Congressional Term Limitations: Chadwickian Policy as an Antecedent to Modern Ideas
Political Science, International Development, and International Affairs
An examination of the early writings of British policymaker Edwin Chadwick (1800-1890) points out that his analysis of an artificial identification of interests in policy prescriptions serves as a precursor to modern ideas on the subject of legislative term limits. His work supports the writings of economists who argue that the private interests of public policymakers often diverge from those of the electorate, or the public interest. By giving legislators a monopoly right to govern, the political arena may be one area where Adam Smith's "natural identity" of interests does not prevail in practice. Statistical evidence is presented which supports the views of Chadwick and modern-day public choice scholars on the subject.
American Journal of Economics and Sociology
Mixon, F. G.
(1996). Congressional Term Limitations: Chadwickian Policy as an Antecedent to Modern Ideas. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 55(2), 187-196.
Available at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/5494