Union Membership, Economic Rents, and Migration Behavior
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-1-1990
Department
Political Science, International Development, and International Affairs
Abstract
This study represents an extension of the human capital paradigm as it relates to an individual’s decision to migrate. It differs from previous studies by incorporating union membership, a labor market variable, into the model. In effect, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 granted a monopoly bargaining position to unions. The theoretical implication of a union’s monopoly bargaining position is that union wage levels will increase relative to nonunion wages. The increase of relative wages results in union membership granting a property right that possesses positive net present value and hence reduces an employed union member’s probability of migrating. Additionally, the supra-competitive remuneration of union members results in a surplus of labor supplied to union firms. Employers respond by using quality screening to hire workers from the larger labor pool. As a result, unemployed union members will on average possess higher levels of human capital, which will increase their probability of migrating above that of their unemployed nonunion cohorts.
Publication Title
Journal of Labor Research
Volume
11
Issue
3
First Page
347
Last Page
355
Recommended Citation
Goss, E.,
Paul, C.
(1990). Union Membership, Economic Rents, and Migration Behavior. Journal of Labor Research, 11(3), 347-355.
Available at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/7393