perpetrator behind several terrorist attacks that struck the American government and its people. This fundamentalist group was accused of being directly connected to the October 1983 U.S. Embassy and barracks bombings that occurred in Beirut, Lebanon, where a grand total of 258 Americans were killed. In addition, Hezbollah was held responsible for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, where another 19 Americans were murdered. The significance behind these tragic events was concentrated upon the Iranian influence and support in favor of their happenings. The souring U.S.-Iranian relationship that continued to unfold was undeniably related to historical occurrences (Ansari, 2003; Kinzer, 2008; Wright, 2010).

In 1986, with the purpose of securing U.S. interests within its own hemisphere, President Reagan and his administration began a process of selling arms to Iran. Profits were used to fund the Contras, who were anti-Communist rebels in Nicaragua, with the intent of containing Soviet influence within Central America. Although many people considered this newly found U.S.-Iranian cooperation to be one in which American hostages would receive their freedom, President Reagan claimed that the United States had other underlying global aspirations outside of Iran. This episode revealed that America's national interests stood above any regional interest, regardless of the locale. Within the framework of the Cold War, if engaging Iran elicited more international progress, then U.S. foreign policy was at its maximum strength (Ansari, 2003; Lesch, 2007; Wright, 2010).
Two years later, in 1988, the United States launched Operation Praying Mantis and Operation Earnest Will. While the latter operation involved a U.S. naval strike against an Iranian airbus, the former operation involved American strikes against very critical Iranian oil fields and different models of artillery. In both cases, President Reagan claimed that Iran was implementing suspicious and illegal activity within the Persian Gulf region. These hostile acts were mere responses to potential security threats within this given area. On the contrary, the Iranian government claimed that America was guilty of perjury and deliberately violating numerous international laws. Because of these U.S. falsifications, 290 civilians, across six nations, were killed. Although Iran received a formal apology from the American government in regard to these atrocities, no monetary forms of reparation were given in light of the Persian cause. U.S.-Iranian relations reassumed their role of distrust and conflict that continued to shape the foreign policy agendas of these rival states (Kinzer, 2008; Lesch, 2007; Peniston, 2006).

President Clinton, 1993-2001

When President William (Bill) J. Clinton assumed office, in January 1993, Iran was suddenly faced with more hardships. This decision stemmed from ongoing U.S. apprehension in connection to the Persian state. Two years later, a full embargo was imposed by the American government on dealings with Iran. From the U.S. perspective, any form of trade between these divergent states was now considered to be illegal and illegitimate. The following year, in 1996, other countries were urged to limit their investments within the Iranian energy sector. The U.S. Congress passed a law, known as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which was designed for this very purpose. Although the European Union (EU) denounced this statute as invalid and redundant, U.S. goals toward
Iran were, nevertheless, upheld to a maximum standard. These mandates that emerged over this brief time period were emblematic of the seriousness in which most U.S. governmental officials viewed potential Iranian terrorism, both inside and outside the region (Ansari, 2003; Lesch, 2007; Wright, 2010).

At the beginning of 1998, recently elected Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, who was a moderate leader, called for a dialogue between his native country and America. After a positive response was given by the latter state, not only did citizens of both countries enjoy freer travel, but Iranian carpets and pistachios became marketable, once again, via export to U.S. borders. These cordial relations quickly disintegrated because of dissent from Iranian hardliners, along with American preconditions for discussion, which included Iran’s foreign policy toward Israel, nuclear energy, and terrorism. During this short term of events, although U.S.-Iranian relations were marked by further instability, it became overly apparent that both states would be able to achieve gradual sincerity, albeit through certain unfolding of situations and opportune circumstances (Kinzer, 2008; Lesch, 2007; Wright, 2010).

President George W. Bush, 2001-2009

Unfortunately, on September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda, a popular Sunni Islamic terrorist organization that dwells throughout the Middle East, orchestrated deadly attacks within U.S. boundaries, whereby numerous innocent people were killed. From one perspective, in regard to this gargantuan tragedy, many American diplomats believed that Iran had assumed a critical role. Before their departure, the 9/11 Commission Report declared that eight of the terrorist hijackers had spent ample time within Iran. In addition, prior to 9/11, this same report noted the network connection that developed
between these specific hijackers, Iranian officials, and Hezbollah. A federal district court judge from Manhattan, New York, who was responsible for hearing and trying the case of Havlish v. Osama Bin Laden, claimed that his findings held Iran guilty on different accounts such as training, hosting, and planning terrorism in connection to the attacks that took place on American soil. In fact, in association with 9/11, certain defectors from the Iranian intelligence service testified that most native officials were fully aware and knowledgeable about pre-planned frameworks. The extent of Iranian involvement was questioned by other U.S. diplomats. These convictions were attributed to the extremely antagonistic religious ideologies between Al-Qaeda and Iran. The 9/11 Commission Report specified that there were no forms of genuine evidence that could have proved Iran to be directly linked to any sort of terrorist hijacking. When further investigation was proposed, President George W. Bush deemed this unnecessary and wasteful. In regard to the terrorist attacks, he believed that Iran lacked any type of niche. These distinct American viewpoints toward Iran and its affiliation with terrorism provide solid proof that the possibility of ameliorating U.S.-Iranian relations is not defunct in any literal sense (9/11 Commission, 2004; Timmerman, 2011; Wright, 2010).

In January 2002, President Bush made his infamous axis of evil speech, whereby Iran was labeled as a terrorist state, along with North Korea and Iraq. This meant that any manufacturing or possession of nuclear technology within these particular national confines would be deemed as detrimental toward U.S. security. Both Islamic conservatives and reformists were highly irritated at the outbreak of this condescending language. In regard to these remarks, not only did the American government completely disregard Iranian resentment and disapproval, but it also began a process of flying
unmanned aerial vehicles over Iranian soil. This act was implemented for the sheer purpose of trying to obtain information about Iran's nuclear program. In response, by way of international law, the Iranian government quickly dubbed this surveillance as illegal. These happenings were extremely significant because they symbolized the nonchalant U.S. demeanor toward what appeared to be a gradually changing Iranian population, along with an invigorated sentiment that divulged itself through strong American opposition (Kinzer, 2008; Lesch, 2007; Wright, 2010).

From 2001-2002, the Bush administration supposedly received overtures from Iran’s government. This move became termed as a grand bargain, in which the Persian state was willing to propose negotiations that would have possibly helped to resolve outstanding issues with U.S. officials such as its nuclear program and support for suspect Islamic organizations. Strong dissent emerged amongst different factions within the American government. While some administrators saw this as a golden opportunity for progressive dialogue to be achieved, other administrators believed that Iran was promising a lot more than it would offer. While President Bush decided to act passively on this matter, U.S.-Iranian relations continued to spiral down a path of extreme bitterness and impurity. This incident was significant because it further emphasized both countries’ inability to effectively communicate (Kinzer, 2008; Lesch, 2007; “The ‘Grand Bargain’ Fax: A Missed Opportunity?,” 2007).

