Learning to Rent-Seek: Collective Action and In-Kind Benefits in the Public Sector

Authors

Franklin G. Mixon Jr., University of Southern MississippiFollow
Russell W. McKenzie, Oklahoma State University

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

12-1-1996

Department

Political Science, International Development, and International Affairs

Abstract

Provides alternative specifications for public choice models that analyze the determinants of a variety of in-kind efforts to obtain monopoly rights or rent-seeking in the United States. Monopoly as creation of government; Hidden in-kind resource distortions within political process; Importance of societal stability in forming interest-group coalitions.

Publication Title

Applied Economics Letters

Volume

3

Issue

12

First Page

755

Last Page

757

Recommended Citation

Mixon, F. G., McKenzie, R. W. (1996). Learning to Rent-Seek: Collective Action and In-Kind Benefits in the Public Sector. Applied Economics Letters, 3(12), 755-757.
Available at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/5749