Intergovernmental grants and the positioning of presidential primaries and caucuses: Empirical evidence from the 1992, 1996, and 2000 election cycles
Political Science, International Development, and International Affairs
The present study tests the theory that states can impact the size of the grants they receive (per capita) from the federal government by becoming pivotal players in the federal electoral (primary/caucus) process. That is, by rearranging their presidential primary and caucus dates, states can play an important role in determining the field of candidates for the two major political parties in the United States. States are then likely to be rewarded within the budgetary process at the federal level, which begins with the executive branch. Results ft om a simultaneous equation system suggest that the impact of the average movement of primaries/caucuses in the sample period (10.36 days closer to I January) results in an increase of federal grants of $362 million to $1.2 billion lover a two-year period) for the average stare, These results are consistent with the current pattern in the American political process of more front-ended presidential primaries and caucuses. (JEL D72, H11, H72, H77).
CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY
(2001). Intergovernmental grants and the positioning of presidential primaries and caucuses: Empirical evidence from the 1992, 1996, and 2000 election cycles. CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY, 19(1), 27-38.
Available at: http://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/3986