Since 2003, the Iranian government has made several claims that American soldiers and drones have been violating its territorial integrity. When a RQ-7 Shadow and Hermes UAV which were U.S. property crashed within Iran, this offered some justification to their assumptions. The Iranian government attributed these actions to
America’s search for underground installations in association with the development of nuclear weapons. In addition, during the same time period Iran witnessed bombings from its Kurdish population, driven by U.S. provocations. Relative to its Iranian dilemma, these occurrences serve as a reflection of the insecurity and fear that seem to be constantly driving American diplomacy (Lesch, 2007; Linzer, 2005; Wright, 2010).

Also, since 2003 the U.S. government has alleged that Iran possesses a program whereby nuclear weapon development is readily accessible. The Iranian government has maintained that its stance toward nuclear involvement remains dependent upon generating electricity. In 2005, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared that both states were guilty of violating certain articles within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). America and Iran believed themselves to be innocent of any international crime because they claimed that their acts were justifiable via the given global climate. In 2006, while the IAEA continued its search for nuclear industry sites located within Iran, tension between these competing nations reached a significant head. This additional stress on U.S.-Iranian relations is a direct result of the Persian state’s increase in nuclear enriched gas that can be converted into atomic weaponry. The American perspective toward Iran and its nuclear program throughout this brief time period remained on a steady course (Kinzer, 2008; Lesch, 2007; Wright, 2010).

Beginning in 2005, National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) began to reveal that Iran's nuclear conduct was driven by fear of American and Israeli aggression. The following year, in 2006, Congress passed the Iran Freedom and Support Act, whereby millions of dollars were appropriated toward human right non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were working within Iranian borders. Although this law
prohibited the United States from using any kind of militant force against Iran, several diplomats on both sides took an oppositional standpoint. Each side’s antagonism stemmed from the accumulated risk of possible warfare that was becoming an increasingly popular reality. In regard to Western hegemony, these happenings helped to reflect an Iranian perspective that was based upon insecurity and retaliation (Lesch, 2007; Porter, 2006; Wright, 2010).

In 2007, U.S. armed forces raided the Iranian Consulate General in Iraq. Five staff members were confiscated and arrested. Cynical responses were released by diplomats from both the United States and Iran. Many American politicians claimed that President Bush’s actions were illegitimate and redundant. Not only did they believe that he was implementing policy in which the executive lacked full jurisprudence, but also the fact that he was placing an ill-advised imposition against Iran. Similarly, the Iranian government declared that America had no right to interfere with Iran-Iraq diplomacy. The Iraqi government was asked to uphold a pragmatic position, whereby the Iranian prisoners would be released and U.S. troops condemned. While Iraq stepped forward, America vaguely responded to these demands. Some detainees were set free, but others remained in U.S. custody because of their supposed involvement with terrorism. Yet again, U.S.-Iranian relations became even more distanced because of questionable political tactics (Kinzer, 2008; Lesch, 2007; Wright, 2010).

Since 2008, the American government has made accusations against Iranian speedboats for provoking U.S. warships to engage in naval stand-offs within the Strait of Hormuz; Iran fully denies these claims. Both countries have presented their own video and audio footage that portrays what actually occurred during these incidents. As the
American version contains threats, the Iranian version shows no such evidence exists. There has been widespread confusion as to who sent out these threatening radio transmissions. According to a U.S. newspaper, the act could have very well been performed by a famous local heckler. These occurrences add further emphasis to the skeptical perceptions and distrust that have become symbolic of U.S.-Iranian relations (Kinzer, 2008; Wright, 2010).

President Obama, 2009-2012

After being convicted of espionage charges at the beginning of 2009, Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi was sentenced to eight years in prison. Later, as the Iranian authorities changed her charge to possession of a classified document, she was quickly released. Two months afterward, five Iranian diplomats, who had been held since 2007, were set free. While some believe that this exchange was part of a settlement between the United States and Iran, the American government denied these claims. In regard to an American-Iraqi security pact, President Barack Obama deemed this action to be necessary. Unfortunately, regardless of the implications, Iran seemed to gain some degree of influence over its relationship with America (Fathi, 2009; “U.S. releases five Iranians in Iraq,” 2009).

Due to prevalent debate within Iran as its 2009 presidential election approached, U.S. officials anticipated a highly competitive outcome. When Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won by a landslide victory, allegations of fraud and widespread protests emerged across the homefront. The American government suddenly expressed its profound dissatisfaction and resentment against the violent arrests that occurred during post-election protests. From the U.S. perspective, it should be noted that this incident
demonstrated a certain type of revolutionary sentiment and rising expectations amongst the youthful Iranian population (“U.S. 'troubled' over Iran election,” 2009; Wright, 2010).

Also, in 2009, as three American hikers were arrested for infiltrating Iranian territory, U.S.-Iranian relations witnessed yet another significant downturn. In addition, an Iranian nuclear scientist, Shahram Amiri, was believed to have been abducted by the U.S. government. On both occasions, in regard to the nature of these occurrences, American officials took adversarial positions. On one account, they claimed that the hikers entered Iranian borders via sheer coincidence, and on the other hand, that Amiri took an unnecessary form of refuge at the Pakistani Embassy. Nonetheless, these were typical incidents that represented the ill-natured U.S.-Iranian relationship and now symbolized the Obama administration (“Missing Iranian scientist appears at embassy in U.S.,” 2010; Wright, 2010).

In 2012, America accused Iranian officials of using threatening remarks that were directed toward U.S. naval ships within the Persian Gulf. These claims were denied by Iran. American ships temporarily departed because of a ten day naval exercise that Iran was conducting within the region. The Iranian government declared that it had no intention of acting irrationally but would, nevertheless, respond aggressively to all imminent threats. In response, the U.S. Navy resumed its regularly scheduled deployments within the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. This act represented a U.S. attempt to intentionally place further tension on Iran amongst the international environment (Oren, 2012; “U.S. to Iran: Warships to remain in Persian Gulf,” 2012).

