Fixing the Failed: An Investigation of Terrorist Organizations and State Building Capabilities

Joshua Adam Freeman
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The University of Southern Mississippi

FIXING THE FAILED: AN EXAMINATION OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND STATE BUILDING CAPABILITIES

by

Joshua Adam Freeman

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate School of The University of Southern Mississippi in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

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May 2015
ABSTRACT

FIXING THE FAILED: AN EXAMINATION OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND STATE BUILDING CAPABILITIES

by Joshua Adam Freeman

May 2015

This study examines the role of terrorist organizations in failed states. In particular, their ability to perform positive state-building activities that result in stability is investigated. Both terrorism and state failure present unique and serious threats to international security. However, there is very little literature concerning the positive effect terrorist organizations can have in failed states. Presented is not only an investigation of the linkages between state failure and terrorism, but also a new classification of terrorist organizations based upon their ability to state-build in failed states. These organizations are classified by their ability to provide goods and services within the state, become a legitimate sovereign, and provide security from both domestic and international threats to the citizens of the state in the process of filling either capacity, legitimacy, and security gaps. From this a tiered classification is built. The FARC, Hezbollah, and LTTE are examined to ascertain their ability to complete these tasks. Results show that the FARC is unable to fill any gaps, Hezbollah all three, and the LTTE only one. Results suggest that there are indeed terrorist organizations that have the capacity to perform positively. The new classification system allows for study of terrorist organizations that evaluates them on their constructive abilities, an often overlooked dimension of their existence. Using this system, new policy to combat the rising terrorist
threat and the instability surrounding state failure can be developed and put into place tobring about a more security international system.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated in loving memory to my mother, Evednia Marie Freeman. I am also thankful for my father, James Freeman, who has provided encouragement throughout my graduate school experience. This thesis is also dedicated to the Brown family whose encouragement and support has provided me the opportunity to pursue my academic goals.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia</td>
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<td>GTD</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Data Base</td>
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<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This thesis investigates the relationship between failed states and terrorist organizations. In particular, the ability of terrorist organizations to engage in positive, state-building activity in failed states is examined. Such examination leads to the creation of a new classification system for terrorist organizations based upon these abilities rather than those attributes relied on by other classifications, such as ideology, area, and fatality rates. Such a classification allows for the development of new, more strategic policy geared towards eliminating the support base of these organizations rather than engaging them in physical combat in an attempt to eradicate them.

The primary objective of this study is to reveal whether or not terrorist organizations can act in a positive manner. To accomplish this goal, terrorist organizations are evaluated and scored on their ability to meet certain criteria for each of the gaps presented in the Call (2010) model of state failure. From such evaluation, a new classification of terrorist organizations is constructed. As the terrorist organizations are evaluated and classified, a more intimate knowledge is offered that provides the means to better understand the role of terrorist organizations within their states and the international system. An investigation of their constructive capabilities provides insight that studies that simply evaluate their destructive abilities are unable to offer.

I argue that some terrorist organizations are indeed able to act in a positive manner. Though this activity does not forgive their use of violence against innocent civilians, it shows that they are capable of performing a number of functions and that their classification based upon their tactics and fatality rates alone may be inappropriate.
This thesis calls for a closer look at these organizations and argues that there is more to them than meets the eye. Further, the rush to label such organizations as inherently evil has produced ineffective policy and created aversive attitudes in global politics that are detrimental to securing peace for all citizens of the world. Noted during the course of this investigation is that state sponsorship of these organizations is helpful, but not the most influential factor pushing these organizations towards taking positive action.

There is a distinction between terrorist organizations and NGOs such as the Red Cross that must be made, outside of the obvious. The use of coercive force and violence allows terrorist organizations to be more successful at influencing substantive change within a state. The failures of NGOs to stabilize failed states in Africa are numerous, and this is often attributed to their inability to use force. The investigation of terrorist organizations’ abilities to act in a state-building manner becomes important due to their distinct use of violence as a coercive tool for this reason.

In the context of this thesis, a failed state is a state that cannot provide the most basic of goods, services, and security to its citizens at even minimum levels and has lost the ability to control its internal affairs. When presenting original data, the *Fragile States Index* is referenced to draw a list of failed states. Terrorist organizations are any organization that targets innocent civilians with the intent of coercing someone else into a political activity. Data regarding terrorist attacks is drawn from the *Global Terrorism Database* (GTD) published by The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.

The study proceeds as follows. In Chapter II, the phenomena of state failure is explored and analyzed. Literature regarding the definition of state failure, the
relationship of state failure to civil war and revolution, the causes of failure, and appropriate modeling of state failure are analyzed. This chapter also thoroughly explains the choice to use the Call model as a basis for our understanding of state failure in attempts to build a classification of terrorist organizations. Analytic treatment is also given to each of the three gaps as well as the provision of examples of what states fall into each of the gaps, and which fall into multiple gaps.

Chapter III provides an overview of terrorism and terrorist organizations, and their relation to state failure. First, a concrete definition of terrorism is laid forth as to clearly define what constitutes a terrorist organization and what does not. From here, the causes of terrorism are explored and analyzed, and their relation to state failure extrapolated upon. The rest of the chapter is devoted to examining terrorist organizations and goods and services provision within states, both failed and not, and the relationship between terrorism and failed states. The latter is accomplished through analysis of terrorist incidents per year cross referenced with listings from the top 10 in the Fragile States Index.

Chapter IV provides an overview of the classification system to be presented. Each of the criteria that must be met to fill each of the gaps are explained and detailed and the build of the classification is presented. Along with each criterion is an example of a terrorist organization that has fulfilled, or is currently fulfilling, the criteria. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to discussing the build of the classification system. The tiered structure of the classification is set forth and detailed.

Chapter V presents case study of various terrorist organizations and their abilities to fill each of the gaps. The terrorist organizations The Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Columbia (FARC), Hezbollah, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are provided as case study. Using these organizations the classification system is put to practical use and demonstrates its appropriateness and effectiveness. Chapter VI provides the conclusions of the thesis and prospects for future research.

Results of the study show that the FARC fills no gaps, Hezbollah is able to fill all three gaps, and the LTTE is able to fill one. Of these three, Hezbollah stands to do the most good for citizens of the state in which they exist. This is not to say that their use of terrorist tactics is good, but their provision of services to the people of Lebanon is. The result associated with Hezbollah shows that terrorist organizations can act in a positive capacity and do good for the state. This is not a remark to the inherent good or evil surrounding the decision to commit acts of terrorism, however.

Using the operational understanding of the classification presented, it is hoped that more research into the abilities of terrorist organizations is conducted in the future. Through such an intimate understanding of what is considered one of the most grave threats to international security, policy makers worldwide have at their disposal information that allows for competent and effective policy solutions to the threat of terrorism worldwide.
CHAPTER II

STATE FAILURE

This chapter introduces state failure. Due to its use as a classifying mechanism it is a key component of this study. The particular model used is clearly laid out and its use as a classifier explained to provide foundations for commentary in later chapters. Discussion on the definition of state failure, its difference from civil war and revolution, its causes, and an appropriate modeling as well as explanation of the model’s components is offered. The role of poverty, corruption, resource wealth, infrastructural issues, governmental structure, and ethnic tensions in state failure are investigated.

What is State Failure?

State failure is the collapse of a state’s political structure that leads to an inability to promote rule and law (King and Zeng 2001). The state loses the ability to act as expected and becomes engulfed with internal turmoil. State dissolution leads to state predation, the state’s loss over the use of legitimate coercive power, and the inability, or unwillingness, to provide citizens with basic security, positive political goods, and services (Bates 2008; Boas and Jennings 2007; Rotberg 2003). Once political rule and order have dissipated and the state no longer cares for its citizens, it fails.

State predation and loss of coercive power are the key characteristics of the failed state (Bates 2008). The loss of coercive power is the most important. Issues that lead to state failure are numerous, but all ultimately lead to the state’s loss of control over the territory within its borders. In many authoritarian regimes, the state preys on its citizens, exhibits widespread corruption, and fails to provide their citizens with goods and
services, yet do not fail. The lack of failure is attributed to the regime’s maintenance of their monopoly over the use of coercive power within the territory of the state.

Also, unlike the Authoritarian state, failed states face increased competition between armed factions for control of the state. Chowdhury and Duvall (2014) argue that any number of would-be sovereigns begin competing for control over the state once the standing regime begins to struggle. Events in Syria during 2013 and 2014 provide evidence of this. While the Assad regime fights to maintain control of the state, armed insurgent groups attempt to depose him and have taken territory from the state limiting the reach of the state’s authority. Somalia provides further example. No single group is able to control the entirety of the state and regions such as Puntland, are controlled by different regional powers.

Failed states also present unique and troublesome threats to the security of the international community. Iqbal and Starr (2008) find that failed states have an impact on the general stability of neighboring states and the region in which they are located. Importantly, they argue that failure of one state can cause political unrest among the citizens of a neighboring state. Ungovernable territories such as these offer the necessary environment for transnational terrorist organizational development consisting of a network of safe-havens and the inability of police and military forces to effectively combat these organizations out of the state (Patrick 2007; Piazza 2008). The attacks of September 11, 2001 led to the realization that transnational terrorist organizations are a grave and pressing threat.

Further, if failed states harbor and provide these terrorist organizations a staging ground, global leaders must devote their resources to reversing the fate of these states. States such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan are commonly used as examples of the failed state. There are many more that are failed or in varying degrees of failure. The Fragile States Index for 2014 places 16 states within its very high and high alert categories (Fund for Peace 2014). Although these states only represent roughly 9% of the total states in the index, this is still a startling number. Since failure in one state can spread instability to its neighbors, the problem is not just these 16 states, but potentially all states that border them as well.
Between 1955 and 2003, the number of new instances of state failure fluctuated (Figure 1). There was little to moderate fluctuation, ranging from zero to eight new cases in any given year. However, the percent of total states facing instability is more important. There is a steady incline with peaks from the mid-1960s to 1970s and again in the late 1980s and the early 1990s with a sudden drop going into the 2000s. A low of 5% in 1955 ranged to a high of nearly 30% in the early 1990s. There are a number of explanations for why there were sudden rises and declines, but exploring these is outside the scope of this study. This points out that state failure plagues a number of states, even if only for short amounts of time.

Goldstone et al. (2005) also find that nearly 60% of instability events occurred within two geographic regions, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East and South Asia. Of all instability episodes between 1955 and 2003, 34.8% occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa and 22.7% in the Near East and South Asia. While other regions suffer instability, these two regions appear to be particularly troubling. In particular, instability events in Africa have led to the massacre of millions of innocent civilians in the midst of severe civil war in a number of states. Instability has also become prevalent in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria in the last decade leading to the outbreak of civil wars and internal strife.

Problematically, a large portion of the studies regarding failed states are aimed at prediction and policy solutions rather than systemically exploring the issue to explain it (Bates 2008; Patrick 2007). This chapter uses available literature to present a clear image of the conditions surrounding state failure as well as present a conceptualization that

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1 For purposes of the study, the Near East and South Asia were treated as one geographic region.
allows us to accurately explore not only state failure, but also to provide the means to develop policy solutions that are so vehemently desired.

Civil War, Revolution, and Failed States

Civil war is less a cause of state failure than a secondary consequence of the factors that induce failure. Although many failed states are rife with civil conflict that is exacerbated by ethnic, religious, linguistic, or some other enmity between communities, one must be careful not to assume that civil war is an intrinsic trait of state failure (Potter 2014; Rotberg 2002a; Rotberg 2003). Tensions such as these do make it more likely that state-breaking conflict will occur.

Throughout history, states have experienced large-scale civil war yet did not fail during the war or in its aftermath. For example, the American Civil War did not bring the United States to the precipice of state failure – in fact, quite the opposite happened. The United States maintained control, and in the aftermath of the war, quickly reassimilated those states that had seceded. Ndulu et al. (2007) find in study of African states that there are many cases in which the state failed without the presence of civil war before, during, or after failure. This is a surprising finding. Because there are a number of similar causes of civil war and state failure, expectation is that civil war would be present in a majority of failed states. The answer to this puzzle is quite simple, however. While the conditions may be favorable for civil war to take place, there is a chance it will not happen or that there is an antecedent variable preventing its start.

Political revolution and state failure are not intertwined either. The two are separated from similarity on the most basic of levels. Failure is the state’s fall into disorder while revolution within the state is for the creation of new order. Skocpol
(1979) argues that revolutions are attempts to reshape the models of state production in an attempt to enrich the state. This is a difference that must be noted as revolutions take place in multiple states without failure occurring. Egypt underwent a revolution in 2011 to ouster the standing regime and replaced it with a new, democratically elected regime. During the revolution, the state was not in any threat of failure. However, in the case of both revolution and failure, a state may see an explosion of violent activity. We cannot assume they are correlated with one another, however.

