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SECURITY MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENTS

George Murrell Cunningham III
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SECURITY MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENTS

by

George Murrell Cunningham III

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Studies Office of The University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Approved:

May 2007
The University of Southern Mississippi

SECURITY MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENTS

by

George Murrell Cunningham III

Abstract of a Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Studies Office of The University of Southern Mississippi in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 2007
ABSTRACT

SECURITY MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENTS

by George M. Cunningham III

May 2007

The purpose of this study was to document the perceived levels of knowledge and skills of the persons responsible for sport event security management in intercollegiate athletics. The study targeted individuals responsible for event security duties, such as event management and facility operations athletic directors at Division IA football schools (N=81). The study concerned perceptions of their abilities, experiences, training, and education. Specific demographic variables of these schools were also measured. All 81 participants indicated "some" inclusion of security operations within their job scope. Nearly 50% indicated that the responsibility of game-day security comes from within the athletic department administration.

Sixty-two percent of all respondents reported having no formal training, education, or certifications in event security management. Gaps or areas of concern in security management capabilities of athletic department staff were identified. These gaps, currently not discussed in recent literature, will aid in the future development of education, training, and certification programs that can be tailored to the needs of athletic departments. No significant differences were found in perceived capabilities and the variables of football conference, football attendance, education, years of experience, and positions.

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DEDICATION

Vera Voncille Jones Cunningham
1956-2004

Toby John Beaugh
1976-2006
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents who were patient, supportive, and understanding throughout my ten years of higher education. Special appreciation goes out to my dissertation committee, Dr. Nancy Speed, Dr. Walter Cooper, Dr. Kyna Shelley, and Dr. Jerry Phillips for all their help through the dissertation process. I would also like to thank Dr. Rosalie Ward, Dr. Phillip Duplantis, and Dr. Lauren Beckman Duplantis, for “holding my hand,” advising, and leading me through the hidden curriculum of the Ph.D. program. A special thanks goes out to Dr. Billy Jack Talton, Dr. Kendal Honea, Dr. Hunter McIntire, and Pat Green for helping me decide to continue my education and pursue a Ph.D. at Southern Miss. Last, but not least, I would like to thank the woman who I was so lucky to meet and marry during my time at Southern Miss, Claire Beaugh. I Love you all.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. ii

DEDICATION .......................................................................................................... iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................... iv

LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... vii

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................. ix

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1

  Purpose of the Study
  Research Objectives
  Hypothesis
  Definition of Terms
  Assumptions
  Delimitations
  Significance of the Study

II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE ......................................................... 11

  National Security, September 11\textsuperscript{th}, and Modern Terrorism
  Homeland Security
  Department of Homeland Security and FEMA
  Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
  Sport and Terrorism
  "Any Given Saturday"
  Sport and Crowd Behavior
  Sport Security Research
  Sport Security Manager Capabilities
  Assessment of Sport Security Capabilities

III. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 36

  Introduction
  Participants
  Instrumentation
  Procedures
  Data Analysis
### LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Participant Gender and Ethnicity</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Position and Rank of Participants</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Football Conference and BCS Affiliation</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Highest Level of Education</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Highest Level of Education Related to Sport and Physical Education</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>Years of Experience in Athletic Administration and Years of Experience in Current Position</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7</td>
<td>Football Attendance and University Enrollment</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8</td>
<td>Capability Question (Credential Control) – Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9</td>
<td>Capability Question (Spectator Control) – Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 10</td>
<td>Capability Question (Policies and Procedures) – Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 11</td>
<td>Capability Question (Agency Collaboration) – Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 12</td>
<td>Capability Question (Emergency/Crisis Management) – Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 13</td>
<td>Capability Question (Perimeter Control) – Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 14</td>
<td>Capability Question (Liability) – Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 15</td>
<td>Capability Question (Emergency Evacuation Planning) – Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 16</td>
<td>Capability Question (Total) – Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 17</td>
<td>Indication of Position Responsible for “Game Day” Security</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 18</td>
<td>Professional Organization Membership Related to Event Security</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 19</td>
<td>Formal Training, Education, or Certifications Related to Event Security</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 – 119 Division IA Schools by Location.................................................. 37
Figure 2 – Athletic Security Management Constructs.......................................... 39
Figure 3 - Eight Capability Construct Means and Total Capability Mean.............. 52
Figure 4 – “Game Day” Security Operations within Job Scope Chart..................... 55
Figure 5 – Type of Delivery Method Preferred.................................................... 62
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

On March 15, 2005 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the National Planning Scenarios of the fifteen most likely terrorist attack scenarios, which included a possible detonation of a nuclear device in a major city, and a possible release of a nerve agent in an office building (National Planning Scenarios, 2005). Also included on this "all-hazard scenario" list was the bombing of sports facilities. This is an extremely troubling new concern facing sports administrators since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington D.C. With this new awareness of terrorism, guidelines for prevention and responding have been released by the Department of Homeland Security for implementation in case of an actual domestic terrorist attack, major disasters and other emergencies (Target Capabilities List, 2005).

On October 5, 2005, an explosion occurred outside a stadium with 84,000 spectators in attendance during a college football game played between the University of Oklahoma and Kansas State University (CNN.com, 2005). This incident was not terrorist related but a suicide by a troubled youth. The young man had explosives strapped to his body, and only a few were detonated. No one besides the young man was injured or killed in this incident, but the possibilities of what could have happened sent alarming waves throughout the security and sporting event communities.

The question facing sport administrators is not if a future incident is going to happen, but when an incident will happen. Who is responsible for taking the security measures to prepare, prevent, deter, or delay a future terrorist attack on a sporting event
or a stadium? In most athletic departments around the country the Athletic Director is responsible for all business dealing with intercollegiate athletics. At most Colleges and Universities an Assistant/Associate/Senior Athletic Director is responsible, within the scope of their job, for event management, “game day” operations, including coordination of evacuations, and security.

Sporting event security literature since September 11th has been limited on the capabilities required by athletic administrators responsible for event security management. Pantera et al. (2003) surveyed one hundred and twenty-one different athletic directors from various Division 1 athletic programs. The survey developed was considered a “Game Day Security Operations Checklist” that consisted of 38 items critical for stadium and arena security preparations. Venues of concern for this survey were football stadiums and basketball arenas. The questionnaire was not developed by a national set of guidelines or recommendations; rather, the checklist was developed from the consultation of professionals. No statistical conclusions were significant, and little information on knowledge and preparation, currently taking place, was measured.

Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study was to explore the amount of event security self-perceived capabilities presently acquired by the athletic administrators responsible for sport event security management in intercollegiate athletics. The study targeted and surveyed those that are responsible for event security (assistant/associate/senior athletic directors) at Division IA football schools, relative to the capabilities (e.g. knowledge and
skills) that they perceive they have acquired through experience, training, and education (Target Capabilities List, 2005).

The event security capabilities of sport event managers were assessed by the guidelines to strengthen preparedness that were set forth by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (DHS/SLGCP), and the International Association of Assembly Managers (IAAM). The DHS/SLGCP has developed a Target Capabilities List (TCL) of broad operational terms that can be characterized for any situation. These capabilities “may be delivered with any combination of properly planned, organized, equipped, trained, and exercised personnel that achieve the expected outcomes.” Included in these capability guidelines are 300 critical tasks that are defined, as “those that must be performed during a major event to prevent occurrence, reduce loss of life, reduce serious injuries, and mitigate significant property damage”, are essential to the success of a homeland security mission. Within these 300 critical tasks, the Target Capabilities List (TCL) includes 36 target capabilities. The 36 Target Capabilities are grouped according to the DHS’ homeland security missions: Prevent, Protect, Respond, and Recover (Target Capabilities List, 2005).

The International Association of Assembly Managers (IAAM, 2002) have also developed a Safety and Security Task Force to assess and develop ongoing safety and security protocols as well as conduct research on these “best practices.” The task force has developed a manual, Best Practices Planning Guide for Arenas, Stadiums, and Amphitheaters, especially for event management security administrators and personnel.
During questionnaire development, eight constructs were developed from the DHS/SLGCP and IAAM. These cognitive constructs (evacuation procedures, security policies and procedures, emergency/crisis management, credential control, perimeter control, liability, spectator control, and agency collaboration) were measured with a Likert type scale. Specific demographic variables of Division IA football schools were ascertained and presented.

Research Objectives

The following are the research objectives of this study:

O1 To establish a baseline knowledge of event security management capabilities within athletic department administrators.

O2 To establish the perceived level of capabilities presently acquired by the athletic department staff.

O3 To establish the level of formal training, education, or certifications related to event security management of athletic department administrators.

O4 To establish the membership levels in professional organizations related to event security management of athletic department administrators.

O5 To determine the years of experience in athletic management those responsible for game day event security have.

O6 To determine the athletic department administrator’s perception of their responsibility for “game day” security.

O7 To determine the athletic department administrator’s perception of who is perceived to be the person deemed responsible for “game day” security.
Hypothesis

The following were the non-directional statistical hypotheses of this study. The hypotheses was tested at the .05 level of significance. It was hypothesized that:

H₁ There is a significant difference between athletic administration positions and the amount of event security management capabilities they perceive they have acquired.

H₂ There is a significant difference between athletic administration’s education levels on the amount of event security management capabilities they perceive they have acquired.

H₃ There is a significant difference within the Division I conferences of the athletic department administration on the amount of event security management capabilities they perceive they have acquired.

H₄ There is a significant relationship between the average level of attendance at home football games and the amount of event security management capabilities the athletic administration perceive they have acquired.

H₅ There is a significant relationship between the years of experience of the athletic department staff and the amount of event security management capabilities they perceive they have acquired.
Definition of Terms

The following functional and conceptual definitions were used throughout the study:

**Agency:** An agency is a division of government with a specific function, or a nongovernmental organization (e.g., private contractor, business, etc.) that offers a particular kind of assistance (Incident Command System - 100, 2005).

**Arena:** A venue that is intended for indoor events or sports (NCAA, 2004).

**Assessment:** The evaluation and interpretation of measurements and other information to provide a basis for decision-making (NIMS, 2005).

**Critical Infrastructure:** Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or a combination of these matters (Sauter & Carafano, 2005).

**Evacuation:** Organized, phased, and supervised withdrawal, dispersal, or removal of civilians from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas, and their reception of care in safe areas (NIMS, 2005).

**HSPD:** Homeland Security Presidential Directives (Incident Command System - 100, 2005).

**Incident:** An occurrence or event, natural or human-caused, which requires an emergency response to protect life or property (Incident Command System - 100, 2005).

**Incident Commander (IC):** The individual responsible for all incident activities, including the development of strategies and tactics and the ordering and the release of resources. The IC has overall authority and responsibility for conducting incident
operations and is responsible for the management of all incident operations at the incident site (Incident Command System - 100, 2005).

**Mitigation:** The activities designed to reduce or eliminate risks to persons or property or to lessen the actual or potential effects or consequences of an incident (Incident Command System - 100, 2005). Mitigation involves ongoing actions to reduce exposure to, probability of, or potential loss from hazards. Mitigation can include efforts to educate governments, business, and the public on measures to respond to or to support an incident (NIMS, 2005).

**Multi-agency Coordination:** The coordination of assisting agency resources and support to emergency operations (Incident Command System - 100, 2005).

**Preparedness:** The range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents (Incident Command System - 100, 2005).

**Prevention:** Actions to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from occurring, to protect lives and property (Incident Command System - 100, 2005).

**Recovery:** The development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-restoration plans; the reconstitution of government operations and services (Incident Command System - 100, 2005).