Under President Obama, nuclear conflict remains the primary obstacle toward any possibility of reconcilable U.S.-Iranian relations. While the U.S. government has
acknowledged Iran's right to use nuclear power, it infinitely continues attempts at halting its nuclear advancement. Not only has Iran prolonged its enrichment program, but President Ahmadinejad has declared the Persian state to be a nuclear enhanced entity. Although both countries have hinted at possible future negotiations, the fact of the matter is that until it completely abandons all of its nuclear enrichment activities and programs, Iran will more than likely remain on the U.S. down side (Cooper & Landler, 2012; Slackman, 2010).
CHAPTER VI

CASE STUDY OF THE U.S.-PAKISTANI RELATIONSHIP, 1948-2012

This case study follows a very chronological sequence. It outlines each U.S. presidential administration’s policy toward Pakistan, starting with President Truman in 1948 and concluding with President Obama in 2012. Most significantly, it also highlights the continuities and changes that occur from one U.S. administration to the next.

President Truman, 1948-1953

In 1947, Pakistan was partitioned from India and, in turn, obtained its independence from Great Britain. Due to the imminently perceived threat that was posed by India and Soviet influence amongst regional states, Pakistan sought long-term diplomatic relations with the United States. Although President Harry S. Truman did not have a concrete plan in response to Pakistan’s demands, he realized how significant Pakistan was from a strategic standpoint. The U.S.-Pakistani relationship witnessed its birth and newfound existence (Gould, 2010; Kux, 2001; Mahmud, 1991).

From 1950-1953, in search of military assistance, Pakistani delegates visited the United States. American diplomats were quick to label these officials as incompetent and inept. The U.S. government attempted to use this self-constructed cynicism to promote its most strategic interests within the region. Pakistan’s government instantly recognized the selfish demeanor that was associated with the Western superpower. Thereafter, Pakistan sought closer relations with the Soviet Union. When President Truman requested that Pakistan provide a military base for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
purposes, he was rebuffed. This incident represented the first serious altercation between
the United States and Pakistan (Gould, 2010; Kux, 2001; Mahmud, 1991).

President Eisenhower, 1953-1961

In 1953, the United States viewed Pakistan as a genuine anti-Communist state. Also, the Western superpower foresaw the Pakistani military as one that was capable of amassing ample power and strength. In 1954, large-scale military training took place between the United States and Pakistan. In order to receive adequate military training, hundreds of Pakistani soldiers visited U.S. confines on a regular basis. This military cooperation marked the first positive step toward a sincere U.S.-Pakistani relationship. (Aziz, 2010; Schaffer & Schaffer, 2011)

From 1956-1959, U.S.-Pakistani relations were dictated by a strong sense of commensalism. While the United States behaved silently toward Pakistan’s needs, the latter state submitted to multiple demands that were put forth by the former state. First, in order to make preparations for spy operations that were to be conducted against the Soviet Union, President Dwight D. Eisenhower requested that Pakistani Prime Minister Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy leave Peshwar Air Station. Not only did Pakistan’s government grant this request, but it also permitted the United States to build another air force station within its territory. Second, the Western superpower helped stage a military coup against newly elected Pakistani President Iskander Mirza. The core reason that the American government implemented this plot was because Pakistani Army Commander Ayub Khan, when compared to President Mirza, had established a more amicable relationship with President Eisenhower. Third, Pakistani officials were denied access to U.S. controlled military bases. Once again, Pakistan demonstrated that it was fully
subservient to a U.S. request. In regard to its own long-term strategic interests, Pakistan achieved very little. In order to achieve its ultimate goals, these events helped to symbolize the personal deceit that the United States was willing to orchestrate against Pakistan (Datta, 1994; Munawar, 2011; Schaffer & Schaffer, 2011).

President Kennedy, 1961-1963; President Johnson, 1963-1969

Throughout most of the 1960s, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship had reached a significant peak. While under the reign of President Khan, Pakistan remained a loyal member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTRO). In 1960, the United States asked Khan to approve of a spy mission destined to reach the Soviet Union. In response, knowing that Pakistan could be faced with serious consequences if it refused, such as the loss of aid or a potentially orchestrated coup, President Khan decided to give into the Western superpower’s request. One year later in 1961, he visited Washington DC, which although a trip of convenience, symbolized the strong relations that were developing between President Khan and President John F. Kennedy. Also, during this time period, the U.S. government started to increase its economic aid to Pakistan. Consequently, the Pakistani economy underwent a positive transformation. The benefits of establishing friendly relations with the United States gradually began to pay dividends for Pakistan (Datta, 1994; Kelly & Beasley, 2009).

President Nixon, 1969-1974

The end of President Khan’s regime in 1969 incited yet another chink in U.S.-Pakistani relations. When President Khan decided to launch Operation Gibraltar against India, which led to war, he became very unpopular amongst the general Pakistani
population and the United States. The U.S. government imposed military and economic embargoes against Pakistan. As the booming Pakistani economy quickly fell into shambles, this nonetheless, sealed the fate of President Khan’s reign. Perhaps, more importantly, it demonstrated how much Pakistan relied upon the Western superpower for its prosperity, along with the visible misconceptions Pakistan had about U.S.-Indian relations (Datta, 1994; Gould, 2010; Shirin, 1997).

Although the arms embargo continued into the beginning of the 1970s, the United States openly declared its loyalty in favor of Pakistan. This pledge of allegiance to Pakistan was made because Pakistan was perceived as a U.S. ally against Communism. The Soviet Union was already engaged in Afghan affairs, by way of issuing financial assistance and military training. In order to mitigate further Soviet intrusion in the region, President Richard M. Nixon sought to use Pakistan and its geostrategic location to America’s advantage. President Nixon feared that the developing situation in regard to Afghanistan, along with an Indian invasion into Pakistan, would undoubtedly strengthen Soviet influence within the region. Pakistan feared that an independent Bangladesh would lead to its sudden demise. As these current events were slowly unfolding within the region, both the United States and Pakistan were becoming extremely uncomfortable. These occurrences demonstrated that the U.S.-Pakistani relationship was one of mutual interest, but they lacked similar perspective (Gandhi, 2002; Shirin, 1997; Uddin, 2008).

In 1971, the United States and China started to conduct secret meetings. At one point during this year, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger made a secret visit to China. These bilateral relations were established by way of Pakistan. During the same year, the American government was secretly encouraging the shipment of military equipment from
Iran, Turkey, and Jordan to Pakistan. Despite arms embargoes, the Western superpower continued to supplement its Pakistani military aid program. This included the deployment of the U.S.S Enterprise and the Task Force-74 into the Indian Ocean. Due to Indian and Soviet pressures, these ships were eventually forced to withdraw from the region. These particular incidents, in regard to Pakistan, demonstrated that the United States was beginning to make a gradual shift in favor of a more proactive stance (Gandhi, 2002; Shirin, 1997; Uddin, 2008).