Civil war stems from similar issues that bring about state failure. Because of this, many studies of state failure are heavily inclusive of literature on civil war. The use of this literature allows for not only the development of new theories about state failure to be built, but to also provide further insight into political instability. Without this literature, the study of state failure would not be as progressed as it is and would most likely produce trivial results. Political revolution should not be associated with failure because the goal of revolution is to establish a new, more legitimate order while failure is the state’s fall into disorder.

Harbingers of Instability

When evaluating the causes of state failure, three broad categories must be examined: economic, governmental, and social issues. Economically, GDP, GDP per capita, and resource wealth in states is examined. Studies look to the structure of the government and the regime type, corruption within the state, and the overall infrastructural stability when evaluating governmental causes. Social issues such as ethnic tensions are also taken into account. Any of these issues, or any combination thereof, may produce instability that can lead to the failure of a state.
Poverty and political instability have a strong relationship. During state failure, economic and living conditions rapidly decline for the inhabitants of the state (Rotberg 2002a; 2002b). There is an increased likelihood that the state will face instability that can lead to failure as per capita income falls (Goldstone et al. 2005; Sambanis and Hegre 2006). Fearon and Laitin (2003) concur, as they find that a drop of $1,000 in per capita income is met with a 42% increased chance of civil war breaking out and Alesina and Perotti (1995) argue that as the gap widens between the rich and the poor instability is more likely. As citizens’ income drops, they become desperate and can easily be attracted to anti-government groups that are able to offer them prospects for a more bearable life and a promising future.

Poverty of the state itself is also troubling. States that are impoverished find themselves unable to adequately pay civil servants, the military, and police forces leading to their loss of coercive power within the state (Bates 2008). Without the loyalty of military or police forces, the state is helpless but to watch as other would-be sovereigns begin to encroach and claim loyalties that are lost. Once loyalties begin to shift, the standing regime of the state begins to selfimplode and what were once solid underpinnings of the state become severely weakened. While not a case of state failure, Egypt provides a perfect example of this. Even though extremely corrupt, Hosni Mubarak was able to retain political power for a period of time. He lost the loyalties of the police and military forces in 2011 and was soon after removed from office and replaced.

Resource wealth within a state may also lead to stability issues. Resource rich states face both a heightened risk of civil war, and the likelihood of long and drawn out
conflict is increased if civil war is to break out (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ross 2004). Nuedorfer and Theuerkauf (2014) provide evidence to support this as they find that gains from resources are likely to accrue disproportionately to certain groups while others are forced to extract the resources with little or no personal gain. Economic inequality within a state will rise and, as the state hordes the revenues from the resources without properly distributing them, the state income will concentrate with only the elites of the state and plunge the poor even further into poverty. Fjelde (2009) argues that corrupt channeling of resource wealth does provide the circumstances in which opposition groups are able to easily recruit and grow. With revenues aggregating so disproportionately, the shadow of instability looms ominously over the state.

These resources become even more valuable during conflict as they allow the state to maintain a position of superiority and, if opposition movements take control and manage them, the income necessary for continued engagement with the state flows into their coffers. Naturally, the more valuable the resource, the more likely that conflict surrounding it will arise. Many states have access to resources such as ferrous metals, gemstones, and oil, for example. These resources constitute a large portion of the state’s income. Problematically, a small portion of the population often take control of the revenues accrued from these resources.

Of all valuable resources, petroleum provides the most potential for civil conflict and instability (Fearon 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Thies (2010) confirms this and argues that oil exports stand apart from state capacity, unlike many other tested primary export resources. Furthermore, oil is the only resource that has an effect on the
likelihood of civil war. This is attributed to a number of factors. First, states with oil are often much less reliant on their citizens for financial support and are able to rule more repressively without major consequence (Bates 2008). Also, because there is high global demand for oil, much more so than most ferrous metals or gems, states are sure to amass impressive profits and, if mismanaged or handled by corrupt hands, tensions are sure to increase within the state.

As the political structures of the state degrade, corruption spreads nearly uncontrollably. In a number of failing states, leaders begin subverting democratic norms, discriminating against some groups while showing favor to others, and using their power to levy resources for their personal use, and use their power to make the lives of those they rule miserable (Bates 2008; Rotberg 2002b). Moreover, as corruption spreads, the amount of social welfare offered by the state begins to rapidly decline, and state aid to the needy ceases (Fredriksson and Svenson 2003). The corruption of both national and local political leaders leads to a decreased interest in the welfare of the citizenry of the state and instills greed that ensures that the lives of the political elite are comfortable while the rest of the citizens of the state struggles to survive.

Corruption, however, does not exist solely at the top of the political structure, it trickles down riddling the entire structure with corruption. As corruption spreads and eventually infects the ranks of the police and military, the citizens become victim of state predation and are offered very few, if any, protections. In Somalia, Mohammed Farrah Aidid would send his personal guard and militia to secure supply drops from the United Nations to keep it away from citizens to be used as a mechanism of social control. When
the government starts denying citizens access to resources necessary for survival, tensions rise and the foundations of the state begin to buckle under pressure.

Regimes lose their legitimacy and citizens of the state begin to lose faith in state institutions. The state’s ability to properly function as a protectorate and provider is questioned as corruption continues to spread. Choi (2011) argues that as citizens lose faith in the state, there is a higher chance that they will join terrorist organizations or some other type of separatist movement that opposes the state. Naturally, as more opposition movements rise to challenge the regime, the less stable the foundations it stands on become. Loss of legitimacy bring about intense challenges to the authority of the state that exposes further corruption and/or provides the conditions for total political upheaval.

Cruz-Coke (2001) finds in study of Latin American states, that as public satisfaction in the state dropped, it became much more likely that the state would face some sort of stability issues. Drops in satisfaction only have profound effects on democratic regimes, though. Authoritarian leaders often maintain their power through force and political repression while democratic leaders rely on the people for support to continue holding their offices, and through those offices, their power. Through use of the Polity index, Hegre et al. (2001) argue that both strong autocracies and strong democracies are much less likely to face instability issues than states that fall into the median categories, otherwise known as anocracies. These states have an inherent instability about them already and often lack the necessary infrastructure to ward off instability.

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2 Polity is compiled and produced by The Center for Systemic Peace.
In anocracies, even if the government is democratic or transitioning to a democracy, there is still some probability that they are restricting the political freedoms of their citizens. Abadie (2006) finds that a lack of political freedom is significantly and positively correlated with the chances of an increased terrorist presence within a state. Taking this as a proxy for oppositional movement against the established state government, one sees that political repression does have an effect on the stability of the state.

Oppositional movements arise in a number of states but many are too small to be significant, or lack the resources needed to engage the state long term. When one of these groups begins using terrorism or guerrilla warfare as a tactic to claim territories and influence politics within the state, the state faces a more significant challenge than just appeasing upset citizens. Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) find in study of terrorist organizations that territorial control makes the organization much more lethal, and gives them the ability to oppose the state in drawn out conflict. Without appropriate military and police forces, the state cannot fight them off. As the state loses control over its territory and allows outside invaders or domestic enemies to take it, the state’s sphere of influence shrinks and it loses control.

With the foundations of the state failing, numerous infrastructural issues begin to surface. Either the infrastructure crumbles or it is taken over by non-state actors. The lack of roads, rail lines, and telephone and postal communications begin to plague the state (Englehart 2009). A multitude of challenges arise due to these issues. First, the ability of the state to deploy troops and police to maintain law and order within its borders is hindered. Central warning systems and responses to natural disasters and
public emergencies are also drastically impaired. With the state unable to provide these services, it becomes easier for non-state actors to step in and provide for the people and recruit them to their cause.

It also becomes easy for non-state groups to take control of the internal workings of the state and rule through various indirect channels. For instance, the Taliban were able to take control of major roadways and villages throughout Afghanistan and become the de facto rulers of the state. Combined with control over key resources, this allowed them to easily subvert the standing regime and create mass instability from within. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, rebels from both inside and outside of the state have managed to plunder the ferrous metals, precious gems, and forests in the state. They have also managed to control a number of primary transport roads that allow them to moderate trade of these resources and keep a government presence from interfering with their activities.

With the state unable to effectively mobilize troops and the police to deal with crises, security is compromised. The primary job of the state is to provide citizens with security from cross-border invasions, loss of state controlled territory, eliminate threats to domestic security and prevent crime but in failure they are unable to provide minimal security much less accomplish the before mentioned (Call 2010; Rotberg 2003). States that are unable to repel outside invaders leave their citizens exceptionally vulnerable and allow for domestic and international actors to gain power and take territory. In many cases, civilians are massacred or exploited by the invading forces.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo lacks a central government and is unable to repel the invasions of numerous outside militant groups. Armed groups from Burundi,
Rwanda, and Uganda have infiltrated the state and taken over key resources, massacred millions of state citizens, and control large swaths of territory through the use of violence and fear. Many other failed states are also unable to combat the rise of armed rebellion groups that challenge the central authority of the state.

But what induces rebellion against the state? Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that it is not grievance, but greed, that will induce someone to rebel against the state. They argue that in societies that are poor, it is easier to entice citizens to join armed forces and challenge the stability of the state. Further, as the citizens of the state become desperate, they are more likely to be influenced by the ideologies of local demagogues and hatemongers leading to anti-state activities (Krasner and Pascual 2005). With there being a perceived benefit to joining anti-state movements and groups, citizens who are impoverished are much more likely to join even if they do not agree with many of their ideological stances.

Although hatemongering serves to exacerbate existing ethnic tensions within the state that can lead to civil war, studies find that these tensions are not active predictors of the outbreak of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2004, Collier and Hoeffler 2004). However, research does show that rule by a minority group that is particularly forceful and violent towards the majority increases the chance of state failure (Collier et al. 2007). The tensions that build lead to catastrophic events such as the Rwandan Genocide.

In many cases, minorities were chosen by colonial powers as favorites and often remained in power after the colonial powers withdrew. Also, a corrupt dictator or authoritarian regime may have favored them. In Iraq, the Baath regime of Saddam Hussein was made up of the minority Sunnis. The regime was merciless and left the
majority Shia population living in fear for their lives. Aided by the invasion of United States troops in 2003, the Shia began to rise up against the regime and it was eventually toppled, throwing the state into its current situation of on again, off again stability with intense conflict between the two sects.

Failed states are states in which the central authority has collapsed and no longer holds the monopoly over the use of coercive force. State failure derives from a number of factors. Widespread poverty of the state and its citizens, resource wealth, a lack of security, infrastructural issues, and corruption provide the instability needed to cause failure. Civil war is not a predictor of the state failing, but is closely associated with many of the ailments failed states suffer, and, as a result, a number of failed states are engulfed in civil war.

Modeling State Failure

The study of state failure has produced a number of explanations and models. Problematically, many of these are inefficient and poorly suited to fully explore it and differentiate cases. The last two decades saw a rush to fund research into state failure that has resulted in a number of theories that assume all states essentially function in the same way, even in failure, and have improperly clustered all states facing some sort of instability into a one-size-fits-all category (Boaz and Jennings 2007; Call 2008; 2010; Patrick 2008). Due to this, cases such as Somalia, Afghanistan, and Sierra Leone are treated as equal in their failure. This is not true, however, as each state experienced different shortcomings that led to their failure.

Taylor (2014) argues that because state failure can be attributed to no single cause in particular, our understandings are muddled by ambiguity due to complex relationships
between variables we attribute to numerous failed states throughout the world. This ambiguity is enough to dismiss many of these explanations. A list of the causes of failure exists but very few take the time to examine the nuances and intricacies of failure as they relate to individual cases. It is proper to continue defining state failure as the collapse of a state’s government but the one-size-fits-all approach is inappropriate. Disambiguation of these states is pertinent to understanding failure and its surrounding conditions.

Call (2010) presents a new model of state failure using what he refers to as *gaps* to address this (Figure 2). In his model, there are three existing gaps: capacity, legitimacy, and security. He argues that by separating states out using these gaps, we are able to more appropriately study them as the unique cases they are. Each gap is separated from the other two, but it is possible for two or even all three of the gaps to overlap in a failed state. The gaps are not conflated, but are interrelated.
A model such as this has a number of advantages. Separation of states by the gaps provides unique insight into the particular problems that plague the state. Disaggregation allows us to diagnose the ailment, not just the symptoms. Further, this allows for new definitions and conceptualizations to arise. As many of the current understandings are riddled with ambiguity, disaggregation allows for a refreshing examination of state failure that leads to a clearer understanding of the phenomenon and each individual, unique case.

