A Discrete-Time Hazard Model of the Adoption of Legislative Television: Evidence from the US Congress, 1961-1986
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-1-2001
Department
Political Science, International Development, and International Affairs
Abstract
The present study examines the probability of the adoption of legislative television over time (1961-1986) in the US Congress using a discrete-time hazard model. Against a theoretical construct where political services are modelled as search/experience goods, evidence is provided suggesting that constituent homogeneity, relative power struggles involving the legislative branches of Congress and the White House, and the potential prowess of legislators in Congress regarding skilful use of television are all important facets in this probability model. Use of alternative data sources and statistical techniques, such as those presented here, works to provide a greater foundation of knowledge regarding the relationship between representative democracy and modern means of communication.
Publication Title
Applied Economics
Volume
33
Issue
14
First Page
1881
Last Page
1887
Recommended Citation
Mixon, F. G.
(2001). A Discrete-Time Hazard Model of the Adoption of Legislative Television: Evidence from the US Congress, 1961-1986. Applied Economics, 33(14), 1881-1887.
Available at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/3752