President Ford, 1974-1977; President Carter, 1977-1981;
President Reagan, 1981-1989

From 1974-1977, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship became severely crippled. After India conducted a nuclear test near the eastern border of Pakistan in May 1974, the latter state sought U.S. imposed economic sanctions against the former state. Not only were the demands of Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto rebuffed, but Secretary of State Kissinger, nevertheless, told him to deal with this rejection. Two years later in 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger demanded that Prime Minister Bhutto either modify or terminate the Reprocessing Plant Agreement, which was a program designed for weaponry research. Consequently, Prime Minister Bhutto intensified his nationalization policies, spurred research on atomic weapons, and authorized the construction of Chagai weapon testing laboratories. Because of possible Indian nuclear retaliation, the United States heavily opposed these measures. In 1977, President James (Jimmy) E. Carter tightened the embargoes that were previously placed on Pakistan. This measure was due to his strong resentment in response to the increasing socialist policies of Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto. Under Prime Minister Bhutto’s regime, Pakistan focused on becoming
part of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. This membership resulted in closer ties with the Soviet Union and strong left-wing politics. Although Pakistan attempted to balance relations with the United States, President Carter rejected this notion. Pakistan was perceived to be a potential ally for the Soviet Union. Perhaps, more importantly, the Pakistani government succeeded in circumventing these newly tightened embargoes. Sensitive equipment, metal materials, and electronic components were smuggled across Pakistani borders, which, in turn, enhanced its atomic bomb project. While atomic proliferation became more prevalent, the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union had reached a new peak. These events represented yet another kink within the U.S.-Pakistani relationship (Aziz, 2010; Blechman & Kaplan, 1978; “Zulfikar Bhutto had blamed U.S. for his ‘horrible’ fate,” 2011).

The majority of 1979 was considered a continuum of the ill relations that had begun to foment between the United States and Pakistan. A group of Pakistani students burned the American Embassy in Islamabad to the ground in response to the Grand Mosque Seizure, whereby the Al-Masjid al-Haram located in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, fell hostage to Islamic dissidents. Due to false reporting and strong Islamic rhetoric, the United States was blamed for being the external mastermind behind the seizure. Two Americans were killed in the incident. This event was significant because it symbolized the hatred that many Pakistanis were starting to develop toward the United States (Kelly & Beasley, 2009; Mahmud, 1991; Schaffer & Schaffer, 2011).

Toward the end of 1979 and into the beginning of the 1980s, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship started to shift into a positive direction. After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, President Carter issued the Carter Doctrine, which was
designed to protect U.S. interests by the use of military force within the Persian Gulf region. The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was implemented in March 1980, whereby the deployment of U.S. security forces significantly increased throughout the Persian Gulf. Through the distribution of weapons and other forms of military aid, the United States was committing itself to Pakistan’s national security. When President Ronald W. Reagan came to power in January 1981, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship became even more amicable than that at the end of President Carter's regime. For the most part, this was due to the cordial relationship that was established between President Reagan and Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. First, in order to thwart Communism within the region, a multi-billion dollar worth operation, known as Operation Cyclone, was implemented. Second, the U.S. government donated billions of dollars of military and economic aid to Pakistan. Third, the CIA played a critical role in curbing down the liberal, socialist, and communist elements that had begun to disseminate throughout Pakistan. Fourth, the Western superpower helped to expand the idea of Establishment, which was a heavily oriented military policy that included the increased purchases of fighter jets, naval warships, intelligence training, and nuclear technology within Pakistan. The United States and Pakistan were able to demonstrate cooperative abilities that now provided beneficial repercussions for both sides (Aziz, 2010; Kux, 2001; Munawar, 2011).

President George H. W. Bush, 1989-1993;
President Clinton, 1993-2001

After the mysterious death of President Zia-ul-Haq in 1988, the American government blamed an Afghan secret intelligence agency, which was in close connection
to the Pakistani government. U.S.-Pakistani relations entered into another nadir period that would persevere into the next decade. In 1989, when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited the United States, she requested that President George H.W. Bush stop financing the Afghan mujahideen. Also, she demanded that the Western superpower obliterate India's nuclear program. Unless Pakistan was to eradicate its own nuclear program, the American government claimed that it would not give any serious consideration to Prime Minister Bhutto's requests. One year later in 1990, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ascended into power. Immediately, he visited the United States but was instantly rejected because of Pakistan's failure to halt its nuclear program. The Western superpower tightened its economic embargo on Pakistan to an even further level. Consequently, Prime Minister Sharif, once again, entered U.S. confines. His sole intention was to resolve Pakistan's perceived nuclear crisis. Therefore, he declared that Pakistan possessed nuclear facilities that did not participate in the manufacturing of atomic weapons. In addition, under a certain condition, he pledged to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). He was declaring that India act as the first signee. Not only did the United States remain skeptical toward Pakistan’s claimed intentions, but the relationship became even more strained. This tension was due to Pakistan's continuation of its nuclear program, along with a newly agreed upon Chinese deal whereby Pakistan would host its largest commercial nuclear plant. In 1992, when Ambassador Nicholas Platt warned the Pakistani government that terrorist support within India or Indian-administered territory would result in Pakistan's name showing on the state sponsors of terrorism list, U.S.-Pakistani relations witnessed a massive downfall (Malick, 1998; Munawar, 2011).
In 1995, Prime Minister Bhutto, who had regained her title in 1993, made her final visit to the United States. During this visit, she attempted to persuade President William (Bill) J. Clinton to amend the Pressler Amendment, which in order to receive military assistance from the United States, forced Pakistan into annually declaring that it did not possess any nuclear devices. Also, with Pakistan as its ally, she urged President Clinton to launch a campaign against extremism. Although some U.S. arms embargoes remained active, Prime Minister Bhutto succeeded with the passing of the Brown Amendment, which nullified the all non-military assistance and International Military Education Training (IMET) provisions that were found within the Pressler Amendment. This marked a positive but temporary shift for the United States and Pakistan. Due to the Brown Amendment's lack of provisions that were relevant to Pakistan’s nuclear policy demands, the Pakistani government continued to pursue its own nuclear program. The Western superpower quickly responded by chastising Pakistan’s government. Prime Minister Bhutto fiercely criticized the United States for its nonproliferation policy and the fact that it did not abide by contractual obligations. Most economic embargoes remained intact, although it should be noted that Pakistan did receive foreign investment from the U.S. business community. In 1998, Prime Minister Sharif, who had regained his title in 1997, urged for Pakistan to implement its first nuclear tests. This nudge was a direct response to India's nuclear tests that were conducted within the same year. In response, President Clinton imposed tighter economic embargoes against Pakistan. After Prime Minister Sharif decided to take a more proactive stance in regard to the Kargil War, the United States greatly enhanced its relationship with India. When the United States fired missiles at a Taliban-controlled camp within Afghanistan in which five Pakistani
intelligence agents were killed, evidence of this downtrodden relationship was put on full display. In October 1999, a military coup was orchestrated against Prime Minister Sharif, which witnessed President Pervez Musharraf come into power. The U.S.-Pakistani relationship took a further step in the wrong direction. President Clinton demanded that democracy be restored within Pakistan, but the latter entity did not submit. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Sharif never made any attempts to digress from Pakistan's nuclear program before his forced departure went into effect. This decade represented significant decay within the U.S.-Pakistani relationship (Malick, 1998; Munawar, 2011).

