Title

Optimal Information-Sharing Behaviors Among Hotels: Game-Theoretical Approach

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-1-2020

School

Marketing

Abstract

© The Author(s) 2020. The lodging industry uses diverse pricing strategies to maximize revenues. Given the uncertain nature of decision parameters (demand conditions), sharing information among competitors can dramatically affect hotels’ profits. This study examines the decisions of hotels to share or not to share private information with competitors to maximize profits via a game-theoretic model. In a two-stage model, hotels decide whether to share information in the first stage, and then, in the second stage, they compete in setting prices along the lines of a standard price competition model. Results include that hotels share demand information with their competitors if there is a low demand signal but conceal information if the demand signal is high. This study provides a standard price competition model that can assist hotel managers in decision making on revenue management, including room pricing strategy.

Publication Title

Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Research

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