*The Gaps*

Each of the gaps presents a set of unique circumstances. One must be careful to note, however, that there are cross-gap symptoms that could cause failure. This section explores each of the three gaps and provides examples of states that are in or have been in the gap. Later, analysis of the crossover between the gaps is performed. Just because a state falls within a gap does not mean it is failed or failing. However, all failed or failing states will fall into one or more of these gaps.³

*Capacity*

The *capacity gap* refers to the state’s ability to render political goods and services, maintain infrastructure, and maintain economic stability. All states are expected to provide certain political goods and services to their citizens to at least a minimal degree, such as: social welfare, medical care, food, water, open participation in democratic elections, and access to roads, highways, and railways. According to Call (2010)’s

³ To place states in each of the gaps, Call (2010) employs various methods to rate states. For the capacity gap he uses immunization rates, for legitimacy a combination of political rights and freedoms and Polity, and for security a measure of conflict and its intensity. While I have reservations about some of these measures, and due to a lack of time and resources, I accept his rankings and employ them to place states within the correct gaps. To account for my reservations, I compare these rankings with those of the Fragile States Index to examine whether the weakest states appear in any of Call’s rankings.
rankings, states such as Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and Somalia are the top three states in the capacity gap.

In the late 1980s many of the highways and trade routes in Afghanistan were controlled by a number of different warlords. The state had no control over these routes. By holding such integral pieces of state infrastructure, the warlords were able to stagnate the state economy by seizing all trade goods and even people from these routes. They were able to restrict aid and relief to the most rural areas of the state by controlling roadways, leaving citizens highly impoverished and in desperate situations. The citizens were left to fend for themselves with no help from the state. It was not until the Taliban took over in the 1990s and secured all these routes and unified them under their control that everyone had access, for a toll, of course.

Another example is Somalia. Although there is a standing state government in Somalia, it has little to no control within the borders of the state. Chowdhury and Duvall (2014) point out that local tribes serve as the sovereign authorities and rule various regions from within, such as Somaliland and Puntland. The state government is unable to control the capital of Mogadishu, let alone the entirety of the state. Access to roads, railways, communications, and much more are out of the state’s control. The state is unable to provide goods and services to the citizens living within these regions, but the regional sovereigns do, to some extent. This serves not only to place the state in the capacity gap, but also within the legitimacy gap as there is credible challenge to the legitimacy of the state government.
Legitimacy

The legitimacy gap occurs when the state government is no longer viewed as the authority within the state’s borders. Authority within the state derives from the monopoly over the legitimate use of coercive force within the state’s borders (Weber 1964). The state’s loss over the legitimate use of coercive force leads to loss in legitimacy and control within the state. As the state government loses control, the stability of the state wanes and legitimacy comes into question.

Corruption also overtakes the state and the citizens lose confidence in the ability of the standing regime to competently and fairly rule. In a large number of failed states, leaders become tyrannical and despotic, and use their power to keep themselves wealthy while repressing others. Call (2010) argues that the legitimacy gap emerges when leaders begin operating outside the regulations of their power and begin disproportionately distributing wealth and resources. The legitimacy in question is internal, not external. While external legitimacy is key for acting in the international system, it is not of great importance to rule within a state and this study focuses on the internal variety.

According to Call’s rankings North Korea is the least legitimate state. North Korea, however, is not a failed state nor is it in the process of failing. A lack of legitimacy can spark internal uprising that would lead to the overthrow of the state, or as we see in Somalia, regional sovereigns appearing and ruling on their own without influence or interference from the state. Many Authoritarian states lack internal legitimacy yet do not fail. Their ability to continue holding the monopoly over the use of

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4 Internal legitimacy is legitimacy granted by the people within the state. External is legitimacy granted by other sovereign nations to recognize an actor as capable of performing activities expected of an established state.
legitimate coercive force and their claim to sovereignty counteracts the lack of legitimacy.

The presence of mass protests and anger towards a regime signals a legitimacy gap. The defection of military and police personnel can cement the gap and bring about the fall of the state. Egypt serves as a perfect example of this. Nepstad (2013) argues that the Egyptian military and police, when deployed by Mubarak to put down the protests, instead protected protestors from police brutality, and then, when deployed at a later date, refused to shoot at protestors. Eventually, the military pulled their support from the Mubarak regime and sided with the protestors. At this point, Mubarak fled from the state and the military took control. With the entire institution shifting loyalties, the regime had no way to enforce their idea of order upon the protestors. This particular example shows a legitimacy gap appearing and disappearing within a short period of time. Forays into this gap can be extended over a number of decades though.

**Security**

The *security gap* refers to a state’s inability to provide its citizens with minimal security and its inability to safeguard its borders from domestic and transnational enemies (Call 2010). States in this gap are often subject to long and drawn out conflicts that leave the state and its citizens vulnerable. Threats to the security of the state arise from both domestic and international threats. They range from invading enemy armies, to private militias, and armed resistance groups. When the state is no longer able to effectively protect citizens of the state from threats such as this, the state enters into the security gap.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a state that has failed in many aspects. Its record of providing security is more atrocious than its overwhelming lack of goods
and services to citizens. Regularly, armed domestic and international groups kill civilians, plunder resources, and control roads and other means of transportation. The state has no ability to provide defense against these groups at all. Similarly, the Somali state government is unable to defend and police the capital of Mogadishu, let alone the entirety of the state’s territory.

Afghanistan serves as another example. Both before the Taliban took over and after their overthrow by the United States, Afghanistan was subject to the control of various warlords. Citizens were subject to their desires and were offered no protections from their indiscretions. The Taliban did not treat them as well as would be expected by a state government, but they did provide basic protections and took control from the warlords unifying much of the state.

The three above mentioned states rank as the top three most insecure states (Call 2010). There is a gross lack of security provided to citizens and in some cases the state is preying on them. Just because the state has a standing military and police force it does not exempt itself from the security gap. If these institutions are weak and their loyalties are ephemeral, it becomes easy for the state to lose control and become insecure.

*Not Conflated, but Interrelated*

Each of the gaps has an identity that is separate from the other two. This does not imply that there is not a relationship between the gaps or that they don’t share similar onsets, however. In fact, there is reason to assume that the presence of one gap will elicit the appearance of another in the future if not addressed properly. Briefly, these relationships are discussed. This crossover is not important in terms of scoring criteria
for filling each of the gaps as presented later, but this does provide insight into how state failure grows into a larger problem as time goes by and it is left unchecked.

The capacity gap is an inability to provide goods and services and maintain infrastructure at even minimum levels. This leads to widespread poverty, dissatisfaction, and anger. It becomes harder for the state to maintain the status quo and keep the citizens of the state satisfied as conditions such as these arise. If the citizens resort to rebellion, or even appeal to an outside source for help, the security of the state becomes ineffective and compromised. With the state engaging its own citizens, it becomes easier for an outside invading force to move in, such as in the Congo. As the state is unable to fulfill its role as a provider, citizens will begin to question its legitimacy, and even challenge it. As a new would-be sovereign rises to face the standing regime, legitimacy is put into question and the state can enter into a legitimacy gap. If left unchecked, it is easy for a capacity gap to induce other gaps in the state as well.

As the state becomes less legitimate and corruption begins swirling, the state can stop providing citizens with goods and services and begin hoarding resources for their personal use to ensure their own safety. As the legitimacy of the state declines, it becomes much more likely that an internal, or even external force will engage in warfare with the standing regime to become the sovereign within the state, much the same as the Taliban in Afghanistan. There is also the threat that external states, mainly global superpowers who send aid money to states, will pull their support and quit providing resources, plunging the state into a severe capacity gap if the state is reliant on that aid.

As the security gap widens in a state, the state potentially cannot provide goods and services to its citizens. As threats arise and begin taking territory and resource
wealth from the state, there is little it can do to provide for citizens. The corruption reduces goods provisions as leaders begin to protect their own instead of the state and hoard resources for their private use. In turn, citizens begin questioning the legitimacy of the state and its competence to rule. Therefore, the security gap has provided the instability needed to open both a capacity and legitimacy gap.

The amount of interrelation between the gaps is alarming. Importantly, however, we must remember that a state can still reside in a capacity gap without once facing another of the gaps, and vice versa. This relationship must be noted due to the impact they can have outside of their own set of symptoms. Through an understanding of the relationships between the gaps the significance of each gap is drawn more into focus. Realizing that each of these gaps can set the conditions for another to open, the importance of policy to eliminate a gap within a state before conditions become worse and the state faces two or even all three gaps at once becomes abundantly apparent.

Conclusion

State failure poses grave threats on both the domestic and international level. As states are unable to maintain internal stability, their neighbors can face instability issues and a number of global security threats can arise. Through Call’s model of state failure, we are allowed the opportunity to view each case of failure as unique and exclusive. Using this we can formulate competent policy to combat the symptoms that arise with each of the gaps and address them before they grow too large.

The Call model is used and repurposed for the task of building a classification of terrorist organizations based upon their ability to fill these gaps. Throughout the study, various criteria are set forth that a terrorist organization can meet to be classified with an
ability to fill it. It is neither the purpose nor intention of this study to produce a new model for state failure, but instead to use an existing model to further our understanding of both state failure and terrorists in the failed state.
CHAPTER III

TERRORISM AND THE FAILED STATE

NGOs such as the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) operate worldwide. They, however, have not had long-lasting, positive results. A number of NGOs attempt to aid failed states but often fall short of accomplishing their goals (Zaidi 1999). Problematically, these organizations lack the ability to use coercive force in order to enforce their agenda, and are constrained by the limitations the host state places upon them. Terrorist organizations do not face this issue however. They are freely able to use violence to further their agenda. The lack of constraints regarding violence makes these organizations more likely to be taken seriously within state politics and draws the focus of this study.

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce terrorism and its relation to state failure. First, a clear and concise definition of terrorism is offered as to build an understanding of what a terrorist organization is. Next, an overview of some of the root causes of terrorism and their similarities to the causes of state failure is provided. The ability of terrorist organizations to provide positive political goods to the citizens of the state is also analyzed. The chapter concludes with an investigation of terrorism in failed states and implications not only for this study, but also future research surrounding the relationship between two topics.

Terrorism and the Terrorist Organization

The study of terrorism has resulted in a plethora of definitions of terrorism. For this thesis, an amalgam of the definitions offered by Ganor (2010) and Primoratz (2013) is employed. Primoratz argues that terrorism is an act of violence, or threat of its use,
against innocent people, to coerce another person into an action they might not otherwise take. Ganor shares this view but adds that all terrorist acts are motivated by a political goal. By combining key aspects of their definitions, the result is that terrorism is the deliberate use of violence against innocent people with the intent of intimidating some other person/s into a course of political action in which they would otherwise not take. The targets do not have to die, they simply must be attacked.

Importantly, this definition provides that there are two targets of a terrorist attack, a direct and indirect target. The direct target is the innocent people attacked and the indirect are those that the terrorists are trying to coerce into a political act (i.e. a politician or ruler). There must also be a political motive behind the attack. Attacks attempting to accomplish goals such as extorting money are simply criminal acts, not terrorism (Enders et al. 2011). This is not to say that terrorists do not engage in criminal activities, just that these activities are not terrorism, even if perpetrated by terrorist organizations. However, once a criminal organization commits a terrorist act, they are no longer simply criminals.

Terrorist attacks take on one of two primary distinctions, domestic and transnational. Domestic terrorism is a home-directed act of terrorism that involves only the members of the state involved while transnational attacks involve the citizens of multiple states, regardless of the attack location and nationality of the terrorists involved (Santifort et al. 2012). This is an important distinction to be made as it influences attack types, targets, and the motivations behind the attacks. Although the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks are domestic in nature, a great deal of the research done into terrorism focuses on transnational terrorist incidents.
Organizations approach the decision to commit a terrorist act with goals such as regime changes, policy change, self-determination and autonomy, social revolution, and maintenance of the status quo in mind (Acosta 2014; Kydd and Walter 2006). The LTTE in Sri Lanka, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant exhibit the pursuit of such goals. In many cases, an organization will resort to terrorist activity because they lack the means to nonviolently achieve their desired goals. These tactics rarely accomplish the goal the organization has in mind and often serve to inflame tensions between opposing factions though (Acosta 2014).

The resort to terrorist activity is due to a numerical inferiority, limited firepower, and a severe lack of resources in comparison to the state’s defense and national security apparatuses, meaning they have no other option but to engage in clandestine operations (Crenshaw 1983; Hoffman 2006). Tactics of these groups include kidnappings, assassinations, bombings, hijackings, and suicide bombings (Enders et al. 2011). These tactics draw the ire of established state governments and international authorities while presenting security issues not as easily prepared for as conventional warfare. Coupled with the fact that these attacks are carried out against innocent civilians, they are considered to be illegitimate and in violation of the rules of war.