**Response:** Activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident which includes immediate actions to save lives, to protect property, and to meet basic human needs (Incident Command System - 100, 2005).
**Sportsmanship:** A set of behaviors to be exhibited by athletes, coaches, game officials, administrators, and fans in athletic competition. These behaviors are based on values, including respect, civility, fairness, honesty, and responsibility (NCAA, 2003).

**Stadium:** A venue that is intended for outdoor events or sports (NCAA, 2004).

**Threat:** An indication of possible violence, harm, or danger (Incident Command System - 100, 2005).

**Assumptions**

Assumptions of this study were:

1. All athletic staff filled out the questionnaire honestly.
2. The athletic staff is responsible for “game day” operations and security in some capacity.
3. The athletic staff is privy to security information within its own athletic department.
4. The athletic staff only completed the survey once.

**Delimitations**

This study will be delimited to:

1. Athletic administrators at Division IA football schools.
2. Division IA schools.
3. The questionnaire was administered via email and the World Wide Web.
4. Only Senior/Associate/Assistant Athletic Directors and Athletic Administrators responsible for facilities and “game day” operations were targeted for the study.
Significance of the Study

In the event of an attack on a stadium or an arena, the destruction could cause an immediate impact by numerous illness, injuries, and fatalities. A secondary impact would be the closing of the facility for an indefinite period of time. Included in the shutdown of the facility, the economic well-being of the area could result in a severe financial loss to the university (academic and research entities), athletic department, and local economy. With a large-scale attack, or incident, national psychological impact could instill fear among Americans, as well as causing a “ripple effect” to other sports and facilities. In addition, an attack could also cause a significant change to travel, tourism, entertainment, and educational funding sectors. As a result, this damage would be considered a successful completion of the terrorist major objectives. Because of the large gathering, societal impact, and media driven characteristics of a “Saturday game,” the Department of Homeland Security considers stadiums and arenas as a potential target (DHS, 2004).

With the concern for stadiums and arenas being a “likely” target, a sense of responsibility to mitigate and lower the chances of an all-hazard incident falls on the shoulders of the university, primarily on the athletic department (DHS, 2004). Currently, there is little known about the level of skills, education, knowledge, experience, and planning of athletic departments for potential all-hazard events. By assessing the knowledge and skills, this document will set a baseline of information concerning the current levels of knowledge, skills, and experience of those athletic staff capabilities responsible for “game day” operations and event security.
This body of knowledge will also facilitate in finding the gaps in security management capabilities of athletic department staff. These gaps, currently not discovered in recent literature, will aid in the future development of education, training, and certification programs that can be tailored to closing the gaps, or needs, of athletic departments. Future programs will help with the overall goals set forth by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the International Association of Assembly Managers (IAAM), and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in ensuring the safeguards of intercollegiate athletics. This body of research will help in developing education and training of athletic department staff and future sport managers in the preparedness, prevention, or delay of an actual domestic or foreign terrorist attack, major disasters and other emergencies, and recovery if such an event does occur.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

National Security, September 11th, and Modern Terrorism

The conception of national security in America can be traced back to the beginning of the country’s existence. The homeland remained under external attack on its borders, coastline, and towns. Even conflicts between Native American Indians and the colonists structured the formation and existence of what is known now as national security from both external and internal adversaries (Sauter & Carafano, 2005).

The date, December 7, 1941, “which will live in infamy,” according to President Harry Truman, led to the first true legislation on protecting the homeland. After this date, (the bombing of United States Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii) and after WWII, President Truman passed the National Security Act of 1947 (amendments in 1949 and 1958). This act established the Department of Defense (combining military departments), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Council (NSC) in the White House. The CIA, as we know it today, was established to coordinate and analyze all foreign intelligence. The National Security Act was developed to direct all defense and foreign policies. Not only was this important during the Cold War but also in the new modern war on terror that we face today (Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2002).

On the morning of September 11, 2001, Islamic extremists connected to bin Ladin and al-Quaida, changed the world as we know it today. This current war on terror began with that event. Prior incidents such as the February 26, 1993, bombing of New York
City's World Trade Center, the Federal Building Bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995, and the Sarin Gas Attack on the Tokyo Subway in 1995 provided a glimpse of terrorism, but were not considered the primary threat that it is considered today. Would the nine highjackers selected for special security screenings have made it onto their flights the morning of September 11th if terrorism were more of a priority, or with the precautionary measures in place today (Sauter & Carafano, 2005).

Homeland Security

According to the United States Government, Homeland Security is defined as efforts to defend domestic America from terrorists (Sauter & Carafano, 2005). The consequences of terrorism include: “loss of life and health, destruction of families, fear, panic, loss of confidence in government, destruction of property, and disruption of commerce and financial markets” (Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2002, p.11). The term homeland security has also transformed into efforts to prepare for all-hazard incidents. All-hazard incidents can include man-made or natural catastrophes, such as floods, chemical spills, hurricanes, and tornadoes (Sauter & Carafano, 2005).

Post September 11th, the White House developed a national strategy of homeland security. This strategy has been the antecedent and theme of strategic planning for the new war on terror. Three main objectives have been developed: 1) Preventing terrorism, 2) Reducing vulnerabilities, and 3) Minimizing damage and recovery from attacks (Sauter & Carafano, 2005).

The number one priority has been, and will be, the prevention of terrorism. Major efforts have been made to improve intelligence, “harden” borders and trade, and suppress terrorist activities on domestic soil. Defending catastrophic terrorism has now become
proactive in ensuring that terrorists do not have access to weapons of mass destruction. Reducing vulnerability involves protecting the “critical infrastructure” of America (Sauter & Carafano, 2005). The critical infrastructure of this nation goes beyond the skyscrapers in big cities; it represents all assets that are vital to public health and safety, economic well-being, government, and national morale (Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2002).

In the case of terrorist or all-hazard incidents, minimizing damage is also important in protecting the American way of life. Responding to an incident requires effective response by public servants in emergency situations. First responders, public officials and servants (firefighters, police officers, emergency medical agencies, congresspersons, governors, mayors, etc.) at all levels of government play a role in homeland security and protecting critical infrastructure. Recovery capabilities will require a great effort by all entities if another attack should occur. Direct efforts of monies, support, and training for first responders have increased the capabilities of the first responders in order to minimize damage and to recover from all-hazard incidents. Another major player in this quest includes the private sector. Eighty-five percent of the identified critical infrastructure is not controlled by U.S. Government, but by the private sector. The involvement of the private sector, organizations, and corporations should not be overlooked by the government in the involvement of protecting critical infrastructure and the homeland against an incident (Sauter & Carafano, 2005).
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

One month after the fall of the Twin Towers, President George W. Bush made an executive order establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This bold step took 22 separate governmental agencies and blended them together beneath one umbrella to protect the homeland of America (Securing our Homeland, 2004). Previously considered a “patchwork” of agencies, the 22 separate governmental agencies would now come together under one unified mission (Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2002). The official mission “shall be to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats and attacks” (Homeland Security, 2002, p.1; Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2002). The DHS’s primary function is to manage the executive office of the government’s “efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from” terrorist attacks and all-hazard incidents on American soil. Within the realignment of the previous 22 governmental agencies, the DHS also gave a single unified commanding role for state and local governments, organizations, and private industry to follow concerning preparedness and threats (Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2002). In addition to the DHS, the President created a Presidential Task Force on Citizen Preparedness to assist in preparing the American people, public places, neighborhoods, workplaces, schools, and places of worship against the adversaries of terror (Homeland Security, 2002).

The newly created DHS developed a six-point agenda to ensure operations, policies, and structures are aimed to face the potential threats of terror (DHS Organization, 2002):
1) Increase overall preparedness, for all-hazard catastrophic events.
2) Create more secure and efficient transportation security systems.
3) Strengthen interior enforcement, border security and immigration.
4) Enhance interoperable communications with partner agencies.
5) Improve DHS financial management, human resource development, and information capabilities.
6) Organization realignment to maximize operations (DHS Organization, 2002).

Objective 3.7 of the DHS strategic outlines a plan to strengthen the preparedness and mitigation nationwide against terrorism and all-hazard incidents. Preparation is defined as the best way to protect against harmful incidents. Pledging public safety and emergency management, the DHS will have to rely on state, local and tribal governments in reducing the possible impacts. Capabilities-based exercises and training, unified to provide effective and rapid response to all-hazard incidents will have to be expanded for national preparedness. The outline also establishes national standards, evaluations, protocols, and mutual aid systems to implement this plan. Reducing the vulnerability, a movement directed toward preparation of citizens and the private sector must be led by the DHS 2004.

Leading this movement, the President of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, issued Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD)- 5 & 7. These directives outline an instruction to identify, prioritize, and plan for key resources and critical infrastructure in the pursuit of protection from all-hazard incidents (Homeland Security, 2005). Coming from HSPD-5, the DHS mandated the National Response Plan (NRP), and from HSPD-7,
the DHS mandated the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS).

The National Response Plan (NRP) “integrates Federal domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan” across a wide continuum of activities (National Response Plan, 2005 & Incident Command System, 2005). This plan is not intended to replace state, local or tribal plans, but to only add a template to incorporate all plans in a uniformed system. The plan actually encourages incidents to be taken care of at the lowest jurisdictional level. Within the NRP, the National Incident Management System provides a chain of command and uniform response to assimilate all levels of jurisdiction.

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides a consistent nationwide organization of federal, state, local, and tribal governments, the private-sector and non-governmental organizations “to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size or complexity” (National Incident Management System, 2005). This system also provides compatibility for interoperable communication between all jurisdictions and entities using a concise system of principles, concepts, and terminology for optimum compatibility for the preparation, prevention and recovery of an all-hazard incident. (National Incident Management System, 2005, & Incident Command System, 2005).

An outline of the chain of command is encompassed in the Incident Command System (ICS). This order of operation system outlines an organizational structure that can be used for simple incidents to complex incidents, without crossing jurisdictional precincts. ICS uses all resources for each jurisdictional entity, both public and private,
for optimum incident management operations (Incident Command System, 2005). New legislation is requiring the training and certification in NRP, NIMS, and ICS for entities to be awarded grant monies for the preparation and training for all-hazard incidents.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was initially established in 1979 at the height of the Cold War to help support state and local government in the preparedness and defense of natural and human-caused incidents such as floods, earthquakes and hurricanes (Sauter & Carafano, 2005). Within this extensive umbrella of DHS, FEMA now resides. Under this new reorganization FEMA has become the fundamental module and continues to oversee federal governmental assistance in domestic all-hazard preparedness, as well as manage natural disaster response and recovery methods (Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2002).

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

Unfortunately, the 2006 hurricane season tested and taxed the newly reorganized U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Hurricanes Katrina and Rita brought devastation to the gulf coast states in a widespread fashion never seen before by natural disasters in the history of the United States. With these incidents, an intense scrutiny of response at all levels of government developed. These lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will be used in the future of disaster preparedness planning, mitigation, and response (State of Louisiana, 2006).

In partnership with the State of Louisiana, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Preparedness Directorate’s Office of Grants and Training, conducted a “lessons learned” after-action conference and report/improvement plan following
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The report identified many shortcomings and successes, but three major issues were identified in the apparent lack of preparedness for such an incident. All three issues dealt with planning and practicing between the local, state, and federal governments. The three issues included: 1) lack of resource sharing and collaboration, 2) interoperable communications between the level of government and agencies, and 3) local and state response plans were not aligned with federal response plans (State of Louisiana, 2006). These issues should be considered in the development of all plans, regardless of incident, including the athletic realm (Steinbach, 2006).

