Fugitives as Fish: Bounty Hunting and Exploitation of the Commons

Authors

Franklin G. Mixon Jr., University of Southern MississippiFollow
Len J. Treviño, University of Southern MississippiFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2003

Department

Political Science, International Development, and International Affairs

Abstract

This note examines the property rights aspects of bounty hunting, and suggests that fugitives within the criminal justice system represent a common property resource. Economic theory might predict that this resource would be over exploited, perhaps resulting in industry profits being driven to zero. It is argued, however, that, in addition to regulation, recently developed concepts regarding uncertainty and heterogeneity of exploitation skills likely work to limit exploitation effort in bounty hunting. The anecdotal evidence and inference provided in this note make for a compelling pedagogical device for principles and intermediate economics students. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Publication Title

Social Science Journal

Volume

40

Issue

4

First Page

657

Last Page

664

Recommended Citation

Mixon, F. G., Treviño, L. J. (2003). Fugitives as Fish: Bounty Hunting and Exploitation of the Commons. Social Science Journal, 40(4), 657-664.
Available at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/4514