There is further distinction between terrorist organizations that must be addressed. Their goals often take on a benevolent or malevolent nature. One must be careful, though, not to take these as insinuating the inherent “good” or “evil” nature of the organization. This simply means that some organizations work to better the lives of a

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5 Suicide bombings are separated from other bomb attacks due to the death of the bomber. Research finds these attacks to be much more lethal but much more costly for the terrorist organization. Suicide bombings also have the advantage of having a triggerman carrying no external devices that would draw the suspicions of authorities.
community they represent while others work to secure their own political gains through any means necessary. To distinguish between the benevolent and malevolent, this study uses Guevara (1960)’s idea that rebels must be concerned about the welfare of the people and must be fighting to protect and provide for them because they are supposed to represent the people to delineate the benevolent from the malevolent. Malevolent groups fail to do this, and suffer from delusions of grandeur and the creation of their own utopian society.

Hezbollah does not necessarily attack Israeli civilians because they want to eradicate the Israeli people. Although some in the organization express the desire to do so, this is not an opinion shared by all in the organization. Many in the organization do not view Israel as a legitimate state, but do not want to kill all of its citizens. They are working to secure the independence and sovereignty of the Lebanese state, and are attempting to defend the citizens of that state through the only means they possess. ISIL, however, seeks only their own political gain, specifically, that of their leaders. To accomplish this, they are using terrorism to exterminate those who stand in their way or those they do not consider to be desirable for their new order.

Although these malevolent organizations may possess the capabilities to fill any of the three gaps, their doing so is not to the benefit of the state. It is quite often highly detrimental. These organizations are considered for the purposes of classification, but their activities and pursuit of their goals often overshadows their capability to state build because their ultimate goal is state destruction and the establishment of a state only for those they deem worthy.
Terrorist organizations are groups that commit acts of violence against innocent people in order to force someone into a political act. These organizations can be both domestic and/or transnational in their operational scope. They employ a number of tactics to achieve their goals, which are political in nature. They do commit criminal acts (i.e. bank robbery, money laundering, smuggling, etc.) but these activities are not terrorist in nature, even when committed by a terrorist organization. Terrorist organizations operate on both a domestic and transnational level. They can be exclusively one type or they can be both. Since the start of the Global War on Terror, a number of terrorist organizations have become a mixture of both because of their targeting of civilians within their own states as well as those from other states. There is also a benevolent or malevolent nature to their goals and aspirations.

Causes of Terrorism

Studies investigate the relationship between a multitude of variables and the existence of terrorist activity within a state. These find correlation between a number of these and terrorist activity. For this thesis, however, only a few are outlined and analyzed because of similarities they share with the causes of state failure. The causes investigated in this chapter are poverty, government type, and existing ethnic or religious conflict within a state. These are overarching topics and the nuances of each are explored and analyzed in greater detail.

Investigation over the role of poverty is often included in studies regarding terrorism. Although the results of these studies are mixed and sometimes conflicting,

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there is a distinguishable trend that emerges that can aid in the explanation of poverty’s link to terrorism. Recent research shows that poverty itself does not significantly impact the amount of terrorism within a state (Abadie 2006; Krueger and Maleckova 2004; Piazza 2006). GDP per capita, the commonly used measure for poverty, has a minimal impact at best on levels of terrorism. This should not be taken to mean that poverty does not provide the conditions in which terrorism becomes more likely, however. This has caused researchers to investigate the underlying causes of poverty as a result.

Poverty does create a larger pool of potential recruits for terrorist organizations as well as increased support for extremism (Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Piazza 2011). In particular, minority economic discrimination and a lack of social welfare policy or a lack of adherence to such policy are both significantly and robustly related to increases in terrorist activity (Burgoon 2006; Piazza 2011). For the economically underprivileged, aligning one’s self with a terrorist organization provides benefits that are otherwise unobtainable, such as access to food, water, and shelter. Hungry and desperate, people are much more willing to engage in activity in which they would not engage under other circumstances.

While poverty itself is not a significant predictor of terrorism, conditions leading to widespread poverty or discriminatory poverty inflame existing tensions within the state making it more likely that terrorism will occur. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that drops in GDP per capita are correlated with sharp increases in the chances of civil war beginning, as mentioned in the discussion of state failure. They also find that, in the context of these conflicts, some people are drawn to use insurgency as a tactical choice. Insurgency itself does not necessarily entail terrorism, but those conducting insurgent
operations are often inferior to their opponent in terms of numbers and arms and must resort to clandestine assaults, similar to terrorist organizations.

The governmental structure of a state and its treatment of its citizens also have a significant effect on the amount of terrorism within a state. Researchers present conflicting results regarding this. Studies find that both democracies and autocracies have terrorism-reducing effects (Krieger and Meierrieks 2008; Wilson and Piazza 2013). Choi (2011) argues that the presence of strong democratic institutions within the state make it easy for citizens to voice grievances and settle disputes and also serves to deter terrorist activity. However, this reduction is not necessarily due solely to the state being a democracy. As states become more democratic, they begin to offer their citizens a wider array of political rights and freedoms, but states making an initial transition to democracy may not provide these as well as more established democracies. Increased political rights and democratic participation are correlated to a decline in the number of terrorist attacks within the state (Abadie 2006; Krieger and Meierrieks 2008; Li 2005).

There are exceptions to the democracy related reduction in terrorist attacks, however. Chenoweth (2013) finds that democracies that are poor, meddle in the internal affairs of other states, or are tied up in territorial conflict are subject to higher amounts of terrorist activity. The United States is considered one of the strongest democracies in the world, yet were victim of the September 11, 2001 attacks over their military presence in the Middle East and their close relationship to a number of state leaders in the region. Israel is a democratic state, yet they continuously face attacks from Hamas and Hezbollah over their military presence in the Palestinian territory, the Golan Heights in Syria, and southern Lebanon. Iraq and Afghanistan were both impoverished at the time of their
attempted democratization and were met with an onslaught of terrorist activity by those that opposed the democratic regime and its political ties to the United States. Afghanistan was also tied up in territorial conflict between warlords, the Taliban, and other insurgent groups in the state such as al Qaeda.

Authoritarian regimes exhibit a similar trend insofar as states experience less terrorism the more authoritarian they become. Wilson and Piazza (2013) find that varying degrees of authoritarianism are associated with decreases in terrorist attacks. Notably, the supreme power vested in the executive of an authoritarian regime allows for a quick and harsh response to terrorist activity, or other forms of political and social uprising. Also, in states in which the state does not hold high regard for the lives of their citizens, terrorism is less likely. Admittedly, reporting issues are potentially influencing this result. Brockhoff et al. (2014) suggest that underreporting by authoritarian regimes leads to the belief that there is a terrorism reducing effecting when there might not be one. There is no assurance of this, however, so we accept the findings regarding the role of authoritarianism.

If both democracy and authoritarianism both provide a terrorism reduction effect, what is happening? We turn to the Polity IV dataset to explain this. With strong and established autocracies occupying the -10 to -6 range and democracies of the same strength occupying the 6-10 range, there is a large gap left in which many states reside. Our attention then must shift to the intermediary categories. The -5 to 5 range encompasses those states that are transitioning from one regime type to another or are not fit to be categorized as either an autocracy or a democracy, and are otherwise known as
anocracies. States falling into this range are more likely to be subject to domestic terrorist attacks, which is confirmed using data from the GTD.

Jackman and Treier (2008) argue that by squaring the *Polity* score of a state, the stronger autocracy or democracy a state is, the higher the score is. Using this, an effective test is developed to evaluate anocracies. While it is outside the scope of this study to provide any quantitative analysis regarding terrorism, this concept is still useful. The new scores can be used as a gauge of how stable the regimes of the state are. When examining the domestic terrorist attacks from all around the world for each year, it becomes evident that the majority of these attacks take place in the states that have lower scores. While this doesn’t serve to give any directed evaluation of democracies and autocracies, the information gleaned regarding anocratic states is extremely useful, and builds towards the notion that the states falling into the anocracies range of *Polity* are riddled with a number of problems that must be addressed.

Even though many consider it good for a state to transition towards a democratic regime, these states are much more susceptible to instability, widespread corruption, and the emergence of state predation. These conditions are favorable to terrorist activity. Terrorism is a tactical option for those preyed upon by the state and a way to stem the political corruption of the state by fighting back against what is perceived to be a threat to the well being of state citizens.

Existing ethnic and religious tensions within a state also fuel increases in terrorism. Black (2004) argues that terrorism is directed along ethnic or religious lines. He points out that terrorist organizations often target those of another community and the attacks are aimed at those with a socially higher standing in the state’s society.
Interestingly enough, states in which there are high numbers of domestic terrorist attacks each year, there was a minority group favored by the state government at some point in the state’s history.

In Iraq, following the collapse of the Baath regime of Saddam Hussein, the majority Shia, who had been subject to systematic repression, began to lash back against the favored Sunnis. Both sides have since resorted to acts of terrorism to fight each other leaving the state to teeter on the edge of all out ethnic civil war. The Tamils in Sri Lanka provide further example. The LTTE use terrorism against the more powerful state government that was repressive of the minority Tamils in the state. Hamas also acts in the same capacity against the state of Israel. Although lacking the necessary resources to engage in all out war with the Israelis, Hamas targets the settlers sent into the Gaza Strip by Israel and claims to do so on behalf of the repressed Palestinian people.

Ethnic and religious groups become dangerous because they provide ready-made communities that are easy to appeal to and recruit for nefarious purposes disguised as altruistic, or commanded in the name of “God”. Linberg (2008) argues that religious groups are especially useful because actors are more likely to carry out their assigned duties if others in the group share their faith. Although ideology, both secular and religious, is a primary driving force and the existence of a dominant ideology in a state can bring about the genesis of terrorism, there is no evidence to support the notion that any one ideology is more likely to cause it than another (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011; Reynal-Querol 2002).

While Fearon and Laitin (2003) point out that religious and ethnic tension are not significant predictors of civil war onset, one should be aware that they can inflame
grievances that lead to the use of terrorism by one group against another. Rule by a particularly cruel and repressive minority population is correlated to an increased chance of state failure and can also be correlated with an increase in terrorist activity within the state. The use of religion is still a hotly debated topic in the study of terrorism. Researchers are unsure of the exact impact it has, but all tend to agree that it is not a primary motivator of the leadership of these organizations but can influence the decisions of those lower in the organizational structure.

Terrorism is caused by a number of circumstances. This section outlines only a few, but these are important when discussing the links between state failure and terrorism. There is crossover between the two with regards to these causes. This outlines the necessity for their study together and provides significance to the taxonomy of terrorist organizations offered in this study.

Terrorism and Failed States

Poverty, government structure, and ethnic and religious tensions are shown to be indicators of state failure as well as terrorism. These similarities are too important to be overlooked. Poverty, based upon lack of wealth distribution, discrimination, and state predation provide the necessary conditions for both state failure and terrorism to arise in the state. States that fall into the intermediary rankings of the Polity dataset, and those that are unable to vest complete control in the executive, such as authoritarian regimes, and those able to ensure political rights for all citizens are more inclined to experience both. Tensions along ethnic lines signal both as well as making the occurrence of civil war much more likely. Although this is simply a short and fairly basic comparison of the
two phenomena, it is clear that there are strong similarities that point towards the necessity of understanding their connections.

Piazza (2007, 2008) shows that failed states act as breeding grounds for transnational terrorist organizations and also, in study of nineteen Middle Eastern states, that state failure promotes the growth of these organizations. Failed states provide the people the lack of a strong police force to curtail the organizations, and a nearly unsolvable maze of safe houses and caches needed for terrorist organizations to take advantage of. Ungovernable territories such as these allow terrorist organizations to flourish and develop their plan of attack with minimal state interference.

For the years 2005-2007, the top 10 states on the Fragile States Index are analyzed based upon how many domestic terrorist attacks took place within the state. Data for domestic terrorist attacks is drawn from the Global Terrorism Database using

Figure 3. Domestic Terrorist Attacks in Fragile State Index Top 10 versus the rest of the world.
disaggregation criteria set forth in Enders et al. (2011) (Figure 3). These three years are chosen due to an overlap in the data from both datasets. The *Fragile States* Index data only goes back as far as 2005 while the disaggregation data presented by Enders et al (2011) only stretches into 2007. The crossover is therefore examined to gain some insight into the number of terrorist attacks occurring within failed states.

In total, there were 4,041 domestic terrorist attacks in the three-year span. During this time, 2,041 of these attacks were carried out in states that ranked in the top 10 of the *Fragile States Index* in each respective year of the sample. Across the sample these states accounted for an astounding 50% of all domestic terrorist attacks. The Middle East is the area of operation for an impressive amount of these attacks. In particular, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan exhibit high outputs. Iraq and Afghanistan were attempting to transition to democracies after decades of authoritarian rule, making the states highly unstable. Additionally, they lacked the proper infrastructure to maintain a firm grasp on the internal affairs of the state in this time frame. Splinter cells of al Qaeda appeared within the states to combat the American presence and the establishment of a government that they feared would be pro-American and adverse to their cause and ideology.