Sport and Terrorism

Given the warning signs since September 11, 2001, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, what lessons can be learned or carried over to prevent, prepare, respond, and recover in the sports industry? The sport arena does have experiences dealing with terrorism and natural disasters. Examples start with the infamous slaying of the 1972 Israeli Olympic Team at the Munich Olympic Games in Germany. The Fatah terrorist who carried out the acts were ordered by Yasser Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Palestine Facts, 2006).

The 2000 Summer Olympics was also a site for a major security breach; an American citizen, who had no ties to terrorist activities, carried out an incident. He detonated a pipe bomb in the Centennial Olympic Park. Eric Rudolph, a North Carolina native, disguised himself as a security guard, killed two people and injured close to 100 spectators by detonating the pipe bomb. Since this incident and the September 11th attacks, the Olympics have set the precedent on the price tag of security. At the 2004 Summer Olympic games in Athens, Greece, 1.2 billion dollars was spent and 70,000
military troops and police officers were activated to ensure “safe games” (Johnson, 2004).

Since September 11th, some other major sporting events have been classified as a “National Special Security Event” by the United States Secret Service, such as the Super Bowl XXXVI and the 2002 Winter Olympics. Since these events were considered critical infrastructure of the United States, special precautions and the command of the Secret Service were deemed necessary for proper security management (Homeland Security, 2003).

With 84,000 spectators in the stands during an October 2005 college football game in Norman, Oklahoma, an explosion occurred on a park bench 173 yards outside of the stadium. The game was played between two Big 12 Conference rivals, The University of Oklahoma and Kansas State University (CNN.com, 2005). This game closely represents a larger than average attendance of a Division IA college football game (CNN.com, 2005 & NCAA, 2006). This incident has not been ruled terrorist related; rather, it has been deemed a suicide by a troubled youth. The young man, Joel Hinrichs, had explosives strapped to his body, but only a small portion of the explosives were detonated. The 21-year-old reportedly had “Islamic Jihad” materials and additional explosives in his apartment. Hinrichs also reportedly attended the same mosque as the only person charged (and convicted) with the September 11th attacks, Zacharias Moussaouri. No one besides the young man was injured or killed in this incident, but the possibilities of what could have happened sent alarming waves throughout the security and sporting event communities (WorldNetDaily.com, 2006).
After this incident the security measures of The University of Oklahoma’s athletic department staff were in the national security spotlight. According to Associate Athletic Director of Operations, Casey Scott, there would be no need, at this point, to increase the security measures of his facility (Roderick, 2005). Scott also stated that specific measures were in place the week of the park bench explosion. The stadium was secured 24 hours prior to the game, which included a security sweep and bomb squad pass by a canine unit. All bags and other items that were brought into the facility were inspected. The athletic department also conducted an awareness campaign to keep people from bringing bags into the facilities. Security cameras also monitored the environment inside and outside the stadium for suspicious behavior and activities (Roderick, 2005).

Besides the incident in Oklahoma, the United States has been relatively free of terrorist attacks in the sport/entertainment industry. However, other countries have not been so lucky. The following three incidents have occurred to the international sport industry since 2002:

1) January 2002, the Israeli police prevented an attack at Teddy Stadium in Jerusalem. The Israeli police secured approximately eight pounds of explosives disguised in a belt meant to be used by the Palestinian bomber once he was entered the stadium (DHS, 2004).

2) On July 5, 2003, two female suicide bombers killed at least 16 people and seriously injured 20 more when they blew themselves up. The two females were prevented from entering an outdoor concert in Moscow and subsequently, the bombs detonated at a ticket booth (DHS, 2004).

"Any Given Saturday"

Sports are an integral part of the American culture. According to worldstadiums.com, there are 1,713 stadiums and arenas in the United States. This figure does not include high school facilities and other small venues. For an example, The NCAA (2006) has reported that 37 million fans attended Division IA football games last season, as well as 24 million fans attending Division IA basketball games.

In the event of a major incident at a stadium or arena, the concerns of debilitation or significant casualties of the human asset are not the only problems we could face. The social and economic impact on a major incident could be devastating to the country, economy, and entertainment industry. A rippling effect of results could occur. Examples include: decrease (or cessation) of attendance, loss of revenue, loss of jobs, insurance ramifications, and the community would be severely affected (DHS, 2004).

Circumstances surrounding an educational institution would magnify the ripple effect in the academic culture. Traditionally, stadiums and arenas are the focal point or center of the university, which includes many entities. Such an incident at a sporting event could result in a damaging impact for not only one particular university, but a multitude of university impact, depending on the type of event (DHS, 2004).

Another issue is that the most significant effect of an attack could be the psychological impact (DHS, 2004). The force of this impact could become a widespread panic that would reach beyond the immediate area and damages. Sports fans could
possibly change the mindset of “it is not going to happen to us” to “it could happen to us.” This would result in an inevitable impact on national attendance figures and revenues. In addition, this would produce an economic blow to the tourism, travel, and any industry that includes the gathering of a large mass of people (DHS, 2004).

Literature has included the following possible man-made threats to security concerns for administrators of stadiums and arenas: 1) Explosives (e.g. car bomb, suicide bomber), 2) Arson (e.g. firebombing, using accelerants), 3) Biological agents (e.g. botulism, anthrax), 4) Chemical agents, 5) Radiology, 6) Hostage-taking, and 7) Weapons. Possible natural threats of security concern for administrators of stadiums include: 1) Earthquakes, 2) Lightening, 3) Tornadoes, 4) Flooding, 5) Wild Fires, and 6) Hurricanes. Additional threats to stadiums and arenas would occur after such an incident, such as a stampede of spectators and sanitation and health concerns of the immediate area (DHS, 2004).

Vulnerability of stadiums and arenas arise from the periphery. Perimeter control is difficult to attain with larger areas. There are little to no security measures or standards in place for areas outside of the event. Areas such as parked vehicles, tailgating areas, and ticket windows are most vulnerable to an incident. Once inside the stadium, vulnerabilities exist from an employee, participant, food supply, or concessionaires (DHS, 2004).

With the increase of national and international terrorist and all-hazard incidents, there is a profound, heightened sense of awareness for sports events athletic administrators and managers to effectively secure facilities and events from potential dangers and threats. The need for working together as a unified country in the proactive
movement to secure the homeland, now involves all managers, specifically athletic department staff. This duty to protect human assets and critical infrastructures of sport requires new knowledge, skills, and capabilities, unlike previous responsibilities of sport managers (DHS, 2004).

Sport and Crowd Behavior

One of the most realistic threats facing athletic administrators and event security personnel is crowd behavior (NCAA, 2003; Street & Smith, 2006). A recent spike in incidents of athlete and crowd behavior has become the latest area of emphasis. Spectator behavior can result in the tarnishing of the sport and experience of others. Problems of tearing down goal posts, post game riots, and storming the field provide evidence in the break down of value driven sport participation. It has also shown to result in much worse ramifications like deaths, injuries, and restoration dollars (NCAA, 2003). The following examples from the NCAA (2003) provide evidence of crowd behavior being a major and realistic threat to intercollegiate athletics and sport event security administrators.

• 1999, Michigan State vs. Duke in the Final Four – Michigan State lost to Duke and 132 people (71 of whom were Michigan State students) were arrested during and after riots that resulted in overturned cars, burned furniture, and police firing tear gas (NCAA, 2003).

• 2002, Clemson and South Carolina Football game – A 67 year old sheriff deputy was crushed under a pile of students and fans and he lost consciousness after unsuccessfully tried to keep them from attacking the Clemson goal post (NCAA, 2003).
• 2002, Western Kentucky vs. Western Illinois (Div I-AA Playoffs) Football – Several student-athletes from both teams received single and multiple game suspension for kicking, punching, and striking players with helmets (NCAA, 2003).

• 2002, West Virginia vs. Virginia Tech Football game – West Virginia students set fires on campus and tore down goal posts at Mountaineer Field, even though the game was won at Virginia Tech’s Stadium (NCAA, 2003).

• 2003, Michigan State vs. Texas, Men’s Basketball game – Fans overturned four cars, tipped vending machines and set fires in trash bins after the Spartans lost in the NCAA tournament. Police officers in riot gear dispersed the crowd using tear gas. Seven people were arrested on charges of disorderly conduct, six of them were Michigan State students (NCAA, 2003).

• 2006, Miami vs. Florida International Football game – Several student-athletes from both teams received single and multiple game suspension for fighting, kicking, punching, and striking players with helmets (Lederman, 2006).

Sport Security Research

The Center for Spectator Sport Security Management (SSSM) at The University of Southern Mississippi is a center used to promote, support, and enhance academic research, technology development, education and training, and service programs dealing with all aspects of sports events security management. This center achieves this through information sharing and collaboration among academic departments at The University of Southern Mississippi, other academic institutions, researchers, and scholars (SSSM, 2007; Marciani et al., 2006)
The University of Southern Mississippi, over the last two years, has emerged as a national center in the quest to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents at sporting venues (Marciani, 2006). In May 2005, a model for effective security management was developed by The Center for Spectator Sports Security Management through the Department of Homeland Security and the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency funds ($568,000), with the target being university sports events. The seven state-supported universities in Mississippi were assessed in order to identify weaknesses in security and to “harden” their stadiums. Due to these vulnerability studies, countermeasures were developed including updating or development of emergency operations and evacuation plans, multi-agency collaboration plans, access control, lighting, background checks, credentialing, and personal item searches (i.e. backpacks and purses).

Recently (2006) the Center for Spectator Sports Security Management was awarded a grant ($955,700) from the Department of Homeland Security and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for “A Simulation Environment for Planning, Training and Assessment of Emergency Response and Evacuation Capabilities at High Consequence Sports Events.” This ongoing research will be implemented for use by event security management to assist in evacuation planning and traffic flow planning.

In addition to research, the Center for Spectator Sports Security has developed an emphasis area (three academic courses) in sports event security management, which has been integrated with their master’s degree in sport management. The Center has also developed certification programs, training programs, and consulting services (Marciani, 2006).
Hall (2006A & 2006B) developed standards for event security management based on career professional sport security personnel including athletic facility managers, campus police chief, sheriff deputies, and local emergency management directors responsible for game day security operations at the seven state-supported universities in Mississippi. This was the first research-based standards developed for use in university sport venue security. This research produced 134 standards. These standards could be used as a foundation for security management administrators to refer to when deciding on precedence when hardening their stadium or arena.

Beckman (2006), knowing that exercises are an important tool for sporting venues as part of their training plans, implemented a tabletop exercise at a Division IA collegiate institution. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the current emergency response plans and document its effectiveness. The researcher found significant differences in a pre-test/post-test analysis on the perception of awareness regarding emergency response. The multi-agency participants (i.e. athletic administrators, university police department, EMT, local law enforcement, and emergency management directors) also identified “areas of concern” for the improvement of emergency response and evacuation plans.

Phillips (2006) conducted a survey of NCAA Division IA and Division IAA universities to determine the outsourcing of security during sporting events. The researcher’s results concluded that over 60% of the security workers were outsourced, and approximately one-half of the game-day workers were from outside contractors. Problems could arise from the training consistency and background checks performed by companies providing outsourced security.
Sport Security Manager Capabilities

Due to the all variables needed for effective event security management at a stadium or arena, different degrees or capabilities of security management are needed by professionals responsible. Limited information has been disseminated by various organizations regarding security management. Guidelines such as DHS Target Capabilities List, NCAA Security Planning Options and IAAM’s “Best Practices” are not mandatory, but only recommendations regarding security management. These capabilities should be know for proper delegation and management to ensure a safe event.

