CEO Compensation, Backdated Stock Options, and Compensation Committees
CEO compensation in U. S. based companies has undergone considerable scrutiny in recent years. Among the common observations are that U. S. executives are highly paid relative to those of other countries and that the disparities in compensations are increasing over time. In this study, we investigate the effects that backdated stock options, compensation committee structure and process, and ownership factors have on levels or executive compensation. Combining agency and organizational theory perspectives, we find CEO compensation positively associated with the presence of backdated stock options, few large-block stockholders, and small compensation committees.
Journal of Business and Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching
Frankforter, S. A.,
(2008). CEO Compensation, Backdated Stock Options, and Compensation Committees. Journal of Business and Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching, 4(1), 64-69.
Available at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/17185