President George W. Bush, 2001-2009

Prior to 2001, Pakistan was a firm supporter of the Taliban, which is an Islamic fundamentalist political movement located within Afghanistan. After the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, U.S.-Pakistani relations began to shift in a positive direction. In regard to the war on terror, Pakistan declared its full support behind the United States. Hence, the former state became a key ally to the latter state’s quest against terrorism. President George W. Bush lifted the military and economic sanctions that had been a serious burden on Pakistan’s economy. Perhaps, more importantly, Pakistan handed over 369 captured terrorists to the United States. President Bush and President Musharraf established an order that was based upon mutual trust within this newfound U.S.-Pakistani relationship. In regard to the perseverance of their relationship, this paradigm embraced a critical win for both countries (Kelly & Beasley, 2009; Schaffer & Schaffer, 2011).

From 2001-2005, it could be argued that the United States and Pakistan experienced their closest relationship to date. For military purposes, Pakistan suddenly
began to receive billions of dollars from the Western superpower. In 2003, because of Pakistan’s allegiance to the United States in the war on terror, the latter state forgave $1 billion of the former state’s national debt. One year later in 2004, President Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally. Also, the Pakistani government became eligible to purchase advanced military technology from the United States. In 2005, after a devastating earthquake hit the country, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that the Western superpower would pursue all efforts to help restore Pakistan’s economy. Throughout this brief time period, it should be noted that Pakistan had lost thousands of lives. Not only did suicide bombers become more prevalent throughout the state, but Pakistan had completely digressed from any type of cordial relations with the Taliban. In addition, as he committed himself to U.S. efforts, President Musharraf jeopardized the status of the Pakistani economy. While the U.S.-Pakistani relationship had reestablished its cooperative demeanor, only the near future would be able to predict the longevity (Aziz, 2010; Feller, 2008; “Rice: U.S. Will Support Pakistan,” 2005).

President Obama, 2009-2012

The recent history of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship has proven to be both dismal and successful. In 2009, then President Pervez Musharraf declared that U.S. foreign aid had been used for other purposes such as its Indian dilemma. Because of the fact that this aid was supposed to be distributed amongst resources that were essential to the war on terror, the United States felt deceived. Also, in 2009, because of a bombing attempt on a Northwest Airlines flight, a new set of screening guidelines was issued. This included pat-downs for passengers from countries of interest, with Pakistan making the list. Despite these setbacks, Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton guaranteed Pakistan’s
government that the Western superpower was fully committed to the former state’s struggle for peace and security. In addition, President Barack H. Obama declared that the United States and Pakistan needed to create a partnership based upon a foundation of mutual interests, respect, and trust. He believed that these ideals should be used to combat a common enemy, Islamic extremism. At the same time, the U.S. Congress approved of a $7.5 billion non-military aid deal, which would be distributed to Pakistan throughout the subsequent five years (Kelly & Beasley, 2009; “Musharraf Admits U.S. Aid Diverted,” 2009; Walsh, 2008).

At the beginning of 2010, the Pakistani government rejected a request by the United States to launch new offensives against extremist militants. In its fight against militancy, Pakistan had lost more than $35 billion dollars over the past decade. In regard to this common dilemma, President Obama called for greater U.S.-Pakistani cooperation. For economic, political, and security purposes, the Western superpower increased its funding to Pakistan, whereby President Obama sought that over $3 billion dollars of financial and military aid be distributed to Pakistan. In addition, relative to extremist insurgency, Ambassador Anne W. Patterson claimed the United States to be fully committed to Pakistan, the region, and the world. Toward the end of 2010, the Haqqani Network, which is an Islamic extremist group believed to be headquartered in Pakistan and allied with the Taliban, detonated a bomb in Kabul, Afghanistan. Five U.S. soldiers and one NATO soldier were killed. In response, the Western superpower urged Pakistan’s government to immediately act upon this catastrophic event. The United States also declared the possibility that it would use unilateral action of force against the Haqqani Network. This angered the Pakistani government and fundamentalist Islamic
groups within the country. While the former entity threatened the United States with probable retaliation, the latter entity proclaimed jihad against the Western superpower. These mutual hostilities carried over into the beginning of 2011 (Entous & Cornwell, 2010; Gould, 2010).

In 2011, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship witnessed certain events that contributed to further blows on its well-being. First, there was the Raymond Allen Davis incident, in which Raymond Davis, a self-proclaimed private security contractor, killed two Pakistani civilians. Supposedly, they had attempted to rob him of his possessions. Despite demand from the U.S. government to avoid prosecution, Pakistan did not submit to this request. The former state threatened to cut off Pakistani aid flows, which culminated with the latter state taking this request much more seriously. While the slain victims’ families were compensated through monetary payments, Davis was released by Pakistani authorities. Second, there was the discovery and assassination of Osama bin Laden within Pakistan. The Western superpower accused the Pakistani government of treason and alliance with the Taliban, regardless of Pakistan’s denial. Third, there was the murder of the Pakistani journalist Saleem Shahzad. Immediately, the United States accused Pakistan’s government of orchestrating this murder. The latter state rebutted this accusation by claiming that the former state was responsible for his execution. Finally, there was the attack conducted by the Haqqani Network on the U.S. Embassy and NATO headquarters located within Kabul, whereby three coalition soldiers were killed and six NATO soldiers were injured. Not only did the Pakistani authorities deny this alleged accusation, but they countered by threatening the United States if it were to actually enter the country with possible force. On a further note, there were certain Islamic groups that
wanted to see heavier jihadist action waged against the Western superpower. In spite of these bumps to U.S.-Pakistani relations, President Obama continued to insist that the United States remain fully committed behind Pakistani democracy, stability, and security. Although these events demonstrated the shaky nature of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship in regard to achieving common interests, both countries seemed to recognize the significance of each other. Since its incipience, this ideal has characterized the nature of U.S.-Pakistani relations. Essentially, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship could be summed up by the mere notions of self-interest and narcissism (Munawar, 2011; Schaffer & Schaffer, 2011).
CHAPTER VII
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES

This comparative analysis outlines and explains U.S. relations with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan. With realism at the forefront, each of these relationships demonstrate a significant amount of similarities by theory. While many details and events may differ throughout these specific U.S. relationships, their foundations remain committed to the same theoretical precepts of realism.