**DHS Target Capabilities List**

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (DHS/SLGCP) along with State, local and tribal agencies, and national associations developed the “DHS Target Capabilities List” (2005). This national project utilized the knowledge and skills of over 70 governmental and private stakeholders to facilitate a task list for the strengthened protection of our homeland. It was decided that a capabilities-based framework was necessary to define critical tasks. Critical tasks are defined by DHS as “those that must be performed during a major event to prevent occurrence, reduce loss of life or serious injuries, mitigate significant property damage, or are essential to the success of a homeland security mission” (Target Capabilities List, 2005, p.1).

Through the development of the target capabilities list, approximately 300 tasks are identified as “critical.” These critical tasks are categorized under 36 capabilities. The capabilities are general in nature, using “broad operational terms” to encompass...
compatibility to attain the results found necessary to accomplish security outcomes (Target Capabilities List, 2005).

The primary goal of national preparedness and target capabilities is to advance to the model of “prevention, protection, response, and recovery” to all scenarios and events. The following 10 capabilities from the DHS pertain to athletic event security in performing the mission of the DHS (Target Capabilities List, 2005):

**Common Tasks Target Capabilities**

1) Planning- Identify, prioritize and evaluate preparedness plans and integrate interoperability communications within Federal, State, local, and tribal agency jurisdiction. Critical tasks include planning that revolves around the National Response Plan (NRP), National Incident Management System (NIMS), and Incident Command Systems (ICS). Measures of assessment include exercising and updating plans at a minimum annually, as well as contact information of appropriate agencies.

2) Interoperable Communications- A constant flow of information is critical in the event of an incident. This flow of communication must span to all agencies, ensuring one chain of command and unified operations. Critical tasks include operation of interoperable communication technologies, as well as proper policies and procedures in communication to other agencies.

**Prevention Mission Area Target Capabilities**

3) Information Collection and Threat Recognition- Critical collection of necessary information should be carefully identified, collected, and disseminated to
appropriate agencies. A critical task would include the incorporation of surveillance systems.

4) Information Sharing and Collaboration- Effective communication and sharing of all information across all entities and jurisdiction of any all-hazard incidents

Protection Mission Area Target Capabilities

5) Risk Analysis- Identification of hazards, vulnerabilities, and risks are important prior to and during an incident. Effective risk analysis mitigates the incident so the consequences are minimized. Critical tasks include warning systems for patrons in case of a destructive weather event.

6) Citizen Preparedness and Participation- Citizen awareness is important in the prevention, mitigation, preparation, and responding to all-hazard incidents. Critical tasks include the development of awareness plans for special populations.

Respond Mission Area Target Capabilities

7) On-site Incident Management- Implementing the use of the National Incident Management System and Incident Command System (ICS) is necessary to effectively coordinate with other agencies. Critical tasks include implementing ICS, mutual aid agreements, and incident action plans.

8) Volunteer Management- The ability to handle volunteer help and donations is vital is carrying out incident action plans, as well as not interrupting with incident action plans.

9) Citizen Protection- Successful plan for the protection of the human asset at all costs.
10) Emergency Public Information and Warning- Managers must be able to get accurate, timely releases of alerts and warnings to the media during or after the meetings. Critical tasks include designation and implementation of warning systems (Target Capabilities List, 2005).

NCAA Security-Planning Options

Released in 2005, The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), along with law-enforcement and stadium managers, with direction from IAAM “best practices,” (2002) issued a compilation of “security planning options.” Although not considered guidelines mandated by the NCAA, this list serves as a template to work from that can be adapted to each venue, facility, special event, and circumstance. The NCAA highly recommends that all athletic departments consult with all agencies that pertain to public-safety when developing their specific action plans. Entities valuable to development include; campus security, campus leaders and public officials, local, state, and national law-enforcement agencies, fire departments and HAZMAT response units, and state and local emergency management agencies (NCAA, 2004).

Also recommended by the NCAA is to conduct vulnerability studies in order to find the gaps in the security action plans, as well as to meet and to plan on a regular basis in order to strengthen all areas of security. An important role of an athletic department staff would include the above public-safety officials in all planning, communication, preparation, and recovery efforts, by keeping close contact with one individual from each respective agency. A centralized coordinated chain of command is also recommended in order to increase efficiency of communication and decision-making (NCAA Security-Planning Options, 2005).
The NCAA gives specific capabilities recommended for proper sport security event management. These principles were developed from DHS and IAAM guidelines and “Best Practices” (NCAA Security-Planning Options, 2005):

1) Access Control: Inspection of all bags, including those of competitors. Require visiting competitors to provide a credential list (approved by Athletic Director) to have access to the venue.

2) Coordinate with public safety agencies. Meet and contact agencies that will be helpful in the preparation and response of “game day” event security. Developing a hierarchy of command (i.e. Incident Command System) as well as designating the individual that will make final decisions on cancellation of the event.

3) Develop an evacuation plan with the help of public safety agencies. Coordinate and practice evacuation plans.

4) Determine how to handle bomb threats or other suspicious telephone calls.

5) Add additional security including uniformed officers and private security officers as the situation warrants.

6) Conduct an inside and outside visual inspection of the facility before and after the event.

7) Designate drop-off areas, and prohibit vehicles from pausing or stopping within that perimeter.

8) Determine whether it is necessary to have a “hostage team” and/or “SWAT team” available.
9) Develop and review plans for dealing with protests or demonstrations both inside and outside of the competition venue.

10) Limit or prohibit all vendor vehicles during competition to make deliveries. Develop a system for inspecting items delivered to the competition site.

11) Increase facility personnel development by conducting background checks on all athletic staff personnel and all contracted security. Train all personnel on their response in the event of an emergency. Include an exit-procedures announcement in the public address announcer’s script.

12) Post signs and use external public-address systems to inform guests of bag-checking and prohibited-items procedures. Designate an area away from the venue to inspect bags. Use turnstiles to direct and move fans into a single-file line. Establish separate entrances for individuals who are not carrying bags. Open venue doors earlier than normal. Do not allow fans to exit the venue and return later.

13) Determine the length of time before and after the event to require credentials for admittance to the facility by individuals (e.g., facility staff, competitors, officials, fans) for a full facility lockdown.

14) Inspect media bags or subject them to metal detectors. Require photo ID with credential passes each time a person enters the facility.

15) Determine the need for use of metal detectors.

16) Establish an outer perimeter, with concrete barriers at strategic locations in order to keep unticketed individuals and unauthorized vehicles...
away from the competition site. Consider the feasibility of creating additional emergency exits.

17) Work with local authorities, establish evacuation routes for pedestrians and review security around air vents.

18) Inspect air intake units and understand how to shut-off air circulation system. Inspect vents and air-intake systems for hazardous materials.

19) Develop policies for prohibited items.

20) Notify public of specific measures effecting them (e.g., items not permissible inside arena, gate-opening times, plans for use of metal detectors, or physical searches). Determine individual(s) authorized to speak regarding specific emergency preparedness issues. Direct all media inquiries to the local spokesperson.

21) Work with local law-enforcement agencies to determine whether it is necessary to conduct a bomb sweep prior to the competition, then, lock-down the facility after the sweep. Use canine teams to sweep the venue on the day of the contest.

22) Determine who should receive copies of written security plans, restricting the list to a small group on a “need-to-know” basis. Do not permit “standing room only.”

23) Compile a list of telephone numbers and seat locations for the directors of athletics, key decision-makers and chief executive officers (or their designees) from participating institutions.
24) Work with local utilities to ensure the integrity of power lines and telephone lines.

25) Review emergency light and essential electrical power back-up systems to ensure that they are operational (NCAA Security-Planning Options, 2005).

Assessment of Sport Security Capabilities

After September 11, 2001, security measures of several industries were examined, including the sport industry. Security Management Magazine, surveyed 150 managers responsible for stadium and area security in both the U.S. and in Canada. With 45 respondents (30% response rate), 95% of managers indicated that they have increased access controls. Also noted, the largest characteristic of facility security increase was lock-down time between events. The researcher suggests additional investigation of collegiate venues due to the fact that levels of response were dramatically lower than professional organizations (Gips, 2003).

Pantera et al. (2003), also investigated assessing the capabilities of sport event managers and administrators. The researchers took a critical look at “game day” security operations at Division IA college basketball and football venues. Head athletic directors from one hundred and twenty-one different colleges and universities across the nation were surveyed. The survey was designed as a checklist of security preparations at basketball arenas and football stadiums. The instrument was developed from literature and experts with validation from a pilot study. Even though no statistical conclusions were found significant, the instrument was able to classify arenas and stadiums in comparison to other schools and universities. A ranking of best-prepared conferences was
issued, with the Southeastern Conference and the Big East as the leaders in game day security operations. Little information of preparation, knowledge, and skills currently taking place of the athletic directors or athletic department staff was investigated (Pantera, 2003).
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

The procedures and techniques that were used in this study will be discussed and described in this chapter. These procedures include 1) participants, 2) questionnaire development, 3) procedures, and 4) data analysis. This research will be considered survey research in nature.

Participants

Permission was obtained from The University of Southern Mississippi Human Subjects Protection Review Committee to conduct this study (Appendix A-C). The subjects consisted of senior/associate/assistant athletic directors and facility directors from the 119 Division IA football participating schools nationwide (Figure 1 & (Appendix D). These athletic directors in some capacity are responsible for “game day” operations in the area of facility, event, or security management. Ideally there were two individuals that were targeted from each university by the study. Each of these positions encounter responsibility, in most cases, for security management at a sporting event. A possible total of 238 participants were potentially targeted to be surveyed. The subjects were recruited from the 2005 National Directory of College Athletics, as well as each schools official athletic website to verify contact numbers and email addresses.
Instrumentation

The questionnaire was developed with three sections (Appendix D). The first section consisted of 32 questions that inquired about the capabilities obtained through education, training, certifications, or experience by the subject. The participants were asked on a 5-point Likert type scale to respond to these capabilities based on past experience and not based on the need for current practices. The capabilities will be self perceptions of their capabilities ranked from 1=very low levels obtained to 5=very high levels obtained. The questions were based on the capabilities of “best practices” set forth through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the International Association of Assembly Managers (IAAM), and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).
The questions were developed from eight cognitive constructs by the researchers, according to the DHS, IAAM, and NCAA in which they indicated are needed for effective security event management (see Figure 2 for details):

1) Emergency evacuation planning
2) Security policies and procedures
3) Emergency/crisis management
4) Credential control
5) Perimeter control
6) Liability
7) Spectator control
8) Agency collaboration
I have acquired the capabilities necessary to...

Spectator Control
- Q10... determine the security measures for spectators gathering early or socializing (tailgating).
- Q11... determine the security measures for spectators who have intense rivalries with the opposing team.
- Q12... develop crowd screening and control policies.

Policies and Procedures
- Q13... provide procedures to the public announcer (e.g. written emergency script) appropriate for emergency situations.
- Q14... properly establish policies and procedures dealing with a bomb threat.
- Q15... develop a pre- and post-event security checklist.
- Q16... conduct game day audits.

Emergency/Crisis Management
- Q21... conduct an immediate meeting with Emergency Management Team in a crisis or emergency.
- Q22... coordinate a media press release as soon as possible from the result of a crisis or emergency.
- Q23... assure training of all athletic personnel as to response procedures in the event of an crisis or emergency.
- Q24... have a reliable interoperable communication system during a crisis or emergency.

Emergency Evacuation Planning
- Q1... prepare a written disaster evacuation plan.
- Q2... coordinate an evacuation using an all-hazards approach.
- Q3... coordinate an effective evacuation using your disaster evacuation plan.