Pakistan has not failed or endured a strong American military presence, but has been subject to a number of corrupt state leaders and social uprising and is considered to be a safe-haven for many terrorist organizations.

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7 Domestic attacks are chosen over transnational due to amount of attacks. By using data regarding domestic terrorist incidents, a larger sample is drawn.

8 The top 10 states from the index included a total of 13 different states with 7 states appearing all 3 years of the sample. The top 10 included (Those that appeared all 3 years in italics): Afghanistan, *Chad*, Central African Republic, *Congo, Cote de Ivory, Haiti, Iraq, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe*
Terrorist organizations not only reside in these states, they are active within them as well. Also, in the sample, these states represented only a small portion of the overall attacks early on, but exponentially increased each year. The presence of U.S. troops might explain some of this increase, but these are domestic terrorist attacks not targeted at the U.S. troops. The attacks were carried out against citizens of the state, by citizens of the state.

States in any of the gaps are conducive to terrorist development and intervention. The weakened political state allows non-state actors to interact with the citizens of the state and gain their support through various actions via the state’s lack of control. As the dissatisfaction in the state rises, the chance that these organizations are successful within the state increases. Offered is commentary regarding the reasons terrorist organizations would want to target states in each of the gaps. In the next chapter, a detailed set of criteria that must be met for filling these gaps is offered.

The presence of a security gap provides an enticing situation for terrorist organizations to exploit. Without the ability to use military and police to actively and effectively root out these organizations and break them down, the state is helpless but to watch as they grow in size and strength and begin to wreak havoc. Terrorist organizations can flourish with very little to no interference from state authorities as the state becomes ungovernable. A state lacking an established and overwhelming military superiority allows terrorist organizations a much greater chance of accomplishing their goals.

States suffering from a capacity gap are also vulnerable to terrorist organizations and their tactics. Some terrorist organizations are fully capable of providing goods and
services the state should be providing, and are willing to do so, although not necessarily for altruistic motives such as Hezbollah and the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. As in the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan, terrorist organizations can successfully secure the infrastructure of the state and exert control over it. The Taliban had complete control over the state and was able to build a regime that kept the state stabilized until the U.S. military overthrew them in the early 2000s. Such activity allows terrorist organizations the opportunity to subvert the state and gain legitimacy.

Terrorist organizations find a state in the legitimacy gap to be quite enticing as well. These organizations begin engaging in activities that can win over the loyalties of the people as the state loses support. Providing an accepting community as well as goods and services allows a terrorist organization to undermine state authority and siphon away the legitimacy of the state and build what the people perceive to be a legitimate authority. Loss of legitimacy triggers concern among the international community that the state is not capable of acting as it is expected to and helps these organizations gain sympathy from the outside because they are fighting to remove those that are unwilling to take care of the citizens.

Both terrorist organizations and failed states present serious security issues for the international community. Understanding that the two are closely interrelated reveals that together they present a much more severe threat. There are striking similarities between the two phenomena. Poverty and its underlying conditions, the type of government and whether there is corruption and repression, and existing ethnic tensions within a state induce both. The relationship between the two is significant and further research must be
devoted to it. Terrorist organizations flourish in the absence of a strong, centralized state. Provided any of the gaps, terrorist organizations have the potential to be successful.

**Goods and Services Provision**

When states lacks legitimacy and fail to provide their citizens with positive political goods and services, and security, it allows non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, the opportunity to fill those gaps and gain support. Terrorist organizations often provide social services such as welfare, medical care, and education as well as providing political action, emergence relief, and aid, while building an accepting community for the disenfranchised, alienated, and those with no direction in life (Abrahms 2008; Berman and Iannaccone 2006; and Grynkewich 2008). Actively engaging in these activities allows terrorist organizations to embark on hearts-and-minds campaigns of sorts with the objective of undermining public support for the state and building a stable support base of their own.

Grynkewich (2008) views the provision of goods and services as a method of combating the state. She argues that provision of goods serves three primary purposes: it challenges the legitimacy of the state by showing its failure to adhere to its end of the social contract, it offers the population another body in which to place their faith, and it allows the organization to gain a following that rewards in recruits, sympathy for their cause, and support of all sorts. Engaging in such activity gives the organization the ability to better combat the state. As the disparity between the state and terrorist organizations closes, the result is an opportunity for the organization to engage in open warfare with the state rather than simply relying on clandestine operations.
There are other benefits to this as well. Acosta (2014) notes that terrorist organizations very rarely accomplish their goals through terrorist activity alone, and they must somehow also integrate themselves to become part of the state’s political process. As they gain the support of citizens in the state, they gain legitimacy for their cause and are provided the opportunity to actively pursue their goals with a greater chance of success. Without the ability to integrate into the political structure of the state, some terrorist organizations have no choice but to continue engaging in terrorist tactics as their primary form of engagement.

These tactics are much more likely to be successful in democratic states. Democratic states rely on the people to elect their leaders and vest power in them, and losses of support are highly detrimental to the state. When examining failed states, one must be aware that many are not fully autocratic or democratic, and exhibit a mixture of the best and worst traits of each regime type. These states, especially if more democratic, would suffer setbacks from losing the support of the people. With the state prone to more instability than more developed regimes, losing the faith of the citizenry is a tipping point after which state failure may occur.

A number of terrorist organizations engage in goods provision activities. Hezbollah in southern Lebanon regularly accomplishes such tasks. Flannigan (2008) asserts that not only does Hezbollah hold numerous political positions within the Lebanese government, but they also manage highly touted medical and social service providers. Shortcomings of the government of Lebanon allow Hezbollah to gain support of the masses by providing goods and services to citizens that they would otherwise not receive. The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood provides a number of services, such as
healthcare, social services, and relief services to needy communities in the Palestinian territory (Berman and Laitin 2008). Providing security to the citizens of the state is also beneficial for terrorist organizations as it allows them to garner the trust and support of those that they protect.

As states begin to lose control over their internal operations, terrorist organizations are able to step forward and complete tasks that the state fails to complete. In undermining the state’s authority through the provision of goods and services, terrorist organizations can accomplish a multitude of objectives. Taking legitimacy away from the standing state government allows them the chance to assert themselves as a legitimate authority within the state. The state’s loss of legitimacy is dangerous and the state will begin to experience some early warning signs of failure, and potentially suffer the outbreak of civil war.

The role of state sponsorship is of concern when examining terrorist organizations and their ability to provide such goods. A number of terrorist organizations worldwide have some form of state sponsorship, whether it be financial or through other tangible resources. However, this state sponsorship does not necessarily entail success in regards to providing certain goods and services within the state. Terrorist organizations such as the Glenanne Gang received some form of state sponsorship from the United Kingdom and al Qaeda purportedly received aid from Saudi Arabia. Neither of these organizations exhibit the capacity to act in a positive, state-building manner. This is not to say that state sponsorship does not influence a terrorist organization’s ability to act in such a way, but rather that it is not the most impactful factor. Further, these organizations are left to invest the aid in whatever way they see fit.
Hezbollah, for example, makes a conscious effort to use this aid to provide for the citizens of the state as well as carry out terrorist tactics. Hezbollah’s use of Iranian money is predicated on their opposition to Israel and Western ideals, and, as long as they maintain that ideological adherence, Iran continues to give them money. To the contrary, the purported support al Qaeda received was immediately put towards terrorist attacks with little concern towards anything else. Garnering state sponsorship also serves as a tactic for these terrorist organizations. Through collecting aid, the organization is free to carry out their objective. Due to the indirect influence, the state sponsor is not necessarily causing the terrorist organization to engage in positive activity. Such activity is rather a result of the terrorist organization’s agenda, which is aided by revenue collection.

Terrorist organizations engage in many activities that fill one, if not all, of the gaps. Hezbollah’s provision of healthcare, social welfare, emergency relief, and their claim to seats in the state government processes allow them to act towards the filling of the capacity gap and legitimacy gap. They are providing these goods at a minimal level.

Conclusion

Terrorism is an act of violence carried out against innocent people with the intent of coercing someone else into a political action they might not otherwise take. Through the use of various tactics such as kidnapping, assassinations, and bombing, organizations are able to engage in such activity. Any group that does so is a terrorist organization. These organizations do commit criminal acts such as bank robbery and extortion, but that does not make these actions terroristic in nature.
Conditions surrounding poverty, governmental structure, and ethnic tensions have an effect on the genesis of terrorism within a state. These factors are eerily similar to the conditions that surround state failure. The presence of terrorist organizations within failed states is confirmed by cross-examining the top 10 states on the *Fragile States Index* and the *GTD*. In two of the three years examined over 50% of all domestic terrorist attacks for each respective year occurred within these states.

Terrorist organizations are also capable of providing goods and services to the citizens of a state. Through such provision they are able to challenge the legitimacy, security, and capacity of the state. Such a challenge allows them the opportunity to involve themselves with the citizens of the state and provides a way to become involved with state politics. As terrorist organizations pursue their goals in such a manner it becomes more likely they will achieve success.
CHAPTER IV

CONSTRUCTING A CLASSIFICATION

In previous chapters state failure and terrorism were explored as precursors to the development of the new classification offered by this study. Using the Call (2010) model of state failure, a four-tiered classification structure is constructed. Based upon their ability to fill the gaps, terrorist organizations are placed into one of the four tiers. By examining their constructive abilities rather than their capability for destruction, this classification provides a more intimate inspection of terrorist organizations that past studies do not.

Existing classifications are predicated upon the organization’s adherence to an ideology, area of operations, attack types, and the target audience. An understanding of these aspects of terrorist organizations provides an image of the global situation surrounding terrorism and provides necessary insight into the activity and motives of these organizations. Problematically, these classifications are not effective at evaluating terrorist organizations on an operational level that provides practical information regarding their goals, their strengths, and their weaknesses. The classification offered here provides this insight.

This chapter is devoted to clearly outlining what criteria terrorist organizations must meet to fill each of the gaps, the basic structure of the classification system, and how organizations are to be scored using the criteria set forth in discussion of filling the gaps. The largest portion of the chapter is devoted to setting the criteria for filling the gaps. Three major criteria are assigned to each gap and are broken down into sub components. Using these criteria and the classification structure set forth, the next
chapter provides case study analysis of terrorist organizations to show how the classification process works.

Filling the Gaps

Each gap is assigned three major categories that are split up into subcategories to establish the criteria that must be met in order to fill the gap. For the capacity gap, resource control, goods and services provision, and infrastructural control are the major categories. For the legitimacy gap, ethnic similarities, ideological congruence, and political participation fulfill this role. Finally, for security, the categories are military capabilities, policing capabilities, and territorial control within the state. Not all categories are going to have subcategories, however. For those in which it is necessary, the subcategories will be appropriately addressed.

Capacity

To fill the capacity gap, terrorist organizations must be able to control resources within the state, provide goods and services to the citizens of the state, and control major infrastructure. Resource control does not require subcategories, but goods and services and infrastructure do. For goods and services, terrorist organizations are evaluated on whether they can offer medical care, social welfare, and emergence relief. Infrastructure control is split into control over transportation routes such as roads, railways, or waterways, and control over utility providers such as power plants, hydroelectric dams, or some other form of utilities.

The control over state resources allows for the collection of income and control over the allocation of such resources. The resources referenced are natural resources such as oil, precious metals and gems, water sources, and coal, for example. The list of
resources is not limited just to these, however. Control over any resource gives an actor, both state and non-state, considerable power within the state. Also, by controlling the income that results from these resources, an actor is able to use the profits to provide goods and services to the citizens of the state, bolster the economy, or use the money for funding their own goals. Because it is outside the scope of this study to provide any analysis on the ability of terrorist organizations to successfully fill these gaps over a long period of time, the use of the income is not important. What is important is their having control over resources within the state.

In Afghanistan, when the Taliban took over they secured control over the poppy industry in the state. This gave them considerable control over the economy of the state and the quality of life for the citizens within the state. As with many authoritarian regimes, the Taliban were not so much concerned with the quality of life for their people, but rather bolstering the state economy to serve in their favor. The influx of income allowed them to maintain control over the internal workings of the state. In other states, terrorist organizations have some control over oil fields, such as ISIS in Iraq. This brings them considerable income that could be used for the good of the state. Whether this is used for the good of the existing state or the state they wish to build is a different story altogether.

Goods and services provision also goes towards filling the capacity gap within the state. Citizens are often left wanting for basic goods and services within failed states. Terrorist organizations that are able to provide such goods are able to work towards closing the capacity gap within a state. As goods and services are administered, the lives of the citizens improve and conditions become somewhat more bearable. Provision of
such services as healthcare, social welfare, housing, and food distribution help fill the capacity gap and bring about some stability for the state.

