What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of the Urban Heat Island Phenomenon
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
10-1-1994
Department
Political Science, International Development, and International Affairs
Abstract
An examination of urban warming trends in the United States offers a statistical model that points out that the urban areas cited most heavily by the Environmental Protection Agency for violating ozone standards are not the areas with the greatest warming trends. After accounting for environmental and geometric characteristics of the urban landscape, a negative relationship is found between ozone standard violations (by an urban center) and a measure for the urban area's temperature. The simultaneous system of equations also suggests that industrial firms located in these centers employ lobbyists (successfully) to minimize the degree of an EPA citation. Much of the evidence adds some support to the theory of economic regulation, the capture theory of regulation, and the rent seeking model in the public choice literature.
Publication Title
American Journal of Economics and Sociology
Volume
53
Issue
4
First Page
403
Last Page
414
Recommended Citation
Mixon, F. G.
(1994). What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of the Urban Heat Island Phenomenon. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 53(4), 403-414.
Available at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/6574