Security Management Constructs

Credential Control
- Q25... coordinate proper credential dissemination.
- Q26... establish guidelines for vendor credentials.
- Q27... establish guidelines and policies for media and public official credentials.

Agency Collaboration
- Q4... collaborate with Public Safety Agencies to establish policies and procedures for game-day activities.
- Q5... coordinate with public agencies to set up command center operations.
- Q6... determine which agency has the authority regarding cancellations of sporting events due to security measures.
- Q7... develop and carry out a training session with Public Safety Agencies.
- Q8... determine with local law enforcement agencies whether it is necessary to conduct a bomb sweep.
- Q9... conduct disaster scenario exercise with Public Safety Agencies.

Liability
- Q17... be aware of legal issues that may arise during a crisis or emergency.
- Q18... request copies of reports completed by agencies such as police, paramedics, or fire departments for liability record keeping.
- Q19... work with university attorney and/or risk manager to ensure proper documentation is properly gathered for legal and insurance purposes.
- Q20... be aware of the liability repercussions that could come from poor training, poor maintenance, carelessness, misconduct, or fatigue of staff.

Perimeter Control
- Q28... designate perimeter areas for inspection of spectators for prohibited items.
- Q29... establish an outer perimeter for keeping unticketed and unauthorized individuals away from the venue.
- Q30... designate an entrance perimeter checkpoint for only concessionaires, gatekeepers, and others.
- Q31... have policies for vehicles pausing or stopping with-in the perimeter control (drop-off areas).
- Q32... coordinate all traffic flow evacuations.

Figure 2 – Athletic Security Management Constructs

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At the conclusion of Section 1, the participants were asked two questions in regards to job scope and responsibility for “game day” security operations. These questions were intended to establish the theory of responsibility amongst the athletic department and campus wide security. These questions were:

1) How much of your job entails “game day” security operations?
2) Which positions on your campus is most responsible for “game day” security operations?

The second section consisted of 4 ancillary questions about formal training, education, certification, and professional affiliation pertaining to security event management. The participants were asked about their interest in future professional development in event security management, as well as the delivery method that would most suit their needs.

1) List any formal training education or certifications that you have acquired pertaining to event security management.
2) List any professional organizations related to event security management that you are a member of.
3) Which topics of professional development in security management interest you?
4) What type of delivery method would be most beneficial to you for the dissemination of professional education in security event management.

The third section consisted of 10 questions pertaining to demographics which include: Gender, athletic position title, ethnicity, football conference affiliation, level of education, area of educational study, years of experience in athletic administration, years
in current position, university enrollment, and average attendance of home football 
games.

A panel of sports event security personnel and a panel of sports professionals 
enrolled in a graduate sports administration class reviewed the questionnaire. Face and 
content validity was determined by a pilot study. The pilot study also assessed the 
reliability of the questionnaire. The pilot study targeted athletic administrators 
responsible for “game day” security management at the seven state supported universities 
in the state of Mississippi.

Procedures

An online version of the questionnaire was developed. The online questionnaire 
was tested and found to function properly. The procedures of administering the 
questionnaire, as well as increasing return rate was a three-step process. The first step of 
the process was to make a personal phone call to each senior/associate/assistant athletic 
director and athletic department staff responsible for “game day” security management. 
The subjects were contacted in random order. During the conversation, the participant 
was briefed on the project, process, and the importance of their participation. Volunteer 
participation was discussed, as well as permission to send an email link of the 
questionnaire to the participant. Once the participant gave permission, an email with a 
link to the questionnaire was sent. In the event the researcher was unsuccessful in 
contacting the targeted participant, the researcher left contact information with a secretary 
or with voicemail intending for the targeted participant to call the researcher back.

The second step consisted of sending a follow-up email at the conclusion of data 
collection to encourage the participants (if they have or had not already done so), as well
as those not successfully contacted by telephone, to complete the questionnaire in order
to help ensure a larger return rate of completed questionnaires. This occurred at the end
data collection after numerous attempts of step one.

Since no identifying information was exchanged, informed consent did not have
to be signed, nor did informed consent need to accompany the completed questionnaire.
The participants were asked to complete and submit the questionnaire within a quick
return time. The completed survey was returned to a secure database and was emailed to
the researcher. The data was printed and locked in a file cabinet in the researcher’s
office, and no coding or identifying marks were used in order to insure subjects’
anonymity.

This research project was encompassed within the Center for Spectator Sports
Security Management at The University of Southern Mississippi. The Center for
Spectator Sports Security Management has received support and full endorsement by the
NCAA director of security for all educational research projects including this project
(Appendix F).

Data Analysis

After the completion of data collection, statistical analysis began with descriptive
statistics to analyze the demographics. SPSS was used throughout this study for data
analysis. Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the data collected on the sample of
78 participants. These statistics included means, standard deviations, and frequencies
with appropriate graphs for all research questions and demographic variables. An
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to analyze hypotheses 1-3. Pearson
correlation analysis was performed to analyze hypothesis 4-5. A two-tailed test was performed with the level of significance set at .05.
CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF DATA

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to explore the event security capabilities presently reported by the athletic administrators responsible for sport event security management in intercollegiate athletics. This chapter presents and analyzes descriptive data of the participants in the study and the statistical data of the study’s six research objectives. In addition, this chapter presents the findings used to test the study’s five hypotheses. All statistical procedures used SPSS 11.0 with all significance levels set at ≤ 0.05.

Participants

The participants targeted in this study were 238 Division IA athletic administrators (2 from each of each 119 schools) who would be involved in event security management at their university. For this investigation of athletic administrators, a total of 202 athletic administrators were successfully contacted either through telephone, voice mail, call back, or email. During the data collection, a total of 81 participants completed the questionnaire. The final number of participants (n = 81) reflected in a 40.1% return rate for the sample of athletic administrators.

Demographics

For this sample, the majority of the participants were male (n = 68) and Caucasian/white (n = 68). This sample included 60 Caucasian/white males, which represented 77% of the sample. Table 1 contains demographic information of these participants. Two of the ethnic groups were not represented and these categories have been dropped from subsequent analysis and discussion.
Table 1

Participant Gender and Ethnicity

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<th>Gender (n=78)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<td>Male</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity (n=77)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
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<td>5.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian/Alaskan Native</td>
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<td>0.0 %</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

When investigating participant job roles, the majority of those responsible for “game day” security measures and operations came from 35 facility and operations positions (44.9%) and 30 were event management positions (38.5%); 13 “other” positions (16.7%) responded. The “other” positions included all other respondents including internal affairs and external affairs, which may represent a combination of facilities and operations as well as event management positions.

With regard to the rank of the participants, those whose position or title included senior/associate/assistant athletic directors comprised the majority with 47 responses.
Although not a focus of this study, two respondents were athletic directors. Table 2 represents a summary of the participants’ official job titles and ranks.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position (n=78)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilities and Operations</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event Management</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>78</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank (n=78)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Athletic Director</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior/Associate/Assistant Athletic Director</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>60.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Director</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>78</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 represents the participation rate among Division IA (football program) conference affiliation. Participants from the Southeastern Conference (n=13) reflect the highest level of participation. Only one IA Independents were represented in this study.

A broader look at classification centered on the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) affiliation. The NCAA signifies a “large” school by automatic qualifier affiliation of the
BCS. BCS classification is represented by the following automatic qualifiers in the six conferences: Atlantic Coast (ACC), Big 12, Big East, Big 10, Pacific 10, and Southeastern (SEC). A total of 46 participants with a designation as a BCS school (59%) participated in the study. The remaining six conferences of this study (Conference USA, IA Independents, Mid-American (MAC), Mountain West, Sun Belt, and Western Athletic (WAC)) are considered in collegiate football as “mid-major” conferences and do not have automatic bids into BCS affiliated bowl games. A total of 32 participants from these non-automatic qualifier BCS conference schools (41%) were represented.
Table 3

Football Conference and BCS Affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference (n=78)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big 12 Conference</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big East Conference</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big 10 Conference</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference USA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA Independents</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-American Conference</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain West Conference</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific-10 Conference</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeastern Conference (SEC)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Belt Conference</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Athletic Conference (WAC)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BCS Affiliation (n=78)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BCS Affiliation (6 conferences)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCS Affiliate</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>59.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-BCS Affiliate</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>41.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the 78 respondents, the majority (N=44) of the participants have earned a master’s degree (56.4%) followed by 28 with undergraduate degrees (35.9%), and six with doctoral degrees (7.7%) (Table 4).

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest Level of Education</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate Degree</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master’s Degree</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctoral Degree</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The participants’ education “major” was investigated and found that there was an even division in the number of participants who had degrees related to sport management or physical education and those who had degrees in other subject areas. Table 5 represents these two classifications. Examples of a degree considered non-sport management or physical education include accounting, criminal justice, and journalism.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest Level of Education Related to Sport and Physical Education</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Related to Sport and Physical Education</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Related to Sport and Physical Education</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The athletic administrators were asked two questions regarding years of experience (Table 6). The first question inquired about the total years of experience in athletic administration. The range of years was from six months to 45 years with a mean of 13.16 years, and a median of 11.0 years. The second question inquired about the years of experience in their respective current jobs. The range was from "just started" to 26 years, with a mean of 6.08 years and a median of 4 years.

Table 6
Years of Experience in Athletic Administration and Years of Experience in Current Position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of Experience (n=78)</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Athletic Administration</td>
<td>0.5 - 45</td>
<td>13.16</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>9.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Current Position</td>
<td>0 - 26</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 summarizes the two final questions describing the sample which included the average single game attendance at their respective school, as well as the university enrollment. The range of attendance was 10,000 to 104,000, with the mean of 45,243, and a median of 38,000.

Table 7
Football Attendance and University Enrollment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Football Attendance and University Enrollment</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Single Game Attendance (n=78)</td>
<td>10,000 - 104,000</td>
<td>45,243</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>26,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Enrollment (n=78)</td>
<td>4,000 - 55,000</td>
<td>25,822</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>11,917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Capability Questions

Descriptive statistics of questions 1-32 of the questionnaire are displayed in Table 8. Using a scale anchored by 1 “very low levels” to 5 “very high levels” indicating the level of self-perceived capabilities the participants reported. Means were calculated for the purpose of comparing items within the instrument. The individual questions are in Figure 2 (Chapter 3). As the items were developed as a means of addressing the eight major areas of capability recommended by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), International Association of Assembly Managers (IAAM), and National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA), results are initially reported and broken down into these eight constructs. Because the number of items within each construct differed, summative subscales were not used; rather, the items displayed by cognitive capability constructs are followed by a mean and standard deviation (Tables 8-15). Credential control construct (M = 4.20, SD = 0.72) has the highest ratings of self-perceived capabilities. Emergency Evacuation Planning (M = 3.60, SD = 0.96) had the lowest capability rating of the eight self-perceived capabilities (Figure 3). The total capability score (M = 3.84, SD = 0.72) is an overall mean of all 32 capability questions, which is displayed in Appendix F. Frequency histograms of the eight cognitive constructs are displayed in Appendix G-N. Frequency histograms of each capability (1-32) are included in the appendices (O-TT).
Figure 3
Eight Capability Construct Means and Total Capability Mean