Goods and services must be separated out. While all are beneficial and provide aid to the citizens of the state, they are not dependent on one another. Healthcare services such as the provision of doctors and medical clinics is not necessarily tied to the provision of food-stuffs to highly impoverished neighborhoods. This being the case, terrorist organizations are evaluated on their ability to provide the following services individually: healthcare, welfare, food, water, and emergency relief. It is highly probable that terrorist organizations that offer goods and services are offering any mixture of these. To be practical in analysis though, they are treated as being separate.

Hezbollah actively provides a number of highly touted services within Lebanon. In many cases, citizens of the state, especially those belonging to the Shia population, turn to Hezbollah for aid instead of the state. The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood provides such services as well as emergency relief to the citizens of the West Bank and Gaza strip. In the absence of a strong government that provides these as expected, these organizations have stepped up and taken the responsibility of providing for the state’s citizens.

Infrastructural control provides further opportunity for terrorist organizations to eliminate a capacity gap. Control over major transportation routes is key to controlling the infrastructure of the state. In holding the roadways, railways, and waterways, a terrorist organization is able to control trade and distribute resources throughout the state with minimal interference. Provided the opportunity to regulate trade goods so that they are funneled into producing income or used to aid the citizens of the state, terrorist
organizations are able to bolster their ability to stabilize a capacity gap inflicted state and restore stability. Waterways provide a unique opportunity, as these routes flow through various states. The ability to tax the use of the waterway within the state provides another source of income that can be used to provide to the stability of the state.

Control over major utility providers such as electric power plants and dams. Use of these utilities can increase production within the state, make the lives of the citizens more bearable, bolster the economy, and provide needed resources to aid in the development of the state. The ability to allocate such utilities allows for further control over the state and can influence the perception of the terrorist organization in the eyes of the citizens of the state.

Through control of valuable natural resources, goods and services provision, and control over state infrastructure, terrorist organizations can fill the capacity gap. As these organizations stabilize the economy, regulate the infrastructure of the state, and make the lives of the state’s citizens more bearable, they provide the opportunity to lift the state out of the capacity gap and alleviate in state stress related to the lack of such control.

Legitimacy

Filling the legitimacy gap relies less on tangible issues than on sharing subjective similarities with the citizens of the state. Filling the legitimacy gap is predicated on the terrorist organization sharing ethnic similarities to the citizenry of the state, having a worldview congruence, and actively participating in the political processes of the state. While the capacity gaps are fairly universal for all states, the legitimacy gap and its criteria are specific to each individual state. This process allows for illustration of
situations in which the organization would both succeed and fail in an attempt to fill the legitimacy gap.

Sharing an ethnic heritage with the citizens of a state is an effective way to procure legitimacy from them. Habermas argues that “the ‘we-consciousness’, founded on an imagined blood relation or on cultural identity of people who share a belief in a common origin, identify one another as ‘members’ of the same community, and thereby set themselves apart from the environment . . . constitute[s] the core of ethnic and national social formations’ (Habermas 1998; 130). Being part of the “we” creates a commonality with the citizens of the state that will not go unnoticed.

Through this commonality with the citizens, it is much easier to claim legitimacy. In many cases, a citizen’s view of the authority and its legitimacy is based upon their reflection of the citizen’s ethnic and cultural identity (Rothschild 1977). It is therefore logical to assume that an organization that matches the ethnic identity of the people they would govern will have a much better chance at securing their consent, and, in the process, legitimacy. Furthermore, states historically have not taken well to outside powers or forces entering their state and claiming authority.

It is reasonable to assume that the FARC would not be successful in an attempt to gain legitimacy in Somalia. The cultural and linguistic differences alone are enough to stymie any sort of attempt. It is likely that the group would be viewed as an outside “imperial” power and the citizens of the state would reject their claim to authority. However, in Colombia the FARC are much more likely to make a successful claim to legitimacy. They share a similar ethnic and cultural heritage with the citizens of the state. Similarly, Hamas in Palestine can and has made appeals to the ethnic similarities between
themselves and the people of the state to include themselves in the political processes of
the state. Although they defer control of the state to the Palestinian Authority (PA) they
could easily appeal to the people and earn their consent to be ruled and legitimacy.

Interestingly, the Middle East in particular makes it somewhat easier for an actor
from another state to make a successful claim for authority and legitimacy from the
people of another state. Many of these nations share similar ethnic backgrounds and
trace themselves back to a similar lineage. Therefore, an organization like Hezbollah
could make a claim for authority and legitimacy in a Sunni dominated Middle Eastern
state and meet less resistance than would the FARC or the LTTE.

Sharing a similar worldview as the citizens of the state, religious or secular,
allows a terrorist organization to further relate to the community within the state. This
*worldview congruence* provides a relationship to the citizens of a state that goes further
than just a similar ethnic heritage. The two are often tied to each other in some cultures,
but should be treated as separate and given acknowledgement if tied to one another.
Many feel as if one’s worldview is closely associated with just religious belief. It also
stems from a secular ideal that resonates throughout an entire community or state.
Research shows that ideologies are a primary, and central motivator for human (Reynal-
Querol 2002). The same logic can be applied to strong secular belief such as Humanism
as well. Therefore, if a terrorist organization appeals to the ideals of the dominant
worldview in the state, they can establish themselves and a legitimate authority with less
of a challenge that someone from a different worldview attempting the same thing.

A worldview congruence serves another purpose as well. A terrorist organization
can advertise itself as holding a certain worldview as a means to coerce the citizens of a
state to do as they wish. For instance, many Islamic extremist groups such as al Qaeda
and ISIL present themselves as purely religious Islamic organizations. In appealing to
the religious doctrine of the region in which they carry out their operations it is easier to
recruit and effectively implement their plans. This is not to say that these men are not
religious, but instead that they might be exaggerating their religious motives to appeal to
a wider audience.

Certainly, appealing to a worldview congruence (i.e. Christian or Islamic
document) will merit consent from the people in many cases. However, a political
ideology such as the anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment gripping large portions of
the Middle East can easily motivate the citizens of a state to legitimate an authority who
also has such beliefs. For instance, the strong anti-Israeli sentiment held by Hamas
endears them to the people of Palestine who are victim of Israeli persecution and
repression. Other examples of such ideology would be adherence to Communist or
Democratic thought, or a hawkish or dovish stance in international affairs. Such a
political ideological congruence can influence the reception of a terrorist organization
within a state. By appealing to an ideological similarity, the same as a worldview
congruence, terrorist organizations are able to act as social chameleons and build a sense
of community with the citizens of the state.

Political participation allows a terrorist organization to establish a foothold in the
legitimate political processes of the state and strengthen their claim to authority and the
legitimacy that comes with it. Acosta (2014) argues that terrorist organizations that
involve themselves with the political processes of the state are much more likely to
achieve their goals via legitimate routes instead of ineffective clandestine operations that
have to target the citizens of the state. As they earn a legitimate voice, their attempts at change gain more legitimacy and, through this, the terrorist organization becomes a more legitimate operator.

It is feasible that domestic, and some transnational terrorist organizations are involved with the political landscape of their home nation or others. Often times they resort to terrorist tactics when they do not have a strong political voice and need to forward their political agenda. For instance, Hezbollah currently holds a number of seats in the Lebanese Parliament and have two members in the cabinet. They are arguably one of the most effective political organizations in Lebanon, as the people are very likely to come to them for aid instead of the state government (Wiegand 2009). Engaging in such activity allows the terrorist organization a voice in the political processes, and to gain legitimacy that would allow for an eventual move to become the sovereign authority of the state.

Holding an ethnic similarity to the people of a state, a similar worldview, and involving themselves in the political processes of the state allows a terrorist organization to work towards filling a legitimacy gap. By themselves becoming legitimate and asserting their power as a sovereign authority, the organization removes the state from a legitimacy gap and stabilizes the state. Such a stabilization can be tenuous, however, and must constantly be maintained.

Security

A security gap is difficult to fill. It requires that an actor maintain a military force capable of fighting off outside threats, controlling territory within the state, and having the capability to police the territory that it holds to ward off internal threats. Very few
non-state actors are able to provide such a credible offer of security. Even so, terrorist organizations are still evaluated on their ability to close a security gap. Territorial control is split into the control of territory itself and the control over major cities within the state. The other two criteria are self-standing and need no further separation.

To begin, a terrorist organization must be able to field a sizable military force. Provided military capabilities, terrorist organizations can engage enemies and maintain internal order and security. Also, through the use of such power, they can maintain a firm hold on territories and cities that they have claimed through conquest. This type of presence serves as a deterrent to outside invaders as well as internal groups who might attempt a coup.

They must be capable of deterring outside threats as well as securing the borders of the state. This entails access to weaponry, personnel, and supplies. This is possible, but terrorist organizations may have to look to outside actors for help. For instance, the Taliban were able to field such a military force in Afghanistan. However, this was only possible due to weapons and training that were provided by the Pakistani government. Through this military superiority, the Taliban were able to completely control Afghanistan until the most powerful military in the world invaded. Hezbollah was similar in their initial and continued reliance on Iran for finances and military training.

ISIL currently holds a military force that is engaging with outside actors, but is not weathering well. For a time, until states surrounding Iraq and Syria became involved in the fight against ISIL, the organization was effectively capturing cities and territory and defeating all military threats to them. However, if examining ISIL for their military capabilities alone, and not their combat record against the states with whom they are
currently engaged, it is possible to recognize them as being able to fill a security gap. They are also recruiting at an alarming rate as young adults from highly developed states are attempting to leave their homes to join ISIL. As to the success ISIL would enjoy after filling a security gap, there is no clear answer, but, as of their current engagements, there would be no long term hold.

Territorial control also serves to close a security gap. As terrorist organizations gain control over large swaths of territory within a state, they become responsible for its protection and security. They must defend it against attempts by other actors to claim territory, repel outside invaders, and crush any internal strife that may arise. In failed states, this type of territorial control allows the terrorist organization the ability to fill the security gap within a state.

Seizing cities and villages throughout the state strengthens a terrorist organizations hold over territory. It is one thing to control the land surrounding a city, but control over the city itself is an accomplishment that solidifies control over the territory surrounding it. The seizure of urban centers within the state allows the terrorist organization to drive out political and military opponents, and serves to weaken these opponents by not allowing them access to resources and the population that they need in order to continue fighting. While the regime put in place by the terrorist organizations may not be fair, open, and democratic, the citizens are provided some level of security from outside threats.

The Taliban completed such tasks from 1996 until 2001 when the United States invaded and ousted them as rulers of the state. By 1996, the Taliban had expanded their territorial control from just the Kandahar province in the southern region of the state to a
vast majority of the state’s total territory. During this expansion, they effectively drove away warlords who had claimed power and, assumed control of the state government. It was not until a far superior United States military invaded that the Taliban lost control over all this territory. As far as threats in the region were concerned though, the Taliban were more than capable of providing security against them.

Ability to police territory once taken is extremely important. While the military can serve as a deterrent from internal uprising, it is not their job to deter crime and lawlessness. The ability to police internally provides extra security to the citizens of the state and further allows the terrorist organization to work towards filling the security gap. Problematically, with a number of modern terrorist organizations, this self-policing results in harsh treatment of offenders under somewhat archaic laws that apply merciless punishment for rather menial crimes.

During their time of dominance in Afghanistan, the Taliban ruthlessly policed the people. Anyone found committing a crime was swiftly and harshly dealt with, without opportunity to plead innocence. The Taliban also implemented harsh Sharia Law within the state that went as far as commanding the type of clothing women could wear. This required that they be covered from head to toe with no skin showing. Women who did not meet these criteria were harshly punished, with some even being put to death. ISIL currently exhibits a similar capability for policing, however they themselves are the threat to the people. Their policing is so cruel that, even if the citizens are protected from outside threats, they face a similar or even worse threat from ISIL. Just as with military capabilities, the simple ability to police is taken into consideration, not the record the organization holds currently.
Each of the gaps has been prescribed a set of criteria to be met in order to fill them. Using these, terrorist organizations are evaluated, classified, and placed in the appropriate classification tier. It might be assumed that terrorist organizations completing these goals is itself the cause of state failure. While it is true that terrorist organizations and other separatist groups can cause instability, this study assumes that these terrorist organizations would be operating in states that are already failed, therefore their completion of such activities would not contribute to the failure of the state. This does point out, however, that terrorist organizations are grave threats to state stability in a number of cases and must be dealt with swiftly. Using this classification system will allow policy makers to identify these groups and attack to stop them from accomplishing such goals.

Constructing the Classification System

Each terrorist organization is classified based upon its ability to meet the criteria to fill any of the three gaps. The criteria, as discussed above are scored as one point each and a terrorist organization must score two points to be considered able to fill the gap. From here, each organization is placed in the four-tiered structure to separate and classify them. This section fully examines the structure of the classification, scoring system, and provides insight into the classification process.

