Anti-Natalism from an Evolutionary Psychological Perspective

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

9-1-2020

School

Psychology

Abstract

Although research has investigated both moral psychology and evolutionary motivations behind reproduction, psychological issues at the intersection of these two domains remain relatively unexplored. In this paper, we describe anti-natalism, the ethical position that it is immoral to reproduce (e.g., Benatar 2006), and make a first outline of its potential as an area of psychological research. We note three critical gaps in knowledge: (1) extent of endorsement, (2) predictors or causes of this view, and (3) behavioral consequences of its endorsement. Although this position may seem obscure, we point to its practical relevance in understanding decisions to remain childless and its potential to contribute to a theoretical understanding of the moral processes that shape these decisions.

Publication Title

Evolutionary Psychological Science

Volume

6

Issue

3

First Page

283

Last Page

291

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