Abstract
Throughout the world, there is a massive global shortage of viable organs available for transplantation, and systems of cadaveric organ donation have thus far been unable to address this shortage. One potential remedy to this problem is to incentive live organ donation via cash incentives and other benefits, i.e. an organ sale, and this is the type of system Iran has used to effectively eliminate its national kidney waiting list since the late 1990s. In this article, the Iranian model of kidney donation compensation will be analyzed for its ability and effectiveness as an ethical global model, and this is determined by its ability to maximize the benefits of an organ sale while minimizing its potential downfalls.
Recommended Citation
Potter, J. (2015). Does the Iranian model of kidney donation compensation work as an ethical global model?. Journal of Health Ethics, 11(1). http://dx.doi.org/10.18785/ojhe.1101.11
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