The structure of the classification is a four-tiered structure reliant on the number of a gaps a terrorist organization is able to fill. Organizations that are unable to fill any of the gaps are placed in the bottom-most tier, Tier 1. Those that are able to fill at least one of the gaps, regardless of which, are placed into Tier 2. Tier 3 holds those organizations that are able to fill two of the gaps. Finally, Tier 4 holds those that are able to fill all
three of the gaps. For Tiers 2 and 3, terrorist organizations are labeled to represent which of the gaps they are able to feel. For capacity the label is a C, for legitimacy L, and for security S.

The criteria in each gap offer a possible total score of three points (Table 1). A terrorist organization must score at least two points to be considered able to fill the gap. For the capacity gap, a half point is awarded for controlling any major state resource, a point and a half is split between the three services listed so each is worth one-third of a point, and half a point is awarded for controlling the major transportation routes of the state and a half point for controlling a utilities provider for a total of three points. For legitimacy, a point is awarded for ethnic similarities and political participation while both the worldview and political ideological congruence are worth .5 points. For security, one point is awarded for military capability, one half point for controlling a portion of the state’s territory, one half point for controlling a major city, and one point for having the capability to police the state. Any combination of points that amount to two points in the gap suggests the terrorist organization can fill it.

Table 1

*Scoring Within the Gaps*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity – 3 points</th>
<th>Legitimacy – 3 points</th>
<th>Security – 3 points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resource control – .5</td>
<td>Ethnic Similarities – 1</td>
<td>Military Capability – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods and Services</td>
<td>Worldview Congruence – .5</td>
<td>Territorial Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Health – .5</td>
<td>Political Ideological Congruence – .5</td>
<td>• Land Control – .5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Major City – .5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infrastructural Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Emer. Relief – .5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transportation Routes – .5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities Providers – .5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Political Participation – 1 |

| • Policing Capability – 1 |

**Conclusion**

The new classification of terrorist organizations presented by this thesis is presented. Using Call’s model of state failure, a set of criteria are developed. To fill a capacity gap, a terrorist organization needs to control resources, provide services, and hold key infrastructure in the state. The legitimacy gap is filled by sharing an ethnic heritage, a worldview congruence, and actively participating in the states political processes. The security gap can be closed by having an established military, controlling territory within the state, and having the ability to police within the state.

Using these, a scoring system is put into place that terrorist organizations can be evaluated by to ascertain whether or not they can fill a particular gap. By scoring at least two points for a gap, a terrorist organization is considered able to fill the gap. Based on the number of gaps they can fill, they are placed in the appropriate tier. Using this classification system allows researchers and policy makers alike to glean a new understanding of terrorist organizations and begin developing solutions to the problems they and state failure may cause.
CHAPTER V

CASE STUDY

To show the operation of the classification system, three terrorist organizations are used as case study. The FARC, Hezbollah, and the LTTE are examined in depth to ascertain their classification and ability to fill each of the gaps. For each, a brief history of the organization and their activities within their state is explored. Based upon this, they are scored according to the criteria set forth in the previous chapter and then placed in the appropriate tier. The conclusion of the chapter also addresses some of the findings related to this classification and their impact on the study of terrorism.

Due to a lack of data regarding terrorist organizations, this study is limited to a small number of cases. The terrorist organizations evaluated do not reside within failed states but the case studies take their activities within their current state into account, and assumes they would act in a similar fashion within a failed state. Through using these cases as examples to express the usefulness of the classification attention is drawn to the necessity for further data collection. While these cases are merely a theoretical examination, they efficiently and effectively demonstrate the appropriateness of the classification presented.

FARC

The FARC were formed in the 1960s as a Marxist/Communist paramilitary organization in Colombia. Their creation was driven by the loss of land by hundreds of thousands of Colombians due to the decision of Colombian elites to move towards an agrarian society whose primary source of income would be large, industrialized farms and ranches (Domina and Berecz 2014). From their creation to the present day, the
organization uses terrorist tactics to combat the Colombian government and civilians that support the state.

The organization has fielded membership of up to ten thousand. Recent years have seen a decline in membership as the Colombian military has removed or killed a number of high ranking leaders and officials with the group. The organization is primarily funded through practices of extortion, kidnapping, money laundering, and narcotics trade (Renwick and Hanson 2013; Domina and Berecz 2014). They are responsible for a large percentage of the state’s cocaine trade and rake in millions, if not billions in income annually.

At times, the FARC have controlled upwards of one-third of the state’s territory. However, as Colombia is home to dense jungle that makes up a large portion of the state’s territory, this is not an impressive feat. Control of the territory does offer the organization a safe and nearly impossible-to-navigate maze of hideouts and staging areas. This land allows them to coordinate guerrilla warfare against the state but they are unable to match the state sponsored military in manpower and weaponry.

Outside of control over heavily vegetated jungle territory, the FARC holds no territory that inhibits the state’s function or that would allow them to be influential in state politics. Outside of scattered villages, there are no major cities or major transport routes in the territory. Those villages are of no threat to the FARC and are kept in line through threats and fear. State military and police forces are able to access these villages, but are unlikely to get information from anyone due to the fear of reprisal.

There is no evidence to support the idea that the FARC offers any kind of goods and services to those in the state either. The organization is much more worried with
progressing the Marxist/Communist ideology and bringing about the collapse of the Colombian government than they are with the well being and benefit of the citizens of the state. The ideology that drives the organization’s activities also serves to separate them from the citizenry of the state because democracy and capitalism are perceived as preferable and acceptable than the antiquated and failed Soviet ideology that resonated throughout the Cold War. They do, however, share an ethnic heritage with the citizens of the state.

The FARC are not able to fill any of the gaps and are therefore classified as a Tier 1 terrorist organization (Table 2). They score 0 points in the capacity gap due to their lack of control over state resource, provision of goods and services, and infrastructural control. They score 1 point in the legitimacy gap for matching the ethnic heritage of the citizens of the state. Finally, they score .5 points in the security gap for controlling territory, which may be a generous allocation of a score seeing that the territory controlled is mostly meaningless as far as state functions go.

Table 2

Scoring the FARC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity – 0</th>
<th>Legitimacy – 1</th>
<th>Security – .5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The organization is unable to accomplish any of the prescribed criteria</td>
<td>Ethnic similarities – 1</td>
<td>Territorial Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Territory – .5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hezbollah

Hezbollah came to existence during the Lebanese civil war that took place from 1975-1990, and was the result of Israeli invasion and occupation, and were formed as a militia group with the aid of Iran (Anderson and Sloan 1995). Lebanon had served as a base of operations for Palestinian terrorist organizations such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel invaded in an attempt to flush out these organizations and destroy them. Hezbollah rose as a voice to stand against the presence of Western and Israeli influence in Lebanese affairs, and, more broadly, in the Middle East. They did not call for an independent Lebanese state but instead desired to incorporate Lebanon into a larger, more encompassing Islamic State that would envelope the entire region (Hamzeh 1993). This ideology has shifted in recent years to simply securing an independent and sovereign Lebanese state.

The organization was able to garner support from the newly installed Iranian government that resulted from the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. Iranian leadership saw the organization and its young revolutionary leadership as a possible outlet for spreading the idea of Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East (Norton 2014). The Iranian government supplied a hefty amount of money and military training to the members of the organization. Iran’s support for the organization continues to this day with nearly $200 million in financial support annually (Masters and Laub 2014). The organization also draws financial support from a number of local sponsors, as well as securing income through criminal activities such as smuggling and narcotics trade.

Since its creation in the mid-1980s, the organization has garnered considerable political clout and is actively involved in the political processes of the state. Currently,
they hold ten seats in the Lebanese Parliament and have two party members serving in the Cabinet. The organization’s Shia base allows them to potentially hold a high and influential position in the state government as the Speaker of Parliament is required to be Shia. The Shia based population of the state find a strong voice with Hezbollah and provide massive amounts of support for the organization. In return, Hezbollah’s organizational structure and purpose are geared towards the care of the Shia population as well as building a stable Lebanese state that is free of outside influence, namely influence of the Western world.

The *Worldwide Terrorist List 2014* produced by the Athena Institute, describes Hezbollah as an organization that “run[s] charities, hospitals, schools and implements effective polices in territories they control to combat poverty and other social issues” (Domina and Berecz 2014, 30). This in particular has led to the successes Hezbollah has enjoyed in political elections. The organization has a number of committees devoted to services provision such as the committees for: power, water, health, financial aid, and the environment (Hamzeh 1993). As pointed out by Flannigan (2008), they maintain and control very highly touted service providers within the state, which helps to alleviate the shortcomings of the state to provide such goods. Also, they provide emergency relief and aid to those who need it within their territories. The goods and services provision constitutes a large portion of the objectives of the organization. Their control over power and water resources gives them considerable influence over the infrastructure of the state as well.

Hezbollah maintains an active military and security division as well. As of 2014, they organized and maintain what is one of the largest non-state militaries in the world.
Their military consists of thousands of members who serve on a full-time or voluntary basis (Domina and Berecz 2014). Through this they are able to maintain control of the territories in which they rule and actively engage in regular combat with Israel and other actors they see to be credible threats to the security of Lebanon and its people. Further, their military capabilities are such that they can devote troops to fight for the Assad regime in Syria, although this is showing signs of being detrimental to their cause.

Numerous agreements exist to demilitarize and disarm militant groups in Lebanon, but Hezbollah has managed to avoid such action. U.N. Resolution 1559 ordered the disbanding and disarmament of all militant groups within the state, both Lebanese and non-Lebanese, yet Hezbollah has remained armed by calling themselves a resistance group instead of a militant group. This provides immediate security concerns for Israel and concerns for regional stability by other world powers. In Lebanon, the Hezbollah support for the Assad regime has led to Sunni led reprisal attacks that have cost the lives of some Shia civilians. By refusing to disarm and disband their military forces, the organization maintains a sizable and formidable military presence that worries policy makers and state leaders alike.

The organization also shares a similar ethnic heritage with those of the state. While the Sunni and the Shia populations adhere to slightly different religious ideology, they share an ethnic heritage. Importantly though are the similarities between the Shia population and Hezbollah. This allows Hezbollah to identify themselves with a portion of the population which results in their election and rise to power. Through its military campaigns against Israel, Hezbollah is able to bring itself closer to the Sunni population
despite their philosophical difference. The organization therefore shares a worldview and political ideological congruence with the citizens of the state.

Using this information, Hezbollah is scored and classified as a Tier 4 terrorist organization, able to fill all three gaps (Table 3). For the capacity gap, they receive a score of 2 for their provision of health, welfare, emergency aid and relief, and control over utilities provision within the state. For legitimacy, they receive 3 points because they meet all criteria for filling the gap. Because of their military capability, land control, and policing capabilities within the state, they receive a score of 2.5 for the security gap. Hezbollah is therefore able to fill all three gaps.

Table 3

Scoring Hezbollah

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity – 2 points</th>
<th>Legitimacy – 3 points</th>
<th>Security – 2.5 points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goods and Services</td>
<td>Ethic Similarities – 1</td>
<td>Military Capability – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Health – .5</td>
<td>Worldview Congruence – .5</td>
<td>Territorial Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Welfare – .5</td>
<td>Political Ideological Congruence – .5</td>
<td>• Territorial Control – .5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Emer. Relief – .5</td>
<td>Political Participation – 1</td>
<td>Policing Capability – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructural Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Utilities - .5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LTTE

The LTTE operate on the island nation of Sri Lanka. The organization formed in the early 1970s and began carrying out terrorist attacks in the mid-1970s. Primarily, the organization acted in the desire to create a separate and independent state for the minority
Tamils within Sri Lanka (Flanigan 2008). Their attacks targeted the Sri Lankan people and Tamils that were not supportive of a separate Tamil state. For a number of years they were engaged in outright civil war with the Sinhalese government. They carried out numerous attacks, inflicting heavy casualties on not only the Sinhalese military, but also the people of the state and the Indian army when they were deployed to help ensure peace in the mid-1980s.

The organization continued armed engagement with the Sinhalese state until they were defeated in a decisive manner in 2009. During this time, they fielded a military capacity between 10,000 to 15,000 members strong as well as police forces to maintain order in the territory they controlled in the northern and the eastern portions of the state. The LTTE commands special interest in regards to their military capabilities as they are the only terrorist organization to command a three branched military outfit. They were the only terrorist in the world to have operational army, navy, and air force (Domina and Berecz 2014). It wasn’t until their defeat that they lost control of these territories and the Sinhalese government took over control. For the purposes of this study, the organization is assessed before their defeat in 2009 to ascertain how they should be classified to further demonstrate the operationalization of the classification system.