The U.S.-Israeli relationship has definitely embraced many core realist theoretical precepts. From 1948-2012, both countries constantly sought to achieve relative gains within the Middle Eastern region. During the entirety of the Cold War, in comparison to Arab states within the region, Israel’s primary goal was to establish and maintain military supremacy. The United States prioritized Israeli military dominance over particular Arab states such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, which were considered to be Soviet allies within the Middle East. Although a new international era has emerged since the Cold War officially ended in 1991, a parallel ideal to that of Cold War policy remains intact. In comparison to Arab states within the region, Israel has continued its endeavors at maximal military superiority. The United States has maintained its position as pro-Israeli military ally and foreign aid donor over the remainder of Middle Eastern countries along with organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah, which are all perceived to be associative sponsors of terrorism. In order to further their own national and regional interests, both sides decided and have chosen to manipulate each other for long-term benefits. Cooperation has been nothing more than a promotion for Israel’s existence and the United States’ geopolitical security.
It should be noted that although the United States and Israel have always been plagued by inconsistent relations, both countries were and remain heavily contingent upon one another in regard to their international policy agendas. As the years have progressed, relative to decision-making procedures within the region, Israel has gradually accumulated influence and control over its Western superpower ally. From a practical perspective, while the U.S.-Israeli relationship has maintained its symbiotic form, the parasite and host have switched roles.

From 1948-2012, although the U.S.-Iranian relationship has changed course, its livelihood continues to be centered upon core realist theoretical precepts. In 1953 when Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq was removed from office and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi consolidated political power, U.S.-Iranian relations became defined by mutual interest relative to the Middle Eastern region. Both countries’ primary aim was to prevent the spread of Communism within Iran and the Middle East. Each state’s foreign policy revolved around engaging in military and economic cooperation that was geared at the achievement of relative gains against the Soviet Union and its allies.

In 1979, after the Iranian Revolution and Iranian Hostage Crisis unfolded, the U.S.-Iranian relationship shifted from a model of mutual cooperation to one of intense competition. In order to constrain its economic growth rate, the American government started imposing sanctions and freezing assets against Iran. At the same time, U.S. interests within the region continued to focus on peace and stability. On the contrary, Iranian foreign policy veered off in a completely different direction. Its core concept became tied to an ideology known as self-reliance, in which the two superpowers were isolated via non-alignment. In 1980, when the Iran-Iraq War began, Iran’s sole interests
were to finish victorious and assert itself as the most powerful state within its region. It should be noted that in 1986, as the Iran-Contra Affair emerged, both countries instantly became willing to cooperate. President Ronald W. Reagan was covertly selling weapons to the Iranian government, and thus, used the funds to aid the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. National interests proved to be more significant than any ideology. As the war ended in 1988, the American policy of dual containment, relative to Iran and Iraq, was placed into full effect. This symbolized yet another tactic that was connected to realism. During this time period, although the U.S.-Iranian relationship shifted into a cynical and opposite direction, its main objectives continued to be defined by self-interest and relative gains.

When the Cold War ended with the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991, America and Iran decided to restructure their foreign policy agendas. As the world progressed into a global era, accommodations were necessary in order to survive. The United States’ most important goal was to continue its suppression of the Iranian economy. Since the end of the Cold War, past incidents of terrorism, an enhanced nuclear program, and ill-natured Israeli relations all helped to shape the criteria of U.S. foreign policy toward Iran. On the contrary, within this same contemporary framework a continuity of sanctions, isolationism, and historical ghosts continue to motivate Iranian foreign policy against America. While the U.S.-Iranian relationship has witnessed countless forms of cooperation and competition over its given time period, the fact of the matter is that realism has always served as the underlying catalyst in regard to these dual interactions.

The U.S.-Pakistani relationship has had difficulties for a few different reasons. These reasons have been attributed to undefined bilateral regimes, a lack of efficient
communication mechanisms, and presumed standards of behavior. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and Pakistan seemed to possess similar interests, but held different perspectives on how to achieve these interests. While it is genuine to say that the United States did not completely trust the socialist regimes of India, the former state still did not view the latter state as an imminent threat relative to the stability of the region. In regard to its own internal stability, Pakistan perceived India to be a monumental threat. While the United States believed that a more passive stance against India was required in order to safeguard the security of the region, Pakistan believed that military intervention and war were the most suitable instruments for safeguarding its security interests. The United States feared that Pakistan’s military engagement with India would offer the Soviet Union an incentive to infiltrate the region. Pakistan was concerned about the rapid economic and military growth of India, along with the expansion of Soviet influence within the Middle East. Also, while Pakistan believed that its primary purpose was to prevent Communism from entering its borders, the United States was under the impression that Pakistan had fully committed itself at prohibiting the spread of Communism within the region. Due to its contractual obligations, if necessary, the United States expected Pakistan to deploy troops within the Middle East. Pakistan claimed that its sole purpose was to blockade Communism by serving as a buffer state. In addition, while the United States had a very difficult time supporting the elected socialist regimes of Pakistan’s prime ministers, the same could not be said about the former state’s attitude toward the latter state’s military presidential regimes. In fact, most of Pakistan's resentment toward the United States was derived from the latter state’s external influence and interference over the political atmosphere of the former state.
While the United States viewed the socialist regimes of Pakistan as potential allies to the Soviet Union, Pakistan’s military regimes were treated as staunch allies.

At the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was very close to a sudden demise. While Pakistan seemed to be fully dedicated about dealing with its Indian dilemma, the United States was strictly concerned about terrorism within the region. The United States lacked trust in Pakistan's nuclear program and, in turn, perceived the latter state to be a possible sponsor of terrorism. This idea was due to Pakistan's full pledged support of the Taliban, along with being an instigator for terrorism within India. In regard to this matter, Pakistan was never informed about the United States’ given perspective. Essentially, this brief era was symbolized by U.S. skepticism toward Pakistan and Pakistan’s confusion about the United States’ desired outcomes.

In 2001, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship merged into what appeared to be a straight direction. In regard to combating terrorism, Pakistan declared its support to the United States. However, only a unilateral trust was constructed between these two countries, which persevered for nearly a decade. This specific time period demonstrated the United States’ reinvigorated perception of Pakistan as a state opposed to terrorism, but in 2009 it became readily apparent as to why the trust was most definitely unilateral.

The last few years have represented a downgrade to the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. In order to receive funding relative to its struggle with India, Pakistan admitted that it had been intentionally deceiving the United States. Also, particular events convinced the United States that Pakistan may be an authentic sponsor of terrorism. While the United States does not trust Pakistan, the latter state believes that the former state hears only what it wants to hear. Two examples of this would be Osama
Bin Laden’s spotting within Pakistani confines, along with President Pervez Musharraf lying about his spending of U.S. aid on counter-terrorism when it was actually used on Pakistan’s nuclear program.

