Cartels and the Incentive to Cheat: Evidence From the Classroom
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-1-1994
Department
Political Science, International Development, and International Affairs
Abstract
The axiom of human nature alluded to by Stigler has led the demise of most cartel arrangements. It is well known that each cartel member has a tremendous incentive to cheat on production limits to maximize profits. However, if each member exceeds production limits, the price must fall and the cartel collapses. Much of what economists teach about cartels can be illustrated with a simple example familiar to all students-the curve on their midterm exam score. The purpose of this article is to illustrate several points about cartel behavior with the example of the curve on an ex
Publication Title
Journal of Economic Education
Volume
25
Issue
3
First Page
267
Last Page
269
Recommended Citation
Caudill, S. B.,
Mixon, F. G.
(1994). Cartels and the Incentive to Cheat: Evidence From the Classroom. Journal of Economic Education, 25(3), 267-269.
Available at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/7275