Expense Preference Behavior in Trucking: An Empirical Note
Economic and Workforce Development
This note offers a statistical model which points out that the goal of publicly regulated firms often deviates from profit-maximization. Using a large finn-level panel data set from the trucking industry, we offer estimates which suggest that firm managers of the more heavily regulated common carriers practice utility maximization through higher salaries and more lucrative benefits than the managers (CEOs) of less regulated contract carriers. Our results add to the body of empirical work which supplements the theory of the firm developed by Ronald Coase.
Review of Industrial Organization
Mixon, F. G.,
Upadhyaya, K. P.
(1996). Expense Preference Behavior in Trucking: An Empirical Note. Review of Industrial Organization, 11(6), 861-867.
Available at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/8207