In short, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship can be summarized as one that embraces core realist theoretical precepts. Both countries only seemed to be interested in their own imminent affairs. In regard to its Indian dilemma throughout the entirety of this relationship, Pakistan has sought relative gains. Throughout the Cold War, the United States did everything within its power to increase the relative gains of Pakistan in comparison to the Soviet Union. Within the modern age of terrorism, the United States has done everything within its power to increase the relative gains of Pakistan via billions of dollars in military and economic aid, in comparison to labeled terrorist states and organizations. Despite all previous forms of lip-service that were provided by both countries, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has always been about self-interest and egocentrism.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this thesis is to assess the extent to which U.S. relations with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan are best explained by realist theoretical precepts. The theory of realism as promulgated by Hans Morgenthau in his 2005 work, *Politics Among Nations*, is the most effective theory of IR in explaining U.S. policies toward these states. With that approach as its foundation, the thesis addresses the following research question: To what extent does the theory of realism effectively explain the U.S. relationships with and policies toward Israel, Iran, and Pakistan, respectively, from 1948-2012? There are many insights that U.S. policy-makers can draw from these particular relationships: 1) Understand who you are, and who someone else is, regardless of cultural or political appearances; 2) Stay focused on the status quo, as arrogance and patriotism are potential recipes for failure; 3) While morality is not an obligation, it provides an incentive for states to develop amicable and strong relationships; 4) Accept responsibility for your actions, as denial and perjury are detrimental to state interests; 5) Perfection is only possible via careful insight and deliberation, rather than choosing to do what is easy.

In order to gain a better understanding of realism as a theory, one must become familiar with Hans Morgenthau’s (2005) six principles of political realism, which he promulgated in *Politics Among Nations*.

First, politics, like society in general, are governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society, it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to one’s preferences, human beings will challenge them only at the
risk of failure. Second, the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion. Without such a concept a theory of politics, international or domestic, would not be feasible, for without it, one could not distinguish between political and nonpolitical facts, nor would it be possible to bring at least a measure of systematic order to the political sphere. Third, the concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it is not endowed with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place. Classical Greek historian Thucydides' statement, born of the experiences of ancient Greece, "identity of interests is the surest of bonds, whether between states or individuals," was taken up in the nineteenth century by Lord Salisbury's remark that "the only bond of union that endures" among nations is "the absence of all clashing interests." Fourth, political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action. And it is unwilling to gloss over and obliterate that tension and thus to obfuscate both the moral and the political issue by making it appear as though the stark facts of politics could be morally more satisfying than they actually are, and the moral
law less exacting than it actually is. Fifth, political realism refuses to identify the
moral aspirations of a particular state with the moral laws that govern the
universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes
between truth and idolatry. All states are tempted, and few have been able to
resist the temptation, for long, to clothe their own particular aspirations and
actions in the moral purposes of the universe. To know that states are subject to
the moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good
and evil in relations among states is quite another. There is a world of difference
between the belief that all states stand under the judgment of God, inscrutable to
the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one's side
and that what one wills oneself cannot fail to be willed by God also. Sixth, the
difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real,
and it is profound. However, although the theory of political realism may have
been misunderstood and misinterpreted, there is no gainsaying its distinctive
intellectual and moral attitude to political matters. (pp. 3-15)

Hans Morgenthau, who is a lauded realist thinker, preaches that the most
important material aspect of power is armed forces, but even more significant is a
nation’s character, morale, and quality of governance. He believes that power can be
defined by anything that establishes and maintains the power of man over man, ranging
from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls
another. On a final note, he contends that although power tends to be equated with
material strength, especially of a military nature, it also can be imposed via more
immaterial aspects (Morgenthau, 2005; Pashakhanlou, 2009).
The U.S.-Israeli relationship has definitely embraced many core realist theoretical precepts. From 1948-2012, both countries constantly sought to achieve relative gains within the Middle Eastern region. During the entirety of the Cold War in comparison to Arab states within the region, Israel’s primary goal was to establish and maintain military supremacy. The United States prioritized Israeli military dominance over particular Arab states that were considered to be Soviet allies within the Middle East. Although a new international era has emerged since the Cold War officially ended in 1991, a parallel ideal to that of Cold War policy remains intact. In comparison to Arab states within the region, Israel has continued its endeavors at maximal military superiority. The United States has maintained its position of pro-Israeli military ally and foreign aid donor over the remainder of Middle Eastern countries, along with organizations that are perceived to be associative sponsors of terrorism. In order to further their own national and regional interests, both sides decided and have chosen to manipulate each other for long-term benefits. Cooperation has been nothing more than a promotion for Israel’s existence and the United States’ geopolitical security.

It should be noted that although the United States and Israel have always been plagued by inconsistent relations, the fact is that both countries were and remain heavily contingent upon one another in regard to their international policy agendas. As the years have progressed relative to decision-making procedures within the region, Israel has gradually accumulated influence and control over its Western superpower ally. From a practical perspective, while the U.S.-Israeli relationship has maintained its symbiotic form, the parasite and host have switched roles.
From 1948-2012, although the U.S.-Iranian relationship has changed course, its livelihood continues to be centered upon core realist theoretical precepts. In 1953 when Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq was removed from office and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi consolidated political power, U.S.-Iranian relations became defined by mutual interest relative to the Middle Eastern region. Both countries’ primary aim was to prevent the spread of Communism within Iran and the Middle East. Each state’s foreign policy revolved around engaging in military and economic cooperation that was geared toward the achievement of relative gains against the Soviet Union.

In 1979, after the Iranian Revolution and Iranian Hostage Crisis unfolded, the U.S.-Iranian relationship shifted from a model of mutual cooperation to one of intense competition. In order to constrain its economic growth rate, the American government started imposing sanctions and freezing assets against Iran. At the same time, U.S. interests within the region continued to focus on peace and stability. On the contrary, Iranian foreign policy veered off into a completely different direction. Its core concept became tied to an ideology known as self-reliance, in which both bipolar powers were isolated via non-alignment. In 1980 when the Iran-Iraq War began, Iran’s sole interests were to finish victorious and assert itself as the premier state within its region. It should be noted that in 1986 as the Iran-Contra Affair emerged, both countries instantly became willing to cooperate. National interests proved to be more significant than any ideology. As the war ended in 1988, the United States policy of dual containment, relative to Iran and Iraq, was placed into full effect. This symbolized yet another tactic that was connected to realism. During this time period, although the U.S.-Iranian relationship
shifted into a cynical and opposite direction, its main objectives continued to be defined by self-interest and relative gains.