Table 8
Capability Question (Credential Control) – Descriptive Statistics (N=81)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Credential Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q25...credential dissemination</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q26...guidelines for vendors</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q27...media and public officials</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Average</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9
Capability Question (Spectator Control) – Descriptive Statistics (N=81)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spectator Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10...socializing (tailgating)</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11...intense rivalries with opposing team</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q12...crowd screening and control</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Average</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Table 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability Question (Policies and Procedures) – Descriptive Statistics (N=81)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies and Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13...public announcer procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14...bomb threat procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q15...pre- and post-event checklist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q16...conduct game day audits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability Question (Agency Collaboration) – Descriptive Statistics (N=81)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4...to establish policies and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5...to set up command center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6...cancellations of sporting event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q7...develop and carry out training session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q8...whether to conduct a bomb sweep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9...conduct disaster scenario exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability Question (Emergency/Crisis Management) – Descriptive Statistics (N=81)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency/Crisis Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q21...conduct an immediate meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q22...coordinate a media press release</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q23...Assure training of all athletic personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q24...reliable interoperable communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Average</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13

**Capability Question (Perimeter Control) – Descriptive Statistics (N=81)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability Question</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perimeter Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q28...inspection of spectators for prohibited items</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q29...perimeter keeping unauthorized individuals</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q30...concessionaires, gatekeepers, and ushers</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q31...vehicles pausing or stopping</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q32...traffic flow evacuation</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Average</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14

**Capability Question (Liability) – Descriptive Statistics (N=81)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability Question</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17...legal issues during a crisis</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18...request copies of reports</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19...work with university attorney</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20...aware of the liability repercussions</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Average</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15

**Capability Question (Emergency Evacuation Planning) – Descriptive Statistics (N=81)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability Question</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Evacuation Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1...written disaster evacuation plan</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2...evacuation using an all-hazards approach</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3...coordinate an effective evacuation</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Average</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 16

*Capability Questions (Total) – Descriptive Statistics (N=81)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total (Q1-Q23)</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responsibility Questions

Question 32 asked the participants about inclusion of “game day” security operations within their job scope (Figure 4). This question about job scope security operations involvement used a scale anchored by 1 “none” to 5 “a lot.” The participants’ total indicated mid-scale rating of responsibility ($M = 3.75, SD = 1.06$).

![Game day security management responsibility within job scope chart](image)

*Figure 4*

"Game Day" Security Operations within Job Scope Chart

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After the indication of job scope, Question 34 asked the participant who they actually thought was responsible for "game day" security (Table 17). There was an even division between athletic department staff, including the respondent (45.6%) and the university police department or police chief (46.8%). Six additional participants identified the responsible party as "other" who likely represented university public safety directors.

Table 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indication of Position Responsible for &quot;Game Day&quot; Security</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University Police</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Athletic Department Staff (Self-included)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ancillary Questions

Ancillary questions were asked about professional development. Table 18 displays the number of participants who were members of professional organizations related to event security management. Only 19 of the 79 (24.1%) were members of professional organizations related to event security management. The majority of those in professional organizations (n=12) are members of the International Association of Assembly Members (IAAM). A similar question was asked about those who have formal training, education, or certifications related to event security (table 19). A total of 49

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(62%) reported having had no formal training, education, or certifications in event security management.

Table 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional Organization Membership</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional Organization Membership (n=79)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal Training, Education, or Certifications</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal Training, Education, or Certifications (n=79)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Throughout literature research, a potential need for professional development was revealed. The researcher addressed this by asking about the type of delivery method that would be most beneficial for the dissemination of professional education in security event management (Table 20). The participants were given four options of delivery method as well as an invitation to list any additional delivery methods. The participants could choose more than one delivery method. The most popular, or majority delivery method,
was by an on-site training seminar (62.8%), followed by delivery at a professional conference (55.1%). Because the participants were allowed to choose “all that apply” for the various types of delivery method, totals shown equal more than 100%.

Table 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Preferred Professional Education Delivery Method</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desired Delivery Method (n=78)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Campus Class</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Line Class</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional conference</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>55.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Site Training Seminar</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>62.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Participants were allowed to choose “all that apply” types of delivery method.

Questionnaire Reliability

Cronbach’s alpha for the items relating to self-reported capabilities was .901.

Hypothesis Analysis

Hypothesis 1

There is a significant difference between athletic staff positions and the level of event security management capabilities they perceive they have acquired.

Using an analysis of variance, there was not a statistically significant difference found between athletic staff positions (Facilities and Operations, Event Management, and
others) and their level of perceived capabilities in event security management, $F(2,76) = .26$, $p = .77$. Refer to Table 21.

**Hypothesis 2**

There is a significant difference between athletic staff’s education levels on the amount of event security management capabilities they perceive they have acquired.

Using an analysis of variance, there was not a statistically significant difference found between athletic staff’s education levels and their level of perceived capabilities in event security management, $F(2,75) = 1.44$, $p = .24$. Refer to Table 21.

**Hypothesis 3**

There is a significant difference within the Division IA conferences of the athletic department staff on the amount of event security management capabilities they perceive they have acquired. Due to the large number of conferences and relatively small sample, ANOVA could not be used when retaining all 12 conference groupings. Therefore, the 12 conferences were recoded into two groups: BCS schools and Non-BCS schools.

**Table 21**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>F value, significance level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1</td>
<td>Positions/capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2</td>
<td>Education levels/capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3</td>
<td>BCS/capabilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Hypothesis 4

There is a significant relationship between the average level of attendance at home football games and the overall level of event security management capabilities the athletic staff perceive they have acquired.

Using the Pearson correlation, there was no statistically significant relationship $r(N=78)= .185, p=.104$ found between attendance levels of football games and the level of perceived capabilities in event security management the athletic administrators perceive they have acquired. Refer to Table 22.

Hypothesis 5

There is a significant relationship between the years of experience of the athletic department administrators and the level of event security management capabilities they perceive they have acquired.

Using the Pearson correlation, there was no statistically significant relationship $r(N=78)= .005, p=.967$ found between the years of experience of athletic department administrators and the perceived capabilities in event security management. Refer to Table 22.

Table 22

Pearson Correlation for Hypothesis 4-5  

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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Hypothesis 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Years of experience/capabilities</td>
<td>.967</td>
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*Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Additional Findings

Additional relevant findings not originally proposed by the researcher were found in regard to Question 33. This question asked the participants to indicate how much of their job entails “game day” security operations. The scale was anchored by 1 “none” to 5 “a lot,” and Table 10 describes the frequencies. An analysis of variance was used to find a difference between the mean capability score (q1-32) based on the response to Question 33 (job entailing security operations). A significant difference in capability was found (F(3,70) = 11.135, p < .001) between these reported levels of responsibility as expected by the researcher.

Using a Pearson chi square statistic, a similar relationship was discovered with Question 33 (job entailing security operations) and Question 34 (who was actually perceived as responsible for security operations). The level of athletic administrators responsibility to “game day” security operations is significantly related (p=.008) to the actual perceived persons responsible for “game day” security operations.

Other items to which Item 33 (job entailing security operations) was significantly related included highest level of education reported (p<.001) and whether or not the participants reported formal training (p=.003).

While investigating Question 38, “What type of delivery method would be most beneficial to you for the dissemination of professional education in security event management?” one of the delivery options, “conference” was chosen more often from participants with higher capability scores (Figure 5).
Figure 5 – Type of delivery method preferred
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This chapter summarizes the procedures, objectives, and findings from the study. Discussions and conclusions concerning sport security management capabilities were drawn from the data analysis and hypothesis testing. Additionally, recommendations are postulated for conducting future research on sport security management.

The purpose of this study was to explore the sports event security management capabilities presently reported by the university athletic staff responsible for sport event security management in intercollegiate athletics.

Summary of Results

A total of 81 participants completed the survey which represents 40.1% of the target population of Division IA athletic administrators responsible for sport event security management. The method utilized for data collection consisted of personal phone calls to the identified participants, to assist in the return rate of the questionnaire. The return rate (40.1%) was similar to Pantera et al (2003) who distributed surveys to ~317 Division I athletic directors and university directors of public safety with a return rate of 38%.

Four athletic administrators returned an email refusing to participate in the study. These athletic administrators all indicated similar reasons not to complete the survey, which included “part of our security measures is to not make comments,” and “we do not discuss security outside of proper Department of Defense channels” (military schools). Further research in this area of confidentiality leads the researcher to believe participants
could have had moral, ethical, and confidentiality issues with this study. Literature has shown amounts of caution in high regards to confidentiality. For example, vulnerability was protected as “law enforcement sensitive materials” during assessments conducted by The University of Southern Mississippi, Center for Spectator Sports Security Management (2005).

During World War II, Americans that were drafted were not properly educated or trained in confidentially and disclosure of fragile information (Gup, 2001). During this time, educational mottos were used to help keep the secrecy of the war, which included “silence means security,” “loose lips sinks ships,” and “a slip of the lip will sink a ship.” After September 11th, a clear understanding that enemies do lie within America and that borders do not protect information sharing, which afforded new responsibility amongst all to safeguard information. This area of protecting “sensitive” information is currently an area of serious debate.

The participants of this study included a large majority (77%) of white/Caucasian males (Table 1, pg 53). There were ten females who completed the questionnaire (12.3%) which mirrored the rate of the overall target population (11.4%). The National Association of Collegiate Women Athletics Administrators reports that women hold 13.4% of athletic leadership positions in NCAA (2007).

Identifying job roles of athletic administrators was a difficult task. Each athletic department has its own specific organizational chart, job scope structure, and titles. The majority (92%) of the administrators identified as target participants were considered senior/associate/assistant athletic directors with a job scope of either those responsible for “game day” operations or facility administrators. As targeted, 83% of the participants
were considered “game day” operations and facility administrators (Table 2, pg. 54). The remaining respondents could be a combination of the two categories or public safety officials.

All twelve Division IA (football program) conferences were represented in this study. The Southeastern Conference had the highest level of participation (n=13). This is also reflective of football conference rankings by Pantera et al (2003) which ranked the Southeastern Conference with the highest level of security, according to the study’s “security checklist.” A speculated conclusion by the researcher, given the responses, is that those who have higher levels of perceived capability may be eager to share this information. The Southeastern Conference has the highest football game attendance of all division IA conferences, and suggestively ranks with the highest conferences in regard to fierce rivalries. The Southeastern Conference also broke a conference record of attendance this year with an average football game attendance of seventy-five thousand attendees (NCAA, 2006).

Only one participant representing an athletic department not in a conference and classified as an “IA-Independent” school participated in the study. It is noteworthy that two of the four “IA-Independents” are military schools, which could give a possible “security sensitive” explanation for only one respondent.

Throughout this study, a clear understanding of confidentiality was communicated to the participants and adhered to by the researcher. For the study, only frequencies of the conference affiliation were publicly reported in order to keep the utmost respect for the data and for the participants. However, the researcher did divide the participants into BCS and non-BCS categories to describe the data (Table 3). This showed a near equal
representation of "large and small conferences" participation (59% and 41% respectively) in the study.

Relative to academic degrees, 44 respondents (56.4%) of the sample in this study had earned a graduate degree. Fifty percent of the participants earned their highest degree in sport management or physical education, which should be an area of further investigation in the future. Of those participants that did not earn their highest degree in sport administration or physical education, ten (12.8%) reported business administration, accounting, and economics as their field of study. Only one participant reported earning their highest degree in criminal justice. Criminal justice has a history as being the choice area of study for the majority of security professions (collegeboard.com, 2007).

Another descriptor of this data included the average single game attendance of the participant's school. A mean of 45,243 is closely related to the actual average of the 2006 football season, which was 45,828 (NCAA, 2006). This study's descriptors reflect the overall population of athletic administrators in Division IA athletic departments involved in sport event security management across the United States.

