Date of Award

Spring 5-11-2012

Degree Type

Honors College Thesis


Philosophy and Religion

First Advisor

David M. Holley

Advisor Department

Philosophy and Religion


In this paper, I discuss Richard Feldman’s article “Reasonable Religious Disagreement”. In his article, Feldman argues that “reasonable disagreement” is not possible between two “epistemic peers” who have shared all of their evidence. Regardless of whether Feldman’s argument is valid, the two requirements (being epistemic peers and sharing all their evidence) he sets for ruling out a disagreement as reasonable could be impossible to meet in the very situations he is writing about. I argue that in situations of religious disagreements, from the outset the parties involved have reason to judge each other not to be epistemic peers, and that there is some evidence in many religious disagreements that is both relevant to the disagreement and impossible to fully share.