When the Cold War reached its sudden demise in 1991, America and Iran decided to restructure their foreign policy agendas. As the world progressed into a global era, accommodations were necessary in order to survive. The United States’ most important goal was to continue its suppression of the Iranian economy. Within our modern age, past incidents of terrorism, an enhanced nuclear program, and ill-natured Israeli relations helped to shape the criteria of U.S. foreign policy against Iran. Within this same contemporary framework, a continuity of sanctions, isolationism, and historical ghosts continue to motivate Iranian foreign policy against America. While the U.S.-Iranian relationship has witnessed countless forms of cooperation and competition over its given time period, the fact of the matter is that realism has always served as the underlying catalyst in regard to these dual interactions.

The U.S.-Pakistani relationship has witnessed difficulties for a few different reasons. These reasons have been attributed to undefined bilateral regimes, a lack of efficient communication mechanisms, and presumed standards of behavior. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and Pakistan seemed to possess similar interests but held different perspectives on how to achieve these interests. While it is genuine to say that the United States did not completely trust the socialist regimes of India, the former state still did not view the latter state as an imminent threat relative to the stability of the region. In regard to its own internal stability, Pakistan perceived India to be a monumental threat. While the United States believed that a more passive stance against India was required in order to safeguard the security of the region, Pakistan believed that
military intervention and war were the most suitable instruments for preserving its security interests. The United States feared that Pakistan’s military engagement with India would offer the Soviet Union an incentive to infiltrate the region. Pakistan was concerned about the rapid economic and military growth of India, along with the expansion of Soviet influence within the Middle East. Also, while Pakistan believed that its primary purpose was to mitigate Communism from entering its borders, the United States was under the impression that Pakistan had fully committed itself at prohibiting the spread of Communism within the region. Due to its contractual obligations, the United States expected Pakistan to deploy troops within the Middle East if necessary. Pakistan claimed that its sole purpose was to blockade Communism by serving as a buffer state.

While the United States had a very difficult time supporting the elected socialist regimes of Pakistan’s prime ministers, the same could not be said about the former state’s attitude toward the latter state’s military presidential regimes. In fact, most of Pakistan's resentment toward the United States was derived from the latter state’s external influence and interference over the political atmosphere of the former state. While the United States viewed the socialist regimes of Pakistan as potential allies to the Soviet Union, Pakistan’s military regimes were treated as staunch allies.

At the end of the Cold War in 1991, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship was very close to a sudden demise. While Pakistan seemed to be fully dedicated about dealing with its Indian dilemma, the United States was strictly concerned about terrorism within the region. In fact, the United States lacked trust in Pakistan's nuclear program and, in turn, perceived the latter state to be a possible sponsor of terrorism. This was due to Pakistan's full pledged support in favor of the Taliban, along with being an instigator for
terrorism within India. In regard to this matter, Pakistan was never informed about the United States’ given perspective. Essentially, this brief era was symbolized by U.S. skepticism toward Pakistan and Pakistan’s confusion about the United States’ desired outcomes.

In 2001, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship merged into what appeared to be a straight direction. In regard to combating terrorism, Pakistan declared its support to the United States. However, only a unilateral trust was constructed between these two countries, which persevered for nearly a decade. This specific time period demonstrated the United States’ reinvigorated perception of Pakistan as a state opposed to terrorism, but in 2009 it became readily apparent as to why the trust was most definitely unilateral.

The last few years have represented a downgrade to the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. In order to receive funding relative to its struggle with India, Pakistan admitted that it had been intentionally deceiving the United States. Also, particular events convinced the United States that Pakistan may be an authentic sponsor of terrorism. While the United States does not trust Pakistan, the latter state believes that the former state hears only what it wants to hear.

In short, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship can be summarized as one that embraces core realist theoretical precepts. Both countries only seemed to be interested in their own imminent affairs. In regard to its Indian dilemma, throughout the entirety of this relationship Pakistan has sought relative gains. Throughout the Cold War, the United States did everything within its power to increase the relative gains of Pakistan, in comparison to the Soviet Union. Within the modern age of terrorism, the United States has done everything within its power to increase the relative gains of Pakistan in
comparison to labeled terrorist states and organizations. Despite all previous forms of lip-service that were provided by both countries, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship has always been about self-interest and egocentrism.

The theoretical precepts of realism are very applicable to U.S. relations with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan. Relative to these individual relationships, the behaviorisms that the United States has exemplified tend to reveal a unilateral approach. Nonetheless, in light of the Western superpower, the same assessment can be made about Israel, Iran, and Pakistan’s given actions. Pertaining to other international actors such as the Soviet Union, India, the Arab Middle East, or terrorist organizations, and in some cases, each other, the behavioral interactions that have occurred between the United States with Israel, Iran, and Pakistan mirror a clear image of power-based competition and self-interest. These narcissistic ideals are driven by security dilemmas and the need to survive.

When considering Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism, it is plausible to connect these points with U.S.-Israeli, U.S.-Iranian, and U.S.-Pakistani relations. While the United States and Israel have encountered some hiccups in their brief relationship, they have been able to maintain a strong relationship because of cultural and political bonds unseen elsewhere in the region. This is a key incentive as to why Israel continues to be the largest foreign aid recipient of the United States. In the case of the United States and Iran, this relationship was very sound until the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the rise of radical Islam emerged, whereby all cultural ties ceased to exist. The United States implemented sanctions, which continue to exist, as a means to prevent Iran from maximizing power. The United States and Pakistan have followed a similar path as
their healthiest relations have occurred by way of regimes that possessed common ideologies. For this reason, the United States has sought both aid increases and reductions for Pakistan, depending on the administration. In regard to these given relationships, the United States has crafted ways to increase its relative strength and to decrease the power of those states deemed to be potential security threats.

Undoubtedly, the United States and Israel possess a certain type of “special” relationship that is unprecedented amongst most other states. This relationship is attributed to strong domestic, political, and cultural motives within the American homeland. However, when considering national interests, there are better alternatives such as establishing cordial relations on a broader scale. It must be remembered that states are rational actors who seek survivalist mechanisms, rather than moral obligations. In addition, it must be noted that Israelis holds a very independent mindset, divergent from all other entities. Given their historical past, they do not trust anyone, and in turn, are fully committed to the state. This can be seen through Theodor Herzl’s, the father of political Zionism, 1896 publication of “The Jewish State” (Herzl, 1896). Finally, the current U.S.-Israeli relationship has caused infinite distress for Americans in regard to Islamic extremism. U.S. policy-makers must learn to consider the longer term consequences of permanent Israeli commitment, especially when dealing with the complexities of the Greater Middle East.
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