Objectives

The following six research objectives guided this study:

**Research Objective 1:** To establish a baseline knowledge of event security management capabilities within athletic department administrators.

This study collectively discovered many facets of event security management capabilities with athletic department administrators. Thirty-two capabilities (Appendices E-JJ) guided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), International Association of Assembly Managers (IAAM), and NCAA guidelines and suggestions
were researched and documented. The level of education, type of degrees awarded, professional affiliation, frequency of formal training or certifications, and years of experience were all documented, establishing an original baseline knowledge and understanding of athletic administrators who are responsible for sport event security management at Division IA athletic programs.

Research Objective 2: To establish the level of capabilities presently acquired by the athletic department administrators.

This study researched and documented thirty-two perceived capabilities that were suggested by DHS, IAAM, and NCAA guidelines, suggestions, and “best practices.” These capabilities were created from eight cognitive constructs or subscales of event security management. Table 8, represents this information. The overall mean for the capabilities was 3.84, on a scale anchored by 1 “none” to 5 “a lot.”

The highest perceived capability (M=4.41) was “determining which agency has the authority regarding cancellations of sporting events due to security measures.” This high capability seems positive since most conferences mandate and educate its members on “inclement weather” policies and who has the authority regarding the cancellation of the event (SEC, 2006).

The second highest perceived capability (M=4.33) was “proper credential dissemination.” Respondents perceive themselves as highly responsible and aware of who has access to particular areas of the stadium. Athletic departments give the impression to do a good job in proper dissemination of credentials to VIP’s, public officials, and media personnel. However, research at The University of Southern Mississippi, Center for Spectator Sports Security Management (2005-2006 HLS/MEMA
funded projects) observed countermeasures needed for validation of the credentials once issued, such as picture I.D.'s required to be used with the credentials.

The lowest perceived capability (M=3.25) found in this study was "how to conduct disaster scenario exercises with public safety agencies". Beckman (2006), found levels of training, including disaster scenario exercises and table top exercises are one of the largest gaps currently facing the event security industry. Emergency management professionals continue to say "a plan not exercised is not a plan!". A related low capability (M=3.37) was "develop and carry out a training session with aid of Public Safety Agencies." The National Incident Management System (2006) cites the need for unified command control and multi-agency collaboration, particularly interoperable communication systems, as well as training of these systems.

Another possible "gap" or low capability (M=3.32) was "coordination and evacuation using an all-hazards approach." The University of Southern Mississippi, Center for Spectator Sports Security Management (2006) identified an absence of evacuation plans in the majority (sensitive information) of the seven state-supported universities in Mississippi. This low capability level indicates a possible absence of evacuation plans in most all universities, which should be an area of further investigation in the future. Referring back to a typical conference "inclement weather" policy (SEC, 2006), clear instructions are given for the protection of the players, coaches, referees, and officials, but the plan excludes the need to safely evacuate an entire stadium and attendees.

Another area of concern deals with assessment of these capabilities, which included the capability (M=3.49) of "conducting a game day audit." The assessment of
sport event security management practices should be unannounced and completed by an outside party. Without proper assessment, the sport event security management practices cannot be continuously improved. These three capabilities (conducting disaster scenarios, training sessions, evacuation plans, and game day audits), might be considered the “critical few” or “gaps,” and need to be the aim of future research, professional development, and training.

Research Objective 3: To establish the level of formal training, education, or certifications related to event security management of athletic department administrators.

A total of 49 participants (62%), reported having no formal training, education, or certifications in event security management. This clearly shows the need for future mitigation projects and training programs of sport event security management to be centered toward initial and/or additional training in career professional development.

Lane (2003) investigated the effectiveness of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security grants that involved training. The research indicates that the best type of training involves high stress situations, taught by career professionals, and practical “hands-on” experiences. During the years of 2001-2003 only 10% of Homeland Security monies were going to training. Education and training also develop a base of knowledge to help in deterring the mode of terrorist attacks.

Throughout literature research, a potential need for professional development was revealed. This need prompted the investigation of the type of delivery method that would be “most beneficial” for the dissemination of professional education in security event management. The most supported method of delivery was by an on-site training seminar.
(62.8%), followed by delivery at a professional conference (55.1%). This documents valuable information for planning professional development activities.

**Research Objective 4:** To establish the membership levels in professional organizations related to event security management of athletic department administrators.

Few of the participants (n=19) were members of professional organizations. Thus, twenty-four percent indicated professional organization membership related to event security. Of the 19 participants that were members of professional organizations related to event security, eleven were members of the International Association of Assembly Managers (IAAM), which targets event security management as one of its major organizational objectives.

**Research Objective 5:** To determine the years of experience in athletic management for those responsible for game day event security.

A baseline measurement of years of experience in athletic management was identified by questions inquiring about the total years of experience in athletic management (M=13.16), as well as the number of years in the current position (M=6.08). Due to the lack of information documented on the years of experience in athletic departments, this information is valuable in the future progression of this industry.

**Research Objective 6:** To determine the athletic department administrator’s perception of their responsibility in “game day” security.

All 81 participants (100%) perceived the scope of their job describing “some” indication of “game day” security operations. Not a single participant selected “0” or “None” (Table 10). This indicates an awareness for responsibility for all administrators at some level. A somewhat puzzling question remains as to the degree of dependence on
law enforcement, emergency management, or security agency outsourcing for event security management. Phillips et al. (2006) discovered that 66% of all Division IA and IAA University athletic departments rely on some outsourcing.

Research Objective 7: To determine the athletic department administrator’s perception of who is alleged to be the person deemed responsible for “game day” security.

One question asked “who actually is responsible” for the security at a sporting event. The question seeks to determine which position on campus is responsible for the management of sport event security. A closely divided distribution was indicated between the university police department and police chief (46.8%) and the athletic department administrators (45.6%). Six additional positions were identified, which were primarily university public safety officers. Two participants indicated that they outsource security to public and private entities.

Hypothesis

The following were the non-directional statistical hypotheses of this study. It was hypothesized that:

Hypothesis 1: There is a significant difference between athletic administration positions on the amount of event security management capabilities they perceive they have acquired (rejected, p<.05).

Hypothesis 2: There is a significant difference between athletic administration’s education levels on the amount of event security management capabilities they perceive they have acquired (rejected, p<.05).
Hypothesis 3: There is a significant difference within the Division I conferences (BCS/Non-BCS) of the athletic department administration on the amount of event security management capabilities they perceive they have acquired (rejected, p<.05).

Hypothesis 4: There is a significant relationship between the average level of attendance at home football games and the amount of event security management capabilities the athletic administration perceive they have acquired (rejected, p<.05).

Hypothesis 5: There is a significant relationship between the years of experience of the athletic department staff and the amount of event security management capabilities they perceive they have acquired (rejected, p<.05).

In summary, all hypotheses were rejected (refer to Tables 15 and 16, pp. 61-62). The hypotheses were tested at the .05 level of significance. This indicates low relationship between demographic variables and level of perceived security management capabilities. However, specific capability data analysis identified numerous needs for improvement among the constructs.

Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to explore the event security capabilities presently reported by the athletic administrators responsible for sport event security management in division IA intercollegiate athletic programs. The significance of this study results in the potential aid of closing some of the security management gaps in the industry, resulting in safeguarding the human asset. Because of the mass gatherings, societal impact, and media driven characteristics of a “game day,” security management should be at the forefront of all those responsible for operations at sports events. This document has set a baseline of information concerning the current levels of knowledge, professional training,
and experience of those athletic administrators responsible for event security and “game day” operations.

This document has also discovered possible “gaps” in the perceived capabilities of the industry. Over half of the participants in this study had no formal training or education. Future education, training, and certifications programs need to be adapted to help mitigate the current needs of these athletic department administrators responsible for sport event security management.

Recommendations

After analyzing results from this study, some recommendations for future research include:

1. Expand this study to include Division IAA schools and conferences. The responsibility of event security and protection of the human asset does not only affect the larger, more prominent schools and athletic departments. The possibility of a terrorist attack or natural disaster could be just as important at a “smaller” school.

2. Target professional and amateur sport organizations and the capabilities and level of training of those professionals.

3. Revise the length and refine the capability questions and validate the instrument.

4. Investigate the relationship between the university police department (i.e. police chief, law enforcement, and emergency management) and between the athletic department administrators.

4. Investigate the security at high school sporting events. Currently, this area of the industry is in severe need for standardization and recommendations, since
sporting events are considered official after-school events. With the current situations facing public schools in America, these problems have been evidenced in after-school sporting events. The addition of the general public attending these events can cause an additional need and direction by school and athletic administrators.

After analyzing results from this study, some recommendations for industry needs include:

1. Develop an educational program (using experiential learning) to assist in the development of the capabilities and skills of those responsible for “game day” security.

2. Industry professional would prefer the training to be condensed and disseminated through on-site training programs as well as professional conference. These venues and time frame for dissemination need to be considered when developing training and certification programs.

3. Further investigate and emphasize of the “critical few” capabilities (evacuation planning, carrying out of training sessions, and game day audits) discovered in this study. These three capabilities indicate “gaps” in planning, training, and assessment.

4. Investigate the potential financial, social, and economical impact of a major incident at a sporting event. This could assist in justifying the need for implementation and mandating planning, training, and assessment of sport event security. Pre-disaster mitigation planning is a major need identified by the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

5. Implement certification programs, supported by the NCAA or individual conferences, which could lead to consistent standardized practices at sporting events.

6. Conduct risk/threat assessments and external audits of current practices by athletic administrators to assist in “hardening” of the facility and/or finding “gaps” in current practices.
APPENDIX A

HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW FORM
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI
(SUBMIT THIS FORM IN DUPLICATE)

Protocol # __________ (office use only)

Name George M. Cunningham III "Trey" Phone 601-447-1732 Cell

E-Mail Address CunninghamUSA@Yahoo.com

Mailing Address 105 Doleac #123, Hattiesburg, MS 39401
(address to receive information regarding this application)

College/Division Health Dept. Human Performance and Recreation

Department Box # 5142 Phone 5358

Proposed Project Dates: From July 11, 2006 To July 10, 2007
(specific month, day and year of the beginning and ending dates of full project, not just data collection)

Title: Athletic Event Security Capabilities of Intercollegiate Athletic Departments.

Funding Agencies or Research Sponsors

Grant Number (when applicable)

_________ New Project

X Dissertation or Thesis

_________ Renewal or Continuation: Protocol # 

X Change in Previously Approved Project: Protocol # 26042701

Principal Investigator Date

Advisor Date

Department Chair Date

RECOMMENDATION OF HSPRC MEMBER

_________ Category I, Exempt under Subpart A, Section 46.101 () (), 45CFR46.

_________ Category II, Expedited Review, Subpart A, Section 46.110 and Subparagraph ()

_________ Category III, Full Committee Review.

HSPRC College/Division Member DATE

HSPRC Chair DATE
APPENDIX B

Human Subjects Review
The University of Southern Mississippi

Project Title
Athletic Event Security Capabilities of Intercollegiate Athletic Departments.

Project Description
The purpose of this study is to find the level of knowledge and skills of the persons responsible for sporting events in intercollegiate athletics. The study will target and survey those that are responsible for event security (assistant/associate/senior athletic directors), and will be based on the necessary knowledge as suggested by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (DHS/SLGCP) and the International Association of Assembly Managers (IAAM). Knowledge and skills that they perceive they attained, as well as knowledge and skills that they would like to attain, will be investigated. This knowledge could help in the future education and training of athletic department staff in the preparedness, prevention, or delay of an actual domestic terrorist attack, major disasters and other emergencies, and/or the recovery from such events.