The LTTE openly engaged in combat with the Sri Lankan government on numerous occasions as well as engaging the Indian army. They were successful in many of these engagements and were able to forcibly maintain their control over their held territory. They were able to elicit support and troops for their military forces for these conflicts through coercion and by championing the Tamil minority. It was dangerous to
be a Tamil that was not supportive of the LTTE and its mission as that drastically increased the chances that a terrorist attack would be targeted at those who were not.

The LTTE served as the de facto government of the northern and eastern sectors of the state for well over two decades. They established the leadership of the state, maintained a government structure with officials, and worked on behalf of the Tamil people. Through this governmental setup, the LTTE provided a police force, court systems, and other wings to perform various administrative functions (Flanigan 2008). They were not able to function as a state would in the international community due to a lack of international recognition, but they were able to maintain control over the regions they held.

Goods and services provision is handled through various NGOs and the LTTE departments of health and education (Stokke 2006). The organization provides some services to the populous but the majority is done through regional and international NGOs. Through these NGOs services like medical care, welfare, and community building are offered. Some of the NGOs are related to the LTTE but there is not enough evidence to support the claim that the LTTE provided the goods and services. The organization did work to secure the aid of the NGOs, however, but this speaks more to the legitimacy and influence of the organization rather than their ability to provide goods and services.

The organization held control over the utilities services in the territory of the state that they controlled. They also controlled and monitored the major transportation routes through the portion of the state they resided in. This allowed for the control over trade and influence over the productivity of the territory. This further allowed the LTTE to
combat the state without interference when operating in their own territory because they had the freedom of mobility and the means for mass production.

The LTTE share a similar ethnic heritage with the minority Tamils of the state, but share little to none with the Sinhalese population. However, these ties are much stronger with the minority Tamils. Because the organization’s primary objective is to establish an independent and sovereign Tamil state it is safe to assume that they more closely associate themselves as Tamils. This similarity provides great amounts of support among the Tamil community but serves to alienate them from the Sinhalese population. Unlike Hezbollah, they do not engage in activities that endear them to a majority of the state’s population even though they belong to a separated or dissimilar ethnic heritage. The organization also prescribe to the Hindu religion, which is different than nearly 80% of the state’s population, which are Buddhist. Their objective of the independent Tamil state excludes them from sharing a political ideological congruence with the state because of it not being a widespread political desire within the state.

The LTTE is classified as a Tier 2 organization able to fill only one gap (Table 4). The organization is awarded 1 point for the capacity gap due to their control over utilities providers and major transportation routes however they do not meet the 2 point threshold needed to earn consideration as able to fill the gap. They are unable to fill the legitimacy gap as they are unable to complete any of the prescribed criteria merit a score of 0 for the gap. Because of their overwhelming military forces that includes an army, navy, and air force, their control over territory and major cities, and their ability to police the territory they hold, they are awarded 3 points for the security gap signaling their ability to fill it. They are therefore a Tier 2 S terrorist organization.
Table 4

Scoring the LTTE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity – 1</th>
<th>Legitimacy – 0</th>
<th>Security – 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructural Control</td>
<td>The organization is unable to accomplish any of the prescribed criteria</td>
<td>Military Capability – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transportation Routes – .5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Territorial Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Utilities – .5</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Control of Territory – .5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Control of major city – .5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Policing capabilities – 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

This chapter shows the ability, or lack thereof, of terrorist organizations to fill the gaps. Importantly, this confirms the main hypothesis of the study that terrorist organizations are able to engage in activities that can stabilize failed states. By filling these gaps they are providing the foundation to reestablish the state and the underpinnings of government, providing the security needed to protect the state, or are providing the care that citizens need to exist. The difficult question that must be asked now is whether these organizations need to be disbanded, destroyed, or contained.

The distinction between those terrorist organizations that act benevolently and those that act malevolently, must be taken into consideration. A group like Hezbollah, even if engaging in terrorist activity outside of the state, poses to do more good for the citizens of the state and the overall stability of its political structures than does ISIL.
Therefore this classification presents researchers and policy makers with a decision. Should some of these groups be allowed to operate, under containment and with some oversight, or should we continue to develop blanket policy to combat terrorism on a global scale without taking into consideration that these organizations might be doing more to help the state in which they operate more than any NGO or another state may? Sadly, it is not within the scope or intentions of this study to answer this question now, but it must be taken into consideration and is suggested for future study.

The FARC, Hezbollah, and LTTE are offered as case study and example classifications to accomplish a number of goals. First, this shows how the scoring system for the classification works and the placement of terrorist organizations into the tiered structure works. This also establishes that terrorist organizations can and do operate in constructively. The reason for this constructive activity is outside of the scope of this study, however. Importantly, these case studies exemplify the usefulness of the classification system and provide the framework for future research and data collection.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the linkages between failed states and terrorist organizations. In particular, the ability of terrorist organizations to stabilize failed states is evaluated. Results show that there are some terrorist organizations that are indeed capable of stabilizing these states. However, no indication is given as to whether these results are fleeting or long-term. Importantly though, this provides an intimate look into the positive capabilities of terrorist organizations outside of their destructive capabilities showing that they are capable of positive activity that is beneficial to the citizens of a state. Terrorist organizations are examined due to their use of violence to meet political goals unlike NGOs who are limited due to constraints placed on them by the host state and the international community.

State failure stems from a number of issues. Economic struggles, political corruption, and ethnic tensions are but just a few within a long list of other causes. These are particularly important, however, because they are eerily similar to the factors that influence the genesis of terrorism within a state. The alarming number of domestic terrorist attacks within these states alone merits the academic inquiry offered due to the high number of domestic terrorist attacks that occur within states in the top 10 of the Fragile States Index. As a number of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and states have attempted to stabilize and “fix the failed”, new approaches must be taken. It is for this reason that this thesis evaluates the capabilities of terrorist organizations to engage in such activity.
The role of these terrorist organizations in these states sometimes runs much deeper than their attacks, however. Organizations like Hezbollah operate in struggling states and provide an impressive number of social services, governmental legitimacy, and security to the people of the state all the while resorting to terrorist tactics to achieve a number of their goals. This underlies the idea that there is always political motive behind terrorist attacks. In many instances, Hezbollah uses terrorism as a way to ward off threats to the security of Lebanon as well as protecting the state’s citizens from outside invaders.

Terrorist organizations take many forms throughout the world. It is neither the objective nor intent of this study to debate the intrinsic good or evil nature of such organizations. That said, there is a distinct benevolent/malevolent nature to the activities of terrorist organizations. While some terrorist organizations act in order to be the voice for a minority, or are attempting to rectify social injustices within a state, others are much more nefarious. For example, the goal of ISIL is not to be the advocate for an underprivileged population and champion their cause, they use terror because they wish to destroy all they disagree with and replace it with a new, even more repressive and intolerant regime than those that stand. These organizations may meet the criteria to fill any of the gaps, but by no means are able to stabilize a failed state because they wish to destroy the state they are in.

The classification presented provides significant insight into the positive capabilities of terrorist organizations. Through evaluation of the abilities to meet a number of criteria, terrorist organizations are judged on abilities that are believed to influence a positive outcome of state building. The four-tiered structure provides a classification structure that allows for the separation of terrorist organizations so that
those that are more capable are set apart from those that are not capable. Provided this
information, academics and policy makers alike can synthesize new information about
these terrorist organizations that can aid in the development of competent and sound
policy. Through an understanding of what strengths these groups outside of their ability
to commit terrorist acts, a new dimension of these organizations rarely explored is
exposed.

As policy makers begin taking these positive abilities into account, a more direct
and effective policy to combat these organizations can be developed. Since the start of
the Global War on Terrorism in 2001, the nearly universal policy to deal with terrorist
organizations is to combat them physically in an attempt to eradicate them. This thesis
provides insight how to instead build policy directed at eliminating the social conditions
that allow terrorist organizations to gain popularity and support among the citizens of a
state. By addressing these pressing issues and understanding what allows these
organizations to garner support in states, policymakers can stymie the growth of terrorist
organizations and in the meanwhile, bolster the failing states of the world.

The scoring criteria were the recipients of much thought and consideration. Each
have some tie to the expected responsibilities of a state. Failed states are unable to
complete such tasks or simply forgo them even if they have the ability in many cases.
This allows non-state actors such as terrorist organizations to step up and provide leading
to a growth in their influence and power. By dividing terrorist organizations into the
tiered structure, their role within not only the failed state, but in other states is
distinguished and is set forth for further evaluation by future studies.
The three case studies provided exemplify the various constructive traits a terrorist organization can possess. From the capability to provide citizens of the state with goods and services to the ability to field a sizable military force, these organizations are capable of a wide array of activities. The same scoring technique and etiquette can be applied to any terrorist organization throughout the world. The results will obviously vary, but even for those that are unable to fill any of the gaps insight is offered into what they are capable of. Through an understanding these positive capabilities, policy makers can make relevant and tailored policy decisions designed to stymie the growth of these organizations and eradicate the need for their resort to terrorist activity.

The constructive abilities of these organizations is incredible. The ability of Hezbollah to fill all three gaps is astounding because many are so quick to assume that a terrorist organization cannot possible be capable of positive activity. Terrorist organizations are much more complex than we would like to believe. They are sometimes state builders in disguise, and there is often more to them than meets the eye. A growing number of studies touch on this, but the effort must be increased. Results of these studies may not only tell us more about the positive influence these organizations have, but also give more insight as to why they choose the tactics they do.

This thesis was limited to three case studies due to a lack of information regarding many terrorist organizations. The lack of data results from the perceived irrelevance of an organization or simply the inability to gather such data presently. Further, even though state failure still undergoes academic inquiry, there are any combination of issues that may instigate the onset of a failure situation that researchers have yet to understand. The classification system presented is based off of current knowledge regarding failure
and should and will be updated as the knowledge surrounding the topic continues to
grow.

Provided more detailed information on any number of the world’s terrorist
organizations, there is expectation that this study shall be expanded in the future. With
the information presented, the positive relationship a terrorist organization potentially can
have with a state is shown and begs for further study. This thesis highlights the glaring
lack of knowledge regarding this relationship and provides the guidance to close the gap.

State failure and terrorism are pressing matters that are interrelated. This thesis
provides insight into this relationship as well as paves the way for further research. As
we learn more about both of these phenomena, their causes, and their relationships,
security of the state, the region, and the international community can be bolstered for the
good of all.
APPENDIX A

PERMISSIONS TO USE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

3/14/2015 The University of Southern Mississippi Mail - Request for Permission to use Intellectual property

Joshua Freeman <joshua.a.freeman@eagles.usm.edu>

Request for Permission to use Intellectual property

3 messages

Joshua Freeman <joshua.a.freeman@eagles.usm.edu> Wed, Jan 21, 2015 at 2:10 PM To: jgoldsto@gmu.edu

Dr. Goldstone,

I am Joshua Freeman and I am currently a graduate student at The University of Southern Mississippi studying political science. I am currently writing my Master's thesis regarding the ability of terrorist organizations to serve as a stabilizing entity in failed states. In your 2005 APSA Conference paper, "A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability" there is a figure, Figure 1 "Incidence and Prevalence of Political Instability Worldwide, 1955-2003" that I would like to use in my thesis as it would be very useful to do my literature review on state failure as well as help illustrate the gravity of the situation surrounding these states. I contact you to ask for the permissions to use your figure in my project. Thank you for taking the time to read this email.

Best regards, Joshua A. Freeman

Jack A. Goldstone <jgoldsto@gmu.edu> To: Joshua Freeman <joshua.a.freeman@eagles.usm.edu>
Dear Joshua,

You have my permission to use the specified figure, provided you give proper citation of the paper as source.

Jack A. Goldstone

Woodrow Wilson Center Visiting Scholar, Virginia E. and John T. Hazel, Jr. Professor of Public Policy School of Policy, Government and International Affairs

George Mason University 3351 Fairfax Drive, 5th Floor, MS 3B1 Arlington, VA 22201 USA 1-703-993-1409 http://jackgoldstone.gmu.edu/

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From: Joshua Freeman
[mailto:joshua.a.freeman@eagles.usm.edu] Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2015 3:11 PM
To: Jack A. Goldstone
Subject: Request for Permission to use Intellectual property

[Quoted text hidden]

Joshua Freeman <joshua.a.freeman@eagles.usm.edu> To: "Jack A. Goldstone" <jgoldsto@gmu.edu>

Dr. Goldstone,

Thank you very much, and proper citation will be given.

Joshua Freeman [Quoted text hidden]

Wed, Jan 21, 2015 at 2:30 PM
REFERENCES


Baltimore, MD: Brookings Institution Press.


Renwick, Danielle, and Stephanie Hanson. 2014. "FARC, ELN: Columbia's Left Wing Guerrillas". *CFR Backgrounder*.