Process
Upon approval by The University of Southern Mississippi Institutional Review Board, the researcher will invite senior/associate/assistant athletic directors, from 119 Division I football participating colleges and universities, who are responsible for “game day operations” and event security to participate in the study. The individuals will be contacted by phone regarding awareness of the study. The individuals will receive an emailed consent form and questionnaire. The participant will be asked to submit the questionnaire, which will send an automatic email detailing the results to the investigator. Data will be analyzed. Due to the potential for sensitive information to be obtained, all dissemination will be approved by the appropriate law enforcement agency. Overall findings will be summarized and submitted through a professional conference. After the completion of the study, all of the raw data will be destroyed.

Participants
Senior/associate/assistant athletic directors responsible for “game day operations” and event management at the 119 NCAA Division IA football schools, in the United States will be voluntarily surveyed. All participants will be over the age of 18, and no particular demographics will be excluded.

Benefits
The participants of this study have the potential to benefit from an awareness of the guidelines from the DHS/SLGCP and IAAM, by simply completing the survey. The participants could also benefit from future implementation of education and training, thus increasing job competency. Furthermore, the increase of knowledge in the field will
assist in the preparedness, prevention, or delay of an actual incident at an intercollegiate sporting event.

Risk
Risks inherent to this study are addressed by ensuring the confidentiality of the participants' responses. No identifiable information from the individual participants or schools will be recorded. Only summary results will be reported. All dissemination will be approved by the appropriate law enforcement agencies.
APPENDIX C

Dear Assistant/Associate/Senior Athletic Director,

My name is Trey Cunningham, and I am a doctoral student at The University of Southern Mississippi in the Human Performance and Recreation Department. I am asking you, as an athletic staff representative of your school, to participate in a study. The study targets your capabilities that you have obtained pertaining to event security management acquired through education, training, experience and/or certifications. I feel strongly that your completion of this questionnaire will help in developing future security measures ensuring safety and to making certain that intercollegiate athletics remains strong.

As a participant, you could benefit from an awareness of the guidelines and “best practices” from the Department of Homeland Security International, Association of Assembly Managers and the National Collegiate Athletic Association, by simply completing the questionnaire. In addition, you could benefit from future implementation of education and training to increase job competency for you and your department. Furthermore, the increase of knowledge in the field of athletic security management will help in the preparedness, prevention, or delay of an actual incident at an intercollegiate sporting event.

The questionnaire will take approximately 12 minutes to complete, and you must be over the age of 18 to participate. By submitting your responses, you are indicating consent to participate. Participation in this study is voluntary, and you may withdraw from this study at any time. There is minimal risk to you from participating. Please be assured that confidentiality will be held at the highest regard and that no identifiable information from you or your school will be recorded. Only summary results will be reported and all dissemination will be approved by the appropriate law enforcement agencies. Upon receiving your results, the data will be stored in a secure place so that confidentiality will not be breached, and then later destroyed. Questions concerning the research should be directed to Trey Cunningham (601) 266-5544 or george.cunningham@usm.edu.

Thank you for your time,

Trey Cunningham

This project has been reviewed by the Human Subjects Protection Review Committee, which ensures that research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations. Any questions or concerns about rights as a research subject should be directed to the chair of the Institutional Review Board, The University of Southern Mississippi, Box 5147, Hattiesburg, MS 39406, (601) 266-6820.
## APPENDIX D

### 119 Division IA Football Programs and Conferences

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SECURITY MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENTS

Thank you for participating in this research.

Please be assured that confidentiality will be held at the highest regard and no identifiable information from you or your school will be recorded. Only summary results will be reported.

Click "Next" to begin the survey.

Next >>
Capabilities in Athletic Security Management

1. Capabilities Section: Please rate on a scale of 1 to 5 the following components of "game day" security management operations based on capabilities that you have acquired through education, training, certifications, or experience. *(Please do not respond based on need for current practices).*

**MY LEVEL OF CAPABILITIES TO...**

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</table>
... designate perimeter areas to check patrons for prohibited items.

... request copies of reports completed by agencies such as police, paramedics, or fire departments for liability record keeping.

... determine with local law enforcement agencies whether it is necessary to conduct a bomb sweep.

... conduct disaster a scenario exercise with aid of Public Safety Agencies.

... coordinate with public agencies to set up command center operations.

... determine
the security measures for spectators who have intense rivalries with the opposing team.

... establish guidelines and policies for media, V.I.P.'s, and public official credentials.

... collaborate with Public Safety Agencies in order to establish policies and procedures for game-day activities.

... establish an outer perimeter for keeping unticketed and unauthorized individuals away from the venue.

... develop and carry out a training session with aid of Public Safety Agencies.

...coordinate all traffic flow
evacuations.

... insure documentation is properly gathered for legal and insurance purposes.

... conduct an immediate meeting with Emergency Management Team in a crisis or emergency.

... coordinate proper credential dissemination.

... be aware of the liability repercussions that could result in case of a disaster.

... assure training of all "game day" personnel as to response procedures in the event of a crisis or an emergency.

... coordinate a media press release as soon as possible on the result of a
crisis or emergency.

... determine who has authority regarding cancellations of sporting events.

... develop crowd screening and control policies.

... determine the security measures for spectators socializing or tailgating.

... establish guidelines for vendor credentials.

... designate an entrance perimeter checkpoint specifically for concessionaires, gatekeepers, and ushers.

... coordinate an evacuation using an all-hazards approach.

... provide procedures to the public
announcer (e.g. written emergency script) appropriate for emergency situations.

... coordinate an effective evacuation using the disaster evacuation plan.

... have policies for vehicles pausing or stopping within the perimeter control (drop-off areas).

... develop a pre and post-event security checklist.

... prepare a written disaster evacuation plan.

<< Prev Next >>
Capabilities in Athletic Security Management


   NONE 1 2 3 4 A LOT 5

   Please Select

3. Which position on your campus is most responsible for "Game Day" Security Operations?

   ____________________________

<< Prev    Next >>
Capabilities in Athletic Security Management

Section 2: Formal Training, Education or Certification

4. List any formal training, education, or certifications that you have acquired pertaining to event security management.

5. List any professional organizations related to event security management, that you are a member of.

6. Which topics of professional development in security event management interest you?

7. What type of delivery method would be most beneficial to you for the dissemination of professional education in security event management? (Select all that apply)
   - On-Campus Class
   - On-Line Class
   - Conference
   - On-Site Training Seminar
   - Other (Please Specify)
Capabilities in Athletic Security Management

8. Gender
   • Male
   • Female

9. What is your ethnicity?

10. What is your official position/title?
   • Athletic Director
   • Assistant/Associate/Senior Athletic Director - Internal Affairs
   • Assistant/Associate/Senior Athletic Director - External Affairs
   • Assistant/Associate/Senior Athletic Director - Facilities Coordinator
   • Assistant/Associate/Senior Athletic Director - Event Management
   • Other (please indicate title)

11. Please indicate the conference affiliation of your football program.

12. Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed.
13. Please indicate your major (highest degree).

14. Please indicate your total years of experience in athletic administration.

15. How many years of experience do you have in your current position?

16. What is the average attendance at home football games?

17. What is the enrollment at your university?

<< Prev Next >>
Capabilities in Athletic Security Management

Thank you for participating in this research. This knowledge could help in the future education and training of athletic department staff in the preparedness, prevention, or delay of an actual incident at an intercollegiate sporting event.

Trey Cunningham,
Doctoral Student
Center for Spectator Sports Security Management
The School of Human Performance and Recreation
The University of Southern Mississippi
george.cunningham@usm.edu
www.sporteventsecurity.com

Click "Done" and you will be directed back to your email.

<< Prev   Done >>
APPENDIX F

Total Capability Histogram

- Total Average
  - Std. Dev = .72
  - Mean = 3.8
  - N = 81.00

Frequency

0 10 20
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0

Total Average

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APPENDIX G

Credential Control Construct Histogram

Credential Control

Std. Dev = .72
Mean = 4.20
N = 81.00
APPENDIX H

Spectator Control Construct Histogram

![Histogram graph showing Spectator Control with Std. Dev = 0.79, Mean = 3.91, N = 81.00.](image)

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APPENDIX I

Policies and Procedures Construct Histogram

Std. Dev = .80
Mean = 3.86
N = 81.00
APPENDIX J

Agency Collaboration Construct Histogram

![Histogram Graph]

Agency Collaboration

Std. Dev = .79
Mean = 3.9
N = 81.00

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APPENDIX K

Emergency/Crisis Management Construct Histogram

STD. DEV = .85
MEAN = 3.82
N = 81.00

Emergency/Crisis Management
APPENDIX L

Perimeter Control Construct Histogram

Std. Dev = .82
Mean = 3.82
N = 81.00

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APPENDIX M

Liability Construct Histogram

Liability

Frequency

1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00

1.50 2.50 3.50 4.50

Std. Dev = .88
Mean = 3.67
N = 81.00

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APPENDIX N

Emergency Evacuation Planning Construct Histogram

Emergency Evacuation Planning

Std. Dev = .96
Mean = 3.6
N = 81.00
Q1. Prepare a written disaster evacuation plan.
APPENDIX P

Q2... coordinate an evacuation using an all-hazards aj
Q3... coordinate an effective evacuation using the data.
Q4. Collaborate with Public Safety Agencies in order to
Q5. coordinate with public agencies to set up commar
Q6. determine who has authority regarding cancellation
APPENDIX U

Q7. develop and carry out a training session with aid c
Q8. determine with local law enforcement agencies with...
Q9. Conduct disaster a scenario exercise with aid of P1
APPENDIX X

Q10. determine the security measures for spectators.
Q11. determine the security measures for spectators.
Q12. develop crowd screening and control policies.
APPENDIX AA

Q13. provide procedures to the public announcer (e.g.
Q14. properly establish policies and procedures dealir
Q15. develop a pre and post-event security checklist.
Q16. conduct game day audits.
APPENDIX EE

Q17. be aware of legal issues that may arise during a
APPENDIX FF

Q18. request copies of reports completed by agencies

![Graph showing frequency distribution with mean, standard deviation, and count]

Std. Dev = 1.04
Mean = 3.9
N = 81.00
APPENDIX GG

Q19. Insure documentation is properly gathered for lef

Std. Dev = 1.06
Mean = 3.5
N = 81.00
APPENDIX HH

Q20. be aware of the liability repercussions that could
Q21. conduct an immediate meeting with Emergency I
Q22. coordinate a media press release as soon as po: 
Q23. assure training of all 'game day' personnel as to
APPENDIX LL

Q24. have a reliable interoperable communication sys

- Std. Dev = 1.04
- Mean = 3.9
- N = 81.00
APPENDIX MM

Q25. coordinate proper credential dissemination.
APPENDIX NN

Q26. establish guidelines for vendor credentials.
Q27. establish guidelines and policies for media, V.I.P
Q28. Designate perimeter areas to check patrons for p
Q29. establish an outer perimeter for keeping unticket
Q30. designate an entrance perimeter checkpoint spe...
Q31. have policies for vehicles pausing or stopping wi
APPENDIX TT

Q32. Coordinate all traffic flow evacuations.

Std. Dev = 1.11
Mean = 3.6
N = 81.00

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REFERENCES


Gup, T. (2001). Secrecy and the press in a time of war: If we guard our toothbrushes and diamonds with equal zeal, we will probably lose fewer toothbrushes and more diamonds. Nieman Reports, 1 (11-13).


NACWAA (2006). Study: Minority athletic directors at all-time high in NCAA.


http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/emergency_planning/security_options


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